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## The nodality disconnect of data-driven government

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Abstract:	We must ask critical questions regarding what actors are gaining influence, and regarding why the centrality of government is to be preserved in a data-intensive society. The paper recognizes that the transformative capacity of big data — and its AI-based companion data analytics — does not deterministically result from the technologies concerned. Instead, the direction of change depends by both the technical features and the intertwining of big data applications and governmental machinery. In short, the reconfiguration of the government nodality remains an open question. Overall, government is urged to think strategically about its future role within digital ecosystems.

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## Abstract

We must ask critical questions regarding what actors are gaining influence, and regarding why the centrality of government is to be preserved in a data-intensive society. The paper recognizes that the transformative capacity of big data — and its AI-based companion data analytics — does not deterministically result from the technologies concerned. Instead, the direction of change depends by both the technical features and the intertwining of big data applications and governmental machinery. In short, the reconfiguration of the government nodality remains an open question. Overall, government is urged to think strategically about its future role within digital ecosystems.

## Introduction

The reliance on Information and Communications Technology (ICT) in policymaking and in service delivery has been a focal point in public administration, policy studies, and public management for many years, at least since the work undertaken by Dutton and Kraemer in the 1970s (Dutton & Kraemer, 1977; Kraemer & Dutton, 1979). Traditionally, each of these disciplines has considered information to be a means by which to support governments' activities for achieving public purposes (Desouza & Jacob, 2017; Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow, & Tinkler, 2006; Eggers, Schatsky, & Viechnicki, 2017; Salamon, 2002; Sun & Medaglia, 2019).

Nowadays, government's deployment of the latest technological developments, primarily Artificial Intelligence (AI) and big data techniques (Bright & Margetts, 2016; Clarke & Margetts, 2014; Giest, 2017; Kim, Trimi, & Chung, 2014; C. L. McNeely & J. O. Hahm, 2014), in numerous settings, reinforces the belief that ICT has the potential to affect public administrations as 'information-dependent' institutions (Fleer, 2018). Of particular interest are the data-driven decision-making tools (most notably big data) available to public agencies at present (Mattingly-Jordan, 2018). Thanks to powerful analytics algorithms relying more and more on AI and machine

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2  
3 learning, which make it possible to extract insights from large, heterogeneous, structured and  
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5 unstructured datasets, these tools are expected to affect how governments (broadly considered, i.e.,  
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7 without distinction between institutional levels, policy areas, and national and cultural contexts)  
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9 work and alter the same nature of politics (Cukier & Mayer-Schoenberger, 2013).  
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12 In current discourse, big data are portrayed as offering greater precision and predictive powers  
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14 with which to improve efficiency, safety, wealth generation or resource management (Kim et al.,  
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16 2014; Manyika et al., 2011). More critical commentators, however, have begun to draw attention to  
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18 “socioeconomic, cultural, and political shifts that underlie the phenomenon of big data, and that are,  
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20 in turn, enabled by it” (Ekbja et al., 2015, p. 1527; Lupton, 2015). Algorithmic profiling, the impact  
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22 on the right of equal treatment, and the dominant position of big internet companies are the areas in  
23  
24 which observers identify blind spots in the emerging governance landscape (Royakkers, Timmer,  
25  
26 Kool, & van Est, 2018). Thus, there is an urgent need for wider (systemic) reflection on both the  
27  
28 promise and the problems of big data in public governance (Desouza & Jacob, 2017; Ingrams,  
29  
30 2019; C. L. McNeely & J. Hahm, 2014).  
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35 With this in mind, the present paper conceptually seeks to better understand whether, and on  
36  
37 what basis, embedding big data in public action can really have a transformative effect on  
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39 government, as seems to be implied by the mainstream literature (McAfee, Brynjolfsson,  
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41 Davenport, Patil, & Barton, 2012; Mergel, Rethemeyer, & Isett, 2016), by asking: *What, if any, is*  
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43 *the contribution of big data to the transformation of the role of government in a data-intensive*  
44  
45 *society?*  
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49 In trying to answer this question, the article extends past scholarly work to the linkages  
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51 between ‘the digital’ and government. It does so by offering a framework of analysis that refers to  
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53 the ‘orders of change’ in system development (Baptista, Stein, Klein, Watson-Manheim, & Lee,  
54  
55 2020; Bartunek & Moch, 1987; Kuipers et al., 2014). The article’s main stance is that while big data  
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57 can spur incremental improvements in policymaking and in service delivery — up to a *second-*  
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59 *order* change — the possible transformative effect (or *third-order* change) should be found  
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3 elsewhere, i.e. in how the spreading of the use of big data — and its companion data analytics —  
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5 could challenge government’s centrality (or *nodality*) within social systems. This, we argue, should  
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7 urge government to think strategically about (re)defining its role in the new and emerging scenario.  
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10 In what follows, the paper first illustrates the key arguments that have led observers to  
11  
12 anticipate a radical change in the public sector because of the rise of big data. Thereafter, following  
13  
14 a short methodological section, two widely debated areas of application, namely the use of big data  
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16 as the basis for evidence-based decision-making and for service delivery, are discussed to show  
17  
18 how the use of big data can actually represent a possible step change in the scale, scope and  
19  
20 accuracy in government up to a second-order change. The section that follows illustrates how the  
21  
22 erosion of government’s centrality and a possible shift toward a cybernetic form of governance can  
23  
24 imply, under exogenous pressures, a deep transformation in government up to a third-order change.  
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26 To counteract this potential drift, which challenges the role of government within social systems, it  
27  
28 is argued that measures should be taken by government, first of all, to re-establish the fair rules of  
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30 the game within the big data ecosystem. Some of these measures, including appropriate governance  
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32 tools, large-scale regulations, and measures aimed at increasing the organizational capabilities of  
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34 governmental machinery, are discussed in the following.  
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## 42 **Focus of the paper**

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44 Social researchers’ views on the implications of big data for the public sector present a complete  
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46 spectrum of attitudes and opinions, “from overenthusiastic to ultra-conservative” (Resnyansky,  
47  
48 2019), depending on whether the focus is on the benefits or the risks. These contrasting views  
49  
50 underscore the pressing need for wider critical reflection on the nature of big data, both to assess its  
51  
52 possible impact and to tease out the epistemological implications that can drive a paradigm shift in  
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54 science, culture, society and government, based on a new approach for making sense of the world  
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56 (Kitchin, 2014).  
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3 The discussion herein sets out to expand our thinking beyond the well-known and often  
4 examined worries surrounding privacy threats or data protection. A clear and unobstructed view of  
5 the nature of the changes spurred by the later digitization of the machinery is a prerequisite for  
6 identifying public responses which are better tailored to the times in which we live. If the  
7 intertwining of big data and government is to be understood properly, we argue that a simultaneous  
8 analysis at both organizational and systemic levels is needed.

9  
10 Here we use the term ‘big data’ broadly to indicate the use of analytics algorithms in the overall  
11 process of extracting insights from large and heterogeneous datasets, covering both big data  
12 management — which involves processes and supporting technologies used to acquire and store  
13 data and prepare and retrieve it for analysis — and advanced big data analytics — which refers to  
14 underlying techniques used to analyze and acquire ‘intelligence’ from big data (O’Leary, 2013).

15  
16 What we are particularly concerned with are the processes that are utilized to collect data from  
17 multiple and heterogeneous sources and process it to support public decision-making and service  
18 delivery. These operations are based more and more on advanced machine learning algorithms that  
19 “find their own ways of identifying patterns, and apply what they learn to make statements about  
20 data” (Boucher, 2020, p. 4). Among the different uses of big data analytics, we are more  
21 specifically interested in those that derive cognitive insights from data (Davenport & Ronanki,  
22 2018), thanks to the advent of more computational power that has made machine learning —  
23 particularly deep learning through neural networks — more broadly deployable in organizations  
24 (Batistič & der Laken, 2019; H. J. Watson, 2019). However, we do not intend to address technical  
25 details. As nicely summarized by Grimmer (2015, p. 80), for analysis of big data to truly yield  
26 answers to society’s biggest problems “we must recognize that it is as much about social science as  
27 it is about computer science”.

28  
29 In the private sector, advanced uses of big data have transformed processes and provided the  
30 organizational capabilities to tackle key business challenges (Fosso Wamba, Akter, Edwards,  
31 Chopin, & Gnanzou, 2015). However, predictive analytics and data-driven strategies also have a

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3 great deal of potential impact in the public sector (Batistič & der Laken, 2019). First, predictive  
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5 analytics can increase the quality of scenario planning and result in true evidence-based  
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7 policymaking (Höchtel, Parycek, & Schöllhammer, 2016, p. 155). Second, citizens can benefit from  
8  
9 services that may be proposed proactively as a result of large-scale predictive analytics, based on  
10  
11 services used by comparable citizens (ibidem, p. 156). Third, big data and predictive analytics can  
12  
13 be used by governments “to enhance transparency, increase citizen engagement in public affairs,  
14  
15 prevent fraud and crime, improve national security, and support the well-being of people through  
16  
17 better education and health care” (Kim et al., 2014, p. 81).  
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22 Here, our point is not to maintain a simplistic thesis, i.e. for or against the use of big data  
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24 applications. Rather, our aim is to highlight how the effects of ‘algorithmization’ stemming from  
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26 big data can be ambivalent, leading to more or less transformative impacts — different ‘orders of  
27  
28 change’ — depending on how tools are used and new technologies are governed. Therefore, we will  
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30 consider whether, under what conditions, and indeed how the use of big data in the public sphere  
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32 will drive a change and, if so, what such a change will entail for the ‘governmental machinery’.  
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### 37 **Methodological approach**

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39 To develop a more nuanced understanding of the intertwining of big data and government, it is first  
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41 necessary to identify a network of interlinked issues that, together, capture and frame the  
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43 relationship. For this reason, the present paper adopts a conceptualization approach that “integrates  
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45 a number of different works on the same topic, summarizes the common elements, contrasts the  
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47 differences, and extends the work in some fashion” (Meredith, 1993, p. 8).  
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52 More specifically, and by adopting Jabareen’s definition of a conceptual framework, i.e. “a  
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54 network, or ‘a plane’ of interlinked concepts that together provide a comprehensive understanding  
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56 of a phenomenon” (Jabareen, 2009, p. 51), the paper draws on different social science domains  
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58 (including public administration, policy studies, and sociology) that become the empirical data of  
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60 the conceptual analysis carried out to better understand the research object from different

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3 perspectives. Hence, although it makes extensive reference to multidisciplinary bodies of  
4  
5 knowledge, the paper is neither a literature review nor a meta-review. Rather, the following pages  
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7 scope the extant research across multiple domains for relevant signposts, leveraging prior research,  
8  
9 especially the most cited seminal works concerning the impact of big data on government, and the  
10  
11 authors' own knowledge base.  
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14 To understand whether the use of big data algorithms in government implies something  
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16 substantially new or transformational, we refer to the 'orders of change' taxonomy (Baptista et al.,  
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18 2020; Bartunek & Moch, 1987; Kuipers et al., 2014):  
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- 21 – *First-order* change, which can be found in the introduction of new processes, systems and  
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23 procedures, without affecting the primary organizational processes and changing the  
24  
25 organization. This kind of change includes modifications consistent with an already-present  
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27 orientation toward events (or 'schemata'), such as the early use of ICT to automatize  
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29 governmental procedures.  
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- 32 – *Second-order* change, which affects core organizational paradigms, culture, climate, and other  
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34 behavioral factors. The aim is to try to modify the common organization-wide schemata, as in  
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36 the use of ICT to implement new user-centric service delivery processes.  
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- 39 – *Third-order* change, which can be found in the transformation of the underlying problem  
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41 understanding, policy objective, program theory, and even institutional context; this concept  
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43 implies identity change and many organization/sector-wide changes.  
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49 In general, distinguishing between a *before* and an *after* in a change process is difficult and  
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51 questionable. Nevertheless, the aforementioned taxonomy can be useful for capturing the big  
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53 picture. In essence, the 'orders of change' view suggests that the focal point should be the impact of  
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55 big data technologies on the whole machinery of government, and not simply on the programs of  
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57 individual organizational units.  
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3 The paper frames big data as one of the tools or instruments available to government to address  
4 public issues. For the purposes of this discussion, a tool approach (C. C. Hood & Margetts, 2007;  
5 Salamon, 2002) is particularly useful for understanding what, if any, differences big data makes to  
6 the practice of government. The information sweet spots that steer public action provide a fresh  
7 context in which to apply the Nodality–Authority–Treasure–Organization taxonomy developed by  
8 Hood in the pre-digital era (1983), and then revisited by Hood and Margetts (2007). The framework  
9 (which also goes by the acronym of NATO) identifies four core tools at the disposal of government  
10 to monitor society or alter its behavior, and the vital role of ICT therein: i) *Nodality*, meaning the  
11 capability to gather, circulate and control information within multiple social and political networks;  
12 ii) *Authority*, which is the legal power to require and/or condition behaviors; iii) *Treasure*, meaning  
13 the exchangeable assets needed to service policy goals; and iv) *Organization*, referring to the ability  
14 to monitor and manage information to guide policymaking. The four basic tools — as pointed out  
15 by the authors themselves — consider government to be ‘a single analytic entity’ (C. C. Hood &  
16 Margetts, 2007, p. 173), which is the same perspective that we assume in this paper.

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35 In the following, the effects of the use of big data will be explored in relation to the ‘detecting’  
36 and ‘effecting’ capabilities that, according to the NATO framework, for government are “basic for  
37 its existence, and certainly for its effectiveness” (C. C. Hood & Margetts, 2007, p. 3). Detector tools  
38 are instruments that a government uses for taking in information, whereas effector tools are  
39 instruments that it uses to try to make an impact on the world (ibidem). By discussing the dual use  
40 of big data as detector tools that support evidence-based decision-making and as effector tools that  
41 support personalized service delivery based on citizen segmentation, the next section will provide  
42 the first answer to our question, i.e. *What, if any, is the contribution of big data to the*  
43 *transformation of the role of government in a data-intensive society?*

## 54 55 56 57 58 **Second-order changes in the big data era**



### *Evidence-based decision-making*

The development of a new data-driven and evidence-based approach to public decision-making and service delivery points to the need to search for usable and relevant information which can be used to help address and resolve problems (Head, 2008, 2016). Big data substantially extend both the quantitative and the qualitative information base for decision-making (Maciejewski, 2016). In addition to the administrative data — which includes governmental records, tracking information, and data from commercial and business sources (Allard et al., 2018) — big data also make the ‘digital residues’ available to policymakers, i.e. the ‘electronic footprints’ of behavioral patterns, meanings and memes created by our contemporary civilization (Dunleavy, 2016). Moreover, big data technology enables fragments of heterogeneous information to be matched and linked together to identify faster and better insights. In fact, as “those correlations can be automatically deduced by the application of machine-learning algorithms, data can be observed in its entirety, and analytical results theoretically become available instantaneously” (Höchtel et al., 2016, p. 158).

This opens up “new possibilities for research and evidence-based decision making” (Mergel et al., 2016, p. 932), which makes big data a potentially relevant policy instrument that is expected to enable the production of better decision support information and more informed policymaking to achieve policy goals (Giest, 2017; Janssen & Kuk, 2016; Maciejewski, 2016).

The implicit assumption herein is that “the volume of data, accompanied by techniques that can reveal their inherent truth, enables data to speak for themselves” (Vydra & Klievink, 2019, p. 3) and provides insightful, objective and profitable knowledge. In big data discourse, the reference to data evidence appears to be a means of “underpinning policymaking with scientific or expert evidence, in order to make it more effective, regardless of the political preferences of policymakers or other interested groups” (Poel, Meyer, & Schroeder, 2018, p. 353).

Public organizations commonly resort to external data sources, such as hybrid cross-sectoral intermediaries, i.e. think tanks, social enterprises, and other third-sector organizations (Williamson, 2014), to find an evidence base for policymaking; therefore, there is always the risk that these data

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3 are bias-affected. However, when the evidence base comes from traditional data intermediaries,  
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5 governmental organizations can also evaluate its reliability and validity through the trustworthiness  
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7 of a reduced number of (often prequalified) providers. This gives governmental organizations some  
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9 (direct or indirect) control over the data sources on which they base their decisions.  
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12 Conversely, the big data era multiplies the potential data providers that can also operate as  
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14 secondary providers, the trustworthiness of which is much more difficult for government to  
15  
16 ascertain, and this implies a possible reduction of government's control over the data sources.  
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18 Furthermore, current discourse assigns a crucial role to technologies as instruments that not only  
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20 make the data management processes more efficient, but also ensure the data's objectivity. Hence,  
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22 the generation, collection, storage, and processing of big data are conducted using information  
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24 systems and algorithms that, as technological artefacts, are perceived as being *neutral*, or at least  
25  
26 more neutral than humans.  
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30 Nevertheless, "transforming big data into information and insights ... depends on who decides  
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32 what data is worth, what is included, what is excluded, how data are aggregated .... there are  
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34 political decisions to be made not only in interpreting the data, but also in gathering it; the  
35  
36 algorithms used to capture insights from big data reflect specific conceptions of social phenomena,  
37  
38 including preconceptions about factors of importance, expected correlations, or contested  
39  
40 assumptions" (Vydra & Klievink, 2019, p. 3). These assumptions are, however, not transparent;  
41  
42 they are embedded in the logic underlying the analytics algorithms. This logic is most often  
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44 unknown to governmental organizations, therefore heightening the risk of policy decisions being  
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46 shaped by biased data.  
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51 In sum, the multiple information sources available to public administrations in the big data era  
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53 can strengthen government's detecting capability, thus amplifying the efficiency and efficacy of  
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55 decisional processes. This can prompt a step change in scale, scope and accuracy (Schroeder, 2014)  
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57 in many public service sectors, while also inducing changes in the patterns and nature of work as  
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59 well as in organizational schemata, to which a second-order change amounts (Baptista et al., 2020).  
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3 This, however, comes at a price: the possible reduction of government's control over the data  
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5 sources on which its decisions are based.  
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### 10 *Citizen segmentation in service delivery*

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12 Big data are expected to provide governments with powerful tools with which to better assess 'the  
13  
14 will of the people' and to "ensure that their policies — and the subsequent provision of public  
15  
16 goods and services — reflect the preferences of their citizens" (Desouza & Jacob, 2017, p. 1053).

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18 The segmentation of recipients, based on data analytics algorithms, gives a new sense of citizens'  
19  
20 centrality in service delivery through a better understanding of their needs, preferences and  
21  
22 behaviors, which allows for the deeper personalization of interventions (Pencheva, Esteve, &  
23  
24 Mikhaylov, 2020, p. 9). Moreover, "big data makes it possible to understand which incentives will  
25  
26 work and under what circumstances, and to design policy and administrative change in a way that is  
27  
28 realistic, legitimate and efficient" (Clarke & Margetts, 2014, p. 403).  
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34 User/consumer segmentation is quite a common practice in the business world, wherein the use  
35  
36 of big data analytics for customer segmentation has reached highly advanced levels of  
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38 sophistication. Mergel, Rethemeyer, and Isett (2016) report that (as of 2014) the nine largest private  
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40 data brokers hold more than 3,000 data segments (i.e. variables) that can be used to classify  
41  
42 individuals, and thus to "create highly specific segmentations and to tailor products and services  
43  
44 precisely to meet those needs" (Manyika et al., 2011, p. 5). This is claimed to also be of value for  
45  
46 policymaking and for service delivery. As Pirog put it, having "access to more complete or  
47  
48 comprehensive data on citizens, and having a fuller picture of individuals should, all other things  
49  
50 being equal, improve public policy" (Pirog, 2014, p. 537).  
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55 Among the big data enthusiasts, Manyika et al. go further by claiming that the user/consumer  
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57 segmentation approach "can be revolutionary (...) in the public sector where the ethos of treating  
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59 citizens in the same way is commonplace" (2011, p. 5). Contrary to what the above authors claim,  
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however, treating citizens as customers is not so commonplace and what 'revolutionary' can mean

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3 in this context requires a much deeper explanation. This is an old and ongoing debate in public  
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5 administration, at least since the emergence of the New Public Management reform rhetoric some  
6  
7 30 years ago.  
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10 As already highlighted by Fountain in 2001, “the growing replacement of the term ‘citizen’  
11  
12 with ‘customer’ and the idea that government agencies should be ‘customer-focused’ — that is, that  
13  
14 public managers should view their clients as customers and serve them using management concepts  
15  
16 drawn from effective private sector service firms — demand close scrutiny” (Fountain, 2001, p. 56).  
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18 In her critical analysis of the customer orientation transposed to the public sector, Fountain observes  
19  
20 that the service models may produce improvements in the operational performance of public  
21  
22 organizations, but that “those improvements do not replace political outcomes that render some  
23  
24 customers much less powerful than others” (Fountain, 2001, p. 58). This is because public agencies  
25  
26 routinely serve a variety of target populations with possibly conflicting interests. Hence, since  
27  
28 agencies cannot pick and choose their customers, they must mediate the conflicting interests of  
29  
30 different groups in order to avoid increased political inequality. This is a typical aspect of the policy  
31  
32 and administrative discretion (Lipsky, 1980), which is a crucial part of a public administrator’s job  
33  
34 (Sowa & Selden, 2003) — one that the growing algorithmization of policy and administrative  
35  
36 processes tends to eclipse and erode.  
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42 Customer hyper-segmentation in the business world enables firms to offer highly-customized  
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44 products or services to very small groups of consumers, and even to selectively target and satisfy  
45  
46 individual tastes and needs. However, when hyper-segmentation is applied in the public sphere, e.g.  
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48 to social policies and health care, it risks exacerbating the risk of inequalities, bumping it up from  
49  
50 the level of potential conflict between groups of citizens to the much more critical level of conflict  
51  
52 between the needs and preferences of the *single* citizen. Considering the service recipient as a  
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54 cluster of (potentially conflicting) needs that are to be selectively satisfied risks the subversion of  
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56 public purposes, such as fairness, and recognition of the holistic nature of citizens’ satisfaction.  
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3 In sum, big data give government a precision tool with which to better hone and target public  
4 interventions and craft a more effective citizen-centric approach to service design and delivery,  
5 which can sensibly enhance government's effecting capability. This, as already observed, can  
6 represent a step change in scale, scope and accuracy beyond simple incremental improvements.  
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11 In the original NATO language, the use of big data can lead to the 'sharpening' of  
12 government's tools by enhancing both its detecting and its effecting capabilities up to second-order  
13 changes, as described by (Kuipers et al., 2014). However, the use of such data can also have far-  
14 reaching consequences for the administrative machinery as ICT increasingly becomes a *driving* tool  
15 for the design and implementation of targeted public policies. The flipside is that big data would  
16 give ICT artefacts a more penetrative changing role, even beyond second-order changes — one that  
17 we believe deserves close scrutiny.  
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## 29 **Big data and third-order change**

### 30 ***Loosing nodality in the big data era***

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32 In contemporary government, as Peters (2012) points out, information is power. A crucial problem,  
33 then, is "how that information is used and the extent to which information is processed and  
34 politicized prior to being acted upon" (p. 126). The current big data ecosystem — in which a  
35 multiplicity of actors interact with one another to exchange, produce and consume data (Oliveira,  
36 Barros Lima, & Farias Lóscio, 2019) — is characterized by a systemic information asymmetry.  
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46 Currently, in the big data ecosystem an increasingly central role is played by certain big tech  
47 companies — the big five (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Microsoft, and Google) — and a few others;  
48 these organizations not only provide government with the technological tools (algorithms)  
49 necessary to manage big data, but also collect themselves and produce huge amounts of data that  
50 government can use in its policymaking processes. **The contract between the Australian government  
51 and Amazon to store data from the coronavirus tracking app has caused quite a stir. The same  
52 happened when the Canadian government and Amazon signed the contract for the supply of**  
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3 **medical equipment. In this case, the renunciation of the use of the public postal service has raised**  
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5 **strong doubts. Both examples remind** us that, in the information-intensive society, the power of  
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7 government as the central actor within social systems (i.e. its nodality) can be eroded, as other  
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9 (private) actors can take the stage.  
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12 Actually, the risk of government to loose its centrality was already anticipated by Hood and  
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14 Margetts at the dawning of the big data era (the term ‘big data’ made its first appearance in 2005):  
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16 “If those developments continue in the future, we might expect to find government to be decreasing  
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18 nodal in the Google-search sense ..... The algorithms that ... powerful multinational corporations  
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20 use are more tightly guarded than any state secret against the strategizing of those who want to ....  
21  
22 maximize *their* nodality” (C. C. Hood & Margetts, 2007, pp. 190, original emphasis).  
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26  
27 What is distinctive for the current scenario in comparison to the era in which the NATO  
28  
29 framework was originally developed is, first and foremost, the fact that government has little direct  
30  
31 control over the sheer volume of information of potential public interest and the proprietary  
32  
33 analytics algorithms used by big tech companies. The exploitation of the various forms of data that  
34  
35 platforms collect on consumers and business users explains, to a good extent, the current dominance  
36  
37 that these firms enjoy (Khan, 2018). Second, in the contemporary world, the contexts in which data  
38  
39 are generated and processed — whether through commercial platforms or public institutions — “all  
40  
41 appear to be interchangeable” (Van Dijck, 2014, p. 204). In the past the public sector served as “the  
42  
43 repository for most of the stored data in the world”, while “the advent of the information economy  
44  
45 resulted in a dramatic role reversal” (Andrejevic, 2020, p. 85). For example, in the field of national  
46  
47 security, governmental agencies have found ways in which to piggyback on the data collection  
48  
49 practices of major tech players (ibidem), and in many countries worldwide, taxation authorities  
50  
51 regularly use data from social media in the fight against tax evasion. In parallel, in some areas the  
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53 role of public services is being questioned by the presence of digital giants (OECD, 2019).  
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58 Within a few years a sort of continuum between public and private social actors, and from state  
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60 to international level, was created (Scott, Cafaggi, & Senden, 2011). In this ecosystem of supply,

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3 demand and exchange, which are fueled by growing piles of online metadata, social agents and  
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5 online platforms, are “inevitably interconnected, both on the level of infrastructure and on the level  
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7 of operational logic” (Van Dijck, 2014, p. 204). This would entail, at least tendentially, a broader  
8  
9 picture of governance arrangements generated outside of the global public sphere, with a shift  
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11 toward “a polycentric perspective that sees the state as a part of a broader and more complex social  
12  
13 governance system” (Aligica, 2017, p. 542).  
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16  
17 In such a polycentric context, important reconfigurations of power are emerging. The  
18  
19 differential power of tech players and other unaccountable actors is partly a consequence of the  
20  
21 orders of magnitude that they have reached, thanks to their levels of digitization, intermediation  
22  
23 capacity, and global integration. In the emerging scenario, in which nodality will vary according to  
24  
25 the extent to which citizens and public opinion trust the institutions involved (Van Dijck, 2014), the  
26  
27 problem for government lies in how to preserve centrality as the guarantor of fundamental values  
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29 and rights in modern society. This would require government to progressively change not only its  
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31 capabilities and operational modes, but also its steering model and its role and purpose, i.e. to deal  
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33 with questions such as ‘what is government?’ — this can lead to third-order changes.  
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### 38 39 ***A step toward ‘cybernetic governance’?***

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41 Our illustration has shown how the massive algorithmization tends to transform ICT from a  
42  
43 *supporting* tool into a *driving* tool for the design and implementation of public policies. This raises  
44  
45 the problem of what impact the use of big data algorithms can have on public governance, since  
46  
47 different forms of governance can be distinguished based on the “extent to which information drives  
48  
49 decisions or is only part of a decision process that also involves a number of more deliberative and  
50  
51 politicized elements” (G. Peters, 2012, p. 113).  
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55 We shall attempt to answer the above question by relating the use of big data algorithms to the  
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57 reduction of complexity of the information-intensive environment. Borrowing from (Luhmann,  
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59 1993), Kallinikos (2011, p. 23) characterizes technology broadly as a system organized along the  
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3 lines of *functional simplification* and *functional closure* (italics in the original). The former  
4  
5 principle takes the shape of “a set of operations being lifted out of the surrounding institutional and  
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7 organizational complexity ... as simplified causal and ... procedural sequences ...”, while functional  
8  
9 closure implies “the very decoupling of the operations of the technical system from the wider  
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11 organizational and social relations within which the system itself is embedded” (Kallinikos, 2005, p.  
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13 190). Big data algorithms are premised upon functional simplification and closure. In particular, the  
14  
15 (apparent) objectivity of the algorithms makes it difficult for public officials to contend with the  
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17 algorithmically-generated evidence, thus diminishing unwanted and uncontrolled interferences from  
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19 outside of the system, according to the ‘let the data speak for themselves’ principle (or functional  
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21 simplification, in Luhmann’s words). Yet big data algorithms mark a crucial shift: they can shape  
22  
23 the scene for decision-making and policymaking *outside* of decision-makers’ sphere of influence,  
24  
25 i.e. outside of the public realm. In addition, unlike previous problem-solving tools working on the  
26  
27 basis of *recognized* rules, big data management and data analytics algorithms are “opaque,  
28  
29 inscrutable black boxes” (Yeung, 2018), whose inferential engine often operates without regard for  
30  
31 human comprehension (Burrell, 2016) (or the functional closure principle, in Luhmann’s words).  
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35 “The unlimited technicization of work processes” (Luhmann, 2018, p. 302) led by functional  
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37 simplification and closure legitimizes the question of whether big data applications, once they  
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39 become a ‘universal standard of rationality’ (Townley, 2008), will accelerate the transition to a  
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41 ‘cybernetic approach to governance’. Simply put, this conception emphasizes the responsiveness of  
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43 the public sector to changing social and economic conditions as depending upon information  
44  
45 processing, just as physical mechanisms for cybernetic controls involve receiving and processing  
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47 adequate information from the environment and then making the appropriate decisions based on  
48  
49 that information (B. G. Peters, 2012; p. 121).  
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56 It may be easy to initially shrug this account off as unrealistic, especially when comparing the  
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58 contemporary steering models to the distinctive attributes of the cybernetic ideal type, i.e. a closed-  
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60 system vision, a rather linear conception of control, a clear capacity of control, and programmed-in-



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3 advance decisions with regard to changed states. Per contra, the plausibility of a cybernetic  
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5 conception of governance cannot be ruled out in the event that the use of big data and automated  
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7 analytics in government takes an impetuous turn; in other words, ICT applications not only shape  
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9 the decisional field and present recommendations to human decision-makers (as in prescriptive and  
10  
11 predictive analytics), but also autonomously *take action* based on the results of their analysis.  
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14 To gain a sense of the scope of this transformation, it is helpful to go beyond the visible  
15  
16 manifestations of the technologies in use to consider what patterns and logics are related to the  
17  
18 decoupling of technical operations from the wider organizational and social relations within which  
19  
20 such a technical system is embedded (Kallinikos, 2011, p. 77). In this regard, the displacement of  
21  
22 social processes — including social deliberation — with automatic systems can be traced back to  
23  
24 three interrelated ‘built-in tendencies’ or ‘biases’ (in Andrejevic’s words) of big data: pre-emption,  
25  
26 operationalism and environmentality. Table 1 provides an overview of these biases.  
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32 Tab. 1. Built-in tendencies of big data and their effects (authors’ own, based on (Andrejevic,  
33 2020))  
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Bias	Description	Displacement effect
Pre-emption	Extensive monitoring and predictive analysis	Number crunching vs. comprehension
Operationalism	Automated responses	Acting vs. understanding
Environmentality	Monitoring and shaping the conduct of individuals	Regulation of effects vs. regulation of causes

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45 First, big data impose a logic of pre-emption to simulate future scenarios, from crime to  
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47 terrorism, and from natural disasters to pandemics, so as to act on them in the present, i.e. before  
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49 they can strike. Shifting the focus from the past (historical data) to the future displaces narratives of  
50  
51 causation (Andrejevic, 2020, p. 77). Second, the predicted operationalization of monitoring enabled  
52  
53 by digital automation has the effect of eliciting and modeling reality, and renders problematic  
54  
55 domains actionable (ibidem p. 97). In this way, the argument as the main form of motivation for  
56  
57 decisions is abandoned. Third, and finally, the imperative of total information capture and tracking  
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59 transforms the environment into a ‘sensorized space’ (p. 39), populated with devices capable of  
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3 detecting and discerning signals and patterns of behavior (Van Dijck, 2014, p. 198), and modulating  
4 the context accordingly. In this case, automated detection implies the potential displacement of  
5 human intervention; in other words, agency is absent, or at least reduced. In NATO's words, not  
6 only does technology sharpen government's detecting and effecting capabilities, it is also the  
7 technological system itself that ideally acts as both a detector and an effector.  
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14 **An ever-going trend is demonstrated by the well-known State vs. Loomis case concerning a**  
15 **citizen arrested in Wisconsin (US) for driving a car involved in a former shooting case. The arrested**  
16 **was sentenced six years of detention on the basis of his potentiality to re-offend algorithmically**  
17 **calculated by a closed-source risk assessment software (COMPAS). One consequence of the use of**  
18 **algorithms that are insensitive to the fundamental norms in the US legal system is that “the Court in**  
19 **effect outsourced its decision making, ... consequently undermining its public accountability” (Liu,**  
20 **Lin, & Chen, 2019, p. 133).**  
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30 In essence, the increasing use of big data and AI-based artefacts in governmental machinery  
31 can question fundamental principles of public administration — including control, discretion and  
32 accountability — as well as the role of policymakers and that of public officials. In other words, the  
33 far-reaching consequences of the emergent algorithmization of policy and administrative processes  
34 will urge government to think strategically about its purpose and role within social systems, which  
35 can lead to third-order changes.  
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## 47 **Regaining nodality**

### 50 ***Developing an appropriate governance framework***

51 Two mutually-reinforcing factors emerge from the increasing use of big data — and its companion,  
52 AI-based data analytics — that, if not governed, can have far-reaching, critical consequences for  
53 government. As discussed above, the potential — and, regarding many aspects, already actual —  
54 erosion of government's nodality and the possible emergence of a cybernetic mode of governance  
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3 can significantly reduce the role of government in the information-intensive society. As seen in the  
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5 State vs. Loomis case, “ill-informed deference to the privately made machines marginalizes the role  
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7 of public authority and public scrutiny in government” (Liu et al., 2019, p. 138). However, even  
8  
9 when government decides to rely on private firms’ consultancy to elaborate algorithms which might  
10  
11 serve in public decision-making, the public sector has additional duties of accountability to the  
12  
13 citizens (Gualdi & Cordella, 2021).  
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17 Under different forms and with gradations varying in different sociopolitical contexts, the  
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19 centrality of government within social systems is a value that should be preserved for a number of  
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21 reasons, including (van Wynsberghe, 2020): the need to protect people; the need to create a level  
22  
23 playing field; the need for the development of a common set of rules for all stakeholders to uphold;  
24  
25 protection from negative outcomes that may result from new and emerging technologies; and the  
26  
27 interest of the state, given that the new technologies are being used in state-governed areas (such as  
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29 prisons, taxes, educational systems, etc.).  
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33 To retain nodality, government would have to reposition itself to take back its role as the  
34  
35 regulator of the social system and the guarantor of public values, while also maintaining political  
36  
37 agency and democratic accountability (Nemitz, 2018). This could require government to transform  
38  
39 itself, up to a third-order change, to adapt to the new contextual conditions. However, if government  
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41 wants to steer the change rather than to submit to it, the conditions for rebalancing the power  
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43 relationships within the big data ecosystem must be re-established to allow government to operate  
44  
45 on an equal footing with the private players.  
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49 Industry self-regulation in many cases can be (and has been) an advantageous complement to  
50  
51 government policies (OECD, 2015). However, in the big data ecosystem self-regulation by single  
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53 companies or industry branches risks being ineffective due to the massive concentration of  
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55 information industries removing market-led pressures toward self-governance (Koene et al., 2019;  
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57 Nemitz, 2018).  
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3 An obvious alternative for government would be to resort to market-based mechanisms to  
4 negotiate better terms, and to establish rules limiting the scope of non-disclosure and trade secrets  
5 (Liu et al., 2019). When codified as prerequisites in order to bid for government contracts these  
6 requirements take on the form of co-regulation (Koene et al., 2019). However, also contractual  
7 regulation and co-regulation risk being ineffective due to the information asymmetry that would  
8 allow private players to use their informational advantage to water down contractual specifications  
9 and standards (Hirsch, 2011).

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11  
12 Another option, although not free from problems, could be establishing a clear governance  
13 framework for algorithmic transparency and accountability to be adopted by business and  
14 governmental organizations that use advanced data-processing algorithms (European Parliament,  
15 2019; H. Watson, 2019).

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18 The strong information and power asymmetry between public and private actors within the big  
19 data ecosystem makes it unlikely that single governments will be able to succeed in setting such  
20 regulation and enforcing it in global enterprises. The limited room for unilateral maneuvering in  
21 relation to these phenomena requires governments to coordinate their efforts at the supranational  
22 level.

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25 In Europe, the EU Parliament has taken the lead in defining a new governance framework in a  
26 series of coordinated reports prepared for the Directorate-General for European Parliamentary  
27 Research Services (EPRS) (Boucher, 2020; Koene et al., 2019; van Wynsberghe, 2020). In  
28 particular, based on a review and analysis of existing proposals for the governance of algorithmic  
29 systems, Koene et al. (2019) identify a number of possible governance measures that, when  
30 implemented, can help governments to regain a central role in the big data ecosystem.

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32  
33 Excluding the state ‘appropriation’ of big data infrastructure, which is unfeasible in Western  
34 liberal democracies, governments can adopt measures related to (Koene et al., 2019, pp. 45-50):

- Information, which means providing the users of algorithmic decision-making systems with a general understanding of algorithmic processes and specific information regarding a particular application of algorithmic decision-making;
- Command-and-control regulation through legislative measures, as exemplified by the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that, by defining measures dealing with the protection of personal data, also provides some response to the search for more accountability relating to algorithmic decision-making (Brand, 2020);
- Incentives through funding and taxes — individual countries have begun introducing digital tech company taxes, and a global tech tax compact is back in vogue again (Dignam, 2020) — as part of an incentivizing structure for promoting the use of transparency- and accountability-enabling methods such as voluntary certification against transparency standards and performance auditing;
- Public investments on big data infrastructures (most notably platforms and certified data sets to train the algorithms), which would give back to the public some control power on the ecosystem (Nogarede, 2021). While unlikely in the cost-containment scenario of the past, this measure has recently become feasible (at least in Europe) as a part of the Next Generation EU package.

### ***Implementing new organizational capabilities***

Interestingly, the recent EPRS governance measures leverage three basic tools — nodality (information), authority (command and control) and treasure (incentives and public investments) — informing the NATO framework. To be effective, however, the aforementioned means should be implemented ‘on the ground’, which requires complementing them with appropriate organizational actions (i.e. the fourth NATO tool of government) to be taken by each governmental unit. The options, which can be divided into interventions of lower and higher intensity, measured against the extent to which they depart from the organizational status quo, include:

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3 – Capacity-building programs, e.g. action plans coupled with adequate investments in the key  
4 assets and resources required (technologies, skills, and technical knowhow) to develop the new  
5 technical and functional roles that are, at present, unevenly spread in the public sector,  
6 including data cleaners, algorithm writers, data visualizers, and designers of the interfaces of  
7 systems that gather and output data (Kennedy, Poell, & van Dijck, 2015);  
8
- 9  
10 – Large-scale retraining programs for mid-career workers to match the shifts in skill  
11 requirements. Once the gaps in organizational and knowledge capacities are filled, data workers  
12 might create spaces in which to exercise some agency in their work (Kennedy et al., 2015).  
13 These first two steps will enable government to bring in-house vital skills and knowhow to  
14 reorient and rescale its capabilities, moving more upstream and, ultimately, strengthening its  
15 negotiating position with big tech companies;  
16
- 17 – Decision-making procedures that ensure the ongoing involvement of human decision-makers  
18 ('human in the loop'), including engineers, product managers, user experience researchers, and  
19 legal professionals. This is a viable strategy with which to validate models and double-check  
20 results from AI solutions (Chui et al., 2018, p. 41). More interdisciplinary efforts, including the  
21 involvement of social scientists and of experts in the organizational and societal implications of  
22 ICT, are essential when it comes to managing the inherent risks of opaque algorithms.  
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44 All of the above suggests that there is no quick fix that can be implemented to regulate and  
45 steer big data and AI developments in a way that furthers the public interest while unlocking the  
46 potential of these technologies (Cate, 2016; Guihot, Matthew, & Suzor, 2017), without forgetting  
47 that part of the challenge of effectively regulating those developments lies in identifying  
48 opportunities for regulatory agencies to influence other actors when the traditional NATO tools of  
49 government are limited (Guihot et al., 2017, p. 429). In this sense, the large-scale approach recently  
50 adopted by the European Union in attempting to shape the behaviors of big tech companies is a  
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3 clear policy signal to all of those involved in the big data and AI industry that the topic of  
4  
5 governance in the data-intensive era is high on the policy agenda (Royakkers et al., 2018).  
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7  
8 Yet more needs to be done to proactively safeguard governmental nodality in what is largely  
9  
10 “an unregulated field” (Guihot et al., 2017, p. 386). As observed recently by (Brand, 2020) and  
11  
12 (Etzioni, 2018), what are important to establish on a global scale are appropriate frameworks not for  
13  
14 the sake of regulating the use of technology, but in order to protect society from potential harm,  
15  
16 without forgetting that the ongoing evolution requires not only continuous consideration of suitable  
17  
18 legal arrangements, but also a deep transformation of government both at the (macro) policy level  
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20 and at the (micro) organizational level.  
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## 26 **Conclusions**

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28 This paper addresses several crucial questions raised by the use of big data and AI-based data  
29  
30 analytics in government. However, as is often the case with technological innovations that penetrate  
31  
32 nearly all facets of organizations, whether big data delivers on its promise is far from assured.  
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34 Obviously, this introduces another veil of uncertainty into the public sphere.  
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37  
38 To fully appreciate the impact of big data in government, it is necessary to understand at least  
39  
40 two potential manifestations of the effects of these data:  
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- 42 – An *organizational* transformation, to match and combine big data into well-established  
43  
44 practices and public values, in order to leverage the increase *in the scale and scope* of the  
45  
46 efficacy of the core tools deriving from the use of big data to support public decision-  
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48 making and service delivery processes (second-order change).  
49
- 50 – A progressive change of the governmental *identity*, to cope with the emergent cybernetic  
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52 mode of governance and the potential erosion of nodality, and to re-establish, under new  
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54 conditions, the central role of government (third-order change).  
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3 Drawing on the NATO framework, we have also argued for a more multidimensional look at  
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5 big data, recognizing how the real game is played at the level of governmental nodality, as well as  
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7 advocating the need for appropriate strategies that incorporate this aspect.  
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10 In essence, what government can learn from the data-intensive digital whirlpool into which it  
11  
12 has been plunged is that it is unwise to focus exclusively or prevalently on the first- and second-  
13  
14 order change effects. That would allow the real implications of big data for the public sector to slip  
15  
16 by unnoticed, and would lead to the vision, mission and strategies of government paying the  
17  
18 ultimate price. Of course, we are not any closer to a quick solution, but we have distilled several  
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20 principles for action in an information-intensive society.  
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27  
28  
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32  
33 alphabetically indicating equal contribution to the research.  
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For Peer Review

Tab. 1. Built-in tendencies of big data and their effects (authors' own, based on Andrejevic (2020))

<b>Bias</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Displacement effect</b>
Pre-emption	Extensive monitoring and predictive analysis	Number crunching vs. comprehension
Operationalism	Automated responses	Acting vs. understanding
Environmentality	Monitoring and shaping the conduct of individuals	Regulation of effects vs. regulation of causes

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