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Governance Formation in a Post-Industrial European City: The Case of Turin

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Table of Contents

Introduction

This is a research about urban politics and, specifically, about the form politics has taken in a certain city to pursue a strategy of recovery and reconstruction, after a major crisis had undermined its previous development model. The city in question is Turin, the former Italian industrial powerhouse, and the moment is the beginning of the 1990s, when, after more than a decade of crisis of the Fordist development model, the city had to reinvent new strategies of growth, readapting the functioning of its political framework.

In 1993, a new municipal government was elected in Turin, led by Mayor Valentino Castellani. Under his leadership, the local government of the 1990s would drive the city's recovery process, centred on physical and infrastructural redevelopment, research, touristic, and cultural investments. What, however, stood out of such a recovery process is the governance practice that emerged in those years (Bobbio, Dente, Spada, 2005; Dente and Melloni, 2005; Pinson, 2002 a & b; Power *et al*., 2010), reframing the local political process as a participative, incremental activity, resting on the involvement of civil society, non-political elements in the process of agenda setting. Between 1998 and 2000, the elaboration of a Strategic Plan would formalise norms and practices of Turin's local governance: this would be a pluralist type of governance where, because of mutual resource interdependencies, a variety of actors – academia, banking foundations, third sector organisations, labour unions, local constructors – would cooperate with public authorities in devising the city's strategy for recovery. Within this context, local political institutions would have a chief role in steering the restructuring of the local political process, in stimulating the participation and cooperation of civil society actors, in supervising the implementation of the recovery agenda, and in initiating the proper phase of strategic planning (consisting of the elaboration of the Strategic Plan). Turin's governance coalition, therefore, would be pivotal in overseeing Turin's recovery process, which brought a formerly Fordist city to rediscover, in the first decade of the 2000s, its cultural, touristic, and academic vocations: the 2006 Winter Olympics, held in the city, would symbolically seal the transformations of those years.

Such a transformation is quite striking especially if we consider what the city's political circumstances were before 1993. Until the end of the 1970s, Turin was a quintessential 'one company town', where FIAT automobile company had played a decisive role, not only in driving the city's post-war expansion, but in shaping it into a typical Fordist manufacturing centre. Because of this, the two main actors that would interact with the local political sphere would, indeed, be FIAT and labour unions. The relationships these two actors would entertain with political actors would, however, was not one of negotiation and cooperation: FIAT's overwhelming power position entailed that its corporate strategies would impact on the whole city, meaning it could *de facto* unilaterally make decisions affecting the entire local community (Castagnoli, 1998; Pinson, 2002a); further, it would also influence politics through soft power (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; Tranfaglia, 1987, 1999). Labour unions, on the other hand, were the main actor, on labour's side, in charge of industrial relations, while left-wing (the Communists in particular) political parties would focus on policy and essentially

transferring the Unions' claims to the political arena. FIAT's overwhelming role would thus heavily condition the character of the local political sphere; further, because of the Italian dominant post-war political framework, Turin's politics was dominated by parties. These factors would result in an urban political context that was rather weak and insulated from the local civil society, and at the same time little autonomous from the decisions of the main economic actor, which the municipality had little power, or will, to counter (Bagnasco, 1986; Gallino, 1990; Pinson, 2002 a; Tranfaglia, 1987, 1999). Even when, during the 1980s, economic and productive patterns would start changing dramatically, the local political arena would remain highly ineffective, inefficient, and unstable, demonstrating a minimal 'governing capacity' (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; Bobbio, 1990).

What drives my interest in Turin's recovery process is therefore the following puzzle: why did a pluralist governance coalition emerge in a formerly manufacturing, one company town, whose previous political context was characterized by little autonomy, instability, and ineffectiveness? The main factors that can be identified to explain the emergence of Turin's governance are the following: 1), the socio-economic transformations of the 1980s have underpinned the emergence of a phase of ideational innovation, where local actors have started to reflect upon the city's condition and its possible paths to recovery; the local political framework, however, would prove too great an obstacle for any significant change to occur in this phase. 2) Between 1990 and 1993, a series of endogenous and exogenous events, concerning international geo-political and ideological transformations, national institutional reforms, and political scandals, would de-structure the previous institutional framework, opening a series of windows of opportunity for local actors to redefine the local political scene; 3) after this three-year period of major institutional change, individual agency, coordinative response to institutional fragmentation, and isomorphic pressures would be the main mechanisms leading to the emergence of Turin's local governance coalition. It is these processes that would underpin the redefinition of Turin's local political framework which, in turn, would sustain the city's recovery effort. Analysing these processes and uncovering the mechanisms that brought them about is the focus of my research.

By highlighting how Turin's reconstruction was favoured by the restructuring of the local political arena, this work contends that 'politics matters' in affecting urban fortunes, although it by no means denies the major importance of economic factors. For sure, it is processes of globalisation and economic restructuring that, starting from the 1970s, have fatally undermined the Fordist-Keynesian development model that had hitherto sustained growth in the West. Traditional manufacturing cities, which had expanded greatly precisely by implementing the Fordist production process, were then then heavily hit by these transformations: high unemployment rates, underdeveloped tertiary sectors, population decline, and reduced wealth levels would affect many European and North American industrial centres.

If the decline of manufacturing cities was chiefly owed to economic transformations, however, their reconstruction and relaunch was often made possible by the initiative of political actors. In a world where

the political and economic realms, although strongly interdependent, keep on wrestling to prevail over the other, the current one appears as a phase in which the economic sphere predominates over the political one (Pierre, 2011). This, however, does not imply there is no scope for autonomous political choice in urban contexts (Mollenkopf, 1983; Stone, 1989; Le Galès, 2002), nor that things have always been like this, or that they need to remain the same in the future. Both economic and political factors are, I contend, paramount for the prosperity of urban environments and the latter still retains some leeway as to strategic and development choices. What I do counter is not so much the role of economic forces *per se*, by far, but the deterministic qualities certain authors (Harvey, 1989; Castells, 1996; Sassen, 1991; Brenner, 2004) seem to attribute to these, and the consequent hypotheses of convergence they uphold. The main reason for this is that the pressure that sweeping economic processes exercise on cities is mediated by the presence of particular institutional frameworks, local administrative contexts, and national and cultural legacies. This does not mean certain trends are not observable across different areas of the world, but that they unfold differently across space because of the specific interaction that obtains between sweeping global dynamics and local contexts (Le Galès, 2002).

Roughly in the last three decades, then, most of the academic literature, as well as political and institutional actors, has employed the concept of urban governance[1] when referring to city politics. The notion of governance has then become mainstream in political and academic discourse and, although it is surrounded by a certain degree of vagueness (Obeng-Odom, 2012; Rhodes, 2007; Keating, 2013), the idea underpinning its use is rather simple: the actors and organisations that participate to the urban political process, and the arenas where this unfolds, are not limited to elected politicians, bureaucrats, and the formal institutions of local government (Da Cruz et al., 2019; Pierre, 2011). The idea of urban governance, very generally, depicts the political process as involving the cooperation of a variety of actors, including non-political, societal players; further, it shifts attention from formalised government structures and hierarchical procedures, to focus instead on informal, uncodified decision-making processes and practices (Pierre, 2011; Bellamy and Palumbo, 2010). The working definition of governance that I will employ throughout my work, then, reads as follows: "Governance refers to the development of [decision-making practices][2] in which boundaries between and within public and private sector have become blurred. The essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on the recourse to the authority and sanctions of government (Stoker, 1998, p. 17)."

A recurrent motive that can be found in the urban governance literature is that, in recent years, there has been a 'shift from government to governance' (John, 2001; Bellamy and Palumbo, 2010). Such a

[1] Urban governance is but one type of governance. The concept has been applied to a variety of spheres of human activity (Rhodes, 2007; Kjaer, 2004). As my research focuses on urban politics, however, it is to urban governance that I will refer throughout my work.

[2] The actual definition provided by Stoker reads 'governance styles' rather than 'decision-making practices.' I, however, preferred not to include in the definition the very term to be defined.

catchphrase has then been criticized by several authors (Pierre, 2011; Pierre and Peters, 2012), mainly on two grounds. First to be criticized was the idea that governance is some sort of new trend that only emerged in the last two decades of the XX century: the tendency of governments, local or other, to rely upon, interact, and negotiate with societal actors to shape the policy-making process is arguably as old as cities themselves. Surely, different epochs and different territorial settings have stimulated the emergence of different types of governance, and the specific governance practices that have developed throughout the last three decades certainly contain elements of novelty that can for sure be connected to the institutional characteristics of our era; yet, as many authors hold, the novelty is not governance, which on the contrary is quite an old practice: what has changed is the 'role of government in governance' (Pierre and Peters, 2012; Pierre, 2011, p. 19). This leads to the second ground for critique: the fact that government, in our case local government, still exists and still matters, even though its role may recently have changed. It is true that, in most Western European cities, recent reform has brought in novel organizational arrangements – public-private partnerships, development agencies (Pichierri, 2011**;** Le Galès, 2002; Brenner, 2004), etc. – and that these have tended to blur the boundaries between public authorities and private and third sector organizations (Stoker, 1998). Local governments, nonetheless, remain central, among other reasons, because they are still the privileged path ordinary citizens have at their disposal to have a bearing on municipal politics, as well as the chief mechanism of democratic accountability (Pierre, 2011, p. 15-16). The last point is central, for "holding informal networks or partnerships to political account is not an option, since they were never elected in the first place (*ibid*.)." Local political institutions, therefore, "remain critical to democratic governance at the urban level (*ibid*.)." Furthermore, the very public-private partnership and informal networks that have recently characterized city politics did not appear out of nowhere, but were, most of the time, the result of purposive decisions taken at government level, both local and national. In sum, the concept of governance is particularly apt to describe a (local, in this case) political process that relies on public-private interactions and cooperation, several forms of which – public-private partnerships, contracting-out, private involvement in service delivery – are surely proliferating today; it should not be seen, however, as a novel phenomenon that has only emerged in recent years.

In Turin, the redefinition of the local political framework indeed consisted in the emergence of a governance coalition (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; Bobbio, Dente, Spada, 2005; Dente and Coletti, 2011; Scamuzzi, 2005): inquiring into why such a governance coalition emerged in the 1990s is the overarching objective of my research. To carry out my research, I will rely on the theoretical and methodological perspective of neo-institutionalism, which has become one of the main research paradigms employed in the social sciences in the last decades. Neo-institutional scholars view institutions as both traditional organizations and as systems of norms, values, and meanings (Pierre, 2011; Sorensen and Torfing, 2007; Schmidt, 2006); both understandings of institutions, then, are viewed as paramount factors in shaping social and political action. Despite its extensive deployment in various fields of political science, neo-

institutionalism has been little applied to urban political research (Pierre, 2011): I contend, nonetheless, that neo-institutionalism amounts to an appropriate lens to deal with city politics, mainly because of the two meanings of institutions it contemplates. The underlying assumption is that these two meanings of institutions interact between them, so that organizations become means to convey social norms, whereas social norms can become 'institutionalised' (Pierre, 2011, p. 6). Both understandings, I hold, are crucial to grasp the process of governance formation.

Understood as organizations, institutions matter greatly with respect to urban governance. First, because cities are part of nation-states (except for the few extant cases of city states) and are thus embedded within national institutional frameworks (Pierre, 2011; John, 2001). The institutional and administrative fabric of contemporary nation-states contribute decisively to defining the prerogatives of urban political actors and the perimeter of municipal action; moreover, national political cultures and the relationship between local and higher tiers of government (national, but also regional and, when present, provincial) are further elements that characterize urban politics (Page and Goldsmith, 1987). Together, all these factors add up to shape country-specific styles of urban governance. Second, because, as mentioned, the formal institutions of local government remain fundamental in determining the shape that urban governance may take in give settings.

Furthermore, as systems of meanings, values, and norms, institutions remain essential, as the cultural scripts, socio-economic fabrics and legacies, and routinized norms help uncover the frames of reference and the potential objectives of local governance systems. The economic factors upon which a city's prosperity depends, the social groups that are to be found therein, and their class, political and cultural identities, all contribute to defining the 'political culture' of a city, they underpin the character of local governance, and 'shape and constrain' (Thelen and Steinmo, 1991, p. 10) urban political debate and the city's political objectives**.** The form that a given system of urban governance may take, then, is the product of both proper organisations and of internalised values, routines, and norms.

Through neo-institutional theory, then, I set out to uncover the causal processes that have led to the emergence of Turin's governance coalition. Although several works (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; Bobbio, Dente, Spada, 2005; Dente and Coletti, 2011; Scamuzzi, 2005) have offered descriptive accounts of the city's governance structure, no systematic attempt has been made at tracing the causal process that has led to the formation of Turin's local governance network. Even when turning to the governance literature, very few works are found to have dealt with the theme of governance formation: general hypotheses point (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007), alternatively, to the consequences of institutional reform and organisational fragmentation in driving institutional entities to devise novel coordination patterns; to the role of isomorphic pressures that push groups to reproduce other, successful organisational structures; or, finally, to that of agency and the influence of ideas and discourse. These are the hypotheses that I wish to test throughout my

work; importantly, each of them can be associated with one of three[3] variants of neo-institutionalism, that are, respectively: historical institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, and discursive institutionalism (Scmidt, 2006, 2008). Because of the variety of elements that contribute to the shaping of urban governance, my claim is that only through an eclectic research design that employs a combination of these theories, can one obtain a satisfactory account of the reality of governance formation.

Originally, my intention was to carry out a comparative analysis among various former industrial European cities, but the Covid-19 outbreak has frustrated this initial comparative ambition, and the work now focuses solely on Turin. It has heuristic objectives as, considering the limited amount of works that have covered the theme of governance formation, I aim to provide some useful insights and refine hypotheses that could, potentially, be applied to other contexts. The reason why I chose Turin as case study is twofold. First, because there is a significant body of scholarly work that has focused on the city, meaning there is a significant amount of material available that has described the outcome the causes of which I want to explain. As mentioned above, it is indeed work on Turin's governance formation that is lacking. Second, as anticipated, because Turin has been, for a good part of the XX century, an apt example of manufacturing city, where the dominance of one single company – FIAT – has led observers to even define it as a 'one company town'. Like many cities of this kind, until the 1970s Turin's social structure was highly polarised, the working classes amounting to more than half of the working population; the tertiary sector was little developed, and all local activities revolved around automobile manufacturing. Reflecting such a social structure was a political context marked by the importance of Left-wing political formations[4]: the former Communist party and Labour unions. The strength and overwhelming position enjoyed by FIAT, however, would produce a peculiar political framework, one where political actors either sided, submissively, with the car company, or stood in outright opposition to it (Tranfaglia, 1987; 1999); as a result, the autonomy and strength of the local political sphere would always be limited, conditioned by the predominant presence of FIAT (Bagnasco, 1986; Gallino, 1990). The task of redefining and restructuring Turin's political arena, therefore, was no easy one: identifying the causes that have led to its formation, therefore, can be useful to elaborate hypotheses that can be applied to other urban contexts.

The thesis is divided in five chapters. Chapter 1 focuses on defining the problem and illustrating my research object. In doing so, I first go over the post-industrial transformations that affected European urban areas in roughly the last three decades of the XX century; I then introduce the case of Turin, arguing why it amounts to an adequate example of urban reconstruction; finally, I discuss the concept of governance. In chapter 2, I turn to the theoretical underpinnings of my work. After a brief literature review, four ideal types of urban governance are described, which I derived by modifying John Pierre's original typology; I then argue

[3] The fourth variant, rational choice institutionalism, I do not consider, for it rests on ontological assumptions that make it incompatible with the sociological variant (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Thelen, 1999; Sorensen and Torfing, 2007)
[4] Their weight in city politics would not however prevent other parties from governing the city.

in favour of approaching the theme of urban governance through the lenses of neo-institutional theory: in particular, I will deploy an eclectic approach, combining elements of historical, sociological, and discursive institutionalism. Chapter 3 focuses on the research strategy that I will adopt to conduct my inquiry, and illustrates the analytical framework, the methodology, research design and hypotheses, and provides reasons for my choice to adopt the case study method. Chapter 4 illustrates Turin before and after the reconstruction strategy was adopted: this helps me define the outcome that I want to explain, as well as the initial conditions from which the whole process took off.

Chapter 5 and 6 are, then, the empirical ones. In Chapter 5, I analyse the first two stages of the process of governance formation, starting from the dissolution of the previous institutional framework: in this first phase, elements of change of Turin's socio-economic fabric are emerging, but path dependent dynamics have 'locked in' previously established interaction patterns, preventing significant deviations from the status quo. In the second phase, a critical juncture intervenes, de-structuring previous frameworks and opening windows of opportunity for agency and political entrepreneurship to affect the subsequent institutional outcomes; here, actors that will then form the local governance system come together for the first time. Chapter 6 is then dedicated to the last two stages: first is that in which, through the electoral process, one possible coalition is selected. The last stage, then, is that in which the governance coalition is formed, through a combination of isomorphic pressures, learning processes, the use of discourse and individual agency. Conclusions will then wrap up the main findings, and discuss potential contributions of the research to the wider scholarly literature.

Chapter 1. Turin's governance in the European Context

Introduction

One recurring question in urban studies literature asks whether cities can now appropriately be viewed as distinct scales of politico, social and economic organization, and thus, more in general, as the new engines of politico-economic activity and dynamism (Le Galès, 2002; Pichierri, 2018). Various scholars (Sassen, 1991, Brenner, 2004) have argued that globalization did not eliminate territory but, on the contrary, has brought back to the fore the relevance of localities, in an epoch where larger political communities – nation-states – seem to be losing both regulatory and policy-making capacity and, consequently, legitimacy. Cities, and more in general local systems of production, social organization, and political articulation, are therefore viewed as emerging fundamental nodes within the globalized economy. Benjamin Barber (2013) for instance, in a rather provocative vein, argues that nation-states, encumbered by the principle of sovereignty and by the corollary idea of national interest, are today hardly capable of cooperation when it comes to deal, and possibly solve, problems that are global in scope. Cities and their administrations, on the other hand, being unencumbered by sovereignty and closer to their citizens, are used to cope with practical, daily problems, so that they are better positioned to cooperate, and face major issues with a pragmatic hand. What is sure is that, insofar as Western cities are concerned, the Fordist-Keynesian growth model that had sustained their expansion for the most part of the XX century has been supplanted by more indeterminate, erratic, and volatile dynamics that now characterize the international world order. The certainties associated with the previous framework have thus been superseded with uncertainties and question marks: some, like Barber, view this as an opportunity to redefine the role of urban polities and it is unquestionable certain cities have grown dramatically in these last four decades; in other cases, however, the changes that have occurred since the 1970s have hit certain cities hard, putting their administrations before a complicated task of reconstruction. This has been especially true for those European and North American cities that owed much of their fortunes to the Fordist big industry and that have, since, struggled to reinvent themselves.

I have decided, for these reasons, to focus my research on one former industrial city, Turin, which has suffered a swift decline between the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1990s, indeed due to deindustrialisation and changing economic paradigms. The city has, however, undertaken a reconstruction effort in the last decade of the XX century, which has been the object of various academic works; what most of them stress, apart from describing the concrete changes that took place in the city, is the pivotal role of the local political class in sustaining such a reconstruction. After years of ineffective and unstable local administrations, since 1993 a new city government operated an overhaul of the urban political framework, driving the structuring of a local governance system; if recovery was possible, many argue, it was because of

this political experiment. Although the notion of governance has been undoubtedly fashionable in recent years (Keating, 2013), there has been a considerable deal of confusion about its actual meaning and possible applications. While there seems to be a *prima facie* consensus on it being a non-formalised and non-hierarchical decision-making procedure, involving both public and private actors, the fact that it has been indiscriminately applied to corporate environments, international relations, the economy, and public policy (Rhodes, 2007), has surely not served the purposes of conceptual clarity.

In this first chapter, then, I will define the contours of my work and, eventually, define my research question. The first part of the chapter will thus be devoted to an brief overview of the history of European cities, with the aim of singling out those characteristic features that have led Patrick Le Galès (2002) to claim there exists a particular European city model; by the end of the section, I will then go over the social, economic and political transformations that have occurred starting from the 1970s, to illustrate a) the difficulties that certain cities, in particular former industrial cities, have had to face and b) the overall context within my analysis will unfold. In the second part of the chapter, I will introduce the case of Turin, as one example of a city that, after a phase of dramatic industrial decline, has succeeded in articulating a coherent recovery strategy; I will, especially, focus on the role of its governance structure in driving the reconstruction effort. In the third and last section, I will then turn to the concept of governance, I will specify the definition that I intend to refer to throughout my work, and I will then clarify which such a definition is appropriate to my case study, that of Turin. In this latter part, I will emphasise how one aspect of the governance literature has remained relatively underexplored, that is, that of the causes that lead to governance formation; it is from this literature gap that I will formulate my research question, which aims at investigating the process that led to the formation of Turin's governance structure. Conclusive remarks will then wrap up the chapter.

I. European cities: a historical overview

In his work *European Cities*, published in 2002, Patrick Le Galès put forward the thesis that a particular model of European city could be identified, one that set the European urban experience apart from those of other regions. Very briefly, the argument – framed within a neo-Weberian approach (Pichierri, 2018) – would maintain that Europe is characterized by an urban structure that has proved particularly resilient in the course of time, namely an urban network[5] that runs from Northern Italy to the Flanders, along the Rhine, and terminates in England. In Europe, urban density is high, cities are close to each other and often part of larger urban systems which, however, have by no means erased municipal identities that have sedimented for centuries, which make it possible to single out most European cities as 'local societies'. Within such framework, cities are further characterized by their medium size, generally smaller than their counterparts

[5] What Brunet (1989) had called the 'Blue Banana'.

in other parts of the world: with the exceptions of London and Paris, most European cities have populations ranging from 200,000 and 2 million, with only a handful surpassing this threshold.

European urban environments are further marked by their internal inclusiveness and cohesion: socio-economic segregation is contained, welfare structures and provision are extensive, the public sector still retains a major regulative and employment function; moreover, in the latter years of the XX century European cities would often display pluralist governance structures and influential mayors. In those very years, many European cities appeared to have refined their political economic skills (Pichierri, 2000; 2018): they would devise their own development strategies, competing among each other to attract investment, skills, great events, and landmark architecture. Against this background of inter-city competition, infrastructure and public utilities would acquire a major role in singling out a city as a suitable location for economic activity. Another peculiarity of this period, that is, the last decade of the XX century, is the influence of European institutions and the effects of Europeanization, which would decisively contribute to define the European city model. On the one hand, European funding schemes afforded cities a novel opportunity to obtain crucial additional resource to pursue given growth strategies; on the other, certain European institutions, such as the Committee of the Regions, would provide a new arena from where city leaders would successfully lobby European institutions to create EU programmes – such as Urban – directly targeting cities (Bagnasco and Castellani, 2013; Pichierri, 2018). This would help forge a sort of alliance between local leaders and European actors, helping legitimize each other *vis-à-vis* national states.

Two decades have gone by since *European cities* was published, and several changes have occurred in this time frame, leading Le Galès to critically reflect on his previous conclusions. In a recent essay[6], published in 2018, Le Galès wonders whether the events that have unfolded, especially after the EU's neo-liberal turn after 2000 (Le Galès, 2018, p. 220) and the 2008 financial crisis, have put the European city model into question: surely, the answer goes, certain tendencies may appear to have undermined elements of his older argument but, overall, the model holds. What seems to be potentially threatening the validity of the model is a process of differentiation among cities, whereby some are experiencing a renewed success (capitals like London and Paris, but also cities like Milan), while others, especially in Southern and Eastern Europe, are struggling to keep up. However, drawing on empirical material taken from other works, such as the 2016 on EU cities (EU Commission and UN Habitat, 2016), Le Galès shows how social cohesiveness still characterizes European cities which, notwithstanding financial hardships of the aftermath of 2008, keep displaying high levels of public expenditure, and a more comprehensive welfare structure; further, inter-urban competition has not prevented cooperation and networking dynamics to emerge among cities, which

[6] Le Galès, P. (2018) "Urban Political Economy Beyond Convergence: Robust but Differentiated Unequal European Cities", in Andreotti, Benassi, Kazepov (eds.) *Western Capitalism in Transition. Global Processes, Local Challenges*, Manchester, Manchester University Press.

amount to a further strength of the European context. In sum, although threatened, the model is still resisting.

From a theoretical perspective, the claim that European cities embody a distinct urban model, upheld in both works, amounts to a rejection of convergence hypotheses (Brenner, 2004; Castells, 1996; Sassen, 1991) that saw neo-liberalism as a powerful overarching dynamic pushing cities across the globe to look more and more alike. The differentiation dynamic described in Le Galès (2018) more recent work, moreover, is a further argument against convergence; in the previous research (Le Galès, 2002), instead, European distinctiveness was described as having deep roots, as it is in the course of long historical trajectory that several peculiar urban institutions have emerged. Since my work focuses on the emergence of urban governance structures in the 1990s, I am interested in highlighting the context that characterized that period; to do so, I will go over Le Galès' overview of European urban history, as illustrated in *European Cities* (2002), to then shed light on the transformations that occurred in the latter quarter of the XX century.

In the social sciences, one of the first major characterizations of European cities as distinct social and political formations is owed to Max Weber. In *The City* (1958), he analyses medieval and early modern European cities, where the economic and political elements, represented by the marketplace and the city's fortification, coexist. Here, economic interactions developed into a specific organizational pattern, the guild, which, coupled with the existence of a *quasi*-independent judicial system, sanctioned the emergence of a distinct type of urban social structure. On the political side, the very high degree of political autonomy enjoyed by such cities was ensured by the presence of an administrative entity where the *burghers* had a right to participate and, therefore, contribute to the decision-making process of the polity. Finally, the legal status of citizenship granted to residents, often associated with affiliation to a guild (Le Galès, 2002, p. 33), defined the city as a distinct type of society from that of the countryside, where the majority of Europeans of the time would live.

The evolution of cities as social and political entities throughout the middle ages is said to have benefitted from the overarching politico-institutional framework of the time. In an era of overlapping authorities – the Pope and the Emperor, the feudal lords, monastic orders – no one had a degree of sovereignty comparable to that of contemporary nation-states and, within the same territory, different sources of power and authority often coexisted (Zielonka, 2006). Against such a background, power was diffuse and weak, providing the conditions for socio-territorial political entities such as cities to claim autonomy from higher administrative tiers. The process was by no means swift, nor it was unilaterally pursued by homogeneous urban populations: on the contrary, cities were, since the tenth century, the arenas where the overlapping of authorities was arguably most manifest, as religious and feudal powers, different legal systems, rival corporations, or guilds, coexisted (Weber, 1958). The *burghers*, principally consisting of the city's merchant classes, created corporations and guilds to defend their interests and position *vis-à-vis* competing powers that were found, first and foremost, within city-walls themselves. Through time,

corporations of burghers gained access to city government, and acquired enough power to shape municipal institutions themselves, but again, this occurred through "alliances between these *coniurationes* and some other existing authorities and interests, and through a complex interplay of relationships with overlords (Le Galès, 2002, p. 41, italics in original)." For sure, medieval cities did not obtain their formal autonomy through usurpation: this was usually granted by stronger religious or political authorities, and came to shape the administrative institutions of municipalities in relation to the external socio-political environment (*ibid*.) At the same time, yet, the granting of municipal rights "strengthened the coherence of urban society in the face of other powers (*ibid*.)" Today, internal and external contexts are still quintessential in determining urban development: first, the internal dynamics of urban society, that contribute to the configuration of urban societies and to that of city power constellations; second, cities' relations with their external institutional environment, which is essential to understanding a city's potential for autonomous political action.

The period between the XV and the XIX century in Europe is that in which nation-states emerged, although at different paces and not necessarily following the same stages. By the end of the 1800s, nation-states had become the dominant form of political organization, at least in Europe, and through time, municipal autonomy was gradually, but relentlessly eroded. Cities were not, however, passive spectators of such a transformation, as the areas of Europe where their presence was denser, and their autonomy stronger, are the ones where states formed last. Charles Tilly (1975) and Stein Rokkan (Flora, 2002) have argued that the presence of a dense urban network, roughly running along the Rhine, from the Flanders to Northern Italy[7], has proven a formidable obstacle to state formation in this area of Europe. It is not by chance, therefore, that early nation-states emerged where cities were weaker and fewer, namely in the West, along the European Atlantic coast, in England, Spain and France. In these countries, cities would become involved in the process of state-formation as allies to the monarchy. Where cities were more powerful, on the other hand, they resisted state control for a longer time; eventually, between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, even the central urban belt of Europe gave way to state formation, albeit it was not large and centralized monarchies that formed here, but different, and often smaller, forms of polity: a federation of cities, essentially, in the Netherlands; regional states dominated by feudal princes in Germany – except for a few remaining Hansa cities; in Italy and the Flanders, instead, it would be foreign powers that took control of cities and their hinterlands. Although state formations had become the prominent organizational form in Europe, the relevance of cities changed, rather than declined; several cities thus morphed into administrative centres, but their merchant classes remained strong: alongside a market logic of organization, then, an administrative logic has emerged too (Le Galès, p. 51). The combination of these two organizing principles

[7] Some would include Southern England within such a network (Le Galès, 2002, p. 45). In any case, the European urban structure that emerged in the Middle Ages has survived the centuries, which has led Le Galès to emphasise its solidity over time.

ensured the stability and longevity of the European urban system: cities were no longer independent and autonomous, but states in part contributed to their strengthening (*ibid.).*

The industrial revolution and the liberal-democratic turn of the XIX century had the effect of further reinforcing the nation-state, while the shape and social structure of cities underwent major transformations. Labour demand attracted huge migration flows from the countryside to industrial cities, swelling their population: the new working classes would pack into squalid slums and would often locate close or within city centres, where factories would be located; when cities had a longer history and city centres were still cherished by the higher classes, the working classes tended instead to live in the peripheries. In both cases, trams and railways sustained the expansion of suburbs. Typical industrial cities would then feature all of these elements: factories, working class districts, urban and inter-urban transportation links and hubs, and expanding suburbs. Physical change was reflected in social change: the presence of large industrial firms meant that industrial cities were, first of all, workers' cities – in some cases, the working-class population would amount to more than half of the total city population, especially in Northern Europe. This novel social structure would lead to new forms of political and social organization: trade unions, mutual aid societies and social-democratic parties all emerged by the end of the XIX century. The medieval rank society had been replaced by a class society (Le Galès, 2002, p. 52-57). The social fabric of the industrial city, and the institutional developments that were brought with it, would characterize European societies well into the XX century, at least until the 1960s.

Since the 1970s, a number of major events has partially altered the 'structure of constraints and opportunities' within which European cities would find themselves. Before turning to this theme, however, some comments on the structure of the European urban system are in order. Since the 11th century, when cities emerged as major political actors within the continental scene, their fortunes have not followed a linear path: after the medieval 'golden age' of quasi-autonomous cities, the state building process significantly redefined their roles and functions; similarly, the advent of the industrial revolution and of political upheavals throughout the XIX century has once again reshaped their structure, as well as their relationship with other polities and among each other. By looking at population data of European cities through the centuries however, it is striking to note that the European urban hierarchy has remained remarkably stable over time; except for England, where the industrial revolution led to the structuring of a novel urban system[8], cities that rank high on the list have remained roughly the same over a long period. In a sense, a path dependent trajectory can be observed: major cities were those best positioned to adapt and benefit from socio-economic, technological, and political developments. This point highlights adaptability, rather than resistance to change, and, of course, there have been exceptions to this general pattern: cities like Berlin, Madrid and, to a much lesser extent, Turin, have become significant only since the modern era; of the Italian

[8] Until then, England was essentially a rural country, with no significant cities outside of London.

maritime republics, only Genoa and Venice have maintained their position throughout the centuries. All in all, however, the general picture remains true, as the figure (figure 1) below shows. The stability and longevity of the European urban system, as noted by Le Galès (2002, p. 66), is one[9] of the distinctive feature**s** of European cities.

Table 1. European cities by population - thousands (1750-1950)

	1750		1850		1950	
Rank	City	Population	City	Population	City	Population
1	London	676	London	2,320	London	8,860
2	Paris	560	Paris	1,314	Paris	5,900
3	Naples	324	S Petersburg	502	Moscow	5,100
4	Amsterdam	219	Berlin	446	Ruhr	4,900
5	Lisbon	213	Vienna	426	Berlin	3,707
6	Vienna	169	Liverpool	422	Leningrad	2,700
7	Moscow	161	Naples	416	Manchester	2,382
8	Venice	158	Manchester	412	Birmingham	2,196
9	Rome	157	Moscow	373	Vienna	1,755
10	S Petersburg	138	Glasgow	346	Rome	1,665
11	Dublin	125	Birmingham	294	Hamburg	1,580
12	Palermo	124	Dublin	263	Madrid	1,527
13	Madrid	123	Madrid	263	Budapest	1,500
14	Milan	123	Lisbon	257	Barcelona	1,425
15	Lyon	115	Lyon	254	Milan	1,400
16	Berlin	113	Amsterdam	225	Glasgow	1,320
17	Hamburg	90	Brussels	208	Liverpool	1,260
18	Marseilles	88	Edinburgh	194	Naples	1,210
19	Rouen	88	Hamburg	193	Leeds	1,164
20	Copenhagen	79	Marseilles	193	Copenhagen	1,150
21	Florence	74	Milan	193	Athens	1,140
22	Genoa	72	Leeds	184	Bucharest	1,100
23	Granada	70	Palermo	182	Katowice	977
24	Barcelona	70	Rome	170	Brussels	964
25	Seville	68	Barcelona	167	Amsterdam	940

[9] The other distinctive features were mentioned at the beginning of this section.

26	Bologna	66	Warsaw	163	Prague	938
27	Bordeaux	64	Budapest	156	Stockholm	889
28	Turin	60	Bristol	150	Lisbon	885
29	Valencia	60	Sheffield	143	Munich	870
30	Cadiz	60	Bordeaux	142	Newcastle	830
31	Stockholm	60	Venice	141	Rotterdam	803
32	Dresden	60	Turin	138	Warsaw	803
33	Prague	58	Copenhagen	135	Kiev	800
34	Brussels	55	Munich	125	Kharkov	730
35	Edinburgh	55	Prague	117	Sheffield	730
36	Lille	54	Breslau	114	Turin	725
37	Cork	53	Wolverhampton	112	Cologne	692
38	Breslau	52	Newcastle	111	Frankfurt	680
39	Königsberg	52	Valencia	110	Genoa	676
40	Leyden	50	Ghent	108	Lodz	675

Source: (Le Galès, 2002)

What should have emerged from this overview is that a city's relationship with external institutional frameworks is among the fundamental factors affecting a city's role, and its internal social and political structure; if, once, European cities were quasi-autonomous polities, then the development of nation states gradually integrated them into national societies and states (Le Galès, 2002, p. 70), while the changes of the last forty years have the potential of altering their 'structure of constraints and opportunities' once again. At the same time, the stability of the European urban system tells us that a city's capacity to adapt to changing external circumstances also depends on the resources that, within that same city, have been accumulated through time (*idem*, p. 68-69). The concentration of industry and economic activity within European major cities was not a mere mechanical occurrence: urban actors played a decisive role in sustaining urban transformation. Of course, the pattern is not universal, there are exceptions to it and the fortunes of a single city may have changed so many times that trying to single out some clear trajectories is not straightforward. On the contrary, this very fact should highlight that what a city is in a specific moment in time is the result of a complex interplay of external dynamics and internal resources. The balance between these two dimensions is seldom fixed: at times, it may appear that external pressures are overwhelming – think of Venice: a city that built its fortunes on trade with the East and on its millenary independence, almost inevitably suffered a fatal blow when trade routes drifted away towards the Atlantic and independence was lost. On the other hand, cities that found themselves at the European periphery at the end of the XIX century – Milan,

Barcelona, Turin – have been able to transform and modernize because of the dynamism of their economic, social, and political élites.

Looking at cities today, what we see is not the result of a teleological process, but a mere stage in a constantly evolving dynamic. In the previous section, we have seen how European cities went from being quasi-autonomous social and political entities to becoming integrated within wider political structures, namely nation-states. This has been a long and complex process, which arguably reached its peak in the 1960s; starting in the 1970s, however, circumstances seem to have been changing once again; how these changing circumstances have impacted on cities is the focus of the following section.

I.I European cities: the end of Fordism

The oil crisis of 1973 is viewed by many as the watershed between the post-war economic boom, still chiefly structured around the Fordist production model and the Keynesian economic paradigm, and a new era, marked by uncertainty, volatility and increasing inequalities. The increase in raw materials' prices caused a first wave of layoffs in big manufacturing enterprises; by the end of the same decade, technological innovation led to the restructuring of industrial productive systems that, by incorporating automation, would require less manpower. In the same years, barriers to international trade were gradually lifted, thus redefining the rules of the game for enterprises, up until then shielded by state borders; enterprises would then start relocating production where labour costs were lower. Further economic liberalization stimulated greater international mobility of capitals, while nation-states, encountering increasing fiscal difficulties, would often pursue a twofold strategy: that of privatizing public industries and that of state restructuring, i.e., administrative reform. By 1993, when the EU was created, the rules of the international economic system had been significantly rewritten, nation-states' administrative frameworks had been reformed, and the post-war international geo-political order changed dramatically. I will now look at how, in turn, these processes have impacted on European cities.

I.II Economic restructuring

First, industrial and economic restructuring. Looking at the impact they have on major manufacturing firms, these two processes can be understood as intertwined: technological innovation has stimulated a re-organization of the productive system that reduced the need for human labour, which has been in part substituted by automation. At the same time, economic de-regulation and market liberalization have pushed firms to rethink their market strategies, often leading to de-localization, international mergers and further layoffs. Deindustrialization and manufacturing unemployment both derive from these two processes combined. Some further contend these two processes have resulted in an exponential increase in the volume

of international commerce starting from the late 1970s (Le Galès, 2002, p. 152;), which, coupled with a diminished capacity on the part of the state to contain market shocks, has forced firms to reorganize in order to survive within the international trading system. Others, by contrast, maintain that such an increase has been constant since the end of the second world war (Veltz, 2000, p. 38-39; Pierre, 2011), implying that globalized trade can hardly be considered a novelty of the 1980s, but has been a permanent feature of capitalist economies, at least since the second half of the XX century. What has changed dramatically, on the other hand, is the relevance of financial globalization and direct international investment flows; these have grown much faster, and much more, than the volume of either international trade or global production (Veltz, 2000, p. 38-39; Sassen, 1991). There is surely more agreement on the latter cause of change (global finance and investment) than on the former (global trade), but it is not my focus to dwell on this debate; what matters here is how these trends have altered the playing field of within which firms, and in particular mass production, manufacturing firms, operate. National economies, rather enclosed and stable[10] up until the 1970s, would now be exposed to heightened international competition, and more sensitive to market fluctuations: "The evident result of this transformation is that major firms – just like minor ones – now have to practice competition in terms both of costs and differentiation (Vetlz, 2000, p. 39)." In sum, economic, as well as productive, restructuring has had the effect of requiring, on the part of major firms, and in particular of Fordist mass production ones, a marked "organizational and operational overhaul (*ibid*.)." These transformations, in turn, have had a profound impact on cities, but the impact has been different depending on the type of city that is considered.

Saskia Sassen (1991) has noted how the banking and financial sectors, among those that have grown the most since the 1980s, whilst could virtually locate anywhere, in reality have an instrumental interest in establishing their headquarters in a handful of 'global cities', where they can harness agglomeration economies and a greater presence of producer service firms (consulting, accountancy, etc.). Although her analysis focused on three global metropolises – New York, London and Tokyo – similar patterns, if any at a smaller scale, can be observed for a number of Europe's major cities: Paris, obviously, Frankfurt, Milan, Madrid and Barcelona, and probably a few more. Despite the benefits of such trends are unevenly distributed among their populations, these cities have all, generally, indeed grown in the past two to three decades, and are viewed by many as the winners of the recent transformations.

Among medium-sized cities, the effects of such transformations have had a varying impact depending on their pre-existing economic base. Industrial cities have had the hardest time in coping with economic restructuring, and several of them are still in hardships. Up until the 1960s, the growth of these urban areas was owed to the Fordist big industry, which in time had attracted a huge inflow of labour that ended up swelling the ranks of the local working class; consequently, a highly polarized social structure emerged, where

[10] Protected as they were by a mixture of "transport costs, national distribution networks and unchanging consumer patterns (Veltz, 2000, p. 39)," and spatial redistributive policies (Brenner, 2004).

middle- and working classes were markedly distinct (Oberti, 2000, p. 99-101), each with its habits, lifestyle, value system, and, crucially, political leaning. Such a division would moreover be reflected in the local citizenry's residential patterns, where working class districts would be separate from those of the bourgeoisie, and easily identifiable. Shared labour conditions reinforced the class identity of workers, and their status would find "strong representation across a powerful political and trade union structure (*ibid*.)." As economic restructuring led to deindustrialization, such a social structure would be fatally undermined: layoffs caused rising unemployment levels, plants were abandoned, and, in cities where the service sector was weak, local responses generally confined themselves to requiring state assistance, incapable of reorganizing the socio-economic fabric on their own scarce means. Furthermore, finding new employment for the vastly unskilled working classes of the Fordist era would be a daunting task, as a new, more dynamic, flexible and knowledge-oriented labour market was taking shape (Mingione, 2002). Among the places in direst need for resources, both public and private, industrial cities would be the least attractive to investment, entering a vicious circle that would require a massive effort to break (Pierre, 2011). Yet, some former industrial cities have managed to reconvert, while others remain entangled in severe problems.

Non-industrial, medium-sized cities would instead be in a more favourable position from which to cope with change. These were cities where industry might have been present, but not to the same extent as in Fordist ones, meaning their economies and social fabrics were not entirely dependent on industrial production; often, tertiary activities, either public or private, would be rather developed, sustaining quite a strong local middle-class, characterized by a marked local identity and involvement in city affairs (Oberti, 2000, p. 101-102), which could furthermore rely on a greater resource endowment. Several of these cities were thus able to exploit new, expanding economic sectors: higher research, high-tech industry, ICT, culture, and leisure, etc.

Interestingly, a similar process seems to have unfolded in the US, although significant differences set the American case apart. Older US industrial cities of the rust belt and the north east have declined starting in the 1970s; of these, some have managed to come back – Boston, San Francisco – while others have not yet found a way to successfully reconstruct – Detroit. On the other hand, newer, non-industrial cities of the South-West – Phoenix, Southern California, Texas – are the ones that have grown the most in the post-industrial era (Mollenkopf, 1983). In Europe, however, a stronger welfare state has mediated and softened the pitfalls of deindustrialization, so that very few of Europe's industrial cities has experienced a crisis as dire as that of Detroit[11]. At the same time, few, if any, European cities have grown as much as the cities of the American South-West: this again depends on different contextual elements, as for instance a different labour market dynamic, which is much less mobile in Europe than in the US.

[11] By the 1950s, Detroit had almost 2 million inhabitants; today, they are around 700,000. In Europe, only older industrial English cities have suffered a similar decline in terms of population, Glasgow being the best example – although several of them have by now recovered.

I.III Rescaling

A second issue that is central in thinking about cities concerns rescaling. Rescaling "refers to the migration of economic, social, and political systems of action and of regulation to new spatial levels, above, below and across the nation-state (Keating, 2013, p. 6)." If, until the 1970s, the nation-state had been the principal scale of reference for social, economic and political processes, this is now changing: international organizations and regional parties are emblematic of how new spheres of social action, both supra- and sub-state, are developing. To inquire into these trends, it is essential to look at how the nation-state is changing.

From the end of the second World War until the 1970s, the interaction between cities and nation-states had crystallized around what several authors have defined as centre-periphery paradigm. The state-building literature (Flora, 2002; Bartolini, 2005) has long argued that the process of nation-state formation could be roughly understood as a spreading of functions, norms and institutions from the centre to the periphery of political communities, so that territories that were once highly differentiated would gradually become culturally homogeneous. By the end of the process, it is argued that functional differentiation has superseded territorial differentiation, typical of pre-industrial societies (Flora, 2002). In the thirty years after 1945, a high degree of coincidence between functional and cultural borders of national communities had been achieved (Flora, 2002; Bartolini, 2005). Post-war European cities were chiefly recipients of national policies; the administrative sub-divisions of states – mainly provinces and municipalities, regions would come later – were viewed as instrumental in facilitating service provision, and served as means for territorial management (Keating, 2013**;** Le Galès, 2002; Harvey, 1989; Brenner, 2004). Politics and policy were fundamentally national, and the relation between central government and sub-state units was mainly hierarchical. Furthermore, territorial policies of the state, when adopted, had the goal of evening out socio-economic inequalities to be found in specific areas of a country, following a pattern where the centre was seen as responsible for homogenizing living conditions across the national community. These policies, thus, mainly targeted poorer and less developed regions, and came to define a type of territorial-political intervention that would be known as 'spatial Keynesianism'. In essence, in those thirty years, the scale of reference was national, and cities would be fully integrated within national economic systems. National economies were indeed rather protected by state borders, and capital and labour would tend to principally move within the national space: "Welfare developed as an expression of national class compromise, in conditions in which neither capital nor labour could escape the state boundaries (Keating, 2013, p. 33)**."**

After the 1970s, such a model started to change. The processes of economic restructuring described above pushed towards economic rescaling: the national dimension of economic systems was gradually being supplemented by a global one. Importantly, this should not be read as the end of the national scale, and neither as the clear emergence of a single global economic space: several economic actors still operate within

national contexts, although globalization dynamics have surely reinforced the interdependence of national economies, adding a layer of complexity to the whole system.

At the same time, and in part as a response to the problems of deindustrialization and a diminished fiscal capacity on the part of the state – which would lead to what scholars have defined as 'welfare state retrenchment' – central governments have gradually abandoned territorial redistributive policies, i.e., spatial Keynesianism. Today sub-national units are viewed as actors capable of autonomous politico-economic action: growth strategies, therefore, would not be superimposed from above, but would now be sustained by *ad hoc*, specific policy instruments conceived to stimulate development from below (Brenner, 2004, p. 3-5). Between the 1970s and 1980s, politico-institutional rescaling thus materialized in the form of administrative decentralization strategies, in Italy and France for instance, specifically through the institution of regions. Of course, sub-national administrative units had existed at least since the end of the XIX century, if not longer, but as noted before, these were above all viewed as instruments to facilitate territorial management, which would favour central control of the periphery while providing localities with a means to interact with the state (Keating, 2013). The decentralization process that started in the 1970s, albeit gradual, was accompanied instead by a devolution of competences[12] to sub-national administrative tiers; this move was furthermore underpinned by a change in policy approach, whereby different territories were now expected to exploit their particular socio-economic advantages to sustain their growth, in a shift from a policy of territorial equalization towards one of intra-national competition (Le Galès, 2002; Keating, 2013; Brenner, 2004). As a result, today different spheres of social activity are intertwined, but they have not been superseded by a new, single scale, and are interdependent. As Brenner (2004, p. 3-4) puts it: "The erosion of spatial Keynesianism has not generated a unidirectional process of Europeanization, decentralization, regionalization, or localization, in which a single scale—be it European, regional, or local—is replacing the national scale as the primary level of political-economic coordination. We are witnessing, rather, a wide-ranging recalibration of scalar hierarchies and inter-scalar relations throughout the state apparatus as a whole, at once on supranational, national, regional, and urban scales." Different scales, thus, are not separate, but 'interlocking' (Brenner, 2004; Le Galès, 2002, p. 173).

These rescaling processes have been interpreted differently by different strands of the literature. According to Marxists, these changes are intrinsic to the capitalist system, and merely represent a further stage of capitalist development (Brenner, 2004); the state, the argument goes, has actively contributed to implement these transformations, by producing 'new spaces'[13] where novel forms of capitalism, once abandoned the previous Fordist phase, could thrive (Brenner, 2004). Non-Marxist authors like Le Galès take

[12] Although this would not correspond to a similar devolution of fiscal capacities and resources to localities (Brenner, 2004).

[13] This argument, best illustrated by Brenner (2004), owes a great deal to Harvey's idea that capitalism is always in need for a particular 'spatial fix' (Harvey, 1985, p. 146), one that is however never permanent, but is an instance of the creative-destructive dialectic of the capitalist economy.

a different perspective, in that, while conceding that market forces have gained the upper hand since the 1980s, they reject Marxists' determinism, arguing that economic dynamics interact with "political, social, and cultural logics that do not inevitably allow themselves to be governed by market forces (Le Galès, 2002, p. 171)." Particular histories, cultural frameworks, and political traditions thus militate against determinism and convergence, as Le Galès' European city model demonstrates.

I.IV Europeanization

A final aspect of political and economic rescaling, which is also treated as a separate theme, concerns Europeanization. What I am concerned about here is how the functioning of this supranational polity is affecting state structures and cities. In this respect, Scharpf (2009) has described the EU as a regulatory agency: indeed, the EU is competent in matters of economic regulation, as well as in legal production, whereas welfare provision, the articulation of the political sphere, and the paramount *locus* within which identities and allegiances are formed, remains the nation-state. Bartolini (2005) has for instance argued that the disjunction of these functions, once all in the hands of the state, is the principal cause of the EU's legitimacy deficit, which is also reflected at the national level: a supranational economic and juridical space is being created, without there being a corresponding supranational space for the articulation of politics and identities.

For sure, the EU has been redrawing the borders of legitimate state activity, by contributing to redefine state competences and objectives, thus fuelling frictions between European and national institutions; surely "the institutionalization of European governance is generating tensions with long institutionalized national spaces for regulating public policy (Le Galès, 2002, p. 85)." One further tendency is that the effects of Europeanization are blurred with those of globalization (*idem*, p. 86): heightened international competition, greater capital mobility, proliferation of non-state actors, etc. All of this is having a major impact over the shape of nation-states that make up the Union. At the same time, however, Europeanization has offered a new set of opportunities for state, sub-state and non-state actors, in political and economic terms: some have found in Brussels an ally to voice their claims, others have gained access to new funding channels, EU citizens can now move and reside freely across Member States, etc. These new structure of constraints and opportunities is clearly having a significant impact on cities too.

First of all, "As a result of the institutionalization of Europe, the category European city makes greater political sense. Europeanization provides new structure of constraints and opportunities: the EU sets new parameters within which urban governance modes may be organized and are encouraged (Le Galès, 2002, p. 96)."

In essence, Europeanization contributed to making cities (and regions) political actors in their own right, within the EU policy process. This happened through a series of steps that made it possible for cities to

directly interact with, and demand funds to, Brussels, bypassing the nation-state. This process of 'legitimizing' cities and regions as political actors had, in turn, the opposite effect of legitimizing EU institutions, and the Commission in particular, to the eyes of European local polities (Le Galès, 2002, p. 99-100). This came to be not only because certain policies were particularly beneficial to cities, but also because city representatives would be involved in the European policy process. The Committee of the Regions, although technically only a consultative body, provided cities (and regions) with formal representation in Brussels and with a major possibility to lobby the Commission, or the Parliament, to voice their interests and claims. International inter-city networks, which the EU strongly supported, enhanced the opportunities for cities to cooperate among themselves, to learn from best practices, and offered a further platform from which to lobby EU institutions. Europeanization, in sum, had a twofold effect: first, urban issues find room within the European policy process and, second, cities and regions reinforced their role as political actors.

What is sure is that "this set of transformations has produced the current phase of 'urban transition', characterised by changes in the urban economic base, employment, demographic and social composition, in the forms of representation and institutional government and, parallel to these, in the spatial forms of urbanisation (Dematteis, 2000, p. 55)." So, in light of these changes, has the European urban structure changed? As shown at the beginning of this chapter, Le Galès (2018) maintains the European model and its urban structure resist, although increasing differentiation among cities may threaten it in the long run. On the one hand, major European cities – Paris and London, Berlin, Munich and Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Milan and Rome, Lyon, Barcelona and Madrid, Copenhagen, Brussels, and Manchester, and a few more – tend to adapt and maintain their positions at the top of continental urban hierarchies. It is, on the other hand, small- and medium-sized cities whose future appears more uncertain: as noted above, some medium sized cities, especially non-industrial ones, seem to have benefited and grown from recent transformations; industrial cities, by contrast, have suffered the most. My interest in this category of cities derives from two main reasons**:** given that is generally agreed that European urban areas tend to be smaller than their non-European counterparts, and that the majority of Europeans still lives in these settlements, rather than in gigantic megalopolises, one first question concerns whether this type of urban form can survive, or whether it will be superseded by a different pattern. Second, the specific interest on middle sized, *industrial* or *post-industrial* cities depends on them having been the centres of European growth for more or less a century, and having reinforced and in part updated the older European urban system; the question is therefore whether these cities will be capable of reinventing themselves, of maintaining their relevance in a changing institutional context, or whether their heyday has been a mere parenthesis, and they are destined to decline even further.

II. Recovery of a former industrial city: the case of Turin

In the Western world, then, the cities that have arguably been hardest hit by the process of economic restructuring were industrial cities. These were cities that expanded and grew around the Fordist production system, which, between the XIX and XX centuries, had defined their overall social and economic structure. Since economic restructuring has impacted, among other things, on the industrial productive framework of the Fordist era, marking its sunset, it should then come as no surprise that these changes would also undermine the social fabric that had sustained the Fordist phase of development. Specifically, productive reorganization based on automation, plant de-localisation and cost containment connected to heightened international competition would result in massive manufacturing unemployment rates. As manufacturing would employ, in certain cases, around half of the active population of industrial cities (Le Galès, 2002; Oberti, 2000), the implications of such dynamics for their internal social structure were far reaching. Unemployment, however, would not amount to their sole problem: in those industrial cities[14] where manufacturing had had an overwhelming role in the local economic landscape, industrial production had sustained a specific socio-economic framework, often characterised by a limited development of tertiary activities. As the big industry was no longer capable, alone, of sustaining development and could no longer absorb vast numbers of workforce, tertiary activities were not sufficiently developed to uphold, autonomously, any reconversion attempt: the vast working class was for the most part unskilled (Bagnasco, 1986; Pierre, 2011), and the different, higher skills sought by the emerging, more flexible labour market would mostly be lacking (Mingione, 2002).

[14] In certain cities, industry had grown alongside other, pre-existing activities. Here, although manufacturing would surely be a major employer, it would not engender a marked polarisation of the local social structure. These were cities that typically featured a consistent presence of tertiary activities – finance, administration, commerce, transportation – so that, as Fordism came to an end, they were endowed with sufficient internal resources – in terms of skills, knowledge, and organisation – that facilitated their restructuring process. Milan and London exemplify this type of city (Bobbio, Dente, Spada, 2005; Mingione, 2002).

Table 2: Employment per sector (Turin Province)



Source: (Istat)

Furthermore, because of the limited extent of the local tertiary sector, in industrial cities the market[15] would have a limited role as organizing principle of the local society, entailing a modest capacity to adapt, on the part of local actors, to swift changes (Bagnasco, 1986). On top of this, because of the vast numbers of workers employed in factories, industrial cities have typically had strong radical left parties, and a vastly unionised working population (Oberti, 2000; Pierre, 2011); if left-wing parties were in power throughout the deindustrialisation phase (1970s-1980s, in Europe), these would often oppose thrusts towards a tertiarization of the local economy and a general endorsement of growth policies, in favour of defending manufacturing and the development model that had sustained Fordism (Pierre, 2011). Cities of this kind were typical of old industrial areas of Europe and North America, such as the north of England, the Ruhr basin in Germany, northern France, and in the industrial triangle (Turin-Genoa-Milan) of North-West Italy; in the US, these would mostly be found in the zone of older industrial development (the 'rustbelt'), running from the Great Lakes to the North-eastern coast.

[15] The market (or exchange) is one of the three regulative principles of the economy, which rests on 'adaptive' or 'process' rationality; there is then 'organization' or 'redistribution', a principle aimed at reducing uncertainty that entails top-down coordination and long-term planning, which rests on 'synoptic' rationality; finally, the last principle is reciprocity, which is typical of non-regulated forms of interaction, such as those prevalent in archaic societies or in basic social units, such as families or friendship networks. In contemporary society, none of these three principles exists in its 'pure', ideal form: in most cases, today's political communities feature a different combination of these three regulative principles (Bagnasco, 1986; Pichierri, 2011).

Table 3: industrial and service employment (absolute values) – Turin Province (1951-2001)



	1951	1961	1971	1981	1993	2001
Industry	330173	461343	533102	491619	381000	344000
Services	109242	169107	205900	369113	479000	556000

Source: (Istat – Censimento Generale industria e commercio (III; IV; V; VI); Osservatorio Regionale sul Mercato del Lavoro – Piemonte)

All of this is to emphasise how the task of reconversion, for Fordist industrial cities, has been daunting: to sum up, these cities were not endowed with the resources – human and economic – that were needed to face the transformation process. Some of these cities have, nonetheless, managed to embark on a reconversion phase, often helped by the emergence of new political coalitions that would guide these old industrial powerhouses towards a phase of development that rests on different premises (Keating, 2000). Between the 1990s and the first decade of the 2000s, Turin was one of these cities: led by a coalition of left-wing and liberal forces, the city underwent a physical makeover and invested heavily with the aim of fostering the expansion of a tertiary economy based on knowledge, high research institutions, culture, and tourism. The 2006 Winter Olympics, hosted in the city, would symbolise such a relaunch.

In those years, various works have mentioned Turin's case as a success story[16]. In 2010, an LSE report[17] told the story of various former industrial cities that had managed to re-emerge out of the declining spiral they had experienced once deindustrialisation had kicked-in; Turin was identified as one of such 'Phoenix cities' (Power *et al.,* 2010) – the phoenix symbolising re-birth. After a rapid overview of the city's Fordist phase of development and subsequent crisis, the report examines the elements and actions that contributed to relaunch the city. After the first direct mayoral election, the government that led Turin since 1993 would include a significant civil society component, comprising academics and elements of the business-entrepreneurial class. This new local administration would foster a new 'collaborative approach to recovery' (Power *et al*., 2010, p. 226) aimed at involving non-political actors, that is, portions of the local society, in the elaboration of a reconstruction agenda; this practice would later (during Castellani's second mandate: 1997-2001) result in the elaboration of a proper 'Strategic Plan', an urban agenda devised through the collaboration of civil society and sustained through city-wide debates (*idem*, p. 227). Local administration also worked to strengthen relations with the EU; by participating to European city networks and by bidding for EU funds and programmes, the city would be exposed to best practices from its European counterparts and succeed in accessing significant financial resources that would help in the reconstruction effort. Moreover, the reorganization of the local government machine that was undertaken in those years, and the privatisation of local utilities (electricity, water, transport, and waste collection), would free additional resources and enhance the administration's governing capacity. All of this took place after administrative reform had redefined the nature of Italian local governments (Power *et al*., 2010; EU Commission and UN Habitat, 2016; Dente and Melloni, 2005).

The report then identifies three 'key projects' would serve as means to back the reconstruction effort: the Urban Master Plan (*Piano Regolatore Generale*), the Strategic Plan and ITP, the investment promotion agency. After '45 years of deferral' (idem, p. 227), the Master Plan would be approved in 1995; it

[16]Today, in 2020, observers are less optimistic: several authors are now wondering 'what went wrong?', or 'what has halted Turin?' (Bagnasco, Berta, Pichierri, 2020). True, Turin is experiencing modest to no growth at present (Rapporto Rota, 2016). This, however, does not mean the reconstruction did not take place, or that the political experiment that was attempted in Turin was not effective or innovative. For sure, there have been mistakes, and, perhaps, observers have fallen prey to easy enthusiasms; those twenty years (1993-2011) were, nonetheless, a season of novelty for the city, in which its administrators would indeed pursue a new strategic vision, one that could offer Turin alternative patterns of growth. Development strategies, yet, are no panacea: "there is very little that the city can do itself to generate growth (Pierre, 2011, p. 82)." Local administrations can indeed work to provide an environment that is attractive to businesses, by investing in infrastructure, services, culture, and trying to increase rent values; if businesses do not move in however, such a strategy can easily fail for reasons that have, ultimately, little to do with the administration's choices (*idem*, p. 84-85). After all, several formerly manufacturing cities, such as Manchester or Glasgow, have been in the doldrums for very long, and have taken ages to start their recoveries; other industrial cities, like Bilbao, which by the 2000s was presented as a successful story of complete urban overhaul, are now again under stress, as the 2008 financial crisis (Power, 2016) has dramatically reduced the resources they could draw on. It is not my purpose, here, to look at the reasons behind present difficulties; rather, I meant to point out that, despite today's hardships, Turin's restructuring has been the result of a true local political overhaul.

[17] Power A., Ploger J., Winkler A. (2010), *Phoenix Cities: the fall and rise of great industrial cities*, Bristol: Policy Press. The publication would then be followed by various reports on individual city case studies (Power, 2016a; 2016b; Provan, 2015).

was a pivotal legal and planning instrument to sustain the reconstruction of the city, by then dotted with brownfields; the Master Plan's main intervention amounted to 'burying' the railway line that severed the city in two halves, thus freeing space for a central north-south boulevard and making the railway run underground (*ibid*.). As to the Strategic Plan, which the report refers to as 'possibly the city's most important recovery tool', the local administration would draw on the examples set by other European – especially Spanish – cities of those years, which had implemented similar plans themselves. The importance of the plan was twofold: on the one hand, its development and the subsequent implementation phase had been conceived as a participatory, collaborative processes that constituted a value *per se*. Their use was indeed not only that of producing a more thorough strategy, but also that of structuring a practice of negotiation and collective decision-making among that would involve the local populace. As to the proper strategy, this would be articulated along six 'lines of action' (Power *et al*., 2010, p. 28; Torino Internazionale, 2000):

1. Making Torino an international transport and communications hub.
2. Constructing a metropolitan government.
3. Developing training, research and strategic resources.
4. Promoting enterprise and employment.
5. Promoting Turin as a city of culture, tourism, commerce, and sports.
6. Improving urban quality by upgrading the local environment to achieve socially and environmentally sensitive regeneration.

In addition, during the Plan's elaboration phase, the city was selected to host the 2006 Winter Olympics, which would reinforce and accelerate the city's restructuring effort. Finally, the investment promotion agency "was created to promote the region's economic assets internationally, to build relationships with potential investors, to facilitate the location process and to broker the substantial public incentives on offer (Power *et al*., 2010, p. 229)." The report then turns to more specific projects, or sectors of intervention, such as ICT. The Torino Wireless Foundation was created in 2001, conceived precisely for overseeing the emergence of a district of ICT firms that would benefit from enterprise-academia interactions (*ibid.*). In the same field, the *Mario Boella* Institute was established, a research laboratory focused on ICT, created through a partnership between Polytechnic University and *Compagnia di San Paolo*, one of the city's banking foundations. The report moreover points out how, in those years, public-private partnerships proliferated in Turin, as an example of the effort undertaken by local actors to relaunch economic activity (idem, p. 230).

The report then focuses on proper reconstruction and neighbourhood regeneration and mentions a few specific projects: the 'Gate' project for Porta Palazzo; the Urban II project for Mirafiori Nord, both of which were partially sustained by EU Funds. The most interesting initiative the report mentions is, however, the *Progetto Speciale Periferie*, launched in 1997. The plan was, again, inspired by the city's involvement in

European city networks (Bagnasco e Castellani, 2014; Power et al., 2010, p. 232), and would envision a bottom-up model whereby residents would constitute the initial thrust to devise renewal projects for each neighbourhood. The initiative would secure "over 580 million euros of competitive-bid financing for its projects between 1997 and 2007 (Power et al., 2010, p. 232)." The report then turns to labour and population indicators to show how, in the first decade of the 2000s, Turin indeed appeared to have halted its decline.

Table 4: Unemployment rate for the Province of Turin (1993-2008)



Source: (Istat; Osservatorio Regionale sul Mercato del Lavoro – Piemonte)

Table 5: Turin's population trends (city and province)



Source: (Istat)

Other works (Dente, 2011; Bobbio, Dente, Spada, 2005) have acknowledged the progress made by Turin up to the first decade of the 2000s; these works, importantly, would focus on political developments that took place in the city in those years, which had made the city one of the most 'innovative' urban areas of Italy. Both papers argue that what sustained the introduction of innovative policies was the presence of a local governance structure: very briefly, governance[18] can be described as a non-institutionalised decision-making practice, involving both political and non-political actors, where the borders between private and public spheres have become blurred and which is does not rest on government's sanctioning mechanisms (Stoker, 1998; Bellamy and Palumbo, 2010). In the first paper (Bobbio, Dente, Spada, 2005), the authors try to establish a correlation between the heterogeneity of the local governance network and the production of innovative policies, comparing Turin and Milan. The degree of innovation is instead measured by reference to four dimensions, which are then combined (Dente, 2011): 1) agenda innovation: it refers to new issues that enter (or exit) the agenda; 2) process innovation: "the finding of new ways to cope with old problems" (*idem*, p. 45); 3) product innovation: the recourse to new solutions to deal with both old and new problems; 4) Symbolic innovation: that is, communication enhancements. The findings of the first paper emphasise how Turin was more innovative than Milan in those years (Bobbio, Dente, Spada, 2005, p. 48-49), and would connect such a higher degree of innovation to the more articulated and heterogenous governance network that could be found in Turin. In other words, Turin's governance structure was found to be more 'complex', meaning that more actors coming from different environments were involved in decision-making processes;

[18] A thorough discussion of governance will be the focus of the next section of this chapter.

further, Turin's governance was 'denser', meaning there would be more direct links among the actors involved.

Greater complexity and density of the local governance structure were thus found by the authors to be correlated to the higher degree of innovation that characterised Turin by the first decade of the 2000s. The second paper (Dente, 2011) focused on the same possible correlation, that is, between governance and policy innovation, although the comparison this time included, apart from Milan and Turin, also Florence and Naples. Again, Turin ranks first with respect to both measures: it is the most innovative city among the four, and the one where the governance network is more complex and denser (idem, p. 52-53).

Table 6: Innovativeness of selected Italian cities

	Florence	Milan	Naples	Turin
Agenda	1	0.5	1	2
Process	0.5	1	0.5	2
Product	1.5	1	1	2
Symbolic	0	0.5	2	1
Total	3	3	4.5	7

Source: (Dente and Coletti, 2011)

Table 7: governance indicators of selected Italian cities

	Complexity (a)	Density (b)	Centrality (c)	$a \cdot b \cdot c$
Florence	12	0.075	0.86	0.774
Milan	12	0.069	0.63	0.521
Naples	15.5	0.116	0.76	1.366
Turin	16	0.116	0.86	1.596

Source: (Dente and Coletti, 2011)

These two papers, then, highlight how Turin was, in the 2000s, one of the most[19] innovative cities in Italy with respect to the type of policies it implemented; this already seems to sustain the decision of the authors of the LSE report of including Turin among European 'Phoenix Cities.' The papers, furthermore, link policy innovation to the presence of a particularly articulated governance structure which, again, was most evident in Turin. All of this would seem to suggest that the scale of political developments that occurred in Turin was a crucial factor in sustaining the reconstruction process that defined this phase of the city's history.

Other works emphasise, again, the novelty of Turin's governance process, but they do so by focusing on one 'tool' identified as instrumental in fostering participation and cooperation among political actors and

[19] In the two papers, Turin is for sure the most innovative city; however, other Italian cities might have been equally or more innovative but were not included in the sample.

civil society, that is, the Strategic Plan (Dente and Melloni, 2005; Pinson, 2002a; 2002b). In the first work, Dente and Melloni, before turning the actual Plan, reiterate the idea that Turin had, since Castellani's election in 1993, been successful in initiating a restructuration of the local political system – one of the most successful, in this respect, among Italian cities. This was, in their opinion, due to a number of reasons: the first is the severity of the industrial crisis of the city, which has underpinned a more pronounced awareness, on the part of local actors, of the need to 'overcome the automobile monoculture' (Dente and Melloni, 2005, p. 9); the second is that the city had been engaged, by the time the new administration was installed, in a self-reflexive debate over its crisis for several years (*ibid*.); third is the new administration's capacity to actually operate a political overhaul, which not only defines a watershed with the past, but is particularly effective in including elements of civil society within the political process, opening the political arena to cultural and academic environments, the world of business and entrepreneurship, and that of third sector associations (*idem*, p. 9-19).

Starting from these premises, the authors then set out to evaluate whether the Strategic Plan has succeeded in being a 'governance tool': in other words, they ask whether the Plan has managed to somehow prolong and routinize the practice of civil society mobilization, and whether it has truly increased the degree of inclusiveness with respect to the political process and that of density of relations among actors (idem, p. 11). In formulating this hypothesis, the authors stress how the conception of the Strategic Plan[20] was indeed underpinned by the conviction that recovery could only be achieved through an enlarged involvement of actors in the political process. This point underscores how developing the Strategic Plan was an intentional process aimed at routinizing and strengthening governance practices (*ibid*.). For sure, the Strategic Plan explicitly mentions a twofold objective: an instrumental one of supporting the realisation of concrete projects; and an 'intrinsic' one of intensifying and reinforcing relationships among local actors (Dente and Melloni, 2005, p. 12; Torino Internazionale, 1998).

To test their hypothesis, the authors then look at the effects the Strategic Plan has had in terms of participation and enlarged citizen involvement. What is found is that, also through the creation of *ad hoc* instruments, such as the *Torino Internazionale* Association[21], the Strategic Plan has overall had a positive impact on the city's governance structure: the participatory practices supported by strategic planning have succeeded in sustaining and prolonging the local governance system; furthermore, many of the Plan's concrete projects have been realised. For instance, through *Torino Internazionale*, the plan has managed to create a new arena characterised by transparency, where actors could relate to each other on an equal

[20] The idea was inspired, as mentioned above, by the case of Spanish cities, in particular Barcelona (Dente and Melloni, 2005; Bagnasco and Castellani, 2014; Alfieri et al., 2012; Pinson, 2002a & b).

[21] The creation of the association was set out within the elaboration of the Strategic Plan itself; *Torino Internazionale*, then, would be established in 2000, immediately after the conclusion of the strategic planning process. Its goal was to monitor and sustain the realisation of projects defined by the Strategic Plan, and to further enhance citizen participation and involvement in the reconstruction process (Torino Internazionale, 2000).

footing; this has transformed interaction patterns among different players, facilitating relationships. In sum, the local governance network is extended, in part, because of the Strategic Plan; the authors however also stress how certain developments with respect to governance were quite autonomous: for instance, two of the most relevant local players of the period, the local banking foundations[22] – *Compagnia di San Paolo* and *CRT* – have emerged independently of the Strategic Plan. Moreover, the Strategic Plan has not become the sole *locus* for decision-making, as some projects had been discussed before or outside of its elaboration; nonetheless, decision-making activity has indeed occurred within the context of the Plan. Overall, then, the authors conclude that, although Turin's governance had originated previously and the local governance system cannot be solely reduced to the elaboration of the Strategic Plan, the latter has however had a major and positive effect over local governance: it has prolonged the practice, it has reinforced and deepened it, and it thus can be said that it has been successful in maintaining it (Dente and Melloni, 2005, p. 33).

The works of Gilles Pinson (2002a & 2002b) further stress the political innovations represented by Turin's local governance system and by the instruments – Strategic Plan and Torino Internazionale – that have been established to support and nurture such a practice. Pinson (2002b) especially stresses how local *government* has intentionally worked in the direction of deepening and institutionalising governance, "making the best of the pluralism that seems increasingly characteristic of the production of urban policies Pinson, 2002b, p. 491)." This ambition has then enabled the "structuring of new interactions and their territorialisation (*ibid.*)." Such governance practices have then had the function of regulating actors' actions, strengthening a common identity, and infusing legitimacy to the process of strategic planning. Overall, governance has then enhanced local 'governing capacity' (Stone, 1989; Pierre; 2011), by fostering the 'self-organisation' of the local community (Pinson, 2002b, p. 491). The inclusion of various actors within the political process – above all, economic and academic elements – have therefore underpinned the redefinition of the local 'capacity for collective action' (idem, p. 492).

All these works, in describing Turin's transformations, have highlighted how local political innovations, represented by the urban governance structure, have been central in sustaining the city's reconstruction effort. It should then come as no surprise that the 2016 EU report on the State of EU cities[23] has itself identified the strategic planning process and *Torino Internazionale* as successful examples of governance mechanisms (EU Commission *et al*., 2016, p. 208).

[22] A more thorough discussion of the nature, prerogatives and role of Turin's banking foundations will be contained in chapters 3 and 4.

[23] European Commission and UN Habitat, (2016), *The State of European Cities 2016*, European Union: Commission Staff Working Document

III. Governance

The concept of governance gained currency principally because it highlights how, especially in liberal democracies, the act of governing does not solely rely on formal administrative institutions and top-down, hierarchical procedures, but leans on the cooperation of a variety of social actors (Da Cruz *et al.*, 2019, p. 2). At the same time, as the idea moves away from formalized government structures and procedures, to focus instead on informal, uncodified decision-making procedures that involve a plurality of players - be these higher administrative tiers, QuANGOs[24], or proper private actors – governance inevitably contains an element of vagueness (Obeng-Odoom, 2012): the merit of shedding light on social and institutional fragmentation comes at the cost of conceptual clarity. Compounding this definitional complexity is the fact that the notion of governance has been applied to a plethora of dimensions of social, economic and political life; as Rhodes (2007, p. 1246) notes, "in much present-day use, governance refers to: a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed. Of course, nothing in the social sciences is ever that simple. Kjær (2004) provides the best introduction. She distinguishes between governance in public administration and public policy, governance in international relations, European Union governance, governance in comparative politics, and good governance as extolled by the World Bank. And, to be frank, the several uses have little or nothing in common […]."

This is not to say the concept is so indiscriminate as to be redundant, but merely to clarify a few core points of the specific understanding of governance I will be using in my work. In the domains of public administration and public policy, some essential features of the concept can be extrapolated: 1) governance has to do with decision-making and producing political outputs; 2) governance is a decision-making practice that occurs through non-codified, unstructured interaction among various government and non-government actors; 3) governance, being an informal decision-making practice, does not rely on the recourse to government sanctions; 4) "governance involves non-state solutions to the collective action problem (John, 2001, p. 9)." Keeping these tenets in mind, the reason I want to specifically focus on governance in urban contexts lies in the fact that city administrations are typically faced, as far as their governing tasks are concerned, with greater constraints than, say, national governments. These range from budgetary and fiscal limitations, to circumscribed legal competences and narrow territorial scope of action (Pierre and Peters, 2012, p. 72). The constraints placed upon city governments seem to imply their need to cooperate and negotiate with non-government actors is greater than it is at higher tiers of government, although governance practices for sure occur at these levels too.

[24] '*Quasi Non-Governmental Organizations*'.

With these elements at hand, the working definition of governance I will employ throughout my work is the following: "Governance refers to the development of [decision-making practices][25] in which boundaries between and within public and private sector have become blurred. The essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on the recourse to the authority and sanctions of government (Stoker, 1998, p. 17)." As Keating (2013) notes, this definition amounts to a combination of three distinct ideas of governance. The first is network governance (Bellamy and Palumbo, 2010; Sorensen and Torfing, 2007), a concept derived from the theory of organisation and connected to an understanding of human action derived from institutional theory; network governance has at times been presented as a different form of regulation to the more traditional ones of hierarchy and markets (Keating, 2013, p. 96). The second concept is that of governance as problem solving, "which sees actors as looking for common solutions and points away from differences of ideology or interest, towards social production based on consensus and shared visions (*ibid*.)." This view of governance underpins certain organisational forms such as managerialism and public-private partnerships (Keating, 2013; Pierre, 2011); it is also the core component of the concept of urban regime[26] (Stone, 1989; 1993), the dominant paradigm in US urban politics between the 1990s and 2000s (Pierre, 2011). Akin to this latter view, but without implications as to 'shared goals and consensus seeking' (Keating, 2013, p. 96), is the concept of corporatist governance: this, again, is a decision-making practice that rests on the negotiation between political and 'selected' (*ibid*.) private actors, in which the latter are typically articulated in interest representative organisations.

Before turning to how this definition of governance is relevant in the case of Turin, it is important that I clarify a few points. First, some governance scholars (John, 2001; Bellamy and Palumbo, 2010) have claimed that in the last decades there has been a shift from government to governance. This assumption is however lacking proper empirical evidence and typically invokes a past characterised by "a stylized world hierarchical, unitary government rather than the messy reality of real public policy making (Keating, 2013, p. 97)." My use of the concept of governance should not be viewed as implying that I am making such a claim. Second, the notion of governance has often been associated with implicit value judgments as to its effects: some hold that governance is intrinsically more inclusive and participatory, and thus more conducive to desirable democratic outcomes (EU Commission, 2001; UN Habitat, 2001); other stress, by contrast, that governance undermines democratic accountability (John and Cole, 2002). Again, I am not making any such claim, although it may well be possible that governance may produce either of these two outcomes: merely, I hold these are not intrinsic qualities of governance, but something that may emerge in specific cases, and that can only be assessed through empirical verification. Dente's works on Turin, for instance, are indeed attempts to link, through empirical verification, governance to positive policy outcomes.

[25] The actual definition provided by Stoker reads 'governance styles' rather than 'decision-making practices.' I, however, preferred not to include in the definition the very term to be defined.
[26] I will discuss urban regime theory in the next chapter.

One of the reasons why I adopted such a definition, then, is that, in the various works that have focused on Turin's governance structure, the idea of governance that is employed contains elements of both 'network' and 'problem solving' governance. Specifically, Dente (Bobbio, Dente, Spada, 2005; Dente and Coletti, 2011) explicitly refers to governance in the network sense; other works stress instead the problem-solving dimension of Turin's governance experience, among which Pinson's (2002a; 2002b), as well as Belligni and Ravazzi's (2012), who analyse Turin's governance under the lens of regime theory. Furthermore, as Keating stresses, the corporatist dimension of governance has always been typical of the political process (Keating, 2013, p. 97-98) and elements of it (dialogue with the Chamber of Commerce, or with labour unions) have surely been present in Turin too. I therefore hold that the notion of governance I am using is particularly apt to my purposes precisely because it comprises these three elements, all of which have been found to be present in the case of Turin.

The choice of Turin as a case study, then, is motivated by two, connected reasons. The first is that there have been several studies on the city's recovery process and on its governance structure; these, however, as far as governance was concerned, were all descriptive in nature. This means there is plenty of material to draw on to provide a detailed picture of Turin's governance structure; it also implies that I am not going to undertake a further descriptive inquiry over the city's governance. On the other hand, none of these works have proceeded to a systematic analysis of the causes that led to the emergence of such an urban governance system and this leads to the second motive underpinning my research. The governance literature, both in its 'network' and 'problem solving' variant, says little about the causes of governance (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007; Stoker and Mossberger, 2001; Hertting, 2007, p. 43), mainly because there have been very few empirical studies that have dealt with the issue. Nevertheless, some hypotheses concerning the formation of governance have been put forward: in some cases, it is emphasised how governance structures emerge as a response to increased institutional fragmentation and social complexity (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007; John, 2001); alternatively, it is ideas and the logic of appropriateness that play a causal, role, bringing actors together and engendering a dynamic whereby mutual recognition and shared identities sustain the governance structure (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007; Stoker, 1995; Bevir and Rhodes, 2007). This research field however remains, for the most part, underexplored.

It is for these two reasons that I decided to focus on the causes that have led to the emergence of Turin's governance system between the 1990s and 2000s: on the one hand, because empirical work on Turin, which is indeed quite extensive, has done a great job at describing the city's governance structure, but has neglected systematic questions concerning its formation; on the other hand, because the issue of governance formation has been little dealt with by the governance literature itself, both theoretical and empirical. My ambition, therefore, is to investigate this theme, by looking at the causal process that has led to the formation of an urban governance system. My research question, then, reads as follows:

"*Why has a governance coalition emerged in the city of Turin between the 1990s and 2000s? Considering both structure and agency, and both exogenous and endogenous factors, which among these have been most relevant in leading to governance formation?"*

The aim of this research is therefore to inquire about the causes of governance formation. In this introductory chapter I have shown how the fortunes of urban communities have, in history, typically been affected by both endogenous and exogenous factors, at the intersection between their internal socio-political affairs and external institutional environment. Overarching economic and political dynamics are central to understand the frame that 'shapes and constrains' (Thelen and Steinmo, 1991, p. 10) the actions of local urban players; at the same time, I maintain, the way the latter react to these frames and interact among each other, is crucial to gain an understanding of urban politics and their evolution. Further, governance is a concept that permits to approach urban politics by taking into consideration elements that, going beyond formal government institutions, provide a more comprehensive insight into the societal dynamics that occur within urban settings, and to explore the relationships between the social, economic, and political realms. In the following two chapters I will then illustrate how I intend to proceed, by adopting a theoretical and analytical framework that takes into consideration both structure and agency, both the urban context and its external environment.

IV. Concluding remarks

The move towards a general policy of spatial competition, which superseded one of spatial redistribution, has arguably reinforced the tendency of cities to compete among each other; going back in history, cases of inter-city rivalries abound too, and it is not necessary to recall them here. At the same time, there several interesting insights in the general understanding of cities as renewed political actors, and as new scales of organization: the changes of these last thirty to forty years, especially in Europe, have pushed several cities to organize politically to devise local development strategies and to gather resources on their own. It is true that cities today interact and cooperate, that they have gained a foot within the European political system; even more, cities, often including their hinterlands, account for a significant share of their nation's prosperity. The effects of these dynamics are however hard to be evaluated now. Cities are today wrestling to find their place within an uncertain global socio-economic system: in some cases, they manage to implement original development strategies that single them out as success stories, while in other cases, development strategies end up bearing little fruit, or are hard to devise in the first place; global economic tendencies are indeed having profound effects on their fortunes; nation-states have in part restructured, some would say weakened, but are still very real and, as the global COVID-19 pandemic that in unravelling at this very moment shows, seem to be the only political agents capable of giving a significant response to

such a crisis. The EU has certainly given political content to the notion of European cities, but the role and fortunes of several mid-sized European cities, the 'backbone' of the European urban structure, appears still uncertain.

Against this background, Turin has experienced the full force of the transformations that have occurred since the 1970s: deindustrialisation and economic restructuring, rescaling and Europeanisation. If the former process has sanctioned the final decline of the city's Fordist industrial phase, the latter two have constituted novel opportunities which its administration has capitalised on. Administrative reform of local governments and the emergence of new local actors – banking foundations – have redefined the rules of the political game and the character of the local socio-economic fabric, respectively; Europeanisation has afforded the city new opportunities to gather resources, both relational and financial. The governance structure that emerged in the city in those years amounted then to a true overhaul of the local political system, which made it possible to devise a recovery strategy underpinned by wider civic involvement and strategic planning. Yet, the actual process that has led to the emergence of such a structure has not been systematically investigated and this is also connected to the fact that governance formation is an underexplored theme in the literature. For these very reasons, I set out to analyse the causal process that has led to the emergence of Turin's governance structure; the following two chapters, then, will be dedicated to the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of my research.

V. *Population, Employment and GVA data: comparisons between Turin and other European cities.*

Table 8: Population trends in selected European cities (1950-2011)



Source: Statistical Office of the United Nations, (1960-2007)[27], *Demographic Yearbook*, New York: United Nations, retrieved from https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic-social/products/dyb/#statistics

[27] Data were taken from UN Demographic yearbooks every five years from 1960 through 2000, then from the 2007 and 2012 volumes. Data consider core cities. Years on the x axis are reported as intervals (i.e. 1950-1954), because population measurements were not taken in the same year for each city.

Table 9[28]



	Turin	Milan	Genoa	Lille	Lyon	Bilbao	Glasgow	Liverpool/Manchester	Birmingham	Bremen	Stuttgart
1998	29,32	34,93	12,74	18,62	16,85	23,69	13,72	19,34	20,03	17,92	28,41
2007	21,59	31,48	12,44	14,57	13,04	16,66	7,97	11,84	11,53	14,57	25,41
2014	18,54	29,63	10,53	12,3	11,02	13,25	7,14	9,11	9,58	13,71	23,91

Table 10



	Turin	Milan	Genoa	Lille	Lyon	Bilbao	Glasgow	Liverpool/Manchester	Birmingham	Bremen	Stuttgart
1998	5,31	7,67	6,84	5,99	5,83	8,76	7,78	6,26	6,17	5,31	5,98
2007	5,77	8,69	7,31	6,79	6,67	12,31	7,54	7,3	6,64	4,25	5,14
2014	5,47	8,02	6,33	6,86	6,69	6,12	6,72	6,81	6,13	3,96	5,17

[28] From table 9 through 23, all data were taken from: European Metromonitor, *Cities and Economic Recession since 2008*, LSE Cities, retrieved from: http://labs.lsecities.net/eumm/m/metromonitor#4/51.51/12.00 . Data consider metropolitan regions, which are aggregations of Eurostat's NUTS3 regions based on the findings of ESPON's (2007) Study on Urban Functions.

Table 11



	Turin	Milan	Genoa	Lille	Lyon	Bilbao	Glasgow	Liverpool/Manchester	Birmingham	Bremen	Stuttgart
1998	2,76	1,86	2,37	1,26	2,69	2,44	2,28	2,53	2,87	1,66	3,46
2007	3,35	2,25	1,95	1,51	3,11	2,43	3,02	3,35	3,33	2,98	3,66
2014	4,28	1,72	1,93	1,71	3,46	2,73	2,96	3,04	3,01	3,09	3,26

Table 12



	Turin	Milan	Genoa	Lille	Lyon	Bilbao	Glasgow	Liverpool/Manchester	Birmingham	Bremen	Stuttgart
1998	14,82	14,31	16,79	13,62	13,19	14,11	15,76	17,42	17	16,65	13,87
2007	14,88	13,65	15,38	13,64	13,31	14,29	14	16,37	16,05	14,18	13,41
2014	14,21	13,45	14,48	13,74	13,48	16,48	14,27	16,13	16,52	13,12	13,03

Table 13



	Turin	Milan	Genoa	Lille	Lyon	Bilbao	Glasgow	Liverpool/Manchester	Birmingham	Bremen	Stuttgart
1998	4,39	4,03	7,27	4,79	5,33	5,61	5,33	4,44	4,39	10,06	3,23
2007	4,14	3,83	6,92	4,99	5,48	4,79	4,94	4,7	5,06	9,47	3,55
2014	3,59	3,56	7,14	4,97	5,34	5,12	4,53	4,84	5,27	8,91	3,65

Table 14



	Turin	Milan	Genoa	Lille	Lyon	Bilbao	Glasgow	Liverpool/Manchester	Birmingham	Bremen	Stuttgart
1998	6,13	4,62	6,22	4,56	6,42	4,21	4,46	4,73	5,26	4,14	6,51
2007	7,77	4,96	7,44	5,51	7,68	5,57	5,29	6,35	6,66	6,06	7,67
2014	8,63	5,44	8,48	6,06	8,28	6,62	5,88	7,68	7,42	7,18	8,03

Table 15



	Turin	Milan	Genoa	Lille	Lyon	Bilbao	Glasgow	Liverpool/Manchester	Birmingham	Bremen	Stuttgart
1998	11,38	10,56	12,21	21,84	19,59	12,3	18,76	18,36	16,78	14,79	12,38
2007	11,91	10,78	12,92	22,25	19,54	12,66	21,61	20,34	19,43	16,17	14,25
2014	12,06	12,1	12,72	23,48	20,45	14,25	22,41	22,29	21,87	17,65	15,83

Table 16



	Turin	Milan	Genoa	Lille	Lyon	Bilbao	Glasgow	Liverpool/Manchester	Birmingham	Bremen	Stuttgart
1998	7,5	6,6	9,18	3,66	3,23	7,44	2,2	2,56	2,4	6,2	4,66
2007	8,87	7,12	8,77	3,07	2,75	7,51	2,52	2,82	3,26	6,45	4,97
2014	9,75	8,52	9,98	3,03	2,74	7,59	2,57	2,4	2,54	5,91	5,01

Table 17



	Turin	Milan	Genoa	Lille	Lyon	Bilbao	Glasgow	Liverpool/Manchester	Birmingham	Bremen	Stuttgart
1998	24,26	30,81	11,66	16,46	14,63	20,77	15,31	19,62	18,71	25,14	25,75
2007	20,05	30,07	12,21	16,35	15,18	17,82	11,82	16,23	13,48	26,84	32,92
2014	17,69	28,68	10,05	14,43	13,81	16,58	11,25	14,1	11,96	24,68	32,01

Table 18



	Turin	Milan	Genoa	Lille	Lyon	Bilbao	Glasgow	Liverpool/Manchester	Birmingham	Bremen	Stuttgart
1998	4,44	6,41	4,74	6,39	6,26	11,31	9,53	7,63	7,01	4,25	6,28
2007	5,22	7,41	5,58	6,92	6,59	13,71	7,6	7,26	6,92	3,12	4,51
2014	4,81	6,48	5,07	6,15	5,79	9,1	6,08	6,36	5,99	3,43	4,32

Table 19



	Turin	Milan	Genoa	Lille	Lyon	Bilbao	Glasgow	Liverpool/Manchester	Birmingham	Bremen	Stuttgart
1998	3,75	2,62	2,45	1,85	3,53	2,72	2,36	2,67	3,06	0,89	2,81
2007	5,21	3,83	2,55	2,56	4,84	3,48	3,26	4,99	4,65	1,96	3,25
2014	7,2	3,12	2,61	2,87	5,5	3,88	3,22	4,57	4,82	3,17	4,01

Table 20



	Turin	Milan	Genoa	Lille	Lyon	Bilbao	Glasgow	Liverpool/Manchester	Birmingham	Bremen	Stuttgart
1998	4,9	4,65	10,06	4,52	4,96	5,01	5,97	6,37	5,44	10,41	2,08
2007	5,15	4,94	11,08	4,76	5,17	4,77	5,85	5,76	5,62	12,01	2,55
2014	4,82	4,31	9,56	4,87	4,73	5,27	4,62	4,81	4,97	12	2,44

Table 21



	Turin	Milan	Genoa	Lille	Lyon	Bilbao	Glasgow	Liverpool/Manchester	Birmingham	Bremen	Stuttgart
1998	7,5	5,67	5,87	4,72	7,11	3,76	3,79	3,96	4,43	4,79	9,94
2007	7,71	5,29	6,58	5,38	7,36	4,48	5,26	6,23	6,71	5,2	8,58
2014	6,74	5,3	6,68	5,91	8,36	5,17	5,28	6,53	6,81	5,61	9,29

Table 22



	Turin	Milan	Genoa	Lille	Lyon	Bilbao	Glasgow	Liverpool/Manchester	Birmingham	Bremen	Stuttgart
1998	9,28	7,54	8,74	19,24	15,75	12,2	15,48	15,63	13,8	12,25	9,39
2007	9,86	7,66	9,17	17,81	14,03	11	15,01	14,62	14,33	10,46	9,21
2014	9,92	9,35	10,2	18,54	14,49	12,05	15,15	15,65	15,98	11,01	9,96

Table 23



	Turin	Milan	Genoa	Lille	Lyon	Bilbao	Glasgow	Liverpool/Manchester	Birmingham	Bremen	Stuttgart
1998	14,02	11,04	15,74	10,07	11,94	6,44	6,2	7,59	9,98	8,92	9,5
2007	13,31	10,64	15,69	10,29	11,3	6,03	7,46	8,41	9,58	9,04	9,55
2014	13,91	10,9	16,81	11,53	11,46	6,6	10,76	9,52	9,47	9,98	9,75

Chapter 2. A neo-institutionalist approach to the study of urban governance

Introduction

In the last decades, Neo-institutionalism has become one of the most widespread academic perspective in the social sciences. As a research tradition, it understands institutions as both proper organizations and as frames of norms and practices, and systems of meanings: both meanings of institutions, then, are seen to contribute to shaping social and political action. Urban political scholars, somewhat surprisingly, have relied very little on neo-institutionalist insights to account for the dynamics of city politics. By the time neo-institutionalism was spreading, i.e., the beginning of the 1990s, urban political studies would principally focus, in America, on issues of urban regimes and economic development (Stone, 1989; Logan and Molotch, 1987); in Europe, albeit concern for 'the organizational dimension of urban politics' (Pierre, 2011, p. 10) was greater, neo-institutionalism had a similar fate as in the US, never coming to occupy any significant role within the theoretical panorama of urban studies. In America, between the 1950s and the 1970s, urban studies were the lens through which wider political themes would be approached and dealt with, as exemplified by the 'community power debate' between pluralists and elitists (Dahl, 1961; Hunter, 1953). Marxist or neo-Marxist approaches then developed in the 1970s, in part as a critique to the way in which pluralists and elitists had shaped the community power debate, and widened the scope of urban political studies, by shifting their attention to exogenous, overarching economic processes and class conflict (Castells, 1977, 1978**;** Cockburn, 1977). As globalization forces altered the urban socio-economic landscape starting from the 1980s, the focus of urban scholarship would change again (Pierre, 2011, p. 11): in America scholars turned to endogenous urban dynamics, by inquiring into the scope and leverage of political choice in local economic development processes (Mollenkopf, 1983; Logan and Molotch, 1987); in Europe, urban economic transformations were mainly viewed as instances of the restructuring of the capitalist system (Harvey, 1989). Finally, when regime theory (Stone, 1989) came to the fore, it became the dominant paradigm in the US and remained so well into the 2000s, making its way into European scholarship too (Dowding *et al*., 1999; Mossberger and Stoker, 2001); roughly in the same period, scholars on both sides of the Atlantic would turn to New Public Management as the proper organizing principle to restructure the local government machine (John, 2001). Against this background, neo-institutionalist approaches to urban politics are instead very few (Pierre, 2011). The aim of this chapter, then, is to argue why neo-institutionalism is an adequate research perspective to study urban political processes and, specifically, urban governance.

The chapter will therefore be structured as follows: in the first part, I will provide a brief literature review of urban political studies, from the 'community power debate' to regime theory; in the second section, I will argue that the types of urban political systems described in the scholarly literature can equally be viewed

as various modes of governance; because of its understanding of institutions as both organizations and systems of rules and meanings, then, I will contend that neo-institutionalism is a proper theoretical lens to study governance. The third section will then be dedicated to the definition of four ideal types of urban governance, to provide some analytical reference points to my inquiry. To do so, I will slightly modify a typology of urban governance systems as elaborated by John Pierre (2001), to obtain a restructured fourfold typology comprehending: party-government cities, corporatist cities, managerial cities, and pluralist cities. In the fourth section, I will then turn to neo-institutionalism and, by deploying the concepts and mechanisms it relies on, I will show what neo-institutionalism has to say with respect to governance formation. Specifically, I will employ, in a rather eclectic fashion, both the historical and sociological variants of neo-institutionalism, with some incursions into the discursive tradition. In the final section, I will then briefly present some hypotheses as to how governance emerged in the case of Turin: such hypotheses will contemplate the roles of both structure and agency in accounting for a process as complex as governance formation – from the effects of path-dependency and institutional reform to the role of the logic of appropriateness and that of discourse. Conclusions will then wrap up the chapter.

I. Literature Review[29]

I.I The Community Power Debate

Power was one of the first major themes that urban politics scholars focused on, its study giving rise to the 'community power debate', featuring the competing theories of elitism and pluralism. Although elitism and pluralism are overarching theories of power and have been used in research over various types of polities, they were first applied to the field of urban studies in the 1950s and 1960s. Since then, the community power debate has had a paramount influence over subsequent theories of urban politics, as many of these were elaborated either as a critique – mainly neo-Marxist theories – or as further developments – regime theory, growth machines – of these two traditional approaches. Sketching the contours of the matter will therefore be useful to see how, and from where, more recent works have originated. Both approaches chiefly understand power in the classic sense of capacity to influence other people's actions (Dahl, 1957) and the main goal of scholars was to attempt to identify actors that, within urban communities, were most influential over politics and policy. This concern is well expressed by Dahl's famous 'who governs?' question.

Floyd Hunter's study of Atlanta (1953) is the first application of elitist theory to urban politics, as well as the work that sparked the whole community power debate. Hunter's understanding of power draws on

[29] This literature review is not exhaustive. It does not include all the theories of urban politics that have been elaborated in the past century; it illustrates, instead, specific theories that I will draw on and refer to, throughout my work, to clarify certain concepts, either because of the major relevance within the urban politics scholarship, or because of their specific relevance with respect to my inquiry.

classic elitist theory (Mosca, 1939; Pareto, 1935), whose basic argument is that human societies are hierarchically stratified, and that power is in the hands of a restricted group of people who, explicitly or not, are responsible for the most important decisions affecting society as a whole; the élite, in other words, hold the reins of decision making, regardless of whether they hold official government positions. While traditional elitist works (Mosca, 1939; Pareto, 1935; Michels, 1959) featured a normative component – that is, the idea society *ought* to be governed by the élite – alternative variants (C. Wright Mills, 1956), viewed élite rule as a perfectible reality, one that is "neither natural nor desirable, but [is] the worrying product of historical trends (Harding, 1995, p. 37)."

Hunter's work over Atlanta, like several other elite theories of urban politics, falls within this latter family. Through his research, he concluded that major political decisions in Atlanta were actually a prerogative of a number of leading business figures, who, taken together, formed a restricted and homogeneous group of decision makers; their activities, and their role, was hardly visible to the wider citizenry, and elected politicians were in a subordinated position with respect to the elite. For sure, the latter were indeed responsible for implementing proper policies, but these were formulated elsewhere, by and within the business clique; in other words, the business elite was the actual group with agenda setting power. Elections and liberal-democratic rules were deemed inadequate to alter this reality.

Pluralist works were instead underpinned by the opposite assumption, namely that power is dispersed; it is upon this premise that Robert Dahl (1961) conducted his seminal research on New Haven. By focusing on three policy areas – urban redevelopment, public education, and political nominations – Dahl found that no actor would exercise a direct and unmediated influence over politics, although some were more politically involved than others (Dahl, 1961, p. 90): elected politicians, for instance, had to take into account their constituencies' preferences (idem, p. 163-164). Then, in each policy area, a different set of influential people was found to operate; furthermore, economic inequalities would not necessarily translate into political and social inequalities – that is, inequalities were not cumulative. Rather, New Haven's power structure was one of 'dispersed inequalities' (*idem*, p. 85), where different groups possessed different types of resources, to different degrees, and would deploy them differently, with different effects; no resource was more important than others, whereas all resources were potential resources until they would be concretely used (*idem*, p. 228; 271). Dahl was aware New Haven was no perfectly equal polity; still, its resource distribution and the power constellation that derived from it were at odds with oligarchical or elitist conceptions of power (idem, p. 86). New Haven's system, then, was one of 'stratified pluralism' (*idem*, p. 11).

Dahl's work embodies several elements of classic pluralist thought, which can be summarised as follows: First, "power is seen to be fragmented and decentralised; second, there is dispersed inequalities in so far as all groups have some resources to articulate their case [...]; third, [...] this dispersion of power is desirable [...]; fourth, political outcomes in different policy sectors will reflect different processes, different actors and different distributions of power within those sectors; fifth, the exercise of political power extends

beyond the formal institutional structures of elections and representative institutions in liberal democracy; sixth, 'the interaction of interests would supply a practical alternative to the "general will" as the source of legitimate authority (Jordan, 1990, p. 293); finally, [...] the disaggregated nature of decision making, and the very uncertainty of outcomes of the bargaining process, helps bind participants to the process itself (Judge, 1995, p. 14)."

Despite pluralism firmly rejects elitist understandings of power, it acknowledges the existence of élites, although these may be multiple. Dahl too admits that those who are more actively involved in politics amount to a restricted group (Dahl, 1961, p. 90), albeit they lack full control of the decision-making process. Even if different elites are *de facto* in charge of each policy area, these are nonetheless elites; this is why New Haven's power structure is one of stratified pluralism, where a minority of politically active individuals has a major, yet incomplete, influence over policy; the politically inactive majority, by contrast, only exerts a refracted sway over it (*idem*, p. 164). This has led several scholars to view that between pluralists and elitists as a 'non-controversy', for what is being discussed is a form of 'competitive elitism' (Judge, 1995, p. 31).

A criticism, instead, has targeted both élite and pluralist theory, and reads as follows: "Both pluralists and elite theorists conflated geographical places with communities, and power over local government decisions as power *per se*. In so doing, they implicitly imputed an unrealistically high degree of local autonomy. On the one hand, the powerful, whoever they were and however they were identified, were assumed to reside within the relevant boundaries. On the other, the most significant expressions of power were to be seen in an ability to shape local government policies and agendas (Harding, 1995, p. 41)." It is starting from this critique that several Marxist studies of urban politics have developed; subsequent research – growth machine and regime theories – would instead try to refine and update the study of urban power, while taking in some of Marxists' insights.

I.II Marxist theories of urban politics

The emergence of urban Marxist theories in the 1970s had the effect of expanding the research agenda of urban political studies. These works brought attention to the role of overarching economic interests and dynamics, and of class structure, on city politics (Pickvance, 1995, p. 271-272); by so doing, the scope of analysis expanded from what happened within municipal borders to include much wider and sweeping processes, as well as actors operating at different scales, be they regional, national, supra- or international. Furthermore, Marxists offered an understanding of power as 'systemic', meaning that power is connected to certain positions and roles that, because of the overarching capitalist economic system, confers a systemic advantage to certain individuals (Stoker, 1998, p. 122). Overall, Marxist theories laid the foundations for the emergence of the 'political economy' approach that became mainstream between the 1980s and the 1990s and have stimulated the inclusion of new themes in the urban research agenda.

Marxist theories of urban politics view state institutions as instrumental to the capitalist economic system, as they ensure the latter's reproduction. From this perspective, the state apparatus performs two essential functions: an 'accumulation' and a 'legitimation' one (O'Connor, 1973). The former serves to lay down the conditions for capital accumulation to take place, whereas the latter is needed to secure citizens' consent to the system and compliance with its norms (Pickvance, 1995, p. 253). Marxist approaches then vary as to the degree of autonomy they afford to urban governments: while 'instrumentalists' do not admit for any, as city politics – like the overarching state structure – is merely a reflection of capitalist dynamics, 'structuralists' allow for greater autonomy, since the capitalist class does not fully coincide with state institutions (*idem*, p. 254). Marxist theories discussed here fall within this latter perspective.

Manuel Castells (1977; 1978) has for instance argued that state intervention both at national and urban level has ensured the reproduction of the capitalist system. Centrally, policies concerning 'regulation, subsidization and direct provision' (Pickvance, 1995, p. 257) would perform a 'collective consumption' function of the state (*ibid.*); at the city level, the state has implemented specific *ad hoc* policies, generally defined as urban planning, fulfilling the accumulation function and minimising conflicts (*ibid.*) More recently, Castells (1996-98) would focus on the role of technological innovations, especially information technology, and economic globalisation: these forces he deemed responsible for gradually affirming the predominance of 'flows' over 'spaces', heralding the move towards the 'informational city', according to an overarching dynamic of convergence (Le Galès, 2002, p. 92; 147-148).

David Harvey (1989) would instead focus on cities' tendencies towards economic boosterism. The impact of deindustrialization and economic transformations has indiscriminately pushed cities to adopt an 'entrepreneurial' attitude in local political economic matters. While during the previous '*Fordist-Keynesian*' phase of state configuration, cities would most often perform a managerial role, implementing policies flowing from higher tiers of government and would mainly focus on distributive objectives, they would now be expected to take the initiative in devising plans for local economic growth (Harvey, 1989, p. 4). The 'entrepreneurial city' then identifies a development-oriented coalition composed of local administration and the business sector (*idem*, p. 6-7) – often made up of financiers and real estate developers – now operating against a wider institutional backdrop of inter-local competition; most representative of this new approach is the public-private partnership. The common denominator of 'entrepreneurial cities' is the tendency to undertake speculative economic activities – land development, big infrastructure, cultural events – that aim at increasing visibility and appeal for investors but guarantee no sure returns; urban social issues, by contrast, tend to be neglected (*idem*, p. 7-8). This very general trend of convergence, pushed by the dynamics of the capitalist economy, nevertheless allows for a 'relative autonomy' (*idem*, p. 14-15) of cities (read, urban governance coalitions) to search for the best possible strategy to foster local development; such an autonomy, far from being inconsistent with the capitalist economic system, is deemed to be perfectly instrumental to the dynamics of capital accumulation (*ibid.*).

Neil Brenner's work (2004) on state rescaling, mentioned in the previous chapter, builds heavily on Harvey's argument, although the focus is shifted towards state action, and the interaction between national and local policies that produce new territorial spaces for capital accumulation. These intentional and conscious actions underpin a more sweeping process of rescaling, operating simultaneously above and below the national level. Saskia Sassen's *Global City* hypothesis (1991) appears to concede less in the way of local political autonomy, although, as illustrated previously, the expansion of global finance and the concomitant relevance of producer service firms seems to impact some cities more than others – still, the new global urban hierarchy these trends are producing has repercussions over the whole international urban system.

Marxist and neo-Marxist theories have enlarged the research field of urban politics, shifting attention from local power dynamics to the effects of social and economic processes over urban areas; however, albeit conceding something in the way of political autonomy, they put major limits on the availability of real policy options to cities – in Harvey for instance, whatever the specific strategy adopted, there is no alternative to 'economic boosterism'. In the 1980s, then, novel theories tried to put politics back on the agenda.

I.III Community power revisited: 'growth machines' and regime theory

The 'downgrading of politics' (Stoker, 1998, p. 122) highlighted by Marxist scholars then stimulated a revival of community power studies, if in a refined and updated form. These works were however careful to take in some of Marxists' insights, especially with reference to the systemic advantages conferred on the business class by their favoured position in society. Logan and Molotch's 'growth machine' thesis (1987), for instance, is concerned with the privileged political role of business in urban politics; contrary to more deterministic approaches, their argument is "deliberately voluntaristic (Harding, 1995, p. 42)". According to the growth machine thesis, a pivotal role in urban development – rather than urban politics *per se* – is played by rentiers and urban developers, due to the major importance, in cities, of decisions concerning land use. This is because land development can be potentially beneficial to a wide variety of actors; land developers are therefore in a position to guide a coalition of players who have a stake in local development, from local utilities to the media and academic institutions (Harding, 1995, p. 42). As Harding (*idem*, p. 43) notes, the role of political actors is here somewhat undefined as, although they are sure beneficiaries of growth, it is unclear whether they are actual participants of the growth machine. Central to the thesis, in any case, is that politico-economic arrangements favour business interests, which have the capacity and resources to coalesce and drive development. The 'voluntaristic' element of the argument is yet important, as rentiers need the cooperation of other businesses to pursue their goals, and such cooperation is not a given (Harding, 1995, p. 42); furthermore, growth machines are not almighty, and their actions can be successfully challenged by other groups (idem, p. 43).

Another model that developed at the end of the 1980s as a refinement of community power studies, yet taking a political economic perspective, was that of urban regime theory, of which the most well-known elaboration is owed to Clarence Stone (1989, 1993). The regime approach is grounded upon the assumption that political actors alone are not sufficient to carry out complex, non-routine governing tasks, for which they need the cooperation of resourceful actors coming from civil society; regime theorists thus postulate that effective political action can be achieved through cooperation between government and non-government actors. The definition of regime provided by Stone (1989, p. 4, p. 6) is the following: "An informal yet relatively stable group with access to institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions; [...] an urban regime can thus be defined as the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions." As the definition highlights, Stone views regimes as specifically involving *private* actors; although, technically, private actors are not necessarily business players, in practice the business sector is always present in regimes, for it is the better positioned to engage in cooperative arrangement with the political sphere. This is because, in Stone's view, the most fundamental resources to carry out governing decisions, apart from political[30] ones, are economic resources: financial availability, and investment power, which in turn have the potential to increase the local tax base and support employment (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001, p. 812). Since the business community is typically the most endowed with economic resources, it then becomes one of the two fundamental, necessary components of urban regimes. Regimes thus bridge the gap between politics and the market and, structured around cooperative arrangements Stone (1989, p. 232) calls 'civic cooperation', they have an empowering effect on the actors that make them up. Achieving cooperation and, by consequence, an adequate governing capacity, is however not to be taken for granted: it is a feat that requires effort and once achieved, cooperative arrangements need be maintained (Stone, 1989, 1993). In synthesis, for a regime to obtain, four core, necessary elements need to be in place, as identified by Mossberger and Stoker (2001, p. 829):

- "partners drawn from government and nongovernmental sources, requiring but not limited to business participation".
- "collaboration based on social production—the need to bring together fragmented resources for the power to accomplish tasks".
- "identifiable policy agendas that can be related to the composition of the participants in the coalition".
- "a longstanding pattern of cooperation rather than a temporary coalition".

[30] Political resources are the following: the legal decision-making prerogatives, electoral control, and legitimacy.

There are a number of issues with regime theory, the two most important regarding the very definition of the concept and its applicability to non-American contexts. As to the former, I highlighted above that Stone understands a regime to "[…] be defined as the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions (Stone, 1989, p. 6)." But then specifies: "These governing decisions, I want to emphasize, are not a matter of running and controlling everything. They have to do with *managing conflict* and *making adaptive responses* to social change (*ibid.*, italics in original)." The problem is that, in a subsequent work (Stone, 1993) that is meant to clarify the concept, Stone introduces a typology of regimes, some of which do not seem to fit well within Stone's own original definition; these comprise: 1) 'caretaker or maintenance' regimes, devoted to simple service provision, and involving minimal cooperation; 2) pro-growth regime, like Atlanta's, made up of government-business coalitions, and devoted to boosting development by altering land use; 3) middle-class regime, focused on environmental protection, historic preservation and sustainable growth; 4) opportunity expansion regimes, whose aims are to enlarge access to employment and empower weaker segments of the population (Stone, 1993, p. 18-19; Mossberger and Stoker, 2001, p. 813). Inconsistency is most evident in the case of caretaker regimes, mainly focused on routine tasks of service delivery, which requires little cooperation; Stone himself characterizes caretaker regimes as follows: "[they involve] no effort to change established social and economic practice, no extensive mobilization of private resources is necessary and no substantial change in behaviour is called for (Stone, 1993, p. 18)." If a regime is to be able to carry out governing decisions, and if by governing decisions one understands 'managing conflict' and 'making adaptive responses to social change', then caretaker politics appear to have little in common with the more general concept of regime.

To perform their basic functions, caretaker regimes do not, furthermore, require extensive 'civic cooperation: simple coordination is enough for service provision (Stone, 1989, p. 232). Again, if one considers the centrality that Stone (1989, p. 3-11) attributes to cooperation mechanisms within regimes, it is hard to accommodate caretaker regimes within the wider family. This, in turn, signals a further problem that has to do with measurement (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001): how to measure cooperation? When is some cooperation enough to amount as such? These are not minor concerns, as even the simplest of tasks, most often, may very well require a minimum degree of cooperation – which would hardly be enough for Stone. Finally, it is not even clear that caretaker regimes require the presence of 'an informal yet relatively stable group', as the tasks such a regime is expected to carry out do not seem to call for the emergence of a coalition between government and non-government actors.

Then, in middle class- and opportunity expansion- regimes, coordination is necessary, but it does not limit itself to 'informal arrangements' – coercion is often involved, although some voluntariness is still in place. Interestingly, Stone concedes that "investment partnerships can be worked out between government and non-business interests [which can be achieved, for instance] through the use of financial resources from

labour unions (Stone, 1993, p. 20)." Same, in Stone's middle-class regime, 'development must be encouraged or at least not prevented. Progressive mandates thus involve monitoring the actions of institutional elites, and calibrating inducements and sanctions to gain a suitable mix of activity and restriction. The governing task consists of a complex form of regulation (*idem,* p. 19)." Point is, although business somehow participates, if anything merely because of its physical presence, within such regime, the government-business relationship seems to have little in common with that of Atlanta (or, generally, development regimes), which is based on an informal network of civic cooperation based on selective incentives and small opportunities; here, instead, these seem to be replaced by formal incentives and legitimate coercion.

This is to say that, while the description of Atlanta's development regime is very detailed, and such a regime appears to be defined by a number of rather specific features – informality, selective incentives, small opportunities, the network of civic cooperation, etc. – most of these features disappear once other regimes are considered (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001, p. 825). These other regimes, furthermore, do not fit the general and more abstract definition of regime as provided by Stone himself.

A second issue with regime theory concerns its applicability outside of the American context, where the model was developed[31]: in the US, local governments have much less powers, and are much less reliant on central government financial transfers, than their European counterparts, which makes American municipalities more dependent on business actors to carry out policy. In Europe, local political actors retain more competences, resources and a greater scope of action (Harding, 1997); crucially, moreover, although private business can and does sometimes participate in governance coalitions, "[…] It remains the case that coalitions in European cities often tend to be public-public rather than (or as a precursor to) public-private, be they agreements between local authorities and higher levels of government, between different local authorities at the metropolitan level, between various public and quasi-public agencies operating in and on behalf of particular territories or even between different departments of the same bureaucracy (*idem*, p. 300-301)."

II. The move towards neo-institutionalism and its application to urban governance

All the theories described have made major contributions to the study of urban politics. The elitist school has emphasised the role of privileged groups who are capable of influencing politics even if they are not directly involved in the political process. The pluralist critique to elitism would instead emphasise power fragmentation and resource inequalities that characterise society. Pluralist for sure do not deny the existence of elites, but stress how these can be multiple, heterogeneous, and differently involved in various policy areas. Furthermore, elites still need to mediate and come to terms with other elements of a community:

[31] Stone applies the idea of regime to the case study of Atlanta (Stone, 1989).

political actors, for sure, but also the electorate, interest groups, and so on. Marxism has then helped enlarge the scope of analysis, pointing to the role of overarching dynamics that are in part external to the urban environment: socio-economic forces and the national state structure, both of which are crucial in defining the playing field within which urban political life unfolds. The revival of the community power debate of the 1980s has then refocused scholarship on local political issues: the growth machine model did so by looking at the pivotal role urban development plays in driving city policies; regime theory, building on pluralist assumptions as to the fragmentation of society and to the unequal resources endowment that features contemporary polities, has illustrated how informal coalitions comprising business and political actors can increase a city's 'governing capacity'.

By focusing on distinct aspects of urban life, these theories however can only depict certain types of cities, or specific dimensions of city politics; to be sure, apart from the convergence hypothesis upheld by several Marxist scholars, most of the authors mentioned had no ambition of capturing the reality of urban politics in its entirety. This means, very simply, that governing coalitions of the type described by Stone do not obtain in all cities; it also means that city politics is not entirely reduced to urban development issues, although these are surely a major aspect of it. Similarly, societal fragmentation and power dispersion do not imply that in certain cities, economic elites – endowed with disproportionate amounts of resources and power – cannot have an overwhelming influence over local politics. Finally, the fact that sweeping socio-economic processes and state structures are fundamental in defining the conditions for city politics does not meant they do this in the same manner: on the contrary, it is precisely the interplay between these two crucial factors that underpins the variety of urban experiences existing today.

All these models, then, offer a picture of specific types of urban political patterns, each consisting of specific interaction modes between political and non-political actors (with the partial exception of Marxist approaches). As I have defined governance as an informal decision-making practice involving political and non-political actors, the theories described can be viewed as illustrating some features of various modes of governance. To see, however, how different types of governance come about, it is important to look at the factors, both exogenous and endogenous, that underpin them; to do this, I will rely on the insights of neo-institutionalism.

The research perspective that has come to be known under the label of neo-institutionalism has taken centre stage in the social sciences since the beginning of the 1990s. Very broadly, neo-institutionalist scholars view institutions as both (more or less formal) organizations and as systems of norms, values and meanings (Pierre, 2011). Underpinning this approach is an appreciation of institutions, so understood, as central factors in shaping social and political behaviour. While upholding these rather general core assumptions, neo-institutionalists then differ as to the methodological approaches, analytical tools, and methods they employ, so that four neo-institutionalisms now exist (Schmidt, 2006): rational choice, historical, sociological, and discursive institutionalism – I will discuss these in greater detail in the second part

of the chapter. Oddly enough, neo-institutionalism never made its way into urban studies, at least not to the point where it came to be considered a prominent theoretical lens to deal with the theme (Pierre, 2011); on the one hand, this may sound surprising for it seems reasonable to think, at least *prima facie*, that organizational structures and systems of values and norms can shape local governance systems. On the other hand, however, governance "redirects attention from institutions to processes and from the exercise of political and legal authority to public entrepreneurship and public-private partnership (Pierre, 2011, p. 5)." One may then indeed wonder whether neo-institutionalism amounts to a valid approach to carry out research in urban governance.

The main reason to answer this question in the positive has to do with how neo-institutionalists view institutions. What equates the two meanings of institutions – institutions as organizations and institutions as rules, norms, and values – is that both are seen as affecting human behaviour; each of them 'shapes and constrains' (Thelen and Steinmo, 1991) social and political action. Neo-institutionalists then inquire into how these two understandings interact between them, namely how organizations can become vehicles that spread social norms and how these very social norms 'become institutionalized' (Pierre, 2011, p. 6). So defined, neo-institutionalism's scientific commitment is by no means incompatible with the study of urban governance: both institutional structures and systems of meanings and values contribute to defining the specific form urban governance will take in a city; at the same time, city dwellers may aspire, by adopting some governance form, to fashion the local decision-making process and define the locality's objectives in a specific direction. Rather than inadequate in dealing with the theme, then, neo-institutionalism appears quite suitable in identifying the material and ideational elements that underpin a given governance form.

Institutions in the traditional sense of formal organizations, then, still matter greatly with respect to city politics. First, because urban areas are embedded within national institutional frameworks (idem, p. 3). All contemporary states have distinct institutional and administrative frameworks, a peculiar political culture, and they ultimately define the scope of local political autonomy; all these factors contribute to shaping country-specific styles of urban governance. In studying cities, therefore, national institutions are by no means a trivial issue. The flip side of such a consideration is that, as far as urban studies are concerned, "[…] comparative analysis and theory building [are] difficult (*ibid.*)." This has however not prevented the emergence of several theories of urban politics (Judge *et al.*, 1995), but while, in abstract, these should be applicable to a variety of national settings, they often tend to mirror the specific environment which they draw upon. This does not mean that theories of urban politics are necessarily always country-specific, but merely that they travel less well than it is often thought (Pierre, 2011; Harding, 1997).

Local government institutions, too, remain essential components of urban governance. Not only they retain the reins of executive power but, among other reasons, they are still the privileged path for ordinary citizens to have a bearing on municipal politics, as well as the chief mechanism of democratic accountability (Pierre, 2011, p. 15-16). The last point is central, for "holding informal networks or partnerships to political

account is not an option, since they were never elected in the first place (*ibid*.)." Local political institutions, therefore, "remain critical to democratic governance at the urban level (*ibid*.)." Furthermore, the very public-private partnership and informal networks that have recently characterized city politics did not appear out of nowhere, but were, most of the time, the result of purposive decisions taken at government level, both local and national. Local and national government institutions and norms are, thus, a first way in which institutions matter when thinking about urban governance (*ibid.*).

There is, then, a second sense in which institutions are relevant, and this points to the second meaning of institutions, understood as systems of meanings, values and norms (Pierre, 2011, p. 16). In this case, rather than looking at the formal institutional arrangements of municipal governments, what matters are the cultural scripts, practices, and routinized norms that characterize a given city, which help decipher the political objectives that a locality sets for itself. To inquire into this dimension of institutions, the focus should shift to the socio-economic and cultural contexts of urban environments: the economic factors upon which a city's prosperity depends, the social groups that are to be found therein, and their class, political and cultural identities, all contribute to defining the 'political culture' of a city, they underpin the character of local governance, and 'shape and constrain' urban political debate and the city's political objectives**.** So, for instance, a city that owes its fortunes to finance may attempt to equate its goals with those of business, and to structure its governance system accordingly; yet, formal institutions of local government, as well as regional, national, and supra-national regulations may hinder (or facilitate) the attempt; a similar obstructive (or facilitating) role may be played by the other social groups that make up the urban community, who may equate the city's objectives with *their* values and *their* identity and preferences.

For these reasons, I argue, institutionalism is a fully appropriate lens to trace the paths that have led to the emergence of given governance forms; not only, the failure of urban political scholars to employ it more consistently is regrettable. As Pierre (2011, p. 22) maintains: "the focus on process in the current governance literature overlooks the significance of those systems of values and norms which give these processes meaning and purpose." To connect different institutional patterns to modes of governance, then, it is useful to devise a characterization of various ideal types of urban politics governance models: these will provide an analytical tool that will help formulating hypotheses as to which institutional frameworks are conducive to one model rather than another – keeping in mind that, being ideal types, they do not normally exist in their 'pure' forms: in real world scenarios, cities will tend to feature a combination of more than one type. The four ideal types of urban governance I have in mind derive from my own critique of the typology elaborated by Jon Pierre (2011): after illustrating his model, I will highlight what I believe to be its shortcomings, and then introduce my own typology.

III. Four models of urban governance

III.I Managerialist governance

Managerialism is a type of governance that emphasizes the role of non-elected officials, above all senior bureaucrats and managers (Pierre, 2011, p. 29). This type of governance draws much from New Public Management (NPM) principles, which came to occupy mainstream political discourse in the 1980s, especially in the UK and in America, but also in other countries. Very generally, managerial governance entails a division of labour between politicians and managers, whereby the former are in charge of setting out the locality's long-term political and economic objectives, while the latter are left with considerable discretion over how to implement these (*ibid*.). In terms of outcomes, a managerial city may, albeit not necessarily, end up being indeed more efficient in delivering services to its citizens, as well as in containing costs, but this may come to the detriment of democratic accountability (*ibid*.).

As an institution, local government can be understood as performing two essential functions (Keating, 1991): a democratic and an administrative/managerial one. These two dimensions of local government "place different – some might say even inconsistent – demands on local authorities (Pierre, 2011, p. 32)." Sometimes, officials and managers try to balance out these two functions of municipalities; other times, they argue for the priority of one over the other. From the 1980s through the 2000s, the managerial aspect has often been prioritized over the democratic one. The chief reason for this has been identified with the fiscal crisis of the state and of local authorities (Sharpe, 1988); a second motive points instead to the spreading of NPM ideas during the 1980s.

Urban managerialism is sustained by a set of ideas that equate good governance with efficiency: government's administrative duties are to be fulfilled at the lowest cost, provided they cater to the entire community; if this requires putting social service provision in the hands of professionals, then be it. Saving money, furthermore, means having more resources to invest in alternative goals, often coinciding with some strategy for economic development. NPM builds on these ideas, but also departs from them in significant ways: first, it puts a premium on managerial autonomy, which in practice means that political interference should be reduced to the minimum[32]. Second, whereas in traditional managerialism bureaucrats were nonetheless civil servants, and thus expected to adhere to the requirements of public office, NPM favours managers recruited from the private sector, to introduce corporate logics in the running of public service provision.

[32] This qualifies NPM as a particular form of local *government*, rather than *governance* (Keating, 2013). The same does not apply to traditional managerialism. Importantly, as these are ideal types, NPM elements can nonetheless easily coexist with other governance forms.

NPM rests on a fundamental assumption: public-service provision should be equated to service provision of any kind, for there is no "specificity of the public sector as a service provider (Pierre, 2011, p. 36)." Public provision of services, indeed, is seen as the ultimate cause of inefficiency of the system (ibid.); to reduce inefficiencies, the NPM argument goes, private service producers should take over public service delivery; competition among different private players is then expected to 'empower customers' (Pierre, 2011; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). NPM aims at turning service provision into a sort of market, in which the selection of services to be produced results from the exchange between producers and consumers of services, and thus from consumer choice, rather than from the authoritative decisions of politicians (Pierre, 2011, p. 36).

Various instruments have been implemented to realize NPM, or more traditional managerialist principles. The figure of the city manager is perhaps the most distinctive innovation of these modes of governance, epitomizing the centrality of managerial functions in urban affairs. Other tools favour instead the introduction of market principles in service production and delivery: contracting-out, purchaser-provider models and internal markets (*idem*, p. 39-40) all work in the direction of strengthening the role of the market in the allocation of services.

III.II Corporatist governance

This type of governance rests on the extensive participation of civil society organizations in city politics. By civil society organizations, Pierre (2011, p. 49-55) means organized interests, specifically NGOs and voluntary associations, including business organizations, but excluding labour unions. These organizations' involvement in urban politics responds to a twofold rationale: they are means for political and social mobilization, as well as alternative vehicles for service delivery (*idem*, p. 49). Their extensive presence in a city is therefore viewed as a marker of a healthy participatory democratic environment. This model of governance is most typically found in Western Europe, and specifically in its 'small, industrial, advanced democracies' (*idem*, p. 50). Historically, alongside significant civil society participation, these countries have featured a large public sector and display a tradition of state intervention in the economy, all elements connected to a marked collectivist political culture (Pierre, 2011, p. 50; Katzenstein, 1984, 1985; Olsen, 1986).

Civil society organizations primarily intervene at the level of resource redistribution in the locality. From an institutionalist perspective, then, it appears there is a connection between corporatist governance and the presence of comprehensive 'distributive and redistributive policies and programs' (Pierre, 2011, p. 51). For sure, Western European countries feature high-taxes and a sweeping welfare state which, even in an era of welfare retrenchment, remain substantially more generous than in America for instance.

This model of governance is sustained by positive ideas relating to democratic participation and citizen involvement in politics. Contrary to the managerialist model, here it is the democratic dimension of

local government which has taken priority over its managerial one: the city is primarily understood as a participatory and democratic arena geared to the inclusion of 'different social groups and organized interests in the political process' (*idem*, p. 56). Interest representation is therefore pivotal in this case and the political process is chiefly understood as bargaining among different interests. The fundamental role of political authorities, then, is that of mediating the claims of different groups, managing conflict, and sustaining coordinated public-private activity (*ibid*.). Although the main stake for organized interests in this governance model is resource distribution, some of them are likely to aspire, and often succeed, in having a say on the overarching urban political agenda.

Pierre identifies three major groups that seem to have a major role in defining corporatist governance (idem, p. 49-56). One is NGOs, which may encompass a wide array of groups involved in a variety of fields, ranging from poverty to the environment and sports. Professional organizations may also play a role, particularly those comprising public employees, such as doctors' or teachers' associations. Another fundamental group is that of business organizations, typically consisting of Chamber of Commerce and trade associations, whose presence facilitates the interaction between political authority and businesses, among other things[33]. Pierre, then, does not explicitly state why he chose not to include labour unions in the model: one can presume that it is because, in certain cities, especially former manufacturing ones, their presence is so overwhelming that they define a different governance model altogether. However, by their nature, labour unions are indeed interest organizations and their exclusion from the model is somewhat unconvincing – I will come back on this later.

As to the objectives of this model of governance, these are mostly concerned with the value of participation and inclusion *per se*, as indicators of a healthy local democracy, rather than with specific political goals. Moreover, precisely because corporatism features the inclusion of a variety of organized interests, each will have its own specific objectives, which will often collide with those of other groups; in any case, however, all organized interests have a stake in redistribution and resource allocation.

Corporatist governance requires a great deal of organizational and coordination skills on the part of elected officials, as each organization involved in the political process potentially has different needs, objectives, structure, and constituency. Instruments that are typically used in this case are those of 'negotiation, bargaining and information' (*idem*, p. 60); also, financial instruments may be important, especially when civil society organizations, in particular NGOs, may be involved in service delivery (*ibid*.). Yet, the major tasks for the local political authority remain those of mediation and coordination, so that it is probable that the municipality will devote, or create, a specific section of its own structure to deal with a variety of organizations. Finally, "there has to be some sort of framework that regulates the access and influence of organized interests in the city's policies (*idem*, p. 61)."

[33] Pierre also mentions neighborhood associations, but they are mostly relevant in the US context and tend to be single-purpose (Pierre, 2011, p. 54).

III.III Pro-growth governance

Pro-growth governance is a model of urban governance where elected officials closely collaborate with the local business élite in the pursuit of economic growth. Clarence Stone's (1989) work on Atlanta is arguably the most well-known case in the urban politics literature of a coalition of politicians and business players that pool their resources to spur development. A coalition between political and business actors is typical of this form of governance, although, for the reasons mentioned above, I prefer not to adhere to the tenets of regime theory.

The main driver for this type of governance lies in business' control of substantial financial resources, which the local government is very often in dire need for. The significance of business for pro-growth governance arrangements, in any setting, is almost self-evident: not only they control considerable moneys, but they are seen as the drivers of economic growth – they provide employment, they pay taxes, typically more than ordinary citizens, they may attract other businesses, as well as infrastructural investment, to which they may also contribute. A solid and, possibly, resourceful business community is thus the quintessential ingredient for this model of governance, which can be found in a variety of institutional settings.

As to the objectives, again, these are explicit: economic growth. Apart from the consideration that private business is the main engine of economic growth, another set of beliefs sustains this governance model. One is the idea, well described by the notion of 'trickle-down-effect', that economic growth benefits everyone, since it increases the local state's revenues, it offers employment, and so forth. It goes beyond my purpose here to judge the validity of this assumption; for now, it suffices to say this conviction often upholds pro-growth governance. A second reason sustaining this model has to do with business mobility: very simply, most business can relocate and move around. Against such background, it is in a city's interest to offer a local environment that is, to the largest extent possible, business friendly. A pro-growth governance model is therefore seen as the most likely to cater to the business class, present and prospective, for it will orient local policy towards business interests and it will probably be concerned with shaping an urban environment that is attractive to business.

This governance model is obviously backed by the business class and, very often, by local politicians themselves. To politicians, having the business class on their side is an asset, not only because of the financial resources that the latter can make available, but also because politics can then take credit if the economy grows (which is by no means guaranteed). Whether other constituencies will support pro-growth governance will mostly depend on the outcomes: the more benefit, the more will support it.

Among the instruments the model displays, the first is a political tool: a coalition between the business élite and local government. This may not necessarily be tantamount to Atlanta's urban regime[34], but most of such coalitions will feature the informal involvement of the business class in the agenda setting process, they will tend to favour business interests, and may hinder accountability. Apart from this, Pierre points out that "there is very little that the city can do itself to generate growth (Pierre, 2011, p. 82)." So, most of the strategies a city will pursue in this respect will aim at creating a favourable environment for businesses, either to stay or to relocate in the city: building infrastructure, investing in culture and leisure, keeping social conflict low, and so on. Apart from these actions, and pace Pierre, there is one thing that most cities that embark on a growth strategy do: this consists in increasing land value by altering land use, which also employs and strengthens the construction sector. This is something that has been noted by many authors (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Stone, 1989; Mossberger and Stoker, 2001), and that has been applied in many a city: from booming mega-cities to not-so-fortunate declining manufacturing centres. A further instrument is that of public-private partnerships (Pichierri, 2011), that is, projects of various kind where public and private actors not only pool resources but must necessarily engage one another in the process of defining the project's objectives and features.

III.IV Welfare governance

Welfare governance is an arrangement that has emerged after the phase of economic restructuring that started at the end of the 1970s. It mainly serves to accommodate the decline that had been brought about by deindustrialization and the overall loss of competitiveness of the local economic base. In these cities, the private sector has been weakened and has little residual capacity to employ the vast working population, mainly unskilled and under-educated. As unemployment is widespread, the public sector provides the necessary safety net to sustain part of the population, typically through state welfare programs, unemployment support, or social security (Pierre, 2011, p. 88-89). In welfare cities, endogenous prospects for growth are few, and state support is what keeps the populace's living standards at an acceptable level.

Welfare cities are typically old manufacturing centres, where industrial production was chiefly based on the big Fordist plant and was focused on traditional heavy industries, such as shipbuilding, steelmaking and, later, automobiles. The working class would amount to a major proportion of the overall urban working population. Common working conditions, labour union involvement and the presence of strong communist or labour parties (in Europe), characterized these cities as leaning towards a marked radical left political orientation (Pierre, 2011). Industrial decline, then, would lead to massive manufacturing unemployment and limited growth prospects.

[34]In terms of cohesiveness, durability, and surrounding institutional context.

At this point, the city is left with two options (Pierre, 2011, p. 90): either try to restructure its economy, by adopting some sort of pro-growth[35] strategy – but this is difficult because the city lacks the dynamic private sector that could inject the resources needed to revive the local economy; or go along with decline – this alternative, on the other hand, cannot be sustained indefinitely, for it requires a constant inflow of governmental transfers that will eventually dry up. If left-wing parties succeed in taking city hall, the second option is likely. Welfare cities, thus, are heavily dependent on the state's welfare system, which provides the main 'influx of capital into the [local] economy (*idem*, p. 93)." The central state, therefore, has a vital role to play in this governance model, where local politicians spend most of their energies in trying to ensure that government transfers are sufficient; little time, or will, is left, then, to try and revive the locality's economic base[36].

In the US, these are typically the former manufacturing centres of the 'rustbelt'. While American cities such as Detroit have relied heavily upon federal transfers, the absence of left-wing, or communist parties would produce a much less radical local political culture; in Western Europe, by contrast, welfare governance would normally be the most radical and politicized among the four models so far discussed (*idem*, p. 93). Further, especially in Europe, much of the working population tends to be unionized, and union presence is a second defining feature (after central-state dependency) of this model.

Turning, then, to the model's objectives, these are chiefly distributive: the local political class, the unions, and a major part of the local citizenry wants to keep the transfer flow high and constant. Trying to revive the local economy, also, is a latent goal, an objective necessity some may say, but it does not necessarily surface in the political agenda. As to the instruments of this governance type, the chief one consists in the connection with and access to the central state and its welfare programs. Additionally, these cities typically display an engaged civil society as well as active unions and mass-parties: these provide an essential contribution to furthering the city's case for welfare support and entertain relationships with the central state.

III.V The four models revisited

Pierre's typology has the merit of identifying four very broad categories of urban political frameworks that can be viewed to be rather widespread, at least in the Western world[37]. There are, however, some critiques to the model that I believe are in order. The first is analytical: two models – corporatist and

[35] Even in this case, however, nothing ensures that the attempt will be met with success (Pierre, 2011).
[36] "[...] because of the uncertainties involved in such a strategy and also the need to develop networks with the corporate sector, which for political reasons is not seen as an attractive option (Pierre, 2011, p. 93)."
[37] Even here, however, certain models are more typical of either the US or Europe: corporatist cities, as Pierre noted, tend to be found in Norther Europe; even the welfare city model, although declining manufacturing towns have been commonplace in the US, describes a political constellation – radical left parties in particular – that can be more easily found in Europe.

managerialist – are defined, chiefly, by reference to the actors that compose them and only contain a marginal mention of the objectives they pursue. For instance, the fact that the goal or, better, rationale of corporatist cities are those of wide democratic participation and redistribution says little about the actual strategic objectives a given corporatist governance system sets for itself. Similarly, in the case of managerialist governance, cost containment appears, at best, as an instrumental goal: the specific strategies and objectives that a managerialist city pursues are, again, depend on individual cases. By contrast, the description of pro-growth city governance starts from the model's objective – indeed, growth – and mentions the interaction and interdependence of business and political actors in pursuing such a strategy; it is mentioned that several other actors may join the 'coalition', but it is not clear which and on what basis. As to welfare governance, its characterisation most heavily relies on a city's socio-economic structure; in this case, both objectives and actors are spelled out and Pierre is careful to note the differences in political culture between Europe (more radicalised and unionised) and America. Two issues, however, I believe are identifiable: first, the apparently exclusive connection between welfare governance and manufacturing past; surely, many such cities have had Fordist-manufacturing history, but if the overarching defining characteristic of this governance system is its reliance on welfare programmes and its tendency to accommodate decline, there are then other, non-manufacturing cities that share this feature. Several cities in underdeveloped areas of Europe have only had a limited industrial development and have yet been faced with limited growth prospects and severe unemployment problems: this is the case of several southern European cities (Saraceno *et al*., 2002), which can mostly be found in southern Italy and certain regions of Spain and Portugal. In the case of southern Italian cities, for instance, although receiving welfare benefits and redistribution amount to chief objectives of these sort of cities, the governance structure that characterises them is rather peculiar: the presence of a significant unionised workforce is minimal and labour unions, generally, do not feature prominently within the local system; apart from third sector cooperatives and family ties, welfare programmes are mostly filtered by the local party political machine, often through mechanisms of patronage and on a discretional basis (Mingione, 2002). In sum, cities displaying different socio-economic structures and different governance systems may share, as overarching objective, that of receiving welfare assistance. As mentioned, southern Italian cities that feature a heavy reliance on welfare (be it formal or informal in nature) tend to be characterised by governance structures dominated by formal administrative bodies and political party (Mingione, 2002, p. 65-66): that is, a system of government, rather than governance. However, local government systems dominated by parties (which I will call 'party-government' cities) have been rather common in Italy and Europe in general and have not necessarily been characterised by welfare-seeking strategies. All of this is to say that, from an analytical perspective, characterising governance types on the basis of both actor composition *and* political objectives may lead to inconsistencies: indeed, both managerialist and corporatist cities may pursue a strategy of growth; cities that aim at receiving welfare may instead display different socio-economic, and thus governance, structures.

A second critique aimed at Pierre's types concerns his specific choice not to include labour unions in the corporatist model. It is true that, in formerly Fordist-manufacturing cities labour unions normally play a more prominent role than they do in other corporatist, non-manufacturing cities. However, this does not mean that labour unions are absent from the latter nor that other civic organisations are not present in the former. Indeed, as Pierre himself notes, what he defines as welfare governance "often sees a lively civil society and active mass-membership organised interests, protective of their constituencies (Pierre, 2011, p. 98)." Further, not only Pierre claims that welfare and corporatist governance 'share the presence of strong organised interests' (Idem, p. 95), but goes on to say that that of welfare cities is a "particular kind of corporatism (ibid.)," one that chiefly focuses on the defence of its citizens' welfare entitlements. This, however, is perfectly consistent with the definition of corporatist governance as a system where various organised interests put a premium on political participation and redistribution: the specific objectives and strategies a given corporatist city will pursue, will then depend on the particular 'balance of power' that obtains among the various organised interests in that city. Furthermore, the role of interest mediation and negotiation that characterises public institutions in corporatist cities is also typical of welfare ones. In sum, I deem Pierre's definition of welfare city as unsatisfactory, because what is actually being described is a corporatist city that, above all, seeks welfare assistance; on the other hand, moreover, other cities that seek welfare assistance are not corporatist, nor have had a manufacturing past.

For these reasons, I propose to modify Pierre's classification of governance models, by eliminating the 'objectives' from the defining features of a given governance system. In this way, what characterises governance are chiefly the actor constellation, the type of interaction that obtains between political and non-political actors and, at best, the *rationale* – rather than the objectives – underpinning a given mode of governance. So, for instance, in the case of managerialist cities it is perfectly consistent to state that cost containment and efficient service provision underpin such a model, in which however a variety of specific policy objectives can be pursued. Similarly, corporatist cities, which feature a high degree of civic participation and a focus on redistribution, may either be seeking growth or welfare assistance, depending on which interest organisation is more influential.

My adjusted typology of governance models will then still comprise both managerial and corporatist cities; welfare cities are not present, as they are included in the corporatist model. The pro-growth city is eliminated too, as it is chiefly defined by reference to its objective, rather than by its actor constellation; in its stead, I will include a pluralist model, which I will discuss more in detail shortly. Finally, I will add a fourth model, although this is actually a type of government, rather than governance, that is, 'party-government cities'; this will also serve to classify the four models along a 'governance spectrum', that runs from no governance to full governance, as shown in figure 1.

No governance → Intermediate governance → Governance

Party-government	Corporatism & managerialism	Pluralism

Figure 1.

Whereas party-government is a system essentially dominated by political parties, sometimes even a single party, and formal local government institutions, pluralism is the system which better embodies governance, where interaction between political and non-political actors is based on public-private cooperation, mutual trust, and informality. In between are both corporatism and managerialism: in these two systems, non-political actors do indeed participate to the political process, but their involvement is often structured and more formalised than in pluralist systems. This, however, does not mean informality and non-structured interactions are not present: several of the instruments of managerialist governance – contracting out, public-private partnerships – may rely on extensive cooperation between political and private actors.

The two alternative models that I have included in the typology – pluralism and party government – have been partially described already. The core features of the pluralist model are those described by Dahl in *Who Governs?,* where a variety of actors are involved, to different degrees and in different policy areas, in the political process. As we have seen, pluralism does not deny the existence of elites and it does acknowledge that some groups are seldom to never involved in decision-making: merely, the claim is that no single group can hold the reins of decision-making – economic élites, for instance, need to come to terms and negotiate with political actors – and the patterns of interaction are, *a priori*, indeterminate. In some cases, proper governance coalitions between economic and political actors may emerge; in other cases, these coalitions may include further actors, such as universities, civic organisations, labour unions and so on; in others still, a variety of groups is involved in decision-making in a more haphazard fashion, different coalitions arise in connection to different issues and their nature may often be temporary. In the latter case, some authors have coined the terms 'street fighting pluralism' (Yates, 1977) or 'hyper-pluralism' (Savitch and Thomas, 1991). A pro-growth urban strategy based on a coalition between business and political élites (à la Stone) is therefore perfectly compatible with the pluralist model, but it is not the only form the latter may take. Considering the privileged position of business groups, pluralist governance will almost always involve business participation of some kind. This, however, should not be seen as implying that growth will be the paramount objective of such cities: businesses may merely try to pursue their particular goals by realising specific projects in cooperation with public actors, without thereby trying to influence the overarching urban political strategy. In pluralist governance of any kind, then, the rationale is that, since power and resources are dispersed and unequally possessed, cooperation among different actors serves to pool resources to realise their projects.

Party-government cities are instead systems where the political process is dominated by parties, most typically from within formal government institutions. The way parties run the local government

machine and interact with their constituencies, then, may vary. In certain cities, parties may try to genuinely cater to their constituencies by protecting their interests legitimately; by addressing their electors' needs and by proving themselves as good administrators, parties pursue their ambition of maintaining their grip on power. In other cases, such as that of poor peripheral cities of Southern Italy, political parties may often try to hold on to power (maintaining power is this model's underlying rationale) by recurring to patronage and cultivating their own clienteles. What characterises this model, generally, is that the party tries to control the entirety of the city's administrative branches: not only local government, but municipal companies, utilities, and the bureaucratic machine.

In sum, we then have four governance models, defined mainly by their actor constellations and by their underlying rationale; the specific policy goals that will be pursued, then, will depend, but are not considered as defining elements of these governance structures.

Table 1.

	Actors involved in political process	Interaction pattern among actors involved in political process	Underlying rationale
Party-government city	Political parties only	none	Self-reproduction of party/maintaining grip on power.
Corporatist city	Political actors + organized interests	Mainly structured negotiation and mediation of interests.	Increased political participation and distribution.
Managerial city	Political actors + bureaucrats + private service providers	Division of labour between political and bureaucratic actors; contracts and market interactions with private service providers.	Cost containment, efficient service delivery.
Pluralist city	Political actors + heterogenous coalitions of actors, typically involving some business component.	Informal; negotiation, coordination, non-binding strategic planning; public-private partnerships.	Resource pooling to increase governing capacity.

A few final comments on this typology. First, consistent with Pierre's acknowledgment that theories of urban politics do not travel well (Pierre, 2011, p. 3), this typology is specifically conceived having the European context in mind. Party government cities are not likely in the US, as local politics there is often non-partisan, eliminating the essential condition upon which party-government systems may thrive. This consideration already identifies the chief institutional frameworks underpinning this model. Party government cities can typically be found in urban polities where parties play a paramount role in the local

political culture: this was true for most of Western Europe at least until the fall of the Soviet Union, but in several cases even after that; this type of system also benefits from the weakness of state institutions, which struggle to contain the bloating of political parties and are often managed as party possessions. Italy's first republic aptly exemplifies this framework: for instance, Palermo, in Sicily, was run by a Christian Democrat-led coalition – and by Christian Democrat mayors – uninterruptedly from 1948 until 1992.

Corporatism is then typical of societies displaying a "large public sector, redistributive policies, comprehensive welfare state service provisions, a high degree of political involvement, proportional representation and strong voluntary associations (Pierre, 2011, p. 50)": western European countries fit this description, but corporatism is not limited to these: as Pierre notes, Singapore has, for instance, structured a peculiar corporatist governance system (*idem*, p. 49). Managerialist governance types have instead emerged in a period when the state's fiscal crisis would encourage the search for policy solutions that focused on cost-containment; it should come as no surprise, therefore, that such a model – a fiscally conservative model – has been advocated for, and experimented with, the most in countries led, in those years, by conservative political forces, such as Thatcher's UK. The model, however, has been widely applied in the last decades as a response to the general problems posed by the fiscal crisis (Sharpe, 1998) affecting many urban settings. Pluralism, finally, is a type of governance that does not necessarily rest on precise characteristics, except for the presence of a minimally heterogeneous local society.

Finally, it is important to recall that these are ideal types and in real world scenarios, cities often display a combination of more than one type of governance. Having now defined these four ideal types, it is time to look at what neo-institutionalism has to say with respect to the process of governance formation.

IV. Neo-institutionalist understandings of governance formation

IV.I Historical and sociological institutionalism: core elements

Drawing on the variants of neo-institutional theory, Sorensen and Torfing (2007) have attempted to spell out the processes of governance[38] formation. As they concede themselves, such processes were not necessarily understood as proper theories of governance formation by their original authors (Rhodes, 1997a & b; Jessop, 1998, 2002; March and Olsen, 1995; Powell and DiMaggio, 1983, 1991); yet, on the basis of works by institutional theorists, Sorensen and Torfing (2007) have reconstructed various possible

[38] Sorensen and Torfing (2007) specifically refer to network governance. As I have illustrated in the previous chapter, the definition of governance I employ comprehends the notion of governance as networks; moreover, elements of network governance have been observed to be present in my case study, that of Turin (Bobbio, Dente, Spada, 2005; Dente and Coletti, 2011) The hypotheses Sorensen and Torfing have reconstructed as to governance formation, then, are suitable to my research purposes.

explanations as to the causes of governance emergence, declined according to the different neo-institutionalist approaches.

Very briefly, what do the various neo-institutionalist traditions[39] have to say about governance formation? The historical institutionalist tradition views governance as formed by the interaction of independent actors who react to the institutional fragmentation brought about by the implementation of managerialist or New Public Management principles; what underlies actors' actions is their 'mutual resource dependencies' (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007, p. 18). The proper formation process, then, normally consists of an 'incremental, bottom-up process', although political authorities may support their adoption as tools of public policymaking (*ibid*.). The governance structure so formed is then maintained by the participants' "mutual interdependence, which facilitates negotiation, compromise and joint learning processes (*ibid*.)."

Sociological institutionalism too views governance formation as a bottom-up process through which various independent actors come together. Here, however, it is the logic of appropriateness that which drives the selection of appropriate partners in the governance structure; further, once governance is established, isomorphic pressures in turn often determine the emergence of the network's own logic of appropriateness. In this case, what sustains governance is the articulation of shared identities and common values, which then keeps participants together (*idem*, p. 19).

Historical and sociological institutionalism can be compatible, but they rest on different ontological and methodological assumptions. Generally, historical institutionalism mainly focuses on institutions themselves, whereas sociological institutionalism is concerned with both institutions and agency; the two perspectives also hold a different understanding of institutions themselves. Historical institutionalism understands institutions as historically developed structures that reflect the power distribution of a given society and explains institutional evolution according to a 'logic of path-dependence'; in sociological institutionalism, instead, institutions are viewed as socially and culturally constructed, while actors act on the basis of a 'logic of appropriateness' (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Schmidt, 2006). Because of its focus on institutional structures, historical institutionalism, on its own, has had a hard time accounting for human agency and has thus turned, alternatively, either to rational choice or to sociological explanations to integrate its arguments (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Thelen, 1999). My intention to deploy both historical and sociological institutionalism is driven by the assumption that both structures and agency have a crucial role to play as to the formation of governance: institutional fragmentation may well be an essential condition, but it is then actors who come together to form a governance structure. Employing both historical and sociological institutionalism then entails adopting an eclectic approach with respect to the construction of the hypotheses

[39] I will deploy, as methodological underpinning of my work, mainly a combination of historical and sociological institutionalism (with incursions into the discursive school); since the sociological institutionalism is hardly compatible with rational choice, because of a different ontological understanding of preference and identity formation, I will leave rational choice out of my overview.

that will guide my work; thus, before turning to a more detailed discussion of historical and sociological (and discursive) institutionalism, I will now briefly go over the tenets of analytical eclecticism.

IV.II Analytical Eclecticism

Sil and Katzenstein (2011) have offered a defence of analytic eclecticism that primarily rests on considerations that underline the limits of 'paradigm-bound' research. Paradigm-bound research, it is argued, has produced several research traditions or, indeed, paradigms (Sil and Katzenstein, 2011; Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1970; Laudan, 1977, 1996), which have ended up erecting barriers among each other, so that scientific knowledge appears 'compartmentalized', encaged within separate approaches that communicate little among each other. As a result, paradigm-bound research is too often self-referential, for sure producing worthy works that, nonetheless, appear somewhat incomplete if they are not measured against and integrated with knowledge produced within other paradigms; the risk is that research so conducted may become a 'hindrance to understanding' (Sil and Katzenstein, 2011, p. 1; Hirschman, 1970). Analytical eclecticism is a response to this weakness and aims at bridging the gap between different schools and approaches that typically treat similar, or the same, topics with different analytical tools; the underlying claim is that both scholars and policy-makers, as well as social science overall, would benefit from it.

Sil and Katzenstein (2011, p. 6-7) employ a notion of paradigm that is equivalent to that of research tradition as offered by Laudan (1977, 1996). Research traditions emerge as a result of the centrality of 'long-enduring epistemological commitments' (Sil and Katzenstein, 2011, p. 6-7), which define the boundaries and the subject matter of 'scientific research in any given field' (*ibid*.). Such research traditions comprise: 1) "A set of beliefs about what sorts of entities and processes make up the domain of inquiry; and 2) a set of epistemic and methodological norms about how the domain is to be investigated, how theories are to be tested, how data are to be collected, and the like. (Laudan, 1996, p. 83; Sil and Katzenstein, 2011, p. 7)." The notion of research tradition, the authors argue, is to be preferred to those of 'paradigm' and 'research program', introduced respectively by Kuhn (1962) and Lakatos (1970), because it is more flexible, as it acknowledges that "different research traditions not only coexist, but frequently react to each other; [furthermore, they] are not mutually exclusive when it comes to the empirical realities they interpret (Sil and Katzenstein, 2011, p. 7)." As opposed to paradigms so understood, analytic eclecticism builds on "a pragmatic set of assumptions [and] downplays rigid epistemic commitments [...] (*idem*, p. 2)." At the same time, analytic eclecticism does not aim at doing away with paradigms: on the contrary, since it draws heavily from them, the goal is to highlight connections among these (*idem*, p. 3).

Paradigm-bound research offers several advantages to the researcher that have the potential to facilitate his/her work: being endowed with common epistemic assumptions, methods, standards, and a common language, scholars can proceed in a more disciplined fashion, and produce 'parsimonious

arguments' (*idem*, p. 8). When a research field is still underdeveloped, it is probably wiser to conduct research within paradigms; analytic eclecticism becomes fruitful only once research traditions are rather mature, for its rationale is to connect bodies of knowledge that are already well developed, not to create them anew. Parsimony and shared metatheoretical vistas, however, tend to lead to simplifications that overlook or bracket important aspects of social reality (*ibid*.); the scientific objective of analytic eclecticism is precisely that of producing 'richer explanations' (*idem*, p. 3). Sil and Katzenstein thus define as eclectic "any approach that seeks to extricate, translate, and selectively integrate analytic elements – concepts, logics, mechanisms and interpretations – of theories or narratives that have been developed within separate paradigms but that address related aspects of substantive problems that have both scholarly and practical significance (*idem*, p. 10)[40]." By 'selectively integrating' analytic elements of different theories, advocates of analytic eclecticism are implicitly acknowledging the value of such theories. Eclecticism, therefore, is an attempt to overcome the rigidities and limitations of paradigm-bound research, so as to arrive, truly, at 'richer explanations'; the approach thus recognizes the merits of separate research traditions and draws from them.

Analytic eclecticism, then, is a problem-oriented approach characterized by three features, which are the following: 1) "open-ended problem formulation encompassing complexity of phenomena, not intended to advance or fill gaps in paradigm-bound scholarship; 2) middle-range causal account incorporating complex interaction among multiple mechanisms and logics drawn from more than one paradigm; 3) findings and arguments that pragmatically engage both academic debates and the practical dilemmas of policymakers/practitioners (*idem*, p. 19)." As to the first feature, the basic idea is, contrary to analytic approaches that simplify reality, that eclecticism aims at mirroring the complexity and multifaceted nature of the social world. Because of this, trying to provide an account of reality that reflects its intricacy takes priority over goals that are typical of paradigm-bound research, such as testing theories or filling literature gaps. This is not to mean these are unworthy ambitions, neither that eclectic scholars have no interest in them: merely, they are not their first purpose (*ibid.*). The second feature derives instead from a consideration: eclectic work takes into account, and may encompass, different causal mechanisms and different processes, each reflecting given ontological and epistemological foundations – this makes sense, as an open understanding of causality flows from the open-ended approach to problem formulation. For this reason, eclecticism cannot accord causal primacy to any specific ontology; divides such as those between structure and agency, or between material and ideational foundations of the social world, matter little and need be bridged, if one wishes to offer an accurate picture that takes into account the complexity of social reality. Consequently, "eclectic research will typically produce neither universal theories nor idiographic narratives, but something approximating […] 'theories of the middle range' (*idem*, p. 21-22)." As to the latter feature, the relevance of eclectic work with respect to real world problems, this again flows from the

[40] Italics in original.

ambition to overcome self-referential paradigm-bound scholarship. The latter, indeed, risks producing works that are of interest only within the restricted academic circles that uphold the same paradigm; by trying to connect different research traditions, and by producing more complex and nuanced work, eclecticism hopes to engage a wider public and acquire relevance beyond academia – possibly among actual policymakers. Arguably, it is not so easy to tell whether a piece of work has effectively satisfied this last criterion, as Sil and Katzenstein themselves admit (*idem*, p. 212).

These are, in essence, the main characteristics of analytic eclecticism. In trying to keep together different aspects of reality, "Eclectic modes of analysis trace the dialectical and evolving relationship between individual and collective actors in [the social world], on the one hand, and the material and ideational structures that constitute the contexts within which these actors form and pursue their preferences, [on the other] (*idem*, p. 37)." One of the fields where eclecticism has made inroads is institutionalism, where the different metatheoretical assumptions employed by its four variants have been loosened (idem, p. 220). The final section of this chapter will focus on the new institutionalisms and on how I intend to connect them.

IV.III Historical and sociological institutionalist accounts of governance formation

The historical approach sees institutions as 'regularized practices' (Schimdt, 2006), that is, the set of "formal and informal rules, norms and procedures" (Sorsensen and Torfing, 2007, p. 31) that shape action. To inquire into institutions so understood, scholars focus on how these structures are established through time, maintaining that their development follows a path-dependent trajectory. Institutions then seldom reflect the precise purposes of their initiators: actions, even when purposive, may very easily produce unintended consequences, and unpredictable intervening events, such as abrupt crises, may further impact on their institutional realization. The contingencies that contribute to shaping institutional structures, moreover, account for how these, in turn, may fulfil their functions in sub-optimal ways.

As anticipated above, historical institutionalism views governance as a response to institutional splintering and reorganisation brought about by the introduction of managerialist principles (Sorsensen and Torfing, 2007; Rhodes, 1997a, p. 45). Within an institutional environment characterised by the proliferation of public agencies, governance serves as a tool that simplifies and enhances coordination tasks among various agencies. Institutional reform, then, is the ultimate cause of governance, as it pushes actors to find a solution to deal with organisational fragmentation: governance, then, is the aggregate outcome of actors' actions. Throughout the process of governance formation, then, actors' interaction and coordination lead to the articulation of 'particular rules, norms and procedures [that] might help to highlight and reinforce [...] mutual dependency between the actors and to regulate [...] access to the governance network (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007, p. 31-32). Sorensen and Torfing then point to how institutionalised norms concerning 'holistic governance' and 'teamwork' uphold actors' awareness of their mutual interdependency; institutionalised

rules and practices, on the other hand, provide the criteria on which to select appropriate governance members (*idem*, p. 32).

In sociological institutionalism, institutions are viewed as overarching frameworks of meanings, value systems, beliefs, and cognitive frames (Schmidt, 2006). Political action is underpinned by and encapsulated within such contexts that, moreover, inform the outcomes of proper organizational structures, which then also have 'symbolic and ceremonial' meanings (*idem*, p. 4). It is such a sweeping system of meanings and beliefs that not only guides action, but also defines the setting within which people form their preferences and identities and frames the contours of what can be deemed legitimate action, according to a 'logic of appropriateness'. Contrary to the rational choice model, whereby interests are prior to institutions as well as to culture and norms, sociological institutionalists assume interests to be constituted by the institutional setting, which comprises culture, norms, beliefs, and identities; interests are therefore *endogenous* (Schmidt, 2006, p. 4).

Sociological institutionalism can offer both a micro- and macro-level explanation as to how governance forms. The micro-level view focuses on how different, yet interdependent organisations interact, and relies on the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1995). The idea is that, again due to resource interdependencies, some organisations try to 'contact' other organisations, basing their choices not so much on rational calculation, but on "institutional norms specifying who it is appropriate to contact (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007, p. 35-36)." These 'contacts' between organisations are repeatedly reassessed by actors, according to the specific frames of reference that characterise their own given group. Contacts that, through time, prove to be fruitful, again according to the logic of appropriateness, may then be replicated until governance emerges; this, in turn, may develop its own logic of appropriateness. This micro-level understanding is then complemented by a macro-level, top-down view (Powell and DiMaggio, 1983). The idea, in this case, is that isomorphic pressures push organisational fields to implement certain organising frameworks, which can then spread to various settings. Yielding to isomorphic pressures is, for organisations, a way to obtain legitimacy, especially when they operate in conditions of uncertainty (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007, p. 36).

IV.IV Historical, sociological, and discursive institutionalism: mechanisms

The historical approach emphasizes how institutions – understood as sets of 'regularized practices – reflect the power constellation that is found in a certain community. With such a view of institutions in mind, then, scholars have tended to explain institutional continuity and change as two separate moments, involving different mechanisms (Thelen, 2003). With respect to change, which also refers to institutional innovation and/or genesis, historical institutionalism has generally invoked the concept of 'critical juncture'. Critical junctures are moments in which the circumstances that had, up to a given time, sustained some institutional

configuration, change; these are often, but not only, exogenous shocks, such as wars or economic crises, or major changes in the international political order. The idea is that these moments of change interact with a social fabric characterized by the coexistence, and interplay, of different 'institutional orders' (Thelen, 1999, p. 383): change affecting one of these orders, or realms, will in turn affect other institutional realms. Throughout this process, the timing and sequencing of events is key (*idem*, p. 388) in determining eventual outcomes; as Thelen highlights, this is a "perspective that examines political and economic development in historical context and in terms of processes unfolding over time and in relation to each other, within a broader context in which developments in one realm impinge on and shape developments in others (*idem*, p. 390)." Institutions, thus, tend to emerge, or change, in such shifting, 'configurative' (Thelen, 1999, p. 388; Katznelson, 1997) moments in time. Such 'configurative moments', then, are phases of change and innovation characterized by agency, choice and contingency (Thelen, 2003, p. 212, 218; Capoccia, 2015). The ability of critical junctures in accounting for change, however, is offset by their limited capacity to explain continuity (Thelen, 1999, p. 392).

To address this issue, historical institutionalist scholars have turned to the idea of path-dependence. Institutional continuity and adaptation are, in the path dependence literature, explained by the mechanism of feedback effects (or increasing returns). The idea draws from, and refines, an economic historical model used to explain technological trajectories – the most well-known argument being that of the 'QWERTY' keyboard (Thelen, 1999, 2003). In the original technological model, the mechanism works as follows: once a given technology is adopted it can, for contingent and unforeseen reasons, obtain an edge over other similar technologies, even though on the long run it proves to be less efficient than these latter alternatives. The core idea is that having an initial advantage is key, for the spreading of a technology leads the surrounding social environment (firms, individuals, etc.) to adapt to it, producing a feedback effect. This is because an initial adaptation, on the part of the surrounding actors (firms produce keyboards with *that* given key order, individuals learn how to type in *that* way, etc.), reinforces the original choice of technology; shifting to an alternative technology, at a later moment, would then be more costly – even if the alternative technology were better – so that the first choice is sort of 'locked in', making change at subsequent moments in time less likely. The idea with politics is pretty much the same: once a given institution is established, even for contingent reasons, social actors then react to it by adapting, adopting strategies and behaviours that are geared towards the new institution, and thus reinforce it; the more time goes by, the less likely it is for alternative patterns to be chosen (Thelen, 2003, p. 219-220).

Understood this way, path dependency and critical junctures may risk depicting an institutional and political reality where static phases of stability (path-dependency) can only be interrupted by the intervention of exogenous shocks (critical junctures) that reshuffle the institutional framework and provide the novel conditions upon which a new institutional structure may then develop, again, according to a new path-dependent trajectory. Indeed, in the literature, institutional change and continuity are treated as two

separate issues, each explained by a specific mechanism, whereas, actually, it may well be that gradual changes are already occurring during phases of stability and then release their full force when critical junctures intervene. To account for this process of gradual, incremental change, Kathleen Thelen (2003) has elaborated the concepts of 'institutional layering' and 'institutional conversion'. The underlying idea is that, during phases of institutional change, which may have been brough about by a 'critical juncture', the design of new institutions, or the restructuring of old ones, does not happen in a vacuum, so that actors involved in the process have some kind of institutional legacy to refer to (which they may then choose to ignore, of course); similarly, in phases of institutional stasis, i.e. continuity, institutions do not remain immutable: adaptation, yet, does not only occur in the initial phases of the life of an institution, as the path-dependent model would make appear (*idem*, p. 220). Institutional layering, then, refers to the addition of new institutions, or practices within an institution, without eliminating the old ones; what is crucial is that these additions do not produce a feedback mechanism, that is, they do not "push developments further along the same path (Thelen, 2003, 226)," but alter the institutional trajectory altogether. As way of example, Thelen (idem, p. 226-227) mentions public pension systems, which, for various reasons, are quite hard to reform; because of this, rather than reforming the system, the legislator may introduce a private pension scheme that will coexist with the public one; the presence of the private scheme, however, may impact on the overall support for the public system, as some of its core constituencies – the middle classes – may opt for the private one. Institutional conversion, by contrast, refers to a change in the purpose of an institution. This can be due to either a change in external circumstances, or the inclusion of new groups within the institution. Several examples can be drawn from, for instance, industrial firms whose production during World War II was devoted to the war effort, and then reconverted to different uses once the war was over (idem, p. 228-230).

To sociological institutionalists, apart from rules, norms and regularized practices, institutions also encompass "symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the 'frames of meaning' guiding human action (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 947)." The mechanisms or logic it deploys, precisely emphasize the role of rules (not merely formal ones, but also internalized and behavioural rules) and identities in explaining action and institutional outcomes (March and Olsen, 2006, p. 690). The logic of appropriateness rests on the basic acknowledgment that individuals hold on to an ensemble of 'roles and identities' that define norms, procedures or rules of 'appropriate behaviour' in circumstances for which they are pertinent[41] (*ibid.*). Political institutions, as well as institutions more in general, embody such cultural scripts and systems of meanings, and rules of appropriateness are incorporated in the basic laws of contemporary democracies (*idem*, p. 692). Yet, regardless of how accurately rules may prescribe action, behaviour does not necessarily, or automatically, reflect these. Matching a particular situation to a certain rule requires the intervention of human agency: individuals, first, must identify the particular situation they

[41] March and Olsen call 'recognition' the process of matching identities, situations, and behavioral norms (March and Olsen, 2006, p. 690)

find themselves within; then, by comparing the current situation with their own experience, they must select the rule that is most 'appropriate' do deal with the current situation (March and Olsen, 2006).

Isomorphism instead mostly applies at the level of organizations and can account for specific institutional outcomes. In essence, when a given organization emerges, then, it will tend to replicate certain features of existing ones, for these in part embody the 'system of meaning', or cultural script, that frames the worldview and identities of actors; then, when they are intent in designing a new institution, they will, at least in part, take from the existing and often reproduce it (Thelen, 1999; Pichierri, 2011). Different types of isomorphism exist, depending on what stimulates replication. In coercive isomorphism, higher political tiers push organizations to adopt particular organizing frameworks, which in turn ensure the organization will be able to access significant resources; mimetic isomorphism consists of organizations intentionally copying particular frameworks from other organizations that are viewed as authoritative and legitimate; in normative isomorphism, the adoption of a particular organizational design is supported by professional groups that are involved in a given organization (Pichierri, 2011; Sorensen and Torfing, 2007).

Additional mechanisms that I set out to deploy are instead taken from the discursive institutionalist tradition. Being this the most recent of the four 'new institutionalisms', no attempts at providing explanations as to governance formation have been made. This perspective nonetheless provides insights as to how ideas and discourse may shape action and will therefore be useful to complement the explanations elaborated according to the sociological and historical traditions. Discursive institutionalists define ideas as the 'substantive content of discourse' (idem, p. 306), noting that they are typically employed at three different levels of generality: from the least to the most general, that of policies, that of programs, and that of ('public') philosophies (*ibid*.). At each of these three levels, ideas comprise both a cognitive and a normative dimension. The cognitive dimension of ideas is what provides actors with a framework on which to orient political action; it also offers a justification for the adoption of certain policies, by showing how these are consistent with both programs and philosophies. The normative dimension of ideas refers instead to evaluation: whether and how these are 'appropriate' solutions, not only to the problem at hand, but with respect to the underlying values of the polity, with the specific moment they are invoked, and with the aspirations of the public (*idem*, p. 307). Summing up, with Schmidt's words: "cognitive ideas are constitutive of interests and normative ideas appeal to values (idem, p. 321)."

There have been various attempts to show how ideas are translated into policy, at all three levels of generality (*idem*, p. 307-309) but, although useful, these do not specify how ideas are conveyed among actors, and *why* these are eventually adopted; the best way to do so, according to discursive institutionalists, is to directly look at the 'causal influence of discourse' (*idem*, p. 309), for only this way we can see how agency may (or may not) lead to an idea's success. Discourse, in turn, can be either coordinative or communicative. Coordinative discourse is that which takes place 'in the policy sphere', that is, among *policy* experts and relevant policy actors that discuss the details of how to design a policy, its trade-offs, and negotiate among

each other to sort out their divergent views (*idem*, p. 310); communicative discourse occurs instead in the 'political sphere', where *political* actors interact with their constituencies and the public in general, so as to persuade them about the use and appropriateness of a given policy (*ibid.*). Furthermore, the type of institutional setting can tell whether communicative or coordinative discourse will be more prevalent in a given polity: communicative discourse is more commonplace in 'simple' polities, that is, in which "government activity tends to be channelled through a single authority – primarily countries with majoritarian representative institutions, statist policy-making, and unitary states such as Britain or France (idem, p. 312)"; coordinative discourse is, by contrast, more widespread in 'compound polities', such as Germany or Italy, "where governing activity tends to be dispersed among multiple authorities – countries with proportional representation systems, corporatist policy making, and/or federal or regionalized states [...] (idem, p. 313)."

V. Conclusions

In these first two chapters, I have tried to show how urban governance is a complex phenomenon that is affected by a variety of factors, both endogenous and exogenous: a city's internal socio-economic fabric, its power constellation, its peculiar political culture, the nature of local government; its relations with other tiers of government, the national administrative institutional framework, sweeping economic dynamics, and so on. As a research perspective, because of its focus on the two meanings of institutions, I believe neo-institutionalism is particularly apt to account for most of these themes. By contrast, most of the previous theories of urban politics would consider rather specific aspects of the local political context: from the nature of local power to the effects of international economic forces, from governance coalitions to land development, all these topics were dealt with quite autonomously from one another. The shape and features of urban governance, however, depend on all these elements and by adopting a theoretical and methodological approach that can take into consideration the range of factors that interact with the urban environment, I we can obtain a fuller picture of the process of governance formation.

The four ideal types I am referring to, then, serve to provide some analytical reference points, which will then help me to better characterise my own case study, that of Turin. Compared to Pierre's original typology, built by linking governance actors, governance objective and governance model, I preferred doing away with the 'governance objectives' dimension. This reason for this, I hold, is that governance can best be described according to its underlying rationale, as this is often instrumental to, then, pursue more specific policy objectives. By looking only at these two dimensions – actors and rationale – the fourfold typology that has emerged is more general, better capable of including a variety of cases: in corporatist cities, for instance, the governance structure may pursue either growth or welfare objectives, but the latter can also be sought in other types of cities, such as party government ones. Finally, taken together, these four models represent

a ‘governance continuum’, where party government amounts to little or no governance at all, whereas the pluralist form embodies governance to the fullest. The study of Turin will then concern the formation of a pluralist governance model.

To better account for this process, I will therefore employ an eclectic neo-institutional approach, comprehending elements of the historical and sociological traditions, with incursions into the discursive school. The reason is that, through a combination of these variants, I will be able to better account for a phenomenon that involves both structure and agency: one that is surely conditioned by institutional reform and sweeping economic dynamics, but that is ultimately built by single organisations or individual actors. Historical institutionalism, then, mostly looks at structure: it sheds light on how path dependency makes previous institutional structures so difficult to alter and on why critical junctures make it possible to shake and dismantle established institutional frameworks. Sociological institutionalism can tell us how individual agents or organizations, through a logic of appropriateness, can establish repeated contacts with peers, which may gradually lead to the emergence of a governance structure; it also tells us, on the other hand, how certain organisational designs may be borrowed from other organisations, through an isomorphic mechanism. Discursive institutionalism, then, focuses on how, through different types of discourse, relevant actors may push other players to action, contributing to widen consensus and build legitimacy around the potential governance structure. The governance structure that is emerging, then, may engender its internal institutional norms, rules and practices, or its own logic of appropriateness, according to either a historical or a sociological perspective.

Chapter 3. Analytical Framework, Method, Hypotheses and Research Design

I. Analytical framework

As illustrated in the first chapter, the research question that will guide my inquiry reads as follows: "*Why has a governance coalition emerged in the city of Turin between the 1990s and 2000s? Considering both structure and agency, and both exogenous and endogenous factors, which among these have been most relevant in leading to governance formation?"* I will now turn to the analytical framework, method, and research design I intend to deploy to provide an answer to such question.

In the previous chapter, I have illustrated the general tenets of three neo-institutionalist traditions – the historical, the sociological, and the discursive – and have provided an overview for how each tradition accounts for governance formation; I now turn to how the three neo-institutionalist paradigms will guide my inquiry. To analyse the process of governance formation in Turin, I have elaborated an eclectic neo-institutionalist framework, which considers both structure and agency as key factors in determining the possibilities for governance formation. The motive behind this move draws on the long-standing debate in the urban politics literature over whether, in city contexts, politics 'matters' (Le Galès, 2002; Mollenkopf, 1983; Pierre, 2011). Looking back at the history of European cities (chapter 1), and at the XX century scholarly literature on urban studies, my assumption is that both endogenous and exogenous factors matter decisively in accounting for the forms, if any, that urban governance may take. This means that all dimensions of social activity – the political, economic, and social – are important with respect to the phenomenon under study, and they remain relevant even when different levels of analysis are considered: the local, the national and the international. Of course, this does not rule out that at a certain moment in time, one of these dimensions and one of these levels of analysis may appear to matter more than others; this however does not imply that circumstances cannot change in the future and, moreover, this does not do away with the significance of the other dimensions and other levels of analysis. As I have defined urban governance as involving the participation of both political and non-political, civil society actors, it seems reasonable to think that governance structures result from the intersection of the political, social, and economic sphere.

Such an assumption requires to take into consideration political institutions, both local, national and, in Turin's case, supranational (Brenner, 2004; DiGaetano and Strom, 2003; Pierre, 2011; Martì-Costa and Tomàs, 2016); it requires to also consider overarching economic trends, and local socio-economic structures, as well as political cultures and frames of meanings (Harvey, 1989; Castells, 1996-98; Sassen, 1991); it also entails looking into the actions of relevant individual actors, on their intentions and on the discourses they employ (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003; Bevir and Rhodes, 2007; Brandtner et al., 2016). This is the reason why I deem an eclectic analytical framework to be the most appropriate way to inquire into the theme of urban

governance formation: combining the historical, sociological, and discursive institutionalist schools allows to account for all these dimensions.

Briefly recalling the tenets of the three neo-institutionalist schools, we have seen that each has a rather distinct understanding of institutions. Historical institutionalists view institutions not only as proper organisations, but also as formal and informal 'rules, norms, and practices' (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Sorensen and Torfing, 2007). Although, in theory, historical institutionalism does not disregard agency, it typically adopts a macro level of analysis, and principally focuses on structures and processes (Schmidt, 2008); political institutions are viewed the product of historical developmental trajectories that reflect the power distribution that characterises a given social system, and explanations often rely on the logic of path dependency. Sociological institutionalists view institutions also as systems of meaning, cognitive scripts, and moral paradigms that shape the 'frames of meaning' guiding human action (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Schmidt, 2006); institutions are viewed as socially constructed by actors on the basis of a 'logic of appropriateness'; both structure and agency are taken seriously (Schmidt, 2006). Discursive institutionalists, finally, focus on ideas and discourse: while the former constitute the 'substantive content of discourse' (Schmidt, 2008, p. 306), the latter is viewed as the causal factor that has the potential to inform action and translate ideas into policy.

To provide a comprehensive account of the process of governance formation, therefore, I set out to look at all three distinct understandings of institutions, which will constitute the three different levels of analysis I will be considering. First, in line with the historical institutionalist tradition, I will examine the level of political institutions and structures. Specifically, these amount to both the formal institutions of local government, that is, the local administrative machine and its characteristics and functioning, and to formal (and informal) organisations, which consist of political parties, labour unions, and other major local institutions such as banks, the chamber of commerce; further, legal norms and routinized practices will also be examined. Second, taking from the sociological institutionalist tradition, I will focus on frames of meaning and cognitive scripts: this, in practice, entails looking at the ideas, intentions, ambitions, preferences and beliefs of the main actors involved in the governance formation process. Finally, following the discursive institutionalist school, I will look at discourse and at how this has been used by the main actors (collective and individual) to support their goals.

As we have just seen, historical institutionalists view institutions as the expression of power distribution in a given society, whereas sociological institutionalists rather see them as socially constructed cultural scripts and frames of meanings. Hence, the scope of the analytical framework will include two major elements of context: the local socio-economic structure, which is key in determining the local power constellation; and the national political culture, which, in combination with the local power constellation, contributes to shaping the urban political system.

II. The case-study method.

To carry out my inquiry, I set out to employ the case study method; there are various reasons for this move. The first I anticipated in the introduction to this work, and it is a circumstantial motive: the COVID-19 pandemic has prevented me from carrying out empirical work in the cities I had selected for a comparison with Turin, forcing me to recalibrate the scope of my thesis, focusing on Turin only. There are, however, other reasons that underpin my strategy to deploy the case study method, which pertain to both the features of my research object, and to its potential heuristic value.

According to Yin, the use of the case study method is advised, among other things, when "the boundaries between phenomenon [under study] and context are not clearly evident (Yin, 1981, p. 98)." Similarly, Gerring stresses that case studies feature a blurry distinction between the principal object of the inquiry (the unit of analysis) and the within-unit cases that compose it. Within-unit cases "consist of all cases that lie at a lower level of analysis relative to the inference under investigation [...]. The possibilities for within-unit analysis are, in principle, infinite (Gerring, 2004, p. 344)." That of urban governance is indeed a phenomenon that may be hard to neatly distinguish from its context, or from the within-unit cases that make it up: the actor constellation within a city, and the institutional and organisational framework that characterizes it make up the context within which a given governance form may emerge; at the same time, local actors, institutions and organisations are precisely the elements that compose a particular urban governance structure; from this perspective, they are the within-unit cases the inquiry aims to tackle. By way of example, recalling the historical institutionalist model as to governance formation[42], an institutionally fragmented urban context – namely, one characterised by the presence of several public and quasi-public agencies, QuANGOs, and public-private organisations – is understood to be conducive to governance formation; yet it is highly likely that these very agencies, or at least some of them, will be key players of a given urban governance structure. As Gerring (*idem*, p. 345) points out: "Although the primary unit of analysis is usually clear, within unit cases are usually multiple and ambiguous." The fuzzy boundaries between urban governance and its context, and the ambiguity derived from the presence of multiple within-unit cases, therefore, amount to a first reason why the case study method seems to be warranted with respect to the present inquiry.

A second reason has to do with the understanding of governance as a decision-making practice. Decision-making behaviour or practices, of which governance is an instance, are particularly suitable to be examined through the case study method, because of a number of characteristics they display (Yin, 1981, p. 99). These are: 1) "a series of decisions that occur over a long period of time, with no clear beginning or end points [...]; 2) outcomes whose direct and indirect implications are too complex for single factor theories; 3)

[42] According to which coordination among local actors is a response to institutional and organisational fragmentation (see Chapter 2, section *IV.III*).

a large number of relevant participants, and 3) situations that are special in terms of agency context, historical moment in time, and other key elements (*ibid*.)." The governance structure that emerged in Turin at the at the turn of the millennium seems to display all these features, which I will now briefly consider in turn.

First, the fact that the phenomenon under study occurs over a long period, with no clear beginning or ending moments. This is precisely the case of Turin's governance: as I will clarify shortly, I picked, as outcome of the process of governance formation, the development of the city's Strategic Plan, which was elaborated between 1998 and 2000; I will come back on the reasons why I made this choice. What is important to stress now, is that Turin's governance coalition has kept operating even after this moment, at least for the entirety of the first decade of the 2000s; furthermore, while the Strategic Plan has surely routinised, strengthened and formalised Turin's governance coalition (Dente and Melloni, 2005), governance practices in the city were present even before 1998, at least since Castellani's electoral victory in 1993. Furthermore, interactions among various sectors of the local civil society and the city's political class had been cultivated for some time, as far back as the 1980s. In other words, it is almost impossible to clearly fix a moment in time when governance emerged or ended. This also has to do with the nature of governance as an empirical phenomenon: as governance is an informal, interactive, evolving, and dynamic practice, it seems reasonable to assume that it forms incrementally, through a repeated interaction and learning process, rather than at a precise moment in time. This point is also made clear by Beach and Pedersen (2013, p. 54-56), who stress how specifying the temporal dimension of a causal mechanism in a case study is key in defining the boundaries of the inquiry, but this operation may be rather complicated because of the features of the phenomenon under investigation. In certain instances, the temporal dimension may be composed of both a phase of gradual, incremental change and a moment of rather "rapid and profound institutional change (Beach and Pedersen, p. 55)." Identifying clear start and end points therefore becomes essential to better circumscribe the analysis, even though the actual duration of the whole process is not so easy to determine.

Second, the outcome is too complex for single factor theories. With respect to my inquiry, this mostly has to do with the fact that I am analysing urban governance in its entirety, that is, not in reference to a single project, or a specific policy field, which would allow to circumscribe the phenomenon under study more easily. Further, governance is not immediately and straightforwardly identifiable, for the reasons just mentioned: it is a dynamic process, it is informal, and its boundaries are blurred both in space and time. In part because of this, single-factor theories do not appear as the best strategy to approach the theme. For instance, it may well be that institutional fragmentation is conducive to governance formation, as the historical institutionalist view holds, but other factors could play a part too: the administrative structure, the political orientation of the local executive or mayor, the type of actor constellation to be found in a city, the history of relations between the local political class and civil society, to name a few. Indeed, if we consider,

for instance, two of the institutionalist theories of governance formation illustrated in the previous chapter – the top-down sociological institutionalist account, stressing the role of isomorphic pressures; and the historical institutionalist account, stressing the coordinative response to institutional fragmentation – they both appear intuitively plausible, they do not seem to rule each other out, and yet they both seem, again intuitively, to be lacking something, that is, agency. By employing the case study method, I aim at providing the depth and detail that is hard to achieve through alternative research strategies (Gerring, 2004, p. 348), to take into account the complexity of the unit under study. At the same time, however, while going into the details of a particular phenomenon is an advantage of case study research, the boundaries of the inference that is reached are hard to clearly define; as Gerring notes, "case studies often produce inferences with poorly defined boundaries. It is clear that an inference extends beyond the unit under study, but it is often unclear how far the inference extends (Gerring, 2004, p. 347)." There is, in other words, a trade-off between depth and boundedness, and case studies lean towards the former. I will try to solve the issue concerning the boundedness of my inferences in the final chapter of the present work, where I will attempt at distinguishing between generalizable inferences and those that only pertain to Turin.

Third, a large number of relevant participants; Gerring framed the issue by referring to 'within-unit cases': as stated above, he pointed out that these can be several and 'ambiguous' (Gerring, 2004, p. 344). While, in smaller communities, governance may be composed of very few individuals and organisations, in mid-sized or bigger cities, one can expect governance to comprise a vast number of people and relevant bodies. Indeed, the bureaucracies of middle-sized or big cities are often composed of hundreds of people: not all of them will be key players of a given urban governance system, but it is equally unlikely that only two or three will count. In addition, precisely because governance involves the participation of non-political, and often non-public actors, various other people and organisations will be involved in it: the latter can range from quasi-public agencies to utilities, political parties, social movements, religious organizations, and so forth. Further, as governance is a dynamic process, it may be composed of different individuals and organizations at different moments in time. In Turin, for instance, the role of FIAT has changed in the time span under scrutiny, novel players have emerged, such as banking foundations, and various political parties have changed name and overarching goals; further, those works that have focused on the form and composition of Turin's governance (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; Scamuzzi, 2005) have found it to be comprised by roughly one hundred people.

As to the latter point, concerning 'special' situations, that of Turin is definitely a peculiar historical moment: Turin governance emerges after a phase of deep political change, characterised, at an international level, by the fall of communism – which would obviously have national repercussions, considering the central role of the Italian Communist Party within the Italian political context. At the domestic level too, the 1992-1993 *Tangentopoli* corruption scandal marks the end of the Italian post-war party system. Overall, then, the

object of the present research displays features that make it suitable to be examined through the case study method; the latter, furthermore, is also recommendable in consideration of its heuristic potential.

There are various reasons why deploying the case study method can be a fruitful approach, in heuristic terms, in certain cases. A first reason has to do with the depth and detail that case study research has the potential to provide (Gerring, 2004, Yin, 1981): case studies aim at analysing the concrete workings of a particular social or political phenomenon and can thus offer actual examples of how this unfolds (Yin, 1981, p. 109). This proves particularly useful when one wishes to open the 'black box of causality' (Beach and Pedersen, 2013; Gerring, 2004) and go into the detail of the causal mechanisms that link one or more factors to the outcome of interests. In this respect, the usefulness of case studies depends on the aims of the researcher: as noted by Gerring (2004, p. 348), studies that set out to inquire on the causal effects of X over Y are better suited to cross-case analyses, as one single case cannot provide information over the average effect of a factor over an outcome, and therefore tells very little about the probability of the effect of X over Y. By contrast, a focus on causal mechanisms permits to connect X and Y "in a plausible fashion" (*ibid*.), uncovering the specific processes that link an outcome to its causes. Further, going into the detail of causal mechanism has the additional advantage that the researcher can thus "test the implications of a theory, thus providing corroborating evidence for a causal argument (*ibid*.)." This means case studies can serve explanatory purposes (Yin, 1981), if of a specific kind: they are most suitable for investigating causal mechanisms, rather than causal effects (Gerring, 2004).

This last point is connected to another advantage of case study research, namely that, when used with explanatory purposes, it permits to test theories, shedding light on their causal implications, and therefore has the potential to expand knowledge with respect to those very theories (Yin, 1981). Testing (after having constructed) an explanation shall be understood as the chief goal of explanatory case studies (*idem*, p. 107): an explanation, as highlighted by Yin, amounts "to a complex rendition of causal links, far beyond the scope of a single hypothesis (*ibid*.)." Typically, drawing on existing theories, plausible explanations are then compared with each other, to see which of them better accounts for the outcome. In the case of the present research, my goal is similar: my assumption is that, because of the complexity of governance as an empirical phenomenon, a comprehensive explanation of governance formation can only be obtained by combining elements taken from various theories (in my case: sociological, historical, and discursive institutionalisms). In other words, I am not assuming that individual explanations derived from specific paradigms are, *a priori*, mutually exclusive (Sil and Katzenstein, 2011); this, however, does not rule out that, once empirical data have been gathered, one of such explanations may better account for the outcome. However, making this assumption at the outset of an inquiry risks producing partial accounts (Sil and Katzenstein, 2011). For instance, Bevir and Rhodes (2007) criticize what they call 'positivist accounts of network governance', which in their view depict governance as an impersonal, quasi-automatic coordinative reaction to the institutional fragmentation produced by state reform (Bevir and Rhodes, 2007, p. 77-79); they

propose, by contrast, to read governance formation as a socially constructed process resulting from the actions and interactions of several individuals, whose beliefs and preferences are central to account for governance emergence (*idem*, p. 77-80). My take, on the contrary, is that both explanations can be useful and valid, and only by taking an eclectic analytic approach can one see the actual workings of each. With respect to such an assumption, I believe that employing the case study method for my inquiry on Turin, and adopting a single case research design, can provide useful insights on the causal mechanisms of governance formation that take into account elements drawn from each of the different theories I am considering.

The three main accounts of governance formation I am taking into consideration, as specified above, are the following: 1) a historical institutionalist account, whereby governance is the coordinative response to institutional fragmentation; 2) a top-down sociological institutionalist account, according to which governance emerges as a result of isomorphic pressures that lead individuals and organisations to cooperate; 3) a bottom-up sociological institutionalist account, which sees inter-organisational contacts and interactions established by individuals according to a logic of appropriateness, as the root of governance emergence. I hold that a focus on Turin can be valuable because, between the end of the 1980s and the early 2000s, both isomorphic pressures and institutional fragmentation were present in Turin – the former consisting of incentives to cooperation in the form of EU funding programmes, whereas the latter resulted from the creation of novel local organizations. Based on my assumption, I expect that these two factors will be compounded by a third one, that is, the bottom-up process of repeated inter-organisational contacts, hestablished through the logic of appropriateness, as accounted for by the sociological institutionalist paradigm. If this latter factor is found to be present, then, an in-depth, detailed account of the whole process should help clarify whether causality results from a combination of these elements, or whether it can be mostly accounted for by a single factor; such in-depth, detailed analysis can be better obtained by deploying the case study method**.** A detailed focus on a single case study, therefore, should help uncover the causal mechanisms that, if present, connect the three factors (institutional fragmentation, isomorphic pressures, and the bottom-up process of inter-organisational contacts) to the outcome, and should permit to see the specific contribution to causation of each of these three elements.

Finally, as argued by Gerring, case studies should "aim to generalise across a larger set of units (Gerring, 2004, p. 341)." As I am adopting a single-case research design, the other units for comparison will amount to 'informal units' (*idem*, p. 344), that is, elements "brought into the analysis in a peripheral way, [...] often studied only through secondary literature (*ibid*.)." Such a comparison will feature in the concluding chapter of the present research. The choice of Turin, in any case, has an advantage for comparison: Turin was the quintessential Fordist manufacturing city, characterised by a highly polarised social structure and a dominant industrial sector (and a dominant company), and was heavily hit, like many other Fordist manufacturing cities, by industrial crisis and economic restructuring. Of course, there are peculiarities to the locality, as well as features that depend on the national institutional context: hardly two cities are perfectly

the same. However, looking at cities with a similar manufacturing economic base, which experienced a similar severe crisis, who then managed to form an urban governance system, and yet lie within different national institutional contexts, should help clarify the role and weigh of institutional structure *vis-à-vis* other factors in accounting for governance formation.

III. Hypotheses and Research Design.

To carry out my inquiry, I will draw on the insights of the process tracing technique (Beach and Pedersen, 2013), with an overarching objective of validating 'straw in the wind' and 'hoop tests': the former test is mainly used to determine whether the building blocks of my argument can be found to be present empirically throughout the whole process; straw in the wind tests, however, do not lead to conclusive results with respect to hypotheses, as they allow no inferences in terms of necessary or sufficient conditions (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). Hoop tests are instead used to establish the necessary components of an argument, but not the sufficient ones: failing the test significantly disconfirms the hypothesis but passing it does not allow for any inference as to sufficient conditions to be made (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p. 102). Applying these tests to my inquiry means I will have to find evidence validating the hypotheses that will guide my inquiry. The general, overarching hypothesis is that transformations in governance are easier to achieve when change occurs at all the three levels specified above, that is, the level of institutions and organisations, at the level of cultural scripts and frames of meaning, and at the level of discourse; these changes, furthermore, are at the same time underpinned and reflected by changes at the level of the local socio-economic structure and at that of the national political culture. Additionally, the inquiry aims at testing seven more specific hypotheses, which are the following:

H1: The more a crisis of the local development model is severe, the more likely it will be that various elements of the locality (both political and non-political) will feel the urgency to devise an alternative development strategy.

This first hypothesis is in part elaborated from the literature, in particular from works of DiGaetano and Lawless (1999) and DiGaetano and Klemanski (1999), whose work has focused on the governance structure in, among others, former industrial cities such as Birmingham, Detroit, and Sheffield. Rather then spelling it out as a clear hypothesis, they merely noted that the crisis of the Fordist-manufacturing development model has led various elements (political and non-political) of the urban community to consider alternative development strategies. Similarly, John and Cole's (1998; 2000; 2001) works on Lille have highlighted the same point. There are cases, however, where no severe crisis has preceded the emergence

of an urban governance coalition: Stone's Atlanta (1989) is one such case. Of course, Atlanta[43] was not a mainly manufacturing city, but this does not rule out that other explanations can account for actors' cooperation. Even without a crisis, or without a city-wide reflection on a crisis, actors could start to cooperate because of isomorphic pressures. This is, therefore, a straw in the wind test: it is an important element of Turin's case, but it does not seem necessary for cooperation to occur.

H2: The more local government is stable, the higher the chances for a local governance coalition to emerge.

This hypothesis is mainly derived from the assumption that stability helps build mutual trust and develop virtuous learning cycles. By stability, here, I merely mean that a local government can survive at least its first mandate in office: it seems unlikely that a dysfunctional, chronically crisis-struck local administration can lead to mutual trust and cooperative behaviour. However, dysfunctional local governments appear to still be able of entertaining clientelistic relations with their supporters, as was the case in early XX century political machines of American cities, or in certain party-government cities (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; DiGaetano and Lawless, 1999; Stone, 1989). Of course, in this case, non-political elements mostly serve to support the party, or political machine, but are typically not involved in city-wide agenda setting: the type of governance that is configured, then, is rather different from pluralist governance. It must however be pointed out that several authors (Stone, 1989; Mossberger and Stoker, 2001) have highlighted that a governance coalition may outlive the mandate of formal government, although they have not explicitly mentioned the issue of governmental stability. Because of these considerations, although local government stability can be intuitively expected to facilitate the emergence of a governance coalition, I am treating this hypothesis, for now, as a straw in the wind.

H3: State rescaling and institutional fragmentation increase the likelihood that a governance coalition will emerge.

This hypothesis is derived from the literature and elaborates on two distinct but related concepts. In Sorensen and Torfing's view, institutional fragmentation results from the implementation of NPM reforms (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007); these, however, have not been implemented with the same intensity in all national institutional contexts. State rescaling, by contrast, is a wider concept that refers to the restructuring and redefinition of social and political structures at novel spatial levels, both above and below the state (Keating, 2013; Brenner, 2004). As such, it covers a wider range of dynamics, from devolution to, indeed, institutional fragmentation. This move is motivated by the assumption that, beyond institutional fragmentation, other factors may account for the need for enhanced cooperation, such as the redefinition of

[43] Although Stone describes treats Atlanta as an instance of an urban regime, he acknowledges (Stone, 1989) that regimes are a particular type of governance (see also John, 2001). I will, therefore, treat Atlanta as a case of governance coalition.

local government powers, the creation or empowerment of meso-level administrative tiers, or the strengthening of supranational-institutions, to name a few. All these processes reinforce an institutional setting characterised by fragmentation and mutual resource interdependencies, hence formal government needs to cooperate with other actors to increase its 'capacity to act' (Stone, 1989, 1993). Although it is difficult to set a threshold after which we can confidently state that fragmentation exists, liberal-democratic, capitalist societies tend to be characterized by resource dispersion and diffusion: as Dahl (1961) had noted, no group possesses enough resources to determine policy alone. This hypothesis I therefore consider amounting to a hoop test.

H4: Incentives to cooperation in the form of isomorphic pressures will increase the likelihood for a governance coalition to emerge.

This hypothesis is again derived from the literature (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007). Although it is grounded on quite circular a statement – incentives to cooperation lead to cooperation – it is truly quite reasonable to expect that it is a strong factor in accounting for enhanced cooperation and this may well be conducive to governance formation. Cooperation in itself, however, does not guarantee a governance coalition will emerge, as cooperation may remain episodic and circumscribed to individual projects. Further, isomorphic pressures do not seem to be strictly necessary: individuals or organisations may cooperate for other reasons. Finally, as inconvenient as it may sound, it may be the case that, notwithstanding incentives to cooperation, groups fail to do so because of deep cleavages that stand between them. This hypothesis, therefore, consists of a straw in the wind test.

H5: the more contacts have been cultivated between political actors and civil society, the more likely it is for a governance coalition to emerge.

This argument is derived from the literature (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007), but it also appears quite intuitive. After all, governance is premised on cooperation and, regardless of institutional frameworks or incentives, if individuals do not work together, hardly any governance coalition will emerge. Of course, a history of cooperation does not necessarily lead to governance, but its absence makes it difficult to see how governance can exist. This is therefore another hoop test.

H6: the presence of political entrepreneurs increases the likelihood that a governance coalition will emerge.

This argument, too, is drawn from the literature (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003; Mollenkopf, 1983). The idea is that, as governance relies on informality and cooperation among different organisational spheres, political entrepreneurship and leadership can be crucial in bridging the gaps between different dimensions of the urban community (i.e., politics and the private business sector). The hypothesis is underpinned by the assumption that cooperation between different organisational realms is not automatic and may actually be

quite difficult to achieve; certain individuals, because of their personal prestige, resource endowment or, indeed, charisma and entrepreneurship, may facilitate the creation of alliances or the gathering of consensus around a particular political vision. I am assuming that some intentionality is needed to form a governance coalition, and political entrepreneurship intuitively seems to be a major factor in this sense. The hypothesis is therefore a hoop test.

H7: The presence of a shared agenda (compounded by the introduction of strategic programming or consultation tools – i.e., strategic plans or participatory arenas, respectively) the higher the likelihood for a governance coalition to emerge.

This hypothesis is again derived from the literature (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001; DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1999; Stone, 1993). By shared agenda, I am not thinking of a detailed action plan, nor I expect it to require a deep, shared ideological commitment (Stone, 1989): merely, what seems to be crucial is that there be, at least, a shared long-term objective, such as economic development to be achieved through infrastructural investment and attraction of businesses, or, say, a social reform agenda based on popular housing and redistributive programmes. Without a shared objective, there seems to be little point in cooperation. Of course, the more such an objective is detailed, and the more it is backed by support tools (strategic plans or participatory arenas), the higher the chances for cooperation and, eventually, a governance coalition to emerge. Thie hypothesis amounts, then, to another hoop test.

Ascertaining that these empirical signs are present is fundamental to elucidate the steps of the whole process; however, the sequence that will result from it does not yet amount to a process tracing causal mechanism for the simple reason that the whole process is rather long, as I wish to also shed light on the phases prior to proper governance formation, in the attempt to trace the long-term roots of the phenomenon. The analysis, therefore, covers two decades, from 1980 to 2000.

To make the whole process easier to follow, I broke it up in four phases: a first phase will illustrate the stage that is antecedent to the phase of rapid institutional change and reform[44] and to the actual mechanism of governance formation, which I will call the 'seeds of change and stalemate' phase; although proper governance formation is not at issue here, this step is crucial, as it clarifies the motives and the reasons for which several actors and organisations of the urban community undertake a process of ideational innovation, through which they engage in a redefinition of their ideas and strategies; the overarching institutional framework, however, still limits the possibilities for significant change. This stage remains nonetheless crucial, in that it is here that we can find the roots of the process of governance formation.

[44] Which configures the critical juncture phase, the second stage of the process.

The second phase I defined as the critical juncture, which starts in 1990 and ends in 1993, right before election results become official. This is a rather complex and confused stage of the process, as various events, quite autonomous among each other, casually occur at roughly the same moment in time: complexity and confusion derive from the fact that the events that define the critical juncture provide the conditions for relevant players to act in a certain way; these very actions, then, are the first steps of the concrete process of governance formation – some of which take place before all of the relevant events have occurred, while other occur simultaneously, but only meet at a later stage.

The third phase is the 'moment of truth', namely that in which a particular institutional outcome, among the ones that had emerged as potential possibilities during the critical juncture, is selected over the others. This phase is the shortest, in terms of temporal length, but is nonetheless a fundamental one: on the one hand, it marks the taking of power of the political component of the governance coalition – through the electoral process - providing a solid base for the subsequent structuring and strengthening of the local governance system; on the other, the moment of truth is that which connects the very initial steps of the process of governance formation to its subsequent structuring. We do not know what would have happened had a different outcome been selected, but it may have well been the case that the coordination and contacts established during the critical juncture would have been abandoned immediately.

The latter phase concerns the institutionalization of the local governance structure: this is the time frame in which contacts and practices are repeated and routinized, and in which institutional norms, or a logic of appropriateness sustaining the network and binding actors together emerge within the governance structure itself. What needs to be pointed out is that the mechanisms conducing to structuring and institutionalization, which are at work in this phase, may have started before, during the critical juncture. I have selected, as outcome of the whole process, the elaboration of the Strategic Plan (1998-2000), for a precise reason. As stated above, since governance amounts to an *informal* practice, network, or coalition, there is no official tipping point that can tell us once and for all when a governance structure has emerged; there can, however, be indicators that can tell us with reasonable approximation whether, at a certain time, the governance structure was there. In my case study, I am analysing an *urban* governance system, which comprises political actors: I can therefore expect that, at some point, the political component of the governance system will win elections, allowing the other, non-political actors to access the political process. Importantly, this does not mean that a network between political and non-political actors had not already emerged before the elections; neither it means that, after the election, the coalition is formed for good: other actors may still join the network and certain practices may take time to routinize. In the case of Turin, however, the administration's choice to adopt a Strategic Plan has constituted an attempt[45] to formalize[46]

[45] See chapter 1.

[46] The Strategic Plan is a non-binding document. By formalising, then, I simply mean that the actors involved wished to clarify and refine the features of a given interaction pattern, by engaging in a structured agenda-setting procedure

the practices, routines and interaction patterns that had developed in the previous years (Dente and Melloni, 2005, p. 11). This is, therefore, the moment certifying the presence of a local governance coalition in Turin.

based on the acceptance of shared norms. These are however norms the actors gave themselves and were not issued by an authoritative administrative source.

Figure 5.



The figure above is meant to illustrate that I expect certain processes not to unfold in a linear temporal sequence, but simultaneously. While processes of ideational innovation and of path-dependency occur in phase 1 (seeds of change and stalemate), and are antecedent to institutional transformation, the critical juncture operates an institutional de-structuration that sets in motion various processes at the same

time. Of these, only the formation of the electoral list, constructed through the entrepreneurship of political actors who, according to a logic of appropriateness have selected their coalition partners, terminates before the election. The effects of institutional reform and isomorphic pressures, on the other hand, initiate during the critical juncture but carry on even after the election (the moment of truth), well into the fourth phase, that of re-institutionalization. The moment of truth (phase 3) is, indeed, a moment, in which electoral results are officialised: it is important because it is the time that a particular institutional outcome is selected, but causal processes occur before, during, and after it.

The data I relied on to carry out this work are essentially of three kinds: secondary and grey literature, primary documental sources, and interviews. Secondary literature mostly consists of academic works that have been produced on Turin and on Turin's politics, roughly covering the period 1975-2011. This material hjhas been useful to get a first grasp of how scholarship has interpreted and explained political dynamics that have occurred in Turin throughout this time frame. Above all, as I mentioned before, some of these works (Bagnasco, 1986; Bagnasco, 1990; Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; Bobbio, Dente, Spada, 2005; Dente and Melloni, 2005; Dente and Coletti, 2011; Scamuzzi, 2005) have been fundamental in helping me clarify the features of the Turin's socio-economic and political structure in the 1980s and then, those of the city's governance network of the 1990s-2000s. The grey literature essentially amounts to reports that have been produced on the city, covering the relevant time frame, which provide fundamental references as to local socio-economic indicators, and overall trends that have concerned the city.

As to primary sources, I have looked, in the first place at the coverage of events offered by local newspaper articles (principally *La Stampa*, Turin's paper, and the local section of *La Repubblica*): newspapers have been fundamental to obtain a clear picture of the main events pertaining to the local political context. For the first phase of the process, that preceding the critical juncture, I have also relied on publications issued by local cultural centres, such as the Gramsci Institute's journal *Sisifo* (close to the Communist party and the local left-wing environment). These publications feature articles written by key local figures – intellectuals, but also political actors, unionists, and entrepreneurs – and offer an extensive account of the new ideas that were emerging in the city, and the debates that took place around these. I then looked at official documents – covering all the four phases of the analysis – issued by key political figures, mainly consisting of electoral speeches and programs.

All this material I then used to select my interview sample: to do this, I chiefly relied on positional and reputational analysis. Positional analysis is a method through which, to identify the members of a particular élite, one looks at individuals occupying top positions in leading public and private organizations, including municipal ones (Hunter, 1953; Harding, 1995; Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012): in my case, considering the period between 1993 and 2000 (corresponding to Castellani's two mandates, which actually ended in 2001), I looked at members of the political arena (both assessors and councillors), and at individuals involved in the Strategic Plan's elaboration process (Torino Internazionale, 2000). I then turned to reputational

analysis, looking through newspaper articles and previous literature – in particular, Scamuzzi's (2005) work on Turin's élites, Belligni and Ravazzi's work (2012), and reports on Turin – to select a more restricted sample of individuals; finally, I cross-checked these names, again, with those of the people involved in the strategic plan's elaboration process. Eventually, I conducted 24 non-structured interviews with governance members belonging to both the political and non-political sphere.

Before turning to the proper empirical analysis of the process of governance formation in Turin, the next chapter will be dedicated to introducing the case study. I will illustrate the socio-economic and political characteristics of Turin in the 1980s – the phase preceding change – and in the late 1990s, early 2000s, which represent the outcome of the process I wish to explain. By doing so, I wish to shed light on the form and features of Turin's governance coalition, on the one hand, as well as on the initial conditions within which the city would find itself before change, on the other. This should help better situate the process, introduce the main actors, and shed light on Turin's socio-economic features and political culture. The proper discussion of the empirical evidence will then be the focus of Chapter 5 and 6.

Chapter 4. Turin: introduction of the case study

Introduction

The oil crises of 1971-1973 mark the end of Turin's phase of Fordist expansion that had characterised the city since the 1950s. However, transformations in the productive process are not immediate (Castagnoli, 1998) and, until the end of the 1970s decade, the manufacturing character of the city resists. As the 1980s begin, signs of change become nonetheless explicit: the 1980 strike at FIAT and the closure of the historic *Lingotto* plant in 1982 mark the end of an era. Automation, changes relating to FIAT's internal organisation and to its relationships with the surrounding market, all emphasise that the company cannot keep on expanding according to the old Fordist paradigm; this, moreover, has repercussions on the local socio-economic fabric, as the weight of manufacturing over total employment decreases, causing soaring levels of unemployment in the ranks of the working class; at the same time, other economic actors seem to be gradually acquiring importance, altering the local socio-economic framework in the direction of more heterogeneity and pluralism. These changes, however, are not reflected in significant changes of Turin's political framework, not to relevant developments in terms of governance model: corporatist and party-government elements are still dominant, and political actors prove incapable of taking the helm of the ship and steer the city towards a coherent strategy of development and reconstruction. Very simply, whereas the local society is gradually changing, local politics is not. All this changes after the 1993 elections, as Valentino Castellani becomes mayor, supported by a civic list – *Alleanza per Torino* – comprising a wide array of actors, built around a coalition between progressive left-wing forces and liberal elements. The new administration's commitment to foster local development and growth will rest on the realisation of three strategies: one focused on infrastructural investment and urban reconstruction and renewal; another one aimed at enhancing the city's image as a cultural centre and touristic destination; a final one centred on the knowledge economy, conceived to turn the city into a prestigious research pole. Various non-political actors will be major actors of this transformation: the two local universities, the banking foundations, the construction and real estate sectors, as well as cultural and third sector organisations. The involvement of these actors in the political process and the coordination and cooperation that obtains among them then leads to the formation of Turin's governance coalition.

The aim of my research is precisely to uncover the process that had led to the emergence of an urban governance coalition, starting from a situation of industrial decline and political inadequacy. This chapter is dedicated to introducing the case study of Turin and is structured as follows: in the first part, I will briefly describe the major socio-economic transformations that unfolded in Turin between the end of the 1970s and Castellani's election in 1993. I will also describe Turin's local governance model throughout these years,

referring to the fourfold urban governance typology that I elaborated in the previous chapter. In the second part of the chapter, I will turn to the main features of the governance coalition that will emerge in the 1990s and 2000s: drawing on previous works, I will describe the political agenda that was pursued, the main actors that were involved in it, and the main features of the local governance coalition. In the third section, finally, I will illustrate my research design.

I. Turin in the 1970s and 1980s: a corporatist and party-government city.

I.I Turin's socio-economic framework (1975-1993)

By 1980, Turin is still an 'industrial city of production' (Bagnasco, 1986). In 1981, the majority of the population is still employed in manufacturing, and the great majority of manufacturing employment concerns metal works (*Table 1.*) and, generally, activities related to automobile production. The marked increase in service employment that occurs between 1971 and 1981 depends on issues pertaining to data collection: until 1971, service data would not include public administration and the public sector in general (education, sanitation), producing figures that relegated service employment to less than 10 % of the total. As this figure was updated by the 1981 census, it is then striking to see how manufacturing employment still amounts to more than 50 % of the total: of this, the lion's share still consists of metal works activities. This peculiar social structure is indeed typical of manufacturing cities that have expanded greatly during Fordism (Oberti, 2000; Pierre, 2011; Le Galès, 2002).

Table 1[47]. Employees per economic sector: Turin province.



Source: (Istat: Censimento dell'industria e del commercio IV; V; VI)

[47] Data do not include figures for agriculture and extraction industries; Service figures for 1961 and 1971 do not include Public Administration, Education and Healthcare employment, which are instead included for 1981. No disaggregated data for previous and subsequent decades are available.

In Turin, the industrial-manufacturing character of the city was chiefly owed to the expansion of one single company, FIAT, which had alone sustained urban growth, especially in the post-war decades, from the 1950s to the 1970s. It is no exaggeration to state that FIAT's role in Turin had, until 1980, been overwhelming, affecting all aspects of local economic, social, and political life. The huge expansion of the company in the 1950s and 1960s had attracted massive inflows of migrants from other regions of Italy, chiefly but not only from the South: this was mainly an unskilled, undereducated workforce that ended up enlarging the ranks of the city's working class, to the level that, by the 1970s, half of Turin had immigrant origins (Bagnasco, 1986).

In absolute numbers, the metal works sector would employ 337,719[48] people in the province in 1981. Of these, by the mid-seventies, about 135,000 people were directly employed by FIAT industries in the Turin area (Bagnasco, 1986, p. 21), amounting to one third of the overall metal works employment. The number of FIAT employees, alone, is not telling of the disproportionate influence the company had over the city: most of the remaining metal works activities in and around the city would amount to FIAT's provider firms – over which the company enjoyed an overwhelming bargaining advantage; FIAT then controlled several tertiary activities, such as advertising and finance, it owned the major local newspaper (La Stampa) and the major Italian football team (Juventus) (*ibid*.).

According to Arnaldo Bagnasco (1986), such a dominant role of the main local company not only classified Turin as a 'one company town' (Bagnasco, 1986, p. 21; Brenner, 2004; Pinson, 2002a), but it also led to the spreading of the 'organization principle' of regulation[49] typical of the Fordist big industry to the whole urban socio-economic fabric. Recalling its features, the 'organisation' principle is aimed at reducing uncertainty and thus typically involves long term planning and 'synoptic rationality' (Bagnasco, 1986, p. 27), that is, a rather rigid planning approach based on schematic, *a priori* reasoning aimed at controlling the entirety of a given process. The organisation principle is then typically employed in the definition and functioning of redistributive schemes (Pichierri, 2011), as well as in the Fordist plant (Bagnasco, 1986). What is crucial, in this latter case, is that a company can control most of the aspects related to its activity, such as its relations with provider firms, and that market trends are quite predictable: until the mid-seventies, both conditions were present, and FIAT furthermore had complete control of its labour supply (*idem*, p. 25). As way of example, the type of relationship FIAT entertained with provider firms was essentially of two kinds: one the one hand, FIAT would own shares of the supplier firm, which ensured price control and often resulted in FIAT's personnel being present in the minor company; on the other hand, supplier firms might have been formally autonomous, but their position was heavily conditioned by the characters of a monopsony[50] market,

[48] Data from the VII Istat Census on Industry and Commerce (*VI Censimento Istat dell'Industria e del Commercio*). In 1971, metal works employees were 366,263 (*V Censimento Istat dell'Industria e del Commercio*).
[49] For a brief discussion of regulation principles of the economy – reciprocity, market, and organization – see (chapter 1; Bagnasco, 1986; Pichierri, 2011).
[50] Market with a single buyer.

guaranteeing FIAT could exploit its position of sole buyer (idem, p. 26). Internally, the organisation principle was implemented through top-down, hierarchical command forms and a clear division of labour between managerial and operative roles (Bagnasco, 1986, p. 24; Pinson, 2002a, p. 451). Concentration of productive activities in a few, huge establishments – i.e., *Lingotto, Mirafiori* – was a further feature of such a system. The organisation principle that was dominant within and around the factory, then, would penetrate the whole urban environment, including the political and social spheres (Bagnasco, 1986, p. 67-76). Fordist organisation, according to Bagnasco, had resulted in a markedly polarised social structure, where the rigid division of labour would be mirrored by the isolation of social groups, who had limited interactions with members of other social strata. The limited extent of adaptive and flexible relations, typical of the market, produced an interaction pattern that contemplated either submission or full-out conflict with the main company: autonomy and adaptive capacity were reduced to the minimum, leading Bagnasco to argue that, in sum, Turin's society was 'too simple'.

Between the end of the 1970s and the 1980s, the crisis of the Fordist system had exposed FIAT to the vagaries of a more competitive international market, resulting in its diminished capacity to absorb labour and in a redefinition of its organisational structure, including its relations with supplier firms. In these years, then, FIAT would attempt to include some flexibility within the productive process, reducing its reliance on organisation (as regulative principle): the company would then turn into a holding, divided into eleven autonomous departments, each in charge of managerial and operational dimensions, and of its internal organisational framework (Pinson, 2002a, p. 454). As to supplier firms, FIAT would now push them to diversify their customer base, and to focus on their own innovation capacity, to enhance their competitiveness; FIAT would, further, modify its pattern of relations with supplier firms: the old system, in which each provider firm would interact almost exclusively with FIAT, would now be superseded by a two-tier network, where a first, major provider firm – selected according to its competitive edge – would, on the one hand, interact with FIAT and, on the other, supervise and coordinate the second tier, where various, minor provider firms could now interact among each other and seek their own market niches. In those years, some of FIAT's provider firms indeed gained international clout: Bertone, Giugiaro, *Pininfarina*, *Italdesign*, and the machine tool sector (*idem*, p. 454-455).

These organisational developments would then lead some elements of the market – understood as organising principle – to gradually get a foothold in Turin's socio-economic structure. As opposed to organisation, the market is a more flexible regulative principle, characterised by adaptive relationships and contracts, where "productive and consumption choices are based on prices defined in formally free negotiations (Bagnasco, 1986, p. 22)." Importantly, the three regulative principles – reciprocity, market, organisation – are ideal types and, in real world scenarios, they coexist within a given socio-territorial area. During the 1980s, as the market is making its way in Turin's society, the legacy of organisation is by no means disappeared and the two principles coexist (*idem*, p. 31).

Table 2. Employees per employment category from 1971 to 2001.



Source: Istat; Annuario statistico Città di Torino

Table 4: Turin's growth and migration trends



Source: Annuario statistico Città di Torino

Table 5. Turin's population trends (1973-1991)



Source: Annuario statistico Città di Torino

Transformations in the productive process would then be reflected by changes in the economic structure and in population trends. As tables 2 and 3 show, it is in the eighties that service employment surpassed the industrial one (table 2) and, in 1991, for the first time, the working class amounts to less than half of the total employed population (table 3). Population trends are a further indicator of industry's diminished capacity to absorb workforce: immigration to the city had already halted by the mid-seventies and, by the beginning of the 1980s, natural growth becomes negative as well (table 3): the eighties are, indeed a decade of heavy population loss for the city (table 4). From a peak of 1,200,000 people in 1976, the core city loses more than 200,000 inhabitants in fifteen years, going below the one million-threshold around 1990.

I.II Turin's political sphere (1975-1993)

These dynamics have led some scholars to claim that, by the end of the 1980s, the local economic system had become more heterogeneous, especially in terms of relationships among actors (Pinson, 2002a, p. 455); the extant elements of organisational regulation within the local society, however, still condition the political sphere, which has traditionally been 'subordinate' to the economic one (Bagnasco, 1986; Tranfaglia, 1987, 1999**;** Gallino, 1990). The gradually emerging socio-economic pluralism has not yet been translated into a new political framework (Pinson, 2002a, p. 457).

Various scholars and observers have noted that, by the end of the 1980s, Turin's political sphere appeared inadequate to cope with industrial decline and govern the transformations that were taking place (Bagnasco, 1986; Castagnoli, 1998; Pinson, 2002a). The history of FIAT's dominant position in the city and, overall, the relevance of the local industrial-economic framework, had led to the unbalance between an oversized local economic sub-system and an underdeveloped politico-administrative one (Gallino, 1990), hindering political effectiveness and efficiency. The effects of Fordist organisation, as described by Bagnasco, would then also affect the local political sphere, which would typically assume either submissive or confrontational strategies with respect to the dominant company (Tranfaglia, 1987, 1999; Bagnasco, 1986), and was thus little accustomed to negotiation (Bagnasco, 1986, p. 76). The predominance of the organisational principle of regulation, crucially, would also impinge on the strategy Workers' Unions would pursue *vis-à-vis* FIAT, which was typically one of confrontation; local manufacturing workers had, for the most part, chosen to focus their actions at the factory level, rather than the political one, and full-out opposition had been their preferred tactic (*idem*, p. 67-72). In response, FIAT had admitted workers' representatives within its plants, but would not refrain from fighting back. The lack of a local market culture and of habit of negotiation, however, would prevent local industrial relations from evolving in the direction of negotiation and contract and thus in line with a more European trend: this was also due to the lack of legitimation of representatives on both sides (*ibid.*).

What does all this mean in terms of the governance models that characterised Turin between the 1970s and 1980s? Between 1975 and 1993, there have been four elections and six mayors in Turin: between 1975 and 1983, the city was governed by Left-wing administrations ('*giunte rosse*')[51], comprising a coalition of socialists and communists, led by Communist Mayor Diego Novelli. After a corruption scandal involving some socialist members of local government, the socialists would leave the majority and, for the last year of the mandate, the city would be governed by a Communist administration only, always led by Novelli. Between 1985 and 1992, then, a 'five-party' coalition (*coalizione di pentapartito*) would lead the municipality, comprising socialists, social democrats, Christian democrats, liberals, and republicans; although the majority would remain the same, the mayor changed in 1987 (socialist Magnani Noya substituted another socialist, Cardetti), and again in 1992 (liberal Zanone was substituted by republican Cattaneo-Incisa)[52].

[51] 'Red executives'.
[52] (*Comune Torino, 2020)*

Figure 1: list of Turin's mayors and council majorities from 1975 until 1992

1975-1980	Mayor: Novelli (PCI) Coalition: PCI + PSI
1980-1985	Mayor: Novelli (PCI) Coalition: PCI + PSI
1985-1990	Mayor: Cardetti (PSI) - Mayor until 1987 Mayor: Magnani Noya (PSI) - Mayor from 1987 until 1990 Coalition: PSI + DC + PSDI + PLI + PRI
1990-1992	Mayor: Zanone (PLI) - Mayor until Jan. 1992 Mayor: Cattaneo-Incisa (PRI) - Mayor from Jan. 1992 until Dec. 1992 Coalition: PSI + DC + PSDI + PLI + PRI

Source: Comune Torino (2020)

The left-wing governments of the 1975-1985 decade are characterised by a relationship entailing a peculiar division of labour between the local Communist Party and the workers' movement (here I am referring to it in its unitary understanding): while the former was understood to be in charge of the political and administrative arena, the Unions were responsible for industrial relations: factory life and working conditions were their prerogative (Berta and Chiamparino, 1986). Further, because the Communist party had understood economic issues as something that essentially originated from the concrete reality of the workplace, it would not only delegate industrial relations to the unions, but its view of political-economic planning would mostly derive from the activities of the workers' movement (Berta and Chiamparino, 1986, p. 15-16). Such a pattern of interaction between the two major local forces of the left configured a peculiar type of corporatism: one where the exchange between the interest organisation (the labour unions) and the political actors (the Communist party mainly) was constant, so that the policies implemented by the administration during its first mandate (1975-1980) would amount to a 'rather automatic projection' (idem, p. 17) at the political level of the movements' claims and positions. The innovative character of the policies introduced during the first mandate – concerning welfare, urban planning, as well as administrative reorganisation[53] - for sure owed much to the solidity and strength of the popular backing and consensus the administration enjoyed, embodied by the social and workers' movements (Belligni, 1986, p. 2). The constant exchange between workers' movement and party, nonetheless, would not undermine the division of labour between the two, and politics was firmly in the hands of the party: "[…] the coalition's solidity, the party's

[53] Belligni (1986, p. 2) talks about 'redistributive policies' and 'constitutive policies'.

control over the agenda and political personnel, the unitary pressure of the labour unions, and [...] the limited access to negotiation tables on the part of organised interests, amount to further synergic factors that allowed for the emergence of a virtuous government cycle, enhancing both the effectiveness as well as the radical character of this first phase." These are, very simply, the features of a party-government city, although the presence and role of labour unions, even if external to proper decision-making process, would seem to soften this element and combine it with corporatist features.

Because of the strength and support that the workers' movement provided to the party's administrative action, the weakening of the unions after the defeat of the 1980's strike[54] at FIAT, would also reduce the innovative character of local government's policy activity (Belligni, 1986; Berta and Chiamparino, 1986): policy production would be less daring and radical, it would be incremental in nature and mostly concerned with reducing risks, "seeking consensus rather than problem solving (Belligni, 1986, p. 3)." For sure, this change also mirrored altered societal conditions: differentiation after 1980 was slowly emerging, leading to more pronounced heterogeneity and a 'de-structuration of the class order' (*ibid*.). This should not however lead to underestimate the effects of the Unions' defeat over the political conduct of the party: having hitherto benefitted from a wide support of the workers' movement, the weakening of the latter pushed the party to invest energies and resources to contain and soften the Unions' defeat, whereas proper political activity appeared to the most inadequate to deal with the transformations the city was undergoing (Berta and Chiamparino, 1986, p. 17).

During the subsequent seven years, the five party coalitions that governed the city would not feature an established partnership with any civil society group, or social coalition. In this phase, the effects of industrial restructuration have become apparent and the local society appears more differentiated and heterogeneous; however, the local government is uncapable of translating this into a stable coalition with any social actor, and only occasional exchanges with various groups would occur (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; Pinson, 2002a). These coalitions, furthermore, are highly unstable and often quarrelling among themselves (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012, p. 129-130; Bobbio *et al*., 1990). As a governance model, this lies somewhere in between the party government model and the 'machine politics' of early XX century American cities (*ibid*.): party currents or individual professional politicians dominate the political game, often recurring to patronage and favours to maintain their positions and ensure 'their own reproduction'; control of public offices becomes the essence of urban politics, whereas policy making is slowed and hindered by a political process where actors mainly aim at protecting their turf and preventing adversaries to obtain any advantage (*ibid*.).

In the years prior to 1993, then, the city would essentially feature two models of governance. In the first, left-wing phase, elements of corporatism would define the alliance between labour Unions and Communist party (and the socialist party too, especially until 1980); this would not prevent some elements

[54] I will talk about this event at length in the following chapter.

of the party-government model to emerge, mostly during Novelli's first mandate (1975-1980). In the latter phase, while the five-party coalitions were in power, no alliance with any social formation was established, and the model shifted, once again, towards party-government. This time, however, local political activity emphasised the flip side of party-government, recalling machine politics of the 1920s, where patronage and clientelism were the means politicians used to pursue personal gains, to the detriment of the common good. Neither left-wing, nor five-party coalitions, however, were able to devise a political proposal that could mirror the pluralism that was gradually emerging at the level of the local socio-economic fabric.

II. The pluralist city (1993-2011)

After Valentino Castellani was elected mayor in 1993, Turin embarked on a reconstruction process that, throughout the next two decades, radically transformed the appearance of the city and, at least for some time, led observers to state Turin had managed to shake off its industrial attire, entering a new phase of its history. In tourism, culture and big events, the city indeed appeared to have discovered new vocations, to be added to its industrial and technical heritage, and extant know-how; the 2006 Winter Olympics would symbolically 'seal' the reconversion's success, which had managed to unveil a heritage of beauty and culture that for too long had remained hidden behind the image of the grey and dull industrial city. Both ordinary observers as well as scholars would emphasize the municipality's new approach to governance, its innovativeness, and the novelty of strategic planning (Power, 2016; Bobbio, Dente, Spada, 2005; Dente and Melloni, 2005; Pinson, 2002a & b).

The most detailed account[55] of Turin's transformation is contained in a work by Silvano Belligni and Stefania Ravazzi, published in 2012[56]. Their analysis describes the features of the local governance coalition that emerged in the city between the 1990s and 2000s; since Turin's governance coalition of those years consists of the outcome for which I wish to provide a causal explanation, I will now turn to a brief overview of their work, so as to clarify the characteristics of the governance model whose causes I then set out to identify.

Belligni and Ravazzi have shown that, in the nearly twenty years since Castellani's election, the urban governance coalition that emerged in Turin would encompass a group of about 120 individuals, coming from the political and civil society spheres. Most of these people would, in turn, belong to different cultural contexts, or 'milieus' (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012, ch. 7): several came from the academic environment, others had a catholic background, another group would consist of former FIAT employees and managers, while the latter two 'milieus' would be chiefly tied to either the (former) Communist, or the liberal political cultures.

[55] Which itself draws on previous works on Turin's governance (Dente and Melloni, 2005; Bobbio, Dente, Spada, 2005; Pinson, 2002a & b; Scamuzzi *et al*. 2005)

[56] *La politica e la città: regimi urbani e classe dirigente a Torino* (2012).

This coalition between politicians and civil society would, in the course of two decades, pursue a pro-growth political program that would be articulated along three 'sub-agendas' (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012): an urban renewal, infrastructural agenda; a cultural agenda; and a last one, focused on research and the knowledge economy[57].

II.I The political agendas

Each of the agendas had specific objectives and, moreover, would be sustained by a different set of actors and resources (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012). The first agenda, the urban renewal and infrastructural one, had three main, intertwined objectives. First, an increase in land and rent value, to be achieved through a comprehensive constructions program; to do so, the municipality managed to approve a new Master Plan (*Piano Regolatore*) in 1995, which provided the legal guidelines and constraints for subsequent urban interventions, to be organized along three vertical 'spines', and served as starting point for the comprehensive overhaul of the city. A second objective, included in the Master Plan, concerned the reconversion of abandoned industrial facilities, which the city was rife with – by the end of the 1980s**,** it had about 10 million square meters of abandoned plants (Urban Center, 2016). The last goal was that of infrastructural strengthening, for which, again, the approval of the Master Plan was crucial: among the three spines it provided for, the central one would be built on top of the railway bypass, which required that the old railway tracks, which had for decades separated the city in two halves, would run underground. The railway bypass was arguably the chief infrastructural project, in that it made available several thousand square meters of 'new land', on which constructors could focus their operations. A second major infrastructural project was that of the metro line, and transportation would be the focus of various other interventions. As Turin won the bid to host the 2006 Olympics, then, further projects saw the light, in particular sports facilities. Finally, the refurbishment and renovation of the historic city centre was another chief objective, although this line of action stands somewhere in between the renewal and the cultural agenda, as Turin's mainly baroque downtown also consists of a major cultural and touristic asset. Something similar can be said about the projects for suburban renewal – Urban II in *Mirafiori*, the '*Progetto Periferie*' – as these blended physical reconstruction and social requalification, and so stood somewhere in between a renewal agenda and a social program (Castellani and Bagnasco, 2014; Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012).

[57] Belligni and Ravazzi call them: agenda '*policentrica'* (the reconstruction/infrastructural one); agenda '*pirotecnica*' (the cultural/leisure one); and agenda '*politecnica*' (the research agenda). Although these labels are surely catchy, they were not defined as such in the official documents, so I prefer to use labels that are less emphatic. Importantly, these three agendas, so neatly distinct among each other, have actually been identified *ex-post* by Belligni and Ravazzi, who defined them on the basis of the official programmatic documents published by the Administration and by *Torino Internazionale* (2000), an association devoted to participatory strategic planning. This is not to say these programs were not pursued, merely that the reader will not find them in the official documents under these labels. Moreover, a focus on welfare and social services was present too (Power *et al*., 2010; Pinson, 2002a).

As to the actors that have contributed to the realization of this first sub-agenda, Belligni and Ravazzi (2012, p. 77-78) note that these principally consisted in local players connected to the real estate and construction sector, supported by a number of secondary players: professional studios of architects, engineers, and lawyers; large-scale distribution companies; real estate and retail groups, and the National Railway Company (*Ferrovie dello Stato*). This coalition of actors, different in nature, but all revolving around the real estate and construction sectors' objectives of increasing land and rent value, recalls Logan and Molotch's 'growth machine' (1987); this is a heterogeneous set of actors – including the retail sector, professionals, distribution and logistics, as well as the media – gravitating around constructors and the real estate sectors. The underlying idea is that the prospect of growth that should come with land development attracts this range of different players, each of them hoping to reap a part of the benefits that increased rent value should ensure (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Judge *et al.*, 1995). In Turin's case, the authors specify, no actor took a leading role, in terms of determining the agenda: The Commune mainly acted as a mediator between local actors and higher tiers of government, which provided a major portion of the resources that would be employed for urban renewal (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012, p. 78). Both Universities are involved in the reconstruction process, but only insofar as their properties are concerned – in other words, they refrained from taking a coordinative, strategic, or leading role with respect to this sub-agenda; the same would hold for FIAT (*ibid*.).

Figure 2. Infrastructural works approved and initiated between 1993 and 2011.

Infrastructure	Start date	End date	Cost (million euros)
Torino-Pinerolo Highway	2003	2005	90
Caselle Airport enhancement	2004	2005	91
Parking project	2002	2006	76,5
Corso Spezia Underpass	2004	2006	135
Clessidra Park	2005	2008	38
Milan-Turin High speed railway line	2002	2009	7.788
Torino-Aosta highway adjustment	2007	2010	40
Subway line 1	2000	2011	966
Railway bypass	2002	2011	1.325
Torino-Ceres new link		2012	100
Turin-Milan highway adjustment	2002	2013	1324

Sito Logistics Centre enhancement	2005	2013	500
Ring Road enhancement	2008	2016	138
Torino-Bardonecchia highway safety works	2009	2016	200
Torino-Pinerolo railway doubling	2011	2017	204

Source: Russo and Terna (2004); Comitato Giorgio Rota (2006).

The second agenda, the cultural one, was articulated along two main lines: the former was focused on the promotion of the existing cultural heritage of the city, while the latter was concerned with the launching of big events. Both strategies were meant to foster the marketing of the 'city-brand'. As to the first strategy, Turin was fortunate to be endowed with a rich baroque and liberty architecture, major museums, royal palaces, and is credited as the birthplace of Italian cinema and radio – all this heritage, however, had never been 'put to use', so that nobody had considered Turin as a city worth a visit up until the 2000s. The task was then to make these assets 'viable', to refurbish them and transform them into a source of employment and income. The city centre would thus undergo a sweeping make over; the royal palaces would be restructured and opened to the public; a foundation would be created to manage the four civic museums, while a separate foundation would instead run the Egyptian museum (Alfieri *et al*., 2012), one of the world's largest; a new museum dedicated to cinema would be installed within the Mole Antonelliana, the city's landmark; the Film Commission was instituted, an agency devoted to assist film production crews who wished to work in Turin, along with several other initiatives, all meant to unveil and promote the city's cultural richness. As to the second strategy, that of investing in big events, these ranged from music and film festivals to food fairs and art exhibitions; among the category of big events, however, centre stage would be taken by the Winter Olympic Games of 2006, arguably the biggest 'thing' that has happened in Turin over the last three decades. The Olympics[58] had, among others, the effect of accelerating the pace of urban reconstruction, adding to it several new facilities, for the most part dedicated to sports. Taken together, these investments and interventions were all meant to make 'culture' and related activities a new asset for the local economy, a sector on which to ground a new type of development, which would attract tourists and increase the city's international visibility.

Regarding the cultural agenda, the Commune would instead play a leading role, not only with respect to funding, but also in terms of defining strategies and coordinating activities and actors. As to the latter, the main actors, apart from the Commune, are those agencies and organizations that are involved in the cultural

[58] Turin benefited from major financial resources that were transferred to the city to organize the games (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012).

sector; a paramount role, specifically concerning funding, has also been played by the city's two banking foundations – *Compagnia di San Paolo* and *Fondazione CRT* (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012, p. 78-79).

Figure 3. Cultural events and interventions pertaining to the cultural sector (1993-2011)

Event	Inauguration Year	Public works and activities aimed at promoting the arts sector	Inauguration Year
Artissima (arts fair)	1994	Fondazione Sandretto	1995
Athletics International meeting	1995	Artworks installed throughout the city	1995
Salone del gusto (food fair)	1996	Cinema Museum	2000
Festival Cineambiente	1998	Film Commission	2001
Cioccolatò	2000	Gobetti Theatre Restoration	2001
Torino Spiritualità	2002	New Resistance Museum	2003
Terra Madre	2004	New Museum E of Environment	2004
Traffic Music Festival	2004	Medieval township restoration	2004
Ice Skating European Championships	2005	Opening of Fonderie Limone	2005
Italyart – Culture Olympics	2005	Astra theatre restoration	2005
Winter Olympics	2006	New Victoria theatre	2005
Paralympic games	2006	New Theatre House for the youth	2005
Fencing World Championships	2006	Armoury Museum – new fitting	2005
Chess Olympics	2006	Palazzo Carignano – restoration	2005
Universiade	2007	Merz Foundation	2005
Architects' global Workshop	2008	Natural Sciences Museum – restoration	2006
World Design Capital	2008	Mountain Museum – restoration and expansion	2006
Archery European Championships	2008	Venaria Reale Royal Palace – restoration	2007

Biennale democrazia	2009	New Astronomy and Space Museum	2007
Italian Unification Anniversary	2011	Palazzo Madama Restoration	2007
Archery World Championships	2011	New Antiques Museum	2007
		Royal Palace Restoration	2007
		Palazzo Mazzonis Restoration	2008
		New Museum of Eastern Arts	2008
		New Cultural Centre Spine 2	2008
		Carignano Theatre Restoration	2009
		Automobile Museum Restoration and expansion	2011

Source: (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; Comitato Giorgio Rota, 2006)

The last agenda, focused on research and high-tech, had the objective of making Turin a prestigious international research pole; this, in turn, would foster the development of related activities centred on the knowledge economy, such as new start-ups, high-tech businesses and the like. A first way to achieve this was to invest in the physical expansion of the city's two universities – the University of Turin and the Polytechnic University – so as to enhance the respective research and teaching facilities and make them more attractive to prospective students coming from outside the city; these operations also had an effect on the overall restructuring of the city as, for instance, the new facilities of the Polytechnic University would be located along the newly built central spine. As to the proper investment in and strengthening of Turin's knowledge-related activities, the preferred formula would be that of public-private partnerships, through which several new institutions would be created: some of these would be devoted to proper research, while others would function as 'incubators' for new start-ups and new high-tech businesses. Among these there were several significant initiatives: I3P, an incubator for high-tech start-ups; the Aerospace District Committee, meant to foster the local aerospace industry and support the Turin enterprise district; the Torino Wireless Foundation, another incubator whose role is to sustain the ICT sector; the Institute for Cancer research; three technological parks; the *Mario Boella* Institute for Advanced Studies, an ICT think tank; and several other projects of similar nature.

In this latter agenda, the Commune would again play a leading role, defining the direction of interventions and coordinating them (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012, p. 78). Other major players were the two Universities, not only with respect to the expansion of their facilities, but also in the creation of new initiatives

connected with research; here, they would provide their resources, consisting of expertise in applied research, enterprise incubators, and international academic networks (*ibid.*). Pivotal, again, would be the role played by the two banking foundations, both of which would contribute to sustain several projects with their financial might. The business community, as well as FIAT, essentially played a minimal role here (*ibid*.).

Figure 4. Research institutions established in Turin between 1993 and 2011.

Institution	Partners	Objective	
Cancer research Institute		Cancer research	1996
Environment park	Local authorities & utilities; Finipiemonte; Chamber of Commerce; Industrial Union; University	Enterprise incubator and research on environment and renewable energies.	1996
Bioindustry Park	Turin Province; Finipiemonte; Chamber of Commerce; Confindustria Piemonte; Private companies	Enterprise incubator – life sciences sector	1999
Virtual reality and multimedia park	Local authorities; Finipiemonte; University	Multimedia projects – research and development	2000
Mario Boella Institute for Advanced Studies	Polytechnic; Compagnia di San Paolo; Private companies	Research on ICT	2000
Institute for Advanced Studies – Territorial systems for innovation	Polytechnic; Compagnia di San Paolo	Research on innovation and complex systems.	2002
Torino Wireless Foundation	Miur, Cnr; local authorities; Chamber of Commerce; University and Polytechnic; Mario Boella Institute; Industrial Union; Intesa Sanpaolo; Unicredit aziende	Development of ICT sector.	2002

Carlo Alberto College Foundation	University; Compagnia di San Paolo	Research Institute – economic and financial disciplines	2004
GM Powertrain	Municipality; Polytechnic; General Motors	Research on innovative engines.	2005
Conservation and Restoration Centre	Ministry; local authorities; Venaria municipality; Compagnia di San Paolo; University and Polytechnic.	Cultural heritage conservation.	2005
Design Centre	Polytechnic; JAC (company)	Automotive design development.	2006
Microsoft Centre	Local authorities; Polytechnic; Microsoft	Research on gene behaviour and memory functioning.	2007
Human Genetics Foundation	University and Polytechnic; Compagnia di San Paolo	Genetic research	2007
Torino Piemonte Aerospace	Region; Chamber of Commerce	Investment and promotion of aerospace sector.	2007
Smat Research Centre	Smat (water utility)	Research on water treatment.	2008
Ithaca Project	Region; Polytechnic; major food companies	Research on technologies concerning food quality and safety.	2010
Ecofood	Region; Polytechnic; SMEs and major companies in the agri-food sector.	Research on production left-overs.	2010

Source: (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012)

II.II The main actors

According to Belligni and Ravazzi, four main institutional actors were key in defining and, above all, implementing the three sub-agendas: 1) public authorities, mainly the Commune and the Region; 2) Banking foundations, *Compagnia di San Paolo* and *Fondazione CRT*; 3) Academic institutions, namely the University of Turin and the Polytechnic University; 4) FIAT. Within the governance process, each of these actors gave its specific contribution, and made its own resources available.

As we have seen above, the Commune has played a central part in both the definition and realization of the agenda; importantly, the Commune in those years benefitted from significant financial transfers from higher tiers of government, plus the resources that were specifically mobilized for the Olympic games (again, mainly from higher tiers of government); on top of this, Turin managed to obtain funds from EU programs, such as Urban and the Structural Funds. Therefore, supported by major financial resources coming from higher tiers of government, and the EU, the Commune was able to oversee and coordinate the activities of local actors, and to keep them in line with the overall strategic vision. The urban renewal sub-agenda is the only one where the Commune has not played a driving role; here, it acted as mediator with higher tiers of government, while the main local players would be a number of central figures within ANCE (*Collegio Costruttori*, the local Constructors' Organization), real estate agents and some big construction cooperatives, who most often managed to get their way in negotiations with the Municipality. These private actors, importantly, were also involved in the last stages of development of the Master Plan (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012, p. 81). In the other two sub-agendas, the Commune has played a much more central role: as to the cultural agenda, the Commune is the "direct creator of almost all projects and activities carried out within the territory (*idem*, p. 80)"; in the research agenda, its role may not have been equally prominent, but it still drove the agenda, stimulating and connecting public and private actors to promote various projects. In the research agenda, a major role has been played by the Region which, even though it would not define the agenda, acted as mediator between public research institutions and private firms; furthermore, it supported the agenda financially. As to the cultural agenda, the Region again financially sustained several projects, although it would play no role in the definition of the agenda (*idem*, p. 82-83).

A second, fundamental actor within the local governance coalition would consist of the city's two Banking Foundations, namely *Compagnia di San Paolo* and *Fondazione CRT* (*Cassa di Risparmio di Torino*). Italian banking foundations were created in 1990, when the legislator decided to separate banks' non-profit functions from proper banking activities. Foundations are thus endowed with private capital, like banks, but must pursue socially relevant activities, while, at the same time, they own part of the bank's assets; in time, further legislative acts[59] defined banking foundations as private institutions whose boards of directors must

[59] Banking foundations were instituted through law 218/1990; their legal prerogatives were further defined through law 461/1998 and law 448/2001.

however be, in part, composed of representatives of local public entities. Belligni and Ravazzi therefore define them as quasi-public institutions: private legal entities with a partially public management whose purposes must pursue the public interest (*idem*, p. 85). They could alternatively be understood as QuANGOs, 'Quasi non-governmental organizations', to which public bodies have devolved competences and powers, but over which they retain some form of either financial or managerial control.

What makes Turin peculiar in this respect is the presence of two such banking foundations, each owning assets that amount to more than a billion euros (*ibid.*); for a middle-sized city such as Turin, this means having two players with enormous financial capabilities. Because of this, the function fulfilled by these two institutions would be crucial within the local governance system for essentially two reasons. The first is financial: the two entities have injected significant amounts of funds[60] in the Turin area in those twenty years – to a level where these were to a large extent able to support the local policies (*idem*, p. 86). A second reason lies in the fact these institutions can invest in a wide array of activities, provided these meet the criterion of 'socially relevant purpose'; this means they are, *de facto*, 'locality wide oriented' actors (*ibid.*), whose scope of action is almost as wide as that of public authorities, putting them in a position where they can influence the contents of the local political agenda (*ibid.*). In particular, throughout the two decades I focus on, the local banking foundations have chiefly invested in the cultural and research sub-agendas – because of statutory constraints, they cannot invest in infrastructure, so they would contribute to urban renewal only insofar as this contained some 'cultural' aspect[61]. Also, they invested significantly in social services and assistance, although Belligni and Ravazzi (*idem*, p. 86-87) deny[62] these activities amounted to an agenda of any kind, as they were not declined in a strategic perspective.

A third decisive player within the local governance system would consist of the city's two universities, whose activities would be understood as instrumental to the administration's development strategy. Beyond purely research and teaching functions, they would operate to connect the public and private sectors in various instances. A first would merely concern the spill-over effects of their main functions – teaching and research: if they succeeded in increasing the local student population, this would prove beneficial to the renting market, as well as the trade, restoration, and leisure sectors. The expansion of academic facilities, then, must be viewed as means to not only enhance their research and teaching potential, but also to upgrade the two universities to first-class institutions, capable of attracting an ever-larger number of students, possibly also from abroad. The expansion of academic facilities, clearly, also had repercussions over the urban renewal[63] agenda, as in part it contributed to the re-design of the urban territory[64]. With respect

[60] About a billion and a half euros between 1997 and 2009 (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012, p. 86).
[61] Mainly the renovation of historic buildings in the city center.
[62] Not everyone agrees with this point though (Power *et al.,* 2010; Pinson, 2002a).
[63] They had a limited role, however, in setting the contents of the urban renewal sub-agenda (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012, p. 90).
[64] Through the doubling of the Polytechnic and the construction of a new University campus for law and the social sciences.

to the research agenda, University and Polytechnic would obviously be key actors, in that they would participate with both financial and human resources to most of the projects that sought to strengthen the local knowledge economy: they would be partners in 20 out of 24 research institutions that have been created in Turin since the end of the 1980s (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012, p. 89). As to the cultural agenda, the two academic institutions would be active too. The University of Turin mostly collaborated with projects concerning cinema and multimedia, which it also helped define, together with the Commune; the Polytechnic's involvement, on the other hand, mostly consisted in providing its planning know-how to activities linked to the renovation of the city's museums.

The last relevant actor in the local governance system is FIAT. In this case, however, its importance mostly derives from the firm's historic role as the city's biggest company, on its legacy, and on its size and its financial, symbolic, and network resources – reduced in comparison with the past, but still significant – rather than on its actual participation to the governance process. As Belligni and Ravazzi point out, FIAT has historically had a privileged relation with the national government, from which it obtained major financial aid in several forms (*idem*, p. 92). Concerning its relations with Turin itself, instead, FIAT has often been viewed by observers as considering the city as a mere resource (of manpower, or rent value) to pursue its corporate objectives: "FIAT adopts towards Turin a policy of indifference, but at the same time it is extremely intrusive: the city is not yet seen – and this is a symptom of cultural backwardness in comparison to other companies both in Italy and elsewhere – as an arena for dialogue and growth of a community to which the company belongs too, but is [instead] viewed as a parochial and minor city that can be exploited for convenient operations, such as manpower and construction deals (Tranfaglia, 1987, p. 25)." Belligni and Ravazzi use kinder terms, but essentially make the same point: FIAT has never directly participated to the local political process, through outright interferences in decision-making; its involvement, rather, has mostly been indirect, chiefly consisting of 'soft power' and non-decisions[65] (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012, p. 92). So, concerning the pro-growth agenda of the 1990s-2000s, FIAT has been concerned with it only insofar as the agenda had a clear impact on its economic interests (*ibid.*). In the period under scrutiny, then, FIAT refrained from participating in the agenda-setting process, although it was quite active as a property holder: here, however, FIAT would mostly entertain bilateral negotiations with the local administrations to make the most out of its real estate assets[66]. The other project where FIAT would be particularly involved was the Olympic bid: in this case, yet, it was mainly its chairman, Gianni Agnelli who, taking advantage of his own personal network of international acquaintances, took centre stage, rather than the company as such (*idem*, p. 94). As to the research agenda, although initially there were hopes that FIAT's research centre would prove a valuable asset with respect to the promotion of Turin as a first-class knowledge city, it would soon become evident that FIAT had no interest in participating in the overarching urban reconstruction strategy. Overall,

[65] (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, 1963, 1970).
[66] Which would encompass several abandoned industrial facilities.

then, FIAT's role would be limited to some interventions within the urban renewal sub-agenda, but not as a strategic player involved in the community's long-term development project; rather, it acted as a powerful player only concerned with its immediate assets (*idem*, p. 94-95). In sum, FIAT would be a relevant player because of its extant might and prestige, not for playing any particular role within the local governance system.

II.III The governance coalition

The institutions just described make up what the two authors have named the local 'governance coalition'; the individuals involved in governance, instead, who make up the local establishment, composed of both politicians and non-politicians, are referred to as the city's 'governing coalition'. To define this group, Belligni and Ravazzi have employed three methods typically used to identify élites: the positional, reputational, and decisional methods[67]. What they obtained was a sample of 120 people (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012, p. 154), who, from a professional perspective, are divided as follows: about 30 % would belong to private organizations (business and third sector); another third would consist of proper public officials, both elected and non-elected; then, 28 % would instead come from the 'quasi-political' and 'quasi-public' world of utilities, foundations, and development agencies; 6 % would come from academia and the remaining 3 % are 'party figures'.

Whereas, professionally, these people amount to a rather varied group, in terms of 'worldviews', or cognitive scripts, they have been found to share a commitment for competitive development, and the idea that politics should consist of cooperation, rather than conflict (*idem*, p. 158-160). What is, arguably, the most relevant finding of the work concerns the selection criteria to join the establishment: not, as it once used to be, party membership, but a common network of acquaintances, in turn identifying a specific cultural context, that Belligni and Ravazzi have labelled 'milieus'. Almost two thirds (*idem*, p. 165) of the local governance coalition belong to such milieus, which are: the catholic milieu (16 %), the FIAT milieu (15 %), academia[68] (22 %), the liberal milieu (8 %), and the Communist milieu (8 %).

What this governance structure configures can be viewed as a form of 'stratified pluralism' (Pinson, 2002b; Dahl, 1961; Judge, 1995). On the one hand, the governance network is rather heterogeneous in terms of its members' professional background (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012, p. 155) and like in Dahl's New Haven, different actors are involved in different policy areas. This latter element is in turn connected to the fact that,

[67] The positional method allows to identify members of the élite by simply looking at who occupied relevant positions within a given local administration; the reputational method strengthens this first analysis, by trying to establish who is part of the élite according to privileged observers (so, through interviews and by analyzing newspapers and media); the decisional method, finally, looks at actual decisions that were taken, seeking to find out the actors that were most frequently involved in decision-making.

[68] Divided between University (15 %) and Polytechnic (7 %).

although certain actors for sure possess more resources than others – FIAT, Banking Foundations, public authorities – these are nonetheless dispersed and no actor is in a position, alone, to determine the agenda's content and its concrete strategies. For instance, despite banking foundations are endowed with major amounts of financial resources, because of legal constraints they are prevented from intervening in lucrative, productive projects, and may only be involved in socially purposeful initiatives. Infrastructural and reconstruction activities, therefore, would mainly concern actors who had an evident stake in urban development that is, real estate developers and the construction sector, the municipality itself, and major local property holders: FIAT, the Universities, and the National Railways. Third sector and cultural associations, then, would mainly be involved in cultural projects, together with the Municipality and Region, sustained by the crucial financial support provided by banking foundations; with respect to research, instead, it is universities that mostly cooperated with the municipality, again with the support of the two banking foundations. As to social requalification initiatives – which Belligni and Ravazzi do not consider much, but were nonetheless present (Pinson, 2002a; Power *et al*., 2010) – these were in several cases made possible by the availability of European funds, as in the case of the *Progetto Speciale Periferie* and the *Mirafriori* Urban II project and featured the collaboration of the Commune with neighbourhood residents. On the other hand, however, the fact that a governance coalition has emerged is, by itself, an indicator of the presence of a group of actors that are more involved than others in the political process: the size of the governance network – about 120 people – is indeed rather circumscribed with respect to the total municipal population of 865 thousand (in 2001). Consistent with the tenets of pluralism, however, this group of people amounts to a combination of various élites, above all, the local political, economic, and intellectual élites, all sharing a commitment towards economic development and growth (Pinson, 2002b; Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012, p. 158-162; Scamuzzi *et al*., 2005).

III. Concluding remarks

We have seen how, in roughly two decades, Turin has gone from being a manufacturing one company town whose social and political life was heavily, and overwhelmingly, affected by the presence of the FIAT car manufacturer. FIAT had been the main actor behind the city's post-war growth phase, and the city's socio-economic base had been so heavily shaped by the company's presence, that the resulting urban social structure would become heavily polarized, with a huge working-class component. Mirroring the relevance of the local working class, the local communist party and labour unions were among the major political organisations of the city. However, FIAT's might was such that, like for most other players within the urban community, the actions of Communist party and labour union would typically amount to a reaction to FIAT's strategies and behaviour. The relationship between Communist party and labour unions, additionally, would be crucial in determining the form of the local governance arrangement: the 'division of labour' between the

two left-wing organisations would produce a situation whereby the party would mainly operate within the borders of formal political institutions, whereas the union was in charge of industrial relations; the party's policies, however, would reflect the claims and struggles of the union at the socio-economic and labour level, thus producing a governance arrangement that amounted to a hybrid between a party-government and a corporatist structure. As the city's socio-economic framework started to change in the direction of pluralism in the course of the 1980s, the local political sphere appeared as inadequate to cope with such transformations: controversies between coalition partners would severely undermine the stability and effectiveness of local government activity.

During the Castellani years, instead, local administration would unite behind an agenda focused on growth, chiefly centred on infrastructure, culture, and high research. Throughout this phase, the objectives of the administration would be supported by a part of the local civil society, who would contribute not only to the recovery activities, but would be involved in the agenda setting process. It is in this stage that, through the extensive participation of a civil society component to urban recovery, a local governance coalition emerged. The main actors of this coalition were, apart from the PDS – the political entity – the local banking foundations, local universities, plus a variety of other actors such as labour unions and cultural and trade associations. FIAT had a role to play mainly because of its extant economic and symbolic might but was not central within the governance coalition. Because of the heterogeneity and number of actors involved, Turin's governance coalition had a pluralist character, but some actors had proven to be more central than others, thus qualifying such an arrangement as one of stratified pluralism. Why did such a coalition emerge in a formerly manufacturing city, and which factors have been crucial to its formation, will be the theme of the following two chapters.

Chapter 5. 1980-1993: Seeds of Change, Stalemate, and Critical Juncture

Introduction

This chapter and the following one are dedicated to the proper analysis of the causal process that has led to the formation of a pluralist, pro-growth governance coalition in Turin. My argument is that the overarching dynamic of change rests on the eclectic combination of various mechanisms drawn from elements of historical, sociological, and discursive institutionalism. Relying on this framework, I have articulated the whole process in four main phases, each characterized by the unfolding of specific institutional paths. These phases are: 1) a phase defined by the presence of dynamic processes of transformation within an institutional framework that limits the possibilities for change; this I called a phase of 'stalemate and seeds of change'. Here, I have identified two overarching processes of ideational innovation and layering, concerning the nature and objectives of certain left-wing political families and social groups; on the other hand, the prevailing institutional framework, consisting of the overarching political culture and legal-administrative structure, prevents the processes of ideational innovation and layering from provoking an actual overhaul of the local governance structure. 2) a critical juncture, defining a phase in which previous institutional constraints are 'de-structured' and loosened, provoking the opening of a window of opportunity in which a general condition of uncertainty allows agency and choice to have a major impact on the selection of institutional patterns that will define the subsequent period. 3) A 'moment of truth', in which one given institutional path is selected, creating the premises for its eventual path dependent evolution, while the chances that alternative options will be chosen in the future is reduced. 4) Finally, a phase of 're-institutionalisation', in which the institution that has been 'selected' during the critical juncture becomes routinized and is established as the new status quo: this occurs, in Turin's case, mainly through processes of learning and isomorphism.

The first phase of the process, that of 'stalemate and seeds of change', is one in which changes in the local socio-economic fabric and specific socio-political events – the 1980 strike of FIAT's workers – leads local left-wing environments (the Communist Party, the labour unions and local left-wing intellectuals) to initiate a self-reflexive process in which established cultural and programmatic paradigms are questioned; although such a reflection will spread and involve other local political and social environments, the features of the local political culture and of the municipality's legal-administrative structure, inherited from the post-war, Fordist phase of local urban development, will prevent these initial transformations from having a chance to alter the status quo. The second phase, the critical juncture, is brought about by the combination of exogenous events – the fall of Communism, the *Tangentopoli* corruption scandal and national institutional reform – with endogenous ones, that is, a local political crisis. These event, together, loosen the constraints

imposed by the previous political and administrative systems: the Italian Communist Party is re-founded as a reformist centre-left party, the PDS; the fall of communism allows for new alliances and political formulas to be tested; the corruption scandal dismantles the national party system, paving the way for new political parties and formations to enter the scene; institutional reform, then, would lead actors to devise new electoral strategies and a different type of local government structure to emerge. All these changes will lead to a moment of truth in which a new coalition takes power: this is an alliance between the PDS and the liberal entrepreneurial and business élites, joined by elements of various local social groups – labour unions, third sector associations, interest organizations, and universities. In the latter phase, that of 're-institutionalisation', such a coalition will introduce new practices relative to decision-making and goal setting, involving the participation of and negotiation with various elements of civil society; as these practices become more routinized in time, the administration will then institute a mechanism for participatory and deliberative agenda setting, in the form of a Strategic Plan, the outcome of the overall process.

In the following two chapters, I will divide each of the four parts of the process in four sections: in the first section, I will introduce, analytically, the relevant events and processes that take place; in the second section, I will present the empirical evidence supporting my argument; in the third section, I will discuss the more specific causal mechanisms at work in each phase. Finally, in the latter section, I will go back to the hypothesis spelled out in Chapter 3 and try to see whether they can be validated on the basis of the empirical material presented. This fifth chapter will contain the first two phases, namely the 'seeds of change and stalemate' one, and the critical juncture; the sixth chapter will instead focus on the 'moment of truth' and on 're-institutionalisation'.

This study of Turin relies on the analysis of various types of empirical traces. To get a comprehensive and detailed picture of events, I have gathered local newspaper articles and explored the vast grey and secondary literature that exists on the city; then, to triangulate my findings, I have proceeded to interview 24 relevant actors that have been involved in the overall process. The organization of this empirical material, then, has permitted me to reconstruct the events that I will now introduce.

I. First phase: stalemate and seeds of change

The role of FIAT in Turin's post war expansion and development is unquestionable. As we have seen so far, its impact on the city has gone well beyond the mere production of income: its presence in the city has shaped the pattern of industrial relations, it has defined the economic and social structure of the Turin metropolitan area, and it conditioned the functioning of the local political system (Bagnasco, 1986; Pinson, 2002; Tranfaglia, 1987). For sure, the city, until the 1970s, would epitomize the 'one company town' (Bagnasco, 1986; Brenner, 2004) and for long after it would be hard to separate the image of Turin from that

of FIAT[69]. What this implies is that, as FIAT's role in the city started to change at the end of the 1970s, and as it did so more markedly during the 1980s, this would have significant repercussions over the character of the whole city.

The 1980s are opened by an event that marks, symbolically, the end of an era. In October 1980, a few months after the Lefts' second victory[70] in municipal elections, FIAT announces its intention to proceed with the layoff of 23,000 workers; a 35-day strike would follow, during which the Mayor joins workers in their protest; the strike is however followed by the 'march of the 40,000', a rally staged by FIAT's white-collar employees demanding the re-start of working activities. The confrontation would then end with a dramatic defeat for workers, Unions, and the Communist party itself, who would not prove capable of preventing the massive workforce layoff FIAT had announced (Castagnoli, 1998). Within the next six years, the number of FIAT employees would decrease from 139,000 units to 75,000, consisting of overall reduction of 64,000 workers (Bonazzi, 1990, p. 30-31).

Among local left-wing environments, the event would be referred to as 'the defeat of 1980', emphasizing the significance it had with respect to the workers' movement. The period between 1968 and 1980 had been a decade of conflictual relations between management and workers, across the whole country; that of 1980 is the last great strike, after which industrial conflict would dramatically decrease (Castagnoli, 1998). The workers' movement had, hitherto, supported a strategy of outright confrontation and open struggle with industrial management (Bagnasco, 1986); FIAT's decision to proceed with the layoff regardless of the magnitude of the strike would however have a lasting impact on the Unions' bargaining power, as well as on its conflictual approach to industrial relations (Berta and Chiamparino, 1986).

Similarly, the defeat had a lasting effect on the local Communist party (Castagnoli, 1998; Pinson, 2002). The left-wing administrations of Turin, comprising the Communist and Socialist parties, had come to power in 1975, announcing an overhaul of the local administrative machine and of how this would interact with economic interests (FIAT's) in the city (Belligni, 1986). Mayor Novelli maintained that FIAT's pattern of expansion had been detrimental to social cohesion and equality; his political action would then focus, on the one hand, on service provision and on reinforcing social cohesion, by supporting grassroots political activity, cultural offer and by protecting employment (Alfieri *et al*., 2012); on the other hand, he stressed the importance of interacting with FIAT on an equal footing, ready to oppose those projects that were not in the city's best interests (Castagnoli, 1998). During the first mandate, the administration would indeed reject a number of infrastructural projects, on the grounds these would benefit FIAT – among these, the local subway system, the airport's second runway, the ring-road (*idem*, p. 78; p. 94-95). From the perspective of administrative production, the first left-wing administrations (1975-1980) would focus on two types of

[69] This would become, indeed, one of the goals of the Castellani era (Bagnasco and Castellani, 2014).
[70] The 'lefts' consist of a coalition made up by the Communist and Socialist parties. In 1980, they would win local elections for their second term, after having won the municipality a first time in 1975.

policies: those concerning the 'rules of the game', so as to set the conditions for a meaningful government action, and those concerning redistribution (Belligni, 1986, p. 2). The second mandate (1980-1985), opened by the 'defeat of 1980', is instead marked by a diminished commitment of the administration towards redistribution and administrative reorganization, and a heightened inclination towards clientelist relations with various interest groups, compromise and a search for consensus that would reduce the effectiveness and innovativeness of political action (*idem*, p. 3). As illustrated in the previous chapter, this was in part due to the peculiar relationship between the Communist party, on one hand, and the Labour Unions on the other, in particular CGIL: a 'division of labour' existed between these two forces, whereby the latter would not only be in charge of all issues pertaining to working conditions and factory life, but was also viewed as the essential subject around which political and economic ideas and claims would be articulated; further, it provided the party with legitimation and popular support to introduce innovative policy measures (Belligni, 1986). The party, on the other hand, would then operate almost exclusively within the political realm (intended as the formal institutional *loci* devoted to politics), translating claims coming from the base – i.e., the workers' movement – into political struggles (Berta and Chiamparino, 1986). As the Unions were defeated and severely weakened after 1980, the mechanism that had hitherto sustained local government action would break down; the Party would then devote a considerable deal of energies to protect and support the wounded workers' movement, to prevent its complete collapse (Berta and Chiamparino, 1986). This would have an impact on the party's capacity to push for its renovation agenda, but it would not amount to the sole motive underpinning such scaling down. Relationships between coalition partners, for instance, worsened and, in 1983, some socialist members of the administration are found to be involved in a corruption scandal; cooperation between the two parties would soon end, and the Communist would govern alone in the year leading to the end of their mandate (Bobbio, 1990; Castagnoli, 1998).

As the 'left-wing' administrative experience came to an end, the local forces of the left, including Communist party, Union representatives, and civil society, would engage in a comprehensive process of reflection over the party's, the city's, and the Unions' shortcomings, initiating a discussion on possible alternative political strategies and agendas (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012). This is, in other words, a process of 'ideational innovation', where new ideas start emerging within an institutional framework that, despite renovation ambitions, remains well anchored to the scheme of the national post-war political compromise. With reference to such dynamic of ideational innovation, two concepts taken by the discursive institutionalist tradition come in handy. The first is that of background ideational abilities, as provided by Vivienne Schmidt (2008, p. 314): these concern actors' capacity "to make sense of and in a given meaning context, that is, in terms of the ideational rules or 'rationality' of that setting (Schmidt, 2008, p. 314)." These faculties then operate at a level of context-reading and of understanding the surrounding circumstances. So, it is these abilities that are involved with respect to the acknowledgment that the 'March of the 40,000' represents a dramatic defeat for the workers' movement, and the left at large; they furthermore underpin actors'

awareness that socio-economic circumstances are changing and that the political class seems uncapable of coping with such transformations. All of this, however, takes place within a politico-ideational context in which the left's (and, above all, the Communists') position within the national political spectrum is well defined, where the international world order rests on a clear cleavage between capitalist and communist countries, and where class conflict remains the core of the Communists' political agenda.

Awareness of changing circumstances, then, would lead actors to reflect, debate and exchange ideas, opinions, and proposals regarding how to modify and ameliorate the current socio-economic and political settings. What is at work in this case are 'foreground discursive abilities', the second concept illustrated by Schmidt (*ibid*.). Foreground discursive abilities "represent the logic of communication, which enables agents to think, speak, and act outside their institutions even as they are inside them, to deliberate about institutional rules even as they use them, and to persuade one another to change those institutions or to maintain them (Schmidt, 2008, p. 314)." It is these abilities, then, that are involved when actors engage in a lively debate over the city's present conditions, and over possible future strategies for development. Such a debate would be principally held within the city's cultural institutes – *Istituto Gramsci, Club Turati, Fondazione Agnelli*, *GFT* (*Gruppo Finanziario Tessile*); it would find expression in the pages of local newspapers, as well as on political magazines, such as *Sisifo*, issued by the Gramsci Institute. Those who took part to such discussions would belong to the cultural and political worlds connected to the workers' movement, the Communist party, the Fondazione Agnelli (FIAT), and the *GFT*; academics and researchers of IRES Piemonte would participate as well (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; Castagnoli, 1998). Discussions, then, would concern a vast array of topics: from the need to adopt new planning rules and a new Master Plan (Barbieri, 1987), a reasoning over the local technological assets, (Gros-Pietro, 1987), to more political topics, such as the need for institutional reform, and that of renovating the party and Union (Berta and Chiamparino, 1986). This sort of discussion is aptly described by the concept of foreground discursive abilities: as we have seen, these enable actors to think about changing their institutions while they are still inside of them (Schmidt, 2008, p. 314-315), which is precisely what happens in those years: it is indeed members of the left-wing who engage in debates over how to change and renovate the left itself. Up until those years, furthermore, the Italian Left-wing political world was the most connected[71] to the cultural and intellectual environments, and, for sure, when the time came, the local cultural centres (many of which connected to the left), the party and the Unions provided a fertile environment for the discussion to thrive.

While such a process of ideational innovation was unravelling, opposite dynamics would foreclose the actual possibilities for change: these mostly had to do with the structure of the politico-administrative system, the rules and functioning of which would favour a dominant position of political parties and legislative assemblies, to the detriment of executive effectiveness and actual governing capacity (Vandelli,

[71] This is not to say that other political families had no interest in culture, but the interconnection between left-wing and intellectual world had always been significant (Interview 5).

1997). In this case, it is concepts borrowed from the historical institutionalist tradition which can help shed light on the theme, specifically those of path dependency and of lock in effects. As illustrated in the previous chapter, path dependency refers to a process by which, once a given institutional[72] structure is adopted, agents adapt to the new institutions, by deploying strategies and behaviours that reinforce its functioning, even though these may collide with the original intentions of those who created said institution. The result is that the institution becomes 'locked in': so many actors have adapted to it, that changing the institution, the more time goes by, becomes more difficult.

In this case, it is the structure of local governments that has defined the contours of a political game dominated by political parties. Italian local government would, until the 1990s, replicate the structure of national government. The latter, designed by the Constituent Assembly in the years following the Second World War, would feature (and still does, with minor modifications) a proportional electoral system and a weak executive, whose hold on power would heavily depend on Parliamentary majorities. The legislators' idea, right after the fascist years, was that a weak executive would provide the best guarantee against the possible re-emergence of an authoritarian system. Because of this institutional design, governments would be formed through party agreements within Parliament, but parties could constantly re-negotiate their support to the government, making the latter strongly dependent on party strategies for its survival and, ultimately, prone to frequent crises. Local government would work in the same fashion, with an additional disadvantage: party relations at the local level would often reflect party relations at the centre. This is, for instance, one of the reasons why, in Turin, relations between coalition partners worsened in the Left-wings' second mandate (1980-1985). In those years, Bettino Craxi, national socialist leader since 1976, would pursue a strategy aiming at carving for the socialist party a new political space[73]; after becoming Prime Minister in 1983, Craxi heralds an ideological and programmatic makeover in the direction of a 'pragmatic reformism': "the PSI renounces its strategic objectives concerning the transformation of society and sets out to improve the system as it is through *ad hoc* and limited reforms (Morel, 1996, p. 280)." Under this new formula, the Socialist Party would come to support privatisations, anti-inflation policies, deficit reduction, and do away with economic planning. Once in power, however, Craxi's plan "would quickly degenerate [...] into full-out pragmatism, by no means reformist and vaguely neo-liberal, even neo-conservative (Morel, 1996, p. 280)." The party would soon take advantage of the resources its new government position afforded it, would renounce its reform ambitions, and run government in a rather "cynical and wheeler-dealer style" (Pinson, 2002, p. 461); the party would eventually be crushed by the *Mani Pulite* judicial inquiries of 1992-1993, due to corruption.

[72] See Chapter 2.

[73] The Italian socialist party was the true pivotal player in the national political system: it could equally be part of left-wing coalitions with the communists, or of centre-left coalitions with the Christian Democrats (and, often, other parties). Indeed, in its history it had experienced both formulas: the 'popular front' with the PCI from 1948 until 1963, and the centre-left with the DC from 1963 to 1983 (Pinson, 2002 a).

The frictions with the Communists that resulted from such a strategy would then be reflected at the local level, particularly in Turin, where the two parties were allies in a coalition. Indeed, after approving a preliminary plan for a New Master Plan in 1979, Socialist and Communists would spend the subsequent years quarrelling over its content, as the Socialists, after the 'pragmatic turn', rejected its long-term planning ambitions, which they would deem way too 'constraining' (Bobbio, 1990; Mellano, 2008; Pinson, 2002a). Moreover, anticipating *Tangentopoli* by ten years, in 1983 a number of socialist officials was involved in a local corruption scandal that proved fatal for the government coalition which, eventually, the socialists would leave (Bobbio, 1990). The reflection of national disputes at the local level would thus heavily condition the running of local government, where party quarrels would distract administrative activities from policy and hinder its effectiveness (Vandelli 1997; Castagnoli 1998; Bobbio 1990).

After the second, disappointing, Left-wing mandate, a new coalition would take over the municipality after the 1985 elections. This was a 'five party' ('*penta-partito'*) coalition, comprising Christian Democrats, Liberals, Republicans, the Social Democrats (PSDI), and the Socialists, who, together with the secular parties (Liberals and Republicans) would maintain a prominent position within the alliance (Bobbio, 1990). The new municipal government's programme would be grounded on markedly different premises compared to those that underpinned the Left-wing administrations of the previous decade: moving away from rigid planning strategies, it aimed at shifting the focus towards economic development[74], by focusing on investments and by expanding the local tertiary economy (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; Pinson, 2002a). As a first move, the five-party administration would commission a new Master Plan to a Milanese architectural firm in 1986, Gregotti and Co. (Spaziante, 2008), one that would pursue different objectives from that of 1979, thus further certifying a break with the past and with the Communists' emphasis on long-term planning.

Different views as to urban planning approaches had amounted to a crucial factor that, among other things, contributed to undermine the socialist-communist coalition, especially in during Novelli's second mayoral mandate (1980-1985). The communists had upheld an idea of urban planning involving grand, long-term plans, meant to account for all minor intervention details, and consisting of planning documents (Master Plans) whose role was essentially to constrain action, by accurately foreshadowing every building activity. Underpinning this approach was the conviction that Master Plans could potentially serve as cure-all instruments, which, by regulating construction and economic activity, could have beneficial effects over resource distribution and the well-being of the lower social strata (Pinson, 2002a; Mazza, 1988). Such an approach to urban planning would rely on synoptic rationality, that is, schematic, long-term vision, aiming to control all aspects of a given process (Bagnasco, 1986). During the 1975-1980 mandate, these ideas were translated into a vision that was essentially developed within the context of a city that, although the crisis had been ongoing for some time, still viewed itself as Fordist industrial centre: its main objectives were to

[74] Indeed, the five party governments' programme would in part anticipate the agenda of the Castellani era (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012).

redistribute functions and services from the centre to the periphery, to balance out the disequilibrium of resources that existed between these two areas of the city, move industrial facilities out of the core, and lay the foundations for a more sustainable future growth (Bobbio, 1990), which would also contemplate the preservation and regeneration of the environment (Radicioni, 1988). The Master Plan's preliminary project was approved in 1979, but its elaboration process stopped there, and it would not be translated into a concrete binding document (Falco, 1991; Bobbio, 1990; Pinson, 2002a; Gambino, 1993, Mellano, 2008).

A first reason for this failure has to do with the inconsistency concerning the ways local government would elaborate the plan: the commitment to synoptic, long-term planning was offset by a reality where, informally, negotiation among involved actors and interests was the chief procedure through which the Planning document would be elaborated (Bobbio, 1990; Mazza, 1988). Also because of the increasing enmity between the two coalition partners (in the second mandate, 1980-1985), negotiation would result in the dismantlement of the previously agreed upon preliminary plan, rather than in its approval (Bobbio, 1990). A final blow to the Master Plan envisaged by Novelli's administration was however given by the transformations affecting the city that became explicit after the defeat of 1980, during the Left-wing's second mandate. The plan had been conceived on a reality that was no more: demographic growth had halted, industrial facilities were closing down, Fordism was coming to an end, prospects for growth were unclear, and the – albeit fragile – social equilibria that had been achieved in the previous decade had been dramatically undermined by the events of 1980 at FIAT (Bobbio, 1990, p. 107-108). Against this background, turning down opportunities for construction offered by the rising number of abandoned industrial areas became a difficult position to defend[75] (*ibid*.).

In this phase, the Socialists would turn to a different understanding of urban planning, one that would subsequently be defined 'by project', rather than 'by plan' (Bobbio, 1990; Pinson, 2002a). The idea, in this case, is that construction activity and urban renovation should not be connected to an overarching, *grand* planning vision, but it should be incremental, proceeding according to individual opportunities that emerge contingently and are realized through individual, *ad hoc* projects, which need not be connected to any sweeping vision (Gambino *et al*., 1988).

As the five party coalitions took city hall in 1985, the local administration was quick to discard the 1979 Master Plan preliminary project and set out to work on a new document on new premises, consistent with a 'project approach'. The novel, underpinning rationale, in this case, is that only by unleashing market forces can the city take advantage of the opportunities afforded by abandoned industrial areas[76]: the objective is to produce a document that would set the guidelines but would leave ample room for *ad hoc*

[75] This is why the Communists accepted FIAT's offer to restructure the *Lingotto* plant – which was closed in 1982 – despite the operation was totally inconsistent with the planning approach they had claimed to adhere to (Bobbio, 1990; Pinson, 2002a).

[76] More than 2 million square meters of abandoned industrial areas will be found in the municipality of Turin, half of which belonging to FIAT (Corsico and Peano, 1991).

adjustments and private initiative and would emphasize the goals of increasing rent and land value (Pinson, 2002a). The five party administrations would, however, intend to carry out construction activity even before the definition of a new Master Plan, so as to exploit the renovation opportunities afforded by deindustrialisation, as in the case of *Lingotto*[77]. However, internal quarrelling and local government instability would severely hinder local government effectiveness (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; Bobbio, 1990), so that, by the end of their mandate in 1990, the *Lingotto* renewal had barely started, and no new Master Plan was produced. Despite these shortcomings, the move towards a different approach to urban planning – one that, crucially, would rely on incremental rationality and market forces – surely favoured by the new local administration, also testifies to the changes that affected Turin during the decade.

By the end of the 1980s, then, Turin is transforming. FIAT had undergone an organizational and productive overhaul[78] (Bagnasco, 1986; Pinson, 2002a), which ensured the company could still compete in the automobile market, but this came at the price of severe workforce layoffs. Because of the innovations introduced by automation in production, manufacturing unemployment would be soaring in those years, and indeed tertiary employment overtook, during the decade, industrial employment. As the relationships between FIAT and its surrounding socio-economic and political environments are changing, some novelties would gradually start emerging: the regulative principle of organization is leaving room to that of the market, some new economic actors are emerging on the local scene, signalling the that some limited form of pluralism was emerging in the city (Bagnasco, 1986; Pinson, 2002a)**.** An important novelty that appears during the 1980s is that of brownfield sites: as it is clear the city is not going to expand any further, geographically, and demographically (Interview 8; Interview 5), these are now viewed as opportunities for development. Nonetheless, as the *Lingotto* case will show, FIAT's status *vis-à-vis* that of other local players remains disproportionally dominant in favour of the car company; the local economy is slowly changing, and factories cannot absorb as much workforce as they once did, but the weight of FIAT is still overwhelming, and the same can be said for the city's industrial history.

These changes of the local socio-economic framework have generated a process of ideational innovation within the main forces of the Left, the Communist Party[79] and the labour Unions, particularly the CGIL. Faced with the 'defeat of 1980', aware of the changing economic and productive circumstances, and incapable of reversing the increase in manufacturing unemployment, these forces engage in a process of reflection over the possible strategies to 1) relaunch Turin's development and, above all, 2) to redefine their political goals; all this would be underpinned by a firm conviction of the inadequacy of local political institutions (Gallino, 1990). This reflection, nonetheless, would take place within the constraints set by, indeed, the local politico-administrative structure, which, apart from hindering effective governing action,

[77] A more detailed discussion of the *Lingotto* renewal operation will feature in the following section.
[78] See Chapter 4.
[79] The Socialists had undergone their programmatic overhaul for independent reasons, linked to political calculations of the national secretariat, as we saw above.

would prevent conceiving of novel political formulas: parties' political position in the political spectrum were rather fixed, so that the possibility of an alliance between Communists and any other party, aside from the socialist, was off the table (Interview 5). The political and institutional contexts would have, in other words, a 'lock in' effect with respect to political dynamics, meaning political actors had limited tools at their disposal to operate an overhaul of the political system. Similarly, the city would not yet take advantage of the renewal opportunities offered by brownfields, as the functioning of the local political machine made it difficult for governing activity to be coherent.

Table 1: Turin – chronology of events (1980-1989).

Year	Scope of event	Event
June 1980	Local	Novelli elected Mayor for his second mandate, leading a left-wing coalition composed of PCI and PSI
Sept./Oct. 1980	Local (national repercussions)	Strike at FIAT. 23,000 workers are placed on unemployment benefits (*Cassa Integrazione*) but will never be reintegrated in the factory.
June 1981	National	First 'five-party coalition' government in Rome. Giovanni Spadolini (Republican Party) is Prime Minister.
1982	Local	Productive and organizational overhaul of FIAT company.
Feb. 1982	Local	FIAT announces closure of Turin's *Lingotto* plant.
March 1983	Local	*Scandalo delle Tangenti* – Corruption scandal involving Socialist and Christiand Democrat members of local and regional executives. Local government activity is 'frozen' for more than a year.
Aug. 1983	National	Craxi becomes Prime Minister, supported by another 'five party coalition'; government will remain in charge until 4/1987.
1984	Local	A communist-only executive is formed ('giunta monocolore') and will resign in January 1985.
Jan. – May 1985	Local	A 'five party' coalition forms a local executive, awaiting the municipal elections that will be held in May of the same year.
May 1985	Local	'Five Party' coalition wins municipal elections. Giorgio Cardetti (Socialist) becomes mayor.
June 1985	National	Referendum (abrogative) on the salary scale. The communist party and CGIL campaigned lose the referendum, marking a further defeat of radical left-wing positions. Labour Unions' unity is over.

1985-1989	local	Phase of reflection over city's conditions is initiated, involving various sectors of the local civil society along with political actors.
Autumn 1986	Local	Procedures for the development of a new Master Plan are started. A Milanese architectural firm, Gregotti & Co. is tasked with developing the Plan.
July 1987	Local	Mayor Cardetti resigns; he is substituted by Mayor Maria Magnani Noya, another socialist.
1988	International	EEC reg. n. 2052/88 is approved, defining the funding programmes, programming periods, and discriminating between areas. Turin is identified as Objective 2 Area for the 1989-1993 period.
Nov. 9, 1989	International	Fall of the Berlin Wall

I.I Empirical Evidence

The 1980s decade is symbolically opened by the 35-day strike at FIAT[80], followed by the 'march of the 40,000' in autumn, which mark the end of an era of industrial relations. Up until that point, there had been a particular division of labour between Unions and Communist Party: the former would feel and act as the primary subject, on the labour side, devoted to dealing with managers within the workplace, namely the factory (Berta and Chiamparino, 1986; Pinson, 2002); the Communist Party, supportive of such an attitude, would transfer the position of the workers' movement at the political level, although its relationship with other political actors would fall short of proper political confrontation: the Party's position, overall, would mirror the features of a power relation whose balance had been established elsewhere (Berta and Chiamparino, 1986; Pinson, 2002a). Until 1980, for the entirety of the previous decade, unions and workers had pursued a strategy of open confrontation with industrial management (Bagnasco, 1986; Interview 11). In part due to the relatively vast number of workers still employed in manufacturing, such antagonistic stance had proven rather successful: the power of workers and Unions within factories was significant, reinforcing the perception that outright conflict was paying off.

The events occurring between 1980 and 1985 would have a major impact on the organisational structure of the Labour Unions, so it is worth mentioning the characteristics of the workers movement until that moment. In 1972, the three major workers' confederations – CGIL, CISL, and UIL – would unite, by signing a federative pact. Further steps towards a fuller Unions' unity would however never be fully implemented, as for instance, the suppression of the individual confederations, scheduled for 1973, would not occur. At

[80] "Con i quarantamila. Cesare Annibaldi ricorda la vertenza che ha cambiato un'epoca", *La Stampa*, October 14, 2010.

the level of workers' categories organizations ('*federazioni di categoria*'), by contrast, unity would materialize more effectively: it is actually the federations of metal workers (FIOM, FIM and UILM) that had pushed to unite the three major confederations; FIOM, FIM and UILM would thus merge to create FLM, the united federation of metal workers. Throughout the 1970s, the Union (intended here in its unitary understanding) would score important victories both at national and local level, in part remedying to the ineffectiveness of proper political actors; the attitude would remain confrontational throughout these years, and unions' political struggles would be started from the workplace. In 1978, then, at the EUR conference[81], unions' leaders would propose a strategic change, aimed at pushing industrial relations towards a negotiation practice and away from conflict within the workplace (Bagnasco, 1986; Berta and Chiamparino, 1986); the move, however, would encounter little support, and the movement would not abandon conflict and workplace struggles, especially in Turin (Bagnasco, 1986; Interview 11).

By fall 1980, then, the Unions' movement is formally united, both at the level of the general confederations (CGIL, CISL and UIL), and at that of the metal workers federation – FLM – which are those mainly involved in the strike at FIAT. The defeat had various effects over the workers' movement, and the forces of the left at large. A first effect was rather practical and concrete: by dismissing 23,000 workers, FIAT eradicated part of the Unions from its factories, in that several laid off workers had been union delegates, and their departure from the plant would greatly reduce the Union's power and bearing within the company (interview 14).

> *"Well, at that stage, things had changed completely, because…these 24 thousand FIAT workers who'd been put out of the factory had changed…this made the Union lose a great deal of influence. From that moment on, there would be no more strikes…many of those who were put on payroll subsidies had been Union's delegates, so that the internal organizational structure was undermined…"*
>
> (Interview 14)

[81] In February 1978, a momentous conference would be held Rome's EUR neighbourhood, proclaimed by the United Federation of CGIL, CISL, and UIL. The conference was meant to redefine the Union's strategy for the subsequent years. Two novel paths would be proposed. One, pertaining to politico-economic policies, concerned the proposal to scale down wage raise demands and reduce individual consumption to the advantage of public and collective consumption (Mirafiori Accordi e Lotte, 2021). These policies were in line with the austerity line backed by the PCI in those years (the 1971-1973 oil crises had just halted post-war growth). The second proposal would instead regard strategy: the idea was to adopt a more typically neo-corporatist, centrally conducted negotiating procedure (Bobbio, 1987; Bagnasco, 1986; Berta and Chiamparino, 1986). This idea would have on the one hand, reduced the relevance of industrial conflict and, on the other, it was feared by Unionists that it would have also marginalised the role of Unions themselves, relegating them into a subordinate position with respect to party politics (Mirafiori Accordi e Lotte, 2021). For these reasons, the EUR strategy was opposed by several Union's elements (Mirafiori Accordi e Lotte, 2021), such as the FLM, whose rejection of the EUR line was particularly strong in Turin (Bagnasco, 1986; Berta and Chiamparino, 1986)

This, in turn, would reduce the Union's overall bargaining force, its significance within the national political system, undermining its position as the essential political subject of industrial relations (Berta and Chiamparino, 1986) on the part of labour: "In the medium-term, when social life is sufficiently free, a 'truth-mechanism' is at work, capable of 'punishing' the limited representativeness of the Union. When members decrease, when proclaimed strikes fail or, by contrast, non-authorized strikes succeed, the bargaining and political power of Union leaders inevitably decreases (Manghi, 1985, p. 10)." The defeat of 1980, then, considerably weakened the Unions, as several of their members were physically eradicated from the factory, where their presence had hitherto been a crucial asset the Unions could count on. In addition, a defeat of such proportions would certify, for sure, a loss of political clout for the movement and the loss of effectiveness of the strategy that had been pursued until then.

Despite these immediate effects, the defeat at FIAT would not, at least in a first moment, alter the cultural frame of reference of the Union and, more in general, of Turin's left-wing environment. Berta and Chiamparino (1986) argue this consisted of an ideology of 'industrialism', that is, an ideology constructed upon a concrete reality where industry has a central role with respect to development. Their argument is that the 'industrialist' culture has turned into ideology ('in the negative understanding of the term'), once it has posited its own hegemony over other cultures, viewing society and politics as subordinate to the economic-productive sphere. This 'industrialist' ideology has significantly affected, then, local system of political and societal alliances, both before and after the defeat of 1980. The 'division of labour' between union and party[82] had emerged during the previous decade and accorded to the Union an extensive control of matters pertaining to factory life, from wage bargaining to working conditions; moreover, since the Communist party had always viewed economic planning as something that should be articulated on the basis of working life, this entailed that the system of industrial relations would *de facto* be in charge of political economy. In other terms, the centrality of industrial production within the economic sphere, and the superiority of the latter with respect to other spheres of human activity, would constitute the grounds for such an industrialist ideology; against this background, then, the workers movement, because of its direct involvement within the productive process, was understood as the 'agent of change', that is, the privileged subject devoted to conducting the anti-capitalistic struggle. The centrality of the workplace and of the Unions' movement is somewhat compounded by the subordination of politics to the economic sphere: this means there was no perception of the need to reform an administrative culture that was still inadequate with respect to the managerial tasks it had to deal with (Berta and Chiamparino, 1986, p. 17).

Apart from the immediate and concrete consequence consisting of the defeat of the Unions *vis-à-vis* capital within the system of industrial relations, the defeat of 1980 would then have another major effect, that is, the loss of centrality of industrial relations as such with respect to the regulation of society as a whole

[82] See chapter 4.

(*idem*, p. 16). Because of this, while the 'industrialist ideology'[83] would persist, the division of labour between party and Union would start changing: politics, that is, the Communist party, would gradually step back in and restart negotiating directly with capital.

> *"…and the Union, basically, wouldn't negotiate anymore, as it was messed up…I mean, after the defeat, it had little credibility. I remember we would negotiate in their stead. […] So…these negotiations, we did them all…every union controversy…in reality, negotiations would always go through the PCI, because it was the subject that, back then, was able to fill the gap between the business world [and that of labour]. […] All major negotiations of the 1980s had been somehow…but not because the Union wasn't capable, merely because, after the 1980's defeat, it had lost strength, and as for all weak subjects it was…how can I put it…not to be viewed as subordinate, it would withdraw to narrow-minded stances…"*
>
> (Interview 9)

The Union's attempts to regain some bargaining space proved rather clumsy, as it accepted deals that were chiefly desired by FIAT, which the movement had rejected a few years earlier[84]. At the same time, itself weakened by the Unions' defeat, the Communist party[85] seemed to have lost its innovative approach to policymaking (Belligni, 1986; Berta and Chiamparino, 1986); this, according to Berta and Chiamparino, was essentially due to two factors. On the one hand, industrial restructuring had marked the beginning of the end for Fordism in Turin, leaving the party bewildered before events, and ever more frequently targeted by critiques emphasising its inadequacy: it seemed apparent that the Communists lacked the know-how and the capacities to cope with these transformations. In essence, the party was deprived of its historical interlocutor, albeit an adversary, on which it had hitherto calibrated and devised its strategies, policies, claims and struggles; in those years, therefore, the party would appear to merely react to FIAT's actions, while having lost its innovative capacity. On the other hand, the party would invest major energies to prevent a further deepening of the Union's crisis, and to ensure that relations with FIAT would evolve in the direction of negotiation (Berta and Chiamparino, 1986, p. 17).

The latter is the first instance of 'change' that is gradually occurring within the left-wing and, especially, the Communist Party: that is, a move from an understanding of industrial relations as essentially conflictual and firmly in the hands of the Unions' movement, towards an approach centred on negotiation, where the

[83] In Turin, the EUR's strategic turn would not be fully accepted (Bagnasco, 1986; Berta and Chiamparino, 1986)
[84] These were a series of deals signed with FIAT between 1980 and 1983, concerning wage payment procedures, productivity bonuses and the lengthening of the disbursement of unemployment benefits (meaning workers would have not been reintegrated into the factory, as promised). (Berta and Chiamparino, 1986; For a full list of FLM's deals with FIAT in Turin, see (Mirafiori Accordi e Lotte, 2021): http://www.mirafiori-accordielotte.org/1981-88/accordi/)
[85] Communist party secretary Berlinguer had supported the 1980 strike at FIAT, as Turin's mayor Novelli had (Bricco, P., "Morto Cesare Romiti, manager duro e quasi brutale (ma vero fino in fondo)", *Il Sole 24 Ore*, August 20, 2020).

Party or, generally, institutional political actors would have a more prominent function. This approach, although gradually emerging, would however encounter major resistance, in particular among the ranks of the FLM leadership, but also within major sections of the Communist party.

> *"…there was […] a rather strong labouring tradition…and yet, even within the Unions you had perplexities, qualms, but this…how can I say, this 'jusq'au bout' attitude, as the French would say, was very…it was very influential. […] Siding openly against it looked like a sort of betrayal. […] Moreover…the first opportunities for a new collaboration between the labour world and…the industrial world…had already opened up. Those had [nonetheless] found in Union leadership, specifically in FLM leadership, a formidable obstacle…"*
> (Interview 14)

This resistance can indeed be attributed to the grip still exerted on Unionists and Party members by the 'industrialist' cultural frame of reference: in this case, this acted like an obstacle, or a slowing down factor, with respect to the possibilities for a change of strategies. Both path-dependency and the logic of appropriateness can be seen to be at work here[86]: as to the former, it can be argued that during the previous decade, the left-wing at both national and local level, had developed a strategy of interaction with the entrepreneurial and business sector that rested on conflict and confrontation; even when conflict appeared to be a sub-optimal solution[87], the conflictual approach was entrenched within the left-wing world, and both the Unions' movement and the Party would cling to confrontation. As to the logic of appropriateness, we can see how the 'industrialist ideology' would constitute the cultural frame of reference for the left-wing, resulting in both party and Unions having a clear idea of their respective roles and functions within a capitalist, Fordist society. As a consequence, conflict would still be viewed by many as the 'appropriate' response to the actions taken by industrial management.

Moving from conflict to negotiation would not be the only instance of change that started emerging in those years, namely, the first half of the 1980s. A second line of transformation, then, would concern proper programmes and policies and a first indicator of such a change came from factory workers themselves. Between 1979 and 1980, a questionnaire was submitted by the PCI to FIAT workers employed across Italy – about 22-23,000 responses were gathered – and the results were surprising to the eyes of the Unions' and party's executives: most workers were against the policies hitherto promoted by the left – equal wages, equal raises, etc. – and favoured the introduction of some differentiation of treatment and saw in Scandinavian

[86] A more detailed discussion of the causal mechanisms at work will feature in the next section.
[87] In the second half of the 1970s, frictions started emerging within the movement, and it appeared that the conflictual approach was yielding less than desired. The EUR conference of 1978 represents an acknowledgment of this reality, but the mild support it gathered is an instance of the difficulty of getting this line through (Bagnasco, 1986; Berta and Chiamparino, 1986).

countries, rather than in the USSR, the socialist model to look up to (Interview 14; Interview 22). The harshest reactions to these replies came precisely from the leading figures of party and movement (interview 22).

Subsequently, after the defeat at FIAT, a discussion emerged within the ranks of the local Communist party, contemplating the possibility of embracing new policy ideas, such as, again, flexibility in the workplace, differential treatment for workers, and so on. The gradual emergence of these elements of innovation in the party can be attributed to three key factors: the first is the very defeat at FIAT (Interview 9; interview 14), which by itself had fostered a self-reflective moment in the wider left-wing world, including the party; a second element is the concrete reality of the changes affecting factory life, which were gradually leading to the first experiments in the direction of flexibility (interview 9; interview 14; interview 15); the third had to do with the fact that the younger generations, within the ranks of the local party section, were coming of age and started accessing leading executive positions right in those years (interview 9).

> *"…it had developed, let's say, through an in-party discussion, as you would do back then […], keeping in mind [that], clearly, everything originated from the reflection after the defeat at FIAT […]. So, I can tell you that the sequence of events, within the Communist party, [in] 1983, the federation's secretariat changes, Fassino becomes Secretary, and a group of young people joins him, including myself, […] Livia Turco, Mario Virano, […]. I mentioned them just to say, I mean, all people who are now doing different things…but in that context, back then, an idea is being born, a proposal that – 'let's call it Convention over the future of Turin' – we called it Convention precisely to distinguish it from the lexicon…the usual party lexicon, which was that of the conference (convegno), of the…the assembly, of the workers' conference…we called it convention a bit to…mimic the Americans, but we did it on purpose. […] It's not something that was born like that, like Minerva from Jupiter's brain, I mean…it came from a work…then, I mean, in Settimo's Pirelli factory in those years…in the first part of the 1980s you had the first experiments with flexible working hours, I mean, six-day shift, with different time-tables…all things that back then…today it's laughable, today…experts would talk about it…back then, instead, these were occasions for discussions, for evenings and nights spent within the PCI, discussion with the branch, with unionists, so…so, from all these things, these people […] had endorsed the idea that some policy innovation was needed, both with respect to labour and infrastructure…it emerged a bit like that…"*
>
> (Interview 9).

A few elements emerge from this piece of interview. The first highlights, once again, the momentous role played by the defeat at FIAT – which acted a bit like a tipping point, a decisive defeat for the workers' movement – with respect to the strategy that had until that moment been pursued by the wider left-wing

environment, both locally and nationally, and the overall significance of the defeat, which was felt quite immediately. The defeat of 1980, however, would not merely bring to the realization that a certain political strategy had become ineffective; importantly, it shed light on the fact that a new reality was emerging, the Fordist productive system was a thing of the past, industrial restructuring and automation were changing socio-economic circumstances, and new approaches were needed to deal with these transformations. Finally, the fact these proposals were put forward by the younger generations should come as no surprise, as the older generation is that which has been most exposed, and that had thus grown more accustomed to the 'industrialist' culture.

In sum, during this first part of the 1980s – roughly between 1980 and 1985 – ideational change was occurring mainly on two fronts: on the one hand, this would regard the approach the left-wing should maintain vis-à-vis industrial management and, specifically, it envisaged a shift from a conflictual and confrontational attitude towards an strategy based on negotiation; on the other hand, this would contemplate the opportunity of endorsing new policy positions, a move generally underpinned by the acknowledgment that the reality of industrial labour was changing. Throughout this first phase, however, the prevailing frames of reference of the left-wing environment, that is, the 'industrialist culture', were still predominant at the level of party and union leadership; the resistance to change exerted by these elements would be made explicit at the 1985 salary scale referendum, which marked PCI's second major defeat in five years and brought an end to Unions' unity.

In February 1984, to contain increasing inflation rates, Craxi's government would cut the salary scale, which reduced the adaptation of wages to increases of the cost of living. Up until this moment, the three general workers' confederations (CGIL, CISL and UIL) and the three metal works federations (FIOM, FIM, UILM) had been united for more than a decade; precisely due to divergent views over the salary scale cut, the three Unions broke unity. The more moderate Unions would back the government's move (interview 11), while CGIL would be divided: the majoritarian communist component would oppose the measure, while the minoritarian, non-communist one would uphold it. The Communist party would side with CGIL's majority in opposing the salary scale cut and, together with the radical left-wing *Democrazia Proletaria* party, would start a signature collection campaign to hold a referendum aimed at repealing the law. In the months leading up to the referendum, CISL and UIL, and CGIL's minoritarian component, campaigned for the NO vote, thus aiming to maintain the law, supporting the position of the 'five party' coalition that was governing the country at the time; CGIL's majoritarian communist component and the Communist party, on the other hand, supported the YES vote (Montanelli and Cervi, 1993). Eventually, the NO vote won[88], marking the government's victory, and the Communists defeat; Unions' unity was over for good. The fact that the

[88] (Archivio Storico delle elezioni, Referendum 09/06/1985, in Interior Ministry, https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it/index.php?tpel=F&dtel=09/06/1985&tpa=I&tpe=A&lev0=0&levsut0=0&es0=S&ms=S).

Communist party voted in favour of repealing the law does not mean, however, that this position was endorsed by all members: those who had supported the opening to new ideas and a new approach to industrial relations were not fully convinced by the leadership's official position but had to go along with it anyway.

> *"Well, in 1985 […] the famous referendum was held…over the salary scale…where I, contrary to…even if I knew Fassino agreed with me, but as federation secretary he had to say he agreed, while I said I didn't agree. It was two of us, within the federation, to openly declare our positions…then, as you would do back then, we were involved in the electoral campaign, and so forth…but we were very perplexed with respect to the referendum, because we deemed it wrong, because it was…it was the opposite of…and, indeed, Berlinguer came over essentially to say…to snipe at us, or in any case, to oppose…and the salary scale referendum was nothing but the logical consequence of those narrow-minded positions Berlinguer had taken, so…we saw in the salary scale referendum the contrary of those policies…back then you would call them 'wage-planning policies', whose interlocutors were…Tarantelli and some people both in CIGL and CISL…I keep on thinking that if a different path had prevailed back then…instead, first the defeat at FIAT, then the salary scale defeat, that would be the 'de profundis'…I mean, we ran towards the 'de profundis'…we wanted to get there, I mean…"*
>
> (Interview 9)

1985 was also the year that local government changed colour in Turin: the left-wing majorities that had guided the city for the past decade would be substituted by a five party, centre-left coalition, comprising Socialist Party, Christian Democrats, the Social Democratic Party, Liberals and Republicans. By looking at electoral results for the 1985 round, however, the Communists still retained the relative majority: it was, rather, the change of alliances that had occurred a few years earlier, underpinned by Craxi's strategy of repositioning the Socialist Party and making it the major force of the Left, taking over the PCI's position, that lay behind the change of administration. To note that this was fully consistent with a system where government majorities would be formed through party negotiations (Vandelli, 1997), rather than being an expression of the popular vote.

Table 2: Turin's municipal election results (1980-1985)



Source: (Comune Torino, 2020).

In the old system of local government, there would be no majority bonus for the winner, mayoral election was indirect, and the voting system was fully proportional. After the elections of 1985, the major opposition party – indeed, the Communists – had 30 councillors, whereas the five-party coalition could count on 42 councillors, so distributed[89]: the Christian Democrats had 20, the Socialists 9, the Social Democrats had 2, and Liberals and Republicans had 5 and 6, respectively. Although the Christian Democrats were the major party within the coalition, the latter's propulsive force amounted to the socialist *plus* secular[90] parties' axis (Bobbio, 1990). This means the coalition consisted of two major components of similar force (20 councillors for the Christian Democrats, 22 for the Socialist-secular component), an element of potential instability within the new municipal government. As mentioned in the previous section, in terms of political agenda the new coalition embraced reformism, privatisations, anti-inflation policies, deficit reduction and opposed economic planning (Morel, 1996); further, it had a view of urban planning that would discard long-term, overly detailed, and constraining plans, in favour of a more flexible approach focused on individual projects (Bobbio, 1990; Pinson, 2002a). This, in part, amounted to a way of taking advantage of the opportunities afforded by the proliferation of brownfields, which were becoming widespread in the second half of the 1980s (Interview 6; Interview 5; Interview 8).

The case of *Lingotto*'s renewal[91] well illustrates, on the one hand, the type of opportunities that would be opened by the growing presence of abandoned industrial areas in the city and, on the other, the

[89] Source: Città di Torino, (2020), "*1946-2020: Il consiglio comunale di Torino*", Presidenza del Consiglio Comunale, retrieved from: http://www.comune.torino.it/consiglio/pubblicazioni/volume_consiglio.pdf, accessed on Feb. 20th, 2020.

[90] Liberals and Republicans were the secular parties ('*partiti laici*', in Italian).

[91] The account of the Lingotto's renewal operation presented here mainly draws on Luigi Bobbio's essay, "Archeologia industriale e terziario avanzato a Torino: il caso del Lingotto", (1990).

incapacity of local government to make the most out of it, mainly due to the fragility of the five-party coalition, and to the different ideas each majority had with respect to the whole operation.

In 1982, FIAT closed the *Lingotto* plant, declaring its intention to 'offer' the factory to the city so that it could be renovated and put to a different use, pertaining to the public interest: the offer was too big to turn down, even for left-wing governments. In the 1980s, for sure, the number of abandoned industrial facilities would increase steadily, creating an opportunity to renovate such areas and, thus, to attract investments, productive activities and increase rent values. Due to its size and symbolic significance within the city, that of *Lingotto* was potentially a major renewal operation[92], one which the local administration could not afford, politically, to ignore (Bobbio, 1990).

As the five-party government came to power in 1985, the *Lingotto* operation appeared to be more in tune with the style of administrative intervention, by project rather than by plan, supported by the Socialists; yet the composite nature of the coalition and the weight of party loyalties proved an obstacle to a smooth running of the renewal process. Each party's position over the project was different and would shift over time, except for the Liberal and Republican parties, who would back the operation all along. The Communists, now back at the opposition, would oppose the very project they had reluctantly accepted just a few years earlier; Socialists found themselves in an even more ambivalent position, as the party was torn between the "anti-FIAT stance expressed [...] at the national level" (Bobbio, 1990, p. 148) and the line pursued by local party managers, who felt negotiating with FIAT was a necessity due to their institutional position – Turin's mayor was a socialist after 1985 – to the point they had acquired a propulsive role in the whole matter. Such a confusion became explicit when, in 1986, socialist national vice-secretary Martelli proposed to demolish the building, while Turin's socialist Mayor Cardetti was at that very moment involved in negotiations with FIAT and had clearly endorsed the project (*ibid*.). If, just a few years before, the party's national position would be replicated locally, gradually bringing the left-wing government experiment to an end, this time a cleavage would emerge between centre and periphery, adding to the incoherence surrounding the operation. The Christian Democracy, despite being part of the majority since 1985, appeared to resist the project: such resistance could in part be linked to the uneasiness that resulted from their minor role within the executive, dominated by the PSI-secular parties' axis, regardless of the fact Christian Democrats were the biggest party of the coalition. Fundamentally, the local DC always viewed the *Lingotto* issue as something concerning the other parties (*idem*, p. 149). Throughout the second half of the 1980s, then, various ideas were put forward as to the possible ways to reuse the factory, but they would for the most remain on paper and works would barely start (*idem*, p. 102); it should come as no surprise, then, that the renewal operation would eventually be completed in 2002.

[92] Although the '*Lingotto* operation' would collide with the urban planning understanding the Communists had until that moment sustained (Pinson, 2002a; Castagnoli, 1998).

The *Lingotto* story is telling with respect to the local power constellation in the 1980s, and to the characteristics of the local political context. First, the public-private company that was created to oversee the whole reconstruction would involve, among private players, only FIAT; this is obvious, as FIAT had owned the plant, but other private actors could have had an interest in participating to a potentially lucrative project, yet none of this happened. Furthermore, FIAT always had the edge in negotiations with public authorities, which were then far from balanced: the availability of the plant for renewal, for sure, would not result from negotiation, but from FIAT's unilateral decision; public authorities, faced with the company, were not yet autonomous and resolute enough, and had too few resources[93] in terms of credibility and consensus, so that, politically, opposition to the project was not an option (Bobbio, 1990).

The role public actors played in the operation resulted, on the one hand, from their need to gather consensus and favour among the local citizenry, to the eyes of which the relative weakness of the political class with respect to FIAT was evident; on the other hand, their behaviour was still heavily influenced by party culture[94] and the administrative framework they had to operate within. In essence, the position of political players in the whole operation was characterized by an official endorsement of the project, offset by an internal lack of cohesion[95], both among the parties of the government coalition and within individual parties.

That of *Lingotto* is perhaps the major example of renewal opportunities offered by the proliferation of abandoned industrial facilities of the period – and of the incapacity of the local political sphere to act swiftly and effectively in this respect. In the latter part of the 1980s, however, brownfields were not the only novelty: this was a phase, immediately after industrial restructuring, in which Turin's industry experienced what were probably its last successes. These would not only regard FIAT – which, in any case, in those years would become Europe's second automobile company[96] after Volkswagen, in terms of sales – and some its provider firms[97], but would concern the ICT sector, which had in Olivetti and in CSELT laboratories its leading firms, making Turin the centre of Italian high tech of the day (Interview 5; Interview 21); the Financial Textile Group (*GFT*), furthermore, was a successful textile firm that produced Italian high fashion clothes that would be sold on the global market (Interview 21). Of course, this type of economic expansion would not display the same capacities of workforce absorption as the Fordist phase did: it was not huge masses of unskilled workers that were needed now, but more limited numbers of highly skilled personnel (interview 5). In any

[93] The main local newspaper, La Stampa, owned by FIAT, would support the project all along (Bobbio, 1990).
[94] The 1985-1992 years are "[…] characterised by the growing instability of the 'five-party' government majorities, which had become hostage of the various parties' criss-crossing vetoes, substantially blocking administrative activity (Rabaglino, 2016)."
[95] In 1987, socialist Mayor Cardetti resigns and is substituted by Maria Magnani Noya, a socialist too.
[96] These were the years of the Ghidella-Romiti duopoly. The two had opposing views: Ghidella (FIAT Auto's CEO) wanted more investment on the automotive core, while Romiti (the company's CEO) wished to diversify the company and turn it into a holding, with shares in different types of enterprise. Eventually, after a long struggle with Romiti, Ghidella resigned, marking the victory of Romiti's view (Tropea, S., "Ghidella dimissionato, si è aperto il caso FIAT", *La Repubblica*, November 26, 1988).
[97] See chapter 4.

case, against this background of societal and economic transformation, and gradual economic growth, the political sphere nonetheless appeared uncapable of exploiting the situation and driving the city towards some specific direction.

> *"[…] We were seeing a growing gap between the economic resources that were being produced, and which could be mobilized for development, on the one hand, and, on the other, a political context that acted like a brake…potentially slowing down the process…why? On one side, the centre-left*[98] *had become dysfunctional: I mean, it was highly fragmented, local governments wouldn't last long, there was instability; on the other side, the left was clinging to an administrative line it had pursued for over ten years…an administrative line that wasn't convincing, at least, to the eyes of various people, among whom those who signed that paper*[99]*…because we needed dynamism, we needed a turning point: the city was grey and dull, although a great deal of resources were being produced here, I mean…"*
> (Interview 21)

What most interviewees pointed out, with respect to the five-party governments of the 1985-1990 period were, indeed, their instability, inter- and intra-party quarrelling, fragmentation, patronage, and partitioning logics (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; Bobbio, 1990; Interview 14; Interview 15; Interview 5). Indeed, in 1987, mayor Cardetti was substituted by Maria Magnani Noya, another socialist.

It is against this background of political ineffectiveness and incapacity to take advantage of emerging opportunities that the local left-wing, now for the most part excluded from local administration, would start engaging other sections of the local civil society in a debate about the city, about its political context and about its future growth prospects. Although interactions between political actors and intellectuals had always been a feature of Turin's local society, especially in the context of the Left, debates would intensify in this phase (interview 5), in particular because of the economic transformations that appeared to be potentially undermining of the political and ideal paradigms hitherto upheld by the left (interview 5). Another element of novelty lay in the fact that, this time, it was not only politicians and intellectuals who were involved, as this moment of reflection was joined by sections of the local entrepreneurial and business class, which would not necessarily identify with the left-wing world (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; interview 5). One element that contributed to the increase of these interactions, in particular between political actors and business figures, amounted to the redefined role of Communist political leaders who, after the defeat of 1980, had gradually taken the place of unionists in negotiations with industrial management. This contributed

[98] The 'five party' governments would represent the centre left, back then.
[99] See Berta and Chiamparino (1986).

to expanding networks, strengthening relations, and reinforcing trustworthiness between these groups (Interview 9).

> *"For good or bad, in the 1980s, within and around the Communist party…I am talking about the Left…a party leadership had come of age, one that succeeded in securing, let's say, trustworthiness from the current…from what, back then, was the industrial-entrepreneurial establishment, which, differently from today, still existed…it was there, and it was important!"*
> (Interview 9)

The debate over the city would take place within Turin's main cultural institutes, most of which, back then, were more or less closely connected to a political or party area (interview 5). Among these, those that contributed the most to the development of the debate were the Gramsci Institute[100], close the Communist party; the Agnelli Foundation, connected to FIAT and not to any specific party area, although generally identified with the liberal culture; the Financial Textile Group, the textile firm of the Rivetti family, which would itself host several meetings (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012); then, also the Einaudi Centre, close to the liberal area, and the *Turati Club*, close to the socialists, would host the discussion (interview 5). Arnaldo Bagnasco's works (1986; 1990), which I have quoted extensively throughout my research, would themselves mirror much of the debate's content.

> *"Well, we would meet over there…it was great…we were attempting to – Beppe Berta, me, and others – to find some common ground among industrialists, Unions, intellectuals…Annibaldi[101] was very supportive, you know? We would talk freely about the city…obviously. So, you had…Annibaldi…you had the great one from the GFT, a great person…Rivetti, and the director…I forgot, another good one…so we would meet very openly, with economists, etc., to talk about Turin. We met more than once, right? In different locations…and this has created…oh yes, it had created…"*
> (Interview 15)

A rather heterogenous group of individuals would then participate to this debate, belonging to different spheres of the local society: politicians, unionists, academics, and entrepreneurs (Interview 14; Interview 15; Interview 5; Interview 9); although several of the participants could be identified as belonging to the reformist-left wing area (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012), this phase of reflection had no specific political

[100] The journal *Sisifo* was a published by the Gramsci Institute and much of the reflection of that period would be reported by the journal (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012).
[101] Annibaldi was FIAT's director of external relations.

colour and, for sure, bridging different political cultures was one of its goals (interview 5; interview 14). The moment of reflection, then, would clearly unfold through a rather extended period of time and involved several individual discussions, workshops, and so on; their content was therefore obviously varied, as well as the themes that were dealt with (interview 14; interview 15). What can however be said, for instance by checking the articles contained in *Sisifo*, is that, among the various topics, attention for Turin and its problems had a privileged place, both because that it is the city where participants to the discussion lived in, and because of the swift transformations that were unfolding under their eyes (interview 14). Among those discussions that concerned the city, then, some were surely focused on its political context and problems, others would centre on its socio-economic issues, whereas others still would shed light on possible prospects for future development; discussions over Turin were nonetheless not limited to these themes: some others would focus on its history, others on its artistic heritage, and so on[102]. What has emerged, rather, from the interviews is that, during these encounters, people would gather to talk 'freely' (interview 9; interview 14; interview 15) about Turin and that the main, underlying goal of the whole reflection was to 'find some common ground among participants' (interview 15).

> *"[…] Participants would come with cultural interests…not militant ones, not activist ones…neither evocating possible future scenarios. But the atmosphere surely was one of…genuine openness, right? The people who would come were really…culturally and socially very different. It was a bit of a representation of this city that…was evolving, and didn't really know where to, but it had realized change was necessary…"*
> (Interview 14)

In sum, what has emerged is that these discussions served, first, to create new networks among local personalities, or extend and strengthen already existing ones. The idea was to gather people with different political or professional backgrounds, and pool together ideas, make contacts and, this is the second point, see whether there was some common ground which would allow to consider working together on yet undefined projects or objectives. These meetings would then have a twofold effect: one concerned the production and circulation of ideas, which would also often be articulated in the form of written material; the other was that of creating and strengthening relationships and networks among distinct components of the local society. For the moment, however, although ideas about the inadequacy of the political sphere (Bagnasco, 1986; 1990; Gallino, 1990; Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; Berta and Chiamparino, 1986) and its possible reforms would undoubtedly arise, none of the actors involved would prefigure a radical overhaul of

[102] Sisifo's journal can be accessed from: https://www.byterfly.eu/islandora/search?page=1&type=dismax&f%5B0%5D=dc.creator%3A%22Istituto%20Gramsci%20piemontese%22

the local political system. This, again, can be viewed as depending on the path-dependency and 'lock-in' effects produced by the overarching political framework, or system, by which I mean the sweeping cleavages and frames of references of social and political groups: in this case, the frame of reference is still that of a bipolar world divided between liberal-democracies and Communist states, where the two are seen as alternative, overarching paradigms that serve to regulate and organize political communities. At the political level, in 1980s Italy, this still meant that the Communist party was prevented from accessing the national government and had no potential allies, except for the Socialist Party. This, of course, would not mean that there were no cultural or ideational changes within a given political force – as the criticism of the 'industrialist culture' that emerged within the Communist Party shows – but that these changes would not foreshadow a modification of the pattern of alliances, or the dissolution of traditional political forces. This meant, in Turin, that the political formulas considered viable for local government were quite limited; to be more precise, the possibilities were only two: either left-wing administrations, composed of communists alone, or a coalition of communists and socialists; and centre-left, five party administrations (interview 5). A complete overhaul of this framework was not yet taken into consideration.

> *"[…] What I am saying should not be understood as if these [innovations] were absent…you had activities, even important ones, in quotation marks, underground or not…that would concern the left, the catholic world, as well as the liberal world, and so forth; no doubt about that. None of these had, however, contemplated – not even as a possibility – an overhaul of the political system as such. […] It was an evolution of political cultures within a pre-defined scheme."*
> (Interview 5)

In sum, the overarching political culture and party system would pose a formidable obstacle to concrete political innovation. Despite the major transformations that would affect the city throughout the 1980s, the political sphere proved uncapable of guiding Turin through a changing socio-economic landscape towards new horizons; nor it was able to exploit more concrete opportunities, such as those offered by brownfields, as exemplified by the Lingotto's case. Even though, in the second half of the decade, the reflection over the city had come to involve a major portion of the local civil society, the ideas that were discussed therein would not lead to any significant political innovation. The resistance posed by the political framework of the day is perhaps even more explicit if we think that the 'five-party' coalition governments would in effect support some sort of development agenda (Pinson, 2002 a): their internal litigiousness and the prevailing understanding of the political process – as a moment to empower the party, rather than as an instrument to cater to the wider community – would severely hinder effective political and administrative activity.

Figure 1: Seeds of change and Stalemate – key process shifts.



I.II Causal mechanisms

The phase I just analysed comprises elements of both change and of rigidity, that is, two overarching processes that are working in opposite directions. That of change is a dynamic process that, underpinned by the city's changing socio-economic conditions, fostered a phase of ideational innovation that has had a twofold effect: 1) that of pushing local actors to reflect on the inadequacies of the local social, economic, and political systems, and 2) that of bringing together local actors, originally belonging to different social environments. This sort of collective 'brainstorming' occurs as the city is still undergoing rapid change of its socio-economic fabric which, on the one hand, appears to mark the end of the Fordist phase of development, while on the other, seems to open new opportunities for Turin: the possibilities of taking advantage of the recent, high-tech industrial developments and of the urban empty spaces that are being created by the dismissal of industrial sites. As these changes unfold, however, the local political class appears unable exploit and steer them, following some long-term political vision. On the one hand, the administrative framework defining the local government structure is ill-suited to sustain stable and cohesive local executives; further, a political system that is dominated by parties often falls prey to power struggles internal to the government coalition, whose 'governing capacity' is therefore severely limited (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; Bobbio, 1990; Rabaglino, 2016). Consequently, the local political class appears uncapable to lead the city through such a transformation. This last element, relative to the rigidity of the political system, was evident to a part of the local actors, who would then emphasise the inadequacy of the local political system (Bagnasco, 1986; Gallino, 1990) during the phase of reflection over the city. This, by acting as a brake on the city's prospects for change, would imply that the city appeared to be missing its opportunities to guide its own transformation, as the *Lingotto* case has shown. I will now turn to the specific causal mechanisms that underpin these two opposite dynamics.

First, ideational innovation and change. What occurred in Turin in the course of the 1980s can be understood as a process of 'event-driven' ideational change (Ferrera, forthcoming). Ideational (and ideological) change may be either theory- or event-driven and can occur either suddenly or gradually. Whereas theory-driven change is the result of the development of new doctrines, and usually follows a process whereby ideas elaborated by 'great thinkers' are then spread by individuals who stand in between the intellectual and practical spheres (Ferrera, forthcoming), event-driven change follows form concrete events or transformations occurring either in the political realm or in the wider socio-economic framework. In Turin's case, ideational change precisely results from both transformations of the socio-economic environment (industrial restructuring, loss of influence of the Unions deriving from the defeat of 1980), and developments in the political sphere (increasing animosity between socialists and communists, the latter's incapacity to cope with change and crisis, the defeat at the salary scale referendum and at municipal elections of 1985). Change would however be gradual, as even between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the

1990s, there were left-wing elements that still frowned upon the reformist ambitions of part of the party and union (interview 14).

Profound crises, such as that of the 1970s and 1980s, marking the move from Fordism-Keynesianism towards neo-liberalism, typically lay the conditions for processes of gradual change (Ferrera, forthcoming). During these phases, established ideational frames can easily lose appeal and their utility in depicting society and its functioning may be undermined (Ferrera, forthcoming). Usually, deep-seated ideational frames are initially partially updated and corrected, starting from their outer and tangential conceptual elements, and only in a second moment, if needed, will their core components be modified as well (Ferrera, forthcoming). During crises, ideational change may often occur through ideational displacement, facilitated by the overall uncertainty engendered by volatile conditions, which pushes individuals to re-evaluate and re-consider their beliefs and potentially redefine established meanings. Processes of displacement, however, usually take advantage of existing ideas and scripts that have been around for some time, but which have so far remained in the shadows of the intellectual world, elaborated and discussed outside prevailing academic settings, or which have lived on as traces of previous ideologies (Ferrera, forthcoming). The changes of the 1970-1980s precisely involve such type of displacement, as the neo-liberal paradigm that superseded social democratic Keynesianism could draw on economic theories that had been circulating for some time, although these were still minoritarian in intellectual circles and public discourse (Ferrera, forthcoming).

Turning to Turin, we have seen in the previous section how the defeat of 1980 operated as the 'event' that suddenly drew awareness to the changed reality: on the one hand, it was clear the role of Unions was changing and the type of confrontational strategies that they had until then pursued appeared ineffective; on the other, it opened the eyes of the public to the process of industrial restructuring (Interview 14). Initially, however, this event would trigger a form of displacement that would concern the outer elements of the left-wing ideal frame of reference, that is, on the one hand, a reconsideration of the appropriate strategies to adopt to interact with capitalistic forces – from outright conflict overseen by unions, to negotiation mediated by the party; on the other, some new policy ideas start emerging, concerning flexibility in the workplace and some differentiation of workers' treatment (Interview 9; interview 14; Interview 21). These ideas, for sure, were not invented from scratch by Turin's communists, but were part of the wider neo-liberal creed that was back then rapidly spreading in other parts of the world, i.e., Tatcher's UK and Reagan's US. At the same time, nonetheless, the core elements of the Left's frame of reference were still the same: Communists would still view their paradigm as essentially alternative to the liberal-democratic one and the centrality of class struggle and industrial work were still unaltered. These initial ideational changes, furthermore, would not immediately succeed in becoming mainstream, as old ideas were still present and they would not only coexist with the new ones for some time, but they would trump the latter in a first moment, as the salary scale referendum would show.

During this initial phase of displacement, there is at work a mechanism of 'layering', as described by Kathleen Thelen (2003). Institutional layering concerns the partial redefinition of certain aspects of an institution, while others remain in place (Thelen, 2003, p. 225-226; Schickler, 2001). One important element of the idea of layering is that contrary to path-dependent processes, the layering of novel practices within existing institutions (or, the creation of new institutions alongside older ones that are not suppressed) does not "push developments further along the same track (Thelen, 2003, p. 226)." Initially, the new elements that emerge within Turin's local communist party concern, as we mentioned, policy ideas and the endorsement of a strategy of industrial relations based on negotiation; the introduction of such new ideas, especially those concerning policies, was initially owed to the coming of age of the younger generations, who had reached authoritative positions in the local section of the party for the first time (interview 9). This is consistent with the idea of layering as deriving from the involvement, within an existing institution, of new elements[103] (Thelen, 2003, p. 224) that attempt to introduce new practices and ideas.

These new ideas, however, initially failed to become mainstream within the party, and so to orient leadership decisions, as the party's official position at the salary scale referendum would testify. This, as noted previously, is owed to the prevailing culture of industrialism which had been permeating both Communist party and unions for at least a decade. We have already emphasised how, within this frame of reference, the Union would be identified as the proper 'agent of change' (Berta and Chiamparino, 1986, p. 17), and how the political sphere had essentially delegated to it all aspects of factory life, as well as the running of industrial relations, which were essentially carried out according to a confrontational attitude *vis-à-vis* capital (Bagnasco, 1986; Berta and Chiamparino, 1986). From a historical institutionalist perspective, such a culture can be viewed as the expression of the power acquired by the Unions' movement during the first half of the 1970s: according to Berta and Chiamparino (1986, p. 15-16), it was in the phase between the social upheavals of 1969 and 1975 that industrial relations acquired a pivotal significance with respect to the overall system of socio-economic regulation of the country: against this background, the Union became the privileged subject, on the part of labour, embodying social transformation ambitions, and was invested by the Party with the *de facto* quasi-total control of industrial relations; these, crucially, tend to be run according to a chiefly conflictual attitude, also because of the successes of such a strategy in this first phase (*ibid*.).

If, moreover, we turn to the case of Turin, where at the beginning of the 1970s the working classes represented more than half of the total urban working population[104], the labour unions would occupy a dominant cultural position with respect to the overall left-wing environment (*idem*, p. 16-17). According to Bagnasco, Unions – in general terms – have an option to gear their actions either towards the factory, or towards the political arena; to be sure, the two options are not mutually exclusive, but when either becomes

[103] "[…] these institutions were *transformed* through politics, and specifically through the incorporation of new groups whose role in the system was unanticipated at the time of their creation (Thelen, 2003, p. 224; italics in original)."
[104] See chapter 4.

predominant, an "organizational and cultural tradition" may emerge that essentially excludes, or minimizes, the recourse to the other option (Bagnasco, 1986, p. 67). In Turin, Unions pursued a conflictual attitude towards capital that was oriented towards the factory, rather than the political arena[105], because of the working conditions imposed by the big Fordist industry, which would create opportunities to organize confrontational actions (*ibid*.). The fact that Turin, as a one company town was an isolated case in the Italian urban panorama, coupled with the big industry's regulative principle of organization, and the impossibility for the communists to access government at the national level, would then push Unions' activity towards the factory (*idem*, p. 68). In a rather path-dependent fashion, then, the more this framework became entrenched, the less the possibilities to recalibrate Unions' actions towards the political arena (*idem*, p. 68-70). In addition, such a confrontational strategy started to appear 'sub-optimal', in that frictions would emerge within the movement itself, especially in the second half of the 1970s (Berta and Chiamparino, 1986, p. 16); however, the 'lock in' effects generated by the path dependent nature of this tradition prevented a move towards a re-orientation of activities away from the factory and from confrontation, towards the political arena and negotiation. The failure of the 1978 EUR conference, which indeed aimed at promoting a shift of activities towards negotiation and politics, aptly illustrates the difficulties of the alternative line of action to emerge. Therefore, even after the defeat of 1980, although a process of ideational innovation indeed started emerging, due not only to the defeat, but also to the evident socio-economic changes that were unfolding, the 'lock in' effects of such a 'workerist' (Bagnasco, 1986; Berta and Chiamparino, 1986) organizational and cultural tradition would prevent any significant deviation from the entrenched practices and norms so far pursued by the Left-wing, at least until the 1985 salary scale referendum.

As we are not only talking about norms and practices, but also about the cultural frames that characterized the Left-wing in those years, resistance to change can, in this case, also be understood from a sociological institutionalist perspective, according to the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2006). According to this latter mechanism, cultural scripts, and entrenched rules of behaviour shape human action, but they do not do so in a deterministic fashion, as agency has a key role to play. The idea is that, when confronted with a particular situation, individuals choose a course of action that is consistent with the rules and norms of a community, "based on mutual, and often tacit understandings of what is true, reasonable, right, and good (March and Olsen, 2006, p. 690)"; when they choose, individuals have to match the specific situation before them with an action that they typically draw from the repertoire of their own experience and knowledge – March and Olsen call 'recognition' the matching of situation and action (ibid.). In matching situation with action, then, individuals typically try to answer three questions: "What kind of situation is this? What kind of person am I? What does a person such as I do in a situation such as this (*ibid*.)?" So, turning to

[105] Union activity may instead be oriented towards the political arena if another set of conditions obtains, namely, the extension of citizenship and social rights, and the concrete opportunity to access government (which was precluded to the Communists at the national level) (Bagnasco, 1986, p. 67).

the Left-wing in Turin, it seems appropriate to claim that, confronted with the prospect of layoffs announced by the company, Unions and the Party viewed in a strike the most appropriate type of reaction; after a decade in which industrial relations had chiefly been carried out this way, all in all, this seemed the most obvious line of behaviour the movement could take. The grip exerted by the prevailing cultural script is also evident in the phase following the 1980 defeat: especially in the case of CGIL[106], the conflictual, workerist tradition was so great that Union members took a very long time to accept the defeat (Berta and Chiamparino, 1986; Interview 21). Both the logic of appropriateness and path dependency and lock in effects, then, can explain the effects – that is, resistance to change – exerted by the prevailing workerist organisational and cultural tradition of the Left-wing in Turin: Communist[107] defeat at the 1985 referendum on the salary scale is the concrete political outcome of the operation of these mechanisms.

After the 1985 referendum defeat, as we have seen in the previous sections, the process of ideational change would enter a new phase, as Left-wing party and union members intensified their interactions with other components of the local civil society, initiating the moment of reflection over the city that would cover the latter part of the decade. What appears to have accelerated the process of ideational change is, now, the local political scenario. As Ferrera (forthcoming) has noted, another mechanism that contributes to ideational change is what could be understood as a test of power, that is, the moment that a given political formation supporting a certain ideal finally accesses power, and the practice of administrative routine is assessed against ideal ambitions that the political formation in question had supported before accessing government positions. In this case, it may well be that governing practice produces frustration, rather than enthusiasm, as the transformative ambitions of sweeping normative goals are gradually undermined, together with their symbolic and salvific appeal (Ferrera, forthcoming). This is because the incremental character of policy change is ill-suited to accommodate redeeming narratives and is typically susceptible to repeated failings deriving from wanting implementation and unpredicted outcomes (Ferrera, forthcoming). As time goes by, the chasm that opens between ideals and practice may lead to eroding the appeal of the ideal for both supporters and policy actors (*ibid*.).

This is precisely what happened with the experience of the left-wing governments[108] – especially the second mandate (1980-1985) – in Turin. After the defeat of 1980, Left-wing administrations in the city would find it ever more difficult to live up to the expectations that had sustained their electoral victory; this was due to a number of factors: the dramatic weakening and scaling down of the Unions' movement, which had

[106] CISL and UIL, which were more pluralist Unions (Interview 5), were quicker to absorb the defeat and embrace more reformist stances, which led them to side with the five-party government at the 1985 referendum. It must be noted, nonetheless, that until the 1984 salary scale cut, the three unions were still federated in a united entity, but, as the individual confederations had not been suppressed, they kept on existing throughout the phase of Unions' unity.
[107] Because it was the Communist Party and the communist majority within CGIL that lost at the referendum (Interview 9).
[108] While the communists were prevented from accessing government at the national level, this was not the case locally where, starting from the 1970s, they took power in several Italian cities and Regions.

constituted the administration's grassroots base; the changing socio-economic conditions; and the increasing animosity that emerged between the two coalition partners, socialists and communists (Bobbio, 1990). All of this resulted in a second mandate that in which promised results failed to materialise: the very defeat at FIAT was also a defeat for the administration, as Mayor Novelli had supported the strike; the Master Plan would not eventually be approved; the administration proved incapable of coping with socio-economic change; the acceptance of FIAT's offer to renew the *Lingotto* plant appeared as a betrayal of the Communists' previous planning commitments – indeed, the *Lingotto* operation had by no means been contemplated by the Master Plan's preliminary project; finally, the corruption scandal of 1983, although it mainly involved socialists and Christian Democrats, basically froze administrative activity (Bobbio, 1990; Castagnoli, 1998), essentially giving the final blow to the Left-wing's government experience. The 1985 referendum defeat, although this was national rather than local in scope, was the final dramatic instance of the inadequacy of the Communists' most orthodox and conservative positions (interview 9).

It is from this moment that the process of ideational change enters a new stage, that is, from being a reflection that was mainly internal to the Left, it became a moment of discussion involving various sectors of the local civil society. As anticipated in the introductory section, this shift can be well expressed in the language of discursive institutionalism, with the concepts of 'background ideational abilities' and 'foreground discursive abilities' (Schmidt, 2008).

> *"…The watershed was 1980, the first five…let's say, simplifying a lot, the first five years would be years of elaboration, then there was this, let's say, beginning of a socialization phase, even outside of the party, until you eventually had the fall of the Berlin wall, a rupture…this is another element that however enters the picture at a later stage…"*
> (Interview 9)

While the former would mainly be involved in the first phase (1980-1985), as relevant actors became aware of the new situation and of the changing circumstances, the latter would come into play in the second phase, as actors started to reflect and engage in discussion outside of their political contexts, initiating a networking process that would gather industry, business, academia, unions, and parties. Interviews too confirm how this second phase was one of interaction and 'socialisation' among different groups and political cultures (Interview 5; Interview 9).

> *"the Turati club was connected to the PSI, the Gramsci to the PCI, and so on. Those who were unaffiliated, who were a bit outside of the game, would try to build cross-cutting relationships, so the Agnelli Foundation had surely tried to overcome…I mean, say, having worked with people*

traditionally belonging to the left-wing, right? It precisely had this sense of taking the discussion beyond [political] barriers…"
(Interview 5)

This phase of reflection and 'socialisation' would not lead, however, to significant changes of the local political system or to the formation of novel political alliances. This was essentially due to the path-dependent structure of the national political system, whose balance would be affected by both ideological stances and by the overall international geo-political context of the cold war. In a post-war world divided in blocs, Italy found itself in a strategic border position, with one of the major Communist parties of the West: the post-war compromise then ensured the Communists would never form government majorities, but always stay at the opposition, at the national level; locally, the communists could instead form municipal administrations in various Communes, in particular since 1975 (the year Novelli was elected for the first time). Their only possible ally would be the Socialist Party, because of the ideological affinities between the two; the socialists could, however, also form centre-left majorities with the secular parties (liberals and republicans) and the Christian Democrats, which made them the only proper pivotal player within the Italian party system. Unless right-wing governments were formed (so, without the socialists), this balance meant there were only two options for the left: either left-wing governments, comprising socialists and communists, or centre left-governments, sustained by a 'five-party' formula. The latter two were, at least in Turin during the 1980s, the two possible coalitions the party system offered: different alliances were not contemplated.

"Well, you know, I believe…actually, throughout all the 1980s and also in the first two years of the '90s decade…you had the impression of a political system…let's say, surely until 1990…a political system in which…the margin for innovation was limited, meaning you had, substantially…variation on a plot outline that would contemplate two possibilities, namely: 'five-party' administrations, or left-wing administrations, and within these worlds, if you will, people would reflect within the contours of a party structure that was considered as a given, as taken for granted and stable."
(Interview 5)

Although the structure of the political system would prevent new political formulas from emerging, one may still wonder why the five-party government coalition, which would embrace reformism and would appear to be more in tune with the transformations occurring in those years, would not succeed in governing the city's transition to a post-Fordist phase. In this case, it is the legal and administrative framework of local government that amounted to a formidable obstacle in the way of change. Again, a path dependent dynamic can help explain why 'governing capacity' (Stone, 1989; 1993) would be hard to obtain under the old local

government structure. A system that had originally been designed to limit the strength of the executive power vis-à-vis the legislative one, as well as to ensure, through proportional representation, the widest inclusion of the instances present within the population, has had the undesired effect of exposing local governments (as well as national ones) to excessive instability. The latter, furthermore, would be compounded by a faulty and vague division of labour between legislative and executive bodies that would severely limit the executive's 'governing capacity'. A brief look at the structure of Italian local governments until 1993 should clarify how such framework would pose an obstacle to effective governing action; the following overview draws on the work of Vandelli[109] (1997).

In the 1980s, the electoral system of municipalities was still proportional (for municipalities with population over 5,000). Municipal councils would represent all parties, even the tiniest ones, with the effect that councils would often be fractured among a myriad of groups. Mayoral election was indirect, negotiated among aldermen (*consiglieri*) who had won seats in the municipal council. Often, resulting from agreements among parties, both majority and minority would hold positions in the local executive (*giunta*).

Negotiations among parties were also necessary in order to select executive officials, or assessors, which held the most desired positions. Local executives would thus be highly fractured too, divided in party delegations; delegation leaders of the executive had the role of mediating between party and council group. Importantly, executive officials were chosen by and among councillors; rather than merit or competence, party solidarity or political representativeness were the main criteria of selection.

The overall organization of the local government machine was furthermore characterized by confusion and overlapping of positions, to the point that executive and legislative bodies were not as neatly separated as a straightforward application of the liberal principle of the balance of powers would have prescribed. Within this system, not only executive officials were chosen exclusively among councillors, but they also had to play both executive and councillor functions. On top of this, the position of Council President, or Speaker, would be reserved to the Mayor: therefore, the Council President, who was meant to be a neutral arbiter of assembly works, would actually be a rather partisan figure.

Reflecting the confusing organization of municipal bodies was the definition of the competences of executive and legislative organs. The council had, by law, 'residual competence', and was thus responsible for all those acts that were not explicitly attributed to the Mayor and the executive by Statute. This meant, in practice, that the Council was involved in a plethora of issues, often even minor ones, which would slow down assembly works and reduce the effectiveness of the body.

The executive, on the other hand, was not only responsible in those fields explicitly attributed to it by Statute, or those delegated to it by the Council: it could intervene in *any* topic in cases of necessity and

[109] Vandelli L., (1997), *Sindaci e Miti: Sisifo, Tantalo e Damocle nell'amministrazione locale*, Bologna: Il Mulino.

urgency. It was the executive itself, however, that was responsible for invoking necessity and urgency, and its decision would not be appealable by the courts.

As to bureaucracy, it was essentially managed by executive officials, who would oversee administrative issues on the basis of political and party logics. Municipal administrators had no powers to organize offices or personnel, or to distribute resources; political organs were then also responsible for issuing administrative acts. As a result, bureaucrats could not counterbalance the weight of executive officials not only in political, but also in administrative matters.

Overall, the functioning of the local government machine was significantly constrained by two factors. One the one hand, the lack of clarity in the distribution of competences between executive and Council had the effect of limiting the practical effectiveness, and the capacity to swiftly tackle major issues, of both organs. On the other, the peculiar organization of the local government structure would strengthen party logics over pragmatic administration: party solidarity was typically stronger than government solidarity. Executive delegation leaders would withdraw their support to local government and mayor if their party so commanded. Since party agreements would determine the choice of mayor and executive officials, these would condition the overall stability of local government: if agreements and compromises changed, executive and mayor would often change accordingly, during the same legislature. With respect to this feature, party negotiations reflected local as well as national compromises.

In sum, party dominance and poor organization would not only hinder government effectiveness and stability, but negatively affect government accountability and democratic performance. Majorities, in fact, were often created regardless of electoral results, while the fuzzy separation of competences would make it harder to identify the actors responsible for specific choices, let alone the actual *locus* of decision-making. Moreover, because local governments were formed through agreements among parties, there have been moments, like 1983[110], when negotiations over the formation of local executives would paralyze government activity for months.

Throughout the phase I am analysing, the 1980s, there has been one change of majority in 1983, which we mentioned above, after which the government coalition between socialists and communists broke up; before the coalition would break up, a whole year – 1984 – would be spent in trying to find a formula that would carry the government to the end of its mandate: not only the attempt was unsuccessful, but this negotiation essentially paralyzed administrative activities. In the second half of the decade, during the five-party mandate (1985-1990), the majority would hold, although the mayor would change in 1987**.** However, the composite and heterogeneous nature of the 'five-party' coalitions meant that it was rather difficult to find an agreement, not only with respect to long-term strategies, but also concerning single projects, like that

[110] When a corruption scandal invested some socialist members of the local administration.

of the Lingotto. Concluding, such an administrative and legal framework than stood in the way of government effectiveness, while at the same time it was instrumental to strengthen the position of political parties.

To conclude, this phase of 'event-driven ideational change' would not yet lead to the emergence of significant political innovations, nor to the creation of novel political formulas or alliances. This is essentially because the local political context would prove a formidable obstacle, preventing any major departure from the status quo. The rigidity of the political system can be seen as operating at three different levels: 1) at the level of the administrative framework of the municipality's government, with respect to the rules for government formation and to the proportional system, both of which would undermine administrative stability; 2) at the level of positional balance of the local political system, therefore with reference to the possible alliances among political parties; 3) at the level of political culture within each party and group.

I.III Causal Significance

At this point, we can attempt to analyse the processes at work in this first phase, on the basis of the analytical framework elaborated in Chapter 3; I will further attempt to see whether the hypotheses that apply to this phase are validated. As we have just seen, the 1980s decade is a phase of ideational innovation, underpinned by socio-economic transformations; ideational innovation is however not yet translated into proper structural change (of the party, and of the local administrative structure), mainly because of the obstacles embodied by the legal-administrative framework of local government, as well as by the entrenched practices embedded in the Italian post-war political culture (impossibility of a coalition between Communist party and other political forces).

Recalling the framework illustrated in chapter 3, I have articulated the analysis over three levels, namely those of structure, ideas, and discourse, and taken into consideration the two contextual dimensions of local socio-economic framework and national political culture. In this phase, change seems mainly to occur at the level of ideas and discourse; these changes are, in turn, sustained by transformations at the level of the socio-economic framework. As to structure, although there are some novelties, circumstances remain overall unaltered. I will now briefly summarize the process of the 1980s decade in light of these considerations.

The workers defeat of 1980 at FIAT had certified the end of an the proper Fordist era of industrial relations: socio-economic restructuring was now evident to the eyes of Turin's urban community. The reality of socio-economic restructuring, in turn, engendered a phase of ideational innovation within the forces of the local left, in particular within the Communist party. Ideational innovation has first consisted of an elaboration phase internal to the party, which relied on background ideational abilities; subsequently, it has expanded beyond party and unions, coming to include various elements of the local civil society. In this phase, the city-wide debate would deploy foreground discursive abilities (level of discourse). These changes at the

level of ideas and discourse were not, however, mirrored by significant changes at the structural level. With respect to structure, the analysis has mainly focused on three 'entities': the local section of the Communist Party, the local labour union and the administrative structure of local government. The structure of local government, as we have seen, remains the same in this phase; as to party and union, too, although there is, indeed, an internal debate concerning ideas and strategy, they remain all in all the same. With respect to the party, there is no significant structural change: the name remains the same, as well as its ultimate mission; the same applies to the union, although in this case, socio-economic transformations have heavily affected its position within Italian (and Turin's) society: no longer as central as it had once been, its role has been heavily scaled down, and its position within Italian society has been weakened**.**

The fact that these 'structures' do not significantly change, I have argued above, in part accounts for why the process of ideational innovation does not yet permit a radical overhaul of the status quo, nor the emergence of novel governance forms or coalitions. Hence, while ideas and discourse do start changing, structure does not, and this stands in the way of further and wider transformations. It is not only structure, in any case, that remains unaltered. While there is ideational innovation at the local level, both within left-wing environments and at the wider urban level, other widely held ideas, or cultural scripts, remain unchanged. This mainly concerns the national political culture, at least with respect to the party system, and thus has repercussions in Turin too: no political force other than the socialists could have allied with the Communists, significantly limiting the possibilities for alternative government coalitions. To sum up: change, in this phase, occurred at the level of socio-economic framework, and at the level of ideas and discourse, and mainly concerned the local dimension. However, long established political institutions (local government, party, and unions) remained largely the same and a similar point can be made about the national political culture and the ideas concerning the party system. These two latter factors, both structural and ideational, stood in the way of wider transformations.

These considerations appear in line, at least provisionally, with the overarching hypothesis I have spelled out in Chapter 3, that is, that change is more easily achieved when it occurs at all three levels of analysis: the structural, the ideational, and the discursive. As to the more specific hypotheses I have introduced, only three of them seem to concern this first phase of the process: H1 – the more a crisis of the local development model is severe, the more likely it will be that various elements of the locality (both political and non-political) will feel the urgency to devise an alternative development strategy; H2 - The more local government is stable, the higher the chances for a local governance coalition to emerge; H6 - the more contacts have been cultivated between political actors and civil society, the more likely it is for a governance coalition to emerge.

As to the former hypothesis, we have seen that the severity of the crisis of Turin's development model has indeed triggered a process of ideational innovation that, in turn, was underpinned by the urgency to find alternative development scenarios for the city. Of course, this does not imply that an alternative

development strategy would immediately be devised and implemented, but merely that the need to change path was felt by various parts. In this respect, two things should be telling: first, that the moment of reflection was not confined to the left-wing environments, but, especially in the second half of the decade, would involve various sectors of the local civil society, including industrialists, the local financial sector, professionals, and intellectuals. Second, also the 'five-party' local governments of the second half of the decade were, at least on paper, committed to a different development strategy, but would have a hard time implementing it because of internal frictions and high instability. Before attempting a comparison with other cases – which will feature in the conclusive chapter – we can see that, at least in the case of Turin, the hypothesis seems to hold. Moreover, the hypothesis remains a straw in the wind, as the crisis of the local development model, and the city-wide reflection that ensued, do not seem necessary for the governance coalition to emerge.

As to the second hypothesis, concerning the stability of local government, it can, for now, be only partially addressed, as the governance coalition has not yet emerged, and the features of the political component that will be involved in governance are yet to be described. However, we can look at the opposite situation of what the hypothesis states, that is, at whether unstable government is conducive to governance of some sort: if it is, government stability would not be a necessary requirement for governance formation, and the hypothesis would be disconfirmed. As we have seen above, the unstable 'five-party' local government of the second half of the 1980s did not manage to establish any stable governance arrangement with civil society elements, entailing that, for the moment, the hypothesis is at least not disconfirmed. Further, I have illustrated how in the previous years, during the red-wing administrations of the 1975-1985 decade, some sort of corporatist governance arrangement had been established between the Socialist-Communist local administration and the labour union. This was especially true with respect to the first red-wing mandate (1975-1980), which was, indeed, the one in which the local administration was most stable; throughout the second red-wing mandate (1980-1985), by contrast, growing tensions between socialist and communist government partners undermined the stability of local government and the governance arrangement of the previous five years broke down. This seems to confirm, at least temporarily, the hypothesis according to which government stability is conducive to governance formation, whereas its contrary prevents it. It must be said, in any case, that the peculiar corporatist governance arrangement between local government and labour unions did not falter just because of enhanced tensions between government coalition partners: the severe and dramatic defeat of the labour union after 1980 amounted to a fatal blow for the labour component of the previous governance arrangement. Hence, although the hypothesis is not disconfirmed, there still may be factors other than government stability that facilitate governance emergence – such as the strength and stability of the organised interests, or civil society groups.

As to the sixth hypothesis, according to which a history of contacts between political and non-political actors facilitates governance emergence, there is yet no way to address it, as the pluralist governance

arrangement I am interested in has not yet emerged. However, contacts between various elements of the local society, including political ones, have indeed begun in this phase. If it can be shown that the governance coalition that will emerge between the 1990s and 2000s has built on these initial contacts, this will be a major step in the way of validating the hypothesis.

II. Second Phase: The Critical Juncture

The previous phase, containing what I called the 'seeds of change', was a one where economic and social transformations that unfolded would not be mirrored by an equivalent transformation of the structure and organization of the local political system. On the contrary, it is precisely the structure of the local political system that prevented local actors (political and non-political) from trying to redefine the contours of the local political arena. The fragility of local executives, their limited governing capacity, coupled with the dominant role and rigid positions of political parties would stand in the way of any restructuring attempt.

These background institutional conditions then underwent a major change in the course of a three-year period that goes from 1990 to 1993. Considering how, in these three years, cards are reshuffled, producing a situation of uncertainty that would allow for a major role of agency and choice in selecting certain institutional patterns over others, such a phase can be appropriately understood as a critical juncture. In historical institutional analysis, "critical junctures are cast as moments in which uncertainty as to the future of an institutional arrangement allows for political agency and choice to play a decisive causal role in setting an institution on a certain path of development, a path that persists over a long period of time (Capoccia, 2015, p. 148)." Critical junctures are, then, periods in which the institutional framework that had constrained action in the preceding phase breaks up, allowing for a greater role of agency and choice in affecting the selection of institutional outcomes. The fact that the previous institutional framework 'breaks up', however, does not mean that critical junctures create a void (Thelen, 2003), where anything may happen; on the contrary, "antecedent conditions define the range of institutional alternatives available to decision makers, but do not determine the alternative chosen (Capoccia, 2015, p. 151)." Critical junctures, importantly, constitute the initial phases of path-dependent trajectories, in which an initial choice, made in a moment of relative freedom and uncertainty, determines the subsequent development of a given institutional pattern. This assumption, coupled with the idea that antecedent conditions set out the range of choices available to relevant actors, leads then to focus not only on the actual outcome that was chosen, but also on those that, although available, were not selected (*idem, p. 150*). Critical junctures then amount to breaks between a previous and a subsequent period that are, comparatively, more 'stable': with respect to these, critical junctures are freer, uncertain and 'fluid' (*ibid.*), implying that in these moments, actors "face a broader than typical range of feasible options" (*idem*, p. 151) and, further, that their actions will more probably have a major bearing on successive developments (*ibid.).* Finally, critical junctures are 'relatively short periods of

time' (idem, p. 150-151), which means that the duration of the juncture must be brief relative to the duration of the path-dependent process it instigates (*ibid*.)."

So understood, then, critical junctures can shed light on three important elements that characterized phases of change. First, by stressing the major role of political entrepreneurs in constructing coalitions that can drive institutional change, critical junctures shed light on how institutional frameworks constitute both constraints and opportunities for change. Then, critical junctures avoid the risk of 'constant cause explanations' (Thelen, 2003), by allowing for a possible disjunction between the eventual institutional outcome and the original intentions of actors. Finally, by highlighting the role of agency in selecting certain outcomes, the concept draws attention to the role of cultural construction of preferences, which relevant actors may try to manipulate or redefine to promote change (Capoccia, 2015, p. 148).

Turning now to the case of Turin, the critical juncture that I analyse features certain characteristics. First, it lasts three years: this may not appear, at first sight, as a very short time frame, but it should be recalled that brevity is, in this case, measured against the duration of the subsequent path-dependent process. In Turin, the governance structure that emerges after the critical juncture would last for more than twenty years – twenty-three to be accurate – terminating in 2016, with the Democratic Party's loss of city hall. When set against this amount of time, three years can be viewed as a 'relatively short period'. There is, moreover, a reason why the juncture lasts three years: whereas the actual moment of fluidity and uncertainty, in which agency is determinant in the selection of outcomes, is very brief – lasting from the end of 1992 until the June's municipal election of 1993 – the previous two years represent the phase in which circumstances, both internal and external, change, opening the conditions for actual transformation. Thus, the juncture I will describe comprises a first phase of two years in which the surrounding political context changes substantially, followed by a brief, six months phase in which agency is crucial in determining the actual institutional outcome that will be selected.

Very often, phases of rapid transformation and uncertainty such as critical junctures are triggered by exogenous events, but also internal shifts may foster the weakening of previous institutional constraints (Capoccia, 2015, p. 151). The case of Turin is one where both external and internal events would produce the conditions for institutional change: the two are, in part, connected, but I will treat them separately for the sake of analytical clarity. In the previous section, I have reviewed the processes at work that contained the 'seeds of change', whose role in promoting institutional restructuring had however been previously suffocated by the rigidity and inefficiency of the local political structure; during the critical juncture, the constraints previously posed by the political structure would be lifted, allowing for a chance to reshuffle political alliances and strategies. To sum up, the endogenous circumstances that were instrumental in building up an opportunity for change are the following: 1) the changing socio-economic conditions within the city, which alter the relations among local social and political actors, 2) the opportunities for physical reconstruction offered by urban empty spaces produced by the process of deindustrialization and industrial

restructuring, and 3) the process of ideational innovation that leads relevant political actors, mainly those on the left of the political spectrum, to a) reconsider their goals and strategies (whether party or union), and b) start interacting more frequently with members of different social groups. These potential elements of change would, however, find an obstacle in the political context, which prevented transformation on three levels: that of the legal-administrative framework, that of the limited alternatives offered by the party system, and that of political culture. The latter level, that of political culture, is precisely that on which endogenous process of ideational innovation would have the major bearing, although it would still be exogenous transformations that would lead to altering the status quo. As to the first two levels, it would instead be exogenous events that would have the effect of altering the conditions that had, previously, prevented change. What contributes to characterize the critical juncture as such, is that these 'exogenous events' that would trigger change had in turn been brought about by the combination of various processes that had unfolded in parallel and quite autonomously, which would yet coincidentally occur at around the same moment in time.

The three crucial exogenous 'events' are the following: the implosion of the Soviet Union, which would put an end to the bipolar international order; the *Tangentopoli* corruption scandal, involving major Italian post-war parties, which would foster a restructuration of the Italian party system; and proper institutional reforms, which would intervene at two levels: a) that of the proper legal-administrative framework defining the structure of and form of local government, and b) that of the socio-economic fabric, by redefining the prerogatives and functions of institutional collective actors, in this case banks and universities. These three different events would lead to a phase characterized by the unfolding of three dynamics: a dynamic of de-institutionalization, underpinned by the removal of the conditions that had sustained the status quo; the opening up of various 'windows of opportunity' that present agents with a greater set of institutional options, and greater freedom to act; a dynamic of 'creative agency' and 'search', whereby following a logic of appropriateness, agents exploit the window of opportunity, by forging new alliances and selecting certain paths, while closing the door to others. I will now preliminarily look at these exogenous events in turn.

The fall of the Soviet Union is one of the most significant and defining turning points of recent contemporary history. Historians like John Hobsbawm (1994) have picked it as the event that closes a historical phase marked by pronounced ideological conflicts, bipolarism, and by the role of mass industrial society. Retrospectively, many have then argued that the USSR's fall was inevitable; arguably, there may be some validity to these claims. Yet, it is out of the scope of this work to investigate these issues: what I deem important to stress is that a) before 1989, very few, had foreseen that the Soviet Union would fall and that b) its fall would trigger a chain of events that would impinge on several aspects of contemporary political communities. It would put an end to an international political order characterized by bipolarism and by the opposition between two alternative ideological and regulative systems of political communities; it would lead

to the creation of new states and allow for the formation of novel political orders in much of Eastern Europe. For the purposes of my inquiry, nonetheless, what I am interested is how the fall of the Soviet Union would mark the end[111] of Communism, not merely symbolically, but in practice, in much of Western Europe. While in Eastern Europe communism had been *the* status quo, in the liberal-democratic West communism would constitute one of the major ideological and political forces that had characterized the whole post-war era: in France and Italy, for instance, communist parties would have a huge social consensus and be among the major political subjects of the four decades between the end of the War and 1989. In the case of Italy, to which I now turn, the position of the Communist party was surely peculiar: soon after the war it would become one of the country's two major parties (Ginsborg, 2006); yet, because of Italy's siding with the US during the Cold War years, the Communist party would be prevented from having any governing responsibility and, indeed, no post-war Italian government would ever include it[112], at least at the national level. Locally, as we have seen previously, Communists would instead have the possibility of governing, although their options as to potential government coalitions were limited: either alone, or with the socialists. In this latter case, the barrier to an alliance with liberal-democratic parties (Liberals, Republicans, Christian Democrats, and various minor political formations) was chiefly ideological and programmatic. Obstacles to political alliances between Communists and liberal-democratic parties were, then, not only profound, but were built in the very organization of the political system itself. Therefore, the fact that a process of ideational innovation was gradually taking place, by no means implied that local actors were envisaging possible new political formulas that would contemplate a collaboration between communists and other forces: a strong cleavage[113] prevented this from being an actual possibility.

These elements should provide an intuitive picture of what, in such circumstances, the fall of the Soviet Union meant. In 1991, the Italian Communist Party was disbanded, leading to the creation of two novel political parties: the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS – *Partito Democratico della Sinistra*) and the Communist Refoundation Party (*Partito della Rifondazione Comunista*). In a sense, these two formations would represent the two conflicting souls of the Communist party that had characterized the later part of its existence: the PDS was the party of the reformists, whereas *Rifondazione Comunista* would be the party of traditionalists, who would still draw on more orthodox Marxist stances. Regarding the PDS, one may be

[111] For sure, some Communist states still exist today. Among these, however, those that can properly be defined as communists, like, arguably, North Korea and Cuba, have little international clout and a limited bearing over international affairs; a similar point can be made for South American states like Venezuela and Bolivia. More powerful countries that, officially, adhere to a communist ideology, such as China and Vietnam, have in effect implemented market reforms of their economies in the past thirty years, to a point that they are hardly identifiable as Communist anymore, albeit their political systems, for sure, remain undemocratic.

[112] There has, for sure, been one attempt at creating a government coalition including Communists and Christian Democrats (the '*Compromesso Storico'*), which was however abandoned after the kidnapping, and subsequent death, of Christian Democrat leader Aldo Moro, in 1978.

[113] As mentioned in the previous section, this did not meant Communists would not interact with individuals or groups belonging to different political cultures: merely, these contacts would never end up becoming a proper political coalition (Interview 5; Interview 11).

tempted to claim that its creation officialises the conclusion of the process of ideational innovation the Communist party had undergone in the previous decade. This event, furthermore, had the effect of dramatically modifying the possibilities for political alliances within the Italian – both national and local – party system: the PDS was no more a Communist political subject, but a left-wing democratic party that placed itself on the side of liberal-democracy. In theory, then, it could have been a partner in political arrangements with other liberal forces, which had hitherto amounted, essentially, to a taboo. The fall of the Soviet Union, therefore, with respect to the purposes of my inquiry, has mainly affected the balance of the party system, tearing down a barrier that stood in the way of an alliance between liberal forces and left-wing political entities. The new PDS, although officially a reformist democratic party, would however still take some time to clearly redefine its programmatic priorities and position itself on the political spectrum: rather than ultimately concluded, the process of ideational innovation would then continue throughout the critical juncture, albeit in a more open and unconstrained fashion. How this new party will act, and what strategies it would follow, would then depend on the effects brought about by the other two exogenous events, as well as by how these would combine with internal developments.

One of such external events is the Tangentopoli corruption scandal of 1992-1993. When the *Tangentopoli* scandal erupted it shook the Italian political system from its foundations. Except for the former Communist Party, all major political formations were involved in the scandal, which had led to an enormous swelling of the overall cost of politics, had contributed to hindering efficiency, and, when found out, gave the final blow to the already cracking credibility the political class had to the eyes of the Italian public. Three were the immediate effects of the scandal: first, it led to the prosecution and incarceration of a many first level national political figures, basically eliminating from the scene a whole political generation; second, it radically altered the party landscape of the country, as the major Italian parties – the Christian Democracy, the Socialists, the Liberals, and the Republicans – ceased existing and morphed into novel configurations, changing name and losing major portions of their constituencies; third, the scale of the event exacerbated a pre-existing feeling of distrust of parties among the Italian populace, who called for a sweeping reform of the political system, and became openly resentful of the political parties that had dominated the domestic scene since the end of the Second World War.

Like the fall of the Soviet Union then, *Tangentopoli* would immediately intervene at the level of the Italian party system, by undermining, first, the credibility of huge political machines that had hitherto had an overwhelming importance within the Italian political system; second, by dismantling the actual parties themselves. This would crucially contribute to deepen the dynamic of de-institutionalization that, when the USSR fell, was circumscribed to the Communist party only. Such de-institutionalization had two further consequences with respect to the national and local party landscape: one the one hand, at the local level, it posed the conditions for civil society to get more directly involved in politics; on the other, the vacuum created by the sudden disappearance of the major post-war institutional parties would free a space that

novel political entities would, in the subsequent years be quick to fill. These would be the Northern League and Berlusconi's Forza Italia: while the latter would only be founded in 1994, and thus was not yet present in the years I am analysing, the Northern League had been created between 1989 and 1991 and would already be an important political force at the 1993 local elections. As it marked the end of several political formations, engendering uncertainty, and a phase of de-structuration of the political framework, *Tangentopoli* would effectively open a concrete window of opportunity for new alliances to be considered, new political formulas explored, and new strategies pursued. Crucially, moreover, Tangentopoli would accelerate the process of institutional reform that had been started just a few years earlier: regarding the legal-administrative framework of local governments, a first reform had been implemented in 1990[114], regarding the division of competences between legislative and executive bodies and allowing Communes to write their own statutes. The most innovative elements of the reform, concerning a move to the direct election of the mayor based on a majoritarian rule, had not yet been adopted; *Tangentopoli* then pressured the legislator (Vandelli, 1997), so that, within a year, the second part[115] of the reform was introduced. Institutional reform is the third exogenous element that characterizes Turin's critical juncture.

In the previous section, I have offered a brief overview of the structure of Italian local governments prior to the reforms of 1990-1993. Briefly summarizing its main points, the older system was one where the electoral system was proportional, mayoral election was indirect, so that local governments would be formed through agreements made within municipal councils; the prerogatives of council and executive were vaguely defined and overlapping, and parties would dominate such a system, which tended to produce, overall, limited governing capacity and limited accountability.

The reform of municipal electoral systems, then, took place in two different stages. Law 142 of 1990 introduced various novelties, first of all the possibility for Provinces and Communes to define the organization of their administrative structures through statutes (Vandelli, 1997, p. 11). In addition, the law inverted the attributions of Executive and Council: the executive would now have general competence, whereas before the reform this pertained to the Council; the latter would now only be responsible for the approval of specific acts, such as statutes and budgets. Moreover, it did away with vagueness in the separation of competences between the two bodies, by eliminating the possibility to delegate issues and the power of the Executive to adopt acts of urgency, except for budget variations (*idem*, p. 12).

The changes introduced by the 1993 reform (Gazzetta Ufficiale, law 81/1993) were however more dramatic; *Tangentopoli*, as anticipated, was decisive in getting the law approved in 1993. First, mayoral election became direct, with the possibility of a ballot round in case no candidate had obtained an absolute majority at the first round; the Municipal Council would now be elected through a majoritarian system, so as to provide mayors with more solid majorities. Importantly, the law would connect the mandates of Mayor

[114] Law 142/1990.
[115] Law 81/1993.

and Council: if the former resigned, the Council would fall as well, and if the Council voted the Mayor out of office through a no confidence vote, both organs would have to resign. Furthermore, it empowered the Mayor with the responsibility to nominate executive officials, managers, and municipal representatives in public-private institutions; to further separate executive and legislative bodies, the law would prevent the Mayor from becoming Council Speaker, as well as it prohibited Councillors from becoming executive officials. The Council, additionally, was now entitled to approve, when a new mandate started, the general government programme; executives were instead reduced in size, so that they could now not comprise more than eight assessors (this number will increase to 12 in 1995); and, finally, it limited the possibility of re-election for Mayor and executive to two mandates (Vandelli, 1997, p. 14-15).

This reform then intervened at the level of the legal-administrative framework of local government, bringing about its actual overhaul (Vandelli, 1997) and addressing the shortcomings of the previous system. It clarified the respective competences of executive and legislative bodies, favouring the former, which would be greatly empowered; by establishing a direct connection between mayor and electorate, through the direct election, the mayor would now appear as the actual expression of popular preferences; the possibility for the mayor to pick his own executive team would partially[116] prevent this from being an heterogenous assemblage of different political factions; this, coupled with the fact that the fall of the mayor would entail the concomitant fall of the legislative body, would enhance the stability of the whole system. In sum, the reform would result in a generally more stable system, with more clearly defined competences and constraints, and in a greatly empowered executive.

The final element that would contribute to define the features of Turin's critical juncture is, instead, endogenous and concerns local political events. At the 1990 municipal elections, a 'five-party' coalition would win city hall once again, although this time the mayor, Valerio Zanone, would be expressed by the Liberal party. Zanone was a liberal politician with national clout who, within two years of his election, decided to return to the national Parliament; he would then be succeeded by republican mayor, Giovanna Cattaneo Incisa, who took office at the beginning of 1992. The following months would be devoted, as usual, to finding an effective political formula that could sustain local government for the whole duration of the mandate. The combination of these two elements made the local administration excessively fragile, so that, by the end of 1992 (not even a year after Mayor Cattaneo had taken office), central government would authoritatively put an end to the administration, by sending a delegate Commissar, Malpica, to govern the city.

The event had some immediate effects over the local political context. First, it was a further, final confirmation of the inadequacy of the old legal-administrative framework which, coupled with a system that was still, although not for long, dominated by parties, had led to the nth local political crisis, reinforcing the

[116] As political parties gradually reconstructed their status in the years following *Tangentopoli*, they would then have a greater say over the formation of local executives (Bagnasco and Castellani, 2014); still, this was greatly reduced if compared to the pre 1993 system.

feeling, among the local populace, that change was urgently needed. Second, the crisis meant that Turin's elections would be anticipated to 1993, instead of being held in 1995, as they would have been had the local government not fallen. This is a crucial, and final element that would open up a concrete window of opportunity for local political and societal forces to explore new political formulas in view of the elections, to be held in June 1993. There is a final, crucial element to note, one that had actually triggered the cjrisis and which had a decisive impact on the events of those months. Liberal politician Zanone had been a key political figure that, while serving Mayor, had the support of the local business community; as he left Turin, the local business class would lose one of their key political referents, which resulted in their political attachments being vague and uncertain; this opened up, for them as well as for the city, the possibility of considering novel political formulas and alliances.

A final exogenous element that would intervene in altering the institutional landscape of Turin still has to do with institutional reform and concerns the two national laws: one instituting banking foundations, the other providing for university autonomy. Italian banking foundations would be instituted in 1990 through law 218/1990[117], which, as illustrated in Chapter 4, aimed at separating banks' non-profit operations from proper banking activities. Banking foundations can be properly understood as quasi-public institutions, or QuANGOs, in that they are defined as private institutions in which, however, public authorities maintain some form of leverage as to the composition of their managerial boards. Banking foundations are then endowed with private capital and own part of a bank's assets, but must pursue socially relevant activities; further, their board of directors is in part nominated by public entities – typically municipalities and Chambers of Commerce. In Turin, two such banking foundations would be present: *Compagnia di San Paolo* and *Fondazione CRT*. Both institutions would own – and still do – assets amounting to more than a billion euros (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012); further, their statutory requirement of undertaking operations with a 'socially relevant purpose' still allows them to invest in a wide variety of activities. These two features, together, would make of banking foundations two crucial actors within the local power constellation, as their margin of manoeuvre would be almost as wide as that of public authorities, putting them in a position to influence the contents of the local political agenda (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012).

In those years, two laws, law 168/1989 and law 341/1990 would instead provide for university autonomy, freeing universities from the overwhelming central control previously exerted by the Ministry of Education (Interview 13). The laws would, importantly, allow universities to have their own statutes, to devise their own teaching programmes, define their own organisational frameworks, and would confer them legal status. Most importantly, the reform would provide for universities' financial autonomy, allowing them to obtain private funding and to borrow money. These provisions would, crucially, transform universities into proper collective actors (interview 22), able to interact and negotiate autonomously and independently with

[117] their legal prerogatives were further defined through law 461/1998 and law 448/2001.

public entities: most importantly, they would thus be in a position to pursue their own strategies to strengthen their research and teaching capabilities, also through interventions aimed at restructuring or expanding their facilities. In Turin, after the implementation of these norms, therefore, universities would form various partnerships with public and/or private institutions[118] and intervene in the physical reconstruction of the city[119].

These two reforms of universities and banking foundations, importantly, would not open specific windows of opportunity during the critical juncture, but would create novel institutions (banking foundations) or empower existing ones (universities), which, throughout the Castellani's two mandates, would gradually acquire a more central position with respect to Turin's redevelopment process, becoming two crucial players of the local governance structure. Although the two reforms were enacted in 1990, during the critical juncture, it is during the re-institutionalisation phase that their role would become pivotal; I will, therefore, come back on them in the last section of this analysis, indeed, that of 're-institutionalisation'.

Table 3: Turin – chronology of events (1990-1993).

Year	Scope of event	Event
1989/1990	national	Law 168/1989 and law 341/1990 provide for universities' autonomy.
1990	national	Law 218/1990 establishes banking foundations.
1990	local	A new five-party coalition government is elected in Turin. Liberal Valerio Zanone is Mayor.
1991	international	Fall of the USSR.
Feb. 1991	national	Italian Communist party re-founded as Democratic Party of the Left (PDS).
Dec. 1991	national	A PDS splinter group forms *Rifondazione Comunista,* radical left-wing party.
Dec. 1991	local	Master Plan's preliminary project is approved.
Dec. 1991	local	Mayor Zanone resigns from office
Feb. 1992	local	Republican Giovanna Cattaneo Incisa takes Zanone's place as Turin's Mayor.
Feb. 1992	national	Tangentopoli corruption scandal starts.

[118] See Chapter 4.
[119] A major operation of the 1990s would be the 'doubling' of the Polytechnic's facilities.

1992	local	Turin's PDS secretariat endorses the Master Plan's preliminary project.
1992	local	Turin's liberal entrepreneurial class start a series of meetings over the city's future in *Torino Incontra*. Enrico Salza is group's leader. Wide attendance, including PDS members.
Apr. 1992	national	Major post-war parties lose votes (except for liberals and republicans). New political forces acquire consensus and relevance: *La Rete* and the Northern League.
Fall 1992	local	In Turin, attempt to create a 'super-government' (governissimo), comprising Socialists, Christian Democrats, and PDS.
Dec. 1992	local	Attempt to form 'super-government' fails; no alternative majority can be found. Central Government Commissar Malpica is sent to Turin, local administration is suspended. Snap elections are called for Spring 1993 (unclear whether in March or June).
Jan. 1993	local	Salza's 'group of 70' publishes plea on newspapers, declaring civil society's intention to enter the local political stage.
Jan.-March 1993	national	Tangentopoli worsens: Socialist leader Craxi is prosecuted.
March 1993	national	Law 81/1993 reforms local governments' structure and electoral system.
April 1993	local	Electoral list *Alleanza per Torino* is officially formed (supported by PDS and Salza's group). Valentino Castellani is mayoral candidate.

II.I Empirical Evidence

In February 1991, less than two years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Italian Communist Party would be dissolved and a new reformist political formation would be founded in its stead, the Democratic Party of the Left[120] (PDS). The new PDS would be a reformist[121], left-wing formation that would place itself within the tradition of European social democracy. Its birth, at first sight, would seem to officialise the conclusion of the process of ideational change that had been unfolding within the Communist party for the previous decade; the creation of the new party would not, however, do away with more radical Communist stances, which had been a major component of the defunct Communist party until its disbandment. The new PDS, then, would include, alongside a reformist component, a more radical element that, in December 1991, would separate from the main party and go on to constitute the Communist Refoundation Party (*Partito della Rifondazione Comunista*), more aligned with orthodox Marxist positions. Although these events would have the effect of moving the PDS closer to the centre on the Italian political spectrum, making it a potential ally of political parties other than the socialist one, a more radical component would still be present within the party, with the potential of undermining the strategies of the new local leadership, at least until the conclusion of the critical juncture in 1993 (Interview 9; Interview 4). I will focus on these issues later in this section.

The dissolution of the Italian Communist Party would not merely lead to the creation of the PDS but would trigger a telluric shock within the national party system. To get a picture of the magnitude of the event, it is important to recall the that the Italian Communist Party had, in every national election since 1948, always been the second party of the country, with a popular consensus ranging from 22 to 34 %.

Table 4: Electoral performance of Italian Communist Party (1948-1987) – Chamber of Deputies

Year	votes	Vote percentage	Seats (Ch. Of deputies)
1948	8,136,637	31.0	130 / 574
1953	6,120,809	22.6	143 / 590
1958	6,704,454	22.7	140 / 596
1963	7,767,601	25.3	166 / 630
1968	8,557,404	26.9	177 / 630

[120] Fuccillo, M., "L'ultima notte da comunisti", *La Repubblica*, February 1, 1991.
[121] Bonsanti, S., "Noi siamo l'alternativa", *La Repubblica*, February 1, 1991.

1972	9,072,454	27.1	179 / 630
1976	12,622,728	34.4	228 / 630
1979	11,139,231	30.4	201 / 630
1983	11,032,318	29.9	198 / 630
1987	10,254,591	26.6	177 / 630

Source:
https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it/index.php?tpel=C&dtel=18/04/1948&tpa=I&tpe=A&lev0=0&levsut0=0&es0=S&ms=S

The turn of 1991, then, would imply that a major political formation, the second in the country, which had been kept out of national government majorities throughout all the post-war era, was now available as a potential component of a government coalition. This was momentous change, as these were the first signs that the country had entered a new era, politically speaking, and that until then unexplored political scenarios could now be taken into consideration (Interview 15; Interview 11). Moreover, at the local level, where the Communists had instead governed, this meant the range of possible allies was no longer limited to the socialists.

> *"[…] The PCI is gone, I mean…let's not forget this minor detail (laughs)…because it would delve deep into…[communism] was an identity, right? In 89-90, everyone has [buzzed off], everyone's cut loose, […] a new politics can be born…"*
> (Interview 15)

As the interview emphasises, the implications of the fall of Communism would not be limited to a redefinition of the party system, as this was something that would impinge on a political identity that had sedimented for more than half a century. This in part helps understand why, even within the new PDS, certain elements would remain sceptical about the subsequent moves of the local party leadership: while the dismantling of the Communist party had indeed initiated a process of de-structuration of the local (and national) left-wing, the new party had not yet found a clear position on the political spectrum, it had not yet established new alliances, and every move in a novel direction could be seen as a risk (interview 9) at best, or a betrayal of older commitments, at worst. The initial stages of PDS' existence, therefore, are characterised by deep uncertainty as to possible future developments.

Despite this, the events of 1989-1991 had the concrete consequence of putting the PDS in a position where it was now free to conceive not only of new political formulas, but also to endorse new policy ideas and novel programmes. In Turin, a first actual opportunity in this direction was given by the approval, within

the municipal council, of the Master Plan's preliminary project in December 1991. At that moment, Turin was still governed by a five-party coalition, which had won the 1990 elections, although the new mayor Valerio Zanone would this time be expression of the Liberal Party, more specifically of the left-wing component of the Liberal party. At those elections (Table 5), the held one year after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Communists lost a significant number of votes compared with 1985[122], losing overall about 7 percentage points; still, the PCI remained the first party in Turin, with 28 % of the vote share. The five-party coalition, on the other hand, would gather similar percentages as in 1985, with the DC losing some consensus, whereas the other four parties – PSI, PSDI, PLI, PRI – maintained their positions, or gained slightly.

Table 5: Turin's electoral results (1990)



Source: (Comune Torino, 2020)

During their previous mandate (1985-1990), the five party coalitions had committed to approving a New Master Plan (Mellano, 2008) but, by the end of the mandate all they had issued was the Plan's 'programmatic resolution' ('*Delibera Programmatica*'), that is, the document containing the preliminary definition of objectives. The approval of the Preliminary Project in 1991 instead meant the elaboration procedure had entered a more concrete phase, as a first plan had been drafted, which would then have to acknowledge the observations and critiques of the citizenry, before being approved[123]. At this stage, right

[122] When they had gathered about 35 % of the vote share. In 1990 the Communist party still existed, and it ran for elections in Turin.

[123] The Master Plan's approval procedure actually comprises two stages: a municipal and a regional one. At the municipal level, the first document to be produced is usually the 'programmatic resolution' (*delibera programmatica*), which identifies the general objectives of the planning procedure; the second document is the 'preliminary project', a

after the preliminary project had been voted, mayor Zanone[124] resigned from the mayoral position on the 31 of December 1991. Zanone left to run for Parliament[125] at the subsequent national elections of April 1992, leaving Turin's five-party local government majority in turmoil. As typical of a system where public offices would be decided through inter-party agreements, Zanone's position as mayor had been the outcome of negotiations among parties: according to such a 'deal', struck among five-party coalition partners – which, importantly, was absolutely explicit – after the 1990 elections, the Region would have been led by a Christian Democrat, the Province by a Socialist and the Municipality by a member of one of the secular parties[126] (liberals or republicans). Zanone's resignation would, by itself, undermine the credibility of the pact to the eyes of the very parties involved: while, in theory, it should have been again a member of the secular parties to take the mayoral position, to ensure continuity to the agreement, Christian Democrats and Socialists were upset by Zanone's betrayal and, initially, the possibility of electing a mayor coming from either of these two parties, thus breaking or amending the 'deal', had been contemplated[127]. Eventually, a solution to the crisis would be found, one that respected the original deal, and Republican Giovanna Cattaneo Incisa would be elected mayor[128]. Whether this solution would have healed the situation municipal fragility for good was, however, still uncertain: the liberals were upset about having lost their mayoral seat, while everyone was awaiting to see how the national elections would have redefined local political equilibria, possibly entailing a reshuffling of the local government coalition[129].

Zanone's departure and the local five-party's fragility would however open a first opportunity for the newly formed PDS to update its programmatic priorities: the PDS' local leadership decided to endorse the New Master Plan, as well as the project for Turin's subway line, both of which had been until then opposed by the Communist party.

> *"[In Turin], when I became secretary, the first issue we pose…I'm talking about me – secretary – and Carpanini, who was the Municipal party whip. […] Zanone was Mayor and we still had the [old local government] system…[Zanone] resigns in '91, to run [for Parliament] in '92…and Giovanna Cattaneo becomes Mayor, in January-February '92 […]; many claimed that was the start of the crisis for the Liberals, let's say, of what back then was called the 'five-party' [coalition] in Turin, right? Because…Zanone resigns in '92, so…two completely separate trajectories start*

sort of first draft of the Master Plan, which is then to be submitted to the citizenry for critiques and observations; after this stage, the municipality can finally approve the Master Plan. From here, the Master Plan goes to the Region, which has to give a final approval before the document can be legally adopted (law n. 1150/1942; D.P.R. n. 8/1972).

[124] He would be substituted by Republican Giovanna Cattaneo Incisa.

[125] Sangiorgio, G., "Zanone decide: dimissioni ormai vicine", *La Stampa*, December 30, 1991

[126] Tropeano M., "La crisi anche in Regione?", *La Stampa*, December 31, 1991; Paviolo, G., "Non chiamatemi traditore", *La Stampa*, December 31, 1991

[127] Sangiorgio, G., "Zanone lascia, anche a Torino è crisi", *La Stampa*, December 31, 1991

[128] Tropeano, M., "Dibattito in consiglio che dirà Zanone?", *La Stampa*, January 27, 1992

[129] Paviolo, G., "E una donna al timone di Torino", *La Stampa*, January 28, 1992

from that moment: on the one hand, we…without having any future in mind…we undertake a programmatic change…we change PDS' programmatic priorities within the Municipal Council, essentially…chiefly on two issues: the subway line, which had until then been…I mean, the PCI backed the tramway up to that moment […]; and the Master Plan, because the Master Plan […] the PCI opposed it."

(Interview 9)

Such a programmatic turn would have a deep significance within the ranks of the PDS. First, although the party had been founded as a reformist, progressive left-wing political formation, it had not yet translated such a change into a redefinition of its actual, concrete policies. The choice to endorse the new Master Plan, then, would mean that the party, in Turin, had effectively abandoned older ideas about urban planning – the 'plan' approach[130] upheld by Novelli and his administrations – and had committed to a vision that had been followed by several other European cities in the previous ten to fifteen years (interview 9). By supporting the Master Plan, importantly, the PDS had made an important step certifying the party's real shift towards a proper reformist stance – other left-wing elements, including former Mayor Novelli, strongly opposed the Master Plan (Interview 4) – and could now be a viable candidate for an alternative local government coalition, as the Mayoral change had by no means solved the municipal crisis that had been brought about by Zanone's departure.

The choice of the new Mayor, Giovanna Cattaneo Incisa, as usually resulting from an agreement among coalition partners[131], in line with the typical mechanisms of the old local government structure (Vandelli, 1993), provided no assurances as to local government stability: within the municipal council, many saw this as a temporary move[132], one that would have allowed the five-party coalition to buy some time while searching for a more viable formula; five-party coalition partners, on their part, firmly rejected these accusations[133]. 1992 would for sure be a year of uncertainty, evident local government fragility and confusion. The PDS would then try to make the most out of this situation, and its local secretariat would begin a phase of 'search', in the party leadership started contemplating possible political formulas that could allow it to join the majority and push for the approval of their new agenda.

"So, we launched a challenge within the Municipal Council […]: we said, 'we're ready to form a "governissimo" (super-government), with PSI and DC, conditional, let's say, on the acceptance of these two programmatic priorities: that you commit to back the subway [and the Master Plan]'. So, we do a programmatic turn within our ranks and we launch – before […] Commissar Malpica

[130] See 'seeds of change and stalemate' section.
[131] Tropeano M., "Dibattito in consiglio che dirà Zanone?", *La Stampa*, January 27, 1992
[132] Minello B., "Da Zanone a Cattaneo staffetta con polemiche", *La Stampa*, January 28, 1992
[133] (*ibid*.)

comes, I think, in Fall '92, so a little earlier, summer-fall '92 – [we launch the proposal], because we were ready to do […] the 'super-government'. […] The only point we didn't agree on, as usual, was not…it was not the programmes, but political offices […]."
(Interview 9)

The party's first attempt, then, would be that of forming a 'super-government' (indeed, '*governissimo*', in Italian political jargon), with the Socialists and the Christian Democrats, parties that were part of the local majority which had approved the Master Plan's preliminary project just a few months earlier. As noted in the interview, the alliance would not be concluded because no agreement could be reached among party leaders regarding government positions – once again, confirming the major role of party negotiations withing such a local government framework (Vandelli, 1997). Reflecting on these events helps appreciate how they can indeed be interpreted as a critical juncture, especially considering the mechanisms they trigger. First, Zanone's resignation from the mayoral office would plunge the local government arena into a crisis, marked by uncertainty and confusion; the recent transformation of the former Communist party into a reformist left-wing formation would add to this confusion, as the new party was still trying to find[134] a clear and defined position within the local (as well as national) political system of alliances. Zanone's departure and the approval of the Master Plan's preliminary project would thus open a first window of opportunity for PDS' political entrepreneurs – in this case, local Secretary Sergio Chiamparino and Domenico Carpanini, PDS' leader within the municipal council – to capitalize on the greater freedom of action afforded to them by circumstances. Backing the Master Plan was their first move (Interview 9), giving concrete policy content to the shift from Communism to left-wing reformism embodied by the formation of the PDS; second, they tried to pursue an alliance with Socialists and Christian Democrats, until then the other two major political formations of the country, proposing a novel political coalition, on that had been never tried in Republican Italy – Communists and Christian Democrats had never governed together, not even locally, in the post-war era. This option was however soon discarded for, as the interview emphasises, no agreement on the possible mayor could be reached. There were other reasons, however, why an alliance between PDS and Socialists *cum* Christian Democrats would not materialise: PDS proposal dates to summer-fall 1992[135] (interview 9), the same year as the *Tangentopoli* corruption scandal, which started in February 1992[136]; Socialists and Christian Democrats would be among the parties involved in the scandal, making the move, from the perspective of several PDS members and Left-wing militants more in general, politically inconvenient.

[134] "PDS: ci siamo anche noi", *La Stampa*, January 12, 1992
[135] Sangiorgio G., "'Governissimo', si parte", *La Stampa*, September 8, 1992
[136] "Arrestato per concussione il presidente del 'Trivulzio'", *La Repubblica*, February 18, 1992.

"…there had been, at some point, this thing I had opposed, together with Novelli…a 'super-government' with DC, PSI, and PCI – a coalition DC, PSI, PCI – which we opposed […]. And Tridente gave a speech at the PDS directorate, saying 'you look like those running after the previous regime's cart, who are being brought to the guillotine, and say "We want to join too! We want to join too! (laughs)"
(Interview 17)

This option is, then, discarded, for reasons related to both the concrete unfeasibility of the project, as well as to the qualms it raised within the PDS itself; this second motive relates, in part, to the consequences of the *Tangentopoli* corruption scandal. Among the major parties, the Christian Democracy and the Socialist Party were those most involved in the scandal: it is also for this reason that part of the PDS would not support an alliance with them. But the scandal's major impact would concern the reputation of political parties, which would decrease dramatically. *Tangentopoli* would then create the conditions for two phenomena to occur: first, it opened room for elements of the civil society to step in and take government responsibility; second, it created space for novel political entities to enter the scene (Interview 9; Interview 11). At the beginning of the 1990s, these would be the Northern League and *La Rete*, the movement former Mayor Novelli had joined; on these I will come back shortly. The public's perception, back in those days, was that *Tangentopoli* had unlocked the conditions for a comprehensive overhaul of the national political system. Not only had the old parties been still attached to a social contract that had not changed since the end of the war – whereas the country's social conditions had changed, as the Fordist imprint on the organization of society was no longer dominant – but their perceived ineffectiveness coupled with their involvement in corruption had alienated a considerable portion of the Italian citizenry from the whole political system (Interview 3). At the same time, this was perceived by many as a momentous opportunity for a sweeping restructuration of the whole political structure, a chance for a 'liberal-democratic revolution' (interview 11) that could substitute the old post-war political framework, still embedded in a bi-polar logic that was no more, and that had exhausted its already limited capacity to offer alternative formulas that could ensure political alternation[137] (Interview 5).

It is against this background of national political turmoil (and major international transformations: the USSR had ceased existing in 1991), that the local municipal crisis would reach its climax. A further demonstration of the local administration's fragility, this final episode was precisely caused by the failure to create a new PDS + PSI + DC 'super-government' coalition. In September-October 1992, talks relative to the formation of the 'super-government' were undermining the current executive, as it seemed probable that, had the 'super-government' hypothesis failed, a new election would have been called[138]. And this is indeed

[137] From 1946 until 1991, only two prime ministers would not belong to the Christian Democratic Party (Italian Government, https://www.governo.it/it/i-governi-dal-1943-ad-oggi/i-governi-nelle-legislature/192).
[138] Paviolo G. and Sangiorgio G., "Il PDS affonda il governissimo", *La Stampa*, November 21, 1992

what happened: as no agreement was reached among the parties, Mayor Cattaneo resigned, Turin's local government was suspended, and national government Commissar Malpica was sent to oversee administrative activities for the time being[139], and new elections were called for the next year[140].

At this point, a novel opportunity for PDS was opened, as the prospect of new elections would pave the way to another process of 'search', in which the party leadership would start considering alternative possibilities as to the best political formula that could have helped them win city hall. Such a new possibility consisted of an alliance, not with the liberal party as such, but with entrepreneurial and business components of the civil society that had until then been tied with the liberal party. This group of the local civil society, which gravitated around the Chamber of Commerce (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; interview 5), had had in former mayor Zanone their political reference; Zanone's departure in December 1991 had then left this group 'orphan' of political representation, opening a chance for the PDS to take the place formerly held by the Liberal party (Interview 9). Importantly, this civil society group was one that had managed to carve its own space in the city and, crucially, within the Chamber of Commerce, that was autonomous from the city's big private actor, FIAT; this portion of the local business class had its leading figure in Enrico Salza[141]. The process of forming the alliance would, in any case, take some time: it would be created only two months prior to the elections.

According to some interviews (interview 5; interview 4), Salza represented a peculiar position within the liberal-entrepreneurial world. Although strongly connected to Zanone, Salza had maintained cross-cutting relationships with the local political world and thus with members of other political formations; further, he would not belong to, nor identify with, the FIAT world and, on the contrary, he would oppose FIAT's supremacy within the local entrepreneurial world (interview 5). With FIAT, Salza would have frictions over some national political economic choices, which he deemed to be a concession to political pressures (Interview 5). In Turin, in any case, his autonomy and power would derive from his position as President of the local Chamber of Commerce, which he held from 1976 until 1992[142]. Oddly enough, the Chamber of Commerce in Turin was not dominated by FIAT: this is because FIAT's leading role would be mostly felt in the proper industrial association, that is, the Industrial Union[143], whereas the Chamber of Commerce would

[139] "Marzano affonda, arriva il commissario", *La Stampa*, December 11, 1992; Paviolo, G., "Il commissario in Sala Rossa", *La Stampa*, December 15, 1992

[140] Sangiorgio, G., "Ma non ho la bacchetta magica", *La Stampa*, December 24, 1992.

[141] Paviolo G., "Una Torino da vendere", *La Stampa*, December 5, 1991

[142] In those years (1971-1989) he is also vice-president and CEO of the financial daily newspaper, *Il Sole 24 Ore*. By 1992-1993 he is also vice-president of the San Paolo IMI bank.

[143] An almost unique case in Italy, in Turin's province there were two industrial unions: one for the city, dominated by FIAT; the other for the *Canavese* area, dominated by the other major local company, Olivetti: *"So, in this sense, the Chamber of Commerce [is] obviously a world in which the representation of economic instances is different from that you would find within the Industrial Union because, whereas in the Industrial Union you typically had the metal works world, if you will, with FIAT at its centre – note that, among other things, back then you had, somewhat paradoxically but not even that much, two – in Turin's province I believe it was the only case on a national scale – two industrial unions, one for Turin, one for the Canavese area, why? One was dominated by Olivetti, the other by FIAT, so you really*

include other interests beyond the industrial ones, from trade associations to labour unions, the agricultural world, and local constructors. The presence of varied interests within the Chamber of Commerce would be conducive to a more heterogeneous power structure:

> *"[The Chamber of Commerce] was a much more pluralist type of governance […], an extended type, so it produced different results, in terms of representation – different from those of the FIAT world."*
> (Interview 5)

Having a major position within the Chamber of Commerce also entailed, since 1990 – year that Banking Foundations were instituted – having an important leverage with respect to the local power constellation, as the Chamber of Commerce would be entitled to nominate two members of the banking foundations' boards[144] (of both *Compagnia di San Paolo* and *Fondazione CRT*). In 1992, as President of the Chamber of Commerce, Salza would push for the creation of the Chamber's congress centre, special agency *Torino Incontra*[145]: during that year, as the local government crisis was unfolding, with Zanone already in Rome by then, *Torino Incontra* would serve not only as a meeting place, but also as a venue for the promotion of a reflection process over the city, which, like those meetings held in the second half of the 1980s, would function as a venue for networking and the free circulation of ideas[146] (Interview 5; Interview 9). The basis for this reflection was a booklet published by *Torino Incontra* itself, called "*18 Idee per Torino*"[147] (18 Ideas for Turin), containing suggestions concerning, indeed, 18 strategic projects for the city that could have constituted the programmatic core of an urban agenda for development. Crucially, individual members of the PDS would take part to these meetings, strengthening contacts with the local entrepreneurial and business liberal worlds, and discussing programmatic ideas for the city: most of the projects contained in *Torino Incontra*'s booklet – from the Master Plan, the Metro, and the railway bypass, to the Investment agency and the need to sort out the municipal budget – were also backed by the PDS local secretariat.

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had…there was no risk that in the Turin one you'd have Olivetti-backed positions, and vice-versa: they were fully separated and divided (Interview 5)."

[144] For instance, the general council of the Compagnia di San Paolo is so composed: two members are nominated by Turin's municipality; one by the Piedmont Region; one by Genoa's municipality; two by Turin's Chamber of Commerce; one by Genoa's Chamber of Commerce; one by Milan's Chamber of Commerce; one by the Piedmontese Union of Chambers of Commerce; one by Genoa's Italian Institute of Technology; one by Turin's Academy of Sciences; one by the national *Accademia dei Lincei*; one by FAI (Italian Environment Fund); one by the European Foundation Centre (Fondazione Compagnia di San Paolo, "Statuto", 2018).

[145](Torino Incontra, "history", https://www.torinoincontra.org/pages/Storia_it/121; "Torino Incontra: il mondo in diretta", *La Stampa*, March 22, 1992)

[146] These meetings would be joined by representatives of the local political, intellectual, and business spheres, together with parts of the labour unions and the third sector (Interview 16; Vattimo G., "In declino i partiti, nascono i movimenti", *La Stampa*, March 27, 1993).

[147] Torino Incontra, (1992), *Un'alternativa al declino: 18 idee per lo sviluppo di Torino negli anni Novanta*, Torino: Camera di Commercio di Torino.

"In parallel, throughout '92, indeed because Zanone had left for Rome, Enrico Salza, who was a civil society figure – one with major links with Zanone – so…he launches that series of meetings on strategic projects for Turin's future, […], centred on this idea […], I think it was 'Ten[148] Projects for Turin's Future' […]. It was one of these many communicative formulas, but you had the subway, the high-speed [railway], […] the railway bypass…the Master Plan, the incinerator, that is, many things that had caused the establishment of the day to have been, for a long, very unsatisfied with politics. Then, I'm saying this once again, the divorce…I mean, Zanone ['s departure] amounted to […] the crucial moment of an itinerary in which the city's establishment had found its leader, him who they viewed as their leader…they felt betrayed and they felt bewildered […] and from then on, I think – this is my analysis, so – this civil society, because Salza…yeah, civil society in that he was an entrepreneurial leader […]. He was one who had […] in Zanone – he always claimed this – his reference point. I am sure that, had Zanone not resigned, had he kept his mayoral seat, [Salza] would have discussed these projects with […] Zanone. He felt betrayed, bewildered, so he said, 'I'm acting on my own'."
(Interview 9)

As Turin's administration was handed to a government commissar and new elections were called for spring 1993[149], the PDS' local secretariat would then turn to Salza and his entourage to discuss the possibility of forming an alliance that could have backed a potential mayoral candidate. This further 'window of opportunity', importantly, was opened by two chief factors: the former has to do with the very government crisis of December 1992, the arrival of the government Commissar and the calling of a new round of municipal elections for spring 1993. Had the PDS joined the previous government or formed the 'super-government' with PSI and DC, none of this would have probably happened, no early elections would have been called, and negotiations with Salza and liberal entrepreneurs to form an alliance might have not taken place; the government crisis, instead, opened a door in this direction, while closing one to the possibility of forming a 'super-government'. The second crucial factor, as mentioned in the interview, was, once again, Zanone's departure. In retrospect, this event would be fundamental as, on the one hand, it would initiate a phase of administrative instability that would last throughout the whole of 1992 and would only be concluded by the Commissar's arrival; on the other hand, Zanone's resignation meant the liberal entrepreneurial group centred around Salza and the Chamber of Commerce was left without a political reference point: it is following Zanone's departure, indeed, that *Torino Incontra* launched this series of meetings that would

[148] As just mentioned, the projects were actually 18, not 10 (Torino Incontra, 1992).
[149] Until the very end of 1992, it was not certain whether Turin's local elections would be held in March or in June 1993: this in part depended on whether the new electoral law for municipalities would have been approved in February-March 1993 ("Ma non ho la bacchetta magica", *La Stampa*, December 29, 1992).

constitute a crucial opportunity for idea circulation and for networking, which would eventually underpin the collaboration between PDS and the local liberal entrepreneurial class. These meetings, crucially, would also be joined by Labour Union members, who would participate as private individuals, some of whom had concluded that the best way to put the city back on the path of development was through a concerted effort of different spheres of the city's civil society (interview 16).

A further factor contributing to the decision, on the part of PDS' local secretariat, to start negotiating with liberal civil society elements about the possibility of forging an electoral alliance had to do with Novelli's decision, at the end of January 1993, to run again for mayor[150]. At this stage, at the beginning of 1993, knowing the subsequent elections would be held sometime between March and June of the same year, the two candidates that seem most likely[151] to win city hall are Northern League's Gipo Farassino[152] and Diego Novelli, Turin's former communist mayor. Novelli, who represented one of the most traditionally radical elements of the local left-wing political formations, had chosen to join neither the PDS nor *Rifondazione Comunista*, but to run with a recently founded movement called *La Rete*, upsetting several former party colleagues (Interview 9); further, he opposed the Master Plan and several points of the development agenda that had been endorsed by PDS' leadership, making his figure rather inconsistent with the party's reformist stance.

> *"So, the first theme that separated Novelli and what would later become his candidacy from Sergio Chiamparino, PCI…PDS, now I've lost count, but it doesn't matter…so, the secretary and some people like me, a group of people…we argued that risking the re-publication[153] [of the Master Plan] wasn't acceptable, merely in name of a hypothesis that we deemed abstract, ideological […]; that this city needed certainty, certainty! Even if impaired by previous work, which you couldn't modify much…this was still better than re-starting [works] from scratch, for this would have led to another five years of uncertainty. The point was very clear."*
>
> (Interview 4)

[150] "Un economista in Sala Rossa", *La Stampa*, January 28, 1993; Martini, F., "'Caccia grossa' al sindaco", *La Stampa*, January 30, 1993.

[151] In a poll conducted in the months prior to the election, 25 % of respondents would support the League, 12.5 % would support the PDS and 8.6 % would back *La Rete*. However, because of the possibility to vote disjointedly for mayor and municipal council (introduced by the reform of local electoral systems, law 81/1993), 65 % of PDS voters stated they would back Novelli as mayor, that is, *La Rete*'s candidate (Frandino B., Schiavazzi V., "A Torino è pieno caos. Incubo-liste per i partiti", *La Repubblica*, April 23, 1993).

[152] At the last moment, the League would candidate Domenico Comino in Turin, rather than Gipo Farassino (Frandino B., Schiavazzi V., "A Torino è pieno caos. Incubo-liste per i partiti", *La Repubblica*, April 23, 1993.)

[153] A republication amounts to starting over the whole procedure for the Master Plan's approval (art. 9, law 1150/1942; Interview 4).

The prospect of siding with Novelli was not, then, particularly attractive to the PDS leadership: this would have amounted to disowning the programmatic turn operated by the local secretariat in early 1992 – which had brought the party to endorse the Master Plan and the subway – and to backing a figure whose political programme was, according to many, 'backward looking' (Interview 16) with respect to economic development. Further, from a strictly political perspective, PDS members were not sure as to the convenience of backing a candidate who had chosen not to join their party (Interview 9).

Another crucial element that would contribute to the formation of an alliance between PDS and liberal civil society elements was, of course, *Tangentopoli*. Between 1992 and 1993, the judicial inquiry was entering its most dramatic phase[154], and several major political personalities would be indicted by judges, quickly eroding the already cracking credibility of major and minor political formations of the old post-war party system. At the national elections of spring 1992, some months after the inquiry had started, all major parties had registered a loss of preferences[155]**;** the only two parties that had gained votes were novel formations, namely the Northern League[156] and, indeed, La Rete (Montanelli and Cervi, 1993), who had both run a campaign that targeted political corruption and the vicious spiral that national politics had fallen prey to. Although the PDS was not involved in the corruption scandal, it would have to confront, in Turin, the two parties that had capitalised the most on *Tangentopoli* and on the gradual dismantling of the party system. At this stage, in the first months of 1993, as major parties were being wiped out by *Tangentopoli*, the hypothesis of siding with elements of civil society became more and more convenient to the PDS; then, in January 1993, Salza's group would publish a plea on local newspapers titled 'For Turin'[157], signed by 70 influential personalities[158] of the local society, calling for civil society and political actors to sustain a project of development for Turin – essentially based on the agenda elaborated in the booklet '18 ideas for Turin' – by forming a cross-cutting alliance that would renounce using party symbols. This move, in a moment of political turmoil that was undermining parties' credibility, would emphasise the availability and intention of civil society actors in taking responsibility for and committing to public affairs. This was an opportunity for the PDS, and negotiations with Salza were soon started: as the two sides both supported a development agenda for the city, and shared a similar view as to specific projects, from the Master Plan to the subway, and so on, there surely were the right conditions to consider running together for the elections (Interview 9).

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[154] Between December 1992 and March 1993, several leading personalities of Italy's major parties were prosecuted, among whom Bettino Craxi, national secretary of the Socialist Party (Brambilla M., Buccini G., "In diciotto pagine le accuse a Craxi", *Corriere della Sera*, December 16, 1992).

[155] (Petracca, O.M., "Finita l'epoca della 'diga anticomunista', la formula s'inceppa", *Corriere della Sera*, April 7, 1992; Archivio Storico delle Elezioni, Camera 05/04/1992, Interior Ministry, https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it/index.php?tpel=C&dtel=05/04/1992&tpa=I&tpe=A&lev0=0&levsut0=0&es0=S&ms=S).

[156] Altichieri, A., "Il dato dovrebbe far riflettere chi sta a Roma", *Corriere della Sera*, April 7, 1992.

[157] "Settanta vip per un sindaco", *La Stampa*, January 31, 1993

[158] In those days, they were referred to as the 'Group of 70' (Vattimo G., "In declino i partiti, nascono i movimenti", *La Stampa*, March 27, 1993).

Rather than on programmes, negotiations would then chiefly focus on a viable candidate for the mayoral seat: Salza was pushing for the name of Mario Deaglio, a liberal economist and journalist; the PDS leaders proposed Carpanini instead, the party whip within the municipal council.

> *"The issue, with Salza…we got to a stage where we got to the point – because you always get to the point. The point was that he wanted Mario Deaglio […] as mayor. And I tell him, 'look, we have Carpanini – he was the central figure of those things I mentioned earlier, programmatic turn and so on – 'no, way too communist…' 'Well, [Deaglio]'s too liberal'.*
> (Interview 9)

Neither name could be accepted by the other part, as the former was deemed 'too liberal' by the PDS, while the latter was 'too radical' to the eyes of Salza and his group (Interview 9; Interview 11; Interview 23). Eventually, the two sides would settle on Valentino Castellani, a Polytechnic Professor with no prior political experience, whose political leanings were those of the local Catholic left-wing, that is, a moderate progressive position.

> *"Let's say the truth: Castellani was a compromise. Salza's entourage supported Mario Deaglio's candidacy; and Castellani represented the meeting point, because he embodied […] a sort of compromise between what I described before as Turin's CISL…Turin's left-wing catholic world…so, Castellani's ticket was put forward to counter Deaglio's one. [Deaglio's] public image was that of the Confidustria man, the Sole 24 Ore man, and so on…none of this would be acceptable […] to the PDS and so…"*
> (Interview 11)

Castellani was then proposed as a compromise figure, surely a progressive, but whose moderate leaning would please Salza's group. Further, the fact of having no political background was, in *Tangetopoli*'s darkest days, definitely a trump card to play for the prospective coalition. At this stage, however, there was still an element of severe uncertainty: local governments' new electoral reform, as of March 1993 – elections were scheduled for June of the same year – had not been approved yet, so it was not clear, until the very last moment, which electoral system[159] would have led to the formation of the new municipal administration. Further, Castellani had made his candidacy conditional on the approval of the law (Interview 1; Interview 4), so neither his name, nor the list that would support him had been officialised yet.[160] To officially select the

[159] It was known that the reform would have introduced the direct mayoral election; what was unknown was whether the law would have passed in time for the June 1993 vote ("Legge sui sindaci a tappe forzate", *La Stampa*, March 15, 1993; Vattimo G., "In declino i partiti nascono i movimenti", *La Stampa*, March 27, 1993).
[160] Sangiorgio G., "Comune, si vota il 6 giugno", March 24, 1993

name of the mayoral candidate, then, a sort of public legitimising strategy would be deployed: the PDS, in agreement with the group of 70, would select a group of eight 'wise men'[161], entrusted with the responsibility of engaging parties and associations[162] and, together with these, find a suitable candidate that could unite different realities under a political project grounded on the idea of civic commitment. The idea was, this way, to further highlight how the choice of the mayoral candidate would be in the hands of civil society, rather than following form a decision made by party secretariats, and thus to strengthen the legitimacy of the candidacy to the eyes of the public (interview 9). This move, however, amounted to a device aimed at obtaining popular consensus over a choice that had actually been already made through the agreement between PDS and Salza's group.

> *"[…] At one stage, to publicly legitimise Castellani's candidacy, I invented the 'wise men' mechanism, that is, we identified six or seven people, who were: for sure the Polytechnic's dean, Zich, then Bruno Manghi, than […] Gianni Vattimo […], there was Nicola Tranfaglia, if I remember well, there was Francesco Traniello, a professor of religious history with the political science department, then…someone else of similar stature […], now I can't recall all of them…but it was them, more or less, six or seven, not many more…to whom we asked to choose…to validate, let's say, the mayoral candidates…basically to choose, but knowing we'd already chosen ourselves, I mean, we had…so, in a way, they validated Castellani's candidacy, they presented it, they supported it and…this was the mechanism through which…"*
> (Interview 9)

Castellani's name would be picked by the eight 'wise men' on April 14th, 1993, less than two months before the elections, which had been scheduled for June 6th. In the meanwhile, law 81/1993 on the reform of the municipal electoral system had entered into force on March 28th; I will come back on it shortly. Once Castellani's name had been picked, before he could be officialised as a candidate, his name had to be approved by the PDS' local directorate. It must be noted, as anticipated above, that Secretary Chiamparino's commitment to a reformist agenda centred on development – embodied by the programmatic turn of 1992, and the decision to support the Master Plan – and his choice to side with Salza's group was not necessarily backed by everyone within the local PDS ranks**.** The founding of the PDS had initiated a process of re-structuration of the party, whereby it would try to redefine its political priorities and its positioning within the party system, that had not been terminated yet: to some, the Communist legacy was still strong, and the choice to sustain a liberal alliance was seen as a gamble, a risk, and a possible betrayal of traditional

[161] These were: sociologist Bagnasco; philosopher Perone; Rusconi; historian Tranfaglia; Traniello; Polytechnic Dean Zich; Unionist Bruno Manghi; philosopher Gianni Vattimo. (Vattimo G., "In declino i partiti, nascono i movimenti", *La Stampa*, March 27, 1993)
[162] (*ibid*.)

ideological commitments (Interview 9; Interview 15; Interview 14; Interview 4; Interview 8; Interview 11). To convince the directorate to back Castellani, the main argument that was used was one against Novelli. The underlying rationale was that backing Novelli would have amounted to giving up the commitments of the newly formed party; further, it would have meant that, regardless of the programmatic, ideational, and strategic changes operated within the PDS, Turin's left would be in the hands of a figure who had not taken part to these transformations, and whose vision for the city evoked past experiences rather than future ambitions (Interview 13; Interview 14). In sum, the argument concluded, the PDS could not be handed to a man who had chosen not to choose between PDS and *Rifondazione Comunista*, and had gone on its own, for this would 'have amounted to an abdication' (Interview 9).

> *"Perhaps, the main argument that was adopted to keep the executive group together – the electorate is a different thing – was that we could not hand to an agnostic – agnostic with respect to the splintering of Rifondazione [Comunista] and to the birth of the PDS – the future of Turin's left, because it would have meant…it would have amounted to an abdication…and this was quite…it was an argument that touched the right chords, even among the PCI's old guard […]. Among the PCI's old guard, those who'd chosen to side with the PDS weren't happy about…about looking up to Novelli, who had been shrewd […] for being…at least, from their perspective he'd been shrewd, as…he didn't side with the PDS, and didn't even join Rifondazione [Comunista]…"*
> (Interview 9)

Once Castellani was officially endorsed by the PDS, the candidacy now needed to be backed with a civic list. This was among the first proposals of Salza's group of 70, who had wanted to create a cross-cutting, civil society progressive alliance[163] that would renounce political symbols and that could be backed by a variety of groups, with or without a party history, whose commitment would however centre on the overall project, rather than on a given political colour. Further, creating a civic list was also a necessity because, apart from the PDS, there were doubts about the possibility of other parties backing Castellani, had he run as the official PDS candidate (Interview 15). The creation of the list *Alleanza per Torino* would then aim at gathering the support of figures coming from heterogeneous political and professional backgrounds, with the idea that the list did not originate from party agreements and did not amount to a 'sum of parties' (interview 4), but it expressed a cross-cutting liberal-progressive alliance[164], whose composite nature was no flaw, but actually an adequate embodiment of a society that was transforming.

The creation of the list would therefore have the effect of creating a rupture that would cut across most parties that were preparing for the electoral race: some members of established political formations

[163] "Settanta vip per un sindaco", *La Stampa*, January 31, 1993
[164] Sangiorgio G., "Meglio il PDS che La Rete", *La Stampa*, May 14, 1993

would leave their parties and join *Alleanza per Torino*, while others would remain in the original party and run on their own (Interview 9; Interview 4; Interview 14). This dynamic truly invested almost all parties, except perhaps for the League; it would even break up the liberal front, which is one of the two groups (the other was PDS) that had chosen to construct this 'experiment': the Christian Democracy, which had not yet been disbanded, and the liberal formation '*Torino Liberale'* would team up to form a 'popular' alliance and back their own candidate, Zanetti, while many coming from this same environments – Liberal and left-wing Catholic – chose to back Castellani (Interview 4); also the greens would split up, as well as the Republicans and, of course, the wider left-wing world, as *Rifondazione Comunista* chose to back Novelli, whereas the PDS[165] would support *Alleanza per Torino*.

> *"[…] Alleanza per Torino was born when we chose Castellani, [then] all parties would break up…except for the League, which even then was a monolith…Farassino…all parties break up and then…for instance, the Liberal Party presents Giorgio Re as mayoral candidate, while Elsa Fornero runs with Alleanza per Torino…I mean, Alleanza per Torino was born…I don't want to say, but from my idea…to provide a container for all those bits of parties that wanted to join the Castellani experiment […]. The Greens split up: Tricarico, Vernetti […] and…then you had […] Rampi, who had backed Novelli, La Rete; Rifondazione is Rifondazione…then you had La Rete, with Tartaglia and others…the PRI…had split up, the PLI had done the same…same with the popular front, they had presented Giovanni Zanetti as mayor, while a part had joined…Alleanza per Torino…Bruno Manghi, these…the radicals had joined Alleanza per Torino because…and indeed they elected Rossi, they elected Palma…so, Alleanza per Torino, this is how it was born…"*
> (Interview 9)

Alleanza per Torino, then, would consist of a list that gathered a truly heterogeneous combination of various political cultures and groups, united behind the commitment towards a liberal progressive experiment (Interview 14; Interview 4). The original axis would comprise the PDS, that is the reformist left-wing; a liberal component of the entrepreneurial and business class; Unions[166], and academics; it would then be joined by catholic left-wing elements, gravitating around the world of Catholic associations and ACLI[167] (Christian Associations of Italian Workers), that saw in Castellani a suitable figure to represent their interests; they would also be supported by a part of the Greens ('Greens – Laughing Sun'), who saw in the new Master

[165] This did not however mean that PDS members were all united behind Castellani; at the first electoral round, many would still vote for Novelli, against the official party line (Prandino B., Schiavazzi V., "Torino incorona Novelli", *La Repubblica*, May 6, 1993; Interview 9; Interview 4).
[166] Although unions would never impose on their members to back a specific candidate, CISL leadership and, in part UIL's, significantly contributed to building Castellani's candidacy; CGIL, due to its more radical outlook and its historical connection with Communism, would be much more divided (Interview 15; Interview 16).
[167] (Sangiorgio G., "Castellani, nome nuovo a sinistra", *La Stampa*, April 14, 1993; Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012)

Plan a tool to further their environmental objectives[168]; elements of the secular parties – Liberal and Republicans – would also be involved in *Alleanza per Torino*, as well as some Christian Democrats who chose not to back Zanetti; finally, many socialist figures who had not been involved in *Tangentopoli* and had remained without party, would flow into the list. This, in essence, would be the bulk of the electoral coalition that would then go on to constitute Turin's governance.

The final, crucial factor that had been paramount as to the formation of *Alleanza per Torino*, and that would be decisive in its paving the way for its final electoral victory, was the approval of the reform of the local electoral system. In particular, the reform would be crucial in two respects: first, because it finally convinced Castellani to accept the candidacy and, second, because it permitted *Alleanza per Torino* to adopt a peculiar electoral strategy. As to the former aspect, the reasons why Castellani deemed the reform a necessary condition for him run as candidate have to do with the greatly empowered executive role the law would have produced. With the direct mayoral election, Castellani's role as mayor would not have been subject to party negotiations within the council; the empowered mayoral position, furthermore, would identify in the mayor the appropriate organ in charge of choosing his own executive team, thus, again, freducing the role of parties[169] and posing the conditions for the formation of more stable and cohesive local executives; then, the majoritarian electoral system coupled with the majority bonus would ensure the executive body, and the mayor, would be backed by a wide council majority; the power to nominate the managers of municipal public companies, attributed to the mayor, would further contribute the empowerment of the mayoral position, and of the local executive overall.

As to the electoral strategy that would be pursued by the *Alleanza per Torino*, this would be geared on a further innovation introduced by the electoral reform, that is the possibility of a ballot round: if no candidate reached an absolute majority at the first round, the two candidates who had gathered most votes would go on to a second round. This novelty would be crucial, as it greatly increased the list's concrete possibility to win the election: Novelli's was the ticket that had the widest support[170] and *Alleanza per Torino*'s members were well aware that, at the first round, Novelli would have probably gained the upper hand. Had the old system still been in place, *Alleanza per Torino* could have aspired at becoming a minor partner in a government coalition, but its influence over the formation of a local executive would have been mediated by the presence of other coalition partners and subject to inter-party negotiations. With the new electoral law,

[168] The idea was that the subway, the railway bypass, and a new parking plan would reduce traffic and de-congestion the city centre; further, various environmentally friendly projects could have been undertaken around abandoned industrial areas (Interview 8).

[169] As to this aspect, the *Tangentopoli* scandal would also contribute, in a first phase, to reduce the influence of parties with respect to the formation of local executives.

[170] In a poll conducted by SWG one month before the elections, Novelli seemed favourite, with 30 % of preferences; Comino, the League's candidate, would not surpass 11 %, with Castellani just behind, with 10 % of preferences. In terms of parties, however, 33 % of respondents stated they would back the League, followed by the PDS with 16 % of preferences; then, Rifondazione Comunista (8.6 %), the Christian Democracy (8.1 %), La Rete (6.6 %), the MSI (6 %), and the Republicans (5 %) (Prandino B., Schiavazzi V., "Torino incorona Novelli", *La Repubblica*, May 6, 1993).

things changed altogether: had Castellani gained second position – nobody expected him to win at the first round – he could have accessed the ballot round and his chances for a final victory would have been greatly enhanced.

> *"Well, I'll get to the point: we were perfectly aware that the left…what was left of the PCI and Alleanza per Torino…weren't in a position to win…they had already lost. So, we made a very pragmatic reasoning, that was, 'we need to find a candidate and run a campaign that places our candidate second', because the risk was that the League could make second; [this resting] on the conviction that Novelli has already lost if he gets to the ballot round, and this is what happened…"*
> (Interview 4)

As the interview highlights, the actual objective of the electoral strategy was truly to place Castellani in second position, knowing that it was impossible to beat Novelli at the first round. Two further elements stand out: first, the real challenger was the Northern League, which, together with La Rete, was the only political formation, as we mentioned above, to have gained major consensus after the turmoil engendered by *Tangentopoli*. Castellani, in other words, was running against the two most accredited political formations for the final victory: beating the League was then the chief goal of the electoral strategy. A second element has to do with the features of a system contemplating the ballot round: as several interviewees have pointed out (Interview 9; Interview 4; Interview 8), Castellani's supporters were hoping that, as the presence of the ballot round allows to presume, electors would have, first, voted for their favourite candidate and then, at the second round, the majority would instead have chosen the candidate that was less distant from their positions (Interview 8). While Novelli's ticket was clearly identifiable as a radical left candidacy, Castellani's moderate reformist position had the potential of attracting a much more heterogeneous range of voters; further, all those who would not identify with Novelli's radical left and had not voted for either candidate at the first round were likely, at a hypothetical ballot, to shift their votes to Castellani, as Novelli would attract a much more specific voter profile.

> *"Well, it's a political process that, let's say, rests on the intuition that making it to the second round was more important than, say, gather many votes at the first round […], meaning that the candidate who wins is the one with positions that are closer to those that are farther to him, and the loser is him who has positions that are farther to those who are closer to him […]."*
> (Interview 8)

Less than two months before the election, then, *Alleanza per Torino*'s ticket was finally defined, in terms of its composition, namely a heterogeneous combination of liberal-progressive forces; in terms of programmes, consisting of a development agenda focused on several reconstruction projects, chief of which was the Master Plan's approval; and in terms of its electoral strategy, that was aimed at taking Castellani to the ballot round, hoping that everyone who opposed Novelli would have eventually backed him.

In conclusion, such a critical juncture featured a series of events that would set in motion a process through which alliances were redefined, new political formulas were devised, and the overall political framework would be significantly redrawn. This would, crucially, occur due to the opening of various 'windows of opportunities' that, in a phase of great uncertainty, have allowed for agency and choice to be determinant in producing the outcome – as of now, the mere formation of liberal-progressive electoral alliance. Going briefly over the process helps highlight the various events that have led to the creation of *Alleanza per Torino*. First, the fall of Communism between 1989 and 1991 had triggered the re-foundation of the Communist party as PDS, a reformist left-wing party; the approval of the Master Plan's preliminary project had provided the PDS with an opportunity to give policy content to its own evolution. Zanone's resignation from the mayoral position would then trigger a chain of events that, and open a series of opportunities, that would be pivotal: first, it brought about a government crisis that would last for the whole of 1992; second, it left the liberal components of the local entrepreneurial and business class without a political reference point, which would lead Salza's group to launch a public reflection over a possible agenda for the city. These meetings would provide a major opportunity for political and civil society actors to discuss over Turin and, crucially, for networking. Within formal political arenas, on the other hand, the local government crisis had triggered a phase of 'search', in which various political formations sought to find a novel political formula that could ensure the municipality's survival; as the project of creating a 'super-government' comprising DC, PSI, and PDS failed, the chance of prolonging the executive's life by recurring to an exclusively political solution that relied on traditional post-war parties greatly decreased. Rather, the failure to form a super-government would certify the end of this short-lived five party mandate, and the calling of new elections by June 1993: this would open a novel window of opportunity for local actors – political and non-political – to engage in a further phase of search of alternative political alliances. In the meanwhile, since February 1992, the *Tangentopoli* corruption scandal would swiftly undermine the credibility and reputation of traditional post-war political parties, producing two intertwined effects: on the one hand, novel political formations such as La Rete and the Northern League, which had been born in those very years, and that were not involved in the scandal, would capitalize on the demise of traditional parties, building their consensus on a violent attack against corruption and administrative inefficiency; on the other hand, *Tangentopoli* would favour the construction of civil society movements and their direct involvement in politics. As, in Turin, there was a major component of the local society who would not identify with the positions expressed by either the League or *La Rete*, they would cooperate with the other party that had not

been involved in *Tangentopoli*, that is, the PDS, and conceived of a liberal-progressive electoral alliance. Finally, as the electoral reform was approved – the reform, importantly, would intervene at the level of the overarching opportunity structure for actors, changing it altogether – in late March 1993, this would allow the alliance to take shape: a civic list, *Alleanza per Torino*, was created; a candidate, Valentino Castellani, was identified; and a specific electoral strategy would be defined.

Figure 2. Critical Juncture – key process shifts.



II.II Causal mechanisms

During the three-year period that defined Turin's critical juncture, various mechanisms would be involved in de-structuring the previous institutional framework, thus creating a phase of uncertainty and search where agency and choice did matter, in that they were crucial in taking advantage of the window of opportunity that had opened. The first mechanism that was triggered, then, was one of de-institutionalization, whereby old schemes, institutions, and rules would be de-structured. De-institutionalization, in Turin's case, would concern three elements. First, the fall of Communism led to a de-institutionalization, through dissolution, of the Italian Communist Party. We can talk about de-institutionalization, in this case, because not only the traditional ideological and programmatic underpinnings of the Party were abandoned, but also because the new party, the PDS, would be somewhat freer to re-position itself on the political spectrum, allowing for new political formulas to be, at least potentially, taken into consideration.

A second instance of de-institutionalization would instead concern the whole party system, effectively dismantled by the Tangentopoli corruption scandal. This not only meant that the major post-war parties would be massively weakened, in a first moment, and then effectively dissolved; it meant that the political sphere was now up for grabs, making it possible for new political formations to emerge, new programmes to be discussed and new alliances formed. In essence, old political schemes and constraints were no longer binding, and, for some time, there was, indeed, uncertainty as to what could have happened: in this sense, as some interviews have shown, this led actors to think that a new politics could emerge.

Finally, there has been de-institutionalisation also at the level of the local political system. Zanone's departure would cause the municipality to precipitate in a political crisis that could not be solved by recurring to old political formulas. This, in part, explains the failure of the PDS' first attempt to form a coalition with parties that represented the old system – the Christian Democrats and the Socialists – which, furthermore, were heavily involved in *Tangentopoli*. Also, this explains why, as no solution to the crisis was found, the central government would send a delegate Commissar. At this point it would be clear that attempts to revive old political schemes were not adequate to the context: the old institutional framework had been torn down. It should be no surprise, then, the political formations that appeared to take advantage of the uncertainty deriving from comprehensive system de-structuration were new ones, like the Northern League and *La Rete*, which were not involved in the corruption scandal. The same holds for PDS, which was, in a peculiar sense, a novel political formation, and one that had not been stained by *Tangentopoli*: this is what ensured its political viability. To defeat both the League and *La Rete*, however, the local PDS needed to find an appropriate political formula**.**

By de-structuring the established political framework, moreover, the critical juncture would create the conditions for the opening of a series of 'windows of opportunity' that would make it possible for relevant

local actors, both political and non-political, to 'search' for new alternatives in terms of political alliances, political programmes, and positioning along the political spectrum. De-structuring and the opening of windows of opportunity, in other words, would facilitate the search for novel political formulas. By window of opportunity, however, one should not imagine a generally undefined situation where anything could have happened: it is more appropriate to think in terms of a series of successive opportunities that a) result from previous circumstances or contexts, and b) are the further result of specific choices, which have the effect of selecting one alternative and closing off another one. At the end of the previous section, I have highlighted how the opening of various windows of opportunity was typically followed by choices that would impinge on subsequent evolutions, not only by selecting specific patterns but, crucially, also by reducing the likelihood that alternative choices would be made in a subsequent moment.

In line with the concept of critical juncture, furthermore, is that the uncertainty deriving from the de-structuring of the system and the loosening of institutional constraints, and the series of windows of opportunity that are opened, set in motion a phase of search in which relevant actors, both political and non-political, start considering possibilities that had until then been precluded to them. During this phase, in which, indeed, alternative political formulas are conceived of, agency and choice have a major role to play as to the eventual selection of given outcomes; against this scenario, political entrepreneurship has a fundamental role to play. The two most relevant 'political entrepreneurs' are, in this context, PDS' party leadership, chiefly represented by local Secretary Sergio Chiamparino and Municipal party whip Domenico Carpanini, and Enrico Salza.

As to the former, it is worth noting that the PDS' local leadership would exploit every opportunity that would be opened during this phase and contemplates a variety of possibilities before settling on the alliance with the liberal business class. First, as the Master Plan was approved, the PDS was quick to endorse it, to emphasise its shift towards the backing of a development agenda, and to be identified as a viable coalition partner by the municipality's majority. Then, after Zanone resigned, by attempting to form a 'super-government' which would have led to the definition of an alternative political formula, the PDS leadership would try to carve for the party a more central role within the local administrative arena. At the same time, however, by keeping contacts with the liberal entrepreneurial class and attending the meetings held *in Torino Incontra*, they would keep this door open, which, when the time came, would constitute a crucial opportunity for the party to build a brand-new type of electoral alliance, one involving both political and non-political elements.

It is worth noting that, in backing the Master Plan and in maintaining contacts with the Salza group, Chiamparino and Carpanini's actions proved rather consistent with their ideational positions and their behaviour of the previous decade, when they were still members of the Communist party. They were part of the group of innovators who would conceive of new policy ideas and a new way of interacting with capital; they would also engage in a process of network building with entrepreneurs and other elements of the local

civil society, both through proper industrial negotiations and by joining the reflection over the city that had intensified in the second half of the 1980s.

> *"So, underpinning the Castellani experiment is a convergence of…of things that had emerged before, communities of intellectuals, economic interests, the will to part from the past…"*
> (Interview 4)

The contacts that had been established during the previous phase, then, would strengthen trustworthiness between left-wing political actors and local business players, and would amount to a crucial resource the PDS leadership could then rely on, when the opportunity came to start negotiating over the possibility of an electoral alliance between these two groups. Backing a development oriented political agenda and negotiating with liberal figures was thus in line with positions that had developed for some time, already within the former Communist party. On the other hand, these positions would endanger the leadership within its own party, the PDS, where traditional radical stances had not disappeared.

This would be most evident after the Commune's government was suspended and electoral talks would enter their most lively phase, just a few months before the 1993 municipal elections. Although the choice to ally with Salza's group might be seen, in retrospect, as consistent with the idea of the PDS as a reformist left-wing party, as well as with the line backed by several Communist members in the previous years, within the party many would not fully back the move, to say the least: it was, effectively, a huge gamble.

> *"So, surely in the story that led to the formation of the Castellani coalition there's an innovation…that is seized by Sergio Chiamparino who, back then, is risking a lot politically, exposing his party to a rather liberal option that was represented by Salza."*
> (Interview 8)

The 'risk' was on two fronts: on the one hand, Chiamparino was risking to bringing about a rupture within his own party. This would not happen, mainly for two reasons. A first motive has to do with the authority and prestige of the leadership (Interview 4), and with the fact that leaders' decisions would be binding within the party (Interview 4), so Chiamparino's line would prevail.

> *"So […] within the Communist party[171], the majority to pursue this project was an élite and minimal majority, supported by considerations, let's say, of personal prestige and authority,*

[171] Actually, it was the PDS already – the Communist party had ceased existing in 1991.

connected to Chiamparino, to some like us, to Giorgio Ardito, to a group of intellectuals…those I mentioned before: Bagnasco, Rusconi, etc., etc. […]. So, the reason that brought together […] the Communist Party – I call it that because that's what it essentially was back then – part of the executive group came to a harsh clash and, since in the party, the secretary…you either removed him, or he would decide…well, he won!"

(Interview 4)

A second reason, as we mentioned in the previous section, is the argument against Novelli (Interview 9), which was deployed by the Secretary and his supporters to keep the party together: indeed, Novelli's positions were not in line with the evolution of the PDS from a communist to a reformist party, and, furthermore, his choice to side with neither PDS, nor *Rifondazione Comunista* had not been appreciated by several party members. Backing Novelli would have meant, the argument went on, renouncing PDS' ideal commitments[172].

The risk, however, also concerned the party's fortunes as a whole, at least in Turin, as well as Chiamparino's own political career. Before the ballot round, many still expected Novelli to win: had this happened, this would have meant the end of the PDS' experience in the city (Interview 11). After the first round, further, as the PDS had collected 9.55 % of the vote share[173] (the PDS as an individual party, not the whole coalition), many wanted to sack the secretary (Interview 15; Interview 9), including national secretary Occhetto (interview 15), and Chiamparino himself was ready to resign (Interview 9).

Turning to Enrico Salza, he too had a fundamental role to play in the creation of the electoral alliance. Although not a professional politician, his moves definitely contributed to paving the way towards the deal struck with the PDS. First, his decision to host meetings on the city's future at *Torino Incontra* not only served as means to strengthen relationships but made explicit the positions of a portion of the civil society that had been for too long unsatisfied with the local political context; by the same token, it marked the interest and commitment of a civil society that wished to somehow take the initiative and concretely contribute to the definition of the priorities for the city. The worsening of the *Tangentopoli* scandal at the beginning of 1993 would then open a major opportunity for civil society to step in: as parties' credibility was being more and more undermined, the call launched by the 'group of 70' on local newspapers amounted to something like a challenge to traditional political formations. The group had a programme and demonstrated a genuine interest for the community's prospects, while the signatures of seventy prominent local figures stressed the cross-cutting character of the project.

[172] See previous section, pp. 159-160.
[173] (Comune di Torino, 2020).

"Other social formations are growing, but they need means to achieve their ends and it's evident, from this perspective, that these groups are pushing for the Master Plan's approval, although these élites are aware that they can't make it on their own and they must necessarily rely on a popular force. They find, in the Democratic Party of the Left, the popular force to rely on."
(Interview 8)

As the interview highlights, Salza's group knew that the movement they had put together could not count on its own forces but, to obtain power, they needed the political resources, in terms of popular consensus and organization, that only a political organization could provide. Seen from this perspective, the group of 70's plea amounted to a strategic move for, against a background of decreasing satisfaction with traditional parties, siding with Salza's entourage would have been a convenient move for the PDS' leadership. Of course, this does not diminish the audacity (Interview 15; Interview 8) of Chiamparino's move, considering what it meant for intra-party equilibria, as we just showed: Salza, for sure, would not run the same risks that Chiamparino would be exposed to. In sum, however, the actions and choices of these two political entrepreneurs were decisive in leading to the creation of *Alleanza per Torino* which, as mentioned in the previous section, would constitute the bulk of the governance coalition that would then form in Turin.

Another crucial factor in the construction of the electoral alliance has instead to do with discourse, as treated by discursive institutionalists (Schmidt, 2006; 2008). The process of constituting the alliance and of selecting the mayoral candidate would obviously require a process of negotiation and discussion between the parts. This negotiation, in turn, has been carried out by recurring to the sorts of arguments that fall under the category of coordinative discourse. In Schmidt's elaboration of how discourse is used pro-actively to promote a given policy or strategy (Schmidt, 2008d), she distinguishes between coordinative and communicative discourse: the former refers to the type of discourse that is used among policy actors, while the latter is that which policy actors deploy when interacting with the public. In theory, the idea is that coordinative discourse, as it involves policy experts, is more technical and focused on policy details, while the communicative one, which serves to gain consensus, may deploy rhetorical devices that invoke values or worldviews, and is thus less technical and more symbolic (Schmidt, 2008). In the case of Turin, coordinative discourse has concerned two themes. The former theme, as we have seen already, would concern the programme: the discussions and debates held within and around the Chamber of Commerce environment, which have gathered policy makers, as well as civil society elements[174], has chiefly focused on the contents of a possible government agenda. The overarching topic would be that of development and modernization, whereas more detailed themes would concern specific projects, such as the metro and the Master Plan.

[174] Comprising intellectuals, professionals, labour union representatives and the elements of the third sector.

"It was a nice phase, of real political discussion, something which doesn't occur today anymore […]. I mean, real political discussion, conducted by people who had […] ideas…connecting programmes and people…I mean, we were engaging in reasonings that were, perhaps, even excessively…overly contemplating strategic scenarios […]."
(Interview 9)

Importantly, this first type of coordinative discourse would, for the most part, focus on ideas and plans that had spread in the previous years, which, indeed, had featured intellectual debates already in the past decade: the master plan is a project that starts being discussed and planned in 1986, and the same roughly holds for the metro. Thus, from this perspective, as the PDS local leadership had operated its 'programmatic turn', endorsing these two projects and the overarching development vision, reaching a consensus would be relatively easy (interview 9; Interview 4). The meetings held in *Torino Incontra* throughout 1992 would not, however, solely feature the presence of political actors and business world, but also intellectuals, third sector associations and labour unions; the themes, however, would remain the same: development and modernisation, with a focus on specific projects.

"Concerning how we got to Castellani…we actually organized a totally informal table that was joined by some politicians, some academics from both university and polytechnic, some civil society figures, among whom myself – all participating as private individuals. Essentially, we established we needed to deal with the issue of development […] in this territory. The city needed modernising, overcoming things that the Unions…had basically opposed in the previous years, such as the subway […]. I mean, modernisation was the main theme, clearly along the reconversion of the territory."
(Interview 16)

The theme of development was, in sum, the underlying element that would glue the alliance together. A second theme on which the coordinative discourse would focus would, instead, relate to the mayoral candidate, and this was much less technical. Here, once the agreement between the business world and the PDS was reached, the PDS leadership would have to convince its own party members to accept the choice; as mentioned in the previous section (interview 9), the main argument that was invoked to convince the remainder of the party directorate, was that the reformist PDS could not afford to side with Novelli, who had not joined the party and whose vision was anchored to a past, some say conservative, vision of development.

As to communicative discourse, which is aimed at gathering the populace's consensus (Schmidt, 2008), this would deploy two strategies. First, to select the candidate, the citizenry was directly involved, through the mechanism of the 'eight wise men', whose role was to engage the public in a reasoning over a

viable mayoral candidate, and then to 'select' him[175] (Interview 9). As mentioned in the previous section, this amounted to a strategy deployed by the PDS' secretariat to 'legitimize' the mayoral candidate to the eyes of the public, by getting the latter involved in a decision that had, actually, already been made (Interview 9). Once the candidate was chosen, the actual electoral campaign would start and, in this case, communicative discourse would emphasise the urgence to start a novel path of development, and a big part of the discourse's content would truly highlight how the Castellani ticket represented 'novelty'. As opposed to coordinative discourse, communicative discourse can often be intentionally vague or unspecific, aiming instead to touch the right 'chords', through an appeal to symbols or catchphrases: novelty and hope would then amount to such keywords, while the detail with which specific topics would be treated would change according to the topics themselves.

> *"We knowingly built, with all ambiguities, a brand that aimed at winning the ballot, because it was a brand of hope, knowing that the other side pushed for a return to the past; and this city couldn't stand the return to the past […]. [The element of novelty], which was in part vague…in part concrete, in part vague…with respect to some sections [of the programme], above all the Master Plan, because in that case it was super concrete, it said: 'you will have, before the end of our mandate, a Master Plan;' other things were less clear: 'we'll do some cleansing over squandering'; other things were equally clear, but vague: 'let's try to focus on the knowledge economy, on culture, on university, on education.' Castellani was credible in this respect! Because he was a great academic…great scientific value…"*
> (Interview 4)

In sum, both coordinative and communicative discourse have been deployed to turn the experiment into a success. Importantly, both types of discourse have relied on the contest that was being fought between two alternative views of the city: Novelli's one, which opposed development and further growth, and the PDS', which favoured development and growth strategies. The contest would then be, symbolically, turned into a contest between 'new' and 'old', but it is significant that the core ideas were the same in both coordinative and communicative discourses. For sure, nonetheless, there were some differences between the two. In coordinative discourse, among policy makers, the argument against Novelli focused on the political significance such a move would have had for the party: going with Novelli would have entailed disowning the reformist stance the party had taken. At the communicative level, on the other hand, the same argument emphasised what Novelli could have meant for the *city*, rather than the *party* – of course, the essence was the same: for both city and party Novelli meant a return to the past. A further difference is that

[175] Vattimo G., "In declino i partiti, nascono i movimenti", *La Stampa*, March 27, 1993.

coordinative discourse, with certain actors, such as constructors, would also focus on some details of the programme, such as the implications the Master Plan would have for construction activity; with the citizenry, instead, communicative discourse would indeed mention the programme, but in a more vague and unspecific manner. What was, on the other hand, crucial with respect to communicative discourse, that is, communication with the public, was the mechanism of the 'wise men': having authoritative civil society personalities to select the mayor would help legitimize the choice as one that had not been imposed by the party system, but by the people.

To conclude, we can now try to read the process that has been described under the lenses of the neo-institutionalist theories illustrated in the second chapter. In this case, the mechanism leading to the formation of the electoral alliance between PDS and liberal civil society elements can be best understood from the perspective of sociological institutionalism, as a micro-level process. As illustrated in Chapter 2, then, the mechanism focuses on the interactions between organisations and the relevant ones are, in this case, the PDS political party, and the liberal group of entrepreneurs and business personalities gathered around *Torino Incontra*. The core idea is that, because of resource interdependencies, certain organisations attempt at establishing contacts with other organisations, according to a logic of appropriateness (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007, p. 35-36); interactions between organisations are then constantly repeated in time, and are repeatedly evaluated and reassessed, according to each organisation's frames of reference; through time, fruitful contacts may be strengthened, leading to the emergence of an informal network.

This mechanism, I hold, aptly explains the process that has led to the formation of *Alleanza per Torino*. The two groups – PDS and the liberal group gathered around *Torino Incontra* - had actually started their contacts in the 1980s, when neither organisation existed yet: the former group consisted of the reformist component of the Communist Party, while the second generally consisted of entrepreneurs and business personalities gravitating around the Chamber of Commerce.

> *"[…] we are talking about something that has lasted for a decade, right? I mean, it was roughly a ten, twelve-year long process, because – from the start of the '80s until '93 – so, ten years in which…I mean, it wasn't a brief period, it was ten years in which we had the chance to get to know each other, to sense each other, even to put each other to test […]."*
> (Interview 9)

The interview precisely highlights the gradual character of the process, and the mechanism of constant reassessment and re-evaluation of the other part. The logic of appropriateness, here, had to do with the fact that both groups were unsatisfied with the local political context, and both were willing to discuss themes concerning the city's potential paths for future development. As the meetings in *Torino Incontra* were launched in 1992, the two groups could then rely on the trustworthiness they had built in the previous years;

again, both realised they shared a similar strategic vision for the city, one that, this time, was actually articulated along specific lines of action and projects (the 18 ideas for Turin). The logic of appropriateness was then further deployed at the very moment the deal was struck, that is, in a situation in which *Tangentopoli* was severely undermining parties' credibility: in such circumstances, just a few months before the vote, partnering with a civil society force could have been a particularly 'appropriate' move, considering how the agonising Italian political system was, back then, the target of virulent critiques, which had in turn brought about a wave of disaffection on the part of public opinion with respect to political parties. Finally, also the theme of resource interdependencies, as we saw earlier, has been crucial here: the liberal civil society group knew they needed the political resources that only a party could provide – consensus and organisational structure; the party, on the other hand, knew that the civil society group amounted to a portion of the local society endowed with major financial power.

Finally, drawing on Bevir and Rhodes (2007) social constructivist interpretation of governance formation, a further process can be highlighted, which contributed to the emergence of *Alleanza per Torino*. Bevir and Rhodes view governance formation as chiefly depending on the role of agency, beliefs, traditions, and ideas; the basic assumption for their proposal is that "any existing pattern of rule will have some failings[176]" (Bevir and Rhodes, 2007, p. 80). Because of these 'governance' failures, individuals will think of, and recommend alternative governance arrangements, which will lead to a 'contest of meanings' (*ibid*.). The root of governance change, or governance emergence, the argument concludes, therefore consists of the "contingent responses of individuals to dilemmas" (*idem*, p. 82). In the case of Turin, there would, indeed, be a contest of meanings during the electoral campaign, especially before the ballot round, between the position represented by Novelli, and that embodied by Castellani.

> *"Within the city and within what was left of the PCI, a clear cleavage was opened…between those who supported novelty, keeping track of transformations, and those turning to the old ways […] well, in this respect, secretary Chiamparino was definitely for novelty."*
> (Interview 14)

As the interview shows, this would be a contest of meanings all internal to the left-wing culture, between a reformist proposal, represented by PDS' leadership, and a more traditional left-wing one, represented by Novelli and *La Rete*. But such a contest of meanings would not merely oppose two different political formations of the left: even within the same party, the PDS, there would be frictions between those who supported, first, the programmatic turn and then Castellani's choice, and those who favoured a more traditional proposal. Only Castellani's electoral victory would put an end to such a contest.

[176] A similar point was made by Ferrera (forthcoming), when talking about the mechanisms of ideational change.

II.III Causal significance

During the critical juncture, the two dimensions that had, in the previous phase, prevented change, undergo a process of transformation. These dimensions are those of structure (party and administrative structure of local government) and that of the national political culture. Such transformations allow for the ideas and discourses that had developed in the previous decade to orient the actions and behaviours of key players and organisations, in a phase in which institutional constraints are loosened. The events set in motion during the critical juncture, therefore, seem to confirm the overarching hypothesis of this inquiry, that is, that change is easier to achieve when it occurs at all three levels of analysis: structural, ideational, discursive. The latter to levels had already undergone change in the previous decade, but their transformative potential had been limited by the legal-administrative framework of local government (structural level) and by the prevailing national political culture (ideational level): taken together, these two factors would undermine the stability of local government majorities and limit the possibilities for the formation of novel coalitions. Ideational innovation, in other words, would take place within a pre-defined political context (Interview 5), greatly limiting the opportunities for overarching modifications of the system.

During the critical juncture, these constraints loosen, as both structure and ideas change; crucially, developments at both levels are intertwined. The end of Communism is a huge global event, a momentous structural change whose repercussions would be felt at many levels: in Italy, it led, among other things, to the dissolution of the Italian Communist Part, and its re-foundation as the Democratic Party of the Left, a social democratic political formation. The structural change concerning the party's refoundation also be reflected at the level of party ideas, beliefs, and interests: these allowed the party to endorse a pro-growth political agenda, and to make itself available for alliances with political formations that had until then been seen as adversaries.

Tangentopoli is the second factor that heavily impacts on both structure and ideas, redefining the playing field for relevant actors. The corruption scandal directly affects political parties, as several of their members are convicted; it further affects structure in that it is swiftly followed by the 1993 referendum which modifies the national electoral system, and it accelerates the introduction of the 1993 reform of local government (Vandelli, 1997). At the level of ideas, political corruption greatly reduces popular support for traditional political forces, while consensus gathers around novel political formations (*La Rete* and the Northern League); such negative view of traditional political parties, furthermore, favours the entry of civil society elements into the political arena. The final major structural change consists of the 1993 reform of local government which, if on the one hand has been favoured by *Tangentopoli* (effect of causes), on the other sets in motion further transformation dynamics; not all of these can be observed during the critical juncture, as many take some time to unfold and occur in the subsequent phases of the process. Until 1993,

nonetheless, the reform of local government is key in ultimately facilitating the alliance between the Democratic Party of the Left and the civil society elements gathered around *Alleanza per Torino*, as well as in favouring Castellani's choice to run for mayor. Apart from Zanone's departure, which is an endogenous, circumstantial event, most of the windows of opportunities of this phase are opened by these three major events: the fall of communism and the Italian Communist party refoundation as the Democratic Party of the Left; the *Tangentopoli* corruption scandal; the 1993 reform of local government. These three events (indeed, coupled with Zanone's departure) allow for a change at the level of structure and ideas that permits wider transformations to take place.

As to the specific hypotheses I elaborated in Chapter 3, those that apply to this phase are principally H5, H6, and H7, namely: H5 - the more contacts have been cultivated between political actors and civil society, the more likely it is for a governance coalition to emerge; H6 – the presence of political entrepreneurs increases the likelihood that a governance coalition will emerge; H7 - The definition of a shared agenda (compounded by the introduction of strategic programming or consultation tools – i.e., strategic plans or participatory arenas, respectively) increases the likelihood for a governance coalition to emerge.

H5 concerns contacts between political and non-political actors which, if present, may be conducive to governance emergence. The hypothesis cannot yet be fully verified, as proper governance has not yet emerged. There are, however, several elements that, during the critical juncture, appear to sustain such a hypothesis, or at least, for now, they do not disconfirm it. Indeed, the city-wide debate that was held in the previous decade had surely helped to create and strengthen relationships between political and non-political actors (Interview 9); as Salza's group begun holding meetings and events in *Torino Incontra*, those who participated to these meetings (among whom several PDS members) could build on a history of previous relationships, facilitating interaction and dialogue between business elements and political actors. Further, the electoral alliance between these two groups, which would fully materialise a few months before the 1993 municipal elections, was not yet governance, but would constitute the core around which Turin's governance would be built. In chapter 3, I had qualified this hypothesis as a hoop test: interaction between political and non-political groups does not necessarily lead to governance, but without some interaction, governance does not emerge. Frankly, it is hard to see how governance can emerge without some prior interaction between the very groups that make up governance; the hypothesis therefore remains a hoop test, and it is, although not validated yet, not disconfirmed.

H6, concerning political entrepreneurship, draws on the literature (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003; Mollenkopf, 1983), as mentioned in chapter 3. In the case of Turin, the role of political entrepreneurs has been essential in leading to the constitution of the electoral alliance that brought Castellani to victory. Enrico Salza and Sergio Chiamparino belonged to two worlds which, until that moment had never cooperated at the political level, although contacts and interactions between the two had existed since the previous decade. Chiamparino's role was crucial in convincing the PDS' local leadership of the convenience of an alliance with

Salza's liberal group, and his commitment to a vision of development was probably the chief factor that determined the party's positioning on a moderate reformist stance; this is because, although within the party he was not the only one backing such a move, but his official position as local secretary was determinant. Salza, on the other hand, was decisive in pushing for civil society's entry into the political game: the *Torino Incontra* meetings were held under his initiative, which signalled the commitment of the liberal sectors of the local business community to public urban issues. These meetings, as well as the negotiations with the local PDS leadership concerning the formation of the electoral alliance, would then serve to strengthen mutual trust between the two groups. The electoral alliance that was eventually formed, in sum, owes a lot to the actions of these two individuals, who had to overcome the resistance within their own groups (indeed, one part of the left still sided with Novelli, whereas a portion of the liberal faction supported Zanetti's popular ticket), in the pursuit a bold political strategy – Chiamparino risked a lot politically, while Salza was among the first liberals to collaborate with the former communists (Interview 4). Looking at the Turin case, therefore, the role of political entrepreneurship appears to be quite essential for the formation of political coalitions: the hypothesis is therefore validated, and it amounts to a hoop test.

Finally, H7, which stresses that a shared agenda facilitates governance emergence. Again, events unfolding during the critical juncture seem to corroborate this hypothesis. First, the PDS' local secretariat, with its choice to back the New Master Plan and the subway, has become a viable potential partner for those groups supporting master plan and subway, among whom Salza's. Second, *Torino Incontra*, the Chamber of Commerce's congress centre, where events and meetings were held to discuss Turin's future, definitely acted as a participatory arena: here, people coming from various environments would meet to discuss the very contents of the city's future political agenda. In sum, the PDS' choice to pursue a development agenda was the first factor that would get the two groups on the same programmatic line; meetings in *Torino Incontra* would then be crucial, as discussion over policy entered here in more detail, and participants had a chance to repeat and further cultivate their relationships and networks. The hypothesis appears to be validated; further, its standing as a hoop test would appear to be confirmed: had the PDS not backed the Master Plan – which is what Novelli did – it seems unlikely that it could have cooperated with a pro-growth civil society sector that firmly supported it.

Chapter 6. 1993-2000: Re-institutionalisation – from the 1993 elections to the Strategic Plan

I. The Moment of Truth

The third phase of the process under scrutiny is the 'moment of truth'. After the uncertainty that had characterized the critical juncture, where various institutional options had been available, this is the moment in which one of these options is selected, and a given institutional pattern comes to define the subsequent period. What is central to the concepts of critical juncture and of path dependency is that the mode in which a given pattern is chosen will influence its subsequent development: the initial moments, and context, within which the choice is made are therefore fundamental to understand why a certain institution evolves in a specific manner. It is important, then, to pause for a moment over such initial conditions. In the previous chapter, we have already seen how, right before the June 1993 municipal elections, the various lists and their respective candidates positioned themselves, and which choices have led to define the contours of the final 'contest of meanings' (Bevir and Rhodes, 2007). I will now review these very briefly.

In 1991, the fall of Communism would trigger the refoundation of the Italian Communist Party as PDS, a reformist social democratic party; at the start of the following year, in Turin, mayor Zanone's departure from city hall would lead to a local government crisis that would undermine the five-party coalition's grip on power. After the PDS local leadership operated a programmatic turn, at the start of 1992, the party would initiate a phase of 'search', in which the viability of new political alliances was tested. The failure to settle on a mayoral candidate's name and the outburst of the *Tangentopoli* corruption scandal closed the door to a cooperation between PDS, Christian Democracy and Socialist party; furthermore, the PDS leadership's choice to endorse a development agenda had meant the option of running with Novelli was off the table. In the meanwhile, during 1992, liberal elements of the local business and entrepreneurial classes, now without a political reference due to Zanone's departure, launched a phase of discussion over a possible development agenda for the city, which would be joined by local intellectuals, politicians, and union representatives; by the end of 1992, then, local government fell. This would lead to early elections to be held in June 1993, speeding up the search phase to build a candidacy: at this point, PDS and part of the local business class, both supporting a development agenda, negotiate the possibility of forging an alliance to run for city hall. The approval, at the outset of 1993, of the local government reform would accelerate the process, leading to the creation of the list *Alleanza per Torino*, supporting Valentino Castellani's mayoral bid. At this stage, just prior to the election, the positioning of competitors is defined: the Northern League represents, in its right wing variant, a call for political renovation underpinned by a critique of the old system's political corruption;

Novelli's *La Rete* is the expression of a ticket that is aligned with the radical left tradition of the previous decades; *Alleanza per Torino*, finally, represents a new centre-left reformist movement, one that spouses development, supports collaboration with business élites, and wishes to break away with from more orthodox left-wing positions.

The creation of *Alleanza per Torino* has, furthermore, produced a division in all local political families, except for the Norther League's: within the Left, those who oppose the endorsement of the development agenda side with Novelli; within the liberal and moderate families, those unconvinced by *Alleanza per Torino*'s proposal will remain with a traditional popular candidacy comprising the remnants of the Christian Democratic and Liberal parties. After the first electoral round, Novelli is first, but does not have enough votes to secure city hall right away, meaning there will be a ballot round with *Alleanza per Torino*, which reached second place. The final contest between these two forces has two implications: first, by a handful of votes, the Northern League is out of the race; second, the ballot leads to a process of 'band-wagoning', whereby all groups who would not initially side with Novelli, would join Castellani's *Alleanza per Torino* at the second round. Eventually, *Alleanza per Torino* would emerge victorious, certifying the prevailing of a development vision over what had been heralded as a 'return to the past'. Two elements, I believe, require attention in this case, as they define the nature of such turning point. First, the premises upon which Castellani's coalition had been built, which amount to an indicator of the subsequent evolutionary trajectory of Turin's governance; and second, the role the electoral reform had in, first, securing *Alleanza per Torino*'s victory and, second, in helping Castellani construct a local administrative machine that would be consistent with its government programme.

The weakening of FIAT, and the consequent changed nature of the relationship it had with the city, had led, in the years between 1985 and 1993, to a heightened civil engagement of certain portions of the local business and entrepreneurial élites, keen on taking advantage of the reconstruction opportunities offered by deindustrialization. Furthermore, the decreased weight of industrial production in the city had made it clear that future development could not be underpinned by manufacturing only, as it had been until the 1970s. That the city needed to reinvent itself and embark on a new, yet not fully defined, development path was also felt by other local actors: elements of the labour Unions, local intellectuals and professionals, part of the third sector and the world of associations; part of the city's Communist party would, finally, converge on similar positions. This is, in essence, the nature of the coalition that would comprise elements coming from civil society alongside political actors: on the civil society side, the business-entrepreneurial group is joined by intellectual, labour and third sector elements that have acknowledged the city has entered a novel phase of its history; on the political side, the reformist left, now PDS, is joined by splinter elements coming from progressive liberal positions who oppose both Novelli and the Northern League.

The coalition's programme, then, would support a development strategy that will be grounded on the physical reconstruction of the city, on the one hand, and on the attempt to diversify its economic base.

Apart from the programmatic points, however, these groups also found common ground in their critique of the inadequacy of the old political system, whose ineffectiveness had resulted in its incapacity to exploit the reconstruction opportunities that had already been opened in the previous years by the proliferation of brownfields. The *Tangentopoli* scandal, then, by dismantling the old political system, would make room for civil society to intervene in the political process; to do so effectively, however, civil society would need the consensus resources that only a political entity could provide, and it would find them in the Democratic Party of the Left.

> *"On the other hand, there was some agitation at the level of civil society, generated by the very creation of PDS, the end of the USSR and the Eastern bloc…what can be said, as far as Turin was concerned […], I mean, there surely was an interest, within the forces we could now define as liberal, left-wing liberal, but essentially liberal, also in a wider sense…which wouldn't identify with the League, which was beginning to structure back then…and at the same time, they were in part wary of the PDS, due to its nature of former communist party…this concerns Turin…in those years, the PDS management, which I was a member of, did a great job, trying to build a relationship with this, let's say, neo-liberal area, representing major forces of the local power constellation. This would then lead to the creation of an independent political force called Alleanza per Torino, compounded by the selection of Castellani as mayoral candidate for the 1993 elections."*
>
> (Interview 11)

The coalition that is formed through the encounter of these two elements, *Alleanza per Torino*, is then a direct expression of civil society's commitment to play a role in the definition of the city's goals, and in the running of the local political machine. This coalition, in other words, is a true representation of one part of the local society which, through its involvement in local government, could have an input to the political process. The transformations that occurred during the critical juncture, by de-structuring the old system, sustained the hope that a new politics could emerge: this would be a politics where concrete programs, rather than ideologies, should take centre stage; one that was not distant from society and that was not self-referentially reproducing itself; finally, a politics that had gotten rid of perverse dynamics that, in time, have made clientelism and corruption endemic. *Alleanza per Torino*, and the coalition that supported it, presented themselves as an expression of all these ambitions.

The coalition's victory would, then, mark the selection of a given institutional path over others; the way this choice will determine a path-dependent evolution of Turin's governance will be the focus of the next chapter. For now, it is important to emphasize that, as the concept of critical juncture provides for, Castellani's victory meant that, by rejecting the other two alternatives, Novelli and the Northern League,

their chances to subsequently influence Turin's policies would be foreclosed for good. At the subsequent municipal election, the right-wing political space would be occupied by a coalition led by Berlusconi's Forza Italia[177], while the Northern League, which chose to run alone, would get a 6.4 % vote share[178]. As to Novelli and *La Rete*, they would not run in 1997*; Rifondazione Comunista*, on the other hand, would: yet, after the first round, it would join Castellani's coalition, within which the major political subject was still the PDS. This is to say that, if any of the two political formations, either the *League* or the radical left grouping comprising Rete and *Rifondazione Comunista,* ever had any significant chance of being the major political force governing the city, this was in 1993. Both parties had good results at the first round: the League failed to make the ballot round by less than 1 percentage point; Novelli obtained 36.01 % vote share at the first round. In no subsequent election would a radical right, populist proposal be so close to governing the city; similarly, Novelli's defeat would mark the end of an alternative vision for the city: one aimed at defending manufacturing production and employment, which also envisaged a non-growing, shrinking future for Turin, was off the table. Novelli's first round exploit, according to some, was then mainly due to his personal political history, one of integrity and commitment that was highly respected by the local populace.

> *"Furthermore, this I know for certain because I was told by many…at the first round, Novelli was voted…how can I put it…out of personal respect: that is, many had voted Novelli because Novelli's history, among other things, was that of a very […] honest person, undeniable, and so on, and many had voted for him at the first round…out of personal recognition essentially; nevertheless, when, at the ballot round, [his] would shape up to be a very extreme political solution…many changed their minds…"*
> (Interview 3)

Novelli's view of the city's future, according to several interviews, would have resulted in his defeat in any case: in other words, had the Northern League made it to the ballot round, many believe it would have won. Of course, there can be no proof of this, but the message is clear: a return to the past was not welcome by the local populace and Novelli represented a world that had been buried by the fall of Communism.

> *"So, we made a very pragmatic reasoning, that was, 'we need to find a candidate and run a campaign that places our candidate second', because the risk was that the League could make second; [this resting] on the conviction that Novelli has already lost if he gets to the ballot round, and this is what happened […]. And indeed, Castellani made it because he made second, but the*

[177] At the 1997 municipal elections, the Forza Italia-led centre-right coalition would fail to secure city hall, again, by a handful of votes.
[178] http://www.comune.torino.it/consiglio/storia/tornata12.htm

true worry was that the Northern League would win [the first round], because at that stage, the Norther League would have won, not Novelli; Novelli had lost already! This was certain!"
(Interview 4)

The 1993 election is, therefore, a turning point: on the one hand, the old left-wing political proposal would be discarded for good; on the other, the rising Northern League would miss a chance to strengthen, perhaps, its base and position in Turin, and would, from that moment on, remain a minor[179] political force in the city. This outcome was favoured, it must be noted, in great part because of the approval of the new local government's reform, which introduced the direct mayoral election based on the majoritarian principle, which also established a second electoral round in case no candidate would reach 50 % of the vote.

Such an electoral system intervened in the contest in essentially three ways. First, it opened an opportunity for the alliance between PDS and liberals to have a concrete chance of winning: knowing that Novelli still enjoyed a wide popular consensus, the coalition knew that only through a ballot round would their political proposal have some chances. Further, it convinced Castellani to run for office, as it ensured the new mayor could have freely selected his executive team, which, thanks to the majority bonus system, could be supported by a wide council majority.

"[…] Let's say the thing unfolds vortically, in a short time…Castellani, that is, Chiamparino's choice – Chiamparino who didn't obviously want Novelli – Novelli is forced, as he's not backed by his former party, he has to join La Rete, I mean, it's not a minor thing…in the meanwhile, the League is making progress, the popular front goes on its own…and so there's a mess, but there's the new electoral law and we understand we can gamble…"
(Interview 15)

Second, it led the *Alleanza per Torino* coalition to devise an *ad hoc* electoral strategy, elaborated with the new law in mind: the aim was to put the list in second position. Finally, the ballot round would foster a process of band-wagoning: most of the parties that had run on their own at the first round, would now join Castellani's ticket, whereas Novelli's vote share would remain essentially the same as in the first round.

I.I Moment of Truth: Empirical Evidence

A look at electoral results of 1993 is useful to give an idea of the balance of forces that would be competing for the municipality. The presence of two electoral rounds, furthermore, can readily illustrate the

[179] In all subsequent elections, the Northern League would never reach 7 % of votes and would never have more than 3 councillors (http://www.comune.torino.it/consiglio/storia/welcome.htm).

difference between the first round, where electors tend to cast their vote to a candidate that, as much as possible, represents their preferences in full; at the second round, on the other hand, being the choice reduced, electors tend to vote for candidates that are less distant from their own positions. What follows is a recap of the 1993 election, which shows the competing forces and final results.

Table 1: Electoral results (first round): mayoral election

Mayoral candidate	Associated List	Votes	Percentage
Novelli Diego	La Rete; Movimento per la Democrazia; Alleanza Verde per Torino; Rifondazione Comunista; Pensionati.	215.876	36.01
Castellani Valentino	Alleanza per Torino; Verdi (sole che ride); Partito Democratico della Sinistra	121.517	20.27
Comino Domenico	Lega Nord Piemont	116.925	19.50
Zanetti Giovanni	Torino Liberale; Democrazia Cristiana	78.724	13.13
Martinat Ugo	Movimento Sociale Italiano – Destra Nazionale	27.868	4.65
Lupi Maurizio	W Le Donne – Lista delle Donne; Verdi Verdi (orsetto); Lega Vento del Nord – Lega Alpina Lombarda – Pensionati; Pensionati Uniti	11.382	1.90
Marzano Marziano	Unità Socialista per Torino	10.456	1.74
Pioli Claudio	Lega per Torino	10.395	1.73
Zingaro Giseppe Giacomo	Lega Pensionati Insieme	3.717	0.62
Vittucci Righini di Sant'Albino Roberto	Alleanza Nazionale Monarchica	2.702	0.45

Source: http://www.comune.torino.it/consiglio/storia/tornata11.htm

This first table shows the votes obtained, at the first round, by mayoral candidates and their respective lists. From a first look, it appears the competition mainly concerns three candidates: Novelli, Castellani and Northern League candidate Comino; out of the race, but still with a significant share of preferences, is Zanetti, leading the popular centre-left list comprising Christian Democracy and Liberals. At the first round, Novelli's 15 % lead over the second, Castellani, is significant; what Castellani's supporters hope, is that at the ballot round, this figure will not increase, and that the votes obtained by other lists will move towards Castellani, rather than Novelli. What is striking, however, is Castellani's overtaking of Lega by less than a percentage point – in absolute terms, less than 5,000 votes. This data should give an idea of how close Castellani was to being out of the race; had Lega won, moreover, like several interviewees have pointed out, the possibility it would have eventually conquered city hall was concrete. This is, in a sense, the aspect of the whole process where the role of chance has been perhaps most relevant.

> *"It's clear that the winning side has a greater weight in the narrative that typically goes with events, but a researcher should start from the facts […], and the facts are still there, firm and stubborn, telling us a story that we wouldn't have lived without that electoral system. […] For it's undeniable, as to the story, that the left-wing coalition, that led by Diego Novelli…was by far the majority coalition in the city – if I'm not mistaken, but data can be found in any document of the day…Novelli got close to 47[180] %."*
> (Interview 8)

These interviews highlight the element of chance that has characterized these elections: expecting that Novelli would have obtained the widest consensus at the first round, the PDS was actually racing with the Northern League to access the ballot round, and it made it by a very narrow margin. If this data seems to confirm the thesis that chance had a role to play relative to the elections results, it must be pointed out that Castellani's list was weakened by the choice of a part of the liberal progressive world not to join *Alleanza per Torino* and to run with their own list.

> *"[…] for instance, you had this guy Zanetti who chose to run – a great person, left-wing Christian Democrat, supported by a friend of mine […]; so it isn't true that the agreement with Salza had strengthened the entirety of that culture; there was a chunk that was still [doubtful], so the things was extremely risky…because…in retrospect is looks easy, but it wasn't easy [at all]; [some people] for instance would accuse, legitimately, that the agreement was too big a favour to Salza; so, a progressive and catholic component of former DC members said 'no, we […]', they*

[180] As official electoral data show, Novelli actually obtained a 36.01 % vote share at the first round, not 47 %.

went with Zanetti, and would only vote Castellani at the second round. But this would weaken you vis-à-vis the League."

(Interview 4)

Looking at electoral data, again, Zanetti's role in weakening Castellani's list becomes apparent. His is the only other list that obtains more than 10 % of vote share. Had these votes gone immediately to *Alleanza per Torino* – which they eventually did, but only at the second round – Castellani's second place would have, probably, been much more solid. Reality, however, was one where Zanetti would run with a separate list, making the race as tight as it would turn out to be. Downplaying the League's position would, furthermore, be a mistake: individual party results in the concomitant municipal elections confirm the party's strength.

Table 2: Municipal Council – election results[181]

Party	Votes	Percentage	Councillors
Movimento Sociale Italiano - Destra Nazionale	25.468	5.83	1
La Rete - Movimento per la Democrazia	30.846	7.06	3
Alleanza Verde per Torino	15.035	3.44	1
Partito Comunista (Rifondazione Comunista)	63.951	14.64	4
Torino Liberale	11.930	2.73	1
Democrazia Cristiana	54.473	12.47	3
Lega Nord Piemont	102.000	23.35	7
Alleanza per Torino	31.620	7.24	10
Verdi (sole che ride)	18.171	4.16	6
Partito Democratico della Sinistra	41.702	9.55	14

Source: http://www.comune.torino.it/consiglio/storia/tornata11.htm

[181] Only the parties that obtained at least one councillor are reported.

The table shows how, as far as individual parties are concerned, the Northern League was by far the relative majority party: it had about 40,000 votes more than *Rifondazione Comunista*, the second placed party, and more than double that of the PDS, which obtained less than 50,000 preferences. For sure, the table also emphasises the weight of the liberal-progressive coalition that ran with Zanetti which, overall, totalled more than 60,000 votes: a significant share, but the minor among the four major challengers. If we consider the coalitions' totals, summing up individual party votes, we find out that Castellani's coalition would not even reach the second position and that the Northern League was second by a relatively narrow margin – being the only major party that ran alone.

Table 3: Municipal council election results – 4 major coalitions

Coalition	Total votes	Total councillors
La Rete – Rifondazione Comunista - Alleanza Verde (Novelli)	109,832	8
Lega Nord Piemont (Comino)	102,000	7
PDS – Alleanza per Torino – Verdi Sole (Castellani)	91,493	30
DC – Torino Liberale (Zanetti)	66,403	4

Source: http://www.comune.torino.it/consiglio/storia/tornata11.htm

This last table clarifies how tight the race was. Going back to the argument that chance helped Castellani's coalition, two remarks seem to be in order here: first, it was 'unfortunate' for the League not to have any coalition partner, which, by contrast, turned out to be an advantage for Castellani. On the other hand, again, had Zanetti sided with Castellani from the outset, the latter's coalition would have easily surpassed Novelli, reaching more than 150,000 votes. To sum up, one could say that Zanetti's decision not to join Castellani at the first round made the contest much harder and tighter for the PDS/*Alleanza per Torino* coalition: without a significant portion of the moderates' support the coalition's position was greatly weakened *vis-à-vis* the Northern League. Had the League run with a partner, things might have gone differently; there is, however, another element of luck in Castellani's victorious exploit.

These data tell us something else however, and it relates to the crucial importance the electoral reform had on the overall election results. First, had the old system been still in use, electors could have only voted for the municipal council, and not directly for the mayor. Local government would have then been formed the basis of the council's balance of forces. Even if, by hypothesis, Castellani's list had participated in a coalition government with Novelli and, perhaps, Zanetti, the nature of this potential administration would

have been very different from that which would materialize in reality: it would have been a government comprising a radical left component alongside a moderate one, which may have been much less stable than the administration that eventually formed. This first consideration shows how the possibility of also voting directly for the mayor, coupled with a majority bonus system, would permit the formation of a rather different type of government: an internally cohesive one, with a wide council majority. For sure, this counterfactual scenario has only been discussed for the sake of argument: the actual possibility for this to happen was very remote, for two reasons. First, simply because the law had in effect changed; second, because, as we have argued elsewhere, it is precisely the approval of the reform that which led to the formation of *Alleanza per Torino*, and to Castellani's candidacy. Castellani's supporters were right to believe Novelli would have won the first round; had the old system been still in use, their chances to win would have been significantly lower and, perhaps, might have led the PDS to conceive of another electoral strategy altogether.

Another crucial novelty introduced by the reform is the majority bonus system, which ensured Castellani could be backed by a solid council majority. If we look once again at municipal election results, we see how Castellani's list, which came third, had more than three times the number of councillors that Novelli and the League would have: thirty councillors for Castellani's coalition, eight for Novelli and seven for the League, out of a total of 50 council seats. Furthermore, the possibility of the ballot round paved the way for band-wagoning mechanism, which is what, eventually, led Castellani to victory.

Table 4: Ballot round results

Mayoral Candidate	Votes	Percentage
Castellani Valentino	280,048	57.30 %
Novelli Diego	208,691	42.70 %

Source: http://www.comune.torino.it/consiglio/storia/tornata11.htm

As we can see, Castellani's gamble was correct: Novelli would indeed obtain roughly the same number of votes as he did in the first round – actually, he got less. Castellani, on the other hand, would total more than double the number of votes he had attracted in the first round. At this point, with only two challengers left, the contest was really one between development, future oriented vision, and one anchored in the past: Novelli's opponents, then, would move their votes to Castellani, to prevent the 'old' from coming back to city hall.

Finally, the possibility for the mayor to pick his own executive team meant he could build a much more cohesive team as compared to what happened before, when, for instance, opposition members would sometimes be included in the local executive body, as a result of inter-party agreements conducted within

the municipal council (Vandelli, 1997). This obviously strengthened the new government's position, although it must be noted that, in these circumstances, Castellani was further helped by the repercussions of *Tangentopoli*, which was still ongoing. This is because parties were, in those circumstances, not able to influence the mayor's choice with respect to the names that would have supported Castellani in government: "[The choice] was much easier for me, because parties had basically disappeared. [...] I was under no pressure whatsoever to set [the executive] up, on the contrary: I must say I was the one who asked for advice, requesting to the only structured party that supported me, the Democratic Party of the Left [PDS], a list of names [...] (Bagnasco and Castellani, 2014, p. 37)."

If we now turn to the composition of Castellani's executive, we can see how this is consistent with the ambition to bring civil society into the political process: out of the 12 people[182] who served as assessors during Castellani's first mandate, five were professors, four were professionals (architects and lawyers), two came from the world of catholic associations and only one was a professional politician.

I.II Moment of Truth: conclusive remarks

After his election, then, the new prerogatives attributed to the Mayor would allow Castellani to select an executive team of his own choice without the meddling of parties, typical of the previous system; additionally, his administration is backed by a solid council majority. The composition of the executive, as well as that of *Alleanza per Torino*'s councillors, reflects the composite, mostly non-political character of the list. If we think of the election as the 'moment of truth', in which a given path is selected over other alternatives, Castellani's success would amount to the victory of the development vision for the city, one that had been supported by a significant component of the entrepreneurial-business sector of the local society. Consistent with the latter's ambition to take responsibility for the city's choices, the construction of the candidacy, first, and the formation of Castellani's executive, then, would be the expression of such new political vision, one where local civil society actors joined professional politicians in setting the city's priorities and agenda.

If the construction of the ticket owed a lot to Chiamparino's political entrepreneurship, it must be emphasised that the recently approved electoral reform had a huge bearing over the whole election. First, it essentially convinced the PDS leadership to construct its candidacy and devise an electoral strategy that was calibrated on the new law; further, it convinced Castellani himself to run for mayor. Considering the wide support Novelli still enjoyed, the reform would then be a decisive element contributing to *Alleanza per Torino* and PDS' victory.

[182] In 1995, a new law allowed to increase the number of assessors from eight to twelve.

"No, it's clear that, let's say, studying history, you once again find evidence for this, that an accident changed the course of the city's political history. It changed it for real because that event led to subsequent developments that would emerge, again, here in Turin – the workshop that led to the Olive Tree [party], and then to the Democratic Party…and this is a fact, and it cannot be denied. Of course, the winning side won't concede they won due to an accident…"
(Interview 8)

The new system then permitted Castellani to reach the ballot round, a tool that would in turn be conducive to band-wagoning mechanisms: indeed, Castellani more than doubled his votes at the second round, collecting the preferences of those who opposed Novelli. The majority bonus system, furthermore, ensured Castellani's executive would be supported by a strong council majority, an element that has arguably contributed to the heightened stability of these administrations. Finally, the reform's provision allowing the Mayor to select his own assessors would further facilitate Castellani's task of building a cohesive and competent local government. Looking at the results obtained by the coalition's competitors, finally, one can notice how tight the race was and that, had things gone differently, Turin's recent history could have been dramatically different too.

II. Re-institutionalization

The last phase of the four-part process I am analysing is that of re-institutionalization. This is a dynamic whereby innovative practices gradually become routinized and are eventually crystallized as the new mainstream institutions: this refers both to the historical institutional view of institution as structure, and to the sociological view of institution as cultural script. From the first perspective, structure consists of the actual organization of the local government machine, as well as of the participative governing practice that would emerge. The latter followed a path-dependent trajectory, in that the way these practices have been routinized chiefly depends on how certain patterns were chosen during the previous critical juncture phase. From a sociological institutionalist understanding, what becomes institutionalised is a new 'cultural script', whereby the old labour-capital dichotomy is surpassed, in favour of a view of the local governance structure as attempting to represent the city as a collective actor. This new perspective is further sustained by an understanding of the political process as a moment of synthesis and negotiation – rather than conflict - involving both political elements and civil society actors. This second understanding of institutionalisation is underpinned by an overarching logic of appropriateness whereby the older view of the industrial city as the privileged locus for industrial and class conflicts is superseded by a conception of the post-industrial city as an entity that must be capable of competing on a global market.

These two overarching processes of re-institutionalisation are backed by concrete governing activity that is aimed, among other things, precisely at promoting and defining a novel understanding of local government. These governing activities, then, can be interpreted as dynamics that contribute to re-institutionalization; on this I will focus on in the latter part of the chapter.

To see how governing activity would then be conducive to such process of re-institutionalisation, it makes sense to recall the premises on which Castellani's coalition had built its electoral success. The critique of local institutional frameworks that had been a central feature of local debates in the decade prior to Castellani's election focused on two central points. The former was an understanding of the reigning political culture, and the party system this had produced, as an element contributing to the overall inefficiency of the system for, to put it shortly, party feuds and pre-defined ideological positions would hinder a capacity for collective, participatory strategic vision. Apart from the overarching political culture, a second issue had been identified in the actual shortcomings of the legal-administrative framework that supported the concrete local government machine, illustrated in the previous chapter, which would itself amount to one of the motives underpinning the limited 'governing capacity' of local administrations.

If these two former themes can be said to be generally related to features of the local politico-administrative context, the second essential issue would relate to the actual political programmes: this would be grounded on the conviction that a development agenda was necessary to lead the city into a new phase of growth. To pursue such a strategy, it was considered essential to take advantage of the reconstruction opportunities represented by brownfields, which at the outset of the 1990s had become widespread**.** Approving the Master Plan was then crucial, since being the legal document needed to provide the guidelines for comprehensive urban planning, it could unblock reconstruction activities. For sure, the Master Plan would be the one concrete project that divided the various candidates in the electoral campaign; furthermore, the stance each candidate took on the Master Plan would ground the rhetoric of novelty vs. return to the past: Novelli's opposition to the Master Plan was stigmatized by his opponents as the expression of an urban vision anchored in the past; by contrast, those who supported the Master Plan, thus including Castellani's coalition, would argue the project was central for the city to be able to look forward.

The Master Plan and the restructuration of Turin's politico-administrative framework are, therefore, two paramount objectives of Castellani's coalition. As to the latter, it must be said that the events that took place during critical juncture had already done much to 'de-structure' the previous political culture and 're-structure' the local government's administrative framework. The fall of Communism and the *Tangentopoli* corruption scandal mainly intervened at the level of political culture, dismantling the Italian post-war party system; the 1993 reform of local governments' structure affected, indeed, the legal-administrative framework of municipalities. With respect to this latter change, as we have seen above, the reform has reorganized the electoral process and redefined the competences of the organs of local administration; nonetheless, work still needed to be done at the level of the internal organization of the local government

machine, that is, as to how government branches are organized, whether utilities should be privatized, etc. Castellani's first mandate, then, would be principally concerned with these two issues: overhaul of the local government machine and Master Plan approval.

The restructuration of the local government machine would draw on managerialist principles and aim at a redefinition of the relationship, and of respective responsibilities, of political and bureaucratic actors**.** The task would also concern the proper reorganization of the internal structure of the municipality. The 87 operative sectors inherited by previous administrations would be reduced to 14 divisions – 12 of which connected to the 12 administrative departments, plus two further functional divisions (Pinson, 2002a). The goal was, precisely, to provide for a division of labour whereby assessors, that is, politicians, are in charge of strategic choices, while operative and managerial decisions would pertain to senior bureaucrats (*ibid.*); this is, for sure, what managerialist ideas prescribe with respect to local government (Pierre, 2011). If, previously, bureaucrats' responsibilities mostly consisted in procedural control, such a transformation was intended to expand such responsibilities toward a 'management by objectives' approach (Pinson, 2002 a), which made bureaucrats accountable before Mayor and assessors. Along the same principles[183], the administration would proceed to outsource the provision of services. Four municipal companies would then be privatized – water, electricity, waste collection, and transportation. In addition, a local agency devoted to attracting investments in the city would be created, ITP (*Investire a Torino e in Piemonte*).

As to the Master Plan, the administration would involve local constructors in the final stages of its development (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012, p. 81); the document would eventually be approved in 1995[184], two years after Castellani had become mayor. Cooperation between the administration and the construction business was thus crucial to achieve this result, which had paramount implications as to the emergence of the governance coalition. On the one hand, the swift approval of the plan fostered a perception of effectiveness and pragmatism of the executive, not only to the eyes of the public, but to those of the more restricted civic middle-class group that would gather around Castellani's administration. Second, approving the Master Plan, which was a legal requirement for the reconstruction plan to be initiated, on the one hand strengthened the constructors' sector cooperation with political institutions; on the other, it also served as the basis on which to elaborate the subsequent government agenda, that is the Strategic Plan that would be approved in 2000.

Another element that during Castellani's first mandate contribute to reinforcing the practice of collective, participatory decision-making is the fact that in 1989 Turin had been defined as 'Area 2

[183] In 1998, then, the City Manager role would be introduced, a further move towards managerialism.

[184] As pointed out in the previous chapter, the Master Plan's approval is a two-stage process, requiring the approval of both Municipality and Region. In Turin, the Municipality approved the Master Plan at the end of 1993 (the same year Castellani was elected mayor), while the Region would finally approve it in 1995 – only after this last stage would the document become binding.

Objective'[185] by the European Community, status reserved for industrial areas in decline, that allowed the city to bid for EU Funds devoted to industrial reconstruction. As the procedure to apply for such funds would require perspective applicants to forge partnerships, the instrument would further foster a dynamic of collective negotiation among different actors. Applying for EU funds and negotiating to devise and approve the Master Plan would thus be two process that consolidated the cooperative practices pursued by Turin's local government. It must not be forgotten that these practices are not conceived of anew, but they would build on the process of dialogue, exchange, cooperation, and negotiation between the Left (now PDS), a part of the local entrepreneurial élite, and elements of the local labour unions that had characterized the pre-election years. There has been, in other words, a process of learning, whereby political and non-political actors have familiarized with a cooperative decision-making procedure which will constitute the basis for the subsequent elaboration of the city's Strategic Plan.

As Castellani's second mandate begun in 1997, the Master Plan had been approved and the local government machine had been reorganized, for the most part. We have already stated how the Master Plan would be instrumental in fostering the reconstruction process that would characterize the subsequent years; the reorganization of local government, similarly, had a crucial instrumental role: on the one hand, it rationalised the governing process, enhancing the overall 'governing capacity' of the administration; furthermore, it saved the municipality significant resources to be deployed for the realization of major strategic projects (subway and railway bypass). As the second mandate begun, then, conditions were in place for the administration to strengthen its focus on internationalization and economic diversification, through cultural investment and strengthening of research institutions. These objectives had however remained rather vaguely defined (Alfieri *et al*., 2012) and one of the city's assessors, Fiorenzo Alfieri, pushed the Mayor to initiate a collective, participatory, and cooperative process of long-term agenda setting. This would draw on the experience of Spanish cities – Barcelona in particular – that had implemented Strategic Plans in order to steer their own reconstruction processes.

The Strategic Plan would be the final crucial step in the build-up of the local governance coalition. To define such plan, the administration wished to enlarge civic participation, making the preparatory phase more inclusive with respect to social actors. The idea came from the example of Barcelona, who hosted the 1992 Olympic games, and had undergone a renovation process that would set an example to follow in other European cities. It is, importantly, from Turin's participation in European city networks, in particular the Committee of the Regions and *Eurocities*, that Castellani befriended Pasqual Maragall (Castellani and Bagnasco, 2014), Barcelona's mayor during the 1992 Olympics, who had overseen the implementation of a Strategic plan for the Catalan city. The importance of this personal connection is crucial, in that Maragall

[185] (EU *et al*., 2006 ; University of Pittsburgh, "Archive of European Integration", http://aei.pitt.edu/view/euar/REGIONAL_POLICY=3AStructural_Funds.html)

would subsequently be chosen as one of the two vice-presidents of the Scientific Committee that took part in the drafting of the Strategic Plan[186].

In 1998, the elaboration procedure started, through the creation of a 'development forum' (*Forum per lo Sviluppo*), presided over by Castellani himself and composed of 29 individuals (Torino Internazionale, 2000): of these, one third were representatives of the city's main sectoral associations (agriculture, entrepreneurs, construction cooperatives, ANCE, Chamber of Commerce, retailers and shopkeepers, etc.); the forum was then completed by the presidents of the two banking foundations, the two deans of the city's universities, and labour union secretaries (CISL and CGIL). This first group designed a road map and instituted the scientific and administrative organs that would oversee the proper definition of the strategic plan (Torino Internazionale, 2000). The operative machine thus constituted would then involve several of the people that already participated in the original development forum, plus further participants, distributed between academic professions, entrepreneurs, Unionists, and politicians themselves (idem, p. 5); importantly, no FIAT representative participated to the process, neither in the initial steps, nor later (*ibid*.). After a two-year process, at the beginning of 2000, the Strategic Plan was ready, a document which identified the city's agenda, articulated into six different lines of action. The characteristic element of the plan was that it provided guidelines as well as precise actions to be carried out, but was not meant as a rigid, constraining planning document: objectives and projects were to be redefined and updated in time, through the supervision of a purposely instituted body, *Torino Internazionale*, which would gather both the actors that participated to the design of the plan, and the citizenry. Among the six lines of action the Plan defined, two of them concerned urban redevelopment, to be achieved through the renewal of abandoned industrial areas and the building of infrastructure; two more concerned launching the cultural and leisure sector, with the aim of making Turin a tourist destination; finally, one line of action focused on investment in higher research, and the other one in efforts to reinforce governance practices (Torino Internazionale, 2000). It is during the elaboration phase of the Strategic Plan that the idea of running for the Winter Olympics of 2006 became concrete, and the municipality submitted its candidacy.

The Strategic Plan, as mentioned, not only aimed to abstractly reinforce local governance, but provided for the creation of a concrete body (*Torino Internazionale*, 2000, line of action 2, p. 69), which would serve as a new governance arena for the city. The association *Torino Internazionale* was instituted in 2000, immediately after the completion of the Strategic Plan; the association functioned as a novel arena for discussion, supporting meetings held in various locations throughout the city and centred on various policy areas, which would involve wide citizen participation. Its actual goal was to constantly update the projects that had been sketched in the Strategic Plan and monitor their implementation (Torino Internazionale, 2000,

[186] Fiorenzo Alfieri, the assessor who had pushed for the development of the Strategic Plan, was the other crucial figure in this respect. He, too, had cultivated relationships with Barcelona's administrators since the end of the 1970s, when he served as assessor in Novelli's administrations (Alfieri *et al*., 2012; Pinson, 2002a).

p. 71). *Torino Internazionale*, at its inception, gathered 101 partners, most of whom had participated to the elaboration of the Strategic Plan itself, including universities, banking foundations, constructors' associations, local utilities, research centres, and Unions (Torinostrategica.it). As a new arena for debate, the institution was characterized by a relative high degree of openness: as Dente notes (Dente and Melloni, 2005, p. 16-17), it was an 'informal, non-bureaucratic' meeting place, which brought together actors, public and private, that would have not probably met otherwise; interaction among them would moreover occur on an equal footing, thus facilitating the possibility for networking (*ibid*.). Also, the association served as tool to channel information to the wider public about policy decisions taken both within and outside of *Torino Internazionale*, so as to build consensus around policy action, and provide legitimacy to government initiatives. As to its contribution to decision-making, the association was instrumental in the elaboration of new projects, in particular those of 'small-medium size', whereas initiatives of a greater relevance where in effect the result of decisions taken outside of such arena[187]. *Torino Internazionale*, finally, served as a novel entity that could function as facilitator and mediator between different actors and interests. In this sense, it functioned as a new, proper actor, in that it worked as a "subject bearing coherent objectives [...]" (Dente and Melloni, 2005, p. 17), namely those of rearticulating the modes of interaction among different social and political players (*ibid*.).

Table 5: Turin – Chronology of events (1993-2000)

Year	Scope of event	Event
June 1993	local	Valentino Castellani is elected mayor.
1993	International/ local	Turin is identified as Objective 2 Area for the EU's second funding period.
Dec. 1993	local	Municipal council approves Master Plan; the document now still has to be approved by the Region.
1994	local	Administrative overhaul
1994	international	URBAN I programme is launched by the EU. Committee of the Regions' lobbying activity was crucial.
1994	local	Polytechnic University signs agreement with National Railways to start the doubling of its facilities before lands are sold.
1995	local	Region approves Master Plan.

[187] The Torino Wireless Foundation, for instance, was created through negotiations held within *Torino Internazionale* (Dente and Melloni, 2005, p. 18); major projects such as the metro and the railway bypass, instead, were discussed outside of it, and before its institution.

1995-2001	local	Approval and implementation of 20 urban programmes (11 PRiU, 3 PRU, 6 PRIN).
1997	local	Castellani is elected mayor for a second term.
1997	local	*Progetto Speciale Periferie* (neighbourhoods special project) is launched.
1997	local	Polytechnic signs agreement with Education Department defining 'doubling operation'.
1998	local	Strategic Plan's elaboration process starts.
1999	local	Turin wins 2006 Winter Olympic bid.
2000	local	Strategic Plan is concluded.
2000	local	Torino Internazionale association is established, as provided by Strategic Plan.

II.I *Re-institutionalisation: Empirical Evidence*

The two policy objectives that Castellani's administration – reorganization of local government machine and Master Plan – set for itself during the first mandate had an important role to play with respect to furthering and strengthening a practice of cooperation between Turin's political and non-political actors. These two policy objectives, however, required collaboration from different sets of non-political actors and would thus involve different components of the local governance coalition. In the case of the municipality's organizational overhaul, apart from political actors, those who were involved were mainly senior bureaucrats of the local administration; in the case of the Master Plan, those who would be involved in the definition of the document were mainly the constructions and real estate sectors.

As to the reconstruction of the local government machine, the first thing to be noted is that it would chiefly draw on managerialist principles. Recalling the discussion introduced in Chapter 2, managerialism is an organising principle for public administration that pursues the two overarching objectives of administrative efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery (Pierre, 2011; John, 2001). Typically, it involves a sort of division of labour between politicians and managers or bureaucrats, whereby the former are in charge of defining the strategies and long-term goals of policy action, while the latter oversee the actual 'management' phase, that is, the proper activity of service delivery functions. While according to the NPM framework managers are preferably recruited from the private corporate sector and should be protected as much as possible from political interference, in traditional managerialism managers are still civil servants, and they have a closer relationship with politicians (Pierre, 2011). The latter is, at least in the initial phase, as

we shall see, the case of Turin. Finally, to reduce costs, managerialism often prescribes the privatisation of municipal companies, as well as the recourse to contracting out and other cost containment instruments; in Turin, most of these tools would be implemented.

As mentioned above, the first move in the direction of a rationalisation of the administrative machine was the downsizing of operative sectors, which would be reduced from 87 to 14 divisions, corresponding to the twelve administrative departments and two further functional divisions (Pinson, 2002a). The action was not only meant to reduce confusion and resource waste, but also, crucially, to push in the direction of a redefinition of responsibilities between politicians and mangers, indeed according to the managerialist ideal: strategies and long-term planning in the hands of politicians, whereas managers would be in charge of operative and managerial activities. Bureaucrats' responsibilities would this way shift from mere procedural control towards a 'management by objectives' approach (Pinson, 2002a), whereby bureaucrats would be accountable before mayor and executive. As this latter point highlights, Turin's administrative overhaul would be inspired by traditional managerialist, rather than NPM, principles, as managerial accountability before mayor and executive would ensure the political sphere maintained a major degree of control over bureaucrats' activities. The privatization of the four former municipal companies – water, electricity, waste collection and public transportation – would further serve the objectives of cost containment, as the four utilities would be eliminated from the budget, while their dividends would still benefit the Commune (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; Baraggioli, 2011; Pinson, 2002a).

To oversee the reorganization of the administrative machine, a new executive department would be set up, which combined the functions of seven previous departments (Interview 3).

> *"[The executive] envisaged the creation of a Municipal Corporation Department, […] so a department that would somehow oversee the functioning of the municipal machine, whereas the other departments, somehow, would interact with the city on several fronts: urban planning, education, culture, social services, etc., etc., so…this was, instead, the department in charge of governing the machine. […] This was thus an entity – this department – well, fascinating in the first place, in that, for the first time, we'd use the term 'corporation' to identify an institutional position so…try to imagine, even today, calling an assessor, 'assessor to the Municipal corporation' […]: it's a cultural revolution, no doubt […]! Such a department, however, brought together, I think, six or seven previous departments. […] This meant it was a huge power position […], for I had: finance, taxes, personnel, informatic systems, organization, assets, bursary…"*
> (Interview 3)

As the interview emphasises, the fusion of sever previous departments into one would put the assessor in charge of the new department into a position of huge power. This would, further, be a crucial

move in the direction of effectiveness: by putting seven previous departments into one, this meant that a single person would manage what was previously done by seven assessors, thus making it easier to have a coherent strategy of reorganisation and eliminating the possibility that two similar departments – say, taxes and finance – would pursue different objectives. Then, the new name given to the department, Municipal Corporation Department, or *Assessorato all'Azienda Comune* in Italian, would stress the role of the new department as one devoted to the overarching management of the whole municipal machine, highlighting the new administrations' ambitions to operate a complete overhaul of the local government's structure.

The redefinition of functions and responsibilities of politicians and managers would then intervene in a managerial culture that had previously rested on completely different premises: "Several civil servants would see themselves as still being, above all, loyal to the party or the assessor who had nominated or promoted them. The idea that they could be serving the city, the government or the Mayor would not even cross their mind (Castellani, 1996, p. 73)." In the previous system, party affiliation was the chief criterion for choosing personnel and to progress in one's own career (Vandelli, 1997); because of this, politicians would constantly intrude into administrative matters, and bureaucracy was effectively in their hands. Further, both executive departments and bureaucratic roles would be divided up according to party logics[188] (Bobbio, 1990; Vandelli, 1997), but bureaucrats had no effective operative powers: they could not organize personnel or offices, nor they could distribute resources. Finally, politicians were also in charge of issuing administrative acts, meaning that even with respect to administrative matters, managerial autonomy was minimal, whereas political control was overwhelming (Vandelli, 1997). The introduction of the managerial 'division of labour' between the political and bureaucratic roles would then truly amount to an organisational revolution: concepts such as merit and accountability were a novelty in a system that had until then essentially rewarded party loyalty.

> *"[…] during the transition from a reality where politics would oversee the organizational dimension…namely, politics would be in charge of management…to a phase in which politics had to set objectives and then: 'Guys, as far as managing is concerned, that's my responsibility, choosing people pertains to me, department officials' nominations…I am in charge of nominating, right? Not you! Clearly, I try to pick the right people, but I'm not choosing according to the party card of executive officials; […] I do it because, according to me, that's the most suitable and competent person to manage those things.' I discovered some great managers that had been completely marginalised, whereas I realised that some other managers, who were very accredited…well, they'd better not be there at all. […] I will always remember, when I get there…after some time, among the things I was given, there was this booklet […] containing the*

[188] Tropeano, M., "La crisi anche in Regione?", *La Stampa*, December 31, 1991

list of all the nominations that needed to be done; it was interesting, as near each nomination, you had the name of a party."
(Interview 3)

Such a reorganisation would not only redefine the roles and functions of politicians and managers but would have the effect of changing the way bureaucrats would understand their position within the municipality. While, previously, the bureaucratic sphere was constantly 'invaded' by politicians, and managers were entrusted with little apart from mere procedural control (Pinson, 2002a; Vandelli, 1997), now bureaucrats would suddenly find themselves fulfilling important functions within the administration (Interview 3). By entrusting them with major responsibilities, and by stimulating them to follow a 'management by objectives' approach (Pinson, 2002a), bureaucrats would therefore feel appreciated and esteemed. Furthermore, selecting bureaucrats on grounds of merit would not only strengthen their self-esteem, but would, crucially, ensure management would be filled by competent figures (Interview 3; Interview 4).

"I believe the thing worked well, for the organisational overhaul that we accomplished fostered enthusiasm…so, it charged people – people exclusively chosen on the basis of merit […] and potential…and managerial potential, who would suddenly…they would turn from chief bureaucrats into figures […] charged with major responsibilities, major objectives to pursue…"
(Interview 3)

Such an organisational overhaul, then, would not merely produce effects in terms of cost containment and department rationalisation (Interview 3; Interview 4), but would completely redefine the relationship between the bureaucratic and political spheres, as well as the overall objectives that bureaucrats were now meant to pursue. Thus, from a system that was fundamentally party run[189], and an understanding of bureaucracy as merely devoted to procedural control, the turn of 1993 would lead to the emergence of a system presenting clear managerialist elements (Pierre, 2011). Other actions, such as those of privatizing municipal companies, had a similar effect of radically changing the Commune's approach to policy issues. Efficiency had not been a chief criterion for action, by far: political convenience and party allegiances were, and only the prospect of not constructing the metro – that is, not delivering on something the administration had committed to – would push other assessors to endorse the privatization of the municipal electric company.

[189] We have already stated, in Chapter 4, how Turin had, before 1993, presented features that were typical of 'party-government' cities.

"…because I had the upper hand, I'll give you an interesting example: we meet, among assessors and I present, for the first time, the situation as it actually was…and everyone was speechless, because nobody had fully realized what the real state of affairs was, I mean, truly…the budget wasn't sustainable, by a lot of cash…so I said, 'guys, we have a strategic project, which is the subway…good! Be aware that, if you want…if we want to go ahead with the subway, this has a simple implication: the municipal electric company needs to be privatized…'. 'That's not possible – politically, that's not possible.' I reply: 'No problem…no subway.' 'No way! That's not possible!' 'Listen, guys: if you want me to stay here…it's either one or the other: tertium non datur. AIternatively, I'll leave it to you…'. These were, together, two major operations, because this initial privatization of the electric company brought huge benefits […]."

Administrative overhaul, then, would have these three main effects: it would change the roles and relationships between bureaucrats and politicians, as we have said, increasing the former's responsibilities and their perception of their own function within the administrative machine; it would reduce inefficiencies and free resources, through processes such as departmental rationalisation and privatisation of utilities, which made it possible to deliver on long-promised projects, such as the metro system; then, and in part because of these two former elements, it would amount to a proper change of mentality for relevant actors, that is, chiefly, bureaucrats, but also for politicians, who would start to consider policy problems from an efficiency perspective.

The managerialist inspiration of underlying the local government overhaul was, furthermore, rather explicit, as the following interview shows. Moreover, to lead the Municipal Corporation Department, Castellani called a former corporate consultant, Giorgio Donna.

"In corporate economics, we distinguish between…and unfortunately we can't say the same about common language…we distinguish between corporation and business […] and I believe that's an important distinction…that is, businesses are corporations, but not all corporations are businesses…a corporation, I would say, is a complex organization […] that abides to certain rules: efficiency and effectiveness are valid for all. In the business world, those that are on the market, there is another dimension, that of economic convenience…profit seeking, and so on. Corporations that are not on the market, including public entities, or non-economic entities – the Church, for instance, if you will, to corporate economists, it's a corporation…and it has to be reminded about it, it needs it. We'd forgotten that public administration is a corporation…"
(Interview 3)

What the interview highlights is precisely the core of the managerialist ideal: that is, that private service production and delivery is not substantially different from the same activity when organized by public authorities, implying that the same principles – of efficiency and effectiveness – should guide service production regardless of who is overseeing the activity (Pierre, 2011, p. 37). In this sense, then, understanding local government as a corporation, as pointed out in the interview, helps framing government activity as one that should be inspired by principles of cost containment and by a result-oriented approach. This, furthermore, stresses how, in line with Pierre's observation, the managerial aspect of local government is the one that is being privileged (*idem*, p. 31-32).

A second fundamental factor that contributed to building and extending relationships among actors, both public and private, was the Master Plan. Already in the elaboration phase, which lasted from 1986 until late 1993, the definition of the document would involve the participation of the Polytechnic, in particular with respect to the areas of historical significance (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; Mellano, 2008), and that of constructors (Spaziante, 2008). Citizens' involvement during the elaboration phase, however, is part of the typical development procedure of Master Plans (law n. 1150/1942; D.P.R. n. 8/1972); it is, above all, after its approval that Turin's Master Plan would have a major impact on the local governance structure. There were various reasons for this: the first is that the Master Plan contained a coherent, albeit imperfect (Spaziante, 2008), plan for the subsequent development of the city, one that identified areas of interest where investments and projects would be directed. It is not my purpose here to enter into the details and technicalities of the plan: it suffices to say that it provided for the restructuration of the city centred on four North-South axes, that would be called 'Spines'. The core part of the plan was represented by the 'central spine', that ran along the old railway tracks that had kept the city divided in two halves until that moment: the major project concerned moving the railway underground, to free space for a wide boulevard and for residential and tertiary construction to be undertaken on its sides, where several abandoned industrial areas would lay (Spaziante, 2008; Interview 6). Abandoned industrial areas are one of the elements that had made the plan so urgent: the six million square meters of 'urban empty spaces' were a concrete opportunity for urban reconstruction, remnants of the city's Fordist past that, to the eyes of administrators and planners, could be put to a new, tertiary and residential use. The latter was the overall socio-economic objective of the plan: to foster tertiary development and increase land and rent values (Spaziante, 2008).

The Master Plan would then give an overarching direction for development, construction activities and, above all, provided for a comprehensive vision of the city's future that would constitute a solid base upon which to orient projects, investments and, crucially, interactions among actors (Spaziante, 2008; Pinson, 2002 a).

A second reason has to do with one of the objectives of the Master Plan, that is, to restart construction activity in the city. On the one hand, this served to reduce unemployment in the city, which had,

by 1995, surpassed 10 % of the active population[190]**;** on the other, it was meant to ensure the city would increase its revenues, by increasing land and rent value, so that it could afford to finance the two major projects it had committed to deliver: the subway and the railway bypass.

> *"The Master Plan was underpinned by a hope […]: that building activity would re-start in Turin…why? Because the huge expenses the city was undertaking for the railway bypass and the metro would only be justifiable if you had urbanisation duties. That is, you build infrastructure and raise areas' value and as a city you make a profit […]."*
> (Interview 4)

The Master Plan would then amount to a tool that would, on the one hand, provide a comprehensive strategy for urban reconstruction and, on the other, it would 'unlock' construction activity and re-development. A third reason why the Master Plan would be of major importance for the emergence of Turin's local governance is that it would then funnel public-private collaboration and reinforce negotiation practices. In this respect, important instruments would be the 'complex urban programmes'd (*Programmi Complessi*), which would activate interactions between public and private actors, because of the conditionality requiring the presence of private actors for funding to be awarded (Castellani, 2008; Oliva, 2008); such complex programmes, crucially, would constitute the concrete operative tools that would permit the Plan's realisation (Oliva, 2008; Castellani, 2008), by directing a flow of funds to the city. Complex programmes are essentially of three kinds (Saccomani, 2008, p. 178): urban transformation and requalification programmes, urban regeneration projects and local development instruments[191]. The former type includes programmes such as *PRIN* and *PRiU*[192], both requiring the participation of both public and private actors. These programmes would be extensively adopted in Turin, as the Master Plan aimed at increasing the housing offer but, in a moment of housing market contraction, few resources were available: *PRIN* and *PRiU* programmes would then ensure a flow of public funds would sustain actual construction activity (*idem*, p. 179). Further, the participatory practice introduced by the two programmes would be consolidated during the Plan's realisation phase (*idem*, p. 180), encouraging the 'leverage' exerted by public financing with respect to private financing (*ibid*.). Construction activity, sustained by the use of these plans, would consolidate the network of local actors involved in real estate and housing: Acli Casa[193], cooperatives and local construction firms (*ibid.*).

[190] See table 4, Chapter 1.
[191] Until 2006, the latter type of programmes – local development instruments – would be little used in Turin (Saccomani, 2008).
[192] PRIN stands for '*Programmi Integrati d'Intervento*' (Integrated Intervention Programmes); PRiU stands for '*Programmi di Riqualificazione Urbana'* (Urban Requalification Programmes). Both were instituted in 1992, through law 179/1992 (Artioli, 2016).
[193] Christian workers' housing cooperative.

The second type, concerning urban regeneration projects, comprises programmes such as *PRU*[194], Urban Pilot Projects, Urban II, and Neighbourhood Contracts[195] (Saccomani, 2008). In this case, importantly, the role of participation, including that of local residents, would be further strengthened and emphasised: this type of programmes, indeed, would consist of a combination of physical, social and economic interventions requiring the participation of third-sector actors and local residents. In Turin, *PRU* programmes were inspired by the functioning of EU's URBAN programmes, requiring the presence of a social and economic aspect to a particular project; EU funds would, moreover, subsequently be channelled to *PRU* programmes. Further, inspired by its involvement in European city networks (Bagnasco and Castellani, 2014; Pichierri, 2018)**,** within the context of urban regeneration and requalification activities, the municipality launched an initiative called PSP – *Progetto Speciale Periferie* ('neighbourhoods special project') in 1997 (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; Bagnasco and Castellani, 2014; Power et al., 2010; Saccomani, 2008). All urban regeneration initiatives that received funding after 1997 would be managed through the PSP, which would function through a dedicated department within city council – '*Settore Periferie'* (Neighbourhoods Unit) – and would directly involve local residents through a bottom-up process (Power *et al.,* 2010; Saccomani, 2008). "In each renewal neighbourhood, the Unit opened a dedicated drop-in centre (*laboratorio territoriale*) run by a group of residents, which served as a meeting point for a local community. This encouraged local residents to consult on, develop and deliver aspects of the project in partnership with a neighbourhood forum (*tavolo sociale*), bringing together residents and local organisations with members of the neighbourhood team. The neighbourhoods Unit formed an interdepartmental working group consisting of 15 professionals from the departments responsible for delivering services to neighbourhoods, for example police, education, transport, health (*Gruppo di lavoro intersettoriale*). It also formed a neighbourhood-level interdisciplinary working group for each neighbourhood project, consisting of 15 city employees, for example teachers, planners, social workers. The projects targeted social, environmental and physical problems; they also involved skills development (Power *et al.*, 2010, p. 232-234)." Both the Urban II regeneration programme targeting *Mirafiori Nord*[196], and the Urban Pilot Project 'The Gate', for the requalification of the *Porta Palazzo* market square would be managed as part of the PSP (Saccomani, 2008; Pinson, 2002a; Power *et al*., 2010).

Overall, the 'complex urban programmes' would essentially fulfil two main functions (Castellani, 2008, p. 60): on the one hand, they would, as mentioned, require the presence of private actors alongside public ones, which led to an ever closer collaboration between public authorities and private players that would then be crucial as to the realisation of the Plan; on the other hand, the 'complex programmes' would set out mandatory deadlines as to projects' realisation, which would ensure these were terminated,

[194] PRU stands for 'Programmi di Recupero Urbano' (Urban Recovery Programmes) and were instituted in 1993 by law 493/1993.
[195] *Contratti di quartiere* (CdQ), in Italian.
[196] *Mirafiori Nord* is Turin's neighbourhood where the old *Mirafiori* factory is still located; *Porta Palazzo* is a huge market square at the entry of the city centre, where a numerous immigrant community lives and works.

otherwise the funding would be lost. If this latter element has been crucial with respect to the concrete realisation, within acceptable time frames, of the Master Plan's interventions, the former would indeed positively impact on relationships among relevant actors: "The negotiation approach acquired through the experience of the 'complex programmes' helped us minimize conflictual situations and realize a balanced [Master] Plan, facilitating the public actor's supervisory function [...] (Castellani, 2008, p. 60)."

Complex urban programmes would, in sum, have a twofold effect: on the one hand, they would ensure the Master Plan's implementation while, on the other hand, they would reinforce negotiation and networking practices among different actors. Throughout this process, the administration's commitment to the Master Plan would amount to a further pivotal element contributing to the effective realisation of the Plan's provisions. Of course, the Master Plan's approval had been one of Castellani's chief policy objectives during the electoral campaign, and its swift approval by the end of 1993[197] emphasises the importance attributed to the document by the administration. After the Master Plan's approval too, the municipality would be a key actor during the proper implementation process: not only it would supervise reconstruction activities (Castellani, 2008, p. 60), but in a first moment, when funds were lacking, the public authority stimulated private resource mobilisation and sought to channel these towards public objectives (Corsico, 2008, p. 75)

A third crucial factor that would contribute to fostering the emergence of Turin's governance can be identified under the broad process that falls under the notion of 'Europeanization'[198]. Europeanization would impact on Turin's governance essentially in two ways: the former had to do with the involvement of municipal authorities in European city networks, which provided political actors with an opportunity to engage peer European urban authorities over each other's best practices and with an instrument that could be used to lobby Brussels; the second would instead have to do with the availability of EU programmes for funding, which would push public and private actors to collaborate to receive financing.

As to the former element, in 1993, one year after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union was formed, leading to the creation of the Committee of the Regions, a consultative arena where European regional and city representatives would meet; at the same time, international city networks – such as *Eurocities* – were acquiring visibility and importance. The administration was particularly active within three international city networks[199] at the European level: '*Quartiers en Crise'*, *Eurocities* and the Committee of the Regions. As to the former, Castellani served as its President for some years, and claims it was during this experience that he became familiar with "what is called the integrated approach to issues deriving from

[197] As explained above, municipal approval is the first step of a two-stage approval process that also involves the region. After the Plan was approved by the Municipality in 1993, the Region would finally approve it in 1995 (Castellani, 2008).
[198] See chapter 1.
[199] Turin was a member of several other city networks, but these three are those Castellani recalls as most influential with respect to his policies (Castellani and Bagnasco, 2014, p. 72).

urban crises (Bagnasco and Castellani, 2014, p. 49)." This consists in undertaking revitalization projects in specific areas of a city through a multidisciplinary approach, which envisages the involvement of urban planners, social service operators and police forces, each intervening in the field where their competences are most needed, in a coordinated effort (*ibid.*). Participation to this network was not trivial, for it led the administration to create the 'Neighbourhoods Special Project' (*Progetto Speciale Periferie*) in 1997 (Bagnasco and Castellani, 2014; Power *et al.*, 2010; Saccomani, 2008). As to the mayor's presence within the Committee of the Regions, this was again of major importance, as the network, together with the European Parliament, successfully lobbied for the creation of the *URBAN* programme, a European funding scheme that targets deprived urban neighbourhoods (Bagnasco and Castellani, 2014; Pichierri, 2018; Power *et al.*, 2010). *Eurocities*, on the other hand, allowed Castellani and other city representatives to learn from best-practices and projects that had been started in other urban contexts throughout Europe, and moreover constituted a major networking opportunity. This last element should by no means be underestimated, as Turin for instance greatly benefited from Castellani's personal friendship with Pasqual Maragall, mayor of Barcelona at the time of the 1992 Summer Olympics: Maragall, at the beginning of the 1990s, had himself pushed for the adoption of a Strategic Plan for Barcelona and would later be asked to as co-President of the scientific committee (*Torino Internazionale*, 2000).

EU funding programmes would also play a major role in this respect. Similarly to how the 'complex programmes' would stimulate participation, by requiring the involvement of private actors alongside public ones to obtain funds for given projects, European programmes would amount to a further incentive towards public-private collaboration. Turin and Piedmont have actually started bidding for European funds as soon as these were made available by the European Community – before the EU was established – in 1989[200]. It was with the signing of the Single European Act in 1986 that the European Community made cohesion one of its political objectives, contemplating a reform of Structural Funds schemes, which would be adopted through a Commission proposal two years later (EEC reg. n. 2052/88). This would launch the first funding programme of 1989-1993, articulated along five objectives to be achieved by recourse to all European funds existing until then: ERDF, ESF, and EAFRD[201]. While objectives 3, 4, and 5a would concern the whole Community, objectives 1, 2, and 5b would instead target specific territories, depending on their meeting eligibility criteria for each funding period. Subsequent reforms in 1993 and 1999 would modify[202] the number of the objectives, while the principles introduced by the 1988 regulation – concentration, partnership, programming, additionality – would not be substantially altered, although the 1999 reform would introduce some novelties: among these,

[200] https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/stories/s/Historic-EU-payments-by-region-1988-2018/47md-x4nq

[201] European Regional Development Funds (ERDF), European Structural Funds (ESF), and European Agricultural Rural Development Fund.

[202] With the 1993 reform (EEC reg.2080-2085/1993), the Cohesion Fund would be established and a novel objective, n. 6, would be introduced; in 1999 (EU reg. 1260/99), objectives would instead be reduced to three and objective 5b would be incorporated into objective 2 (EU and Piedmont Region, 2006).

importantly, the partnership principle would be extended to all economic and social actors involved in Regional policy (art. 8.1 EU reg. 1260/99; EU *et al.*, 2006). Turin's region, Piedmont, would be eligible for Objective Area 2[203] during the first three programming periods[204] (1989-1993; 1994-1999; 2000-2006), that is, for a period that started before Castellani's election and would last until the Olympics. Objective 2, specifically, aims at "converting the regions, frontier regions or parts of regions (including employment areas and urban communities) seriously affected by industrial decline (hereinafter referred to as 'Objective 2') (art. 1.2, EEC reg. n. 2052/88)."

Table 6: EU funds received by Piedmont while identified as Objective 2 Area (1989-2006).



Source: https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/EU-Level/Historic-EU-payments-by-MS-NUTS-2-region-filter-by/2qa4-zm5t

As the graph shows, throughout the three programming periods (1989-2006), Piedmont would receive more than 1,6 billion euros. It is interesting to note how the amount of funds obtained by Piedmont would dramatically increase starting with the second programming period (1994-1999), which coincides with Castellani's two mandates (1993-2001); the further increase in funds received by the Region in the last programming period would then be motivated by the 1) Turin's selection as 2006 winter Olympic venue (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012), and 2) by the wide number of projects that would be defined within the Strategic Plan – which would be completed in 2000 – and that would obtain EU funding because of their contribution to the overall strategic redevelopment strategy (Pinson, 2002a, p. 489).

[203] It was eligible for Objective 2 and 5b from 1989 until 1999, until the two objectives were separated; for the 2000-2006 period, Piedmont would still be eligible for objective 2, which now incorporated objective 5b (EU et al., 2006).
[204] https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2000-2006/italy/objective-2-programme-for-piedmont

The requirement of public-private partnership to apply for EU funds has then had a fundamental role in terms of strengthening relations and among different sets of actors.

> *"[…] I had walked up to the Industrial Union director and told him: 'Let's try to do this!' And he says, 'Are they going to listen to us?' I said, 'Yes, because if we have an idea about how to use EU funds in a way that unions and entrepreneurial worlds are on the same line, why should they say no?"*
> (Interview 16)

As the interview shows, the availability of EU funds, and the eligibility criteria requiring various actors to partner, would be strong incentive for a variety of players to extend their networks and engage in programming together. The deal struck between Labour Unions and Industrial Union, to which the interview referred, would bring funds that would help construct five industrial areas around Turin (Interview 16; EU *et al*., 2006). Although Unions and industrial management are two categories that have been interacting for some time, even before EU funding programmes became available, their interactions had been limited to the field of industrial relations (Interview 22), rather than on cooperating for a shared objective. The novelty of EU funds, the opportunities they made available, and the partnership requirement would, in any case, bring together a whole range of actors – beyond those typically involved in industrial relations – that had had until then entertained very few contacts among each other.

> *"This is something I experienced personally…being involved in committee X or committee Y, which had to evaluate projects for the Region, shortlisting candidates, and so on […]. I saw people in dialogue…people that would not interact before, and in many cases not even for traditional class conflict reasons; I mean, it's clear that the Unions and Confindustria, or FIAT, would meet on a regular basis, glowering each other, […], but within a clear pattern of industrial relations. The fact that, at some point, because of the features of a project, the participants to the same table could be, beyond the usual, mandatory unions and local government, these could be…the Church – because this may have consisted in the restructuration or restoration of a church – or a programme relative to professional training, for which in Turin you couldn't ignore the Salesians…this kind of things, and the fact of cooperating and, somehow, co-deliberating, seems to me a strong novelty of the period."*
> (Interview 22)

A final fundamental factor that would contribute to the emergence of Turin's local governance would concern the role of novel or reformed entities, namely banking foundations and universities. A case that well

illustrates their role is the operation concerning the doubling of the Polytechnic facilities, which would also involve the *Compagnia di San Paolo*, one of the city's two banking foundations. At the end of the 1980s, an opportunity for the Polytechnic university to expand its research and teaching facilities is opened by two fronts (interview 13): first, behind the old Polytechnic's building, on what would become the central spine[205], a former industrial area is dismantled, freeing space for a potential construction operation; second, the elaboration of the new Master Plan, although still in its initial stages, offers an opportunity to insert the Polytechnic's doubling into the plan as a strategic intervention that would contribute to the redevelopment of the central spine. During the Master Plan's elaboration phase, therefore, the University would intensify its interactions with the municipality, to discuss and define the details of the expansion project to be included in the planning document (Interview 13). At the same time, between 1989 and 1990, the reforms on university autonomy[206] would enhance the university's freedom of manoeuvre, not only by allowing it to express a novel strategic capacity (interview 13), but also by allowing it to expand its funding sources, making it possible to increase its financial capabilities. In the years between the 1990 university reforms and Castellani's election, the Polytechnic would then become a major supporter of the new Master Plan's approval[207], as this would include the 'doubling operation' within its provisions. As the Master Plan was approved, it appeared as the Polytechnic was free to start construction operations, but a major obstacle would be represented by the national railways. The national railway company (*FS – Ferrovie dello Stato*) owned the land over which the new facilities should have been located, and the Polytechnic needed the acquire those areas. It would take almost ten years for the National Railway Company to finally sell those areas to the Polytechnic: talks were started in 1991 and the sale would only be concluded in 2000; in the meanwhile, in 1994, an agreement between the two actors would allow the Polytechnic start reconstruction activities of selected chunks of the whole redevelopment area even before its full ownership would be transferred to the Polytechnic. At this stage, the Polytechnic needed to find the funds for the operation: in 1997, an agreement with the Education Department would be signed, whereby the whole operation would be financed in equal parts by the Department and University (interview 13). The first intervention was worth 70 million euros, and the University therefore needed to find 35 million, which it could not raise from its budget alone. The reform of university autonomy was, in this case, crucial in putting the Polytechnic in a position to concretely undertake the operation: first, it allowed it to take legal responsibility for reconstruction works, by entering into an agreement with the Education Department as an autonomous actor; second, by allowing the Polytechnic to partner with other institutions, both public and private, and to receive private funding, it would expand funding options for the University, making it concretely possible to

[205] Where, before being moved underground, the railway tracks were placed.
[206] See chapter 5.
[207] Indeed, the Polytechnic's Dean, Rodolfo Zich, would be one of the eight 'wise men' identified to select and legitimise Castellani's candidacy (Vattimo G., "In declino i partiti, nascono i movimenti", *La Stampa*, March 27, 1993). Castellani himself, moreover, was a Polytechnic Professor.

gather enough resources to carry out the doubling project. To cover the University's share of the funding costs, as provided by the agreement with the Department, funds would be provided, indeed, by the *Compagnia di San Paolo*, which would put 30 out of the 35 million needed (Interview 13); further interventions would instead be possible by the funds provided by the Municipality, the Region and the Province, for a further 50 million euros (Interview 13). After the sale of the redevelopment area to the Polytechnic in 2000, works would continue until 2008; however, in the period I am interested in, that is, until 2000, the Polytechnic, in particular through the doubling operation, would strengthen its ties with local public actors – city, province and region – and with quasi-public ones such as banking foundations. The size and importance of the 'doubling operation' meant that, by including the project in the Master Plan, the Polytechnic concretely took part in defining part of the city's agenda, contributing to the definition of a major strategic redevelopment project. Further, during the negotiations with the National Railways, the University would rely on the support of the municipality and the region, equally committed to the realisation of such a strategic project (Castellani, 2008). Finally, the crucial role of the *Compagnia di San Paolo* is not to be underestimated, as it provided most of the funds necessary for the Polytechnic to fulfil its obligation with the Education Department: overall, banking foundations' role in Turin's governance would be crucial precisely because they would act as 'enablers', funding a wide array of projects that, without their financial support, could have not been realised[208].

In sum, all the above-mentioned processes – overhaul of the local government machine, master plan implementation through the deployment of complex urban programmes, Europeanization, and coordination with reformed collective actors (banking foundations and universities) – have all contributed to the emergence of governance practices throughout Castellani's first mandate. As Castellani started his second mandate, after a tight electoral victory[209] in 1997, the two main objectives – Master Plan approval and administrative overhaul (Interview 15; Pinson, 2002a, p. 469-470) – of his first administration had been achieved. At this stage, the municipality had a further task ahead: one of the main policies pursued by the majority, that is, the internationalisation of the city, to be achieved by investing in tourism, culture, and research, had been partially initiated (the creation of ITP is a case in point), but had not been clearly defined as part of an overarching, long-term plan (Pinson, 2002a; Alfieri *et al*., 2012); further, these policy objectives could now be integrated with the Master Plan, so as to combine the physical transformative potential of the latter with a sweeping vision of the socio-economic future of the city that went beyond a mere stimulus to construction activity (Pinson, 2002a). Moreover, the experiences accumulated through the processes mentioned above, from Europeanization to administrative overhaul, had led to the emergence of a governance practice that was, however, not yet formalised, nor had it been cultivated as such, that is, as a

[208] See tables in chapter 4.
[209] At the 1997 ballot round, Castellani's coalition would be joined by *Rifondazione Comunista*, which would sustain Castellani throughout his whole second mandate (1997-2001).

value *per se,* although the idea of restructuring the political process in a more participatory manner, which would have entailed the involvement of local civil society actors, had been among Castellani's objectives since the start.

There were, however, two further elements that would be crucial in leading to the decision to embark on a process of participatory strategic planning. The former is the willingness and commitment of an individual, Assessor[210] Fiorenzo Alfieri. Alfieri, who was now part of Castellani's executive team, had actually been involved in local politics since 1976, when he became Youth and Sports assessor in Novelli's first administration (Alfieri *et al*., 2012). In that role, since the end of the 1970s, he started making frequent visits to Barcelona[211], where he and his entourage would spread their knowledge and experience in the field of pedagogics, in which Turin was, in those years, a pioneer as to new approaches to the discipline (Alfieri et al., 2012). Throughout his visits, Alfieri would get to know Barcelona's policies for education, youth, and culture (Alfieri *et al*., 2012), and would witness the municipal project creativity that was emerging in parallel to Spain's democratization process; his visits would go on until the 1990s and he established personal contacts with Pasqual Maragall, Barcelona's mayor of the 1992 Olympics, and Eric Truno, Barcelona's sports and youth assessor. These contacts would allow him to have a first-hand experience of Barcelona's reconstruction process, and of how this was achieved through the elaboration of a Strategic Plan that involved civil society elements in a process of participatory planning. The second element, as anticipated in the previous section, was the administration's involvement in European city networks, which, apart from learning from other cities best practices, would constitute a major opportunity for learning and where Mayor Castellani too would get to meet Pasqual Maragall (Bagnasco and Castellani, 2014; Castellani, 2008).

After Castellani's second electoral victory, then, it would be Assessor Alfieri who took the initiative. The driving motive behind his move was his unsatisfaction[212] with the how the administration was dealing with its insufficiently defined goals of internationalisation, cultural, research and touristic investment (Alfieri *et al.*, 2012).

> *"[…] Castellani asked me: 'What is it that you want?' I replied: 'I'd like that we followed the example set by those cities that managed to react to their crises and change.' 'That is?', he asked. And I said: 'Those cities that adopted a Strategic Plan, not implemented in a top-down fashion, from politics or administration, but agreed upon among the various major and relevant subjects, and through citizen participation, as much as possible. I followed closely Barcelona's experience, but that's not the only city that undertook this path.' And Castellani: 'I know Barcelona's mayor very well, he's overseen the transformation of that city for 15 years, which started with the*

[210] Between 1995 and 1997 (Castellani's first mandate), Alfieri was Education System Assessor; from 1997 until 2001 (Castellani's second mandate) he would be, not surprisingly, City Promotion and Strategic Plan Assessor.
[211] In the crucial years of Spain's democratization.
[212] "Solo nella città che non sa crescere", *La Stampa*, December 11, 1997.

Olympics but has continued afterwards. I know you know him too. He's left his mayoral post not too long ago and now he's teaching urban marketing in Rome. Let's call him.' On the spot, Pasqual Maragall was called and he was asked if he was available to act as president of the scientific committee of Turin's Strategic Plan. Maragall accepted and me and Castellani parted, both committed to initiate the Strategic Plan's development process as soon as possible, a process that would draw on the experiences of other European cities […]."
(Alfieri, 2012, p. 68-69)

What this quotation highlights is that, while not underestimating the crucial role of the governance practices (Europeanisation and so on) that had emerged during the first mandate, the decision to initiate a process of participatory strategic planning was ultimately owed to individual agency, namely to the ambitions and actions of Fiorenzo Alfieri and Mayor Valentino Castellani. Moreover, a crucial factor that pushed in this direction was the two figures' personal experiences: Alfieri had a personal background of frequent interactions with Barcelona, and had a direct experience of the strategies, practices and instruments that the administration of the Catalan capital had adopted throughout its reconstruction phase; Castellani, on the other hand, personally knew Mayor Maragall and, through his involvement in European city networks, him too had a knowledge of Barcelona's strategic plan.

In 1998, then, the Strategic Plan's elaboration[213] process would start. The overarching objectives of the Plan would be of two types: economic and political. From an economic perspective, the goals were to defend what was left of the city's manufacturing resources, and, as mentioned above, to focus on new aspects that could sustain development, namely tourism, culture, urban marketing, and internationalisation (Pinson, 2002 a, p. 470). The idea was, chiefly, to promote these objectives, as well as specific projects already initiated in the city in the previous years, within a comprehensive strategic vision; further, the Plan itself would serve to launch novel projects, through a constant networking practice (*idem*, p. 475). From a political perspective, the Plan was conceived to strengthen local pluralism, favouring dialogue and interaction among local actors; to create a new arena, alternative to the traditional formal political ones, where different themes could be discussed, and to create a cohesive network of actors involved in discussing these themes. This way, the plan was meant to foster 'teamwork' and increase local 'organisational capacity'; through these actions, the idea was to redefine a local identity and to stimulate the ackowledgment of shared interests and objectives (*idem*, p. 470-475).

Within this framework, a crucial aspect would concern the importance attributed to the idea of 'shared vision', viewed as central with respect to the city's capacity to organise, to its potential for success and its competitiveness (*idem*, p. 475). That of a 'shared vision' would soon become one of the chief goals of

[213] Described in the previous section.

the whole planning process, as well as a resource to be nurtured once the Plan was concluded. In this sense, the way projects and strategic lines would be defined throughout the elaboration procedure was meant to contribute to strengthening interactions and networks among actors: projects were not devised through a synoptic logic, but would be generated through interaction, as part of an incremental process (idem, p. 482-483). This way, the planning procedure would serve to manage the interactive process itself, which would come to be viewed as "constant social activity" (*idem*, p. 484), rather than as a definitive expression of the general interest. This would also mean that, once the document was ready, the planning process should continue along the same principles throughout the Plan's implementation phase: this is why the Strategic Plan provided for the creation of the *Torino Internazionale* Association[214], which was conceived as the tool for implementing the Plan, as well as a means to reinforce the networks and interactions that had been built during the Plan's elaboration.

In sum, the plan was understood from the start as a participatory instrument, one that was meant not only to define a shared agenda, but also to foster, create, and strengthen relations and interactions among actors (Pinson, 2002 a & b; Dente and Melloni, 2005). The way the whole process was carried out, during both the planning and implementation phases, was precisely aimed at building a system of governance, itself viewed as a crucial resource upon which the city could organize its redevelopment strategy. As anticipated in Chapter 1, then, it is through the strategic plan's development process that Turin's governance practices would be formalised, expanded, and strengthened, rather than created[215] anew, and harmonised within a coherent, indeed 'shared' vision.

[214] See Chapter 1.

[215] It is all the processes I have analysed so far that 'created' Turin's governance.

Figure 2. Re-institutionalisation – key process shifts.



II.II Re-institutionalisation: causal mechanisms

This last phase of the process, that of reinstitutionalisation, would essentially comprise two causal mechanisms: a mechanism of coordination as a response to institutional reform and fragmentation, drawn from the historical institutionalist school, and one of isomorphism, drawn from the sociological institutionalist tradition. These two would be complemented by an overarching learning process that had been going on since before Castellani's election. I will now look at them in turn.

Recalling the historical institutionalist understanding of governance formation, illustrated in Chapter 2, this views governance as a response to instiutional fragmentation brought about by the implementation of reforms insipired by managerialist principles (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007). Because of the proliferation of different organisations, public and quasi-public agencies, governance becomes a tool that helps overcome fragmentation and enhances coordination among various actors, who are well aware of their mutual resource interdependencies.

In the case of Turin, there are various instances of how this mechanism has unfolded. A first one is represented by how the Master Plan's approval, and subsequent implementation, would act as a coordinating tool between political actors and the wider construction sector. The latter needed the the Master Plan to be approved as a condition to initiate the reconstruction activities that had been opened by the proliferation of brownfields that had spread throughout the city in the previous years; approving the Master Plan is something that only public authorities could have achieved, and this explains why several members of the local Constructors College (ANCE – *Collegio Costruttori*) would support *Alleanza per Torino* at the 1993 elections[216]. Public authorities, on the other hand, needed the technical and financial resources of local construction firms to concretely start the reconstruction process prefigured by the Master Plan.

> *"[…] There were entrepreneurs, De Giuli was one of those, [he was also] municipal councillor. […] What was the deal? Not an ideological one, he had an interests in restructuring Turin's downtown; our interest was that Turin's downtown wasn't left…it was a Kasbah…so what do we do? One idea was the so-called 3x2…you, De Giuli – and he brought with him other real estate entrepreneurs – you restructure three public housing apartments that cannot be assigned; you then use two of them to install people who are entitled to public housing – so no violations – who are living in the historic centre, in the apartments you want to empty; we have the advantage that, in the meanwhile, we can install two people in public housing, they are not evicted, and we*

[216] Mario De Giuli, who had been President of the local Constructors' College (ANCE), and founder of a major local construction firm, DeGa, would even join Alleanza per Torino and be elected in 1993 as municipal councillor ("Addio a Mario De Giuli, il costruttore che reinventò il centro storico di Torino", *La Repubblica Torino*, August 25, 2015; Comune Torino, 2020).

have a good apartment for… […]. So, behind these things […] there's a whole reasoning process, there's negotiation, economic and social negotiation […]: this is social engineering…"
(Interview 4)

Through the deal illustrated in the interview, De Giuli's enterprise would restructure a whole historic neighbourhood[217] – the *Quadrilatero Romano*, the 'Roman Square' – that had become a severely run-down area in the heart of the city centre. Implementing the Master Plan's prescriptions would then be a constant process of negotiation between public authorities and those actors involved in redevelopment: mainly, but not only, constructors and real estate entrepreneurs.

As shown in the previous section, to implement the Master Plan, local actors would often recur to the 'complex urban programmes' that had been introduced by national legislation at the beginning of the 1990s. Here, again, mutual resource interdependencies were the underlying reason behind this move: Turin's reconstruction process, as emphasised by various observers, would rely heavily upon public resources (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; Spaziante, 2008), because of the limited involvement, especially in a first phase (Spaziante 2008; Corsico, 2008) of private capital. Applying for complex urban programmes was thus a way to obtain additional, fundamental funds to carry out the redevelopment activity of those years; by 2008, 13 of such programmes had been implemented in Turin (Spaziante, 2008). The use of such programmes would then be fundamental in generating a negotiation practice among local actors (Castellani, 2008), who would partner to obtain funds, that would constitute one of the essential ingredients of what would later be reproduced through the Strategic Plan.

Another case of how institutional reform would lead to increased coordination is represented by the administrative overhaul implemented during Castellani's first mandate. In this case, it was the original 1993 reform of local electoral systems[218], that allowed for the restructuration of local government that would follow. In this case, however, managerialist principles would be implemented directly by local government actors, in particular throught the creation of the 'Municipal Corporation Department', which would drive the internal reorganization. Apart from redefining roles and functions of politicians and bureaucrats, the administrative overhaul would require a coordination effort on the part of both political and managerial actors, inspired by concepts of 'teamwork' (interview 3; Sorensen and Torfing, 2007, p. xx), to ensure smooth cooperation between the two.

"There, it was a major novelty and, I must say, I did keep in touch – we have a great relationship – with some managers of the day, because we really established an identity, a spirit, motivation

[217] "Addio a Mario De Giuli, il costruttore che reinventò il centro storico di Torino", *La Repubblica Torino*, August 25, 2015.
[218] Law 81/1993, itself preceded by law 142/1990, which would redefine the structure of local government systems (Vandelli, 1997).

and enthusiasm, and so on…I mean, this was absolutely novel…I mean, they would suddenly discover a…a new world.[…] I organized major training activities, which had never been done – managerial training […], taking managers around Piedmont, all the senior management […] – to teach them what 'teamwork' meant, and so on […]. So, people who, until a few days before, were but grey bureaucrats…were now major figures within the machine!"
(Interview 3)

Administrative reorganisation, therefore, would generate a need to establish novel coordination patterns between actors whose roles had just been redefined, and the administrative machine would be a venue where notions such as 'teamwork' would be adopted as guiding principles of the whole institution. Institutional reform and administrative restructuring would, moreover, also put the municipality in a condition to better supervise the redevelopment phase and better coordinate with other organisations; this was essentially due to two reasons. First, the local government reforms of 1990-1993 had created a municipal institution that produced much more cohesive and stable local executives[219], which would ensure local government activities would be coherent throughout more than two decades: for instance, the major steering function played by municipal authorities with respect to the implementation of the Master Plan has been noted by many (Spaziante, 2008); second, local government overhaul would free significant financial resources the municipality could employ to its ends (Inteview 3; Baraggioli, 2011; Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012).

Institutional reform, however, would not only lead to local government's reorganisation; the novel, or reformed entities that were created by national laws at the beginning of the 1990s would become crucial local players, which would repeatedly partner with the Commune. The most important such players would be the two local universities and the two banking foundations. As to the former, the doubling of the Polytechnic University is a case in point, as to convince the National Railways[220] to sell the land for the doubling operation, the Polytechnic worked closely with the municipal authorities. As to banking foundations, the coordination that would obtain between these and the municipality essentially depended on two elements: first, on the statutory provisions that afforded the Commune (and the local Chamber of Commerce) to nominate two components each of the foundations' management; second, once again because of resource interdependencies. The amount of money the two banking foundations were – and still are – endowed with (more than a billion euros each) would make them crucial actors in the local governance structure (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; Power *et al*., 2010)**:** in particular, their contribution would be fundamental in the realisation of projects related to culture and research, most of which would be possible due to the funds provided by the two institutions.

[219] Since the reform was introduced, in 1993, until today, 2021, all directly elected mayors have governed until the end of their mandates, without major crises; in the seven years (1985-1992) prior to 1993, four mayors would serve during only two mandates, and a commissar was sent in as the last mayor (Cattaneo) resigned in late 1992.
[220] Who acted more as an obstacle than as a partner in the whole operation (Castellani, 2008; Interview 13).

Finally, it is the very elaboration of the Strategic Plan that would crucially contribute to formalise local governance practices. As argued by Soresenen and Torfing[221] (2007), historical institutionalism sees the process of governance formation as one where interaction and coordination among actors foster the emergence of 'institutionalised norms' (idem, p. 31-32) that enhance and strengthen 'mutual dependency between the actors' (ibid.). In particular, these norms typically concern ideas such as 'holistic governance' and 'teamwork', and reinforce actors' awareness of their mutual interdependency. As illustrated in the previous section, then, the Strategic Plan has preceisely worked in this manner. The idea that the planning process should be a continuous and incremental activity of interaction that should have carried on even during the Plan's implementation phase, stresses how the Plan was indeed conceived as a tool to strengthen and reinforce interaction and networking practices. Furthermore, these ambitions were jobvioulsy underpinned by the idea that constructing a governance network would have been a value per se, and one of the aims of the planning procedure, apart from defining an agenda, was indeed that of building or reinforcing interactions among actors, viewed as an indispensable ingredient for the city to achieve its goals. It should then be no surprise that, as Sorensen and Torfing hypothesized, the Plan's elaboration and implementation procedure would emphasise the value of teamwork, shared vision, and organisational capacity: by insisting on these ideas, for sure, actors were pushed to see their cooperation not only as a tool to achieve specific, concrete, and perhaps individual advantages, but also as a fundamental resource in itself.

As to isomorphism, as illustrated in Chapter 2, this is a process whereby organisations replicate already existing organisational frameworks that can be found in the surrounding environment (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007; Pichierri, 2011). Isomorphism can then be of different kinds; in Turin, two types of isomporhism could be observed: coercive isomporphism and mimetic isomorphism. The former type refers to the situation in which given organisations, to access importan resources, are pushed by higher administrative tiers to adopt a specific organisational design; the second type, mimetic isomorphism concerns organisations that intentionally copy organisational designs implemented by other exisiting organisations that are deemed particularly authoritative and effective (Soresen and Torfing, 2007).

In Turin, coercive isomorphism would obtain in two particular cases, both concerning the possibility to access funds. The first has to do with European funding programmes, which would require applicants to partner in order to access funds: the organisational framework that is here required by European programmes is that of the partnership.

> *"[…] Institutional reform changes governance in the '90 […], better, it lets governance in, in a sense…I view [this] as coming from various elements, two of which are particularly important: one, everyone knows, it's the reform introducing mayoral direct election […], and so on; the*

[221] See chapter 2.

other, greatly underestimated, I believe, especially in Turin, is the European influx, namely the direct or indirect influx of European policies […]. Because, in my opinion, in '93, I am unsure as to whether it was in the same year, or within one year time, the governance turn in Turin, or the emergence of Turin's governance derives from the direct mayoral election and the fact, here, that Turin is identified as 'Area 2 objective', so…this is, I believe, a crucial step, somewhat underestimated in subsequent reconstructions, for the European Union, with its procedures to distribute structural funds that, essentially, simply demanded that you never had a single applicant, in the name of…that in the name of social dialogue, […] you always needed a group, at least two…major applicants. I perceived this thing back then – but I believe others saw it this way, unionists, and the politicians I knew – we perceived it as a surprise, as a markedly exogenous factor […]. From this perspective, the Region's cunning, or the EU's cunning…of EU policies is that this money you can only have by complying with certain procedures […], which are discursive procedures…literally, for the first time in those years, sitting around the same table you would find – not for unions' negotiations, but for reasons […] of collaboration and potential agreements over the splitting of the 'bounty' […] – you'd find people that had never met, or surely that had never met for that reason, not in that context…"

(Interview 22)

The availability of EU funding schemes, and the application requirements these would impose, would play a crucial role in getting various players together – some of whom, as the interview shows, had never cooperated before. A second case of coercive isomorphism would essentially work in the very same manner: the introduction of the 'complex urban programmes' at the beginning of the 1990s would bring about a similar mechanism. To obtain funds, actors were required to create partnerships, which would further strengthen cooperative networks and negotiation practices (Castellani, 2008; Saccomani, 2008; Spaziante, 2008).

As to mimetic isomorphism, this can be observed in mainly two instances, and is in part the result of the municipality's involvement in European city networks. One has to do with the *Progetto Speciale Periferie*, the neighbourhood regeneration programme that would feature residents' involvement in a participatory, bottom-up process of defining priorities (Power et al, 2010; Saccomani, 2008). This programme would be insipired by similar schemes put in practice in other European cities that the local authorities came to appreciate in the context of supra-national networking (Power et al., 2010): it was, in particular, within the *Quartiers en Crise* city network that the Turin's officials would learn about the programme (Bagnasco and Castellani, 2014).

The second instance of mimetic isomorphism is that of the Strategic Plan. This was a tool that had previously been adopted by Spanish cities to organise their own reconstruction processes (Alfieri *et al*., 2012);

that of Barcelona, in particular, was indeed a case that could be deemed to be both authoritative and effective, in that it would ground the regeneration of the city that would culminate with the success of the 1992 Summer Olympics. The personal netoworks established by Alfieri and Mayor Castellani with Barcelona's mayor would be the further factor behind the decision to adopt a similar instrument in Turin; further, to ensure Turin's strategic Plan would be effective, both Pasqual Maragall and Eric Truno would be asked to join the Scientific Committee overseeing the Plan's development.

The decision to undertake a process of strategic planning also owes a great deal to individual agency. As Bevir and Rhodes (2007) argued, governance does not merely emerge as an automatic and impersonal reaction to processes of institutional reform and fragmentation: on the contrary, it is typically throught the actions of individual actors who, indeed, act upon particular institutional conditions, that governance is ultimately formed. In Turin's case, the initiative taken by Assessor Fiorenzo Alfieri best exemplifies the importance of agency in pushing for the strengthening of governance practices. Of course, in doing so he could draw on his previous experiences and on the personal networks he had built through the years with Barcelona's public officials: Alfieri did not invent strategic planning, but he was crucial in pushing Turin's mayor to adopt such a procedure. This is not, importantly, to discount the role of 'strucutre' and macro-processes with respect to governance formation, by far: merely, as I argued in Chapter 2, it is to stress how to understand and explain a complex phenomenon such as governance, both strucutral frameworks and agency are fundamental.

Finally, the learning dynamic. The process of learning is a process by which local actors, through repeated interactions, have learnt to cooperate and work together in pursuit of collective goals. The process had actually started some time before Castellani became mayor. As pointed out in the previous chapter, there have been three instances, at the end of the 1980s, where local actors would come together. First, is the process of intellectual debate and reflection, that had taken place in several of the city's cultural institutes. As we saw, these conversations would bring together party members (mainly coming from the Communist party), unionists, intellectuals, entrepreneurs and local professionals; in addition, the crisis of labour unions that had kicked in after the 1980 defeat at FIAT, would lead the Communist party to negotiate disputes with industrial management alongside union members. By the end of the decade, furthermore, the opportunities offered by European funding would further lead union members and industrial management to cooperate on aspects that would transcend the scope of industrial relations, turning instead to joint project definition: the industrial areas around Turin, constructed in the 1990s (EU *et al.*, 2006), are the product of such cooperative effort.

This first phase had the effect of bringing together various actors who would find common ground in the acknowledgment that cooperation was a fundamental tool to get the city back on a development pattern. In addition, it strengthened relationships between these various actors, reinforcing mutual trust among them. As the critical juncture kicked in, the process of building the coalition that would lead Castellani to

become mayor could then build on relationships that had been cultivated in the previous years; local actors, in particular PDS party members and liberal groups, were well aware that part of their programmatic objectives converged. The winning of the election is then a moment of truth, in which the development vision for the city and the pact between entrepreneurial liberal élites and reformist left-wing politicians became a feature of the new administration's understanding of urban governance.

Throughout the first mandate (1993-1997), the learning process would continue, supported by the coalition's commitment to involve relevant actors into the political process. The Master Plan approval procedure would feature the cooperation of political actors and constructor and real estate players; the organizational overhaul of the local administrative machine would instead redefine and strengthen interactions between the municipal bureaucracy and political actors. Finally, the involvement of local actors in cooperation practices to obtain EU funds would reinforce the practice of participative negotiation of objectives.

As the second mandate started, in 1997, local political and non-political actors had then been working and collaborating for several years. The strategic plan's development process is then the culmination of an attempt to formalise the practice of cooperative, participative decision-making. Actors involved had learnt to cooperate and had been major figures of the local political or social spheres in the previous decade. So, although the actual idea to adopt a strategic plan wold emerge at the end of 1997, and would, again, be supported by the political entrepreneurship of local political figure, this time Fiorenzo Alfieri and Mayor Castellani, the operative phase could build on experiences that had been cultivated for years.

II.III Re-institutionalisation: Causal significance

We have just seen the causal processes at work in this latter phase: a process of inter-organisational coordination that followed institutional reform and fragmentation; a process of isomorphism leading to further coordination; a learning dynamic underpinned by repeated contacts between various organisations, groups and individuals; and, finally, the role of the strategic plan in stimulating a strengthening of the governance practices and dynamics.

The unfolding of these processes, furthermore, allows to assess whether the remaining hypotheses spelled out in Chapter 3 can be validated. Additionally, apart from the four hypotheses connected to the four processes above, we are finally in a position to assess the validity of one more hypotheses that I could only start discussing earlier on, since the outcome of the process was not yet observable, namely that concerning government stability. The hypotheses I am going to discuss now are the following: H3 – state rescaling and institutional fragmentation increase the likelihood that a governance coalition will emerge; H4 – incentives to cooperation (isomorphic pressures) will increase the likelihood for a governance coalition to emerge; H6 – the more contacts have been cultivated between political actors and civil society, the more likely it is for a

governance coalition to emerge. H7 – the definition of a shared agenda (compounded by the introduction of strategic programming or consultation tools – i.e., strategic plans or participatory arenas, respectively) increases the likelihood for a governance coalition to emerge. Additionally, I am going to try to assess the validity of H2: The more local government is stable, the higher the chances for a local governance coalition to emerge.

First, H3, according to which state rescaling and institutional fragmentation increase the likelihood of governance emergence. As to state rescaling, the main innovation in Turin was the 1993 reform of local government. We have seen above how this permitted to form more local executives that were more cohesive and less dependent on party negotiations; further, it empowered the executive, contributing significantly to increased local government's capacity to act. The reform not only made local executives more stable but allowed them more freedom of manoeuvre with respect to the further restructuring of the local institutional landscape: the new administration would then proceed to overhaul the municipal administrative machine and would privatize utilities. These two moves, in turn, determined a further fragmentation of the local institutional framework. In parallel to this, during the re-institutionalisation phase, novel institutions have indeed emerged in Turin, while already existing ones have been reformed, like universities for instance; both universities and banking foundations, importantly, were created (or reformed) through reforms in 1990, during the initial phases of the critical juncture, but the effects of such reforms can more easily be observed in this latter stage. Concerning the universities, we have noted how cooperation between the Polytechnic and Turin's municipality was key in ensuring the Polytechnic's doubling project could be undertaken. Here, resource interdependencies were crucial: the Polytechnic did not have enough financial resources to embark on the project on its own, while the municipality took advantage of the doubling project to further implement its goals concerning the physical reconstruction of the urban fabric. The Master Plan was another example of cooperation motivated by resource interdependencies: the Polytechnic needed the new Master Plan (containing the Polytechnic's doubling project) to be approved in order to undertake works; the municipality needed the Polytechnic's expertise to define parts of the Master Plan. In this case, surely, cooperation was underpinned by resource interdependencies, and the reform redefining Italian universities' legal status was a crucial facilitator, in that in allowed the university's administration much more freedom of manoeuvre, permitting it to negotiate with other entities independently of the Ministry of Education. As to banking foundations, resource interdependencies would play a similar, crucial role in establishing a bond between the two foundations and the municipality, facilitated by the latter's role in determining the executive bodies of the two non-for-profit financial institutions.

State rescaling and reform, then, have surely contributed to creating novel institutions in Turin: banking foundations, the ITP investment agency, the two reformed universities, the newly privatised utilities, the Museum Foundation (Alfieri, 2012), besides more traditional public institutions such as the Region and Province, or the ATP, the territorial housing agency for Turin, the Chamber of Commerce and its congress

centre, to name a few. Such an institutional landscape has then provided fertile ground for the emergence and strengthening of inter-organisational cooperative practices. However, as Bevir and Rhodes (2007) have pointed out, the prevailing ideas in the literature (Bevir and Rhodes, 2007, p. 77), seem to call for a quasi-automatic, impersonal coordinative response to rescaling and fragmentation. Over this last assumption, it seems more legitimate to have some doubts. One example, in the case of Turin, can be found by looking at relationships between the municipality and the *Compagnia di San Paolo*, the city's leading banking foundation. As former mayor Castellani (Bagnasco and Castellani, 2014, p. 62-63) himself has pointed out, the municipality's relations with the *Compagnia* were initially far from harmonious, as the foundation's executive had been nominated by the previous local administration: as soon as Castellani took office, he attempted to use his power to nominate the heads of the company, demanding to the foundation's executives to step down from their role; as they refused, a legal battle ensued, which lasted until the *Compagnia*'s executive naturally ended their mandate[222]; only after that moment would the San Paolo Company become a key member of the local governance arena. This is simply to say that resource interdependencies and institutional fragmentation may surely provide the conditions for governance to emerge, but the mere fact of their existence does not automatically lead to cooperation and governance. What seems crucial is that individuals within various agencies and organisations, public and private, interact among each other, repeat their contacts, and engage in a constant process of learning, exchange, cooperation, and networking.

In sum, state rescaling and institutional fragmentation, at least as far as Turin is concerned, appear as having been necessary. Without these, the three main actors of the local governance coalition might have not been there at all: universities would have had a much more limited capacity to act, banking foundations would have not existed, and local government may have been rather different from that which emerged after the reform. At the same time, state rescaling and fragmentation are, by themselves, not sufficient for governance to obtain. The hypothesis remains therefore a hoop test.

As to H4, concerning incentives to cooperation, they undoubtedly have played a key role in Turin, as they have been one of the first factors that led different actors to cooperate to access funding. This is true for both complex urban programmes as well as EU funding, both of which have served, among other things, to strengthen cooperative practices among key actors. Isomorphic pressures, therefore, can definitely be viewed as facilitating factors with respect to governance emergence: without these, several actors of the urban community might have not entered into contact. The hypothesis thus appears as a hoop test.

H6, concerning contacts between political and non-political actors, has been partially addressed at the end of the previous chapter. Surely, the city-wide debate of the second half of the 1980s has surely helped in the way of expanding and strengthening networking relations and contacts among relevant actors; the

[222] In 1996.

contacts that were then held in *Torino Incontra* in 1992, the year before Castellani's elections, not only built on these previous relations, but extended these and were key in leading to the alliance between Salza's group and the PDS. These contacts, coupled with those that developed due to isomorphic pressures, and those that developed with the aim to pool resources – such as that between municipality and Polytechnic – were surely essential in leading to the emergence of Turin's governance coalition: through repeated interactions, a process of learning has been put in motion, whereby mutual trust among relevant players has been strengthened and the compatibility of objectives and ideas has been tested. This factor, moreover, is not a mere facilitator for governance emergence: as governance requires informal cooperation among individuals and organisations, it hard to see how it can emerge without some initial contacts that have helped participants familiarize and build trust among each other. One may still counter that governance emerges because of coercive isomorphism, which pushes individuals to cooperate even if they have not had any prior contact. While this may be true, this type of cooperation does not necessarily amount to governance. Coercive isomorphism pushes individuals to cooperate because this is a requirement to obtain, say, funding for a specific project; cooperation on a specific project, however, does not amount to proper governance. After all, relevant actors may stop cooperating after the project is over; alternatively, they may continue to interact, leading to the gradual and incremental emergence of a governance arrangement or coalition; this, in turn, will have built on the contacts previously established. Precisely because governance emerges gradually and incrementally, it is hard to see how a single, abrupt event may institute a governance arrangement on the spot; time is needed, and only through repeated contacts among relevant actors may governance emerge. The hypothesis therefore is validated, as validated is its status as a hoop test.

As to H7, concerning the elaboration of a shared agenda and the role of supporting tools (strategic plans**,** participatory arenas), these, too, appear as fundamental factors in the way of governance emergence. In the previous chapter we have seen how the shared commitment to development has gradually brought political and non-political actors together, and the supportive role played by the meetings held in *Torino Incontra*. Here, something similar has occurred during the elaboration of the strategic plan, although, in this latter case, the commitment to ideas of shared vision and participation was much stronger and was intentionally built in the whole process by its main actors. Objectives were in this case defined through the interactive planning process, and it is participatory character contributed to the sense of belonging among actors, enhancing their awareness of the value of cooperation. Defining a shared agenda, therefore, has surely helped in the way of governance formation, and the process' participatory character has reinforced relationships among actors. While strategic planning on its own does not seem necessary for governance to emerge, it certainly amounts to a facilitator; a shared commitment to a political agenda, on the other hand, appears to be a necessary ingredient for governance to form.

H2, the last hypothesis I am considering here, instead concerns government stability. We have already seen how, in the pre-critical juncture period, when local government was highly unstable, no

governance arrangement would form. In this latter, re-institutionalisation phase, government was instead definitely stable, in that it managed to survive its whole first mandate – and was even re-elected. Stability was in part owed to the 1993 reform of local government, which empowered mayor and local executive, making them less dependent on party agreements. While the 1993 reform was indeed a crucial enabling factor, stable governments had existed even before the reform, such as the 1975-1980 red-wing administration. In both cases in which local government was stable (during the red wing's first mandate and during Castellani's two terms) governance would indeed emerge, whereas during highly unstable phases (i.e., the 1985-1992 period), no governance coalition could be found. However, in phases of high government instability, it may still be the case that some political actors remain in place even when government changes, and manage to maintain governance arrangements with other, non-political actors. Government stability does not, therefore, appear to be a necessary condition for governance emergence; the hypothesis remains thus a straw in the wind. Yet, government stability does indeed appear to be a facilitating factor for governance formation, and the hypothesis is then validated.

Chapter 7. Conclusions

Wrapping up, we can now provide an explanation to the puzzle that inspired this whole research, that is, why did a pluralist governance coalition emerge in a formerly manufacturing city, whose previous governance models featured elements of party government and corporatism? In the type of pluralist governance that obtained in Turin the political process would be viewed as an incremental, constant dynamic whereby policy goals emerge through the interaction with a variety of actors (this was especially the case during the Strategic Plan's elaboration). True, as mentioned in Chapter 4, this was a form of stratified pluralism, where a series of actors had a more prominent role within the governance coalition – banking foundation, academia, constructors – but this did not prevent other actors, such as third sector associations and cultural organisations, from getting involved in agenda setting and in the overall process of redevelopment. Moreover, within Turin's pluralist governance, no actor was in a position to unilaterally impose its choices to others, and the condition of mutual resource interdependency underpinned the city's governance structure: political actors had organisational and consensus resources; banking foundations had major financial resources; academia had epistemic and technical resources; constructors had the know-how, and so on.

What is most striking is that such a governance type has emerged in city that was, until the 1970s, characterized by a governance model underpinned by completely different premises. First, the city was a Fordist 'one company town', whose economic and social life was dominated by a single actor – FIAT – and by factory life. Because of the overarching Italian post-war political culture, Turin's formal political arena had essentially been dominated by parties. Two were the actors who had a privileged interaction with the local political sphere: on the one hand, obviously, FIAT who was indeed in a position to unilaterally impose its choices over the whole city, because of the disproportionate number of resources it possessed with respect to any other local actor[223]; the other actor were labour unions, and this should not be surprising in a city whose manufacturing character was so explicit. However, the type of interaction that would obtain between labour unions and political actors was not one of constant negotiation: rather, there was what I called a 'division of labour' between unions and political players (mainly the Communist party), whereby Unions were responsible for industrial relations, while the party would focus on policy, translating Unions' struggles in the political arena. Similarly, FIAT's privileged position was indeed owed to its resource endowment, but it would not consist of an established, routinized negotiation and interaction pattern with the political sphere; rather, FIAT would pursue its objective either through unilateral decisions that the municipality had no power to counter, or through soft power (Belligni and Ravazzi, 2012; Pinson, 2002 a; Tranfaglia, 1987, 1999). Apart

[223] FIAT not only had money, but owned major property in the city, it owned Turin's major newspaper, Italy's most successful football team, and so on.

from this, the local political arena had been rather insulated from the local civil society. Until the transformations of the 1980s, therefore, negotiation and cooperation, shared vision and teamwork had no place in the local political process: as Bagnasco (1986) had argued, the dominance of the regulative principle of 'organization' meant that the recourse to market interactions, that is, negotiation and contract, was extremely limited. The governance coalition that emerged in the 1990s, then, amounted to a radical transformation of the previous system.

This, in part, is why the process was rather lengthy, whose roots are indeed to be found in the previous decade, if not earlier. As we have seen, the events that unfold in the first five years of the 1980s are perceived by the local population as the moment in which a phase, the Fordist phase, of the city's history has come to an end: of course, the changing economic and productive frameworks are the crucial factors underpinning the transformation of the local socio-economic fabric that, gradually, comes to appear more pluralist. These transformations, for sure, impact on the relevance of one of the major local actors until that point, that is, labour unions.

The defeat at FIAT in October 1980 is a momentous event that has been often regarded as the 'defeat' of the workers movement, chiefly because of two consequences: first, the initial layoff of 23,000 workers deprives the Unions of delegates that had previously operated from within the factory, decreasing the movement's overall capacity to have a bearing on the company, as well as its bargaining power. The defeat, moreover, is mirrored rather swiftly in a general perception of weakening of the Unions (Manghi, 1985). The second consequence has to do with strategy and ideas: although it appears quite explicitly that the confrontational strategy that had hitherto characterized Unions' actions has lost effectiveness, a move towards a more European, negotiated approach to industrial relations is slow to emerge. In this respect, however, it makes sense to distinguish between the three confederal unions: while CISL and UIL are more rapid in grasping the changed reality, it is within the CGIL, the most left-wing of the Unions, that it is harder to accept the defeat. Although new voices and ideas do emerge, the Union's overall position remains one of closure to innovation, especially concerning the possibility to move towards a pattern of industrial relations centred on negotiation (Berta and Chiamparino, 1986). The 1985 referendum on the salary scale is a case in point, illustrating the divergence among the three Unions: only the CGIL remains adamantly opposed to modifying the norm but, contrary to the past, its position finds little support beyond the Unions' rank, and the confederation is once again defeated. In the meanwhile, FIAT operates an organizational overhaul (Pinson, 2002a), which mirrors the innovations introduced in the productive process: automation enters the factory and huge amounts of workforce are no longer needed. Soaring manufacturing unemployment (the number of laid off FIAT workers will amount to 35,000[224] in the 1980-1985 period) would indeed be the underlying factor depriving the workers' movement of its vitality and force.

[224] (Pinson, 2002a)

The weakening of the unions' movement would impinge over the position of the entire local left-wing environment. Recalling the 'division of labour' between Communist Party and Unions, the latter would be pivotal in sustaining and legitimizing the Party's stances and policies: as the Union weakened dramatically in the first half of the 1980s, this would reduce the party's local strength and its capacity for innovation, forcing it to cater to the weakened movements' needs (Berta and Chiamparino, 1986). Turin's left-wing, in any case, was also significantly weakened by industrial restructuring and the demise of Fordism: as their political battles, strategies and programs had been, for the whole post-war period, articulated on the basis of the peculiar Fordist productive framework, the Unions and the Party were initially rather lost as to how to cope with changing socio-economic circumstances: the plant, and workers' position within the plant, were not as central as they had been until a few years earlier, and the local left was unprepared to steer the city through major transformations of its economic base and it proved equally uncapable of taking advantage of the emerging socio-economic pluralism (Pinson, 2002a; Bagnasco, 1986).

This is what generated the process of ideational innovation and institutional layering that characterised the local Left-wing environment during the 1980s; specifically, the communist party would be affected by two trends. On the one hand, is the proper ideational innovation and layering, where a new group of individuals – the younger generation – comes of age and starts supporting newer positions with respect to working conditions, embracing flexibility, wage differentiation and the overall modernisation process. On the other hand, as it partially substituted the Unions in their function as actor in charge of industrial relations, it started interacting more frequently with the local industrial and economic sectors; a habit of negotiating between these two groups would gradually emerge, enhancing mutual trust. In the second half of the 1980s, then, these contacts would turn into a proper phase of discussion over the city's conditions, involving Union members and academics, alongside politicians and entrepreneurs. This original informal interaction among these groups would engender mutual trust and produce a first networking experience between various sectors of the local civil society and local political actors.

Concomitantly, the 'five-party' coalitions had come to power in Turin: their intention of being the agents of change would collide against a reality of internal rivalries, clienteles, and patronage, thus fostering awareness, among the local populace, of the inadequacy of the local political sphere. The unaccomplished Lingotto renewal and the tormented events concerning the New Master Plan are good examples of the inefficiency of the local government. This way of running politics would result from a path-dependent trajectory that had led political parties to play an overwhelming role in Italian national and local politics. Focusing on the local level, this derived from the administrative design of the local government machine, where the proportional electoral system and the indirect mayoral election would only reinforce the position of parties in local political life. This would, in addition, militate against government effectiveness, limit the municipality's capacity to act as well as hinder its capacity for strategic vision. In sum, the local administrative framework and party cultures would prevent any significant deviation from the *status quo*.

This would change because of series of events, both exogenous and endogenous, would configure the following period (1990-1993) as a critical juncture, which would in turn de-structure the previous institutional framework and open multiple windows of opportunity for agency and choice to impinge upon the subsequent institutional outcome. Two endogenous events would de-structure the national, and local, political systems: the fall of Communism and *Tangentopoli*. Whereas the repercussions of the former would, in Turin, mainly be felt by the Communist party, which would be re-founded as a reformist, democratic political formation – the Democratic Party of the Left – the latter would wipe major Italian post-war parties out of the scene: the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, and the secular parties, that is, the Republicans and the Liberals. At the same time, internally, Zanone's choice to leave the mayoral seat would initiate a phase of uncertainty and confusion concerning the local political arena; when, at the end of 1992, local government would be suspended and a commissar sent to Turin, new elections are then called for spring of 1993. The two elements – endogenous and exogenous – combined would thus open new opportunities in terms of possible political alliances to be formed; previous ideological and programmatic obstacles to joining a coalition government with the Communists – who were officially no longer communists – were now lifted, and the key figures in the PDS started looking for possibilities to form a credible ticket for the subsequent elections. As *Tangentopoli* had severely weakened political parties (their official demise would come a few years later), civil society elements, mostly connected to liberal environments, would be sought by PDS leaders; these are people with whom, in the previous decade, the Communists had strengthened relationships and reinforced mutual trust; by now, the two factions – political left-wing elements and liberal civil society ones – had a similar view as to the city development and chose to form a civic list – *Alleanza per Torino* – to run for elections. In doing so, members of the two factions relied on the logic of appropriateness to select each other. The reform of local government systems, introduced in spring 1993, just a few months before the elections, would then prove decisive to ensure Castellani's victory as, through the ballot round, he capitalised on those voters who were opposed to a repetition of Novelli's experience as Mayor. The electoral results – the moment of truth – furthermore signal the victory of one vision of the city's future over others: a vision contemplating a new pattern of development, based on physical and infrastructural regeneration and on the objective of diversifying the local economic base through an expansion of tertiary activities.

A first step towards governance formation, then, consisted of the contacts that leading local actors established, according to a logic of appropriateness, to build a coalition that would sustain the civic list *Alleanza per Torino*. In this case, the actors were aware of their mutual resource interdependencies, and the alliance was constructed in part to pool these resources: the civil society component had financial means, credibility and the connections that would be helpful to carry out the political agenda; the PDS had the electoral support, and the political organization, that was needed to organize this political experiment. This first step would be concluded with the list's electoral victory. The two other processes of governance

formation would instead begin during the critical juncture and continue until the Strategic Plan's elaboration process. The first of these processes is a consequence of institutional reform: one the one hand, the law on universities' autonomy would put the city's academic institutions in a position where they could redefine their relationship with political actors, acting as autonomous organisations; previously, Italian universities were perceived as branches of the Education Ministry, and academics would interact with political figures as private individuals, not as parts of an institution (Interview 22). The Polytechnic, in particular, had a major role with respect to the reconstruction process and the local governance coalition: the doubling of its facilities required it would cooperate with a plurality of actors – the municipality, the national railways, the ministry – strengthening its relations with them. On the other hand, the creation of banking foundations would introduce in the city two novel actors, endowed with enormous financial resources; further, the involvement of public institutions in the nomination of the foundations' management would provide a formal link between these and the municipality. Finally, their statutory obligation to intervene only in sectors having a social relevance would make them precious allies within the local governance coalition, as they would financially support several cultural and education related projects.

Similarly, the overhaul of the local administrative machine would in part be owed to the reforms of local government systems – of both the reform of 1990 (law 142/1990) and that of 1993 (law 81/1993). Indeed, the reform allowed for the creation of more stable and cohesive executives, over whose formation the mayor would now be in charge, rather than parties[225]; the latter had been further weakened by *Tangentopoli*, and these factors permitted Castellani's executive to undertake the organisational overhaul without party interference. The restructuring of the municipality's administrative structure would then favour merit, rather than party affiliation, and could proceed without major obstacles. As a result of this operation, new coordination patterns would be established between political actors and bureaucrats, and the local administrative machine was put in the condition to operate more effectively and efficiently[226]. Freed from party encumbrances and pragmatically reorganized, Turin's local government would thus find itself better positioned to coherently oversee the city's redevelopment process and to coordinate with civil society actors.

Finally, the last process leading to the emergence of the governance coalition is isomorphism. In particular, two different isomorphic pressures can be identified. The former is a process of coercive isomorphism, represented by the procedures required to apply for EU funds and to bid for complex urban programmes: the disbursement of funds, in both cases, is conditional upon the presentation of an application

[225] Of course, especially in the elections after Tangentopoli (so from 1997 onwards), parties would recover some influence over the formation of local governments; this however, would be much more limited with respect to the pre-reform phase and, by law, it is in any case the Mayor who is entrusted with the formation of the executive. (Bagnasco and Castellani, 2014; Vandelli, 1997).

[226] With respect to efficiency, a crucial factor consisted of the privatization of local utilities, which liberated major resources (Baraggioli, 2011).

involving a plurality of actors, both public and private. In the case of EU programmes, this has brought, since the end of the 1980s, several actors that had, until that moment, never cooperated, to work together; this trend continued during the 1990s, as Turin was selected as Area 2 Objective, at the same time as complex urban programmes would be introduced by the national government: this would further solidify and routinize a habit of cooperation, which would then strengthen the governance coalition itself. Second, is a process of mimetic isomorphism. After the successes of the strategic plan elaborated by the Barcelona administration, which had organized the Summer Olympic Games in 1992, Turin's administrators decided to adopt the same planning procedure. In 1997, then, as the decision to adopt a strategic plan was taken, the municipality would promote an inclusive, participatory planning process: the representatives of the city's major organisations – banks, universities, labour unions, interest organisations, third sector organisations, Chamber of Commerce, etc. – would then take part to the development of the local political agenda, strengthening and reinforcing the governance practices that had been established in the previous years. The Strategic plan, finally, would certify the 'institutionalisation' of the norms pertaining to the local governance coalition: teamwork and shared vision would be the commitments that bound actors together.

In conclusion, these processes confirm the validity of the ideas regarding governance formation as put forward by the neo-institutionalist schools that I considered, that is, sociological and historical institutionalism. As to the former, we have seen that both top-down isomorphic pressures as well as contacts established through a logic of appropriateness, operating instead in a bottom-up fashion, contributed to the formation of the local governance coalition. Concerning the latter process, it is important to emphasise the role of agency: during the critical juncture[227], in the months prior to the 1993 political elections, it was individual political entrepreneurs, mainly PDS' local secretary Sergio Chiamparino and San Paolo Bank vice-president Enrico Salza, who established contacts with each other, and after having deemed the other side, for sure, as an 'appropriate' partner, they would form the electoral coalition *Alleanza per Torino*. It is, further, in this instance that the role of discourse was most important, as both coordinative and communicative discourses were employed to convince party members and the electorate, respectively, of Castellani's candidacy. Isomorphic pressures would instead come in the form of funding schemes (coercive isomorphism), introduced by EU programmes and by complex urban programmes, which would push actors to cooperate and form partnerships; dynamics of mimetic isomorphism would also be present, particularly evident in the decision to adopt the Strategic Plan, directly drawing on the experience of other cities. In this last case, again, the role of agency would be fundamental, as it was an individual politician, Assessor Fiorenzo Alfieri, who would push mayor Castellani to embark on a process of participatory strategic planning.

Turning to historical institutionalism, we have seen how institutional reform would be decisive in fostering the emergence of the local governance coalition. The reform of local government, and its

[227] The dynamic whereby contacts were established among different organisations and groups of the local civil society had actually started in the latter half of the 1980s, during the phase of critical reflection over the city's conditions.

subsequent reorganization[228], and the reforms concerning university autonomy and baking foundations, would redefine the prerogatives of these public, and quasi-public entities would lead them to establish novel coordination patterns among each other, stimulating the emergence of governance practices. In other words, governance would, in this case, indeed amount to a coordinative response to institutional reform and fragmentation (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007). Historical institutionalism, moreover, also accounts for the final stages of the process of governance formation, that is, the gradual emergence, through repeated interactions, of institutionalised norms concerning 'teamwork' and 'shared vision'; this would principally occur during the elaboration and implementation of the Strategic Plan.

Governance, in Turin, would then result from the combination of all these processes. It is for this reason that it was important to adopt an eclectic approach to the whole inquiry: urban governance is a complex phenomenon, whose formation process can hardly be reduced to a single, paradigmatic explanation; on the contrary, it is through the interaction of a variety of dynamics and mechanisms, operating over a rather long period of time, that governance would emerge in Turin (see figure 1 below).

Table 1. Governance emergence in Turin: scope of causal factors.

Local	National	Inter- or supra-national
Crisis of development model (fordism).	Crisis of development model (fordism).	Crisis of development model (fordism).
Defeat of labour unions and left-wing forces after the 1980 strike at FIAT (1980).		
Ideational innovation within local left-wing forces (1980-1992).		
City-wide debate over city conditions. (1985-1992).		
		Fall of Communism (1989-1991)
	Institutional reform creating banking foundations and reforming universities (institutional fragmentation) (1990).	
	Refoundation of Italian Communist Party as Democratic Party of the Left (1991).	
Mayor Valerio Zanone leaves Turin, engendering a local government crisis (1991-1992).		
Local PDS secretariat endorses pro-growth agenda.		

[228] Concerning a redefinition of the relationships between political and administrative apparatuses, a reorganization of the latter, and the privatization of local utilities.

	Tangentopoli corruption scandal (1992-1993).	
Strategic debates held in Torino Incontra (1992-1993).		
Negotiations between Turin's PDS leadership and liberal component of local business class (1992-1993).		
	Reform of local government structure (1993).	
Castellani's election. Victory of Alleanza per Torino (1993).		
		European funding schemes lead to cooperation among local actors (1989 onwards).
	Complex urban programmes lead to cooperation among local actors (1993 onwards).	
Rescaling of local administrative machine (from 1993)		
Elaboration of Turin's strategic Plan (1998-2000).		

It is now time to attempt to derive some general observations, where possible, from the case study of Turin, and see whether these can be applicable elsewhere and, if not, for what reasons. We have seen how, in the case of Turin, governance would emerge out of a rather complex and long dynamic, involving mainly three intertwined causal processes: the coordinative response to institutional fragmentation; isomorphic pressures; coordination resulting from repeated contacts, underpinned by a logic of appropriateness. We have, additionally, seen how in the 1980s, when elements of change and innovation started emerging, comprehensive transformation was nonetheless prevented by the constraints imposed by the institutional framework, at the level of local administrative structure and party culture. This somehow corroborates the core assumption of neo-institutionalists, namely that institutional frameworks shape and constrain human action, and that long-established institutions may well pose a barrier to change. It should then come as no surprise that the conditions for change were offered by the unfolding of a critical juncture, in line with the historical institutionalist paradigm. Yet precisely because critical junctures are rather rare and unpredictable events, one cannot, in an attempt to generalise conclusions, claim that critical junctures are the chief causes of governance emergence. Hence, to assess the generalisability of the account I have provided and, possibly, to refine it, I will proceed by re-assessing the validity of the hypotheses I spelled out in chapter 3, with an eye to the literature, comparing Turin's with other cases of urban governance.

I will start, then, from my first hypothesis, that is: H1 – the more a crisis of the local development model is severe, the more likely it will be that various elements of the locality (both political and non-political) will feel the urgency to devise an alternative development strategy. As we have seen, in Turin's case, the local economic crisis is what gradually set in motion the city-wide reflection over the city's condition, the first instance of a series of contacts among local actors that has eventually led to governance formation; indeed, the crisis itself did not immediately cause governance to emerge, but it provoked a series of reactions concerning the need to devise an alternative development strategy for the city.

Looking at the scholarly literature, there are a number of cases in which the emergence of governance has similarly followed a crisis of the local economic base. These are: Birmingham, Sheffield, and Detroit (DiGaetano and Lawless, 1999; DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1999), Bilbao (Power et al., 2010; Power, 2016), and Lille (John and Cole, 1998; 2001). In all these cases, a crisis of the local development model has generated among the urban community the feeling that an alternative development strategy was needed; in all of these cities, further, a governance arrangement of some sort has then emerged. Two points need attention here: the first is that all these cities had been manufacturing cities throughout most of the XX century. All manufacturing cities of the West were mainly organised around the Fordist productive system, and as this was surpassed by automation and other innovations, all of them suffered a similar crisis of their development models at similar moments in time (a little earlier in the US[229], between the 1950s and 1970s, and a little later in Europe, mostly in the 1970s and 1980s). Not all manufacturing cities, however, have reacted by forming governance arrangements, as in the case, for instance, of Genoa (Guano, 2017). A 'crisis', therefore, appears at most to characterize the post-war history of XX century Western manufacturing cities, rather than being a fundamental factor conducive to governance formation. The idea that it may however facilitate city-wide debates, which in turn may stimulate cooperation, still appears reasonable, although claims as to the necessity of a crisis with respect to governance formation shall be dismissed.

Looking at different types of cities, we can try to assess such a hypothesis from a different angle. For instance, in his study of Toulouse[230], Nicholls (2005) notes that a peculiar, two-pronged form of governance has emerged in the south-west French city, where a metropolitan government authority has existed since the end of the 1960s, although it has been reformed a few times during the 1990s (Nevers, 2002). Informally, to undertake individual projects or short-term initiatives, the various authorities within the urban agglomeration has shown an ability to cooperate, both among each other and with non-political partners, if in "narrowly defined fields" (Nicholls, 2005, p. 797); at the level of the formal metropolitan authority,

[229] (Mollenkopf, 1983)

[230] In Toulouse, the aerospace industry, although central to the local economy, autonomously emerged after World War I, but would then be heavily sponsored by the French state in the 1960s. Although this qualifies Toulouse has a city with a manufacturing vocation, Fordist organisation does not appear to have had a significant role in the city, also because aerospace is no traditional heavy industry. Toulouse has not, therefore, suffered a severe crisis in the 1970s, comparable to that of other manufacturing cities with a more pronounced Fordist heritage (Nicholls, 2005; Nevers, 2002).

however, no city-wide cooperation, or governance coalition, has emerged, as the various local authorities mainly use this arena defend and further the position of their own territory vis-à-vis the others (*idem,* p. 796-797). To put it simply, no long-term, stable governance arrangement has emerged, beyond episodic moments of informal cooperation focused on short-term projects. Among the reasons identified for this outcome (lack of city-wide governance), Nicholls stresses the lack of "perceived benefits of collective action" (*idem*, p. 797). A crisis, I suggest, may well increase the awareness of the 'perceived benefits of collective action', which, in a wealthy city, may instead not arise. This is absolutely not to say that only crisis-struck cities develop governance structures, nor that city-wide debates and strategies can only emerge out of crisis situations; merely, it serves to signal that a crisis may increase the awareness of the (potential) benefits of cooperation, facilitating the emergence of some form of cooperation.

The fact that crises are mere facilitators rather than necessary elements for governance formation is further corroborated by Stone's study of Atlanta (Stone, 1989). In Atlanta, the years between the 1920s and 1940s were surely decades of major transformations and innovations, but no severe crisis hit the city: on the contrary, these were for Atlanta booming years, and urban problems were mainly connected to growth (and racial issues), rather than decline (Stone, 1989, p. 14). The absence of a crisis, in this case, has by no means prevented a local governance coalition to emerge – which would happen in the 1950s. Crises, therefore, may indeed lead to city-wide debates, paving the way for further cooperation to occur, but they are not, in any case, necessary factors with respect to governance emergence.

The second hypothesis instead concerns the stability of local government as a condition for governance emergence. As we have seen, in Turin governance has emerged in a phase in which local government was marked by significant stability, in that the government majority not only managed to survive its first mandate but would be re-elected several times[231]; on the contrary, when local government was highly unstable (1985-1992), no governance arrangement would form. Although the hypothesis appears, *prima facie*, to rely on an intuitive assumption, the literature has been keen on stressing that government and governance are not the same and that governance may well outlive the electoral cycles of formal government (Dowding et al., 1999; Stoker and Mossberger, 2001; Stone, 1989)[232]. In saying this, there has not been much focus on the theme of government stability, however defined, but a mere acknowledgment that governance relies on informal arrangements that are peculiar and different from those of traditional government. The point made in the literature, however, mostly focuses on the possibility that a governance arrangement may survive even if, after elections, an executive with different orientations comes to power. The idea, here, is that the non-political component of a governance arrangement may have become, in time, because the resources it possesses, an indispensable partner for formal local government to achieve its aims: if elected

[231] In 1997, 2001, 2006, and 2011.

[232] These authors are actually referring to the regime model, which, I have specified above, I do not endorse. However, all of them have clarified that regimes are a particular kind of urban governance coalition and, therefore, their discussion can apply to a wider discussion of governance coalitions.

government has objectives different from those of civil society actors, the latter will not support it (Stone, 1989), unless some compromise is reached between the two programmes. In Stone's Atlanta, Mayor Jackson, who succeeded Mayor Massell in 1973 (Stone, 1989; Dowding, 2001) had a social reform agenda focused on community empowerment but could not achieve his aims because these collided with those of the downtown business elite (the main partner of Atlanta's governance coalition); only as Mayor Jackson's reform policies were scaled down, would his relationship with the business elite smooth. A similar situation has been found in Birmingham (DiGaetano and Lawless, 1999), where new council leader Theresa Stewart – who came to office in 1993 – initially intended to implement a social reform agenda, giving up the pro-growth agenda of her predecessor Dick Knowles[233]. This could potentially pose threat to the interests of the local business elite, who had until then cooperated in a pro-growth urban governance coalition with Knowles. The two actors, nevertheless, found a compromise: each would publicly support and recognize the legitimacy of the other's agenda (idem, p. 558) and, as the business component realised that development policies would not be scaled down, the coalition survived.

The examples just illustrated both refer to cases in which the local governance coalition survived in the face of some modifications of the official municipal agenda, through compromise and accommodation. However, cases in which a local governance coalition has thrived in spite of unstable and dysfunctional local government does not seem to have received much scholarly attention. This may be because in certain (Anglo-Saxon) countries, local government is much less prone to crises, hence government stability is almost taken for granted. Whatever the reason, two points seem in order: first, local government stability has received little attention in the literature as a condition for governance emergence; second, in most of the cases the literature has dealt with, where a governance arrangement has been found to exist, local government was stable. Although I have so far treated this hypothesis as a straw in the wind test, these last considerations may suggest it is actually a hoop test; for sure, this is an issue that deserves further research.

The third hypothesis concerns instead state rescaling and the fragmentation of the local institutional framework as a condition for governance emergence. We have seen that, in the case of Turin, these amounted to necessary factors for the formation of a local governance coalition. Looking at other institutional contexts shall now help assess whether this hypothesis can be generalisable. In the (western) European setting, several territories have been affected by state rescaling dynamics between the 1980s and 1990s. In France, regions gained full self-governing powers with the decentralisation laws of 1982-83 (Le Cacheux, Tourjansky, 1992, p. 29); in Spain, the 1980s were the decade of democratization and a new administrative structure for the state was set out, providing for the creation of the autonomous communities; and in the UK, the 1980s and early 1990s were the years in which NPM reforms were implemented. In all these countries (like in Italy), new agencies and institutions were created in these years, many of which would

[233] Both Stewart and Knowles were Labour Party members.

then become involved within governance practices, where these have arisen. In the UK, the Thatcher government introduced various agencies that took up competences that previously pertained to local authorities, "but now came under the jurisdiction of government appointed boards dominated by private-sector representatives (DiGaetano and Lawless, 1999, p. 553)." In urban contexts, the most well-known are UDCs (Urban Development Corporations, with planning and development powers) and TECs (Training and Enterprise Councils, with powers over training and business development). In several cases, after an initial phase of conflict, coordination between municipal councils and UDCs and TECs would then ensue, such as in Leeds (John and Cole, 1998), or in Birmingham (DiGaetano and Lawless, 1999). It must be noted, moreover, that many other such agencies were autonomously instituted by local governments themselves, often in partnership with other entities or groups, such as chambers of commerce, or business circles. As DiGaetano and Lawless explicitly note: "The pro-growth regime also propagated partnerships in areas where central government constraints and directives did not necessarily force the issue (DiGaetano and Lawless, 1999, p. 557)." So, in Birmingham, the governance coalition itself has instituted various bodies of this kind: the local business community autonomously founded Birmingham City 2000, in 1990, as a lobbying and service organisation; in agreement with the city council, the business community, organised within Birmingham City 2000, founded the Birmingham Marketing Partnership (BMP), a local marketing agency; "similarly, in 1991, the city council, TEC, and chamber founded the Birmingham Economic Development Partnership, a strategic body to coordinate activities among the three partners (*ibid*.)." Most of these organisations would then become crucial partners of the governance coalition that emerged in Birmingham between the 1980s and the 1990s.

In France, apart from the redefinition of powers that resulted from the decentralisation laws, a novel institution was created in 1983 that would prove fundamental in the development of public-private partnerships: the SEM, *Societé Economie Mixte*, that is, a public-private company that could be created ad hoc to finance and supervise the realisation of a project. This would have the effect of strengthening collaboration between public and private actors, as well as facilitating the reconstruction process in several cities. In Lille, for instance, the flagship Euralille development (a commercial and office building next to the new TGV station) would be constructed through the creation of a SEM.

Bilbao and the Basque Countries would reap significant benefits from the creation of the autonomous community (state rescaling) that would occur during the democratisation years. The Basque countries obtained from the Spanish state the right to levy taxes and redistribute them within their own territory, a rather unique situation among the other territorial communities in Spain (Power, 2016). This money was used throughout the 1980s and 1990s not only to finance reconstruction investments, but also to repay the Region's debt (Power, 2016). In this case, state rescaling has empowered the regional and municipal authorities, which would now have more resources to autonomously devise and carry out its recovery strategy.

This discussion of state rescaling and institutional fragmentation seems to support the hypothesis, although it is not yet clear whether it amounts to a necessary condition for governance emergence. In most of Western Europe, indeed, the phase of state rescaling that roughly started in the 1980s had the effect of redefining powers of local authorities and partially restructuring their relations with higher administrative tiers; it instituted various agencies, often in the form of quasi-public or public-private organisations and entities, which would share with public authorities the responsibilities for local development and service delivery (Harding, 1997; Pierre, 2011). All of this would create a fertile institutional environment for governance practices to emerge, although, I have specified above, rescaling and fragmentation do not necessarily and automatically lead to the emergence of governance coalitions; of course, certain entities, such as French SEMs, or British UDCs/TECs, providing for both public and private involvement, force cooperation between these two spheres. Cooperation need not, however, be immediately equated to governance, as cooperation may be episodic, or only deployed for individual projects, and be short-lived. In other cases, cooperation may be more frequent, occur in various, distinct policy networks, but still remain haphazard, not connected to a shared vision for the city, and not identifiable as a city-wide arrangement, but as a sum of variously characterised policy networks. In this latter case, we can talk about pluralist governance – indeed, such a framework closely resembles that of Dahl's New Haven (1961) – but not about a governance coalition. In other words, state rescaling and institutional fragmentation might appear as necessary components for governance emergence, but they are not sufficient for it: sometimes they basically force actors to cooperate, like in the cases of UDCs and TECs, albeit they do so in a formal manner (and governance is an *informal* practice); but in general cooperation and pluralist forms of governance do not automatically follow from these two intertwined processes, and neither do governance coalitions. It seems, however, that in most of Europe governance practices have typically followed the implementation of these two processes, which may seem to support the idea that state rescaling and institutional fragmentation are necessary components for governance emergence.

Claims as to the necessity of rescaling and fragmentation have so far been made mostly with reference to Western Europe: if we turn instead to the American context, this claim seems harder to sustain. In the United States there has surely been a change in Federal urban programmes since the Reagan years, when most federal grants targeting cities have been suppressed; there has been some timid resurgence of a federal urban policy during the Clinton administration, but as soon as Republicans won back Congress majority, this was scaled back once again (DiGaetano and Lawless, 1999). Further, the US state has not undergone significant administrative restructuring as Europe would. Indeed, Atlanta's governance coalition emerged between the 1950s and 1960s, a few decades earlier that rescaling processes began in Western Europe; the governance coalition that emerged in Detroit in the 1990s, similarly, would not follow a phase of rescaling. In other words, rescaling and fragmentation do not seem necessary for governance emergence in the US; does this mean that the same holds for Europe? Well, not necessarily. As Pierre (2011) argues,

national institutional frameworks matter a lot with respect to urban politics, and they make urban politics theories travel less than well; from a different perspective, Gerring (2004) claims that, when generalising from case study research, the researcher should set boundaries to the scope for generalising conclusions to other cases. Consistent with these assumptions, one could claim that state rescaling and fragmentation are necessary conditions for governance emergence in Western Europe, but not in the United States.

Further reasoning may however undermine this conclusion. In Turin, for instance, rescaling and institutional reform were indeed necessary for the emergence of a local governance coalition, as the previous institutional framework acted as a major obstacle with respect to governance formation. This can also be viewed as a contextual condition for the case study that does not hold in general and cannot be exported to other cases. Indeed, what really seems to be necessary is a peculiar institutional framework where the organisational landscape is sufficiently fragmented and public and private entities have sufficient resources and organising capacity to establish cooperative networks, rather than state rescaling *per se*.

As to institutional fragmentation, the literature generally agrees that administrative reforms, that is, state rescaling, that have been implemented between the 1980s and 1990s in Western Europe have led to a proliferation of private, public, and quasi-public agencies and organisations, increasing institutional fragmentation. We have seen the reasons why institutional fragmentation facilitates cooperation, and that several instances of urban governance have emerged in parallel with these transformations. However, we do not have much empirical material on urban governance referring to the period prior to the phase of state rescaling, that is, roughly most of the XX century until the 1970s. I have argued in Chapter 2 that I reject the assumption that there has been a 'shift from government to governance', because a) government still matters and b) governance, I hold, has existed in various and possibly different forms in the past. It must be noted that the link between governance and institutional fragmentation appears intuitive, in part because the concept of governance implies informality and horizontal coordination, and this is often typically associated with a dispersed and complex institutional setting (John, 2001); as Keating stated, however, "there is an absence of rigorous before-and-after studies; instead, the present is usually contrasted with a stylised world of hierarchical, unitary government, rather than the messy reality of real public policy making (Keating, 2013, p. 97-98)." Further research should try to focus on past cases to see if, in a rather different institutional context, similar governance forms have emerged; without such evidence, it is hard to state that institutional fragmentation is necessary for governance to emerge. In conclusion, then, state rescaling and institutional fragmentation are facilitating factors with respect to governance emergence, but until further research will have dealt with the issue, they are not necessary factors for it.

The fourth hypothesis concerns isomorphic pressures, stating that they increase the likelihood of cooperation. As we have seen in the case of Turin, the possibility to apply for financial resources (disbursed both by the EU and through complex urban programmes) was conditional on applicants forming a partnership. This type of incentive has served to bring about cooperative practices among local actors who

had not necessarily had interacted before; the outcome is twofold: it expanded personal networks and relationships, and it provided an opportunity for players involved to familiarize with cooperative practices. Further, this type of grants would stimulate more consistent private sector involvement in the application procedure and in project design (DiGaetano and Lawless, 1999). Looking at other cases of governance emergence, it is striking to see that isomorphic pressures have almost always been a crucial feature of processes of governance emergence. In their analysis of English cities, DiGaetano and Lawless (1999) highlight how the central state would provide major incentives to cooperation among urban players. Of course, like most EU cities had the opportunity to apply for European funding. In addition to this, the British state set out a number of programmes: under John Major's premiership, competitive "regeneration grants – such as City Challenge (which targeted deprived urban districts for regeneration assistance) and its successor, the Single Regeneration Budget (which consolidated a number of urban programmes) – were awarded on the basis of bids submitted by localities. Moreover, these competitive grant schemes placed a high premium on the creation of partnerships in the preparation and implementation of local regeneration grant proposals (DiGaetano and Lawless, 1999, p. 553)." In the US, similar programmes were not as widespread and yet, when these were made available, their effect on cooperation was similar. Empowerment Zone Grants, introduced by the Clinton administration to cater to ailing cities, "required demonstration of broad-based cooperation and support from business, government, labour, and neighbourhood organisations (*idem*, p. 563)." In sum, these types of government programmes, requiring applicants to form partnerships in exchange for funds, almost always engender cooperation and this should come as no surprise: in an era of fiscal retrenchment, in which local authorities have a limited resource endowment, the opportunity to receive funding is seldom overlooked. Two comments seem to be in order here: first, coercive isomorphic pressures should not be taken to be a necessary condition for governance emergence, or for mere cooperation for that matter, as these may arise for other reasons. However, when coercive isomorphic pressures are present, and this is the second comment, cooperation almost always emerges. Of course, further research in this sense should clarify whether some of these programmes are more effective than others in producing cooperation, or whether there actually are some outliers that disconfirm this present conclusion. What seems to be the case, nonetheless, is that in a institutional setting where several of this programmes are made available (such as in Europe, where EU programmes and national ones have been available at the same time), this will lead at least some local actors to cooperate in order to obtain funding. Coercive isomorphic pressures, therefore, appear to amount to a sufficient condition; at this point, the question should be: are they sufficient for governance emergence, or merely for cooperation to emerge? Prima facie, coercive isomorphic pressures lead to cooperation, not necessarily governance. However, as we have anticipated in Chapter 2, when discussing urban governance types, pluralist governance is not necessarily embodied in a governance 'coalition', with sufficiently well-defined objectives and a city-wide scope; it may well be that various networks emerge in conjunction with distinct policy areas and, although they may operate in a rather

haphazard fashion, informal and participatory decision-making becomes widespread. For this to happen, nevertheless, public-private cooperation should become widespread among the local community and isomorphic pressures may not guarantee this. In conclusion, coercive isomorphic pressures can be understood as a sufficient condition for cooperation to emerge; for both pluralist governance, and pluralist governance coalitions, they are major facilitators.

The fifth hypothesis states instead that the more contacts have been cultivated among various actors of the local community, the more likely it is for a governance coalition to emerge. This intuitively appears to be a fundamental factor, as governance rests on informal contacts and relationships among a variety of actors. In all cities where governance has been found, this has been preceded by a phase in which various urban actors have interacted among each other. In all the cities that I am considering in this brief comparison, contacts and interactions between various civil society and political players has been a feature that has typically preceded governance formation – of course, where governance has been found to emerge. In former manufacturing cities, contacts have often followed crisis. In Lille, for instance, the local left-wing political class, and the city's private sector actors had remained separate until the 1980s: service delivery was a political responsibility, whereas growth pertained to the private business sector (John and Cole, 1998, p. 396); until that moment, contacts between the two spheres were few and rare. The crisis then had the effect of rising awareness – as it happened in Turin – in both the political and private spheres that a change of strategy was needed, and this gradually changed the pattern of relationships between the two, which became more frequent. Crucially, moreover, the previously established 'division of labour' – whereby social services pertained to politics and growth pertained to business – was no longer valid: both would now focus, together, on a potential growth strategy. In Bilbao, similarly, the industrial crisis of the 1980s led the local city council to launch consultations concerning possible recovery strategies (Power *et al.,* 2016, p. 15). In non-manufacturing cities, such as Stone's Atlanta, contacts and interactions among local actors were equally decisive with respect to the formation of the local governance coalition. In the 1940s, Mayor Hartsfield, who already had contacts with the white business élite, wished to enlarge his electoral base: his political intuition was to seek consensus among the African American population – in an era when segregation was still very much the reality in the US, and particularly in the American South. Hence, the mayor had to engage the local black community, and to do so "Hartsfield met with black leaders. That meeting began a pattern of resolving issues by quiet, behind-the-scenes negotiations between the mayor and black leaders (Stone, 1989, p. 28)." These contacts constituted the root of the local governance coalition, consisting of an alliance between the white business elite and the black middle-class, which provided electoral support to the political component of the alliance. The pivotal role of contacts bridging between different worlds (political and civil society) can be noted by observing what happens when these are absent. Mossberger and Stoker have pointed out how, in 1980s Liverpool, in an institutional setting that was similar to that of other UK cities, the local Labour leadership "was more interested in resisting central government and business interests than in building

collaboration with local business (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001, p. 816)." As a result, no governance coalition emerged in the city, and Liverpool was much slower than other UK cities – such as Manchester, Birmingham or Glasgow – in embarking on a recovery path. In sum, contacts between political and non-political actors are an essential component for governance formation, and they qualify as a necessary condition.

The sixth hypothesis states that the more political entrepreneurs are committed to constructing a governance coalition, the more likely it is that it will arise. I have specified above that by political entrepreneurs, I do not exclusively refer to political actors, but to all those actors whose actions have political repercussions: Salza, in Turin, has played the part of the political entrepreneur. This hypothesis is strictly connected to the one above, in that political entrepreneurs are often, although not always, those who initiate a pattern of interactions with other sectors of the local society. In Turin, we have seen that this role was principally played, indeed, by Enrico Salza and Sergio Chiamparino. In Lille, it was Mayor Pierre Mauroy who broke the tradition of separation between political and economic sectors in the city, engaging and supporting the local private sector in devising a growth strategy. In the case of Mauroy, and in general in France, his 'entrepreneurship' was helped by the *cumul de mandats,* a French norm allowing public officials to hold more than one office. Mauroy, apart from being Lille's mayor, had served for as French socialist Prime Minister from 1981 to 1984, and this surely favoured his role of gaining the trust of Lille's private sector because, as Prime Minister, he could support Lille's business interests *vis-à-vis* the central state (John and Cole, 1998). We have seen above, similarly, that in Atlanta it was Mayor Hartsfield who had the shrewd intuition to attempt to form an alliance with the local black community. The role of political entrepreneurs, with respect to governance formation, is often that of initiating interactions among groups that had previously had few contacts among each other; alternatively, if prior contacts had been present, political entrepreneurs can be decisive in forging novel alliances between ideologically distant groups, as was the case in Turin. The role of political entrepreneurs, however, does not stop here. With respect to governance formation, they may also back and build consensus around major urban projects or initiatives that are considered strategic for a city's recovery, or continued growth trajectory. This, again, was the case of Pierre Mauroy, who was a staunch supporter, first, of the Channel Tunnel connecting Britain to France and, second, of the Euralille[234] project (John and Cole, 1998, p. 396-397). In Birmingham, Mayor Dick Knowles backed the construction of a prestigious International Conference Centre (completed in 1991), as part of the strategy to revive the city's downtown, and this helped strengthen the relationship between city council and the local business community (DiGaetano and Lawless, 1999). Similarly, in Detroit, Mayor Archer was adamant in backing the construction of two sports stadia (a football stadium for the Detroit Lions and a baseball stadium for the Detroit Tigers) between 2000 and 2002. The stadia construction, too, would contribute to reinforce the mayor's alliance with the local business community (DiGaetano and Lawless, 1999). By contrast, in cities

[234] Euralille is a commercial complex, comprising offices and shops, that was built near the city's new TGV railway station in the 1990s.

without such leadership, governance formation seems harder. One example is again provided by the case of Toulouse, where Nicholls notes that the lack of strong leadership is one of the factors that has prevented the formation of a governance coalition (Nicholls, 2005, p. 797). Political entrepreneurship, hence, appears to be a necessary component for governance formation.

The last hypothesis concerns the role of a shared agenda. I have already noted, during the analysis of Turin, how this appeared to be a necessary component for a governance coalition to obtain. Of course, the agenda need not be 'shared' among the whole urban community, but merely within the governance coalition; further, I have specified how, by shared agenda, I intend a shared long-term objective (for instance, growth), and a shared strategy to achieve (for instance, infrastructural development and great events), and not that all relevant actors agree on all details of every single project. With this understanding of shared agenda, it seems unlikely that a governance coalition can function it this is absent. For instance, we have mentioned above the cases of Atlanta and Birmingham, in which there was a misalignment between the objectives of political actors and those of the private sector. In Atlanta, as long as Mayor Jackson had been keen on pursuing his social reform agenda, the private sector did not back his plans and achievements were meagre; only when the mayor agreed to move back towards the interests of the business community, would cooperation start back again (Stone, 1989). In Birmingham, although Theresa Steward wished to pursue a social reform agenda, her commitment not to discard growth objectives ensured cooperation with the private sector would not be undermined (DiGaetano and Lawless, 1999). The definition of a shared agenda, therefore, definitely appears to be a necessary component for a governance coalition to emerge.

An additional factor that I have mentioned, strictly connected to the shared agenda, is the presence of what I called 'support tools' that are meant to help implement the agenda and strengthen cooperation; as examples, I have mentioned strategic plans and participatory arenas. Additionally, also certain development agencies, when established autonomously through an agreement between political and non-political sectors, may play a similar, supporting role. Looking at the cases I am considering, these 'support tools' have appeared in all of them. In Birmingham, I have already shown how a series of such entities have been autonomously instituted by local actors (rather than central government): Birmingham City 2000, a lobbying and service organisation, was set up by the local business community; the Birmingham Marketing Partnership (BMP) was instead jointly instituted by the city council and the business community; moreover, in 1991, the Birmingham Economic Development Partnership (BEDP) was created as a tool to, indeed, "coordinate activities among the three partners (DiGaetano and Lawless, 1999, p. 557)." These tools have also been deployed in the US, as exemplified by the case of Detroit. After Archer was elected mayor in 1994, he swiftly acted to create an alliance with the local private sector around a pro-growth agenda. To do this, he "incorporated the city's business leaders directly in the policy-making process by forming a land-use task force (LUTF), headed by a suburban developer, to study issues of land-use change across the city (*idem*, p. 563)." In addition, Archer established the Greater Downtown Partnership, always meant to further the Mayor's pro-growth agenda,

which included elements from the urban community: "business, civic, and philanthropic leaders (*ibid*.)." In Lille, the local business class, in this case headed by Bruno Bonduelle[235], created the '*Comité Grand Lille'* in 1994, a forum which has the specific aim of promoting and strengthening greater cooperation between public and private sector actors (John and Cole, 1998, p. 397). In Bilbao, a similar role was played by *Bilbao Metropoli 30*, established in 1991 through the sponsorship of both public and private entities, including the Basque Government and the Bilbao Municipality. The body mainly functions as a think-tank and lobby organization, aiming at fostering discourse on local issues, engaging social actors in policy issues and promoting strategic visions for the city (Power, 2016).

To sum up, these various bodies most often serve, as Turin's Strategic Plan, to strengthen and routinize relations that may have already been established, although their function is not limited to this: they are typically meant to monitor the implementation of some project, to lobby central government, or to contribute to the definition of an agenda, or specific project. However, in their function as participatory, cooperative arenas, they are indeed meant to 'support' cooperation and foster network building. With respect to governance formation, I believe that some further research is required to establish whether these amount to necessary conditions: in most cases, such 'support tools' are created after a governance coalition has already formed, and their role is to routinize its practices; at the same time, the fact that in all the cases considered these were found to be present seems to suggest their role may be something more than just supportive.

To wrap up, what can this concluding discussion tell us about the general process of governance emergence? Looking at the case of Turin only, I have described a rather long process, composed of various contingent and contextual factors (think, for instance, about the relevance of Zanone's decision to leave city hall). Of these, some were indeed necessary with respect to the specific case but cannot be generalised. In Turin, state rescaling (through the 1993 reform of local government) and institutional fragmentation (creation of banking foundations and university reform) have been necessary in leading to governance emergence: state rescaling has had the function of de-structuring an institutional framework that had until then prevented change and has therefore provided the concrete possibilities to enact the transformations that had been in motion for some time. Institutional fragmentation has also been decisive, as it has redefined the local actor and power constellation, instituting or reforming organisations that would become major members of the governance coalition. Similarly, isomorphic pressures have been fundamental in engendering extensive cooperation among local actors and supporting the emergence of governance practices in the city.

However, when looking at other cases, these appear to consist of facilitating or enabling conditions, while only four of the above hypotheses concern necessary factors. These are: 1) existing cooperative

[235] Head of the Bonduelle canned food company.

practices among political and non-political actors of an urban community, 2) political entrepreneurship, 3) a shared agenda, and 4) stable local government. All other factors amount to enabling conditions that, depending on the specific institutional framework and socio-economic features of a given urban community, may matter less or more. For instance, we have seen how in several manufacturing cities, coordination among political and non-political actors has typically followed a crisis of the local development model; in non-manufacturing cities, systemic crises appear less relevant. Institutional fragmentation and isomorphism, too, are enabling conditions and their relevance depends on context: the US does not seem to have undergone a process of rescaling and institutional fragmentation that is comparable to the European one. In certain cases, and indeed typically in Europe, state rescaling and institutional fragmentation have in some circumstances provided the necessary conditions for governance emergence. This is to say that, although these conditions cannot be universally considered as necessary, they surely amount to important factors that may be determinant in leading to governance formation: if a policy recommendation has to be considered, providing incentives to cooperation in the form of institutional fragmentation and isomorphic pressures would definitely be a major one; yet this does not automatically guarantee governance will emerge.

This conclusion testifies to the complexity of the phenomenon of governance formation, as it should by now be clear that it is no easy task to define a recipe that will surely foster the emergence of a governance arrangement: the right combination of factors that will lead to governance formation will depend on specific cases. To have a fuller picture of the process of governance formation, one avenue that could be followed is that of paying more attention to the past, to see if certain governance arrangements can emerge even in very different institutional contexts; a similar insight could be provided by extending research to contemporary non-Western cases. This way, certain assumptions (i.e., 'shift from government to governance') could be either abandoned or re-elaborated on the basis of more solid empirical foundations; in the meanwhile, we can affirm that, to foster governance emergence, it is fundamental that a series of elements are in place: a pattern of cooperation between political and non-political actors, government stability, political leadership and the commitment to a shared agenda.

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List of Interviews

- Interview 1. Member of Turin's municipal executive (1993-2001); President of Organizing Olympic Committee; President of Strategic Plan's development Forum. Interviewed February 2020. Face to face.

- Interview 2. Member of Turin's municipal executive (1993-2001); University Professor; member of Strategic Plan's coordinative committee. Interviewed July 2020. Via Skype.

- Interview 3. Member of Turin's municipal executive (1993-1997); public and private manager, corporate consultant, university professor; interviewed October 2020. Face to face.

- Interview 4. Member of Turin's municipal executive (1993-1997); engineer; interviewed July 2020. Face to face.

- Interview 5. Member of Turin's municipal executive (1995-1997); Member of *Compagnia di San Paolo* managing board; among Strategic Plan's working groups presidents; interviewed October 2020. Face to face.

- Interview 6. Member of Turin's municipal executive (1995-2011); Urban planner; interviewed July 2020. Via Skype.

- Interview 7. Member of Turin's municipal council (1993-1997); architect; interviewed July 2020. Face to face.

- Interview 8. Member of Turin's municipal council (1993-1997); Member of Turin's municipal executive (2001-2011); Honorary Secretary of *Quartiers en Crise* city network (2004-2006); member of Green (Laughing Sun) party. Interviewed July 2020. Face to face.

- Interview 9. Member of Turin's municipal executive (2001-2011); member of PDS provincial and local directorate (1991-1996); member of CGIL local directorate (1987-1991); member of Compagnia di San Paolo managing board (2012-2014); member of Regional executive (2014-2019). Interviewed October 2020. Face to face.

- Interview 10. member of local PCI directorate until 1991; member of Turin's municipal council (1990-1992). Interviewed July 2020. Face to face.

- Interview 11. Member of PDS local directorate (1991-1994); interviewed October 2020. Face to face.

- Interview 12. Member of Alleanza Democratica; architect. interviewed October 2020. Face to face.

- Interview 13. Polytechnic University Dean (1987-2001); member of Strategic Plan's development forum; academic. Interviewed October 2020. Via Skype.

- Interview 14. Member of PCI's local directorate, then PDS; member of Turin's municipal council (1980-1985). Interviewed October 2020. Face to face.

- Interview 15. Member of CISL local directorate; member of Compagnia di San Paolo managing board (2004-2010); labour unionist. Interviewed October 2020. Face to face.

- Interview 16. Member of CISL local directorate; member of Turin's local executive (2001-2013); member of Strategic Plan's development forum; labour unionist. Interviewed October 2020. Face to face.

- Interview 17. Member of Turin's municipal council (1990-1992); academic. Interviewed July 2020. Face to face.

- Interview 18. Member of Turin's Chamber of Commerce (1976-1992); San Paolo bank executive; member of Strategic Plan's development forum. Interviewed November 2020. Via mail.

- Interview 19. Member of Strategic Plan's scientific committee; academic. Interviewed February 2020. Face to face.

- Interview 20. Former Vice-President of Olympic Organizing Committee; Vice-president of Olympic candidacy Committee; President of Egyptian Museum; interviewed October 2020. Face to face.

- Interview 21. Member of second Strategic Plan's scientific Committee; academic; interviewed October 2020. Face to face.

- Interview 22. President of IRES Piemonte (2005-2010), former President of IRES CGIL; academic. Interviewed October 2020. Face to face.

- Interview 23. Member of Turin's provincial executive (1999-2008); member of Turin's regional executive (2014-2019); member of Centro Einaudi directorate (2001-2014). Interviewed October 2020. Face to face.

- Interview 24. Real Estate Entrepreneur; interviewed October 2020. Face to face.

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