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An Authorization Model for Geographical Maps

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ABSTRACT

Access control is an important component of any database management system. Several access control models have been proposed for conventional databases. However, these models do not seem adequate for geographical databases, due to the peculiarities of geographical data. Previous work on access control models for geographical data mainly concerns raster maps (images). In this paper, we present a discretionary access control model for geographical maps. We assume that each map is composed of a set of features. Each feature is represented in one or more maps by spatial objects, described by means of different spatial properties: geometric properties, describing the shape, extension and location of the objects, and topological properties, describing the topological relationships existing among objects. The proposed access control model allows the security administrator to define authorizations against map objects at a very fine granularity level, taking into account the various spatial representations and the object dimension. The model also supports both positive and negative authorizations as well as different propagation rules that make access control very flexible.

Categories and Subject Descriptors

H.2.8 [Database Management]: Database Applications—*spatial databases and GIS*

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General Terms

Management, Theory

Keywords

GIS, Authorization model, Access control

1. INTRODUCTION

Geographical data have a strategic relevance in a large variety of contexts, like homeland security, marketing analysis tools and environmental risks control procedures. Most applications in these areas require a fine-granularity flexible access control to geographical information. A possible naive approach to support access control is to build ad hoc datasets (maps) for each type of access the administrator wants to grant: this has been the cartographic approach applied for many years in the past. Such an approach is not suitable when the user community is large and dynamic - which is today often the case in Web-based systems. Moreover, such an approach does not support flexible protection granularities and dynamic changes in the access control policies. The introduction of integrated GIS systems, characterized by high level comprehensive data models, is today making possible the development of advanced access control models which go beyond such naive approach. However, despite the importance of data protection, no efforts have been devoted to the investigation of access control models and systems for GIS.

Several access control models have been proposed for conventional database systems. However, these models are not adequate for geographical databases, because of the peculiarities of geographical maps. Objects in these maps can be represented with different dimensions and the accesses can also be driven by the reference space (i.e., authorization to access only data concerning geographical entities in a given region). Moreover, geographical data can be represented using different approaches. The users of a GIS system usually recognize geographical data from the existence of a geometry describing the shape, extension and location of some geographical objects (features). However, geographical data can be represented also in other forms, for example by using a set of topological relations (topological representation),

that specify the adjacency, the disjointness or other kind of interaction between two features. Those various representations should be taken into account when defining an access control model.

Previous work on access control models for geographical data has mainly dealt with raster maps (images) [1], focusing on confidentiality for sensible information that can be revealed by high resolution image satellites. In such model, each protected object is basically an image or portion of an image. Thus, the model supports neither the vector-based representation of features nor the topological one. As such, the model is not adequate for usage in current GIS and spatial DBMS. Moreover, it only deals with read privileges and it is thus not adequate for dynamic applications requiring data modifications. In [5, 4], an extension of the classical discretionary access control model is proposed to protect vector-based spatial data against requests issued through a Web service. In such a proposal, spatial data consist of objects having a geometry compliant with the OpenGIS simple features model [3]. In the proposed access control model, authorizations on spatial objects can be applied on limited areas (*windows*) within the reference space. As an example, a user may be authorized to insert road objects only if the roads are located in a well defined region. Windows define the geographical scope of authorizations, thus making authorizations themselves geographical objects which occupy a position in the reference space.

In this paper, we present an access control model for geographical maps, admitting multiple (vector-based and topological) representations. We assume maps to be represented according to the Layered Spatial Data Model (LSDM) [2]. Such model is based on the concept of *feature type*. Examples of feature types are roads, lakes, and so on. Each map contains various instances of the feature types (several roads, several lakes, and so on), each represented with a given dimension (0 if they are represented as points, 1 if they are lines, 2 if they are represented as regions). Each specific feature is associated inside a map with at least one spatial representation (geometric or topological). LSDM provides a query language that allows one to express complex queries on the maps and features of an LSDM database instance. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only data model that provides representation and query capabilities for objects with multiple spatial representations. The LSDM model and language thus represent the right context for defining a general enough access control mechanism.

The proposed access control model takes into account several requirements previously discussed. It allows one to specify authorizations against map objects at a very fine granularity level. It also takes into account the various spatial representations and the object dimension. For example, under the proposed model, the administrator can authorize a user to see a given object at 0 dimension and not at higher dimensions, thus hiding detailed information about the object shape. The model also supports both positive authorizations, giving permissions, and negative authorizations, specifying denials, as well as various propagation rules making access control very flexible. Moreover, similarly to [5], the model supports the concept of authorization window, specifying the region of space in which the authorization applies.

Since there are some similarities between the model adopted for spatial data and the typical object-oriented data

models, in order to develop our access control model we took into account access control models proposed for object-oriented databases [6, 10, 11]. In particular, we borrowed the concepts of weak and strong authorizations from the authorization model of Orion [10]. In Orion, an authorization is strong if it, and any authorization it implies, cannot be overridden by other authorizations. By contrast, authorizations implied by a weak authorization can be overridden. With respect to the Orion model, spatial data require more sophisticated propagation mechanisms like the type of spatial representation of the objects (geometric or topological) or the dimensional level of their spatial representations.

The proposed access control model consistently differs from the one presented in [5, 4]. Indeed: (i) the map model is more complex, providing multiple representations (geometric and topological) of the same map object and multiple representations of the same feature; (ii) in [5, 4] propagation is only allowed along application-dependent privilege hierarchies; on the other hand, in our model propagation rules constitute an invariant part of the access control model and are defined along object and privilege hierarchies; (iii) differently from [5, 4], both positive and negative authorizations, as well as a mechanism to define exceptions to propagated authorizations, are supported.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly present the adopted map data model. In Section 3 we define the basic elements of the authorization model. Access control model and mechanisms are then presented in Sections 4 and 5. Finally, Section 6 presents some conclusions and outlines future work.

2. TOPOLOGICAL SPATIAL DATA MODEL

In this paper we consider a modified version of the Layered Spatial Data Model (LSDM) [2]. We call this model Topological Spatial Data Model (TSDM), since we keep only the topological layer of LSDM beyond the geometric one. This modification allows us to simplify the definition of the access control model without reducing significantly its expressive power.

In TSDM the schema of a spatial database can be defined as a set of feature types and a set of map types. A map type is a set of feature types and a feature type can belong to different map types. Each feature type has some descriptive attributes and one spatial attribute. The spatial attribute of a feature type can be represented in different maps with different dimensions. Formally, a spatial database schema in TSDM can be defined as follows.

DEFINITION 1 (SPATIAL DATABASE SCHEMA). *The schema of a spatial database in TSDM is a 5-tuple $S = (\mathcal{E}, n(), \text{Dom}\varepsilon(), \mathcal{M}, \text{Map}())$ where:*

- $\mathcal{E} = \{E_1, \dots, E_k\}$ is a set of feature type identifiers.
- $n : \mathcal{E} \rightarrow \mathcal{N}$ is a function which defines the number of attributes of each feature type $E_i \in \mathcal{E}$. The j -th attribute of E_i is denoted by $E_i.a_j$, $1 \leq j \leq n(E_i)$. Each feature type E_i has an attribute called identifier denoted as $E_i.a_0$.
- $\text{Dom}\varepsilon : \mathcal{E} \times \mathcal{N} \rightarrow \{D_{\text{number}}, D_{\text{string}}\}$ is a partial function which defines the domain of each attribute.
- $\mathcal{M} = \{M_1, \dots, M_h\}$ is a set of map types.

- $Map : \mathcal{E} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \{-1, 0, 1, 2\}$ is a total function which defines if a feature type E_i belongs to a map type M_j . In particular, if $Map(E_i, M_j) = -1$, the feature type E_i does not belong to the map type M_j ; if $Map(E_i, M_j) \geq 0$, E_i belongs to M_j and the spatial representation of E_i in M_j is: the set of isolated points of the Euclidean plane (E^2) if $Map(E_i, M_j) = 0$; the set of simple polylines of E^2 if $Map(E_i, M_j) = 1$; the set of simple polygons of E^2 if $Map(E_i, M_j) = 2$.

Feature and map types are also called schema objects. \square

The fact that a feature type has one or more geometric domains associated with it in different map types does not imply that a feature will have in the database a geometric representation. Indeed, the spatial representation of a feature can exist in one or both the layers, that are available in a map. We briefly present these layers here (more details can be found in [2]).

- *Geometric layer* (D_{geo}): in this layer, shape and location on the earth surface of features are represented. Geometric values belong to one of the following sets: the set of points in the Euclidean plane E^2 , the set of simple connected or not connected polylines in E^2 , and the set of simple polygons of E^2 delimited by a simple closed polyline or by a set of closed polylines (not connected polygons).
- *Topological layer* (D_{topo}): in this layer the spatial properties of each feature are represented by describing the topological relations of the feature with other features of the map [9]. The reference set of topological relations is $\{Disjoint, Touch, In, Contains, Equal, Cross, Overlap\}$. These relations are binary, mutually exclusive (if one is true, the others are false) and they are a refinement of the well-known set of topological relations proposed in [7].

Given a TSDM schema, a TSDM instance can be defined as follows.

DEFINITION 2 (SPATIAL DATABASE INSTANCE). *The instance of a spatial database schema $S = (\mathcal{E} = \{E_1, \dots, E_k\}, n(), Dom_{\mathcal{E}}(), \mathcal{M} = \{M_1, \dots, M_h\}, Map())$ in TSDM is composed of:*

- A set of feature type extensions $I(\mathcal{E}) = \{I(E_1), \dots, I(E_k)\}$. Each feature $e \in I(E_i)$ is a tuple belonging to the domain $\mathcal{N} \times Dom_{\mathcal{E}}(E_i, 1) \times \dots \times Dom_{\mathcal{E}}(E_i, n(E_i))$. We denote with $D_{ft} = \{e.a_0 | e.a_0 \in I(E_1) \cup \dots \cup I(E_k)\}$ the set of all feature identifiers.
- A set of map instances (or simply maps) $I(\mathcal{M}) = \{I(M_1), \dots, I(M_h)\}$. Each map $I(M_j)$ is a set of tuples: $\langle f, geo, topo \rangle \in D_{ft} \times (D_{geo} \cup \{\perp\}) \times (D_{topo} \cup \{\perp\})$, where \perp denotes a null value.

Each tuple is called map object. We denote the instance of a schema S as $I(S) = (I(\mathcal{E}), I(\mathcal{M}))$. Map objects and features are also called instances. Extensions of feature types (feature sets) and extension of map types (maps) are also called group objects to emphasize the fact that they have an extension, i.e., a set of instances. \square




Figure 1: Top: Example of a geographical database: the railway network of Lombardy. Bottom: Topological relations among the features of the Region and the County feature types (in italics). A double arrow represents a Touch relation, while a single arrow represents a In relation.

EXAMPLE 1. *Consider a geographic database representing the territory of Lombardy (North Italy) and containing its railways, its administrative areas and its counties; moreover, the accidents on the railway network are registered in the database. The TSDM schema contains four feature types $\mathcal{E} = \{Railway, Accident, Region, County\}$. and two map types $\mathcal{M} = \{M_{rail}, M_{admin}\}$. The feature types Railway and Accident belong to the map type M_{rail} with dimension 1 and dimension 0, respectively. The feature types Region and County belong to the map type M_{admin} with dimension 2. Moreover, suppose that all feature types have an attribute Name (a_1) representing the feature name, and an attribute N (a_2) representing: the number of inhabitants for Region and County, the number of tracks for Railway, and the accident type for Accident.*

An instance of this schema can contain for example: a complete geometric representation of the Railway features (and therefore, also a topological one, since the topological representation can be inferred from the geometric one) (Fig. 1) and a topological representation of Region and County features (Fig. 1). When an accident occurs, either a geometric representation (a point) can be inserted in the database or a topological one, represented by an In relation between the accident and the railway section where it occurred. \square

In [2], a query language for TSDM has also been proposed. It is an algebra with the following types of operators:

- **Feature-based operators:** they are applied to feature sets and produce feature sets; they are very similar to the operators of the relational algebra. Examples

of feature based operators are traditional relational operators like *selection* ($\sigma_F(E_i)$), *projection* ($\Pi_{\bar{X}}(E_i)$), *Join* ($E_i \bowtie_F E_j$), and the usual set based operators (union \cup , difference \setminus , intersection \cap).

- **Map-based operators:** they are applied to maps and produce new maps. Among them, we recall: *map selection* ($\sigma_F^M(M_i)$), that takes a map instance $I(M_i)$ and selects all the map elements satisfying a certain formula F ; *semi-join* ($M_i \times_F^M M_j$), that takes two map instances $I(M_i)$ and $I(M_j)$ and returns a new map instance containing all the elements of the first map instance related as specified in F to some element of the second map instance; usual set based operators (*union*, *intersection*, *difference*) can be applied on maps.
- **Mixed operators:** they are applied to maps and feature sets and produce either maps or sets of features. Among them, we recall: *mixed projection* ($\Pi_{ft}^x(M_i)$), that takes a map instance $I(M_i)$ and returns the set of features with feature type ft contained in the map; *mixed join* ($M_i \bowtie_F^x M_j$), that takes two map instances $I(M_i)$ and $I(M_j)$ and returns a new set of features obtained by combining together the features associated with pairs of map elements, satisfying condition F .

EXAMPLE 2. Consider Example 1. The following are examples of queries, the first, Q_{map} , producing a map, the second, Q_{Fset} , a set of features (more complex examples can be found in [2]):

- Q_{map} : find all the map objects representing the 'MI-VE' railway from Milan to Venice.
 $\sigma_{Railway.Name='Mi-VE'}^M(I(M_{rail}))$.
- Q_{Fset} : find all the counties with more than 100,000 inhabitants.
 $\sigma_{County.N \geq 100,000}(I(County))$. \square

3. BASIC COMPONENTS OF THE AUTHORIZATION MODEL

The proposed access control model relies on the classical discretionary model centered on the notion of authorization [10]. An authorization is traditionally a tuple (S, O, P) , where: S is the *subject* of the authorization, i.e. the entity benefitting from it, for example a user or group of users; O is the *object*, i.e. the logical data structure that needs to be protected, for example a map; and P is the *privilege*, i.e. the kind of operations that can be performed on the object. The object and the privilege are strictly dependent on the data model. In our model, additional components, all described in the following, include the *authorization sign*, specifying whether the privilege has to be granted (+) or denied (-); the *authorization type*, specifying whether the authorization can be overridden (weak) or not (strong); the *window*, i.e., a spatial object representing the region of space over which the authorization can be granted; the *query*, further restricting the set of objects over which the privilege is granted or denied; the *grantor*, i.e., the user assigning the authorization to the subject; the *grant option*, which when true denotes that the subject itself can further grant the (positive) authorization to other users.

3.1 Subjects and objects

Subjects. Subjects are all users that interact with the system. The access control model we are going to present does not support groups and roles, even if it can be easily extended to deal with them. In the following, we denote with U the set of all the users.

Objects. In a TSDM database, both schema, group, and instance objects have to be protected. Schema objects can be protected with respect to operations concerning access to their definition (metadata). Instance objects can be protected with respect to selection, deletion, and update. Group objects can be protected with respect to operations concerning their extensions (insertion, deletion, update, selection).

It is important to note that even if, similarly to the relational context, queries are defined against maps and feature sets, unlike the relational context, in a geographical database it is very important to deal with single instances. Indeed, the spatial representation of a feature can be very detailed and thus can be of great interest to a specific user.

In the following, given a TSDM schema $S = (\mathcal{E}, n(), Dom_{\mathcal{E}}(), \mathcal{M}, Map())$ and its instance $I(S) = (I(\mathcal{E}), I(\mathcal{M}))$, we denote: with O_{FT} and O_{MT} the set of feature types \mathcal{E} of S and the set of map types \mathcal{M} , respectively; with O_M and O_F the set of maps $I(\mathcal{M})$ and the set of feature sets $I(\mathcal{E})$, respectively; with O_{MO} and O_{FE} the set of all map objects of the maps $I(\mathcal{M})$ and the set of all features of the feature sets $I(\mathcal{E})$, respectively.

3.2 Privileges

Privileges can be classified according to the object on which they can be granted (see Table 1). Various privileges can be assigned on instance objects, corresponding to the various operations that can be executed on them (selection, deletion, and update of an instance) and to their spatial properties (dimension, type of spatial representation). We call these privileges *instance privileges*. Instance privileges can also be assigned on group objects with the following meaning: an instance privilege p assigned to a group object o is propagated, following a precise rule, to the instance objects belonging to o . An additional privilege is assigned to group objects, in order to insert a feature into a feature set or to assign an object to a map (*insertion privileges*). Finally, for schema objects, we consider access to their definition as a privilege (*schema privileges*). In the following, we denote with P the set of all the privileges.

EXAMPLE 3. Consider Example 1.

- *Privilege* $sel_M(1, geo)$, granted on M_{rail} map, allows the user to read the geometric representation of the M_{rail} map objects with dimension 1 (i.e., railways).
- *Privilege* $assign_M(0)$, granted on M_{rail} map, allows the user to insert a map object of dimension 0 (i.e., an accident).
- *Privilege* $upd_F(2, space)$ on the $County$ feature type allows the user to update the spatial representation of all the $County$ features in each map in which they appear with dimension 2 (i.e., map M_{admin}).
- *Privilege* $insert_F$ on the $County$ feature type allows the user to create a new instance of the $County$ feature type (with no spatial extension).

- Privileges sel_sch_{FT} and sel_sch_{MT} , on feature type *Railway* and map type *M_admin*, respectively, allow the user to access the meta data concerning the schema of *Railway* feature type and *M_admin* map type, respectively. \square

According to Table 1, privileges of the form $p(d)$, of the form $p(d, t)$ with $t \neq \text{alpha}$, and del_F are called *spatial privileges* since they allow one to read, delete, or update spatial information. All the other privileges are *non-spatial*.

Since not all types of privileges apply to all possible types of object, we introduce a function, called *scope* that, taken a privilege, returns the set of objects to which the privilege can be assigned. According to Table 1, the main problem arises with privileges for map objects, since they must be represented at the layer and the dimension required by the privilege.

DEFINITION 3 (PRIVILEGE SCOPE). *Let $p \in P$. The scope of p , denoted by $s(p)$, is the set of objects defined as follows (for the meaning of O_x sets and of d and t , see section 3.1 and Table 1, respectively):*

$$\begin{aligned} s(sel_sch_{FT}) &= O_{FT} & s(insert_F) &= O_F \\ s(sel_sch_{MT}) &= O_{MT} & s(assign_M(d)) &= O_M \\ s(sel_F(d, t)) &= s(upd_F(d, t)) = s(del_F) &= O_F \cup O_{FE} \\ s(p_M(d)) &= O_M \cup \{o \mid o \in O_{MO}, dim(o) = d\} \\ s(p_M(d, t)) &= O_M \cup \{o \mid o = \langle f, geo, top \rangle \in O_{MO}, dim(o) = d, \\ & \quad t = geo \rightarrow o.geo \neq \perp, t = top \rightarrow o.top \neq \perp\} \end{aligned} \quad \square$$

3.3 Authorization sign and type

In the proposed model, positive and negative authorizations can be specified (*authorization sign*). A positive authorization establishes that a subject is authorized for a given privilege on a given object, whereas a negative authorization establishes that a subject is denied access to a given object under a given privilege. Thus, a subject u may be denied access to object o because either u has no authorization on o or u has a negative authorization on o . We give precedence to negative authorizations: if u has both a positive and a negative authorization on o , u is denied access to o .

The *authorization type* specifies whether an authorization can be overridden or not. More precisely, *weak* authorizations can be overridden by *strong* authorizations. Weak and strong authorizations, when combined with authorization sign, are a useful mechanism for modeling exceptions. For example, if user u can update all instances of a given map m but a certain instance o , we can grant a weak positive authorization to u for updating m (thus, all instance of m can be updated by u) and then a negative update authorization on o .

Weak and strong authorizations can also be defined for instance and schema objects, as well as on group objects and insertion privileges. Even if authorizations for such objects and privileges are not propagated, the authorization type can be used to give precedence to positive authorizations with respect to negative ones, as we will see in Section 4.

3.4 Queries and windows

In order to specify authorizations for subsets of group object extensions, content-based access control is provided by specifying a TSDM query as part of authorizations. The query restricts the set of objects to which the authorization applies. The query can be specified for all privileges affecting objects already existing in the database.

In order to spatially restrict the assignment of new objects to a map, we also introduce the concept of *window* as the region that the assigned objects must intersect. We define a window as an object belonging to the TSDM geometric domain $D_{polygons}$. Thus, it consists of a (collection) of simple polygons with no holes. Note that windows can be useful also for spatial instance privileges. However, since they apply to existing objects, in those cases the effect of the window can be obtained by specifying a query containing a map selection operator. For the sake of usability, both modalities are allowed in the model. When both of them are present, the authorization is applied to all the objects of the query result, intersecting the window.

3.5 Authorization grantor and grant option

The grantor is the subject that granted the authorization. Likewise the classical authorization models, we assume that a subject can delegate the administration of the authorization to some other subject. The mechanism used for delegating such functions is that of the *grant option*. The grant option is expressed as a Boolean variable; if it is true, the subject is authorized to grant/ revoke the authorization to/from other subjects. The grant option is specified only for positive authorizations; negative authorizations cannot be delegated.

4. THE GEOGRAPHIC ACCESS CONTROL MODEL

In our access control model, an authorization is a tuple containing all the components introduced in Section 3. Not all possible tuples, however, represent authorizations. Indeed, tuple components must satisfy some properties depending on the object and the privilege they consider. First of all, the object must belong to the privilege scope. Moreover, authorizations admit the specification of the window and the query components only for group objects. More precisely, the window can be specified only for spatial privileges (either instance or insertion privileges). The query, for instance privileges, is an expression of the TSDM query language returning a subset of the group object extension. For insertion privileges, the query does not seem reasonable. However, when assigning objects to a map, it could be useful to restrict the privilege to objects with a certain feature type. To model this requirement, the query component of such authorizations is extended to represent a specific feature type.

DEFINITION 4 (AUTHORIZATION). *An authorization is a tuple of the form $\langle u, p, pt, g, go, o, t, w, q \rangle$, where:*

- $u \in U$, $p \in P$, $pt \in \{+, -\}$, $g \in U$, $go \in \{true, false\}$, $o \in O \cap s(p)$, $t \in \{st, wk\}$, $w \in D_{polygons} \cup \{\top\}$, q is either a query expressed in the TSDM query language having o as a parameter or $q = \perp$ or q is a feature type; $w = \top$ represents the overall space whereas $q = \perp$ represents the identity query, i.e. the query that takes an object and returns the object itself.
- if o is an instance or schema object, $w = \top$ and $q = \perp$;
- if o is a group object, p is a spatial instance privilege, $w \in D_{polygons} \cup \{\top\}$ and $q(o) \subseteq o$;
- if o is a group object, p is a non-spatial instance privilege, $w = \top$ and $q(o) \subseteq o$;

Privilege	Description
Object: Feature types	
sel_sch_{FT}	It provides the access to feature type schema information, i.e., information concerning descriptive attributes of the considered feature type.
Object: Feature sets (Feature type extensions)	
$insert_F$	Ability to insert a new feature, instance of the considered feature type.
Object: Features	
$sel_F(d, t)$	$d \in \{0, 1, 2, \perp\}$, $t \in \{geo, top, alpha\} \cup schema(ft)$. Ability to read information of type t for the considered feature of feature type ft . If $t \in \{geo, top\}$, selection is provided in all the maps in which the feature appears with the layer of representation t and with dimension d . If $t = alpha$, $d = \perp$ (it is not relevant) and selection is provided on all the alphanumeric attributes of the feature. If $t \in schema(ft)$, $d = \perp$ and selection is provided on attribute t of the feature.
$upd_F(d, t)$	$d \in \{0, 1, 2, \perp\}$, $t \in \{space, alpha\} \cup schema(ft)$. Ability to update information of type t for the considered feature. If t is $space$, update is provided on the geometric representation of the feature in all the maps in which it appears with dimension d . If $t = alpha$, $d = \perp$ and update is provided on all the alphanumeric attributes of the feature. If $t \in schema(ft)$, $d = \perp$ and update is provided on attribute t of the feature.
del_F	Ability to delete the considered feature. As a side effect, the feature is deleted also from all the maps it has been assigned to.
Object: Map types	
sel_sch_{MT}	It provides the access to schema information for the considered map type, i.e., information concerning the dimension of a feature type representation inside the map with the considered map type.
Object: Maps (Map type extensions)	
$assign_M(d)$	$d \in \{0, 1, 2\}$ Ability to assign a feature to a map (i.e., to insert a map object) with dimension d , inserting spatial information inside at least one layer of the map.
Object: Map objects	
$sel_M(d, t)$	$d \in \{0, 1, 2\}$, $t \in \{geo, top\}$. Ability to read spatial information at layer t and dimension d for the considered map object, that must have dimension d (otherwise, the privilege is not considered).
$upd_M(d)$	$d \in \{0, 1, 2\}$. Ability to update the spatial information for the considered map object, that must have dimension d (otherwise, the privilege is not considered).
$del_M(d)$	$d \in \{0, 1, 2\}$. Ability to delete a certain map object, that must have dimension d (otherwise, the privilege is not considered). Note that after a deletion the feature still exists but it is no more assigned to the considered map object.

Legenda: $schema(ft)$: schema of the feature type the considered feature is an instance of.

Table 1: Privileges

- if o is a feature set and $p = insert_F$, $w = \top$ and $q = \perp$;
- if o is a map and $p = assign_M(d)$ $q = \perp$ or q is a feature type identifier.

Given an authorization a , we use the dot notation to identify authorization components. \square

EXAMPLE 4. Let W be a set of authorization windows (for the sake of readability, windows are identified by names): $W = \{Milan_MetroArea, Milan_City, Sesto_County\}$. Consider the authorizations sets presented in Figure 2.

The authorization set A authorizes Bob (grantor= SA), where SA stands for Security Administrator) to: (a_1): read the schema of the feature type Railway; (a_2): read alphanumeric information concerning Railway features; (a_3): read the geometry of M_rail map objects intersecting Milan_MetroArea (window restriction); (a_4, a_5): update the spatial representation of Accident features due to “wrong manoeuvre” in any map (a_4) except those intersecting the window Sesto_County (a_5) (note that this behavior is possible since a_4 is a positive authorization and a_5 is a negative one); (a_6): insert new Accident features; (a_7): insert map objects representing the spatial location of Accident features in the M_rail map.

The authorization set B authorizes Ted (grantor= Bob) to: (a_8): read the geometry of M_rail map objects intersecting Milan_City (window restriction); (a_9): update the spatial representation of Accident features due to “wrong manoeuvre” and of name “ X ”, only inside the window Milan_City (window restriction).

The authorization set C authorizes Ted (grantor= Bob) to read the geometry of M_rail map objects with no window restriction (a_{10}). \square

Authorization $\langle u, p, pt, g, go, o, t, w, q \rangle$ states that g has granted u (denied if $pt = -$) privilege p on a set of objects, depending on o, p, w , and q . We call these objects *authorization extension*. Due to the complexity of the map model, the definition of the authorization extension simplifies the definition of access control mechanisms. The definition uses the concept of privilege scope, introduced in Definition 3.

DEFINITION 5 (AUTHORIZATION EXTENSION). Let $a = \langle u, p, pt, g, go, o, t, w, q \rangle$. The authorization extension of a , denoted by $ext(a)$, is the set of objects defined as follows:

- if o is a map object or a schema object, $ext(a) = \{o\}$;
- if o is a feature set and p is a non-spatial privilege, $ext(a) = \{o' | o' \in q(o)\}$;

<p>SET A = { $a_1 = \langle \text{Bob}, \text{sel_sch}_{FT}, +, SA, \text{true}, \text{Railway}, \text{st}, \top, \perp \rangle,$ $a_2 = \langle \text{Bob}, \text{sel}_F(\perp, \text{alpha}), +, SA, \text{false}, \text{Railway}, \text{st}, \top, \perp \rangle,$ $a_3 = \langle \text{Bob}, \text{sel}_M(2, \text{geo}), +, SA, \text{true}, M_rail, \text{st}, \text{Milan_MetroArea}, \perp \rangle,$ $a_4 = \langle \text{Bob}, \text{upd}_F(0, \text{space}), +, SA, \text{true}, \text{Accident}, \text{wk}, \top, \sigma_{N \neq \text{'wrong manoeuvre'}}(\text{Accident}) \rangle,$ $a_5 = \langle \text{Bob}, \text{upd}_M(0, \text{space}), -, SA, \text{false}, M_rail, \text{st}, \text{Sesto_County}, \perp \rangle,$ $a_6 = \langle \text{Bob}, \text{insert}_F, +, SA, \text{true}, \text{Accident}, \text{st}, \top, \perp \rangle,$ $a_7 = \langle \text{Bob}, \text{assign}_M(0), +, SA, \text{true}, M_rail, \text{st}, \top, \text{Accident} \rangle$</p> <p>SET B = { $a_8 = \langle \text{Ted}, \text{sel}_M(2, \text{geo}), +, \text{Bob}, \text{false}, M_rail, \text{st}, \text{Milan_City}, \perp \rangle,$ $a_9 = \langle \text{Ted}, \text{upd}_F(0, \text{space}), +, \text{Bob}, \text{false}, \text{Accident}, \text{wk}, \text{Milan_City},$ $\sigma_{N \neq \text{'wrong manoeuvre'}} \wedge \text{Name} \neq \text{'X'}}(\text{Accident}) \rangle$</p> <p>SET C = { $a_{10} = \langle \text{Ted}, \text{sel}_M(2, \text{geo}), +, \text{Bob}, \text{false}, M_rail, \text{st}, \top, \perp \rangle$ }</p>

Figure 2: Some authorization sets

- if o is a feature and p is a non-spatial privilege, $\text{ext}(a) = \{o\}$;
- if o is a feature set or a feature and p is a spatial privilege, $\text{ext}(a) = \{mo | o' \in q(o), \exists m \in O_M, mo = \langle o'.a_o, \text{geo}, \text{top} \rangle \in m, mo \in s(C(p)), mo \text{ Intersect } w\}$,¹ where $C(p)$ converts p in the corresponding privilege over map objects:² $C(\text{sel}_F(d, t)) = \text{sel}_M(d, t)$, where $t \neq \text{alpha}$; $C(\text{upd}_F(d, \text{space})) = \text{upd}_M(d)$, $C(\text{del}_F) = \text{del}_M(2)$.

The extension in this case coincides with the subset of map objects corresponding to a spatial representation of the correct type (i.e., in the scope of $C(p)$) of at least one feature in $q(o)$, intersecting the window w ;
- if o is a map type and p is an instance privilege, $\text{ext}(a) = \{o' | o' \in q(o), o' \in s(p), o' \text{ Intersect } w\}$, i.e., the extension coincides with the subset of objects in $q(o)$ and in the scope of p , intersecting w ;
- if o is a group object and p is an insertion privilege, $\text{ext}(a) = \{o\}$. \square

Given a set of authorizations, two properties must be satisfied. The first, *minimality*, imposes that the window and the query be unique for the authorization granted by g to subject s with grant option go , on object o , with privilege p , privilege type pt , and type t . Therefore, if an authorization has to be specified on disjoint regions, the authorization window should be specified as a collection of disjoint polygons (an admitted value of D_{polygons}). The second, *grant safety*, specifies how the presence of a window constrains the authorizations that can be granted by u . More precisely, authorizations with grant option ($go = \text{true}$) can be granted to other users only if $pt = +$ and the window of the granted authorizations is contained in the corresponding windows of the grantor. We also assume that the Security Administrator (SA) can grant all possible authorizations, without constraints. Sets of rules satisfying previous properties define a *correct authorization set*.

¹*Intersect* is equivalent to *Touch* \vee *Overlap* \vee *In* \vee *Contains*, and represents the not empty intersection condition.

²Note that when there are different choices when converting a privilege over a feature in a privilege over a map object, the less restrictive choice is chosen. For example, del_F is converted into $\text{del}_M(2)$, which is less restrictive than $\text{del}_M(1)$ and $\text{del}_M(0)$ (see Section 5.1.2).

DEFINITION 6 (CORRECT AUTHORIZATION SET). Let \mathcal{A} be a set of authorizations. \mathcal{A} is a correct authorization set (CAS) if the following properties are satisfied:

- Minimality: $\nexists a_1, a_2 \in \mathcal{A}$ such that $a_1.u = a_2.u, a_1.o = a_2.o, a_1.p = a_2.p, a_1.pt = a_2.pt, a_1.g = a_2.g, a_1.t = a_2.t, a_1.go = a_2.go$, and $(a_1.w \neq a_2.w \text{ or } a_1.q \neq a_2.q)$;
- Grant safety: Let $a_1 \in \mathcal{A}$, $a_1.pt = +$, $a_1.go = \text{true}$. Let $q_{a_1} = \cup\{q | a \in \mathcal{A}, a = \langle a_1.u, a_1.p, +, g, \text{true}, a_1.o, a_1.t, w, q \rangle\}$ ³ and $w_{a_1} = \cup\{w | a \in \mathcal{A}, a = \langle a_1.u, a_1.p, +, g, \text{true}, a_1.o, a_1.t, w, q \rangle\}$. Then, $\forall a_2 \in \mathcal{A}$ such that $a_2 = \langle u, a_1.p, +, a_1.u, go, a_1.o, a_1.t, w, q \rangle$ we must have $q \subseteq q_{a_1}$ ⁴ and $(w \text{ In } w_{a_1} \text{ or } w \text{ Equal } w_{a_1})$. \square

Note that verifying whether an authorization set is correct requires to check all pairs of authorizations, thus, if n is the cardinality of the set, the complexity is in $O(n^2)$.

EXAMPLE 5. Consider the authorization sets presented in Example 4. The authorization set $\mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{B}$ is a CAS. Indeed, minimality is obviously satisfied. Moreover, a_8 has been granted by Bob to Ted from authorization a_3 , queries in a_3 and a_8 are not specified and (*Milan_City In Milan_MetroArea*) is true. Additionally, a_9 has been granted by Bob to Ted from authorization a_4 , the query in a_9 is a refinement of the query in a_4 , and the window in a_9 is obviously contained in the window in a_4 , which coincides with the overall space. Thus, grant safety is satisfied. On the other hand, $\mathcal{A} \cup \mathcal{C}$ does not represent a CAS since, although Bob has the grant option on a_3 , the condition on windows is not satisfied: ($\top \text{ In Milan_MetroArea}$) is not true. \square

5. AUTHORIZATION CONTROL MECHANISM

Given a CAS \mathcal{A} , the aim of the authorization control mechanism is to determine whether to grant or reject an access request according to what has been specified in \mathcal{A} . In general, an access request is a triple $\langle u, p, o \rangle$ stating that a user u wants to exercise privilege p on object o . In order to check the request, we must consider which other authorizations can be derived from the ones in \mathcal{A} . This is achieved by defining specific derivation rules.

In the following, we first present derivation rules and we formally define the authorization base. Then, we show how the authorization base can be used to answer access requests.

³ \cup on $\{q_1, \dots, q_n\}$ produces as result the query expression $q_1 \cup \dots \cup q_n$.

⁴A query q_1 is contained in another query q_2 if for any database D , $q_1(D) \subseteq q_2(D)$.




Figure 3: Relationships between (a) objects and (b) privileges (\leftarrow represents $<$)

5.1 Derivation rules

Given a CAS \mathcal{A} , other authorizations can be derived from those in \mathcal{A} . Derivation between authorizations can be specified by using *derivation rules*. Given an authorization having a certain form, each derivation rule specifies which other authorizations are implied by it. When this happens, we say that authorization a_2 is derived from authorization a_1 , denoted by $a_2 \leftarrow a_1$.

Two different groups of derivation rules can be identified, depending on whether the derivation considers relationships between objects or relationships between privileges. In the following, both groups of authorizations are described.

5.1.1 Derivation over object relationships

Among the objects defined in Section 3.1, it is possible to define some relationships such as if an authorization a exists for object o_1 and there exists a relationship between o_1 and another object o_2 , a is propagated from o_1 to o_2 . The considered relationships between objects are graphically represented in Figure 3(a). Authorizations should be propagated from group objects to their instances. Moreover, because of the logical binding between a feature and its spatial representation in one or more map objects inside maps, authorizations for map objects can be derived from authorizations for features. This can be useful, for instance, when we want to grant a user the privilege to access the spatial representation of the instances of a certain feature type.

Next rule specifies derivation between group objects and their instances.

RULE 1. Let $o \in O$ be a group object. Let $a = \langle u, p, pt, g, go, o, t, w, q \rangle$ be an authorization such that p is an instance privilege. Then, for each $o' \in ext(a)$ the following rule holds: $\langle u, p, pt, g, go, o', t, \top, \perp \rangle \leftarrow \langle u, p, pt, g, go, o, t, w, q \rangle$.

Next rule specifies derivation between features and map

objects. This derivation applies only to privileges for map objects, i.e., those involving spatial representations.

RULE 2. Let $a = \langle u, p, pt, g, go, f, t, \top, \perp \rangle$ be an authorization such that p is a spatial instance privilege and f is a feature. Then, for each $o' \in ext(a)$, the following rule holds:

$\langle u, C(p), pt, g, go, o', t, \top, \perp \rangle \leftarrow \langle u, p, pt, g, go, f, t, \top, \perp \rangle$ where function C generates the privilege corresponding to p over map objects (see Definition 5).

EXAMPLE 6. Let *Milan* be a feature of *County* type and $mo = M_admin(Milan)$ the map object inside the map M_admin representing the spatial extension of the feature *Milan*. The following are some examples of derivation rules over object relationships:

$\langle B, sel_F(2, geo), +, A, true, Milan, st, \top, \perp \rangle \leftarrow$
 $\langle B, sel_F(2, geo), +, A, true, County, st, \top, \perp \rangle$

$\langle B, sel_M(2, geo), +, A, true, mo, st, \top, \perp \rangle \leftarrow$
 $\langle B, sel_F(2, geo), +, A, true, Milan, st, \top, \perp \rangle$

According to the previous rules, a select privilege $sel_F(2, geo)$ on the feature type *County* is propagated, due to Rule 1, from *County* to the feature *Milan* and, due to Rule 2, from $sel_F(2, geo)$ on the feature *Milan* to the map object $M_admin(Milan)$ as $sel_M(2, geo)$. \square

5.1.2 Derivation over privilege relationships

Due to the nature of spatial objects, additional derivation rules can be defined in order to take into account object dimension and spatial layer. Such information are contained in the granted privileges. The most informative layer is certainly the geometric one, since topological information can be computed from it but the converse is not true. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that an authorization granting a privilege for the geometric layer has to be propagated to the topological layer. On the other hand, an authorization denying a privilege for the topological layer has to be propagated to the geometric one.

Similar rules can be defined by considering object dimension. Indeed, an authorization granting a privilege to objects with a certain dimension has to be propagated to objects with lower dimension (e.g., if a user can select regions, he can also select lines and points). On the other hand, an authorization denying a privilege to objects with a certain dimension has to be propagated to objects with higher dimension (e.g., if a user cannot select points, it cannot select neither lines nor regions).

In order to formally introduce derivations between privileges, we introduce a partial order $<$ among them. We say that $p_1 < p_2$ if and only if: (i) $p_1 = p'_1(d_1, t_1)$, $p_2 = p'_2(d_2, t_2)$ and either $(t_1 = geo \text{ and } t_2 = top)$ or $(t_1 = t_2 \text{ and } d_1 < d_2)$; (ii) $p_1 = p'_1(d_1)$, $p_2 = p'_2(d_2)$ and $d_1 < d_2$ (see Figure 3(b)). Next rule formally specifies derivations based on such privilege ordering. Note that the rule can be applied only to objects belonging to the scope of the derived privilege.

RULE 3. Let $p_1 \in P, p_2 \in P$ such that $p_1 < p_2$ and $o \in s(p_1) \cap s(p_2)$. The following rules hold:

$\langle u, p_1, +, g, go, o, t, w, q \rangle \leftarrow \langle u, p_2, +, g, go, o, t, w, q \rangle$
 $\langle u, p_2, -, g, go, o, t, w, q \rangle \leftarrow \langle u, p_1, -, g, go, o, t, w, q \rangle$.

EXAMPLE 7. The following are some examples of derivation rules over privilege relationships:

$a_1 = \langle B, sel_M(2, top), +, A, true, mo, st, \top, \perp \rangle \leftarrow$
 $\langle B, sel_M(2, geo), +, A, true, mo, st, \top, \perp \rangle$

$$\begin{aligned}
a_2 &= \langle B, sel_M(1, geo), +, A, true, mo, st, \top, \perp \rangle \leftarrow \\
&\quad \langle B, sel_M(2, geo), +, A, true, mo, st, \top, \perp \rangle \leftarrow \\
a_3 &= \langle B, sel_M(1, geo), -, A, true, mo, st, \top, \perp \rangle \leftarrow \\
&\quad \langle B, sel_M(1, top), -, A, true, mo, st, \top, \perp \rangle \leftarrow \\
a_4 &= \langle B, sel_M(2, top), -, A, true, mo, st, \top, \perp \rangle \leftarrow \\
&\quad \langle B, sel_M(1, top), -, A, true, mo, st, \top, \perp \rangle \leftarrow
\end{aligned}$$

According to the previous derivation rules and to Rule 3, a select privilege $sel_M(2, geo)$ on the map object mo is propagated as $sel_M(2, top)$ (authorization a_1) and as $sel_M(1, geo)$ (a_2). Moreover, the privilege $sel_M(1, top)$ is propagated as $sel_M(1, geo)$ (a_3) and as $sel_M(2, top)$ (a_4). \square

5.2 Algorithms for access control

Given a CAS \mathcal{A} , based on the derivation rules presented above, we can now define the authorization base as the set of authorizations contained in \mathcal{A} extended with those derived from \mathcal{A} . The construction of the authorization base guarantees that it represents a correct authorization set.

DEFINITION 7 (AUTHORIZATION BASE). Let \mathcal{A} be a CAS. Let \leftarrow^* denote the transitive closure of \leftarrow . Let \mathcal{A}^+ be defined as $\{a \mid a \in \mathcal{A} \text{ or } \exists a' \in \mathcal{A} \ a \leftarrow^* a'\}$. The authorization base $AB(\mathcal{A})$ for \mathcal{A} is defined as $\{\langle u, p, pt, g, go, o, t, w, q \rangle \mid \langle u, p, pt, g, go, o, t, w', q' \rangle \in \mathcal{A}^+, w = \cup\{w_i \mid \langle u, p, pt, g, go, o, t, w_i, q_i \rangle \in \mathcal{A}^+\}, q = \cup\{q_i \mid \langle u, p, pt, g, go, o, t, w_i, q_i \rangle \in \mathcal{A}^+\}\}$. \square

PROPOSITION 1. If \mathcal{A} be a CAS, $AB(\mathcal{A})$ is a CAS.

Proof Sketch: By construction, minimality is satisfied by $AB(\mathcal{A})$. Note that minimality may not be satisfied by \mathcal{A}^+ . This happens for example when \mathcal{A} contains an authorization with privilege $p(2, l)$ and one with privilege $p(1, l)$. When applying derivation rules, a new authorization with privilege $p(1, l)$ is generated that may violate minimality. Grant safety can be proved by contradiction by observing that derivation rules do not change users, grantors, grant option, authorization sign and type, queries and windows. Thus, if grant safety is not satisfied by the authorization base, it cannot be satisfied by \mathcal{A} but this contradicts the hypothesis. \square

The following proposition gives an estimated of the complexity of computing the authorization base and of its cardinality.

PROPOSITION 2. Let \mathcal{A} be a CAS and $AB(\mathcal{A})$ the corresponding authorization base. Let n_a be the number of authorizations in \mathcal{A} . Let $a \in \mathcal{A}$ such that $a.o$ is a group object. Let $n_{a,o}$ be the cardinality of $a.o$ extension. Let n_m be the number of maps in the database and $n_o = \max\{n_{a,o} \mid a \in \mathcal{A}\}$. Assuming that $n_m \lll n_o$, the cardinality of $AB(\mathcal{A})$ is linear in n_a and n_o . The number of authorizations derived from a is linear in $n_{a,o}$. The complexity of constructing $AB(\mathcal{A})$ is quadratic in n_a and n_o .

Proof Sketch: The proof follows from the following considerations: (i) The longest derivation can be obtained by considering authorizations on group objects or features (otherwise Rules 1 and 2 are not used). (ii) Given an authorization a such that $a.o$ is a group object or a feature, the longest derivation starting from a is obtained by first applying Rule 3 to a . According to Figure 3, this can be done at most 3 times. Then, if $a.o$ is a group object, Rule 1 can be applied once for each object belonging to the extension of $a.o$, which is lower than or equal to n_o . If $a.o$ is a feature, Rule 2 can be

applied at most once for each map object corresponding to $a.o$. Since maps are at most n_m , the number of map objects is at most equal to n_m . (iii) From the previous consideration, since we assume that $n_m \lll n_o$, it follows that from each authorization a we can generate at most $3n_{a,o}$ authorizations. Thus, from \mathcal{A} , we can generate at most $3n_o n_a$ authorizations. Thus, the cardinality of $AB(\mathcal{A})$ is linear in n_a and n_o . (iv) On the other hand, in order to construct $AB(\mathcal{A})$, windows have to be combined, thus, each authorization in the set has to be compared with all the others. Thus, the complexity is quadratic in n_a and n_o . \square

EXAMPLE 8. Consider the geographical database described in Example 1. Let Bob be a user, having only the following two authorizations:

$$\begin{aligned}
a &= \langle Bob, sel_M(2, geo), +, Ann, true, M_rail, st, \top, \perp \rangle \\
b &= \langle Bob, sel_F(1, top), -, Ann, true, Railway, st, \top, \perp \rangle
\end{aligned}$$

In M_rail , Railway instances have dimension 1, Accident instances have dimension 0, no object with dimension 2 exists. Moreover, both Railway and Accident features admit both a geometric and topological representation. Thus, from a , we can derive the following authorizations:

$$a_1 = \langle Bob, sel_M(1, geo), +, Ann, true, M_rail, st, \top, \perp \rangle, \text{ by applying Rule 3 to } a.$$

$$a_2 = \langle Bob, sel_M(0, geo), +, Ann, true, M_rail, st, \top, \perp \rangle, \text{ by applying Rule 3 to } a \text{ or to } a_1.$$

$$a_3 = \langle Bob, sel_M(2, top), +, Ann, true, M_rail, st, \top, \perp \rangle, \text{ by applying Rule 3 to } a.$$

$$a_4 = \langle Bob, sel_M(1, top), +, Ann, true, M_rail, st, \top, \perp \rangle, \text{ by applying Rule 3 to } a_3.$$

$$a_5 = \langle Bob, sel_M(0, top), +, Ann, true, M_rail, st, \top, \perp \rangle, \text{ by applying Rule 3 to } a_4 \text{ or } a_3.$$

$$a_1^i = \langle Bob, sel_M(1, geo), +, Ann, true, i, st, \top, \perp \rangle, \text{ where } i \in \{y \mid y \in M_rail \wedge y \text{ represents a Railway feature}\}; \text{ these authorizations are obtained by applying Rule 1 to } a_1.$$

$$a_2^i = \langle Bob, sel_M(0, geo), +, Ann, true, i, st, \top, \perp \rangle, \text{ where } i \in \{y \mid y \in M_rail \wedge y \text{ represents an Accident feature}\}; \text{ these authorizations are obtained by applying Rule 1 to } a_2.$$

$$a_4^i = \langle Bob, sel_M(1, top), +, Ann, true, i, st, \top, \perp \rangle, \text{ where } i \in \{y \mid y \in M_rail \wedge y \text{ represents a Railway feature}\}; \text{ these authorizations are obtained by applying Rule 1 to } a_4.$$

$$a_5^i = \langle Bob, sel_M(0, top), +, Ann, true, i, st, \top, \perp \rangle, \text{ where } i \in \{y \mid y \in M_rail \wedge y \text{ represents an Accident feature}\}; \text{ these authorizations are obtained by applying Rule 1 to } a_5.$$

From b , we get the following authorizations:

$$b_1 = \langle Bob, sel_F(2, top), -, Ann, true, Railway, st, \top, \perp \rangle, \text{ by applying Rule 3 to } b.$$

$$b_2 = \langle Bob, sel_F(1, geo), -, Ann, true, Railway, st, \top, \perp \rangle, \text{ by applying Rule 3 to } b.$$

$$b_3 = \langle Bob, sel_F(2, geo), -, Ann, true, Railway, st, \top, \perp \rangle, \text{ by applying Rule 3 to } b_2 \text{ or } b_1.$$

$$b_2^i = \langle Bob, sel_F(1, geo), -, Ann, true, i, st, \top, \perp \rangle, \text{ where } i \text{ represents a Railway feature; these authorizations are obtained by applying Rule 1 to } b_2.$$

$$b_1^i = \langle Bob, sel_F(1, top), -, Ann, true, i, st, \top, \perp \rangle, \text{ where } i \text{ represents a Railway feature; these authorizations are obtained by applying Rule 1 to } b.$$

$$b_2^i = \langle Bob, sel_M(1, geo), -, Ann, true, i, st, \top, \perp \rangle, \text{ where } i \in \{y \mid y \in M_rail \wedge y \text{ represents a Railway feature}\}; \text{ these authorizations are obtained by applying Rule 2 to } b_2^i.$$

$$b_1^i = \langle Bob, sel_M(1, top), -, Ann, true, i, st, \top, \perp \rangle, \text{ where } i \in \{y \mid y \in M_rail \wedge y \text{ represents a Railway feature}\}; \text{ these authorizations are obtained by applying Rule 2 to } b_1^i. \quad \square$$

Given an access request $r = \langle u, p, o \rangle$, stating that a user u wants to exercise privilege p on object o , and a CAS \mathcal{A} , the problem arises of establishing whether the request can or cannot be satisfied and on which set of objects. To this purpose, the authorization base is used. More precisely, given an authorization a , we say that $r = \langle u, p, o \rangle$ depends on a if and only if $a = \langle u, p, pt, g, go, o, t, w, q \rangle$, i.e., a grants or deny privilege p to u over object o . According to what we presented in Section 4, the access request can be satisfied if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:

1. r depends on a strong positive authorization and on no strong negative authorizations;
2. r depends on a weak positive authorization, on no weak negative authorizations, and on no strong authorizations.

In all the other cases, the access has to be denied. This means that, in presence of strong authorizations, weak ones are not considered. For both weak and strong authorizations, negative authorizations have precedence with respect to positive ones.

DEFINITION 8. Let \mathcal{A} be a CAS and $r = \langle u, p, o \rangle$ be an access request. r is satisfied in \mathcal{A} if and only if one of the following condition holds:

- $\exists \langle u, p, +, g, go, o, st, w, q \rangle \in AB(\mathcal{A})$ and $\nexists \langle u, p, -, g, go, o, st, w, q \rangle \in AB(\mathcal{A})$;
- $\exists \langle u, p, +, g, go, o, wk, w, q \rangle \in AB(\mathcal{A})$, $\nexists \langle u, p, -, g, go, o, wk, w, q \rangle \in AB(\mathcal{A})$ and $\nexists \langle u, p, pt, g, go, o, st, w, q \rangle \in AB(\mathcal{A})$. □

If r is satisfied in \mathcal{A} , we define $O(r) = \{o' | o' \text{ is an instance of } o \text{ and } \langle u, p, o' \rangle \text{ is satisfied in } \mathcal{A}\}$ as the set of instance objects over which the privilege is granted. □

The complexity of checking an access request depends on the cardinality of the authorization base. Thus, it is linear in n_a and n_o (see Proposition 2).

EXAMPLE 9. Consider the authorization base computed in Example 8. Suppose that Bob makes the following access request: $\langle \text{Bob}, sel_M(1, geo), M_rail \rangle$. Since authorizations b^i and a^i , as well as b^i and b^i are all strong but conflicting, and since we give precedence to negation, M_rail map objects corresponding to Railway features cannot be accessed by Bob. On the other hand, map objects corresponding to Accident features can be accessed both at the geometric and topological layer, due to authorizations a^i and a^i . Now suppose that authorization b (and therefore all the authorizations derived from b) are weak. In this case, since strong positive authorizations exist for Railway and Accident map objects, all of them can be accessed both at the geometric and topological layer. As a third case, suppose that authorization a (and therefore all the authorizations derived from a) are weak. Independently on whether authorization b is weak or strong, only Accident map objects can be accessed. □

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this paper we have presented a new access control model for geographical maps. Our model supports both positive and negative authorizations, permits inheritance of

the authorizations according to the objects hierarchy and propagation of authorizations, taking into account object dimension and type of spatial information.

It is interesting to note that a window assigns an authorization a spatial extent. An authorization thus can be considered itself an entity with spatial and non spatial properties and as such it can be modeled as a TSDM feature with a specific feature type. Moreover, the set of windows can be represented in TSDM as an authorization map. As a result, a uniform model is applied for representing and querying application data and authorizations.

As part of future work, we plan to develop efficient techniques for authorization administration and for access control enforcement, based on the use of logic programming techniques. An additional issue we plan to investigate concerns the development of similar access control models for GIS standards [8].

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