

## Online appendix

# Government coalitions and Eurosceptic voting in the 2014 European Parliament elections

Stefano Camatarri, Centre de Science Politique et de Politique Comparée (CESPOL), Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain, Belgium

Francesco Zucchini, Department of Social and Political Sciences, University of Milan, Milan, Italy

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**Table A.1. List of Eurosceptic parties (source: CHES Expert Survey 2014)**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Party label</b>	<b>Party name</b>	<b>Eurosceptic score</b>
AUSTRIA	FPÖ	The Freedom Party of Austria	5,11
	BZÖ	Alliance for the Future of Austria	4,3
	Team Stronach*	Team Stronach*	4,1
BELGIUM	VB	Flemish Interest	4,40
	PP	People's Party	4,5
BULGARIA	NOA	National Union Attack	5,5
	NFSB*	National Front for Salvation of Bulgaria*	4
CZECH REPUBLIC	KSCM	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia	4,27
	Svobodni	Party of Free Citizens	5,67
	Úsvit*	Dawn of Direct Democracy*	4,73
	ODS**	Civic Democratic Party**	4,13
DENMARK	DF	Danish People's Party	5,09
	FolkB	People's Movement Against EU	5,91
	Enhedslisten*	Red-Green Unity List*	5,18
GERMANY	Linke	The Left	4
	AfD	Alternative for Germany	5,39
	NPD*	National Democratic Party*	5,33

FINLAND	PS	True Finns	5,4
FRANCE	LO	Left Front	4,92
	FN	National Front	5,79
	MPF*	Movement for France*	5,77
	PCF*	French Communist Party*	4,36
GREECE	ANEL	Independent Greeks	4,78
	KKE	Communist Party of Greece	5,89
	XA	Golden Dawn	5,89
HUNGARY	JOBBIK	Movement for a Better Hungary	5,77
	Fidesz**	Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Union**	4,29
SWEDEN	V	Left Party	4,86
	SD	Sweden Democrats	5,73
UK	UKIP	UK Independence Party	5,86
IRELAND	SF	We Ourselves	4,22
	SP	Socialist Party	4,79
	PBPA	People Before Profit Alliance	4,75
ITALY	LN**	North League**	5,86
	M5S	Five Star Movement	5,57
	Fd'I	Brothers of Italy	4,83
	RC*	Communist Refoundation Party*	5
LATVIA	LKS	Green & Latvian Russian Union	4,11
LUXEMBOURG	ADR	Alternative Democratic Reform Party	4

NETHERLANDS	SP	Socialist Party	4,90
	PVV	Party for Freedom	5,91
	CU-SGP**	Christian Union–Political Reformed Party**	4,45
POLAND	KNP	Congress of the New Right	5,94
	SP	United Poland	4
PORTUGAL	CDU	Unitarian Democratic Coalition	5,13
SLOVAKIA	SaS**	Freedom and Solidarity**	4,14
	OLaNO	Ordinary People and Independent Personalities	4
	SNS**	Slovak National Party**	4,72

\* Not included in the 2014 EES Voter Study; \*\*Participating in a government coalition during the period 2008–2014

**Table A.2. List of caretaker governments in the European Union over the period 2008-2014 (source: ParlGov database)**

Country	Government name	Type of support	Period in charge (months)
Belgium	Verhofstadt IV	Parliament's confidence vote	3
	Leterme III	Parliament's confidence vote	6
Bulgaria	Raikov*	Only Presidential nomination	2,5
	Oresharski	Parliament's confidence vote	14,5
Czech Republic	Fischer	Parliament's confidence vote	14,8
	Rusnok	Presidential nomination (confidence vote lost)	6,3
Greece	Papademos	Parliament's confidence vote	6,2
	Pikramenos*	Only Presidential nomination	1,1
Italy	Monti	Parliament's confidence vote	17,4
Luxembourg	Juncker V	Parliament's confidence vote	4,8
Netherlands	Balkenende VI	Parliament's confidence vote	7,7
	Rutte II	Parliament's confidence vote	6,4
Slovakia	Radicova II	Parliament's confidence vote	5,5

\*These governments have not been included in our analysis due to their lack of any ideological profile and/or support toward the EU, both at the government and at the parliamentary level. In other words, their extremely short-term and bureaucratic nature, merely aiming at favoring the transition to new imminent elections, makes it basically impossible to assign to them any level of Euroscepticism.

**Table A.3. Descriptive statistics of independent variables**

	Mean	Minimum	Maximum	Standard deviation	N
<b><i>Individual level</i></b>					
Attitude toward EU integration	5.34	0	10	3.11	27,362
Attitude toward one's own country's EU membership	0.14	0	1	0.35	30,064
Eurosceptic voting at last national election	0.10	0	1	.294415	16857
Government disapproval (dummy)	0.60	0	1	0.49	26,410
Left-right self-placement	5.08	0	10	2.63	24,388
Judgment toward the state of the economy (past 12 months)	2.79	1	5	1.01	29,449
Judgment toward the state of the economy (next 12 months)	3.00	1	5	0.93	28,349
Political interest (dummy)	0.51	0	1	0.50	29,859
Political information (dummy)	0.28	0	1	0.45	30,031
Subjective social status	5.39	1	10	1.58	29220
Occupational condition (dummy)	0.34	0	1	0.47	30,064
Place of residence	1.94	1	3	0.77	30,042
Education (dummy)	0.82	0	1	0.38	29,511
Age (centered to sample mean)	0	-35.06	47.94	17.92	30,064
Female	.55	0	1	.50	30,064
<b><i>Country level</i></b>					
Euroscepticism of government coalitions (period 2008-2014)	1.82	0.26	4.64	1.19	28
Euroscepticism of most pro-EU government parties (dummy) (period 2008-2014)	0.32	0	1	0.48	28
Time span from previous national election (months)	25.32	1	48	13.12	28
Rate of employment (difference 2009–2013)	-0.01	-0.19	0.10	0.06	28
Median equivalized net income (difference 2009–2013)	0.03	-0.27	0.24	0.11	27

**Table A.4. Predictors of Eurosceptic voting**

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<i>Individual variables</i>						
PERCEIVED SOCIAL STATUS	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
OCCUPATIONAL CONDITION (unemployed=1)	0.38*** (0.11)	0.35*** (0.11)	0.40*** (0.11)	0.37*** (0.11)	0.40*** (0.11)	0.3*** (0.11)
RETROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC EVALUATION	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)
PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC EVALUATION	-0.21*** (0.07)	-0.17** (0.07)	-0.22*** (0.07)	-0.18** (0.07)	-0.22*** (0.07)	-0.19*** (0.07)
GOVERNMENT DISAPPROVAL (disapproves= 1)	0.73*** (0.11)	0.78*** (0.11)	0.77*** (0.11)	0.81*** (0.11)	0.77*** (0.11)	0.82*** (0.11)
IDEOLOGICAL SELF-PLACEMENT	0.05** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)
POLITICAL INTEREST (interested in politics=1)	-0.12 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.11)	-0.14 (0.11)	-0.12 (0.11)	-0.15 (0.11)	-0.10 (0.11)
POLITICAL INFORMATION (informed=1)	-0.24** (0.10)	-0.21** (0.10)	-0.24** (0.10)	-0.21** (0.10)	-0.24** (0.11)	-0.21* (0.10)
EDUCATION (highly educated=1)	0.04 (0.14)	0.029 (0.14)	0.02 (0.14)	0.01 (0.14)	0.03 (0.14)	0.02 (0.14)
(NEGATIVE) ATTITUDE TOWARD EU INTEGRATION	0.18*** (0.02)		0.14*** (0.04)		0.08 (0.05)	
(NEGATIVE) PERCEIVED UTILITY OF COUNTRY'S EU MEMBERSHIP		1.37*** (0.13)		1.03*** (0.25)		0.42 (0.33)
PREVIOUS EUROSCEPTIC VOTING	4.45*** (0.13)	4.48*** (0.13)	5.64*** (0.26)	5.67*** (0.26)	5.56*** (0.26)	5.58*** (0.26)
LOCATION (Rural, benchmark level)						
Small- or middle-sized town	0.11 (0.12)	0.08 (0.11)	0.09 (0.12)	0.06 (0.12)	0.08 (0.12)	0.06 (0.12)
Large town	0.00 (0.13)	-0.04 (0.13)	-0.00 (0.13)	-0.04 (0.13)	-0.00 (0.13)	-0.04 (0.13)
GENDER (Female=1)	-0.62*** (0.10)	-0.60*** (0.10)	-0.63*** (0.10)	-0.61*** (0.10)	-0.63*** (0.10)	-0.62*** (0.10)
AGE (centered to sample mean)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)

**Contextual variables**

EUROSCEPTICISM OF GOVERNMENT COALITIONS	0.48**	0.53**	0.27	0.46**	0.29	0.93**
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.42)	(0.37)
POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRY	-1.66***	-1.82***	-1.72***	-1.88***	-1.72***	-1.86***
	(0.51)	(0.55)	(0.51)	(0.55)	(0.52)	(0.53)
TIME SPAN FROM PREVIOUS NATIONAL ELECTION			0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.02
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
PERC. VARIATION IN RATE OF EMPLOYMENT (2009-2013)	3.00	4.50	3.30	4.61	1.53	2.18
	(4.11)	(4.38)	(4.00)	(4.28)	(3.98)	(4.12)
EUROSCEPTICISM OF MOST PRO-EU GOVERNMENT PARTIES (1=countries with a score over the European average)					1.26	1.35
					(1.33)	(1.21)
<b>Interactive terms</b>						
NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD EU INTEGRATION* EUROSCEPTICISM OF GOV. COALITIONS			0.02		0.08***	
			(0.02)		(0.03)	
NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD EU INTEGRATION* EUROSCEPTICISM OF MOST PRO-EU GOVERNMENT PARTIES					-0.01	
					(0.09)	
NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD EU INTEGRATION* EUROSCEPTICISM OF MOST PRO-EU GOVERNMENT PARTIES* EUROSCEPTICISM OF GOV. COALITIONS					-0.06	
					(0.04)	
PERCEIVED UTILITY OF OWN COUNTRY'S EU MEMBERSHIP* EUROSCEPTICISM OF GOVERNMENT COALITIONS				0.16		0.59***
				(0.11)		(0.17)
PERCEIVED UTILITY OF OWN COUNTRY'S EU MEMBERSHIP* EUROSCEPTICISM OF						1.00



MOST PRO-EU GOVERNMENT PARTIES						(0.67)
PERCEIVED UTILITY OF OWN COUNTRY'S EU MEMBERSHIP *						-0.69***
EUROSCEPTICISM OF MOST PRO-EU GOV. PARTIES*						
EUROSCEPTICISM OF GOV. COALITIONS						(0.25)
EUROSCEPTICISM OF MOST PRO-EU GOV. PARTIES*					-0.35	-0.84
EUROSCEPTICISM OF GOV. COALITIONS						
PREVIOUS EUROSCEPTIC VOTING* TIME SPAN FROM PREVIOUS NATIONAL ELECTION			-0.05***	-0.05***	-0.05***	(0.59) (0.54)
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
CONSTANT	-4.68*** (0.61)	-3.96*** (0.62)	-4.52*** (0.81)	-4.03*** (0.80)	-4.15*** (0.85)	-3.91*** (0.78)
LOG LIKELIHOOD	-1678.60	-1719.80	-1662.39	-1703.60	-1655.68	-1695.92
AIC	3397.19	3479.60	3370.78	3453.19	3365.36	3445.84
BIC	3538.37	3621.57	3533.13	3616.46	3555.95	3637.50
RES. INTRACLASS CORRELATION	.26	.29	.25	.28	.23	.24
OBSERVATIONS	8594	8942	8594	8942	8594	8942
NUMBER OF GROUPS	28	28	28	28	28	28

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A.5. Predictors of Eurosceptic voting (with median equivalized net income as macroeconomic predictor)**

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<i>Individual variables</i>						
PERCEIVED SOCIAL STATUS	-0.0335 (0.0346)	-0.0405 (0.0342)	-0.0334 (0.0346)	-0.0397 (0.0343)	-0.0353 (0.0348)	-0.0377 (0.0345)
OCCUPATIONAL CONDITION (unemployed=1)	0.383*** (0.112)	0.354*** (0.110)	0.396*** (0.112)	0.370*** (0.111)	0.396*** (0.112)	0.367*** (0.111)
RETROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC EVALUATION	-0.0230 (0.0694)	-0.0254 (0.0691)	-0.0175 (0.0691)	-0.0188 (0.0691)	-0.0172 (0.0693)	-0.0168 (0.0694)
PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC EVALUATION	-0.213*** (0.0702)	-0.170** (0.0697)	-0.215*** (0.0700)	-0.175** (0.0696)	-0.215*** (0.0702)	-0.189*** (0.0701)
GOVERNMENT DISAPPROVAL (disapproves= 1)	0.730*** (0.110)	0.773*** (0.109)	0.768*** (0.111)	0.807*** (0.110)	0.771*** (0.112)	0.820*** (0.111)
IDEOLOGICAL SELF-PLACEMENT	0.0465** (0.0188)	0.0624*** (0.0185)	0.0451** (0.0189)	0.0600*** (0.0187)	0.0457** (0.0190)	0.0582*** (0.0188)
POLITICAL INTEREST (interested in politics=1)	-0.118 (0.111)	-0.103 (0.110)	-0.143 (0.111)	-0.120 (0.110)	-0.152 (0.112)	-0.106 (0.111)
POLITICAL INFORMATION (informed=1)	-0.236** (0.105)	-0.204* (0.104)	-0.240** (0.105)	-0.204* (0.105)	-0.232** (0.106)	-0.201* (0.105)
EDUCATION (highly educated=1)	0.0432 (0.142)	0.0320 (0.141)	0.0254 (0.143)	0.0170 (0.143)	0.0377 (0.144)	0.0267 (0.145)
(NEGATIVE) ATTITUDE TOWARD EU INTEGRATION	0.177*** (0.0182)		0.137*** (0.0387)		0.0866* (0.0516)	
(NEGATIVE) PERCEIVED UTILITY OF COUNTRY'S EU MEMBERSHIP		1.370*** (0.127)		1.023*** (0.253)		0.416 (0.326)
PREVIOUS EUROSCEPTIC VOTING	4.445*** (0.127)	4.479*** (0.126)	5.627*** (0.262)	5.657*** (0.260)	5.558*** (0.260)	5.574*** (0.257)
LOCATION (Rural, benchmark level)						
Small- or middle-sized town	0.114 (0.117)	0.0782 (0.115)	0.0860 (0.119)	0.0553 (0.116)	0.0829 (0.119)	0.0598 (0.117)
Large town	-0.00223	-0.0459	-0.00674	-0.0491	-0.00603	-0.0438

	(0.130)	(0.128)	(0.131)	(0.129)	(0.131)	(0.129)
GENDER (Female=1)	-0.622***	-0.601***	-0.626***	-0.608***	-0.625***	-0.620***
	(0.0982)	(0.0971)	(0.0987)	(0.0978)	(0.0990)	(0.0985)
AGE (centered to sample mean)	-0.00416	-0.00242	-0.00425	-0.00257	-0.00455	-0.00268
	(0.00336)	(0.00328)	(0.00339)	(0.00331)	(0.00340)	(0.00332)
<b>Contextual variables</b>						
EUROSCEPTICISM OF GOVERNMENT COALITIONS	0.476**	0.536**	0.280	0.466**	0.393	1.041***
	(0.197)	(0.215)	(0.229)	(0.213)	(0.415)	(0.365)
POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRY	-1.455***	-1.584***	-1.502***	-1.625***	-1.581***	-1.712***
	(0.505)	(0.547)	(0.507)	(0.551)	(0.506)	(0.524)
TIME SPAN FROM PREVIOUS NATIONAL ELECTION			0.00945	0.00914	-0.0119	-0.0167
			(0.0170)	(0.0186)	(0.0196)	(0.0204)
PERC. VARIATION IN NET EQUIVALISED INCOME (2009-2013)	-0.801	-0.581	-0.547	-0.343	-1.841	-1.942
	(2.065)	(2.254)	(2.030)	(2.224)	(2.047)	(2.127)
EUROSCEPTICISM OF MOST PRO-EU GOVERNMENT PARTIES (1=countries with a score over the European average)					1.298	1.403
					(1.258)	(1.127)
<b>Interactive terms</b>						
NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD EU INTEGRATION* EUROSCEPTICISM OF GOV. COALITIONS			0.0234		0.0787***	
			(0.0173)		(0.0294)	
NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD EU INTEGRATION* EUROSCEPTICISM OF MOST PRO-EU GOVERNMENT PARTIES					-0.00945	
					(0.0897)	
NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD EU INTEGRATION* EUROSCEPTICISM OF MOST PRO-EU GOVERNMENT PARTIES* EUROSCEPTICISM OF GOV. COALITIONS					-0.0553	

PERCEIVED UTILITY OF OWN COUNTRY'S EU MEMBERSHIP* EUROSCEPTICISM OF GOVERNMENT COALITIONS				0.165	(0.0397)	0.593***
				(0.106)		(0.167)
PERCEIVED UTILITY OF OWN COUNTRY'S EU MEMBERSHIP* EUROSCEPTICISM OF MOST PRO-EU GOVERNMENT PARTIES						0.997
						(0.662)
PERCEIVED UTILITY OF OWN COUNTRY'S EU MEMBERSHIP * EUROSCEPTICISM OF MOST PRO-EU GOV. PARTIES* EUROSCEPTICISM OF GOV. COALITIONS						-0.691***
						(0.250)
EUROSCEPTICISM OF MOST PRO-EU GOV. PARTIES* EUROSCEPTICISM OF GOV. COALITIONS					-0.461	-0.962*
					(0.566)	(0.504)
PREVIOUS EUROSCEPTIC VOTING* TIME SPAN FROM PREVIOUS NATIONAL ELECTION			-0.0481***	-0.0479***	-0.0462***	-0.0457***
			(0.00869)	(0.00864)	(0.00867)	(0.00860)
CONSTANT	-4.722*** (0.572)	-4.064*** (0.586)	-4.629*** (0.787)	-4.160*** (0.791)	-4.222*** (0.810)	-3.987*** (0.739)
LOG LIKELIHOOD	-1677.3716	-1718.8862	-1661.2832	-1702.7553	-1653.9304	-1694.1872
AIC	3394.743	3477.772	3368.566	3451.511	3361.861	3442.374
BIC	3535.48	3619.29	3530.413	3614.256	3551.855	3633.424
RES. INTRACLASS CORRELATION	.2488183	.2861219	.2368348	.274774	.2071607	.2211335
OBSERVATIONS	8,407	8,742	8,407	8,742	8,407	8,742
NUMBER OF GROUPS	27	27	27	27	27	27

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table A.6. Predictors of vote switching toward Eurosceptic parties**

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<i>Individual variables</i>						
PERCEIVED SOCIAL STATUS	-0.0405 (0.0404)	-0.0462 (0.0396)	-0.0387 (0.0404)	-0.0471 (0.0396)	-0.0391 (0.0406)	-0.0427 (0.0401)
OCCUPATIONAL CONDITION (unemployed=1)	0.461*** (0.127)	0.417*** (0.126)	0.463*** (0.128)	0.419*** (0.126)	0.463*** (0.128)	0.420*** (0.127)
RETROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC EVALUATION	-0.0631 (0.0784)	-0.0570 (0.0781)	-0.0632 (0.0785)	-0.0572 (0.0782)	-0.0665 (0.0787)	-0.0583 (0.0789)
PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC EVALUATION	-0.174** (0.0790)	-0.146* (0.0783)	-0.180** (0.0791)	-0.147* (0.0783)	-0.180** (0.0794)	-0.167** (0.0792)
GOVERNMENT DISAPPROVAL (disapproves= 1)	0.900*** (0.126)	0.957*** (0.125)	0.899*** (0.126)	0.954*** (0.125)	0.902*** (0.127)	0.982*** (0.126)
IDEOLOGICAL SELF-PLACEMENT	0.0455** (0.0224)	0.0638*** (0.0219)	0.0440** (0.0224)	0.0628*** (0.0219)	0.0450** (0.0225)	0.0627*** (0.0222)
POLITICAL INTEREST (interested in politics=1)	-0.0758 (0.127)	-0.0622 (0.126)	-0.0736 (0.127)	-0.0634 (0.126)	-0.0864 (0.128)	-0.0409 (0.127)
POLITICAL INFORMATION (informed=1)	-0.301** (0.121)	-0.297** (0.120)	-0.301** (0.121)	-0.299** (0.121)	-0.289** (0.122)	-0.296** (0.122)
EDUCATION (highly educated=1)	0.0401 (0.161)	-0.0397 (0.160)	0.0399 (0.162)	-0.0350 (0.160)	0.0606 (0.163)	-0.0252 (0.162)
(NEGATIVE) ATTITUDE TOWARD EU INTEGRATION	0.234*** (0.0222)		0.126** (0.0500)		0.0838 (0.0680)	
(NEGATIVE) PERCEIVED UTILITY OF COUNTRY'S EU MEMBERSHIP		1.517*** (0.138)		1.317*** (0.296)		0.456 (0.398)
LOCATION (Rural, benchmark level)						
Small- or middle-sized town	0.0208 (0.133)	0.0167 (0.131)	0.0177 (0.133)	0.0185 (0.131)	0.00991 (0.134)	0.0267 (0.132)
Large town	-0.172 (0.152)	-0.171 (0.150)	-0.177 (0.152)	-0.171 (0.150)	-0.175 (0.153)	-0.156 (0.151)
GENDER (Female=1)	-0.627*** (0.113)	-0.601*** (0.112)	-0.640*** (0.113)	-0.604*** (0.112)	-0.642*** (0.114)	-0.623*** (0.113)

AGE (centered to sample mean)	-0.00611 (0.00390)	-0.00475 (0.00376)	-0.00664* (0.00391)	-0.00487 (0.00376)	-0.00673* (0.00392)	-0.00518 (0.00379)
<b>Contextual variables</b>						
EUROSCEPTICISM OF GOVERNMENT COALITIONS	0.539** (0.240)	0.583** (0.259)	0.125 (0.299)	0.561** (0.260)	0.257 (0.526)	1.206*** (0.438)
POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRY	-2.267*** (0.628)	-2.472*** (0.673)	-2.229*** (0.632)	-2.399*** (0.676)	-2.202*** (0.627)	-2.343*** (0.636)
TIME SPAN FROM PREVIOUS NATIONAL ELECTION			0.0103 (0.0207)	0.0113 (0.0223)	-0.0170 (0.0250)	-0.0228 (0.0255)
PERC. VARIATION IN RATE OF EMPLOYMENT (2009-2013)	2.987 (4.813)	5.155 (5.192)	3.462 (4.800)	5.349 (5.164)	0.893 (4.728)	1.654 (4.803)
EUROSCEPTICISM OF MOST PRO-EU GOVERNMENT PARTIES (1=countries with a score over the European average)					2.190 (1.610)	1.948 (1.399)
<b>Interactive terms</b>						
NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD EU INTEGRATION* EUROSCEPTICISM OF GOV. COALITIONS			0.0543** (0.0230)		0.113*** (0.0380)	
NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD EU INTEGRATION* EUROSCEPTICISM OF MOST PRO-EU GOVERNMENT PARTIES					-0.0656 (0.110)	
NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD EU INTEGRATION* EUROSCEPTICISM OF MOST PRO-EU GOVERNMENT PARTIES* EUROSCEPTICISM OF GOV. COALITIONS					-0.0499 (0.0506)	
PERCEIVED UTILITY OF OWN COUNTRY'S EU MEMBERSHIP* EUROSCEPTICISM OF				0.0932		0.694***

GOVERNMENT COALITIONS					(0.123)	(0.196)
PERCEIVED UTILITY OF OWN COUNTRY'S EU MEMBERSHIP* EUROSCEPTICISM OF MOST PRO-EU GOVERNMENT PARTIES						1.054
PERCEIVED UTILITY OF OWN COUNTRY'S EU MEMBERSHIP * EUROSCEPTICISM OF MOST PRO-EU GOV. PARTIES* EUROSCEPTICISM OF GOV. COALITIONS						(0.741) -0.899***
EUROSCEPTICISM OF MOST PRO-EU GOV. PARTIES* EUROSCEPTICISM OF GOV. COALITIONS					-0.669	(0.286) -1.169*
					(0.737)	(0.629)
CONSTANT	-5.329*** (0.707)	-4.166*** (0.718)	-4.759*** (0.974)	-4.407*** (0.952)	-4.462*** (1.024)	-4.271*** (0.896)
LOG LIKELIHOOD	-1278.2723	-1322.909	-1275.2518	-1322.5021	-1266.9709	- 1309.7856
AIC	2594.545	2683.818	2592.504	2687.004	2583.942	2669.571
BIC	2726.624	2816.669	2738.487	2833.84	2757.731	2844.376
RES. INTRACLASS CORRELATION	.3221346	.3640613	.3178988	.3575555	.2862076	.2939965
OBSERVATIONS	7,720	8,040	7,720	8,040	7,720	8,040
NUMBER OF GROUPS	28	28	28	28	28	28

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## A theoretical account of voting behavior in EP elections in two dimensions

In two dimensions ( EU integration and Left-Right ), the utility of voter  $i$  ( $i=1,\dots,n$ ) for opposition party  $o$  ( $o= 1,\dots,m$ ), is inversely related to the ideological distance between voter  $i$  and  $o$ . Such a distance is calculated according to the Pythagorean theorem. In formula

$$U_{io} = -\sqrt{(v_i - p_{oEU})^2 + (v_i - p_{oLR})^2} \quad (1)$$

where  $v_i$  is the ideal point of voter  $i$ ,  $p_{oEU}$  and  $p_{oLR}$  are the positions of party electoral platform  $o$ , respectively on the dimension “EU integration” and the dimension “Left-Right”.

The utility of voter  $i$  ( $i=1,\dots,n$ ) for the government party  $g$  ( $g=m+1,\dots,n$ ) is inversely related to a weighted average of the ideological distance between  $i$  and  $g$  and the distance between  $i$  and the *status quo* policy at time  $t_1$ ,  $sq_{t_1}$ . In two dimensions ( EU integration and Left-Right )

$$U_{ig} = -\alpha \left[ \sqrt{(v_i - p_{gEU})^2 + (v_i - p_{gLR})^2} \right] - (1 - \alpha) \left[ \sqrt{(v_i - sq_{t_1EU})^2 + (v_i - sq_{t_1LR})^2} \right] \quad (2)$$

where  $p_{gEU}$  and  $p_{gLR}$  are the positions of party electoral platform  $g$  respectively on the dimension “EU integration” and the dimension “Left-Right”;  $\alpha \in (0,1)$  is the relative weight of the two components of voter utility. The more proximity-led is voting, the larger  $\alpha$  becomes. When  $\alpha$  tends to one then the government party is fully evaluated according to its electoral platforms  $p_{gEU}$  and  $p_{gLR}$ . When, on the contrary,  $\alpha$  tends to zero the government’s performance evaluation will prevail in the party position perception and the government’s party position will be equal to  $sq_{t_1EU}$  and  $sq_{t_1LR}$ .

Suppose that a political system of an European Union country has four parties (Fig. A1), ranging from a strong pro-Europe party  $g_1$  on the right (high values) to a fully Eurosceptic opposition party  $o$  on the left (low values). Every government party is supposed to be a veto player and to decide in conditions of complete information. At time  $t_0$  a new government is formed. At time  $t_1$  the parties that are government members will change (or preserve) the *status quo*  $sq_{t_0}$  left by the previous government. At time  $t_2$ , the voters vote for the European Parliament elections by considering the party platforms  $p_o$ ,  $p_g$  and  $sq_{t_1}$ .




Assume that

- 1)  $\alpha = 0$  , in other words, the perceived government party positions depend on the policy outcomes on both dimensions before European elections ( $sq_{t1LR}$  and  $sq_{t1EU}$  ).
- 2) the voters are uniformly distributed along both dimensions, namely the European integration dimension and Left and Right;
- 3)  $sq_{t1EU} = p_{g1EU}$  : in other words, the *status quo* on EU dimension is located on the pro-EU side of the ideological spectrum and coincides with the electoral platform of  $g_1$ , a very pro-European integration party;
- 4)  $p_{g2LR} = sq_{t1LR}$  when the government is formed by  $g_2$  and  $g_1$ ;  $p_{g3LR} = sq_{t1LR}$  when the government is formed by  $g_3$  and  $g_1$ . Model's implications hold also if we assume that the status quo on the Left-Right dimension is a compromise between  $g_1$  and  $g_2$  or  $g_1$  and  $g_3$  . If the  $p_{g1LR} = sq_{t1LR}$ , as we assume that  $sq_{t1EU} = p_{g1EU}$ , there is no difference with the theoretical account in one dimension.

Since we assume that the voters are uniformly distributed and that the space is two-dimensional, we use the cut lines to identify the support that each party enjoys. Within this framework, we can envisage two different scenarios (Fig.A1). In scenario *a*,  $g_1$  and  $g_2$  form a two-party government quite homogenous along the European integration dimension. In scenario *b*, on the contrary, the government is heterogeneous as  $g_3$ , a moderately Eurosceptic party, is a government member.

**Fig.A1 Spatial model with government and opposition parties' positions on two dimensional space and Eurosceptic voting**



The area of support in favor of very Euroskeptic party  $o$  is much bigger in scenario  $b$ . Also in two dimensions the existence of a moderately Euroskeptic government party ( $g_3$ ) increases, *ceteris paribus*, the propensity to vote for a very Euroskeptic party. Such a result does not depend on the specific positions of the parties on the Left-Right dimension.