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The Segregation of Women in Politics

Could Gender Quotas break the Glass Ceiling?

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To my son, Fernando Fëdor,
who came into my life during my Ph.D,

To Politics,
which became true during my Ph.D,

To Krook, Dahlerup, Paxton and Hughes,
hoping that they read my research as I did with theirs,

To my Supervisor Cinzia Meraviglia,
hoping that she will continue to support me for a long time,

To all women and men
who do not believe in gender quotas,
hoping that my research will help change their mind, if only a little.

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Introduction

The distinction of roles between men and women, and the limited access of women to the public sphere, have been very clear since the times of ancient Greece and ancient Rome, the civilizations we recognise as the *arkè*[1] of our societies.

As we know, the word democracy means people's power or people's government[2], in which citizens rule the affairs of the state. Only men, however, could vote and be elected in politics (Cantarella, 2010; Bernard, 2003; Duby and Perrot, 2009), women being no more than a male's possession. Women were actually excluded from politics and needed the consent of a male tutor to exercise their rights, e.g., inherit goods, get married, make a will[3] (Mercogliano, 2011; Cantarella, 2010; Bernard 2003; Viarengo, 2009; Duby and Perrot, 2009). Constraints posed on the exercise of women's civil and legal rights were justified by the inferiority[4] of the feminine mind in comparison with the masculine, a difference which was also legitimated by the laws in force (Viarengo, 2009). As a matter of facts, in Roman jurisprudence we find the first well-articulated example of a prejudiced juridical statute of women, i.e., their stated inferiority in juridical relations and their exclusion from political power as a consequence (Cantarella, 2011; Duby and Perrot, 2009). Hence, in a world where women were not born free and did not enjoy the same rights as men, we observe a legally androcentric perspective (Mercogliano, 2011).

[1] From ancient Greek, ἀρχή means «beginning», «origin».

[2] From ancient Greek δῆμος, démos, «people» and κράτος, krátos, «power».

[3] The terms used in juridical Latin to indicate female weakness are usually *infirmitas* (and *imbecillitas*), which meant that women needed to be under male tutors due to their poor judgement, as Cicero claims in 63 BC Cic. Pro Mur. 12.27*: Mulieres omnis propter infirmitatem consilii maiores in tutorum potestatem esse voluerunt* (Mercogliano, 2011: 22).

[4] On the one hand, inability is explained as female weakness (*infirmitas*); on the other hand, female inability is viewed in opposition to male ability related to a single *munus masculorum* or *virile officium*.

Marriage ideally represented the institutional function of women in ancient times, that is, providing descendants for citizens by bearing their husbands' children, while men would still have the right to repudiate them, and to expose or sell their children without their wife's consent. As marriage was finalised to procreation, women identified themselves as wives and mothers and would spend their lives mostly at home (Duby and Perrot, 2009; Mercogliano, 2011; Bernard, 2003), obviously banned from the public sphere. As Bernard puts it (2003:142), women and politics were mutually exclusive.

The division of roles between the two genders was extremely simple: citizens (*polites*) were to rule over the city, women (*oikos*) were to rule over domestic affairs. The juxtaposition between *polis* and *oikos* confirms the gap created to separate men and women: the city of ancient times did not contemplate female citizenship in the political sense of the term. From this perspective, the *polis* was really a men's club, and the participation to the State's government was a jealously limited and guarded privilege. Women were excluded from it, as were slaves and children.

In the Greek jurisdiction, as in the Roman one, male superiority was based on women's incapability and on the 'natural' inequality and juxtaposition between men and women. The subordination of women to men logically follows from these arguments: men and women are tied by a relationship in which the (male) ruler dominates over the (female) ruled, which can be seen as, essentially, a form of submission (Bertrand, 2003; Duby and Perrot, 2009).

In this respect, it is interesting to consider the case of Ipazia (370 AD - 415 AD), a mathematician, an astronomer and a philosopher, who took over the role of head of the Neoplatonic school in Alexandria of Egypt after her father (the former head) died. Her story resembles what very much we can still see in contemporary days and societies. After having inherited her position from a male precedessor (like

Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Benazir Buttho, Indira Gandhi and many other female leaders; see Chapter 2), she took her role so seriously as to go to the street of Alexandria and publicly discuss the theories of great (male) philosopher like Plato or Aristotle. A woman of independent thought and married to no man, she studied and excelled in disciplines that are still nowadays considered a males' kingdom (Zajczyk, 2004), and was known and appreciated by those ruling the city for her judgement and brilliance. As a non-Christian public and influential personality, Ipazia fell under the conflict between the Christian bishop of Alexandria and the pagan prefect of the city. Several sources describe her violent assassination with envy, calumny, and the accusation of witchcraft (Ronchey, 2016; D'Errico 2017; Loiodice and Minerva, 2006). The description of the homicide is preserved across the centuries in Socrates Scholasticus' (380 AD - 440 AD) words:

> *Some Christians, hurried away by a fierce and bigoted zeal, whose ringleader was a reader named Peter, waylaid her returning home, and dragging her from her carriage, they took her to the church called Cæsareum, where they completely stripped her, and then murdered her with tiles. After tearing her body in pieces, they took her mangled limbs to a place called Cinaron, and there burnt them*

(Socrates Scholasticus, cit., VII, 15, Ronchey, 2016)[5].

The memory of these events was lost for centuries; would have it be the same, were she a male philosopher, astronomer, mathematician? Socrate's death has been passed on, narrated in books, represented on the stage, and his fame is alive after more than two thousand years. What we know is that, throughout centuries, at times when freedom of speech was not granted, women paid with their lives for

[5] The Cinaron was the place where all waste was burn; hence, her limbs were burnt there leaving nothing behind (Ronchey, 2016).

what they said or did, when they did not conform with the role expectations of their society, as was the case of Ipazia (Parinetto, 1983; Feci and Schettini, 2017; Vallino and Montaruli, 2015) and of many other women, including those murdered during the so-called witch-craze between the XVI and the XVIII century in Europe (Walby 1986; Karlsen 1987; Hester 1992a, 1992b).

Still nowadays women continue to be the main target of sexist stereotypes, prejudice, physical and psychological violence in politics and in the labour market (Bourke, 2011; Bonura, 2016; Battaglia, 2015; Corsi and Toma, 2016; Sala, 2008; Stevens, 2009; Soffici, 2010; Musolino, 2017; Corradi, 2016; Gribaldo and Zapperi 2012; Volpato, 2013). They often still pay with their life when they chose freedom from male control and freedom of expression (Roia, 2017; Romito, Folla, and Melato, 2017; Feci and Schettini, 2017).

It is worth looking back at ancient societies because they show in nuce traits and dispositions that can be found in contemporary societies. Indeed, segregation of women into the domestic sphere – and their parallel delegitimation in the public one – that we find in ancient Greece and Rome is still a reality in many countries and for many women around the world. Where this kind of segregation has been (at least in part) overcome, horizontal occupational segregation in the labor market took its place, resulting in the confinement of women to tasks viewed as 'traditionally' or 'naturally' female, like the care of the young and the elder, and the education of children (e.g., Cotter, Hermsen and Vanneman, 2001; Blau, Brummund, and Liu, 2013; Regini, 2007; Reyneri, 2005, Reskin and Roos, 1990; Thistle, 2006).

As another similarity between ancient and contemporary societies, we see that the traditional exclusion of women from formal education and from the public sphere

(sanctioned for centuries by philosophers[6], writers, scientists[7] and some religions) resulted in today's vertical segregation, with women being underrepresented in positions of power, both in the private sector and in electoral politics (Paxton and Hughes, 2007; Dahlerup, 2006; Tremblay, 2008; Krook, 2009; Chozick, 2018).

This last form of underrepresentation, that of women in electoral bodies, will be the focus of this study. The main motivation for specifically dealing with the domain of politics, in relation to the scarce presence of women, is that politics is *the* crucial arena, where rules are set and decisions taken that concern both genders – but actually and unfortunately without enough active participation and contribution of women. The main questions around which the present study revolves are the following: is there any means to overcome the vertical segregation of women in politics, or the glass ceiling? Are gender quotas such a means? And, at all events, do women really make a difference in the political arena? If so, to what extent and in what terms? Do we need women to be represented in the public sphere because they can take care of their own interests better than men, or because they work for the good of the entire society? Ultimately, all these questions amount to one: why should we care for women to be equally represented in the political sphere? Apart from considerations of social justice and equal rights – that have a worth in themselves, of course – can we single out any further reason that would backup the claims for equal representation? After all – although indeed history does not

[6] Aristotle, and many thinkers around the world, argued that man belonged to the *polis*, the public sphere, and woman belonged to the home. He offered the first comprehensive theoretical account of the superiority of men's virtues, reason and status. According to him, and to many philosophers who followed him (F. Hegel, J.J. Rousseau, I. Kant and A. Schopenhauer), women were biological different from men, across intellectual and emotional dimensions. (Okin, 1979; Witt, 2004; Gadrner, 2006).

[7] Giddings (1996) argued that Gustave Le Bon, the founder of social psychology, pronounced the intelligence of women *closer to savages and children than adult civilized males*. Their *incapacity to reason* made educating them *a dangerous chimera*, he said, which would create women utterly *useless as mothers and wives*. Harvard professor Dr. Edward Clarke went so far as to say that college education could *destroy a woman's reproductive organs*. The propaganda unleashed to keep women out of the impure realms of the classroom, politics, and the labour force was formidable (Giddings, 1996:76).

say this is the case – men could be capable of taking care of everybody's interest, irrespective of his/her gender. Why do we need women in politics? Evidently, the latter question is rhetorical; but is it really so, after all?

Research evidence coming from seventy countries shows that men are more oriented towards individualistic values, competitiveness, power and success in life, while women privilege universalistic and communitarian values (Schwartz and Rubel, 2005). Does this make any difference, when it comes to politics? Volpato (2013) reports that a study conducted by the Bank of Italy (2012) finds that, in Italy, the more women are represented in governing bodies, the more resources are allocated to areas of common interest (health, care, education). A similar finding comes from the study of Beaman, Duflo, Pande and Topalova (2012), who show that in India's rural areas a more numerous presences of women in local governing bodies goes together with an improvement of services and infrastructures that are useful to the entire community. Also, women are less tolerant of corruption and immoral practices in business (Franke, Crown and Spake, 1997); they are also more inclined to the common good than men and are deemed to be more trustworthy (Francescato and Mebane, 2011).

In the Italian context, the glass ceiling in politics confines women to position of lesser power than those held by men; hence, it is worth asking whether the above-mentioned findings also hold when we get to the highest level of political representation, namely, the Italian Parliament: do women make a difference? Do more women mean a better politics for a better society?

The dissertation will seek at addressing these issues by combining the vast body of knowledge on the topic of women and politics, with an approach borrowed from economics, that is, treating the Italian Parliament as if it were a corporation, and measuring the effectiveness of a condition (ie., the presence or absence of women in the Parliament) on the output of the 'company', namely the kind and number of

bills proposed by parliamentarians in the legislatures from 2001 to 2018. Italy has been taken as a case study, as it will be explained in Chapter 4, since in 2008 the Democratic Party voluntarily introduced gender quotas in its statute, being the only Italian party (back then and until present days) to do so. However, the approach and methodology I propose can be easily generalized to other countries and periods, while the Italian case can be interesting *per se*, given the sharp resurgence of sexism and male chauvinism this country witnessed from the first Berlusconi government on, starting in 1995 (Volpato, 2013), well represented by the proudly masculine and genuinely sexist character of parties like the Lega Nord (Baroncelli, 2006; Caputo, 2012).

The dissertation is divided into five chapters. The first chapter starts from the assumption that politics can be seen as a segment of the labour market, hence sharing some of its characteristics. The chapter explores the extensive literature on women's occupational segregation in the labour market by analyzing the explanation that economists and sociologists provided of this phenomenon. The focus will be on vertical segregation, defined as the underrepresentation of women in higher positions of power. This kind of segregation is the most obvious kind of segregation, when it comes to politics, so much so that the term “glass ceiling” has been coined to suggest the idea of an invisible barrier that prevents women from achieving power. The main ideas of the literature on the glass ceiling will be considered, before finally analyzing specific studies on gender quotas. In order to contrast the glass ceiling phenomenon, many countries adopted policies of affirmative action, such as targeted recruitment programs, preferential conditions for minorities and women and, in particular, the adoption of quotas. The chapter will at this point review the vast literature existing on gender quotas, both in corporations and, more relevantly to this thesis, in politics.

The second chapter, starting from the struggle for political and civil rights leading to universal suffrage in the United States, will provide an overview of the variables that can determine the presence of women in politics, in particular with a snapshot of women's presence in parliaments all over the world, in Europe, and in Italy. As for Italy, details will also be provided concerning the number of women in politics at regional and local level, in order to better understand the magnitude and extension of the glass ceiling phenomenon and the underrepresentation of women in the political arena.

The third chapter opens with the historical origins of quotas, then focuses on the differences between various kinds of quotas and on the different types of electoral systems, which are seen as a crucial element to determine women's presence in parliaments. The specific contributions women make to legislation will also be analysed, by looking at the kind of bills they tend to promote. The chapter will also consider the history of gender quotas in Italy, up to those that the Democratic Party has recently introduced.

The fourth chapter regards the methodology adopted in this study and illustrates the process of data collection and organization, the research questions and the hypotheses that will be tested in the fifth chapter.

The final chapter presents and discusses the empirical test of the hypotheses concerning the effect of the voluntary gender quotas introduced by the Democratic Party in 2008. Evidence will be provided confirming my expectations and providing support to the need for women to be more present in the political arena, in order not only to take care of their own interests, but also to help society becoming more equal and just.

1. Theoretical framework: the landscape of explanations of gender segregation

The profound transformation in the economy of Western countries that occurred over the last century had several effects on women's employment. Women have shifted their energies from traditionally unpaid work at home toward the paid workplace. To be more exact, the return of women to paid work is the most important phenomenon of the second half of the 20th century, it is a return because the female presence in agriculture and the beginning of industrial development, based on textile manufacturing, was not secondary nor should it be forgotten that during the World Wars women replaced men in the factories (Reyneri, 2005). However, the growth in the service sectors has created a lot of employment opportunities in areas that are culturally tilted toward women's work mainly in sector of activity close to their traditional role, such as childcare, health, education and food services (Cotter, Hermsen and Vanneman, 2001; Blau, Brummund, and Liu, 2013; Regini, 2007; Reyneri, 2005; Reskin and Roos, 1990; Thistle, 2006).

At the same time, the female labour force has been seen as *weak* and *marginal*, with characteristics of discontinuity, poor attachment to work, availability at reducing times: a labour force weak and marginal but precious for an economic system in search of organizational forms (Reyneri, 2005).

As Saraceno (1992) points out,

> *It is easy to understand why the new service sector has turned to women. Most social services are nothing more than the professionalization of activities that were once carried out exclusively within the family: from assistance to the elderly to health, from the children care to their primary education*.

It could be said that the feminisation of developing professions has favoured women to entry into labour market, protecting them from male competition. However, the other side of the coin is segregation, that is, the concentration of women in sectors and occupations where they are dominant and therefore the exclusion from those sectors considered purely male[8].

Thus, the expanding service sector has also created occupational ghettos (Charles and Grusky, 2004), or occupational segregation defined by Burnell (1999) as inequality in the distribution of women and men across different occupational fields.

According to overcrowding theory, women are constrained by market demand side to flow into a limited number of employment positions, whose labour markets are overcrowded on the supply side. In this way, since the wage is determined based on the neoclassical law of marginal productivity, and due to the principle of decreasing returns, female wages will be reduced as market crowding increases (Abburrà, 1989). Thus women, even if they have personal characteristics equal to those of men, will be led to present a marginal productivity, and therefore a lower wage (Padavic and Reskin, 2002; Rubery and Fagan, 1995). Segregation would therefore explain women's low pay levels.

Indeed, the high concentrations of women in workplace associated with their historical family roles, has been studied as one of the main reasons for the well-known gender pay gap (Levanon, England, and Allison 2009; Blau, Ferber, and Winkler, 2010).

However, the reason for the discriminatory behaviour of labour demand, which produces segregation, remains to be explained

[8] The degree of segregation remains stable in all developed countries, with women concentrated in a few activities located on the lower levels of the occupational hierarchy both in the manual and non-manual work area (Saraceno, 1992).

Despite recent major increases in the educational level of women and labour market, despite political lobbying and legislative reform, why occupational segregation of women persists so strongly?

As Anker (2001) argues, occupational segregation[9] (both horizontal and vertical) by gender occurs everywhere, causing labour market rigidity and economic inefficiency, wasting human resources, preventing change, disadvantaging women and perpetuating gender inequalities. The occupational segregation[10] is one of the core themes both in the sociological literature, exploring gender inequalities in employment, and in the labour economics literature and the concept of inequality can be addressed through a distinction between the horizontal and vertical segregation (Reskin, 2000).

Horizontal segregation is a universal characteristic of contemporary socio-economic systems (Anker, 1998) and it is defined as the over- or under-representation of a certain social group in specific occupations or sectors[11], which is not supported by any factual criterion (Bettio and Verashchagina, 2009; Regini 2007). Horizontal segregation is considered as a constant in the labour market in all Western Countries (Rubery and Fagan, 1993; Anker, 1998).

[9] The most common measure of occupational segregation is the index of dissimilarity. This measure reports what percentage of women, or men, would have to change occupations to make the gender distribution equal across all occupations (Duncan and Duncan, 1955).

[10] Since occupations are embedded in the structure of national labour markets, their distribution within each country may differ; countries also vary in workers' characteristics such as education level, female labour force participation rates and types of occupation populated by women (Rubery and Fagan, 1995). However, my goal here is to give a general theoretical framework of segregation in the labour market, without considering the differences among countries.

[11] Horizontal gender segregation is also visible as the concentration of women and male graduates in in specific fields of study: women are over-represented in care-related and humanistic fields, while men dominate STEM fields (Mann and DiPrete, 2013). Empirical evidence suggests that horizontal gender segregation is among the causes of the gender income gap among college graduates (Brown and Corcoran 1997; Bobbitt-Zeher, 2007). Furthermore, several studies suggested that gender segregation in education matters for the skill composition of the future workforce (Altonji, Huang and Taber, 2015) and explains the difference in wages between women and men.

On the other hand, vertical segregation (or hierarchical segregation, as it is currently more commonly termed) occurs when the opportunities for career developments within a sector are severely reduced or denied for a given group (Bettio and Verashchagina, 2009:32). As a result, vertical segregation tends to keep women (or other disadvantaged social groups) out of the top positions in private and public organisations (Maron and Meulders, 2008) as well in politics (Reskin, 2000).

Inspired by the Anker[12] 's (2001) heuristic subdivision of theories on occupational segregation, I propose the main concepts again, making some additions that I considered necessary for my analysis Three main streams of research can be singled out: neoclassical theories, labour market segmentation theory, and gender theories.

1.1. Neoclassical explanations: human capital theory

Human capital theory is a first perspective within neoclassical theory aiming at explaining gender segregation in the labour market. According to this theory, women and men are considered as rational agents (*homo oeconomicus*) and tend to use their human capital differently (Becker, 1957); more specifically, women invest less in education and training due to childbearing and rearing. In this sense, Mincer and Polacheck (1974) say that women accumulate less human capital than men, which could prevent the former from having access to the top positions of organizations.

[12] Anker (2001) points out that most of the research literature dealing with occupational segregation by sex is not concerned with occupational segregation *per se*, but with the effect it has on female-male pay differentials.

Hakim (1991, 1995, 1996) argued that the segregation between women and men results from women's preferences and free choice, since women tend to be oriented towards flexibility at work and towards occupations which are compatible with their family life. As a consequence, women are better represented in occupations and sectors that require less investment in human capital and offer more flexibility.

In Hakim's perspective, therefore, occupational segregation is not a consequence of institutional disadvantages. She argued that there are three qualitatively different types of working women:

- Committed women, who give priority to their career, work full time, and are self-made in Hakim's terms;
- Uncommitted women, who give priority to their household duties, work part-time and are *grateful slaves*;
- Drifers or adaptives women, who have chaotically unplanned careers, and whose activities probably defy explanation.

The existence of these different types of women supports both rational choice and human capital theories.

Hakim's approach has generated several critical replies. Indeed, Crompton and Harris (1999) criticize the use of fixed categories in order to explain women's or men's employment behavior. They stress the importance of the processes through which women arrive at different combinations of employment and family biographies, since both choice and constraint play their part. Among the latter, institutional conditions are of substantial importance for the employment behavior of women (Crompton, 1997).

In contrast to Hakim's approach, gender theories claim that the segregation of women in the labour market is explained by both the dominant position of men

and by the fact that they have an interest in maintaining their privileged position by making it difficult for women to access high-level positions. In line with gender theories, I would argue that theorizing that there is a female preference for performing certain tasks rather than others is particularly risky, because it not only implies that women will remain relegated and anchored to traditional gender roles, but also prevents their emancipation[13].

Furthermore, preferences are a somehow inadequate ground on which to build a theory. Firstly, they are difficult to prove on an empirical ground, without a more-than-reasonable degree of measurement error. Secondly, preferences are formed in the context of social norms and values, among which are gender roles and expectations; however, it may prove to be very hard to disentangle the normative component of gender roles and stereotypes on one side, and preferences on the other, the former being the cause of the latter.

Nonetheless, without this disentanglement, it is impossible to say to what extent an individual or group preference is genuine, instead of induced by role expectations.

[13] In 1980s, the Sears case in the United States has become paradigmatic of the theory of preference. The court case arises from the lawsuit filed by the *Equal Employment Opportunities Commission* (EEOC) with the private company Sears, the most important retailer in the United States, which employed the largest concentration of female workers in the country. The allegation was of "systematic" discrimination against women, excluded from the best-paid sales jobs, those in which the fixed salary is combined with a premium for each sale. In Sears, most women were confined to fixed salaries, which therefore involved lower salaries and very few career opportunities. Sears' defence has insisted on the theory of women's preferences, according to which women themselves prefer jobs that do not involve risk, competition and aggression. The victory of the company has certainly contributed to the US political changes in the Reagan's era, among which was the cutting of provisions of the EEOC and the inclusion in the same Commission of members who notoriously opposed to affirmative actions. This case represents one of the most important defeats of equal opportunities in the Eighties (Milkman, 1986). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is an independent federal agency that guarantees compliance with the laws against discrimination in the workplace. The EEOC investigates allegations of discrimination of various types: ethnicity, religion orientation, sex, age, disability. Initially it had only one investigative power, since 1972 it has also the power to bring lawsuits for discrimination and order positive action plans as a remedy for discrimination.

Maternity is very much considered by employers when recruiting their employees in the attempt to maximize profits and minimize costs. On the basis of the idea that women interrupt their occupational career when having children, employers maintain that women are more costly than men, so they are more oriented to hire men for jobs requiring a high level of qualification, and women for low profile jobs (Becker, 1971; Kanter, 1997; Acker, 2004, 2006, 2009). Again, as Anker (2001) argues, women are often said to have higher rates of absenteeism (probably in part because of family responsibilities, which cause women to miss work in order to care for family members). Women are said to be late at work more frequently than men (again, probably in part because of family responsibilities). Of course, one could observe, a more balanced division of housework and childcare between partners might reduce absenteeism and career irregularities; a higher provisions of public kindergartens would go in the same direction, which are scarce or expensive, due to the lack of a welfare policy and legislation with the aim of fostering effective equal opportunities among women and men. From a sociological point of view, a major issue that characterizes neoclassical theories is that they leave non-economic and non-labour market variables out of the picture. The unbalanced division of labour within the household; the gender role expectations that make girls to avoid enrolling in STEM subjects (which are more well-paid and prestigious than non-STEM subjects); the persistence of gender stereotypes according to which women are communal and men are agentic (Williams and Best, 1990; Eagly and Mladinic, 1994) and, ultimately, the power imbalance that in all known societies favour men and penalizes women: none of these - and other - exquisitely social factors are taken into account in the design of an explanation for gender segregation (within and outside the labour market). Although, strictly speaking, these factors lay at the borders or outside the competence of economists, they are nonetheless crucial in explaining why occupations are segregated by gender.

1.2. Neoclassical explanations: taste for discrimination and statistical discrimination

In light of the fact that the occupational segregation cannot be explained fully by different characteristics of women and men, neoclassical economists developed alternative theories.

A first proposal is Becker's model of taste for discrimination. In 1971, he argued, in his seminal work The Economics of Discrimination that tastes for discrimination are the most important immediate cause of actual discrimination. He describes a classic theory about how aversion to interracial contact—referred to as a "taste for discrimination"—can affect wages and labour markets according to which employers are prejudiced against certain groups of workers on the basis of their race, disability, age or gender. According to the theory of a taste for discrimination, employers who are willing to discriminate must be available to pay the monetary cost of hiring only those who belong to the preferred groups, and not hiring those whom they want to discriminate.

In essence, an employer who hires someone from the disliked group (say, a woman) incurs in a non-monetary cost, which s/he will transfer on the worker by paying her/him less than a worker of the preferred group (say, a man). Hence, the difference *d* between the pay of workers belonging to the two different groups is the measure of the employer's taste of discrimination, which can be measured in the aggregate, if not at the individual level (Lucas, 2008).
Lucas suggests three problems with the taste-based discrimination theory:

- Taste theory attempts to identify the particular economic sources of economic discrimination. This effort is misguided, for it tends to truncate

the range of discrimination behavior and turns attention toward individual actors acting alone in fundamentally independent roles.

- The insightful claim at the center of the theory works for the economy, but severely limits the general application of the theory.
- The framework uses a definition of discrimination that is hopelessly ambiguous. (Lucas, 2008: 149).

Statistical discrimination theory was developed in response to taste-based discrimination theory. Arrow (1971, 1998) and Phelps (1972), instead of agreeing with the premise that irrational motives underlie ethnic and gender discrimination, argued that unfair treatment of minorities can be the outcome of rational actions executed by profit maximizing actors who are confronted with the uncertainties accompanying selection decisions (Arrow, 1971, 1998; Phelps, 1972).

First, employers rationally discriminate against job candidates who are a member of a minority group that possesses on average less human capital than the native group of job applicants. In the words of Edmund Phelps, one of the thinkers of statistical discrimination theory:

> *The employer who seeks to maximize expected profit will discriminate against black or women if he believes them to be less qualified, reliable, long-term, etc. on the average than whites and men, respectively, and if the costs of gaining information about the individual applicants is excessive*
> (Phelps, 1972:659).

Second, employers rationally discriminate against job candidates of a minority group or women because employers know that the variance in the level of human capital is greater within the pool of minority candidates and the risk of making wrong hiring decisions implies cost that employer do not want to sustain (Aigner and Cain, 1977).

Third, employers rationally discriminate against job candidates of a minority group or women because of the absence of perfect information and confronted with uncertainty, people will rely upon group statistics to base selection decisions upon (Thijssen, 2017).

As Anker (2001) argues, this model poses two issues.
Firstly, how the system resulting from statistical discrimination can be sustained in a competitive economy? Secondly, how this model can disregard social values and stereotypes?

From a sociological point of view, statistical discrimination theories do not consider discrimination at the point of entry in labour market; the discrimination theories do not allow for any analysis of the motivations for or sources of discriminatory behavior. Statistical discrimination theory ignores the role played by occupational segregation by sex in perpetuating labour market discrimination into the next generation because women are generally discriminated against, they are likely to obtain less education than men and to pursue careers that reinforce the current segregation (Anker, 2001:137).

Moreover, as Lucas rightly argues,

> *statistical discrimination, like many taste theories of discrimination, uses a circular definition of discrimination; the phenomenon is identified by its likely effects*. (Lucas, 2008:160).

And ultimately, statistical discrimination legitimize discrimination which as Lucas remind us: *discrimination is often illegal* (Lucas, 2008:146).

1.3. Neoclassical explanations: labour market segmentation theory

The second stream of theories dealing with gender segregation in the labour market also relies on well-established economic thought and neo-classical logic (Anker, 2001). More specifically, according to Piore (1973), the socio-economic status of an individual in the labour market depends on labour market structures, rather than on human capital. In this view, the labour market is divided into a primary and a secondary sector, with little mobility between them.

The primary sector is the segment of labour market characterized by hierarchies, well-remunerated and protected employment; on the contrary, the secondary sector is characterized by low job security, low wages and low career perspectives (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). Unsurprisingly, women are concentrated in the secondary sector. The reason for this is, once again, women's alleged preferences: women are considered less interested in their career and less stable in the occupational trajectory, which makes the employers to hire men in the primary sector and women in the second one. This implies, on average, that women's pay is lower than men's, because many women workers are overcrowded into a small number of female occupations (Bergmann, 1974; Edgeworth, 1992).

Here again, neoclassical economists started from the assumption that a woman is less interested in career, without considering several variables such as why occupational segregation persists despite a wide overlap in the abilities of individual women and men and why the stereotype of women in society generally is reflected so consistently in stereotypically female occupations (Anker, 2011).

In conclusion, the explanatory power of neoclassical theories and institutional, dual labour market theory are limited, I would argue, because they consider women and

man only as rational agents without considering the importance of the dominant culture based on gender stereotypes, gender contract, which is a set of implicit and explicit rules governing gender relations, and which allocate different work, value, responsibilities and obligations to women and men and unbalanced division of family responsibilities.

The dominant culture must be considered simultaneously in its family and labour market component because it is a result of history, norms, values which in turn are embedded in the society and which are the results of a historical segregation of women firstly in house, later in work considered more compatible with their biological and reproductive role.

Then, the question why occupational segregation of women persists so strongly, is still open.

1.4. Gender theories

It is very hard to summarize gender theories under a single paradigm because many of them start from far away and not for explaining gender occupational segregation rather than for explaining the existence of female gender itself.

As mentioned in the Introduction, the historical exclusion of women explained by the explicit law, misogyny of philosophers (Witt, 2004) religion, practice and culture tradition (Paxton, 2017) has given rise to several feminist currents of

thought[14]. Particularly, the works of Mary Wollstonecraft[15], Harriet Taylor[16] and John Stuart Mill[17] started demanding equality in civil and political rights for women (Code, 2000; Kensinger, 1997; Joseph, 2007; Paxton 2017). They have been defined liberal feminist (and with them began the First[18] Wave Feminism) in contrast to the

[14] The most relevant feminist theories have been the liberal with Harriet Taylor and J.S. Mill and the socialist feminism with Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels but we can find also the Individual Feminism (Rockler, 2006), the Global Feminism (Zalewski and Runyan, 2013), the Postmodern Feminism (Brown, 1997), the Radical Feminism (Lewis, 2007) and many others (Cavarero and Restaino, 2002; Zappino, 2016).

[15] The English writer and philosopher, Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797), was one of the most influential thinkers in the history of feminism. She published, in 1792, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman: with Strictures on Political and Moral Subject, in which she claims that women and men are equally and they must have the same civil and political rights: *It is time to bring about a revolution in female manners, time to restore their lost dignity to them and to make them, as a part of the human species, work to reform the world by reforming themselves* (Wollstonecraft, 1972:31). She was a strongly supporter for women's education, arguing that only with education women could enter in the public sphere, which until then was a male domain (Wollstonecraft, 2004).

[16] Harriet Taylor (1807-1858) was a British philosopher and an influential thinker in women's rights advocate. In 1851 using a pseudonym she published The Enfranchisement of Women on Westminster Review. Probably, if she had not used the surname of the famous husband John Stuart Mill, her article would never have been taken into consideration at that time. As Mary Wollstonecraft, did before her, she strongly claimed for the importance of women's education. Another essay published under the name of her husband was The Subjection of Women (1869). This work denounces the inferior role of women within the political and family spheres. Taylor argued that women destroy themselves and their rights because of children and husbands caring. Women would have total emancipation only by freeing themselves from the cultural obligations that weigh on them (Cavarero and Restaino, 2002).

[17] John Stuart Mill (1806 -1873) was a British philosopher and political economist. With him and her wives Harriet Taylor started the first wave feminism, demanding equal rights for women and men. In their essay The Subjection of Women (1869) he wrote: *Women are in a different position from all other subject classes in this: their masters require more from them than actual service. Men want not only the obedience of women but also their sentiments. All but the most brutish of men want to have, in the woman most nearly connected with them, not a forced slave but a willing one, not a slave merely but a favourite. So, they have done everything they could to enslave women's minds. (…) All women are brought up from their earliest years to believe that their ideal of character is the very opposite to that of men: not self-will and government by self-control, but submission and accepting control by someone else. (…) And by 'their affections' are meant the only ones they are allowed to have—those to the men with whom they are connected, or to the children who constitute an additional and unbreakable tie between them and a man*. (Mill, 1869:9).

[18] The term first wave movement is used to refer to struggle for women's rights and is used to distinguish the early women's movement from the women's liberation movements of the 1960s and 1970s called second wave movement (Paxton, 2017).

socialist feminism of Karl Marx[19] and Friedrich Engels[20] which stress the belief that women were oppressed by the structure of capitalist society and only through a collective class struggle, only through a socialist revolution, women could be consider equal to men (Bryson, 1992; Brown, 1997; Garner, 1999).

All these theories have allowed the birth of gender studies as we know them today and have allowed the existence of gender theories on occupational segregation.

First of all, feminist theories start from the critique of traditional theories, for instance, they have criticized neoclassical economic thought as positivistic, atomistic, androcentric, ahistorical, and emphasizing market behaviour to the near exclusion of the household (see, for example, Ferber and Nelson 1993; Strober 1994; Strassmann 1994; Kuiper and Sap 1995; Nelson 1995). And as Acker (2009) argues we spend most of our days in work organizations that are almost completely dominated by men. It is well known and evident that power - both at the national and world level - is in all-male hands, although sociologists paid no attention to this fact until feminism came along to point out the problematic nature of the obvious (Acker and Van Houten, 1974; Moss Kanter, 1975, 1977).

A first approach of gender theories is based on the consideration that the position of women in the labour market and in society is a consequence of patriarchal system in which men have the power to choose, because the society is structured

[19] Karl Marx (1818–1883) was a German philosopher, economist, political theorist and socialist revolutionary, well known for the Communist Manifesto (1848) and The Capital (1886) in which deeply explore the relationship between capitalism and class exploitation. However, he also stresses the belief that women were oppressed by the structure of capitalist society and only through a collective class struggle, only through a socialist revolution, women could be considered equal to men (Bryson, 1992; Brown, 1997; Garner, 1999).

[20] Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) was a German philosopher and social scientist. Engels developed Marxist theory together with Karl Marx and, after the Marx's death, he published *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884) in which Engels analyses the oppression of women from a materialist point of view (Cavarero and Restaino, 2002).

along the lines of masculine power (Burnell, 1999; Onsongo, 2004; Foord and Gregson, 1986; Medes 2011; Moghadam, 1992). Lerner (1987) suggests that *patriarchy is a historic creation formed by men and women in a process which took nearly years to its competition* (Lerner, 1987:212).

The patriarchal system, defined by cultural stereotypes, social norms, power and privilege of men, has an impact on the kind of jobs women do and it also impacts on the organisational decisions about which jobs and how much opportunity are suitable for women and men (Konrad and Pfeffer, 2001; Acker, 2006; Reskin, 2008, Foord and Gregson 1986, Medes 2011,). Indeed, In the words of Barbara Bergmann (1987):

> *Feminist economists ... see employment discrimination not as a personal foible of the individuals who make hiring decisions, but as deriving from a system of social organization in which woman's role is as a servant of men* (Bergamann, 1987: 136).

Always in patriarchal theories we find Ferguson (1984) which develops a radical feminist critique of bureaucracy arguing that it is constructed through an abstract discourse on rationality, rules and procedures and in conclusion it is an organization of oppressive male power.

Afterwards, feminist scholars start recognizing the power of culture and ideology in constituting gender (Figart, 1997), using interdisciplinary analysis, considers both economic variables, and the importance of cultural and traditional institutions, religion, government policies, and focusing on how gender shapes social institutions (Acker 1988, Acker 1990, Beechey 1988, Folbre 1994, Chafetz 1989). Specially, Deborah Figart (1997) strongly criticizes the study developed by Ronald Oaxaca (1973) because he measures the discrimination in labor market as a residual, in other words, the unexplained portion of the differential in wages. Thus, according to Figart (1997) discrimination become "other", we know discrimination

only by what it is not. Nevertheless, early research by feminist economists sought to estimate this unexplained residual in order to document the existence of discrimination (Darity, 1989). Dissatisfied with the limits of the approach to discrimination, many feminist economists, convinced that the wage gap and women's predominance in low-paid occupations were neither productivity-based nor voluntary, had isolated a new variable: the impact of percent female in an occupation on the wage (Sorensen, 1989, 1994).

In addition to this, Figart (1997) proposes a new definition of discrimination which emphasizes process as well as outcomes; measurable as well as unquantifiable repercussions. According to her, discrimination is not ''other;'' it is more than an unexplained residual: *Labor market discrimination is a multidimensional interaction of economic, social, political, and cultural forces in both the workplace and the family, resulting in differential outcomes involving pay, employment, and status* (Figarti, 2017:514).

Another important author, Birgit Pfau-Effinger (1998), try to identify the reason of differences in gender occupational segregation across countries. Dissatisfied with the limits of welfare state approach, according to which national welfare state policy is decisive in structuring women's participation in the labour market (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Crompton, 1997) and occupational segregation, she proposed some assumption for understanding differential gendered division of labour:

- In societies there exist long lasting cultural traditions - as well as long-lasting social structures - which are the result of former interaction processes and which have an impact on behaviour.
- Although there is usually a set of dominant cultural values and ideals, it cannot be assumed that there is cultural "coherence" in society. Alternative and competing cultural value systems may exist.
- Cultural change depends on the way social actors deal with contradictions and alternatives in value systems. Thus, social change is based on the way

tensions and contradictions between institutions are dealt with by social actors. Power relations between social actors play an important role here.

- Cultural change is interconnected with structural change by the behaviour of social actors and the policies of institutions but is in parts also autonomous from it. There may be time lags and discrepancies in the development between both levels (Pfau-Effinger, 1998:4).

In conclusion, there is no doubt that national welfare state policies are an important impact on women's labour market participation, but this theory does not explain the gender segregation of women, since does not consider the variables suggested by Pfau-Effinger.

An interesting article of Joan Acker (1990)[21] focusing on organizations, stressed the importance of considering organizations as gendered not neutral, in contrast to many important feminist contributions such as Moss Kanter (1977), MacKinnon (1979), Feldeberg and Gleen (1979), which writing about organizations assuming that organizational structure is gender neutral. According to Acker (1990) scholars must dissolve the concept of abstract job and hierarchies, indeed, she argues that

> *the worker is actually a man; men's bodies, sexuality, and relationships to procreation and paid work are subsumed in the image of the worker. Images of men 's bodies and masculinity pervade organizational processes, marginalizing women and contributing to the maintenance of gender segregation in organizations. The positing of gender-neutral and disembodied organizational structures and work relations is part of the larger strategy of control in industrial capitalist societies, which, at least partly, are built upon a deeply embedded substructure of gender difference* (Acker, 1990:139).

As mentioned above, feminist scholars studied also the impact of religion on constituting discrimination against women. Indeed, Assumptions about women's

[21] Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A theory of Gendered Organizations, Acker (1990).

inherent nature or capabilities and beliefs regarding women's proper place in society were also the basis of many religions and as Okin (1999) rightly argued, generally, religion[22] has an important power in influencing the cultural message in society, across myths and religious stories, women's importance is undermined or denied. Between religion and the role of women in society there is a strong relation (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Voicu 2009) but there are also some differences within them: the Orthodox tradition turns out to be the most conservative, the Protestant tradition the most liberal (Voicu M, Voicu B, Strapkova, 2009).

A recent study conducted by Paxton (2017) compared the presence of women in politics across countries, analyzing the impact of religions (during the period 1970-2015). She found that Catholic and Muslim countries have less women in parliaments than Protestant countries: prior to 2010, Protestant countries tended to have higher presence of women in parliament than Catholic countries did. In addition, both Catholic and Protestant countries had more women in parliaments than Orthodox and Muslim countries did. Countries that have not a dominant religion tended to fall in the middle. By 2015 Catholic countries had the most women in parliament (25%) with Protestant (21%), Orthodox and mixed countries (both 20%) not far behind. Muslim countries have a percentage of women in parliaments equal to 16% (in 2015), and according to Paxton this is not surprising considering the interpretation of Islamic texts emphasize women's place in the private sphere.

In conclusion, according to gender theories the segregation of women in labour market is a result of economic, social, and political institutions but especially a result of historic discrimination and as well as dynamics of power.

[22] For example: during the Middle Ages, the place of women in society was dictated by Bible. Eve was created from the rib of Adam and, having eaten the forbidden fruit, was responsible for Man's expulsion from paradise. Once again, the story stressed the belief that women are inferior to men, and that they are person lacking reason and judgement and likely to tempt men into sin (Bovey, 2015).

1.5. The consequences of vertical segregation: the glass ceiling

The most-studied effect of occupational segregation is its contribution to the gender wage gap (Shauman, 2006).

However, the sorting of men and women into different jobs has a variety of consequences, including job satisfaction and stress as well as employee turnover (Reskin, McBrier and Kmec, 1999) and including the existence of glass ceiling. Closure connected to the concept of vertical segregation; Glass Ceiling is defined as an invisible[23] barrier which prevent women to achieve the highest positions of power.

The first documented use of glass ceiling first appeared by magazine editor Gay Bryant in 1984: Women have reached as certain point - I call it the glass ceiling. They're in the top of middle management and they're stopping and getting stuck. There isn't enough room for all those women at the top. Some are going into business themselves. Others are going out and raising families. (Barretto, Ryan and Schimitt, 2009).

Later, appeared in the Wall Street Journal in 1986 and it was then used in the title of an academic article by A.M. Morrison and others published in 1987. Entitled

[23] I context the definition of glass ceiling as "invisible" barriers, because it is enough to have a look at any statistics on the percentage of women in politics or on boards and the underrepresentation of women in positions of power will be clearly visible and evident. Another consideration, that you allow me to make, concerns the choice of using glass as a metaphor: glass is a transparent material, a material that can be broken, a harmless material. What I would like to stress is that the ceiling that prevent women to reach the top positions, as well as not being transparent, besides being very difficult to break, is harmful. Harmful for all society because if women are underrepresented in politics or labour market, we all lose (see Ferrera in *Il Fattore D*, 2008, and Del Boca, Mencarini and Pasqua in *Valorizzare le Donne Conviene*, 2012). Therefore, I would like to call it the asbestos ceiling, as asbestos is known to be a very harmful alloy, although still invisible.

“Breaking the Glass Ceiling: Can Women Reach the Top of America's Largest Corporations?”, the article described the imperceptible and invisible barriers that women and minorities confront as they approach the top of the corporate ladder.

The glass ceiling theory implies that gender disparities are more prevalent at the top of hierarchies than at lower levels, and that the disadvantages for accessing top positions become more challenging as a person’s career advances (Cotter, Hermsen, Ovadia, and Vanneman, 2001, Baxter and Wright, 2000, Morrison and Von Glinow 1990, Frankforter 1996; Powell 1988; Cox 1994, Jackson and Callagan, 2009).

Undoubtedly, the glass ceiling reflects labour market discrimination, not just labour market inequality. According to Cotter et al. (2001), the glass ceiling creates job inequality, which it is not explained by a person’s past qualifications or achievements, nor by job related characteristics of the employee: they are explained instead by gender differences.

Women find it more difficult to enter the clans inside the organizations and in informal networks, those that are called - not accidentally - *old boy network* (Bianco, 1996). Being the last to come implies having to be evaluated as a rule by superior men, who even unknowingly tend to act according to elective affinity criteria in choices that often include elements that cannot be evaluated, such as trust. And the consolidated social networks can only be masculine, because for a long tradition the positions of power in companies, banks, ministries, universities are occupied by men (Reyneri, 2005). It is therefore possible that a paradoxical situation arises: the organizations recruit more and more women due to their high education, but then they block their career to the bottom organizational and managerial levels (Reyneri, 2005).

Several studies have shown that glass ceiling is on corporate (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Bertrand, Black, Jensen and Lleras-Muney, 2014), on top management organizations (Powell and Butterfield, 1994), in Academia (Bain and Cummings, 2000; Harvey, 1999; Zinovyeva and Bagues, 2011), wherever there is power and prestige at stake (Buzzanell, 1995; Baxter and Wright, 2000; Amon, 2017; Zamfirache, 2010; Folcke and Rickne 2014, Singh 2007, Chernesky, 2003; Bain and Cummings 2000; Braun, 1995; Chaffins, Forbes, Fuqua and Cangemi (1995); Frankforter, 1996; Harvey, 1990).

However as mentioned in the introduction our focus will be the glass ceiling in politics (Chozick, 2018, Paxton and Hughes 2007, Dahlerup 2006; Tremblay 2008, Krook 2009, Schmidt, 2003, Schmidt and Saunders, 2004, Jalalzai, Farida, 2008).
In order to break the glass ceiling, several countries introduced positive action[24] or affirmative action such as gender quotas both in corporate and in politics, and even in the academia[25].

[24] Positive or affirmative actions are policies favouring members of disadvantaged groups who suffer or historically suffered from discrimination.

[25] As Zinovyeva and Bagues (2011) argued the number of women undertaking PhD studies has increased steadily but the presence of women in the top academic positions remains low, especially full professors, and the larger presence of women at the lower rungs of the academic latter has not translated into proportional increases in the presence of women at the top. There are several reasons which explained the under-represented presence of women in top academic positions: some authors argue that family commitments make it more difficult for women to move up the academic career ladder beyond their early post-doctorate years (National Research Council, 2007). Women's careers may also be hindered by the lack of role models among the upper echelons (Holmes and O'Connell 2007). To prevent gender discrimination, several countries, including Norway (1998), Finland (1995), Sweden (1999) and Spain (2007), have introduced a minimum share of women in hiring and promotion academic committees (European Commission, 2008).
Zinovyeva and Bagues investigated whether gender quotas in hiring and promotion committees at universities increase the presence of women in top academic positions. The identification strategy exploits the random assignment mechanism in place between 2002 and 2006 in all academic disciplines in Spain to select the members of promotion committees. The authors find that a larger proportion of female evaluators increases the chances of success of female applicants to full professor positions. The magnitude of the effect is large: each additional woman on a committee composed of seven members increases the number of women promoted to full professor by 14%. Conditional on the research production of candidates, female applicants to full professor positions have lower probability of success relative to male candidates when assigned to an all-male committee (Zinovyeva and Bagues, 2011).

1.6. Gender quotas: in favour or against?

Historically, quota systems raise several questions and strong resistance[26].

The criticisms of quotas, as a tool to restore social equality, are rooted in liberal egalitarianism and focus mainly on the fact that attributing a preferential treatment to certain social groups discriminates against the groups that are non-targets of this treatment of favour. In short, this criticism contends, reverse discrimination is generated, as in the famous Regents of University of California v. Bakke case that represents a milestone in jurisprudence and in the philosophical debate on the foundations of positive action or affirmative actions (Beccalli, 1999).

Since 1965, most colleges and universities in the United States adopted various systems of affirmative actions by implementing race-sensitive admission policies. Alan Bakke was a white student who applied in 1978 for admission at the University of California, which held reserved seats for African-American applicants. Since Bakke was denied admission, even if his score was higher than that of an African American student who gained admission instead, he decided to appeal to the Supreme Court. The latter ruled in Bakke's favour, then overlooking the seat reservation in favour of African American students. Since then, the Supreme Court ruling did not cease to raise a still ongoing debate. Among the first to contribute to this debate, Ronald Dworkin questions the very criterion of "merit" and wonders whether by chance it is not possible for an ideal of a more just society to sacrifice the competitive advantages of some individuals, favouring others who belong to a disadvantaged group. Dworkin also points out that a differentiated policy that puts some individuals at a disadvantage can be justified by the overall improvement of the resulting societies (Dworkin, 1998).

[26] Arguments against gender quotas share many of the characteristic of arguments against quotas for Blacks. (Dahlerup, 2006).

However, the most ferocious opponents of gender quotas in politics were the politicians themselves. Actually, all the arguments against quotas in politics could be summarized by the following question:

Why men would willingly concede women to take seats in legislature when they may themselves be displaced? (Hassim, 2009: 9).

Gender quotas in politics could be considered undemocratic for two reasons: first, in a democracy voters should decide freely whom to vote for; second, women may be uninterested in politics, hence reserving seats for them could be against their preferences - an argument we already mentioned when discussing the neoclassical theories.

Furthermore, gender quotas in a political party could create conflict within the party, and quotas may imply that some politicians are elected because they are women, not because of their qualifications (Dahlrup, 2006; Del Re, 2014), ie., on the basis of merit (an argument that echoes that of the Bakke case). On the other side, nobody seems to care when a more qualified woman is denied an occupation in favor of a less qualified man, as if maleness is a property that in itself guarantees the best treatment over competitor candidates (Lucas, 2008; McKinnon, 1987; Volpato, 2013; Dahlerup, 1998). In addition to this, as Del Re (2014) points out gender quotas could create conflict within the party but only for a short time.

A first comment that can be made on the criticisms that considers quotas as non-democratic is to ask what is democratic and what is undemocratic. Phillips (1995) argued that in a democracy it is assumed that politicians express the full variety of opinions of their electors; women's interest are automatically included. However, as we know, and as Phillips argues, elected representatives represent the views of the select portion of the population from which they come, ie., usually middle-class men. For this reason, this author introduces the notion of politics of presence,

arguing that political representatives should display the characteristics of the underrepresented members in order to counter who currently dominate elected bodies.

Another relevant argument in favour of quotas argues that, if barriers exist, compensatory measures must be introduced in order to reach equality of result (Beccalli, 1999). In other words, quotas systems do not discriminate but compensate for actual visible barriers that prevent women (or other disadvantaged groups) from their fair share of political (or other kinds of) seats (Carol Bacchi, 2006; Dahlerup, 1998; Del Re, 2014).

In conclusion, contemporary societies did not yet remove the complex patterns of direct and indirect or invisible barriers, which prevent women from achieving the top positions from gaining power, at the economic, political and social level. Indeed, as feminist scholarship pointed out, the concept of equality has better to be interpreted as equality of result: real equal opportunity does not exist just because formal barriers are removed (Dahlerup, 2006).

And in the words of President Lyndon B. Johnson:

> *You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say you are free to compete with all the others and still just believe that you have been completely fair* (Speech at Harvard University, 1965).

Even if quota provisions are often very controversial, the use of the quota tool to make historical leaps or jump starts in women's representation is becoming a global trend both on corporate boards and in politics (Dahlerup, 2006:3).

1.7. Gender quotas as a global trend?

Most scholars recognize three basic types of quota measures: reserved seats, party quotas and legislative quotas (Krook, 2005; Norris, 2004). Reserved seats set aside a certain number of positions for women among elected representatives through constitutional reforms; party quotas aim to increase the proportion of women among a particular party's candidates through party reforms, while legislative quotas require parties to nominate a certain proportion of women among their candidates through constitutional or legal reforms (Krook, 2007). Electoral gender quotas are simply a type of equal opportunity measure that force the nominating bodies in most political system the political parties, to recruit or select more women for political positions (Dahlerup, 2006:6).

Starting with legislative gender quotas on corporate, we can affirm both gender quotas and the presence of women on boards of directors have become an important issue in recent years, both in the European Union strategy and in the Italian government Agenda (as we will see in this study).

In the corporate domain, the debate around quotas has shifted from an issue of fairness and equality to a question of financial performance. If gender diversity in boards implies a greater corporate profitability, then it would make sense to pursue such an objective. Several empirical studies examine the relationship between the increasing presence of women in boards and companies' profitability. The evidence on this relationship is mixed, since it does not really support a business case for gender quotas, nor it provides a case against (Ferreira, 2014; Carter, 2010).

Several authors point at the existence of a positive relationship between the share of women in boards and the financial performance of companies (e.g., Carter,

Simkins, and Gary Simpson, 2003; Isidro and Sobral, 2013; Torchia, Calabrò and Huse, 2011; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008). However, the evidence on the effects of female representation on performance is inconclusive, since many studies find that gender diversity in a company board has either a negligible or a negative effect on firm performance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Bøhren and Strom, 2010; Carter, D' Souza, Simkins and Gary Simpson, 2010). Still other studies suggest that firms are more likely to promote women after a negative performance or in times of economic turbulence, defining this phenomenon the glass cliff (Ryan and Haslam, 2005).

Regarding the behaviour of women on boards, some studies show that women have many favourable traits in value judgment, risk attitude, and decision-making style (e.g., Jones and Gautschi, 1988; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; Trinidad and Normore, 2005; Adams and Ferreira, 2009).

The issue of presence of women in political roles entails a different range of considerations, the most important among which is political representation and its meaning for democracy.

Pitkin (1967) distinguishes between four meanings of political representation:

- symbolic representation, which embodies an idea or an entity;
- formal representation, which refers to institutional rules and procedures by which representatives are designated (voting system);
- descriptive representation, why so few women are elected in politics, and substantive representation, if women and men tend to perform differently, in other words if women offer substantive representation of women's interests, which are our main areas of interest in this study.

The extensive literature on women in politics has focused on the two latter meanings. The first focuses on descriptive representation and seek to identify the

reason why so few women are elected in politics, among which are the role played by parties, by the electoral system and the resources (money for electoral campaign) and motivation of women (Darcy, Welch, and Clark, 1994; Lovenduski and Norris, 1993, 1996; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Tremblay 2008; Krook, 2009; Dahlerup, 2006; Caul, 2001; Paxton 1997; Matland 2003; Tremblay, 1998).

The literature reveals an interplay between parties and interest groups such as women's organizations, and also between these kinds of actors and structures of society. The type of electoral system matters for the number of women elected, as does the type of welfare state (Wängnerud, 2009). Regarding substantive representation, scholars ask whether an increase in the number of women elected as a result of gender quotas leads to greater attention to women's issues in the policy process (Krook and Zetterberg, 2016; Norris, 1996; Carroll, 2001).
Indeed, several studies, have focused on the implications of quotas in terms of substantive representation, on Western countries like the U.S. and Canada (e.g., Bedolla, Tate, and Wong, 2005; Black, 2000; Smooth, 2001), and the results have been mixed, there is little evidence that women's representation changes policy outcomes.

On the contrary, Hanks (2015) found a positive relationship between the strength of gender quotas in Latin America and the strength of gender violence legislation: countries with legislative quotas produce more rigorous gender violence laws (Hanks, 2015:56). Moreover, Papavero (2011), in her analysis carried out on six Italian legislatures (1987-2008) tested whether women officeholders in the Italian Parliament tend to prioritize women-related policy issues in their bill sponsoring activity. She found that women tend to prioritize legislation concerning women's rights, children and family, but not welfare, health care and environment; second, that as the number of women increases in the assembly, female legislators tend to sponsor more bills dealing with women-related issues (Papavero, 2011:20).

Notwithstanding the interest raised by this approach, it calls into question a construct which is hard to define, namely that of women's interest. A definition is given by Wängnerud (2000), who claims that such interests are all political issues in which men and woman could disagree (for example, the management of the armed forces, or environmental policies). On the other side, Lovenduski and Norris (2003) define women's interests as all policies that increase women autonomy. Whatever women's interests could be, Burnheim (1985) suggests that they would be better pursued when women are represented by those who share their same experience and interests, that's to say other women (Burnheim, 1985:7).

According to some authors, women act for women as a group, due to their everyday life and experience: in the family and home, through the division of paid and unpaid labour, exposure to violence and sexual harassment. This makes women have different values and policy priorities than men, for example on abortion, education, childcare and health (Phillips, 1995; Lovenduski, 1997).

2. Establishing the *explanandum*: women in politics

It is only recently that women have achieved the right to be part of the public sphere. In order to better understand the reasons why men decide to extend voting rights to women, it is necessary to briefly refer to the history of the United States. It is no accident that the interest in discrimination and anti-discrimination policies first arose in the United States.

Among Western countries, this is where the contrast between the allegedly universal principle of equality and the most obvious exclusionary practice, the one based on race, was starkest. In the Western world, the United States are the country (Beccalli, 1999).

2.1. A brief glance to the history of universal suffrage

Between 1861 and 1865, Americans fought the American Civil War. In the words of Southern historian Ann Firor Scott, the Civil War:

> *had left a generation of women without men, and relatively speaking, women had done quite well. Many had shown their resourcefulness when they were forced to manage plantations and their own lives without chivalrous shoulders to lean on. After the war, many southern women were forced to work. Others were joining local women's organizations* (Giddings, 1996: 76).

Then, during the 18th and 19th centuries, women started participating in the abolitionist movement[27] and they were both leaders and active participants[28]. According to Paxton and Hughes (2017), women's participation in the abolitionist movement was crucial for their future struggle for the vote, because the discrimination of women in abolition movements led them to advocate for women's rights.

Indeed, the effort to silence women at Anti-Slavery conventions in the United States and England drove the decision, by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, to establish the first Woman's Rights Convention at Seneca Falls, in New York, in June 1848[29].

[27] After the American Revolution, Northern states began to abolish slavery. Many slaveholders in the upper South also freed slaves. In 1817, the American Colonization Society formed to resettle freed slaves in Africa. However, the South depended on slave labor as cotton production expanded after the 1793 invention of the cotton gin. Repressive laws and public justification of slavery followed southern slave revolts in the 1820s and 1830s. Religious revivals during the Second Great Awakening intensified anti-slavery activity after 1830. Seeking to perfect society, adherents targeted slavery as an evil that destroyed individual free will as moral beings. Abolitionists began to demand immediate, uncompensated emancipation of slaves. In 1833, William Lloyd Garrison, editor of The Liberator, Quaker Lucretia Mott, and several others formed the American Anti-Slavery Society (see www.nps.gov for details).

[28] Women started working for influencing government for example participating in crowd action, lobbied legislatures and circulated petition. In the 1830s, Angelina and Sarah Grimké were the first women to take on visible positions in the antislavery movement: they wrote pamphlets imploring Southern women to defy slavery (Paxton and Hughes, 2017).
Women were a large part of the general membership and formed separate, local female anti-slavery branches. Lucretia Mott also helped found the Philadelphia Female Anti-Slavery Society in 1833, an organization, noted for its promotion of racial and gender equality, that included African American and white women as leaders and members (see www.nps.gov for details).

[29] Between 1838 and 1840, the American Anti-Slavery Society split in three, in part over the issue of women's leadership, specifically Abby Kelley's appointment to the business committee. Radical abolitionists and women's rights supporters, known as "Garrisonian" abolitionists, remained in the American Anti-Slavery Society. The newly formed American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society restricted membership to males, with auxiliaries for females. The politically minded formed the Liberty Party, limiting women's participation to fundraising. In 1848, there was the first Women's Rights Convention with the claim "all Men and Women are created equal" the goal of this Convention was the extension to women the right to vote, control property, sign legal documents, serve on juries, and equal access to education and the professions (see www.nps.gov for details).

The aim was to advocate for extending the right to vote to women.

From the Anti-Slavery movement, women learned how to organize a political protest. Specifically, how to fund raise, write convincingly, organize supporters and speak to large groups of men and women about important social and political issues.

During the 19th and 20th centuries, battles for women's suffrage were fought across the world.

As we can see from Table 2.1, women's voting rights changed rapidly during the first decade of the Nineteenth Century (even though the battles for equal representation proceeded slowly). As Teele (2016) argued,

> *in most of the world's first democracies, the lag between the initial extension of voting rights to men and later laws that brought women to the polls was quite long. Nearly 144 years passed from America's democratic founding until 1920, when the Nineteenth Amendment enfranchised women nationally.*
> *In the Southern hemisphere, women in Argentina, Uruguay and Chile waited, respectively, 94, 102, and 119 years between when the first men could vote and women's political inclusion. Similar gulfs materialized all over Europe, where, in the most extreme case, many Swiss women were prevented from voting until 1971 (and some could not vote until the 1980s).*
> *In all of these countries, women gained the right to vote after an initial transition to democracy* (Teele, 2016:46).

Table 2.1 The worldwide progression of women's suffrage

THE WORLDWIDE PROGRESSION OF WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE			
Year	**Country**	**Year**	**Country**
1893	New Zealand	1902	Australia*
1906	Finland	1913	Norway
1915	Denmark; Iceland	1917	Canada*
1918	Austria, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Ireland*, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Poland, Russia, United Kingdom*	1919	Belgium*, Belarus, Kenya*, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Sweden, Ukraine
1920	Albania, Czech Repubblic, Slovakia, United States	1921	Armenia, Azerbaijan, Lithuania
1924	Kazakhstan, Mongolia, St. Lucia, Tajikistan	1927	Turkmenistan
1928	Ireland**, United Kingdom**	1929	Ecuador, Romania*
1930	South Africa*, Turkey	1931	Portugal*, Spain, Sri Lanka
1932	Maldives, Thailand, Uruguay	1934	Brazil, Cuba
1935	Myanmar	1937	Philippines
1938	Bolivia*, Uzbekistan	1939	El Salvador
1941	Panama*	1942	Dominican Repubblic
1944	Bulgaria, France, Jamaica	1945	Croatia, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Senegal, Slovenia, Togo
1946	Cameroon, Djibouti, Guatemala, Liberia, Macedonia, North Korea, Panama**, Romania**, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yugoslavia	1947	Argentina, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Singapore
1948	Belgium**, Israel, Niger, Seychelles, South Korea, Suriname	1949	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Syria*
1950	Barbados, Haiti, India	1951	Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Nepal, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines
1952	Bolivia**, Cote d'Ivoire, Greece, Lebanon	1953	Bhutan, Guyana, Hungary, Syria**
1954	Belize, Colombia, Ghana	1955	Cambodia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru
1956	Benin, Comoros, Egypt, Gabon, Mali, Mauritius, Somalia	1957	Malaysia, Zimbabwe

1958	Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Laos, Nigeria	1959	Madagascar, San Marino, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania
1960	Canada**, Cyprus, Gambia, Tonga	1961	Bahamas, Burundi, Malawi, Mauritania, Paraguay, Rwanda, Sierra Leone
1962	Algeria, Australia**, Monaco, Uganda, Zambia	1963	Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Iran, Kenya**, Morocco
1964	Libya, Papua New Guinea, Sudan	1965	Afghanistan, Botswana, Lesotho
1967	Democratis People's Republic of Yemen, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kiribati, Tuvalu	1968	Nauru, Swaziland
1970	Andorra, Yemen Arab Republic	1971	Switzerland
1972	Bangladesh	1974	Jordan, Solomon Islands
1975	Angola, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Vanuatu	1976	Portugal**
1977	Guinea-Bissau	1978	Republic of Moldova
1979	Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Palau	1980	Iraq
1984	Liechtenstein	1986	Central Africa Republic
1989	Namibia	1990	Samoa
1994	South Africa**	1999	Qatar
2002	Bahrain	2003	Oman
2005	Kuwait	2006	United Arab Emirates
2011	Saudi Arabia		
Source: Updated from Paxton, Green and Hughes (2008)			
Suffrage was sometimes granted to women with restrictions; for example, only women of a certain racial or ethnic group could vote. When women's enfranchisement proceeded in stages, a single asterisk (*) denotes that first women in a country were allowed to vote nationally, while two asterisks (**) signify universal suffrage			

Once women achieved the right to vote[30], they had the right to participate in politics and they formally had power. However, formal political equality does not mean equal representation.

As Phillips (1995) argued, equal participation of both women and men in politics was seen as a general goal. However, equal representation was not seen as an equally important goal to address for a long time.

Formal representation cannot automatically produce a large number of women in politics, because these two elements were sometimes at the center of two separate struggles[31]. Even though New Zealand and Australia were the first countries to grant women's right to vote, they were not the first countries to elect a woman in their national Parliament.

Actually, the first country to elect a woman in a national parliament was Finland in in 1907[32]. In fact, after the 1907 Finnish election, there were 19 women MPs

[30] According to Firebaugh and Chen (1995), despite struggles for women voting were successful, women voted less than men for many years. Indeed, women have been used to consider voting an only man right.

[31] The processes of extending rights to groups diverge throughout the world. Obtaining suffrage had involved prolonged and intense struggles in the West. In these cases, enfranchisement has been incremental, first providing some men suffrage, followed by all men, and women only afterward. In contrast, in Africa and Asia, suffrage was granted to women and men simultaneously, coinciding with the dismantlement of colonial governments. Women in these areas may have benefited from this pattern (Jalalzai, 2008:213).

[32] Finland was an autonomous Grand Duchy in the Russian Empire from 1809 to 1917. Russian Tsar Nicholas II confirmed on July 20th in 1906 the new electoral law of Finland called "the Parliament Act of the Grand Duchy of Finland". It guaranteed a universal and equal unrestricted right to vote. Finnish women were the first in Europe to be given the right to vote, and third in the world after New Zealand and Australia. At the same time, they were first in the world to be granted the right to stand for parliament. The new Finnish parliamentary system and the electoral law reforms came into effect on the 1st of October 1906 and the first parliamentary elections were held on XV and XVI of March 1907. Nineteen women were elected to a parliament of 200, which was a surprise. They represented various professional groups, including teachers, factory workers, farmers' wives and high school graduates. Source: www.europeana-newspapers.eu/the-story-of-women-and-the-right-to-vote-in-finland/.
The electoral system, based on multi-member constituencies and a proportional voting system, is generally regarded as more favorable to women candidates than single-member constituencies with a majority-vote system, but the fact that Finnish women are active voters has probably also helped to

(Member of Parliament). As Dahlerup and colleagues argued, the Finnish development is extraordinary, first because women obtained the right to vote at the same time as men, second because since 1907 women's representation in the national parliament reached almost 10% and remained at a worldwide high (Freindenvall, Dahlerup and Skjeie, 2006).

The most interesting key point to report is the type of laws that Finnish women MPs have proposed. They presented 26 bills during their first legislature, covering topics such as the legal rights of married women, maternity insurance, women's property rights, women's employment, and funding for school, in line with the theory of politics of presence, according to which women act for women as a group, and women better represent women's interests (Phillips, 1995; Lovenduski 1997; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Papavero, 2011). After the 1907 election, Finland would not elect so many women MPs until 1954 (Paxton and Hughes, 2007).

2.2. The dynamic influencing women's political participation

Before exploring participation of women in politics around the world, and the factors which influence their presence (or absence), it is necessary to introduce the dominating concept of power.

increase the number of women MPs. Indeed, the first women's organization, Finnish Women's Association was founded in 1884, Women continued to participate in both their own and joint organizations in the struggle for suffrage. The women's movement was supported by the working-class movement, demanded universal suffrage with arguments of equality and justice: women as citizens should have the same rights as men. The working-class women added interest-based arguments to the debate by asking who could better represent working women and mothers than they themselves. Civil activism culminated in the Great Strike of 1905, which forced the Russian authorities to agree to demands for reform. Thus, in 1906 the Finns, both women and men, were granted both universal suffrage in national elections and the right to be electoral candidate. Source: www.helsinki.fi

Often, sociologists use Weber's definition of power, namely the ability to impose one's will upon others, even in the face of opposition. He suggests that power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests (Weber, 1978:53). In addition, political organization necessarily involves inequalities in power, as Gaetano Mosca, an Italian scholar, has suggested (Mosca, 1939).

Moreover, Lukes (1974) gives other definitions of power. In line with Weber, he argued that in some cases power is explicit and direct; we can evaluate this dimension of power by looking at the policy preferences, and by looking at the political participation and behavior of the legislators. Finally, Weber considers that one person may exercise power over another by influencing or shaping what a person even wants.

This last concept of power, I would argue, is one of the most important in order to understand the behavior of women in politics, especially when they reach power and especially when they are still underrepresented in a certain assembly. I consider this premises essential to better explore the other variables that influence the presence of women in politics.

In order to understand the different degree of women presence in politics across countries, it is important to note that, in each country, the percentage of women in national parliaments is influenced by many factors, specifically, cultural, socioeconomic and political factors, as shown in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 The global dynamic influencing the proportion of women in national parliaments



Source: Tremblay (2008)

As Tremblay (2008) argued, three important factors interact and influence the presence of women in politics (she refers specifically to parliaments).

- Cultural factors, as indicated by the proportion of women enrolled in tertiary education, women literacy rate, gender role values (traditional or egalitarian) and religion.
- Socioeconomic factors, as indicated by the Gender empowerment Index[33], Human Development Index[34], the level of poverty, the fertility rate.

[33] The Gender Empowerment Index it is a measure of gender equality that estimates overall the access of women to parliamentary, high paying positions employment and women's economic income.

[34] The Human Development Index (HDI) was created to emphasize that people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country, not economic growth alone. The HDI can also be used to question national policy choices. HDI is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions. The health dimension is assessed by life expectancy at birth, the education dimension is measured by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age. The standard of living dimension is measured by gross national income per capita. The scores for the three HDI dimension indices are then aggregated

- Political factors, as indicated by the structure of the state (unitary or federal), the structure of the national legislature, the party system, the conditions of candidacy, and electoral turnout.

As Tremblay notes,

> *In this perspective, the proportion of women in parliaments ought to be seen as an interactive function of electoral systems, political parties, and sex quotas as well as a host of cultural, socioeconomic, and political variables. In addition, electoral systems in themselves constitute a very complex universe; their impact on the election of women depends on their specifics (such as the level of proportionality, the number of electoral districts, district magnitude, whether the party list is closed or open, the electoral threshold, the electoral formula - d'Hondt, Hare, or St. Laguë) and so on* (Tremblay, 2008:15).

Specifically, according to Tremblay, the electoral system has a major impact on the feminization of parliament than other variables (as shown by Figure 2.1, the Electoral system circle is linked to the percentage of women in parliaments by a direct line). In her perspective, the analytical framework highlights the contribution of two other variables: political parties and gender quotas. These variables appear as dotted lines adjacent to the voting system, in order to express their close relationship with the voting system.

Tremblay has conducted 15 studies on different countries divided among three electoral families: plurality-majority system (Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Afghanistan, France and Australia), proportional system (South Africa,

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into a composite index using geometric mean. The HDI simplifies and captures only part of what human development entails. It does not reflect on inequalities, poverty, human security, empowerment, etc. Source: hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi.

Spain, Belgium, Ireland, Peru) and mixed-member system (Mexico, New Zealand, Hungary and Japan).

The study has produced four findings. Firstly, the voting system has a major influence on the proportion of women in parliaments (as suggested by Figure 2.1.). Secondly, the electoral system and political parties work in tandem to define the composition of parliament, while gender quotas do not automatically result in a high proportion of female representation. The third finding is that socioeconomic factors have perhaps the least significant effects on women's access to parliament. Additional findings suggest that cultural factors play an ambiguous role.

As Inglehart and Norris (2003) noted, political participation requires educational and economic resources. Indeed, many studies have found that a high percentage of women in politics is correlated with a high rate of women literacy[35], high-paying positions employment, a longer period since enfranchisement, secularization, and, finally, an electoral system[36] based on proportional representation rather than plurality-majority systems (Sainsbury 1993; Norris and Lovenduski 1993; Matland and Studlar 1996; Caul 1999).

Paxton and Hughes (2017) suggests that three main factors explain the difference between women and men in political participation: social structure, political factors and ideological factors. Social structure affects the pool of available women, political factors influence the openness of the political systems to women, and ideology determines the general impression of women in politics and how viable women are as candidates and leaders (Paxton and Hughes, 2017:433). More specifically, Paxton supports the impact of each factor with a large cross-national

[35] Staudt (1998) argued that women comprise two-thirds of the world's illiterate population and economic and physical well-being are also very important for political participation. The World's Women 2015 report confirmed that women are the two-thirds of the world's illiterate adults, a proportion that has remained unchanged for the past 20 years.

[36] See Chapter 3.

sample for two cross-sectional time periods, from 1975 to 1988. In line with Tremblay, she found that the political system is crucial in determining the number of women in parliaments. The results also indicate that broad differences in women's position within the social structure are not a significant explanation of women's political representation.

The variable that does have a negative impact on the presence of women in politics is religion (classified as ideology). In Paxton's view, both Islam and Roman Catholicism could play an important role in keeping women out of the political sphere. Indeed, the Roman Catholic church is considered patriarchal in its moral dictates and church policy. Moreover, biblical scholars provide a long tradition of theories about women's innate inferiority (Paxton and Hughes, 2017: 460-461).

Kenworthy and Malami (1999) confirmed Tremblay's theory regarding the importance of electoral systems and found a connection between the timing of women's suffrage and women's representation in parliaments: earlier suffrage is associated with larger women's shares in parliaments.

In addition to these studies, there is some historical evidence that deserves to be considered. Indeed, some women ascend to the highest level of political involvement despite their level of education, religion, or employment.

This could be the case of a country with low level of institutionalism, and where other factors such as group affiliation have greater relevance (particularly patronage-based systems [37]).

[37] As Matland points out *In a patronage-based system, clear rules are far less likely to be in place, and even when they do exist, there is a significant possibility that they are not carefully followed. Authority is based on either traditional or charismatic leadership, rather than legal-rational authority. Loyalty to those in the party is paramount* (1998, 70).

As Jalalzai notes,

> *Women may rise to power through dominant group affiliation, possessing familial ties to politics, defined as blood or marital connections to a former executive, opposition leader, or member of the military. While ties also benefit men, this may be the only way women assume power in some countries* (Jalalzai, 2008:212).

Looking at Table 2.2, we can observe the list of women leaders around the world between 1960 and 2016, their countries and their family ties with the political predecessor.

As we can observe, the first woman prime minister in the world was Sirimavo Bandaranaike[38] in Sri Lanka (at that time called Ceylon). She gained power in 1959, after her husband assassination, Solomon Bandaranaike, while he was serving in Ceylon as Prime Minister. Table 2.2 shows that the election of women in the highest political position tends to occur in countries where women in leadership positions would be least expected (Jalalzai 2010). One well-known example could be Indira Gandhi in India. India is a country where females are strongly discriminated still now[39]. Table 2.2 also shows that 40% of women who gained

[38] Sirimavo Bandaranaike was born in Balangoda in 1916 and she married Solomon Bandaranaike in 1940. She was involved in politics when her husband was killed, becoming president of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party in May 1960. She was Prime Minister of Ceylon (Sri Lanka from 1972) during the period 1960–1965, 1970–1977. She became Prime Minister once again in 1994 (until 2000), after her daughter, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumatunga, had been elected President. She coordinated government policy; whose main lines were determined by Kumatunga. She died on election day, hours after casting her vote in the elections. Source: www.oxfordreference.com.

[39] As Raju and Phil argued, *The most deep-rooted forms of gender inequality had been built into the structure of traditional Indian society. In the traditional society the inequality between males and females existed to a large extent. Women were looked down socially, economically and politically. Women became scape goats of many traditions and customs. She was brutally killed in the name of Sathi. The practice of child marriage, Kanyasulkam, Prostitution was taken it granted by society and women has no voice whatsoever for centuries together. Women's role was restricted to domestic life especially kitchen work and bearing and rearing of children. She has no place in economic and political*

power before 1995 had family ties with their predecessor as Prime Minister or President (husband or father).

The path of women who held the highest positions in politics, and at the same time had a relationship to previous leaders, has been defined by D'Amico (1995) as *widow's walk to power.* According to Burn (2005), these women were defined as surrogate of their husbands or fathers. In addition to this, Jalalzai (2013) notes that in countries where wives were considered helpmates to their husbands, women were viewed as easily controlled. Paxton and Hughes (2017) observe that the previous leader may have been killed, thus becoming a martyr in the eyes of citizens. In such cases, the surrogate wife becomes the symbol of the continuing struggle. They also argued that *there is nothing subtle about women's surrogacy. During campaigns, references to the husband or father are repeated time and again with the spoken or unspoken implication that the women candidate would simply continue his legacy* (Paxton and Hughes, 2017:91).

Looking at Table 2.2, it can be noted that, until 1979, only women in the global South have achieved the highest political positions. In 1979, Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister of Britain, and she was also the first women leader in a country situated in the developed world[40].

activities. Girl children were discriminated in terms of basic necessities of life such as food, clothing and shelter. Woman is the last person in the family to eat", Raju and Phil, 2014: 55).

[40] Margaret Thatcher's political career has been one of the most remarkable of modern times. Born in October 1925 at Grantham, a small market town in eastern England, she rose to become the first (and for two decades the only) woman to lead a major Western democracy. She won three successive General Elections and served as British Prime Minister for more than eleven years (1979-90), a record unmatched in the twentieth century. Source: www.margaretthatcher.org

Table 2.2 WOMEN NATIONAL LEADERS IN THE HISTORY 1960-2016 *(CONTINUED)*

Leader	Title	Country	Dates of rule	Relationship to previous executive leader	Global North or South
Sirimavo Bandaranaike	Prime Minister	Sri Lanka	1960-1965, 1970-1977	Yes, husband	South
Indira Gandhi	Prime Minister	India	1966-1977, 1980-1984	Yes, father	South
Golda Meir	Prime Minister	Israel	1969-1974	No	North
Isabel Peron	President	Argentina	1974-1976	Yes, husband	South
Margaret Thatcher	Prime Minister	United Kingdom	1979-1990	No	North
Lidia Gueiler Tejada	President	Bolivia	1979-1980	No	South
Eugenia Charles	Prime Minister	Dominica	1980-1985	No	South
Gro Harlem Brundtland	Prime Minister	Norway	1981, 1986-1989, 1990-1996	No	North
Corazon Aquino	President	Philippines	1986-1992	Yes, husband	South
Milka Planinc	Prime Minister	Yugoslavia	1982-1986	No	North
Benazir Bhutto	Prime Minister	Bangladesh	1988-1990, 1993-1996	Yes, father	South
Violeta Chamorro	President	Nicaragua	1990-1996	Yes, husband	South
Ertha Pascal-Trouillot	President	Haiti	1991-1996, 2001-2006	No	South
Khaleda Zia	Prime Minister	Bangladesh	1991-1996, 2001-2006	Yes, husband	South
Kim Campbell	Prime Minister	Canada	1993	No	North
Sylvie Kinigi	President	Burundi	1993-1994	No	South
Tansu Çiller	Prime Minister	Turkey	1993-1996	No	South
Reneta Indzhova	Prime Minister	Bulgaria	1994-1995	No	North
Chandrika Kumaratunga	President	Sri Lanka	1994-2005	Yes, mother and father	South
Ruth Perry	President	Liberia	1996-1997	No	South
Sheikh Hasina Wazed	Prime Minister	Bangladesh	1996-2001, 2009-Present	Yes, father	South
Jenny Shipley	Prime Minister	New Zealand	1997-1999	No	North
Janet Jagan	President	Guyana	1997-1999	Yes, husband	South
Mireya Moscoso de Arias	President	Panama	1999-2004	Yes, husband	South
Benazir Bhutto	Prime Minister	New Zealand	1999-2008	No	North
Megawati Sukarnoputri	President	Indonesia	2001-2004	Yes, father	South

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo	President	Philippines	2001-2010	Yes, father	South
Anneli Jäätteenmäki	Prime Minister	Finland	2003	No	North
Nino Burdzhanadze	President	Georgia	2003-2004, 2007-2008	No	South
Radmila Sekerinska	Prime Minister	Macedonia	2004	No	South
Angela Merkel	Chancellor	Germany	2005-Present	No	North
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf	President	Liberia	2005-Present	No	South
Michelle Bachelet	President	Chile	2006-2010, 2014-Present	No	South
Portia Simpson-Miller	Prime Minister	Jamaica	2006-2007, 2012-Present	No	South
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner	President	Argentina	2007-Present	Yes, husband	South
Zinaida Grecianii	Prime Minister	Moldova	2008-2009	No	South
Johanna Siguroardottir	Prime Minister	Iceland	2009-2013	No	North
Jadranka Kosor	Prime Minister	Croatia	2009-2011	No	North
Roza Otunbayeva	President	Kyrgyzstan	2010-2011	No	South
Mari Kiviniemi	Prime Minister	Finland	2010-2011	No	North
Julia Gillard	Prime Minister	Australia	2010-2013	No	North
Iveta Radiĉová	Prime Minister	Slovakia	2010-2012	No	North
Laura Chinchilla	President	Costa Rica	2010-2014	No	South
Kamla Persad-Bissessar	Prime Minister	Trinidad and Tobago	2010-Present	No	South
Yingluck Shinawatra	Prime Minister	Thailand	2011-2014	Yes, brother	South
Dilma Rousseff	President	Brazil	2011-Present	No	South
Helle Thorning-Schmidt	Prime Minister	Denmark	2011-2015	No	North
Joyce Banda	President	Malawi	2012-2014	No	South
Alenka Bratušek	Prime Minister	Slovenia	2013-2014	No	North
Laimdota Straujuma	Prime Minister	Latvia	2013-Present	No	North
Erna Solberg	Prime Minister	Norway	2013-Present	No	North
Park Geun-hye	President	South Korea	2013-Present	Yes, father	South
Catherine Samba-Panza	President	Central African Republic	2014-Present	No	South
Ewa Kopacz	Prime Minister	Poland	2014-Present	No	North

Source: Paxton and Hughes (2017)

The Iron Lady is an example of a woman who gained power thanks not to her relationship with the previous political leader, but thanks to her standing within her party. Indeed, she became Leader of the Conservative party in 1975.

However, it is very difficult for women to become the leader of a party (such as Margaret Thatcher or, more recently, Angela Merkel). Indeed, Diana O'Brein (2015) analyzed 71 parties across 11 countries from 1965 to 2013 and found that only 14% of their leaders were women. In addition to this, O'Brein finds that women are more likely to become leaders when an organization is about to fail, or when a country is politically instable. According to O'Brein, this happened to both Margaret Thatcher and Angela Merkel.

This phenomenon is called "glass cliff" and means that women achieve positions of power on boards, and in politics, in times of crisis and instability (Ryan and Haslam, 2005). The glass cliff exposes women to a high risk of failure, criticism and consequently psychological pressure (Ryan and Haslam, 2007).

According to Jalalzai (2013), women became national leaders after a period of political transition. Looking at Table 2.2, from 1960 to 2011, 45% of women came to power in regions with a recent history of instability, and 33% of women achieved the power after a military takeover. Moreover, women are more likely to become leaders during a period of social or political instability, as suggested by the theory of the glass cliff.

In conclusion, women have occasionally broken the glass ceiling in politics, especially if they had a relationship to the previous leader (husband or father), and especially in countries where women were more discriminated. This is why more women achieved the highest position in politics in countries of the global South rather than in the global North. Finally, after breaking the glass ceiling, these women were also likely to find themselves in the dangerous "glass cliff" situation.

As Jalalzai (2013) argues, women also achieved the highest positions in politics through gender party quotas. Finally, in the words of Jalalzai, *a country with a woman leader does not signify the end of gender discrimination. Only when women are equally represented in all facets of society and when elected officials support and promote issues that help combat inequality is this possible* (Jalalzai, 2008:229).

2.3. Women in politics around the world

An overview of political representation by gender at the national level around the world is shown in Table 2.3, accounting for the world average proportion of seats held by women in parliaments (as compiled by the Inter-Parliamentary Union[41]). We can see that there is no significant difference between single or lower house on one side, and upper house or senate on the other. By combining the two political bodies we can see that the percentage of elected women around the world is equal to 24.3%.

Table 2.3 Women in parliaments: world average, 2019

Both Houses Combined	
Total MPs	46'137
Men	34'910
Women	11'227
Percentage of women	**24.3%**
Single House or Lower House	
Total MPs	39'151
Men	29'628
Women	9'523

[41] The Inter-Parliamentary Union is a global organization of national parliaments. The data in the tables 2.3 and 2.4 has been compiled by the Inter-Parliamentary Union based on information provided by National parliaments by 1st April 2019. The percentages do not consider the case of parliaments for which no data was available at that date.

Percentage of women	**24.3%**
Upper House or Senate	
Total MPs	6'986
Men	5'282
Women	1'704
Percentage of women	**24.4%**

*Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union website www.ipu.org - S*ituation as of 1st April 2019

More differences can be found when looking at the presence of women grouped by region. Table 2.4 shows the average of women in parliaments around the world grouped by region. We can see a significant difference between regional areas: in Nordic countries, the presence of women in national parliaments is equal to 42.5%, while in North Africa, Middle East, Asia and the Pacific area the percentage of women in national parliaments is around 18.5%. Kenworthy and Malami (1999) suggested that regional differences are partially explained by ideological differences. Nordic countries have a long history of ethic equality, they are among the first countries to give women the right to vote[42] and have had higher numbers of women in parliament at earlier times compared to most other countries of the world (Bystydzienski, 1995). The combination of ideology and political reforms present in Scandinavian countries has an undoubtedly positive effect on women's political participation.

[42] As we have seen in the Table 2.1 The worldwide progression of women's suffrage: Finland grant women the right to vote in 1906, Norway in 1913, Denmark and Island in 1915 and Sweden 1919.

Table 2.4 Percentage of women in national parliaments by regional area, 2019

	Single House or lower House	Upper House or Senate	Both Houses combined
Nordic European countries	**42.5%**	---	---
Americas	**30.6%**	31.4%	30.7%
Europe (Nordic countries included)	**28.6%**	28.1%	28.5%
Europe (Nordic countries not included)	**27.2%**	28.1%	27.4%
Sub-Saharan Africa	**23.9%**	23.5%	23.8%
Asia	**20.0%**	17.4%	19.7%
Middle East and North Africa	**19.0%**	12.5%	18.1%
Pacific	**16.3%**	36.0%	18.4%

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union website www.ipu.org - Situation as of 1st April 2019.

Nordic European countries are also well-known for having a large public sector, an extended welfare state and high standards of living (Dahlerup, 2006). Another aspect that must be mentioned to understand the presence of Scandinavian women in parliament is a more balanced household work compared to European countries. As Bernhardt observes,

> *In Sweden it is a matter of greater equality between women and men in sharing tasks related to household work and childcare [...]. Swedish men are clearly encouraged to have a primary care relationship with their children, according to this principle called active paternity* (Bernhardt, 2005:245).

In line with Bernhardt, data show that the time spent by women and men in unpaid work (housework, childcare) across European countries is still very unequal, with women bearing a heavier burden (Table 2.5).

Table 2.5 Time spent by women and man in unpaid work, 2018

Age Group	15-64		15-64	
Time	2018			
Indicator	Time spent in unpaid work, by sex		Time spent in unpaid work, by sex	
Gender	Men	Women	Men	Women
Unit	Minutes per day	Minutes per day	Hours per day	Hours per day
Country				
Portugal	96,3	328,2	1,6	5,5
Italy	130,7	306,3	2,2	5,1
Ireland	129,2	296,1	2,2	4,9
Poland	158,8	295,0	2,6	4,9
Hungary	162,3	293,8	2,7	4,9
Lithuania	151,6	292,0	2,5	4,9
Spain	145,9	289,1	2,4	4,8
Slovenia	166,5	286,2	2,8	4,8
Austria	135,3	269,2	2,3	4,5
Greece	95,1	259,5	1,6	4,3
Latvia	129,7	253,3	2,2	4,2
Estonia	160,2	249,2	2,7	4,2
United Kingdom	140,1	248,6	2,3	4,1
Denmark	186,1	242,8	3,1	4,0
Germany	150,4	242,3	2,5	4,0
Luxembourg	121,1	239,6	2,0	4,0
Belgium	144,2	237,3	2,4	4,0
Finland	157,5	235,8	2,6	3,9
Norway	168,5	227,4	2,8	3,8
Netherlands	145,4	224,9	2,4	3,7
France	134,9	224,0	2,2	3,7
Sweden	171,0	220,2	2,9	3,7

Source: data from OECD.stat - Data extracted on 06 Sep. 2019

Shelton (1992) explained gender inequality in housework with the concept of time availability. The literature on housework suggests that the partner with more time will be the one to do more domestic activities.

Moreover, Bianchi and colleagues suggest that there is a kind of feminine identity so that a clean home reflects on competence as a wife and mother (Bianchi et al., 2000). Shelton's theory comes from Becker (1965), which theorizes the allocation of time: the least efficient partner in the labour market will spend more time on housework - and we know that, for centuries and still now, this partner was the woman.

On the contrary, gender theories are based on the concept of power, arguing that the division of housework is the outcome of struggle and negotiation: in negotiations over who does the housework, a higher wage disadvantage works against the partner with fewer resources or lower wage (Brines, 1993; Kan, 2008).

Although several scholars suggest that it is more likely that unemployment influences housework than the other way around, I consider that probably stereotypes affect the hours women spend doing housework more than unemployment.

The Italian sociologist Todesco, in his essay "What men do not do" explains the reasons behind the unbalanced division of housework between women and men in Italy. Through a series of studies and researches, he found that 58.3% of Italian men do not want to cook, 73.5% do not set or clear the table, 98.6% do not wash or iron and 70.5% do not do the shopping.

The trend sets Italy as last in Europe, after Spain (as shown in the Table 2.5), and this is also replicated among couples where both partners are employed in the labour market. In fact, notwithstanding the same external load, it is the woman who carries out three quarters of the housework. In the presence of children, the situation does not change, indeed it actually gets worse (Todesco, 2013).

2.4. Women in national and European Parliament

Among the objectives enshrined in the founding Community, the creation of a social policy was not contemplated, given also the expressly economic aims that led to the constitution of the European Coal and Steel Community[43], initially, and to that of the European Economic Community, later[44].

The Community policy for gender equality was initiated through the Defrenne vs Sabena[45] court case, in 1970s. This case passed through various evolutionary phases, which have intensified since the 1980s, to reach the definition of the mainstreaming approach. The judicial interpretation of art. 119[46] of the Treaty of the European Economic Community (EEC) on equal wage for women and men was the basis for the European Union commitment[47] against any kind of discrimination, especially between women and men.

[43] In 1951, six European countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany) created the European Coal and Steel Community in order to share their industrial production, coal and steel, ratifying Treaty of Paris. It started the process of European integration which ultimately led to the European Union (Mammarella and Cacace, 2013).

[44] Through the European Economic Community, the aim of member states was to create an economic integration among its member states with the ratification of Treaty of Rome in 1957 (Mammarella and Cacace, 2013).

[45] The Defrenne case involved pay discrimination against a stewardess of the Belgian air company, Sabena. Gabrielle Defrenne had turned to the Tribunal du Travail in Brussels because from February XV 1963 to February 1st 1966, the day on which her contract expired due to age limits, since in the hiring of female staff the company included an age limit clause, a salary lower than that of male colleagues who carried out the same job as on-board salesmen, a function equal to the on-board hostesses. Defrenne then asked the airlines for compensation for arrears, for damages due to non-remuneration, for liquidation and for retirement. Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-conten

[46] Article 119 of the European Economic Community Treaty of 1957, which recognizes equal pay, was a milestone for the prohibition of discrimination, seen as a basic mandatory principle of European law.

[47] These objectives are enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In addition, Article 8 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union gives the Union the task of eliminating inequalities and promoting equality between men and women through all its activities (this concept is also known as *gender mainstreaming*). The Union and the Member States have committed themselves, in Declaration No 19 annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the

The gender mainstreaming, therefore, consists in a strategy encompassing both ideas and practical actions, which implies the systematic inclusion of the gender dimension in every area of public policy. Since the adoption of the UN Platform for Action during the Beijing Conference of 1995, the emphasis of this strategy is on political processes, on the implication of an organization of procedures and practices, and on the organization of responsibility and capacity to internalize the gender perspective[48] (Dahlerup, 2006). The European Commission adopted the strategy in February 1996 with a Communication.

According to the report Women in politics in the European Union,

> *In 2019, several European Union countries are marking the centenary of women winning the right to vote in national elections (Luxembourg, the Netherlands), or the first women being elected to their national parliaments (Luxembourg, Austria) or holding a ministerial position (Ireland). Yet, one hundred years on, Europe-wide data show that women are still under-represented in political decision-making at local, national and European levels* (Shreeves, Prpic, and Claros, 2019:2).

Treaty of Lisbon, 'to combat all kinds of domestic violence […], to prevent and punish these criminal acts and to support and protect the victims'. Source: europarl.europa.eu.

[48] According to Dahlerup (2006) the Beijing Platform has been very influential, and women's movements all over the world have attempted to give the controversial demand for gender quotas legitimacy by referring to the Platform for Action. Some of these new formulations may in fact be found in the CEDAW convention from 1979. The convention recommends the states to adopt temporary special measures (UN, 1979: Art. 4) Also, the Interparliamentary Union, and other international and regional organizations formulated early on new claims for women's representation. However, it is in Beijing Platform that is most often referred to the quota debate (Dahlerup, 2006:13-17).

The first direct election of European Parliament[49] was held in 1979, which brought an average of 16.6% of women elected in the member countries (Figure 2.2)[50].

Figure 2.2 Women in first European Parliament, 1979



Source: European Parliament website - www.europarl.europa.eu

The percentage of women who are Members of the European Parliament (MPEs) has risen over time, and in 2018 stands at 35,2%, as we can observe in Figure 2.3.

[49] The European Parliament is an important forum for political debate and decision-making at the EU level, it made up of 751 Members elected in the 28 Member States of the enlarged European Union. The Members of the European Parliament are directly elected by voters in all Member States to represent people's interests about EU law-making and to make sure other EU institutions are working democratically. Source: www.europarl.europa.eu

[50] The figure regards only European Union Member states in 1979: Belgium (BE), West Germany (DE), France (FR), Italy (IT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Denmark (DK), Ireland (IE), United Kingdom (UK).

Figure 2.3 MPs in European Parliament by gender, 2018



Source: data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union - Situation as of 1st April 2019.

There is an important variation across member states. To reach gender balance, women should hold 50% of seats and positions of power. However, a ratio between 40 and 60 percent is considered acceptable, according to the goal set by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE)[51].

[51] European Institute for Gender Equality was established in 2006, in Vilnius, and it has the overall objective of contributing to promote gender equality, including gender mainstreaming in all EU and national policies. In addition to this, EIGE combats discrimination based on sex and raises awareness on gender equality by providing technical assistance to the EU institutions through collecting, analysing and disseminating data and methodological tools. EIGE is an autonomous body and operates within the framework of EU policies.
The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union defined the grounds for the Institute's objectives and tasks in its Founding Regulation and assigned it the central role of addressing the

In 2019, in the newly established European parliament, 8 countries out of 28 reached gender balance, that is, Austria, France, Denmark, Bulgaria, Netherlands, Estonia, Sweden and Finland. Countries with the highest number of female MEPs are those with larger numbers of seats. Italy's contribution of female MEPs grew significantly between 2009 and 2019 and now women's share is equal to 22.2%, as shown in Figure 2.3.

The European Parliament promotes a holistic approach in order to improve gender balance in political representation:

> *The range from 'hard' measures such as changing electoral systems and requiring legislated gender quotas, to 'soft' measures such as introducing voluntary party quotas and providing training, mentoring, funding and other support for women candidates, particularly young women and women from under-represented minority groups* (Shreeves, Prpic, and Claros, 2019:7).

Another important element to be taken into consideration is the clear gender horizontal segregation in the type of portfolio allocated to ministers across European countries.

In line with the historical role played by women in the family, data in Figure 2.4 show that in the 28 governments of the European Union, women reach 50% in delegations relating to work and social affairs, 43% in those relating to family policy, young people, elderly and sports, and 40% in education and culture.

Therefore, the concentration of women in politics is high when their tasks relate to their traditional gender role.

challenges of and promoting equality between women and men across the European Union. Source: EIGE website - eige.europa.eu.

Figure 2.4 Women Ministers across EU countries, 2016



Source: Openpolis - Dossier Trova l'intrusa - 2016

In addition to this, only 14% women hold a seat as minister of justice, 11% of women are ministers of finances, 7% of foreign affairs (possibly considered male affairs). None of the 28 countries has a woman heading the Ministry of the Economy, one of the most important ministries. In other words, there is a high degree of horizontal segregation for women, since they are especially concentred in welfare, social, health and education affairs.

2.5. Women in Italian politics: the persistence of the glass ceiling

After the Second World War, Italy was became a parliamentary republic with a bicameral parliamentary system[52], composed by the Chamber of Deputies (Camera dei Deputati), with 630 elected members, and the Senate (Senato della Repubblica) with 315 elected members (plus a variable number of senator for life, senatori a vita, elected by the President of the Republic).

The Italian Constitution decrees that sovereignty belongs to all Italian citizens, who may exercise that sovereignty in the manner and within the limits defined by the Constitution itself. Then, one of the most important expressions of popular sovereignty is the election of Parliament as composed by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic, which are equal in their functions and powers. For this reason, the Italian Parliament is said to be bicameral.

The Parliament is a central institution in the constitutional system of Italy, since it approves legislation, steers and monitors the activities of the Government, enquires into matters of public interest, and grants and revokes confidence in the Government. Sitting in joint session, and with the attendance also of regional delegates, the Parliament elects the President of the Republic as well as several judges of the Constitutional Court and members of the High Council of the Judiciary. Like the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies is re-elected every five years unless the Parliament is dissolved early. The Deputies are in number of 630 and are elected by citizens who have reached 18 years of age. The minimum age for a Deputy is 25 years (Article 56 of the Italian Constitution). Since 2006, twelve Deputies have been elected by Italian citizens residing abroad.

[52] The bicameral parliamentary system is designed to temper excessive control by any one leader: the prime minister who leads the government needs the support of both houses to govern.

2.5.1 Italian governments

Italy started dealing with the issue of gender representation very late in its republican history: the first woman Minister was appointed only in 1976, as we can see in Figure 2.5. Tina Anselmi was the first woman to become a member of an Italian government as the Minister for Labour and Social Security; she also served as Minister for Health from 1978 to 1979. In her political life, she always fought for equal opportunities between women and men. Indeed, Anselmi was an important promoter and supporter for the legislation passed in 1977 about gender equality in employment. She also chaired the National Equal Opportunities Commission and played a significant role in the introduction of Italy's National Health Service (Di San Marzano et al., 2017).

Figure 2.5 Women ministers in Italian governments (1976-2019)



Source: www.governo.it

Until 1993, with Prime Minister Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, the presence of women in an Italian government was less than 10%. As a matter of facts, for decades the Italian government was dominated by males, an evident sign of the presence of a glass ceiling in the Italian parliament.

If we consider the government as the place of maximum position of power, after the parliament, there is no doubt that Italian women were and are not likely to achieve these positions, despite major increases in the average educational level of women and their raising presence in the labour market, despite any kind of political lobbying or legislative reform.

Actually, the Government is formed by the Prime Minister, and in Italy the Prime Minister has always been a man, and the more so when the country was a monarchy (1860-1946). More precisely, according to the art. 92 of the Italian Constitution, the ministers are appointed by decree of the President of the Republic, on the proposal of the President of the Council of Ministers. In the Italian history, however, we never have had a female as President of the Republic.

Another essential element which I want to report is the focus on Renzi's government (2014-2016). He has been the first Prime Minister to achieve gender equality in the composition of his Government, but this only lasted a short time. Indeed, as shown in Figure 2.6, from 2014 to 2015 the number of female ministers decreased from 8 to 5 (31.25%) because the Ministers Maria Carmela Lanzetta, Federica Mogherini[53] and Federica Guidi were replaced by male ministers.

[53] Federica Mogherini in 2014 served ad High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

Figure 2.6 The decrease of women in the Renzi's government (2014-2016)



Source: Openpolis - Dossier Trova l'intrusa 2016

Hence the Renzi government could be a case of symbolic policy. As Dahlerup argued*, Symbolic policy is defined as policy that develops as a response to demands from the outside but that is not intended to make any real difference* (Dahlerup, 2006:12).

2.4.2 Italian parliament: Chamber of Deputies and Senate

In the history of Italy as a republic, women heading a Chamber of Italian parliament have been very few. As for the Senate, which is the second most important office of the republic, only in one case out of 18 legislatures a woman headed this

chamber, while in the case of the Chamber of Deputies, which is the third most important office of the republic, we count only three women out of 18[54].

The one and only President of Senate so far, Maria Elisabetta Alberti Casellati, was appointed as late as 2018. Regarding the Chamber of Deputies, the female Presidents in Italian history have been Nilde Iotti (1979-1992), Irene Pivetti (1994-1996) and Laura Boldrini (2012-2018)[55].

Moreover, we must consider the increase of women's share in the parliament does not mean equal access to power. The power of a parliamentarian also depends on the roles he or she is called to cover. For example, the presidency of the standing committees[56] is the true fulcrum of legislative activity, and it is a male prerogative. Indeed, during the XVII Italian Legislature (2013-2018) in 12 cases out of 14, a man headed the committee. In addition to this, no political group in the parliament has been chaired by a woman[57].

[54] Source: camera.it and senato.it

[55] *Ibidem*

[56] At the start of each parliament, 14 Standing Committees are established made up of MPs from the majority and from the opposition in a way that reflects the proportionate strengths of the parliamentary groups, which distribute their members among the Committees accordingly. The Committees form themselves by electing a chairperson and a bureau consisting of the chairperson, two vice-chairpersons and two secretaries. Acting with the participation of representatives of the parliamentary groups, the bureau organizes the programme of business of the Committee in a manner that assures priority is given to the consideration of bills that are included in the programme and order of business of the House. A Deputy may be a member of one Standing Committee only, unless he or she is standing in for another Deputy who has been appointed minister or undersecretary, in which case the substitution lasts for as long as the government appointment. Moreover, with the permission of the chairperson of the Committee, each group can substitute a member with another member of a different committee for the consideration of a specific bill. As of the date of formation, Standing Committees are renewed every two years and their members may be re-appointed. With reference to their scope of competence, the Standing Committees have legislative, investigative, policy-setting and control functions. As regards their law-making functions, the Constitution states that every bill presented to a House of Parliament shall be examined first of all by a Committee, pursuant to the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber. Source: Chamber of Deputies website - www.camera.it.

[57] *Ibidem*

The tendency to exclude women from positions of power is confirmed if we look at the number of women who are treasurers of the parliamentary groups: as a matter of facts, in the last XVII legislature, no woman has served as treasurer of her political party[58].

Moreover, if we give a look at the key positions in the currently XVIII legislature, as portrayed in Figure 2.7, we see that the group leader role is mostly played by men (especially in the Chamber of Deputies), that just a woman heads the Senate (as mentioned above Sen. Casellati), and that no woman heads the Chamber of Deputies.

Figure 2.7 Women in key positions in the XVIII legislature



Source: Openpolis - Dossier Trova l'intrusa, 2018

Looking at the presence of women in the Italian parliament from 1948 to 2019, we clearly find a glass ceiling. Women's progress towards becoming members of the

[58] *Ibidem*

Italian parliament, after winning the voting right in 1945, may be summarized as extremely slow. As Figure 2.8 shows, after 50 years of suffrage, in 1995 women amounted to 7% of Senate and 11% of Chamber of Deputies. Over the last ten years, the share of female parliamentarians has strongly increased, perhaps as a consequence of political parties increasing the number of women on their party lists. In addition to this, other factors have contributed to the recent increase of women in parliament, for example the voluntary party quotas adopted by the Democratic Party in 2008 (see Chapter 3).

Figure 2.8 The presence of women in the Italian parliament (1948-2018)



Source: senato.it and camera.it

As we can see from Figure 2.8, in the political election in 1994 there was a relevant increase of the presence of women in the Chamber of Deputies (from 8.4% to 16.1%). This can be traced back to the Law no. 277 concerning the election of the

Chamber of Deputies, which established an equal presence of both genders in parties' electoral lists. However, in 1995, the Constitutional Court declared the quota law unconstitutional and - without quota in the elections of 1996 - the share of women elected fell to 11%[59].

2.4.3 Italian regional councils

Both regional and municipal councils have been involved in reforms regarding the composition of party electoral lists.

The Italian territory id divided in twenty regions, five of which with a special statute, granting them particular forms and conditions of autonomy according to art. 116 of the Italian Constitution. Each Italian region has a regional council, which is the Legislative Assembly. The council exercises the legislative power granted to the Region by the Constitution, takes part in the establishment of regional policies and controls the activity of the regional committees and other regional bodies. Moreover, it carries out all other functions assigned to it by the constitutional and statutory laws, and by the laws of the State and of the Region; finally, it can submit bills to the national Parliament.

The voting system of regional elections, as well as that of municipal elections, is based on interparty competition.

Regarding the composition of a regional council, we find the Governor, the Deputy Governor, the council members (giunta regionale), the Council President and councillors. Each councillor can be president of a specific committee (e.g., tourism, sport, social affairs. The most important committee in Italian regional council,

[59] The Law no. 277 will be dealt with in the 3rd Chapter.

however, is that of health, for reasons linked to its budget and to the enormous expansion that the private health sector had over the last 20 years. For example, in Lombardia the two most important committees are the health committee and the transport committee, the former amounting to 80% of the total regional budget, and the latter to its 13%.

The election of a woman in a regional council is neither a simple nor a foregone fact. First, every candidate needs a huge sum to spend on the electoral campaign, and often women have no possibility to cover campaign expenses. As Inglehart and Norris (2003) noted, political participation does not only require educational resources but also economic ones. As an example, a candidate needs at least 30 thousand euros to run for the regional election in Lombardia, and one's budget should approximately double to 60 to increase the chance of getting elected[60]. This represents a very strong and impenetrable barrier for women, because in a world where money matters, women have less of it (Paxton and Hughes, 2017). On average, women are less likely to work full-time than men, and even they do, on average women earn less money than men. In sum, women may be less able than men to pay their own campaigns (Paxton and Hughes, 2017:137).

In fact, the glass ceiling in regional council is one of the most visible across elective assemblies in Italy. Moreover, the regional council is an important area of power of consolidated male social networks, an arena that can only be masculine, a dense network which allows to choose the boards of state-owned companies: if we look back at Bianco's *old boy network* (1996), you are almost sure that female names rarely fall in this round of appointments. That of a regional councillor is a well-remunerated job, about 10 thousand euros gross per month per member. Given

[60] For instance, see the declaration of regional counsellors for the recent election in Lombardia (2018): Fabio Altitonante has declared an electoral expenditure equal to 71.000 euros, Gianmarco Senna 59.000, Riccardo De Corato 51.000 and all of them have been elected.
Source: pubblicazioniweb.consiglio.regione.lombardia.it/pubblicazioniweb/trasparenza/

these premises, the presence of women in regional councils in Figure 2.9 (17.60%. in 2015) is not surprising.

Women as Governors

Out of a total of 277 presidents elected so far in the 20 Italian regions, only 10 were women, ie., less than 4%. Umbria and Friuli-Venezia Giulia have elected two women as Governor, followed by Abruzzo, Lazio, Lombardia, Piemonte, Trentino-Alto Adige and Valle d'Aosta with one woman. Twelve out of 20 regions have always been guided by men.

Since the early 2000s, almost all regions have introduced rules to promote Equal access for women and men to elective offices. If we look at the last regional elections in 2018 (concerning five regions: Lazio, Lombardia, Molise, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Valle d'Aosta), women increased slightly[61].

Women as regional councillors

In 2000, the presence of women in Italian regional councils only amounted to 8,6%; in 2015 it rose to 17,6%. Ostensibly, this can be taken as a sure sign of the presence of both vertical segregation and glass ceiling in this kind of governing bodies (Figure 2.9), which follows from the dominant position of men, and by the fact that men have an interest in maintaining their privileged position by making it difficult for women to access high-level positions in politics, such as regional councils.

[61] Source: www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/01083354.pdf

Figure 2.9 Women elected in Italian regional councils (2000-2015)



Source: Openpolis - Dossier Trova l'intrusa, 2018

Moreover, regional councils were not affected by Law 215/2012, which introduced provisions such as gender quotas[62] and the double preferences mechanism[63] to facilitate women's access to electoral politics.

The regional councillors have strong decision-making power and are therefore more reluctant when it comes to introducing equal opportunities legislation. In addition, according to the Italian legal system, Regions are autonomous in setting

[62] The Law 215/2012 establishes that in the electoral lists presented at municipality councils, the number of candidates of either gender could not be represented for more than two thirds.

[63] Until 2012, voters were able to write the names of the preferred candidate on the ballot. Often electors choose a man candidate, but with the Law 217/2012 an elector could write two names, provided they are a male and a female. Therefore, the chances for women to be elected increased.

their own electoral laws, therefore adding an element of complexity to the situation.

By virtue of their autonomy, with Law 20/2016, gender quotas were introduced in the Regional electoral lists, similarly to what was already in place for municipalities. Each region set its own quota, for instance: 50% in Emilia-Romagna, Lazio, Sardegna, Veneto, 40% in Abruzzo, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Puglia, Molise, Umbria, 33% in Campania, Marche, Sicilia, Trentino Alto Adige and 30% in Valle d'Aosta. Some Regions, such as Lombardia, Campania, Molise, Sardegna, Toscana and Umbria, chose the "double preference" mechanism instead of gender quotas.

Some other Regions opted for alternate lists, namely electoral lists where candidate names must be entered in an alternate, male-female-male-female order, like in Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sicilia, Veneto, Lombardia, Toscana. Still some other Regions chose to implement more than one mechanism among those mentioned above.

Women as regional assessors

Despite regional councils were not affected by Law 215/2012, the Italian Constitutional Court, with Sentence 81/2012, ruled that Regions have to introduce gender provisions in their own regional statutes. Some Regions have complied with the sentence.

Indeed, by looking at Table 2.10, we can clearly observe that the percentage of women regional ministers is very high compared to the presence of women as councilors in regional councils (Figure 2.9).

Figure 2.10 Women assessors in Italian regional councils, 2015



Source: Openpolis - Dossier Trova l'intrusa, 2018

Another essential element to report is the distribution of portfolio allocated to women who enter the regional council (Giunta Regionale) as we see in Figure 2.11.

Here again, there are high concentrations of women in politics associated with their traditional gender role.

Once women overcome the economic barrier (as I already mentioned above), once they pass the voting barrier (often both women and men prefer to vote for a man),

and once elected, they can become assessors. But once again the prejudice that sees them naturally more capable of dealing with issues such as education, family and the elderly collide with another barrier: the stereotype which consequently traps them in the gender horizontal segregation.

Indeed, as we can see from Figure 2.11, the main political areas for elected women are education and training, social assistance and culture. In economic fields the presence of women decreases. Only in one out of 4 regions the department that manages most of the regional budget, i.e., health, is led by a woman.

Figure 2.11 Distribution of women's portfolio in regional councils, 2015



Source: Openpolis - Dossier Trova l'intrusa, 2016

2.4.4. Italian municipal councils

As seen above, both at national and at regional level, the presence of women in Italian politics is very scarce and the glass ceiling very hard to break. However, at the local level something is changing.

Women as major

Thirty years ago, the municipalities led by women were an exception. As we can see from Figure 2.12, in 1986 there were 145 municipalities led by a woman. Today, after more than 30 years, the municipalities administered by a woman are 1.1345, which is merely 14% of the 7.915 Italian municipalities[64].

Figure 2.12 Women major in Italy (1986-2018)



Source: ANCI - Associazione Nazionale Comuni Italiani - Report 2019

[64] Source: Ancitel web site comuniverso.it/index.cfm?Comuni_per_regioneandmenu=150

However, women lead communities which, all together, total almost 9.3 million inhabitants, equal to 15% of the Italian population. Included in this percentage are large municipalities such as Rome and Turin, led by two women, Virginia Raggi and Chiara Appendino, both elected with the 5 Stars Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle). The percentage of women major in 2019 is 14% (Figure 2.13).

Figure 2.13 Percentage of mayors in Italy, 2019



Source: data from ANCI - 2019

Women as council members (giunta comunale)

In Italy, the municipal council (giunta comunale), is one of the collegiate governing bodies of the municipality, a local authority established by Article 114 of the Constitution of the Italian Republic. The council includes the mayor, who is also its president, a number of councillors (assessori) and a number of town councillors, established by the municipal statute.

According to Article 47 of the d. lgs. 267/2000, the councillors are appointed by the mayor from among the citizens in possession of the requisites of eligibility and compatibility with the office of councillor. The municipal council can be seen as the

mayor's “team”. The provisions concerning the city originate in the Municipal council, although some of them must later be approved by the town council (consiglio comunale).

Each council member has a specific portfolio (delega assessorile) decided by the mayor; accordingly, the council member must work in his or her assigned field, for instance education, welfare, transport, culture, environment and so on. They cannot be more than twelve (according to the Delrio Law, see later). The mayor assigns the kind of portfolio according to her/his priorities, and according to what she/he considers most important for the city (generally based on the agenda presented during the electoral campaign).

Generally, in town with more than 5.000 inhabitants, being part of the municipal council is considered a very important role, not only for the tasks that its members are called to perform, but also for the prestige associated with the position. Council members are part of the mayor’s team, have a large staff, manage a budget and are well-paid. In short, they have power.

Figure 2.14 Percentage of municipal mouncils (assessore) in Italy, 2019



Source: data from ANCI - dossier 2019

In order to explain the high presence of women in municipal councils (Giunta Comunale), it is necessary to consider the Delrio Law, issued in 2014. It concerns the election of town and city councils, and mandates that neither gender could be represented for less than 40%. Additionally, the Delrio Law extends gender quotas to municipalities with more than 3,000 inhabitants, which were excluded by Law 215/2012.

Indeed, the percentage of women councillors is 42,9%. This is why, in my view, the Del Rio Law is an important law for equal opportunities, which has received strong resistance but, at the same time, good results.

Women in town councils (consiglio comunale)

The town council is the heart of city democracy. The number of councillors depends on the number of city's inhabitants. Voters chose their councillors by writing their name on the ballot during city elections. Each candidate is linked to a list and supports one of the candidates to serve as mayor.

The council essentially has normative functions, such as the approval of the municipal budget and the political control over the executive bodies (mayor or city manager). The town council, therefore, has a role comparable to that of the parliament at the national level. Indeed, sometimes journalists define the city council of Milan or Rome as "little parliament" (parlamentino). As at regional and national level, the town council has several committees in different fields such as welfare affairs, transport, environment and so on. Each committee elects a President and Vice president and must pursue, with the other councillors, the objectives set for its specific field. Both the presidents of committees and the councillors have a staff, but cannot allocate resources, even if in line with the aim of the projects of the committee. Only council members (giunta) have the power

to allocate resources for city projects, but the town council has the power to approve or reject the business plan presented by the council members.

As they cannot themselves allocate a budget, presidents of committee can put pressure on the council member assigned to the same field as their committee (for instance, social affairs) to carry on worthy projects (disability, violence against women, migration, family policies) and advise the mayor on undertaking new plans for the city.

Since 2004, virtually all the representative bodies in Italy have been subject to reforms. Law 215/2012[65] , as mentioned above, introduced a number of provisions aimed at facilitating women's access to electoral politics.

First of all, this law introduced gender quotas (in the electoral lists, the number of candidates of either gender could not be represented for more than two thirds). In other words, the quota mandate that, in towns with less than 5,000 inhabitants, at least one third of the candidates be female.

As we can see in Figure 2.15, in the period between 2009-2016 there has been an increasing number of women candidates for municipal election, before and after Law 215/2012. As we can see, the percentage of women candidates to municipal election increased from 27,2% in 2009 to 34,5% in 2016, meaning that at least on the candidacy side, some degree of change has taken place thanks to Law 215/2012.

[65] The Law 215/2012, in the art. 2 defines the procedure for selecting candidates on electoral lists for municipal council elections. The Article 2 establishes that "…. Neither of the two sexes can be represented in excess of two thirds [...]. Each voter can also express [...] one or two preference votes [...]. In the case of expression of two preferences, they must concern candidates of different sex on the same list, otherwise the second preference will be cancelled. [...] Under penalty of inadmissibility, in the sum of the district nominations of each list none of the two sexes can be represented by more than 50 percent [...] ".

Figure 2.15 Candidates for Municipal election: comparison man and woman (2009-2016)



Source: Openpolis - Dossier Trova l'intrusa, 2018

By looking at Figure 2.15 it is immediately clear that once women had the chance to be in the party list, women decide to run for political office.

Another essential element which has been introduced to facilitate women's access to politics is the double preference mechanism. As mentioned above, until 2012, voters could only express one preference, and available data show that electors tended to choose men.

Since 2012, voters have been able to write the names of two preferred candidates on the ballot, provided they are one male and one female. Consequently, the chances for women to be elected dramatically increased, as Figure 2.15 clearly shows.

Figure 2.16 Women elected in Italian Municipalities (2009-2018)



Source: data from ANCI 2019

Data highlight that, with the 2012 law, women were elected to city and town councils with a percentage close to 35%.

Looking at Figures 2.17, it can be argued that there is no significant difference between women and men in political ambition because once women had the chance to be in the party list, women decide to run for political office in contrast with the findings of studies such as Lawless and Fox which found that women are much less likely to aspire to politics. Even when they do aspire to a political assembly, they are less likely to run. For Lawless and Fox, the differences in ambition between women and men can be explained by the traditional sex-role socialization, since girls are encouraged to focus on the private sphere, while boys are encouraged to focus on public affairs (Lawless and Fox, 2010). It follows that the education imparted to children, by family, school or media, does matter.

Also, the lack of a role model has a negative influence on women. Indeed, some studies by Campbell and Wolbrecht (2006) suggest that having a role model, such as a woman in prominent positions, may encourage girls to pay more attention to politics and discuss it more with other girls or adults.

However (despite the absence of prominent women in Italian politics), by looking at Figure 2.17 it is clear that once women had the chance to be in the party list, and thanks to the double preferences mechanism, women decide to run for political office and enter in municipality councils.

Figure 2.17 Women candidates: a confrontation pre and post reform (2009-2016)



Source: Openpolis - Dossier Trova l'intrusa, 2018

The Delrio Law had a remarkable impact on the composition of town and city councils, as shown by the figure. If we compare the number of women before and after the reform, there is little doubt that the law has been highly effective.

However, this is an induced effect, since the law binds the composition of the lists and the way in which preferences are expressed but does not induce any automatism regarding the representation of gender in the elected municipal councils.

3. Gender Quotas

Rainbow Murray (2014) argued that whether we call them gender quotas or quotas for women, the real problem is that gender quota debates focus too much on women. Indeed, as she notes,

> *The focus on women's underrepresentation has the unintended consequence of framing men as the norm and women as the other. With men's presence already accepted as the status quo, the burden of proof for justifying presence lies with the outsiders wishing to enter politics (women), rather than with those already present in excessive numbers (men). Men are required neither to prove their competence nor to justify their inclusion* (Murray, 2014:520).

Before discussing what type of quotas are to be preferred (quotas for underrepresented women or quotas limiting men's overrepresentation), it is important to look back at the historical origins of quota systems.

3.1. Historical background

The demand for the introduction of a quota system began in India in the 1920s, when the country was still under the British rule[66]. During the nationalist movement, women's groups[67] started pressing for the right to vote and at this time first raised the possibility of reserving seats for women in politics.

[66] At that time, India was a large region comprising both Pakistan and Bangladesh. In 1947, two independent dominions, India and Pakistan, were created, in what is known as the Partition. However, the expression "partition of India" does not cover the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan, which occurred in 1971. It is important to remember these events since Pakistan and Bangladesh introduced quota provisions because of their common political history with India.

[67] Three major women's organizations at the national level emerged during the period 1917-1927. These were Women's Indian Association, All India Women's Conference and National Council for

The actors involved in quota campaigns have included not only women's organizations, but also state actors like committees, local governments, parties, prime ministers, cabinet ministers, parliamentary committees; international and transnational actors like the British government, the UN, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and international conference delegates. These actors have supported or opposed reserved seats for different reasons such as electoral considerations or principled stands (Krook, 2009). In 1927, when the British government created a special Commission[68] to determine when self-government should be established in India, a debate started between the nationalist movement and women's organizations.

The nationalist movement, the Indian National Congress under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, and leading women's organizations agreed on universal suffrage *irrespective of any property or literacy qualification*[69] and strongly opposed any quota mechanisms (particularly quotas based on religion and caste). The main reason for opposing the idea of reserved seats was that it deflected from the battle for universal suffrage[70] and would make divisions among the population explicit.

women in India. The issues that were most prominent in the campaigns of these organizations were related to marriage, divorce and inheritance and towards expanding educational and economic opportunities to women.

[68] The British government created the Simon Commission in November 1927 to decide whether and when self-government should be established in India. This Commission was composed entirely of British members and, because of that, the Congress Party and the Muslim League rejected its activities. After one year, it was formed an All-Parties Conference which unfortunately could not draft a new constitution for India because they could not overcome their differences, especially with regards to the rights of minorities such as Hindus and Muslims (Krook, 2009).

[69] "The public, official language of politics especially before a colonial government had to be a language of equality and for fundamental rights of citizenship irrespective of sex, caste, religion or creed." This opinion was supported by the prominent and leading women's organizations of the time and by the Home Rule League, the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League (Rehana, 2008). Urban Women in Contemporary India: A Reader.

[70] In India women's movement came out strongly against quotas on the grounds of equal citizenship rights (Rai and Sharma, 2000).

On the contrary, the British committee and other women's organizations [71] supported special franchise qualifications and gender quotas, arguing for reserved seats for all minorities (Anglo-Indians, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and *depressed classes)*, as a strategy for creating divisions within the movement for universal suffrage. As a result of these conflicting strategies, some groups supported reserved seats for women and for minorities, some supported reserved seats for women but not for minorities, and others supported reserved seats for both women and minorities (Krook, 2009).

All major women's organizations endorsed the declaration of the Fundamental Rights to Citizenship[72], which called for equality before the law, irrespective of religion, caste, creed or sex, universal adult franchise and women's right to vote, represent and hold public office

To find a solution to the debate about reserved seats and minorities, the British prime minister established the Lothian Committee, which, at the end of 1932, recommended that women's right to vote be expanded, and that 2.5% of the seats in all political bodies be set aside for women, assigning reserved seats based on separate electorates, so that Muslims would elect Muslim women, Sikhs would elect Sikh women. (Krook, 2009).

The most relevant aspect of this Indian debate is that the nationalist movement did arrive at a consensus on the issue of affirmative action for the depressed classes (Raman, 2002). The debate on quotas has also taken into account issues of differences among women. Of particular concern has been the élite nature of

[71] Some women's organizations supported reserved seats and proposed that at least 5% of the seats be reserved for women because they were convinced that women could not be elected without quotas.

[72] The declaration of the Fundamental Rights to Citizenship was made by the Karachi session of the Indian National Congress in 1931.

representative politics, especially so in the case of women in politics, in terms of both class and caste (Rai, 2002).

India has paved the way for the debate on gender quotas. Indeed, reserved seats appeared in 1935 as part of the Government of India Act[73], both for women and for other groups based on race, religion or any other minority status.

Indian independence came with the partition of India in August 1947. In both Pakistan[74] and India the traditions of quotas continued.

In conclusion, quotas are part of a long history of constructing post-colonial citizenship, but they are also part of the current governmental strategy to address a complex set of issues relating to the status of the nation within the international community (Dahlerup, 2006).

Aside from India, in South Asia gender quotas at the local level have been implemented in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Nepal. Furthermore, South Asia saw the first woman in the world become prime minister, when Sirimavo Bandaranaike was elected prime minister of Sri Lanka in 1960 (as mentioned in chapter 2). South Asia has also had one of the longest serving woman prime ministers in the world, and the youngest woman prime minister. The longest serving female prime minister in the world was Indira Gandhi; she served as India's Prime Minister from 1966 to 1977, and again from 1980 until her assassination in 1984. The youngest woman prime minister in the world was Benazir Bhutto[75],

[73] In 1935, the Government of India Act reserved six seats for women in the Council of State, nine seats for women in the Federal Assembly, and forty-one seats for women in the various provincial legislatures. Reserved seats disappeared in 1950 and returned in 1980s as part of the government's National Perspective Plan on Women.

[74] Pakistan instituted quota of 5% for women under its first constitution, which was rather arbitrary and based on colonial legislation rather than on percentage of population, which would have given a parity position to women (Rai, 2002).

[75] She served as Prime Minister of Pakistan from 1988 to 1990 and again from 1993 to 1996. She was the first woman to head a democratic government in a Muslim majority nation. Benazir Bhutto chaired the Pakistan People's Party from the early 1980s until her assassination in 2007.

elected in Pakistan at the age of 35. In spite of these important events, in Asia the presence of women in politics has been very limited and continues to be so at a national level.

In modern societies, the invisible barriers (i.e., the glass ceiling) that prevent women from achieving the highest positions in politics, are also what stops them from having power- economic power, social power and, of course, political power. The main argument in favor of quotas claims that if barriers do exist, compensatory measures must be introduced in order to reach equality. In other words, quota systems do not discriminate, rather they compensate for actual visible and invisible barriers that prevent women from their fair share of political (or other kinds of) seats (e.g., Dahlerup, 2006; Paxton and Hughes, 2017; Krook, 2007; Beccalli, 2009).

3.2. The adoption of quotas around the world

Although quota systems were first introduced almost a hundred years ago, it can be argued that gender quotas are one of the most important political developments of the last 30 years (Hughes et al., 2015:331). During the 1990s, an increasing number of countries introduced gender quotas, so that by 2010 more than 60 states has introduced gender quotas into their electoral laws. As we know, the aim of gender quotas is the substantial growth of women's political presence (Dahlerup and Friendenvall 2005; Krook, 2009). Scholars show that quotas are accomplishing this goal (Dahlerep, 2006; Bauer 2008; Hughes, 2011; Krook 2009; Tripp and Kang, 2008).

A growing body of literature highlight the interplay between parties and interest groups such as women's organizations[76], International organizations[77], between these kind of actors and the structures of society, and also between the type of electoral system and the welfare state (Wängnerud, 2009; Dahlerup, 2006; Krook, 2007; Tremblay 2008). As Figure 3.1 shows, 130 countries adopted gender quotas with an average number of women in parliaments of 23.8%[78].

Figure 3.1 Gender quotas around the world, 2018



Source: International IDEA website - www.idea.int - Situation in 2018.

[76] For example: The United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, known as UN Women, the International Women's Forum and the European Women's Lobby.

[77] Some international organizations are United Nations, the Council of Europe, the European Union, the African Union, the Commonwealth and the Organization of American States (Krook, 2009).

[78] Source: Global Database of Quotas for Women, 2018, realized by Inter-Parliamentary Union, Stockholm University and International IDEA (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). IDEA is an intergovernmental organization that supports sustainable democracy worldwide. The database is available on IDEA website at www.idea.int.

Scholars recognize three basic types of quota measures: reserved seats, party quotas and legislative quotas (Krook, 2005; Norris, 2004; Dahlerup, 2006). Reserved seats set aside a certain number of positions for women among elected representatives through constitutional reforms (such as in India). Party quotas aim to increase the proportion of women among a particular party's candidates through party reforms (such as the centre-left Democratic Party in Italy). Finally, while legislative quotas require parties to nominate a certain proportion of women among their candidates through constitutional or legal reforms (Krook, 2007), electoral gender quotas are simply a type of equal opportunity measure that force the nominating bodies (in most political systems, these would be the political parties) to recruit or select more women for political positions (Dahlerup, 2006:6). Voluntary party quotas are the most common type of formal quotas in Western countries such as Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Italy (Dahlerup, 2006:196). The main quota systems are quotas through national legislation introduced in South America, Central America and in some African countries. (See Appendix section for further details regarding quota systems around the world, in particular Tables 0.1, 0.2, 0.2 and 0.4).

3.3. The impact of gender quotas: an overview

Generally speaking, the impact of quotas and the differences across countries, depend on the institutional framework in which they are introduced (Krook, 2007) and on several variables which differ across countries.

Regarding the institutional framework, most studies highlight the relevant impact that electoral systems have in electing women in parliament. More specifically, they suggest that gender quotas have the greatest impact when employed in

proportional representation (PR), electoral system with closed lists, and high district magnitude (Caul, 1999; Htun and Jones, 2002). Other scholars stress the importance of the political party system. For instance, Kolinsky (1993) argues that gender quotas have an important impact in party systems where different parties co-exist and larger parties respond to policy innovations introduced by smaller parties.

Most scholars argued that party quotas are more effective than other types of quotas because they are voluntary measures, adopted to address concerns about electoral advantage (Leijenaar, 1997). Other scholars insist that legislative quotas are more effective because they bind all political parties (Jones, 1998).

More recent studies show that the impact of gender quotas depend on the wording of the quotas itself, as if the language used in the policy strengthened the quota requirement or reduced ambiguity (Htun, 2002; Meier, 2004).

Another important aspect for the effectiveness of gender quotas is the sanction for punishing non-compliance parties (Jones, 1996; Peschard, 2003; Murray 2004; Schmidt and Saunders 2004; Krook 2007). However, sometimes sanctions are not imposed consistently; on the contrary, the absence of sanctions does not preclude compliance from parties (Leijenaar 1997; Opello, 2006).

Finally, another important aspect for the effectiveness of gender quotas is the perceived legitimacy of the quota (Russell, 2000; Yoon, 2001).

Dahlerup (2001) suggests that legitimacy could positively impact the effort to increase women's presence in parliament. Conversely, if quotas are not supported by the public as a system to achieve currently lacking equality, quotas could lose their effect over time, leading to stagnation in the number of women elected. In other words, the more socially accepted quotas are, the stronger their impact. Schwindt-Bayer (2009) examined 26 countries around the world that employ legal candidate gender quotas. The aim was to determine why some countries with

quotas provisions have more women elected than countries that focus on factors like the size of quotas, placement mandate and enforcement mechanism. A placement mandate stipulates that female candidates must be placed in winnable constituencies or winnable positions on party ballots. Enforcement mechanism means that in some countries, the specific way in which quotas will be enforced is not specified. The literature suggests that differences in quota size, placement mandate and enforcement mechanism are relevant variables for ensuring the elections of women in parliament (Dahlerup, 2006; Matland, 2002; Htun and Jones, 2002). Still in other countries, there are serious consequences for parties that submit lists of candidates that do not meet the quotas. In her analysis, Schwindt-Bayer (2009), found that the size of quotas affects women's representation regardless of whether the quotas include placement mandates and enforcement mechanism. However, in line with previous literature, she confirmed that the most effective quotas are those that both require more female candidates on party ballots and provide placement mandates and enforcement mechanisms. In her analysis, Schwindt-Bayer (2009), found that the size of quotas affects women's representation regardless of whether the quotas include placement mandates and enforcement mechanism. However, in line with previous literature, she confirmed that the most effective quotas are those that require more female candidates on party ballots and provide placement mandates and enforcement mechanisms.

Paxton and Hughes (2015) using a longitudinal model from 1990 to 2010, documented that quotas produce gains in women's legislative representation with increasing effectiveness over time (Paxton and Hughes, 2015:354).

Finally, Bonomi, Brosio and Di Tommaso (2006) conducted an analysis on the behaviour of Italian voter, observing how they react to gender quotas. The results show that a higher share of women in party lists leads to a significant increase in the probability that voters will choose a woman candidate. This implies that there is no inherent gender bias against the election of women.

In conclusion, gender quotas (comprising reserved seats, party quotas and legislative quotas) increase the number of women in parliament. The Global database of Quotas for Women[79] suggests the all three types of quota measures adopted around the world produce similar ranges in terms of their impact Therefore, the difference that we can observe is beyond the number, studying whether the growth of women in parliament has an impact on the typology of output (bills) of parliament itself.

3.1.1. Beyond numbers: a new wave of research on quotas

A new wave of quota research analyzed the consequences of quotas beyond the number of women elected. Inspired by competing claims put forward during the debate for quota adoption, this news wave focuses on the implications of quotas in terms of descriptive representation. The scholarship addresses the question of whether an increased number of elected women leads to greater attention to women's issues in the policy making process (Krook and Zetterberg, 2016:2).
Scholars also explored the educational attainment of women elected with quotas, finding that women are often as qualified as men (Murray, 2010; O'Brein, 2012; Sater, 2012).
Finally, another group of studies asks whether the introduction of gender quotas has built a stable network of power in society that would endure if quotas were withdrawn (Bhavnani, 2009; Darhour and Dahlerup, 2014).

Most studies on the implications of quotas in terms of descriptive representation focus on Western countries like the U.S. and Canada (e.g., Bedolla, Tate, and Wong

[79] Source: International IDEA website - www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas

2005; Black, 2000; Smooth, 2001). The results are mixed, as there is little evidence that women's representation changes policy outcomes.

Devlin and Elgie (2008) went to Rwanda (which at that moment had the highest share of women in parliament) and conducted face-to-face interviews, finding that increased women's representation had little effect on policy outputs. However, Bauer and Britton (2006) argued that increased representation of African women has a visible impact on the institution of parliament, in that women parliamentarians have changed parliamentary hours and calendars and have introduced gender into debates and legislation. These authors suggest that issues such as poverty, HIV/AIDS, sexual freedom, and violence against women are generally more relevant in Africa than other countries. Moreover, Meintjes (2002) claims that in South Africa, the presence of women deputies was crucial in passing the Domestic Violence Bill, in 1998. However, results concerning Namibia and Mozambico show that women's increased representation did not translated into significant women policies initiatives (Disney, 2006; Bauer 2006).

According to Devlin and Elgie (2008), the mixed results across African countries may be explained by the type of quotas they adopted, namely reserved seats. Due to the fact that the quota system is usually controlled by men, women feel they must be loyal to men who control the party. This reason could be relevant both in Mozambique and Rwanda, since these are both countries where one party is dominant (Disney, 2006; Tripp, 2006).

We will now analyze the wider impact of quotas in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan beyond the number of women elected with reserved seats. Table 3.1 clearly shows that in this area the issues introduced by women in parliament concern especially social issues such as education, health, pensions, violence against women and empowerment for girls and women. Unlike the conclusions drawn for the effects of quotas in African countries, I would argue that most of the issues introduced by

women in parliament in South Asia provide benefits for the whole population, including both women and men, such as road maintenance, access to drinking water and speedy disbursement of rice and wheat through the Public Distribution System.

Table 3.1 Women's issues in local government in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, 2003

Country	Issues introduced by women
Bangladesh	- Lack of good communication - damage of roads due to incessant rain during rainy season, lack of maintenance of these roads and no plans to repair the roads or construct new roads; - Proliferation of urban slums, rise in urban population due to rural-urban migration; increase in urban poverty; - Lack of women's education - their limited participation in development activities, increase in violence against women, demand for dowry, lack of implementation of laws protecting the rights of women, child abuse, and denial of justice.
India	- Speedy disbursement of rice and wheat through Public Distribution System (PDS) - Widow pensions - Low cost shelters - Encouraging young girls to go to the school - Construction of bathing *ghats*
Pakistan	- Education for girls - Access to drinking water - Price increase - Access to health centres and trained health workers in communities, particularly for the delivery of babies - A say in spending the development funds assigned to local bodies - Violence against women

Source: Dahlerup, 2006: 235. Interview with Shaheen Sardar Ali (first chair of Pakistan Women's National Commission) 29 November 2004; Mahtab (2003), Mohanty and Mahajan (2003).

In line with the theory according to which women better represent women's needs, Hanks (2015) found a positive relationship between the gender quotas in Latin

America and gender violence: countries with legislative quotas produce more rigorous gender violence laws (Hanks, 2015:56).

Similarly, in her analysis of six Italian legislatures (1987-2008), Papavero (2011) tested whether women officeholders in the Italian Parliament tend to prioritize women-related policy issues in their bill sponsoring activity. The answer is positive: women MPs tend to prioritize legislation concerning women's rights, children and family, but not welfare, health care and environment. Furthermore, Papavero observed that, as the number of women increases in the assembly, female legislators tend to sponsor more bills dealing with women-related issues (Papavero, 2011:20).

Oñate (2016) analyses the effectiveness of the legal quotas established in Spain in 2007. This author compared 18 national and regional legislatures, before and after quotas were introduced (Oñate, 2016:75). His focus was not on the output of parliaments, rather on the men-women ratio in parliamentary committees, and the distribution of portfolios. He found that the pattern of horizontal segregation still persists, meaning that women are mainly allocated to the committees considered to be traditionally feminine, i.e., health, education and science, women affairs and gender equality, culture and sport, social affair, housing, policies for the disabled, environment, citizens petitions, immigration. By contrast, men seat in the traditionally masculine committees, like foreign and European Union affairs, defense, economy, budget and taxation, public administration, public works and infrastructures, industry, commerce and tourism, interior justice and territorial affairs, labour, agriculture and fishing, constitutional affairs (Oñate, 2016:77).

Finally, Chattopadhyay and Duflo showed that the reservation of quotas for women affects the type of public goods provided. Specifically, women leaders invest more in the infrastructure directly linked to women's concerns, namely drinking water and roads (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004).

3.4. Families of electoral system

In terms of descriptive representation, a legislative assembly is said to be representative if its makeup constitutes a miniaturized model, or microcosm, of the larger society. If women are equal citizens, they should equally share public decision-making positions with men, otherwise there is a representation deficit. Formal representation refers to the institutional rules and procedures through which representatives are chosen (Tremblay, 2008:3).

The voting system, as the primary mechanism for this choice, is the process through which the will of the people is converted into seats in parliament (Farrell 2001:4; Gallagher and Mitchell 2005:3). Electoral laws and mechanisms are, *in re ipsa*, the very heart of political democracies (Baraggia and Vanoni, 2007:5)

As mentioned in Chapter 2, electoral systems have been considered by some scholars as one of the main factors that influence the presence of women in politics (Tremblay 2008; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Paxton and Hughes, 2017). However, it is important to remember that voting systems do not automatically determine the proportion of women in parliaments.

Researchers have divided electoral systems into three basic types: plurality-majority systems, proportional representation systems and mixed systems (Norris, 2004; Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis, 2005:27; Massicotte and Blais, 1999).

Consequently, each type of electoral system is based on a different concept of political representation. Figure 3.2 shows the electoral system families.

Figure 3.2 Electoral System Families



Source: Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis, 2005

The plurality-majority systems (or majoritarian) ask voters to choose a single person to represent them, meaning that voters go to the polls, see a slate of candidates (one from each party), and choose just one person (Paxton and Hughes, 2017: 155). When a majoritarian system is used in a single-member district, meaning that in that particular area, the winner is the candidate with the most votes, the system can also be called "first-past-the-post" (FPP). This system is used in many countries, including the United States, Canada, Great Britain, India, Bangladesh, Malawi, Malaysia, Sudan and Uganda (Tremblay, 2008; Dahlerup, 2006).

On the contrary, when a majoritarian system is used in multi-member districts, it takes the name of Block Vote (BV). In this case, the voter is granted as many votes as there are seats to be filled, and the winners are the candidates who receive the greatest number of votes in their favor in each electoral district. This system is used in Kuwait, Palestine, Mauritius, and Tonga. If voters vote for party lists instead of individual candidates, the system becomes Party Block Vote (PBV), such as in Djibouti.

Then, majoritarian systems, such as two rounds system (TRS) and alternative vote (AV), try to ensure that the winner receives an absolute majority. For example, in Australia the members of the House of Representatives are elected by the AV. In France the TRS system is used instead. Critics of the majoritarian system, including Tremblay, claim that this kind of system not only bestows victory on the majority while ignoring the minorities, but it also gives further power to the victorious party by accentuating its representation in parliament (Tremblay, 2008).

Proportional representation systems (PR) typically ask voter to vote for a list of candidates to represent them. Voters go to the polls, see a slate of parties (each of which has a list of candidates), and choose a party to represent them (Paxton and Hughes, 2017). PR systems are generally intended to represent both the majority and the minorities, by proportionally translating party votes into party seats in parliament (Tremblay, 2008). A key feature of most PR systems is that they are based on multi-member districts, where multiple people represent the voters of a particular district (Paxton and Hughes, 2017).

In single transferable vote (also called the Hare system, after its inventor Thomas Hare), voters rank-order candidates in multi-member districts, meaning that the voter must rank all or some candidates whose name appear on the ballot. For example, Ireland is one of the rare countries that use single transferable vote.

Proportional representation systems are therefore the most likely to give rise to multiparty arrangement; on the contrary, majoritarian systems give rise to a smaller and less diverse range of parties than PR systems (Tremblay, 2008; Dahlerup, 2006).

Mixed systems use both a proportional representation element and a plurality-majority (or other) elements. Usually, voter have two votes, one for each element. Three countries implement the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) voting system, e.g., Mexico, New Zealand and Italy.

As we already mentioned, the electoral system is an important variable in ensuring a sizable proportion of women parliamentarians. As mentioned, according to most scholars the proportional representation systems are generally more favorable to the election of women (Rule, 1987; Matland 1998, 2005; Norris 2006; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Paxton and Hughes, 2017).

Let us consider the reasons why PR systems are viewed as beneficial to women. The key reason is district magnitude, that is, how many representatives an electoral district sends to the national legislature (Paxton and Hughes, 2017). Higher district magnitudes are better for women because they can get on a party's ballot without displacing a man. On the other hand, in a single-member district, parties must make a choice between women and men candidates, rather than placing both on the ticket (Rule, 1987; Salmond, 2006).

According to Caul, PR systems are more likely to add women to the list in order to broaden their appeal and balance the ticket. The perceived electoral risk with a female candidate decreases when a female is part of a group, rather than the sole candidate (Caul, 1999:84). Moreover, Matland argues that when a party needs to produce a list of candidates, it finds itself under pressure to balance its ticket across interest groups in society: rather than having to look for a single candidate who can appeal to a broad range of voters, party gatekeepers think in terms of different

candidates appealing to specific sub-sector of voters (Matland, 2005:101). In line with Matland, we find Norris (2006), who looked at more than 180 countries and found that women proved almost twice as likely to be elected under proportional representation systems than under majoritarian electoral systems (Norris, 2006:41).

However, this pattern is not universal, as illustrated by Inter-Parliamentary Union data collected from over 190 countries, which showed that PR systems cannot always guarantee the election of women. Why? It is important to remember that this could depend on district magnitude.

From country to country, district magnitude can vary from 3 allocated seats, to 20 allocated seats. Bearing in mind that in PR systems parties get a share of seats in parliament based on how many votes they got, legislators are selected by progressively moving down the party's list. As a result, the relevant question becomes, "where are women on the party's list? Are they in safe or risky position"? (Paxton and Hughes, 2017). As Kunovich (2003) rightly notes, parties can present the appearance of balance between women and men but have men at the top of the list and women at the bottom (Kunovich, 2003).

In conclusion, electoral systems, while influential, are not be considered the determining factor of women's presence in parliaments. Indeed, parties play a crucial gatekeeping role in political systems and are a critical mediator between women and political power (Caul, 1999; Kunovich, 2003; Matland and Montgomery, 2003; Norris and Lovendusky, 1995).

3.5. The electoral system in Italy: the issue of multiple candidacies in the 2018 national elections

The Italian Constitution does not prescribe a specific electoral system (Baraggia and Vanoni, 2007). Until 1993, Italy had a strictly proportional representation system (PR). In 1993, Sergio Mattarella proposed and introduced the first electoral reform (the so-called *Mattarellum*), a mixed electoral system with 75% of seats allocated in single-member districts under the plurality rule, and 25% of seats still allocated by proportional representation system. Such mixed electoral system applied to both branches of parliament. (D'Alimonte and Chiaramonte 1995; Giannetti and Grofman, 2009; Katz, 2001). A second reform was approved in 2005 (Calderoli Law, known as *Porcellum*), which replaced the previous mixed electoral system with a new, different mixed system, consisting of a proportional representation formula plus a majority bonus (D'Alimonte 2007; Di Virgilio 2007; Pasquino 2007; Renwick, Hanretty and Hine 2009). In 2013, the Italian Constitutional Court declared part of the law unconstitutional, with reference to the majority bonus system and the excessive length of the blocked lists.

A third electoral reform, called *Italicum*, was issued at the beginning of 2014 during Matteo Renzi's government, as part of a wider constitutional reform. The Renzi reform involved yet another type of mixed electoral system. As in the Calderoli system, all the seats were assigned with a PR formula, but the party (not the coalitions) with at least 40% of the votes would get a majority prize, allowing it to obtain 54% of the seats (Chiaramonte and D'Alimonte, 2018:9). If, however, no party won 40% of the votes, the two parties with the most votes would face a run-off, the winner obtaining 54% of the seats. The losers would split the remaining 46% proportionally, based on first round results (Chiaramonte and D'Alimonte, 2018:9).The *Italicum* applied only to the Chamber of Deputies.

After the 1993 reform (*Mattarellum*), according to Baraggia and Vanoni (2017), the following electoral reforms occurred during the most critical phase of Italian history. They can be summarized as follows:

- Laws no. 276 and Laws no. 277 (August 1993), known as *Mattarellum,* were approved at the beginning of the so called *Second Republic* (1993-2005);
- Law no. 270/2005 or *Porcellum* was introduced during the transitional phase (2005-2014); however, in 2013 the Constitutional Court declared part of the law unconstitutional, with reference to the majority bonus and the excessive length of the blocked lists;
- Law no. 52/2015, known as *Italicum*, was approved during the reform season (2016-2017), but never used;
- Law no. 165/2017, known as *Rosatellum* (after Ettore Rosato who was the first proponent of the law), replaced the previous Italian electoral law (no. 52/2015, or *Italicum*), and the previous Calderoli Law (*Porcellum*), both subject to partial unconstitutionality rulings by the Constitutional Court. It saw its first application in the parliamentary elections of March 4th 2018.

According to Baraggia and Vanoni, there are probably two political reasons for the 2017 ruling (regarding Law no. 52/2015, *Italicum*). First, it came after the failure of the Constitutional referendum that was the structural framework in which this electoral law was conceived and enacted; second, it came after Decision no. 1/2014[80], which basically opened up a Pandora's box of judicial intervention on electoral laws in Italy. Constitutional judges are quite meticulous in conserving their powers, and once they step into a particular field it is not easy for them to

[80] In 2014 l. no. 270/2005 was partially struck down by the Italian Constitutional Court in historical Decision no. 1/2014, which represents, for different reasons, both procedural and substantial, the leading, ground-breaking case of Italian Constitutional Court jurisprudence on electoral law (Baraggia and Vanoni, 2017:9).

step back: as the Greek myth so clearly explained, once opened, the box is not easy to close (Baraggia and Vanoni, 2017:15).

As mentioned, in paragraph 3.5, the proportional representation system is the most favorable to women. However, despite several reforms, Italy continues to have a mixed electoral system. Indeed, the last electoral reform introduced by Law no. 165/2017 (*Rosatellum*) is a mixed system, like the others, and it applies to both the Chamber and the Senate. Roughly 75% of the seats are assigned with a proportional formula in multi-member districts and 25% of seats are assigned in single-member districts with plurality rule (Chiaramonte and D'Alimonte, 2018). Scholars argue that this latest electoral reform attempted to secure a more equal gender representation by establishing quotas for all parties included in the electoral lists, for both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate[81].Indeed, in the proportional lists in multi-member districts, candidates of different genders must be placed in alternate order. In the Chamber of Deputies, single lists or coalitions cannot field more than 60% of candidates of the same gender in single-member districts. As to the multi-member districts, the first place on the list cannot be assigned to candidates of the same gender in more than 60% of the districts (Chiaramonte and D'Alimonte, 2018:12). However, the law also allowed for the same person to be a candidate in more than one multi-member district (but no more than 5), plus in one single-member district.

It was precisely the possibility of having multiple candidacies that undermined the effectiveness of gender quotas since quotas may be circumvented by strategically placing the same female candidate as list head in multiple constituencies in order to promote the election of different male candidates in the same list. The following examples can clarify how. The Democratic Party presented Maria Elena Boschi as candidate in the single-member district of Bolzano. As allowed by the electoral law, at the same time she was also the top candidate in other five, multi-member

[81] Source: camera.it and senato.it

districts in Lazio, Lombardia, Sicilia and in three different constituencies[82]. In all of these districts, as Boschi's name was at the top of the Democratic Party list, the second name found in the list was by default that of a male candidate, according to the alternating gender order required by Law no. 165/2017. Boschi won the single-member district of Bolzano[83]. As a result, all the other seats where she was top of the list were automatically won by the second candidate on the list- as said, all men. This is not the only case where the effectiveness of quotas was hindered, causing discontent within the Democratic Party. There were also instances in which some female candidates, viewed as strong options in the district where they lived and held previous political office, were actually sent to run in a district where the Democratic Party would have certainly lost, so that their more secure seat could go to a male candidate instead. Within the Democratic Party though, skills and meritocracy are not the only guiding principles in the choice of candidates. The internal political faction to which a candidate belongs to is also an important factor. And ultimately, it falls to the National Secretary to evaluate the political strength of potential candidates and decide who should run and in which constituency.

Nor was the use of multiple candidacies as a means to secure seats for men a prerogative of the Democratic Party alone. The centre-right parties also took advantage of the multiple candidacies' mechanism. The party Fratelli d'Italia ran its leader, Giorgia Meloni, in the single-member district of Latina, but she was also top of the list in 5 different multi-member districts[84]. In conclusion, by making use of the multiple candidacies option, parties were able to bypass the gender-based alternating order of candidates,thus undermining gender quotas despite the attempt of Law no. 165/2017 (*Rosatellum*)to secure a more equal gender representation in politics.

[82] Source: elezionistorico.interno.gov.it

[83] *Ibidem*

[84] *Ibidem*

3.6. Gender quotas in Italy

In Italy, gender quotas had a long history. The first attempt to increase the number of women in elected political bodies was in 1993, specifically with Law no. 81 (direct election of city mayors, province presidents, city and provincial councils), and with Law no. 277 on the election of the Chamber of Deputies (Brunelli, 2006; D'Amico, 2013).

In particular, concerning municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants, Law no. 81/1993 states that, in the electoral lists for the election of the city council, the percentage of candidates of either gender cannot be above 75%; in municipalities with population over 15,000, neither gender can be represented for more than 75% in the total of assigned seats. Law no. 227/1993 established that, in electoral lists the candidate's name have to be presented in alternate order according to gender (man-woman, man-woman and so on).

As mentioned in Chapter 3.5.1, according to the rules established by Laws no. 276 and 277 (*Mattarellum*) for the election of the Chamber of Deputies, 25% of seats (155) were assigned on a proportional basis. The quota of female candidates was to be included in this 25% of proportionally assigned seats assigned seats. By contrast, for the districts with the majoritarian system, no gender quotas were established (Brunelli, 2006).

As mentioned above, proportional electoral systems can be thought of as more women friendly than majoritarian systems, which, by their own nature, make positive action more difficult. This is why in the Chamber of Deputies, for the districts with the majoritarian system, no gender quotas were introduced by Law no. 227; in the Senate, the new electoral law merely stated a general principle (the Senate *is elected with universal suffrage, and the balance in the representation of*

men and women should be promoted[85]). However, the provisions in the two 1993 laws are typical examples of positive action in electoral politics.

The first law, Law no. 81/1993, addressing local elections for towns and cities set a maximum number of candidates for either gender but could not in any way guarantee the actual election of candidates, who is determined by the preferences freely chosen by voters.

The second law, Law no. 277/1993, concerning the election of the Chamber of Deputies, mandated an equal presence of both genders in the proportional representation electoral lists, and could have a direct impact on the composition of the Chamber of Deputies (Brunelli, 2006). This is because candidates were elected according to the progressive order of presentation, and because the electoral lists were blocked (voters could not indicate their preference by writing a candidate's name). In actual fact, in the political election of 27-28 March 1994, 83 women were elected in the Chamber of Deputies, 43 with the majoritarian system and 43 with the proportional system[86].

In 1995, a sentence [87] of the Constitutional Court deemed all the provisions included in political, regional and local electoral laws unconstitutional (D'Amico, 2013). In open agreement with the Council of State, the Court underlined the legal irrelevance of gender. In other words, gender cannot be a requirement for election or candidacy. The Court's reasoning was based on the principle that any discriminatory measure is inadmissible, specifically any measure that *diminishes for some citizens the concrete content of a fundamental right, in favor of other citizens belonging to a group that views itself as disadvantaged*[88].

[85] Art. 20 D. Lgs. n. 533/1993 – www.senato.it.

[86] Source: dati.camera.it

[87] Decision n. 422/1995.

[88] *Ibidem*

As mentioned in Chapter 2.4.3, gender provisions in politics were only re-introduced in 2012 by Law 215/2012 which established gender quotas[89] and the double preferences[90] mechanism only for municipality elections.

However, between 1993 and 2009 Italy took a significant step in the direction of gender quotas, although not applied to politics. In 2009, the right-wing member of parliament (MP) Lella Golfo proposed the first bill aimed at introducing gender quotas in the Boards of Directors of listed companies (D'Amico, 2013).

The application of the law would have been implemented on the occasion of the first renewal of the Board of Directors after the law came into force and would have been permanent. It is precisely this permanent quality that raised within the Chamber of Deputies and among experts the doubt of the unconstitutionality of the rule itself, which would have discriminated the most represented gender (males) on a permanent basis.

Thus, in 2019, Alessia Mosca, another MP from a left-wing party, added some new elements to Golfo's bill in order to solve the problem of unconstitutionality. First, Mosca's bill extended the outreach of the law to all companies with a predominantly public participation, including those controlled by listed or non-listed public administrations, and also extended it to include the boards of statutory auditors. The law promoted a balance between genders by entrusting a share equal to one third of Board members to the less represented sex. This quota refers to the members actually elected, and not only to the list of candidates. Second, a further difference contained in the Mosca bill is certainly the fact that

[89] It is important to note that the Law 215/2012 establishes that in the electoral lists presented at municipality councils, the number of candidates of either gender could not be represented for more than two thirds.

[90] I also wish to specify that until 2012, voters could write the name of one preferred candidate on the ballot (often electors choose a man candidate), but with the Law 217/2012, a voter could write two names provided they are one female and one male. Therefore, the chances for women to be elected increased.

this provision would have been *transitional.* This gender distribution of seats among board members is applied for three consecutive mandates, so as to avoid any doubt of unconstitutionality (D'Amico, 2013).

Golfo's bill was assigned to the Finance Committee of the Chamber, which began its examination in November 2009, and established to proceed with the auditions to analyse in more depth the issues underlying the legislative intervention. In January 2010, both Golfo's and Mosca's bills were examined by the Finance Commission. On March 15, 2011, the bills reached the Senate, where a heated debate took place.

The Senate approved the bill with 203 votes in favour, 14 against and 33 abstentions. Therefore, the proposal came under the scrutiny of the Chamber of Deputies[91] which approved the law in session no. 492 on 28 June 2011.

It could be said that introducing gender quotas in companies' boards has proved easier than in politics. The reason lies in the fact that gender quotas in corporate boards do not deal with the concept of representation.

3.6.1. The short-term impact of gender quotas in Italy

As mentioned in Chapter 2, Law no. 81/1993 established that neither gender could represent less than one third of a party's list of candidates for a Municipal Council election. Thus, this law ensured a minimum number of women candidates.

[91] 529 deputies were present in the hall. 465 voting members, 64 abstaining, the law was approved with 438 votes in favour and 27 against. Act 2426-2956-B. Source: camera.it.

De Paola, Scoppa and De Benedetto (2014) analyzed the effect of gender quotas (applied to candidate lists) on electoral participation, by using a dataset of Italian local elections. Because of the short period covered by the reform (1993-1995), some municipalities never voted using this quota system. By using a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, they found that gender quotas have produced an increase in electoral participation especially in the North of Italy. By contrast, the effect on electoral participation is less significant in the Southern part of the country, typically characterized by a more traditional role for women. Finally, they found that although both men and women voters react positively to the introduction of gender quotas, women react more positively than men (De Paola, Scoppa and De Benedetto, 2014). Probably because they expect female policy-makers to be more sensitive to women's interests, or because they think they may gain tangible benefits from electing candidates of their same gender (Childs and Witheny 2004; Kudva, 2003).

In conclusion and confirming the data in Chapter 2 regarding local elections, it can be claimed that gender quotas applied to party electoral lists increase the number of women candidates. They are viewed positively by voters and provide an important role model for girls and young women (Dahlerup, 2006). One of the main criticisms against gender quotas concerns the quality of women candidates in the electoral lists (suggesting that they probably are not as highly skilled as men). Personally, I have always found this criticism to be very biased. Never in the long history of humanity, has it ever been questioned if a man had the right skills for a certain position, especially in politics. Scholars from Cambridge University have conducted a study concerning gender quotas for the Italian Chamber of Deputies in the national election of 1994 (quotas introduced for a short period, between 1993 and 1995, by Law no. 277). The study shows that women whose candidacy was the result of quotas were no less qualified than men, in terms of education, occupational achievement, or previous experience at local level. The suspicion here

is that when people object to gender quotas on qualification grounds, what they oppose, usually without saying so, is making gender itself a qualification for office (Weeks Catalano, and Baldez, 2014:50). Regarding the short-term impact of gender quotas in Italy, I would argue that, as we can see from Figure 3.3, in the political election of 1994, in which a quota system was in place (valid only for seats allocated by proportional representation for the Chamber of Deputies[92]), there was a significant increase in the number of women deputies.

Figure 3.3 The percentage of women deputies before and after quota law (1993-1995)



Source: senato.it and camera.it

As mentioned, in 1995, the Constitutional Court declared the quota law unconstitutional. Without quotas in the elections of 1996, the total percentage of women deputies fell to 11% from 16% in 1994.

[92] The Law no. 277/1993, concerning the election of the Chamber of Deputies, mandated an equal presence of both genders in the PR electoral lists (Brunelli, 2006).

3.7. The political strategy of parties and the Italian Democratic Party

Generally speaking, political parties differ in the number of women they nominate, in the way they rank women on party lists, and in the proportion of women that they send to parliament.

Figure 3.4 shows the process of legislative recruitment system divided in three steps by Matland and Montgomery (2003).

Figure 3.4 Legislative recruitment system



Source: Matland and Montgomery (2003:21)

In the first step, individuals move from being eligible to becoming aspirants (which depends on ambition and financial resources for the electoral campaign). In the second step, individuals move from aspirants to candidates. This is a crucial stage because it is party gatekeepers that select candidates to run for office. This process is mainly affected by which candidate the gatekeepers believe is more likely to help the party win votes (Matland and Montgomery, 2003). Generally speaking, quotas

attempt to guarantee greater equality in both the first and second step, but in the second passage, the choice of candidate is made only by the political party. As Norris and Lovendusky put it, parties are the real gatekeepers to elected office (Norris and Lovendusky, 1995). Consequently, it may happen that women are placed in unwinnable positions[93] or unwinnable constituencies[94].

Focussing on political parties, according to Caul (1999), the proportion of women MPs are affected by the following characteristics:

- party's organizational structure;
- the party ideology;
- the proportion of female party activists.

Regarding the party's organizational structure, according to Caul (1999), two relevant aspects may influence women's representation: centralization and institutionalization. The first aspect, centralization, describes the distribution of control over decision-making within the party hierarchy. A centralized party organization may be more accountable for its inclusion of female candidates (Caul, 1999:81). The second aspect concerns the degree of institutionalization which determines the nature of the process by which MPs are recruited. A high degree of institutionalization denotes a more rule-oriented process (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). Moreover, highly institutionalized parties select all potential MPs from their ranks, especially those without ties to the power centre, because party leaders have less leeway to bend the rules in favour of certain candidates. By contrast, a weakly institutionalized party tends to favour candidates who have accumulated personal political capital, or resources based upon personal status (Guadagnini,

[93] For instance, if women are placed in the third position on the electoral lists. Indeed, the Italian Democratic Party established that the headlist (the two candidates at the top of the list) could be assigned outside of the gender quota mechanism, and potentially be both male.

[94] Usually, parties know in which region they are more likely to win, and they could run women in unwinnable constituencies.

1993). Thus women, as newcomers to parties, may have fewer of these resources and might find it more difficult to catch up with established men in parties with a lower degree of institutionalization (Caul, 1999:81).

Regarding party ideology, Caul (1999) suggests that the women's movement has been traditionally linked to left-wing parties, confirming Matland and Studler (1996). They argued that parties on the left may feel the need to be sensitive to groups historically excluded from the power circles, and this may include women (1996:27). Indeed, Matland and Studler (1993) found that since 1980, left-wing parties in Norway have begun to send higher percentages of women to parliament than right-wing parties. Similarly, Caul (1997) suggested that the history of left parties in government is strongly associated with high numbers of women in parliament. Generally, left-wing parties are more open to measures such as quotas because they are coherent with their more general goals of social equality (Hassim 2002; Opello 2006). Moreover, Rule (1987) theorizes that women are less likely to be nominated by right-wing parties because they hold a more traditional view of women's roles, but she finds weak evidence in her model. Therefore, according to Caul (1999), the impact of party ideology on women's representation must be examined over time.

Finally, the proportion of female party activists can affect the election of women MPs. Lovenduski and Norris (1993) suggest that in recent years, in Sweden and Germany, women's grassroots level has increased to rival men. Caul's theory suggests that once women begin to enter the lower party ranks, they could directly increase pressure for representation at the highest level - parliament (Caul, 1999:83).

Regarding the political strategies of parties when adopting gender quotas, according to Krook (2007) political elites recognize strategic advantages in pursuing quotas. In fact, most scholars argue that political elites adopt quotas only for

strategic reasons. These tendencies are especially strong when parties seek to overcome a long period as the opposition party, or a dramatic decrease in popularity (Kolinsky, 1991; Perrigo, 1996; Stevenson, 2000).

Moreover, gender quotas could be a way of demonstrating commitment to women's rights. In general, evidence supports the argument that elites respond to strategic incentives when they adopt gender quotas (Huang, 2002).

The further variable explores the influence of international norms in adopting gender quotas. During the last 10 years, a variety of international organizations have issued declarations recommending that all member-states aim for 30% women in all political bodies (Krook, 2009). Such international organizations include the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the European Union, the African Union, the Commonwealth and the Organization of American States.

Thus, political parties could introduce quotas in response to the pressure of women's movement in civil society, women's organizations inside political parties or women's groups in other countries. Women's movements and organizations believe that there should be more women in politics in order to achieve justice, promote women's interests, and make use of women's resources for the good of society (Phillips, 1995).

Another explanation suggests that party elites often adopt quotas when one of their rivals adopts them (Caul, 2001; Meier 2004; Wängnerund 2001; Matland and Studlar, 1996), which is not the case in Italy, as the right-wings parties did not follow suit when the Democratic Party introduced quotas in 2008.

In addition, some parties abstain from taking a public position on quotas (Sgier, 2003). In other words, a political party can adopt quotas but avoid making this policy public. The absence of publicity for quotas could be explained by two factors. Firstly, several women MPs elected without quotas do not like women elected

through quotas (there is a strong internal debate within the Italian Democratic Party regarding quotas). Secondly, concerning the double preference mechanism, the reason of this lack of publicity lies in the concept of power. Indeed, if less voters know that they can write a woman's name as their preferred candidate, more men will be elected or re-elected, thus maintaining their power positions.

In Italy, the left-wing party Democratic Party (DP), since their institution in 2008, has voluntarily introduced gender quotas[95] for women. On electoral lists, women candidates' names must be placed in strict alternate order (man-woman-man-woman), and must be 50% of the total number of candidates in all kinds of elections (national, regional and local).

However, there is an exception regarding the *list head* (*testa di lista*), meaning that the first and second candidate in the DP list could avoid gender quotas. In other words, instead of finding the quotas composition man-woman-man or woman-man-woman, we could find a DP list composed by two men in the first and second position (list head), and then potentially also another male candidate in third position, as the initial element of the man-woman-man-woman alternating order. This implies that often, male candidates are placed in winnable positions and, by contrast, women are placed in -unwinnable positions or unwinnable constituencies. As Matland (2006) argues, party rules can be written in such a way that a party can comply with party regulations without electing a significant number of women MPs.

Moreover, ineffectiveness of gender quotas may occur when a party ignores its own rules, and when no significant sanctions are in place to penalize parties for failing to comply. In addition, referring once again to the legislative recruitment system designed by Matland and Montgomery in 2003, the recruitment process

[95] Party statutes 2008, article 19. Source: www.partitodemocratico.it/statuto/

specific to the Italian Democratic Party, is characterized by an important aspect that has an impact on the second step of the system, namely the passage from aspirants to candidates . This aspect concerns the political current[96] (*corrente politica*) which an aspirant is part of. Indeed, in the DP we can find several political currents, all headed by a man (*capobastone*[97]) who usually decides the candidates and their position in the electoral list.

Finally, as outlined in Chapter 3.6, the multiple candidacies mechanism can also be exploited as a means to bypass gender quotas. Parties, including the Democratic Party, can and did indeed take advantage of this option to get a higher number of male candidates elected.

In sum, for all the reasons explained so far, it is very hard for women to break the glass ceiling, which I consider a visible barrier that blocks women's path to a political career in men-dominated parties.

[96] Some examples of men who lead political currents within the Democratic Party could be Nicola Zingaretti (who is currently the National Secretary of Democratic Party , since his election in January 2019), Dario Franceschini, Matteo Orfini, Maurizio Martina (who was the previous National Segretary of Democratic Party before Nicola Zingaretti), Gianni Cuperlo, Gianni Pittella, Andrea Orlando, Paolo Gentiloni, Matteo Renzi (in September 2019, Renzi left the Democratic Party and founded his own party).

[97] *Capobastone* is an Italian word used in politics. It refers to the party official who holds decision-making power within a given circumscription, and who maintains contact with other leaders (the word comes from Mafia's hierarchy).

4. Hypotheses, Data and Methods

As discussed in the previous section, women are still underrepresented in politics, which calls into question the issue of representation. According to formal representation, women and men have the legal right to participate in politics; hence, women should have the right to vote and the right to stand for office as much as men, requiring that any barriers to women's participation in politics be removed (Krook, 2007; Dalehrup, 2006).

However, as we already said, it is not enough to have a formal political equality for automatically increasing the number of women in politics. Then, in principle, laws can ensure that women have an equal opportunity to pursue a political career, but in practice women may not come to starting line with the same resources or skills as men, owing to historically discriminations and prejudice against women.

As Phillips notes,

> *Those who have been traditionally subordinated, marginalized, or silenced need the security of a guaranteed voice and [...] democracies must act to redress the imbalance that centuries of oppression have wrought* (Phillips, 1991:7).

As Paxton and Hughes (2017) suggest, in order to ensure that women are represented in politics in numbers more proportionately to their presence in the population, we must change electoral laws and/or introduced gender quotas.

Against this backdrop, as outlined in the previous chapters, four Italian legislatures between 2001 and 2013[98] will be analysed. The time span has been chosen so to include the year 2008, when the Democratic Party (DP) changed its statute and

[98] Between 2001 and 2013, Italy has had four Legislatures: XIV (2001-2006), XV (2006-2008), XVI (2008-2013) and XVII (2013-2018).

stated that women must be the 50% of the candidates; furthermore, the DP statute says that electoral lists must be formed so to have a regular alternation of women and men.

The DP voluntary introduction of gender quotas has not been paralleled so far by any other Italian political party; therefore, it configures the only available case study for testing the impact of gender quotas in the Italian context.

The analyses that will be shown in this chapter aim at answering the following research questions: did the DP gender quotas succeed in raising the number of women MPs elected in the XVI and XVII legislatures? If so, had the increased presence of women in the parliament an effect on the kind of bills that were proposed during these legislatures? Were these changes limited to the DP, or did the DP's voluntary quotas have a generalized effect on the Parliament after 2008?

As a matter of fact, my aim threefold. First, I wish to assess whether the voluntary gender quotas of the DP improved the descriptive representation in the Italian Parliament towards the 50-50 share between women and men. Second, I intend to show whether the DP quotas fostered substantive representation, i.e, speaking for and acting to support women's issues such as violence against women, sexual harassment and so on (Krook, 2007; Dalehrup, 2006) by both women and men. Finally, I aim at showing whether, in accordance with the political presence's theory developed by Phillips (1991), the increased presence of women (if any) in the parliament of the XVI and XVII legislatures actually promoted bills that can be considered to be women's interests.

The analyses that I am going to report on wish to contribute to the current debate on quotas in Italy in many ways. Firstly, there are few studies regarding Italian quotas and their impact on policy-making; hence, my study aims at filling this gap. Often, Italy is not even considered by scholars in comparison between countries

regarding studies on gender quotas, so that we lack knowledge on this issue coming from both focused studies on the country, and international comparisons.

Secondly, the scarce literature on Italian quota system are not concerning the last electoral period since the studies focus on local regional and political election of 1993 - 1999 and rarely include 2005 (i.e., De Paola and Scoppa, 2012; Bonomi, Brosio and Di Tommaso, 2006). There is only one study which analyze more recent legislatures and the behavior of women MPs which is the study conducted by Papavero for the period 1987-2008 (Papavero, 2011). Finally, as Hughes and colleagues argue, gender quotas are one of the most important political developments of the last 30 years (Hughes et al., 2015:331) and it is particularly important to empirically analyze this phenomena in Italy, where the debate about pros and cons of gender quotas is still ongoing and the presence of women in politics is still very low.

As we see in Figure 4.1, since 2007 there has been an increase in the number of women in Parliament, however the scarcity of empirical research on the issue does not allow to establish whether gender quotas are a possible source of this increase.

Figure 4.1 The presence of women and men in Italian parliament (1999-2017)

Source: EIGE database on gender statistics. Data collected by EIGE from January 2017 and previously by the European Commission.

The analyses that follow are mostly of a descriptive kind. Being able to prove beyond any doubt that quotas perform their function to increase the share of women MPs requires controls that are out of the reach of a PhD dissertation, such as a thorough analysis and operationalization of how electoral systems work together or against quota systems in the framework of a comparative project.

Therefore, my aim is not to analyse the impact of DP's voluntary quotas in proper causal terms. Instead, I wish to provide scholars with fresh new data, which were not available previously, on which some hypotheses may be formulated that overlook the role of electoral systems, but include the more reasonable individual-level factors and covariates able to affect how gender quotas work, and to put to an empirical test some among the many questions that surround the effectiveness of quotas.

4.1. The Hypotheses

The above-mentioned research questions gave way to the following hypotheses:

H1. The voluntary electoral quotas introduced by the Democratic Party increased the share of women MPs elected in the Italian Chamber of Deputies in Democratic Party as compared to men over the last two legislatures (XVI and XVII), as compared to the previous two.

H2. Gender quotas implemented by Democratic Party increased the number of bills proposed by DP deputies regarding women's interest (i.e., women's rights, violence, sexual harassment, children, family) over the last two legislatures, as compared to the previous two. Gender quotas may produce a substantive representation, i.e, speaking for and acting to support women's issues such as

violence against women, sexual harassment and so on (Krook, 2007; Dalehrup, 2006) by both women and men. Indeed, several studies show that an increased number of elected women leads to greater attention to women's issues in the policy making process (Krook and Zetterberg, 2016).

H3. In accordance with the politics of presence, DP women MPs propose more bills than DP men MPs men regarding women's interest, i.e., women's rights, violence, sexual harassment, children, family.

Meintjes (2002) claims that in South Africa, the presence of women deputies was crucial in passing the Domestic Violence Bill, in 1998 suggesting that women better represent women's interests. In line with the theory according to which women better represent women's needs, Hanks (2015) found a positive relationship between the gender quotas in Latin America and gender violence: countries with legislative quotas produce more rigorous gender violence laws (Hanks, 2015:56).

Moreover, Papavero (2011) tested whether women officeholders in the Italian Parliament tend to prioritize women-related policy issues in their bill sponsoring activity. The answer is affirmative: women MPs tend to prioritize legislation concerning women's rights, children and family.

H4. In the fourth and last hypothesis I wish to test whether DP women MPs propose more bills than DP men MPs regarding everyone's interest, i.e., welfare policies, health, environment, as compared to the previous two legislatures without gender quotas. I wish to assess whether more women in the Parliament mean a different kind of politics, more in everybody's interest, as suggested by previous studies (Franke, Crown and Spake, 1997; Beaman *et al.* 2012; Bank of Italy, 2012).

4.2 Data and measurement

In order to empirically test my hypotheses, I collected the data concerning the MPs elected in the Chamber of Deputies from the XIV to the XVII legislature, as detailed in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Legislatures in force in the analysis

Legislatures	Starting date	Ending date	Days	Year
XIV Legislature	30 May 2001	27 April 2006	1794	5
XV Legislature	28 April 2006	28 April 2008	732	2
XVI Legislature	29 April 2008	14 March 2013	1781	5
XVII Legislature	15 March 2013	22 March 2018	1834	5

The decision to build anew the data basis came after a thorough check of the existing and available data, in order to establish whether I would be doing a secondary analysis or not. First of all, in 2015, I consider using the ILMA[99] database, which was the only source providing the sort of information that I needed. However, I realized that those data were not structured and organized in the way I deemed necessary in order to test the hypotheses. Therefore, I identified the source of the Chamber of Deputies[100] and built a new database organizing the information about MPs.

In 2016, I collected the data starting with the XIV legislature, recording the MPs socio-demographics: age, gender, region of birth, electoral districts of MPs and party affiliation. The kind of information that I found on the Chamber of Deputies

[99] Source: http://159.149.130.120/ilma/sito/

[100] Source: http://dati.camera.it/it/esempi-query-sparql.html

website is shown in Table 4.2: surname, name, birth date, place of birth, electoral district, party, and the acronym of party affiliation.

Table 4.2 Deputies information: name, birth date, electoral district

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
1	cognome	nome	dataNascita	nato	luogoNascita	collegio	nomeGruppo	sigla
2	ACERBO	MAURIZIO	19651204	nato a PESCARA, PESCARA, ABRUZZO, il 04.12.1965	PESCARA	ABRUZZO	RIFONDAZIONE COMUNISTA - SINISTRA EUROPEA (RC-SE) (03.05.2006-28.04.2008)	RC-SE
3	ADAMO	NICOLA	19570731	nato a COSENZA, COSENZA, CALABRIA, il 31.07.1957	COSENZA	CALABRIA	PARTITO DEMOCRATICO-L'ULIVO (PD-U) (03.05.2006-28.04.2008)	PD-U
4	ADENTI	FRANCESCO	19610119	nato a BEREGUARDO, PAVIA, LOMBARDIA, il 19.01.1961	BEREGUARDO	LOMBARDIA 3	MISTO (MISTO) (03.05.2006-28.04.2008)	MISTO
5	ADENTI	FRANCESCO	19610119	nato a BEREGUARDO, PAVIA, LOMBARDIA, il 19.01.1961	BEREGUARDO	LOMBARDIA 3	POPOLARI-UDEUR (POP-UDEUR) (18.05.2006-28.04.2008)	POP-UDEUR
6	ADOLFO	VITTORIO	19451109	nato a IMPERIA, IMPERIA, LIGURIA, il 09.11.1945	IMPERIA	LIGURIA	UDC (UNIONE DEI DEMOCRATICI CRISTIANI E DEI DEMOCRATICI DI CENTRO) (UDC) (03.05.2006-28.04.2008)	UDC
7	ADORNATO	FERDINANDO	19540511	nato a POLISTENA, REGGIO DI CALABRIA, CALABRIA, il	POLISTENA	VENETO 2	FORZA ITALIA (FI) (03.05.2006-28.04.2008)	FI

Table 4.3 Deputies information: level of education, membership committees

	A	B	C	D
1	cognome	nome	info	organo
2	ADENTI	FRANCESCO	Laurea in giurisprudenza; dipendente di azienda privata - funzionario	I COMMISSIONE (AFFARI COSTITUZIONALI, DELLA PRESIDENZA DEL CONSIGLIO E INTERNI)
3	ADOLFO	VITTORIO	Istituto tecnico per geometri; imprenditore - settore industriale	VIII COMMISSIONE (AMBIENTE, TERRITORIO E LAVORI PUBBLICI)
4	AFFRONTI	PAOLO	Diploma; giornalista	X COMMISSIONE (ATTIVITÃ€ PRODUTTIVE, COMMERCIO E TURISMO)
5	AFFRONTI	PAOLO	Diploma; giornalista	X COMMISSIONE (ATTIVITÃ€ PRODUTTIVE, COMMERCIO E TURISMO)
6	AIRAGHI	MARCO	Laurea in ingegneria meccanica; dirigente di azienda privata	XIV COMMISSIONE (POLITICHE DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA)
7	ALFANO	GIOACCHINO	commercialista e revisore contabile, giornalista pubblicista	VI COMMISSIONE (FINANZE)

Table 4.4 Deputies information: bills as main sponsor

	A	B	C	D	E
1	nome	cognome	tipo	numeroAtto	titolo
2	FRANCESCO	ADENTI	Progetto di Legge	1743	ADENTI e LI CAUSI: "Norme a tutela dei diritti costituzionali dei professori incaricati esterni" (1743)
3	FRANCESCO	ADENTI	Progetto di Legge	1870	ADENTI: "Modifica della denominazione del titolo professionale di perito industriale" (1870)
4	FRANCESCO	ADENTI	Progetto di Legge	2632	legislativo 31 marzo 1998, n. 109, recante la scala di equivalenza per la determinazione dell'indicatore della situazione economica equivalente, per agevolare l'erogazione delle prestazioni sociali in favore delle famiglie
5	FRANCESCO	ADENTI	Progetto di Legge	3066	ADENTI ed altri: "Norme in materia di dispositivi per la sicurezza delle autovetture e per la prevenzione della guida in stato di ebbrezza" (3066)

Secondly, I collected data regarding the level of education, job and membership committees, as associated to each MP's name (Table 4.3). Thirdly, I collected information regarding the bills proposed by each deputy as a main sponsor (Table

4.4). Finally, I merged the all information coming from the three sources in order to start the coding of each variable.

Regarding the MP's Region of birth, I codified the Regions (Table 4.5) following the codebook of Centre for the Study of Political Change[101], which has produced an electronic archive of Italy's Lower Chamber MPs. I consider useful for the analyses to use existing classifications when possible.

Table 4.5 MP's Region of birth

MP's Region of birth	
Code	**Region**
0	abroad
11	Val d'Aosta
12	Piemonte
13	Liguria
14	Lombardia
15	Trentino Alto Adige
16	Veneto
17	Friuli Venezia Giulia
18	Emilia Romagna
21	Toscana
22	Marche
23	Umbria
24	Lazio
31	Abruzzo-Molise
32	Campania
33	Puglie
34	Basilicata
35	Calabria
41	Sicilia
42	Sardegna
99 M	Unknown

[101] Centre for the Study of Political Change website - www.circap.org.

Regarding the level of education, I used 10 categories, following again the codebook of Centre for the Study of Political Change, thus I codified the level of education of each deputy starting from the XIV legislature.

Table 4.6 MP's Education Level

MP's Education Level	
Code	**Education Level**
0	None
1	Primary
2	Secondary
3	Technical Institute
4	Teacher Institute
5	High School
6	University Degree
7	Other Degree
8	Doctorate
9	Unknown

Looking at the Table 4.6 we can observe the frequency of educational level among deputies across the 4 legislatures studied and we can conclude that almost 70% of deputies in all four legislatures holds a tertiary degree. For this reason, I created the variable *University_Degree* coded 0 if a deputy has not a university degree and 1 otherwise. The choice to consider tertiary education vs. all other educational levels was driven by data considerations.

Table 4.7 Educational level of deputies by legislature

Count

		LEGISLATURE				
		XIV	XV	XVI	XVII	Total
EDU LEVEL	Secondary	5	8	13	8	34
	Technical Institute	85	62	100	82	329
	Teacher Institute	6	31	11	7	55
	High School	81	90	82	77	330

	University Degree	454	429	421	417	1721
	Other Degree	3	3	7	3	16
	Doctorate	0	4	17	34	55
	Unknown	9	11	24	31	75
Total		643	638	675	659	2615

Regarding MPs' job, I classified the type of occupation held by each deputy according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (Isco-88; see the Appendix section Table 0.6). The Isco-88 code was then translated into a social status score, according to the Icams scale (Meraviglia, Ganzeboom and De Luca, 2016), as an indicator of the social position the deputy occupied outside the political domain.

As for the party affiliation, Table 4.8 shows the parties in the Chamber of Deputies during the 4 legislatures which I analyzed.

Table 4.8 Political parties during the 4 legislatures

Acronym	Political Party
AN	ALLEANZA NAZIONALE
DS-U	DEMOCRATICI DI SINISTRA-L'ULIVO
FI	FORZA ITALIA
FI-PDL	FORZA ITALIA - IL POPOLO DELLA LIBERTA' - BERLUSCONI PRESIDENTE
IDV	ITALIA DEI VALORI
LNA	LEGA NORD E AUTONOMIE
LNFP	LEGA NORD FEDERAZIONE PADANA
LNP	LEGA NORD PADANIA
M5S	MOVIMENTO 5 STELLE
MARGH-U	MARGHERITA, DL-L'ULIVO
MISTO	MISTO
PD	PARTITO DEMOCRATICO
PD-U	PARTITO DEMOCRATICO-L'ULIVO
PDL	POPOLO DELLA LIBERTA'
PI-CD	PER L'ITALIA - CENTRO DEMOCRATICO
PT	POPOLO E TERRITORIO (NOI SUD-LIBERTA' ED AUTONOMIA, POPOLARI D'ITALIA DOMANI-PID, MOVIMENTO DI RESPONSABILITA' NAZIONALE-MRN, AZIONE POPOLARE, ALLEANZA DI CENTRO-ADC, INTESA POPOLARE)
RC	RIFONDAZIONE COMUNISTA
RC-SE	RIFONDAZIONE COMUNISTA - SINISTRA EUROPEA
SCPI	SCELTA CIVICA PER L'ITALIA
SEL	SINISTRA ECOLOGIA LIBERTA'

SOCRAD-RNP	SOCIALISTI E RADICALI-RNP
UDC	UNIONE DEI DEMOCRATICI CRISTIANI E DEI DEMOCRATICI DI CENTRO
UDC (CCD-CDU)	UNIONE DEI DEMOCRATICI CRISTIANI E DEI DEMOCRATICI DI CENTRO (CCD-CDU)
UDCPTP	UNIONE DI CENTRO PER IL TERZO POLO
VERDI	VERDI

If a deputy changed party affiliation during a legislature, I have considered in the analysis the first political party with which she/he was elected, hence discarding the following ones.

Then, I classified committees according to the division already made by the Chamber of Deputy. Indeed, at the start of each legislature, 14 Standing Committees are established as composed by MPs from the winning majority and from the opposition. This is done in a way that reflects the share of the parliamentary groups (Table 4.9).

Table 4.9 Committees of Chamber of Deputies

Number	Committee
I	Constitutional
II	Justice
III	Foreign and European Community Affairs
IV	Defence
V	Budget, Treasury and Planning
VI	Finance
VII	Culture, Science and Education
VIII	Environment, Territory and Public Works
IX	Transport, Post and Telecommunications
X	Economic Activities, Trade and Tourism
XI	Public and Private Sector Employment

XII	Social Affairs
XIII	Agriculture
XIV	European Union Policies

Source: camera.it

If a deputy changed his or her membership during the legislature, I have considered only her/his first membership.

Finally, I classified the information on bills proposed by each deputy as the main the sponsor from the XIV legislature to the XVII. This required a long time, since the bills produced in 4 Legislatures amounted to 20.180 (Table 4.10). In particular, the bills classification took a long time (around 6-8 months), since I double checked all bills to be ensure coding consistency, especially considering some cases which were particular difficult to code. Moreover, in 2018 I updated the information regarding the XVII legislature, which meanwhile came to its end, so I could collect the full information regarding all its bills.

Table 4.10 Legislatures, deputies and bills

Legislatures	Number of deputies	Number of bills
XIV (2001-2006)	643	6963
XV (2006-2008)	638	3600
XVI (2008-2013)	675	5270
XVII (2013-2018)	659	4347
Total	**2.615**	**20.180**

In order to classify the bills proposed by the deputies, I used the seven categories found in previous studies (Jones, 1997; Dodson and Carroll, 1991; Papavero, 2011) (Table 4.11). This ensures comparability between mine and other scholars' study for future analyses.

The bills were assigned to either category in accordance with their title and subject matter. This amounted to give an *ex post* operational definition (Babbie, 2013), which consists of establishing the rules for coding a variable *after* the information has been collected. A first issue that arose in this process, as it is to be expected when giving an operational definition, was that not every bill could be immediately classified to either of the seven categories on the basis of its title. In this case, I searched the bill on the archive of the Chamber of Deputies and read the bill itself, in order to better understand how to code it. This solved all dubious cases, that amounted at about 10% of the total.

Table 4.11 The seven categories of bills

Number	Category	Description
1	**Women's Rights**	Comprises bills specifically targeted to women, such as bills concerning equal opportunities in politics and in the workplace, maternity leave, abortion, regulation of assisted reproduction, domestic and sexual violence, pension benefits, medical treatment of typically female illnesses, and so forth;
2	**Children and Family**	Including bills dealing with issues related to family, marital status, parental leave, childcare, the protection of children from any kind of abuse, and so forth.
3	**Health**	Comprising bills regarding with medical care and medical standards, public health, health care institutions and their organization. It also comprises bills related to the medical personnel and its career;
4	**Education**	Addressing issues related to School, University and the personnel working in these public institutions;
5	**Welfare Policies**	Focusing on pensions, measures against unemployment and poverty, and specific provisions towards disabled people;
6	**Environment**	Dealing with issues such as pollution and environmental quality, natural parks and preservation of animals and plants;
7	**Other**	Residual category comprising bills dealing with issues different from those mentioned above.

Source: Papavero (2011:10)

5. The impact of gender quotas, 2001-2018: results and discussion

5.1. Do quotas increase the share of women?

In order to test my first hypothesis, according to which the voluntary electoral quotas introduced by the Democratic Party increase the number of Democratic Party women MPs elected in the Italian Chamber of Deputies over the last two legislatures (XVI and XVII), as compared to the previous two and as compared to men, I used multinomial logistic regression. The aim of the analysis is to explore the differences between the probability to have women elected in the Democratic Party before and after the introduction of voluntary gender quotas, controlling for the relevant control variables.

A first test of this hypothesis is offered by Figure 5.1, clearly showing that the share of women elected in the DP steadily raises, but the more so after the introduction of quotas in 2008 and especially if compared to what happened in other parties.

Figure 5.1 Percentage of women deputies during the four legislatures (2001-2018)



The more formal hypothesis test makes use of a series of nested binomial logistic regressions. The regression equation that described the baseline model is the following:

$$logit(PD) = a + b_1 time + b_2 gender + b_3 time * gender$$

The parameter of interest is of course the interaction between gender and time[102]: for the hypothesis to be confirmed, the interaction should show an odds ratio greater than 1. At the same time, however, the relevant covariates should be added to this model to check whether the probability of being elected as a DP deputy varied according to education, age, social status or the territorial area of reference.

Concerning these variables, I generated several dummy variables to index them, aside from gender (which is equal to 0 when a deputy is male and 1 when is female). A first variable is the dependent one, ie. *PD,* which equals 1 when a deputy belongs to the Democratic Party and 0 otherwise. A second one is the dichotomy concerning time, ie. *Time*, which splits the four legislatures in two. The first period, before quotas were introduced, comprises the XIV and XV legislature and is coded as 0, while the second period comprises the XVI and XVII legislatures, coded as 1. Though dichotomizing an otherwise polytomous variable means losing information, nonetheless it makes sense for my analyses, since what I am interested into is the difference before/after quotas were implemented, which amounts to dichotomizing the variable concerning time.

As for education, I created the variable *University_Degree,* coded 0 if a deputy has not a university degree and 1 otherwise. The choice to consider tertiary education

[102] As a matter of fact, the interaction term is a difference-in-differences (DID) parameter, and the model is a DID binomial logistic regression. However, as already said, we avoid stressing the causal nature of the analysis, being widely aware that many other factors out of the reach of this project could have influenced the observed outcome.

vs. all other educational levels was driven by data considerations, since about 68% of deputies in all four legislatures holds a tertiary degree.

The social status corresponding to a deputy's occupation is indexed by the Icams status scale scores, whose observed range is between 32.13 and 82.71, while the entire Icams range, as described by Meraviglia and colleagues (2016), is between 13.19 and 85.27. Finally, the *Area* variable indexes the electoral district in which each deputy was elected, as divided in four geographic areas: North West, North East, Center, South and Islands.

Table 5.1 shows the results of the baseline model (model A) and of four additional models that add a covariate at a time.

Table 5.1 Results of First Hypotesis (odds ratios and standard errors)

	Model A	**Model B**	**Model C**	**Model D**	**Model E**
PDnew	OR (SE)	OR (SE)	OR (SE)	OR (SE)	OR (SE)
0	(base outcome)				
1					
1.Time	1.08 (0.10)	1.14 (0.10)	1.13 (0.10)	1.15 (0.11)	1.13 (0.11)
Woman	1.60 (0.25)	1.59 (0.26)	1.61 (026)	1.69 (0.28)	1.58 (0.26)
Time#woman	1.27 (0.26)	1.50 (0.31)	1.50 (0.31)	1.47 (0.32)	1.51 (0.33)
Age		1.32 (0.48)	1.31 (0.04)	1.33 (0.05)	1.33 (0.05)
Age squared		0.99 (0.00)	0.99 (0.00)	0.99 (0.00)	0.99 (0.00)
1.University_Degree			0.85 (0.07)	0.82 (0.08)	0.89 (0.90)
Icams				1.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)
North East					1.15 (0.15)
Center					1.75 (0.22)
South					0.93 (0.10)
_cons	0.50 (0.32)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)

The odds ratio (OR) indicates how the relative risk of the outcome falling in the comparison group (eg., being elected in the DP) compared to the risk of the outcome falling in the reference group (eg., being elected in another party) changes with the variable in question. An OR > 1 indicates that the risk of the outcome falling in the comparison group relative to the risk of the outcome falling in the reference group increases as the variable increases (or takes on the value of 1, for dichotomous variables). Standard errors are reported for completeness, although unnecessary: in fact, the data set does not refer to a sample, but to the entire population (of both deputies and bills), hence no inference is necessary; furthermore, the analysis does not have a predictive aim, so that even regarding time an inference is not needed, and standard errors are superfluous[103].

Model A shows that it is 30% more likely for a woman (as compared to a man) to be elected in the DP (instead than in another party) after the introduction of the voluntary quotas, ie., in the XVI and XVI legislatures. Model B shows that age acts as a suppressor variable, in that (if not controlled for, as in model A) it shows the probability for a woman to be elected in the DP to be lower than when it is controlled for (1.27 vs. 1.50), the difference being substantial. Education does not affect this probability (Model C), while the social status lowers it slightly (Model D, from 1.50 to 1.47). Finally, Model E adds the area of the electoral district in which the deputy was elected, showing another slight suppressor effect of this factor on the probability of a woman to be elected in the DP. In sum, adding covariates does not explain away the relationship between the gender of the elected MP and the

[103] Notwithstanding this, some readers may wish to appreciate the size of the standard error, while conceptualizing the observed composition of the Parliament in the four legislatures as one of the many theoretical outcomes resulting from a (theoretical and stochastic) population of elections. I do not support this view, however I wished to leave open the possibility for interpretations than differed from mine.

time in which she or he was elected, namely, before or after the introduction of quotas.

As Table 5.2 shows, and as the value of BIC suggests, the best model is Model E, with all variables included in the regression. Hence, my conclusion is that the probability for a woman (as opposed to that for a man) of being elected in the Democratc Party (as opposed to other parties) increased by 50% after the introduction of the voluntary quotas, once controlled for the relevant covariates.

Table 5.2 Results First Hypotesis - BIC values

Model	BIC
A	3448.41
B	3397.98
C	3402.58
D	3096.35
E	3046.91

Then, we can conclude that the first hypothesis is confirmed: voluntary gender quotas introduced by Democratic Party are associated with an improvement of the descriptive representation in the Italian parliament.

5.2. Do quotas increase the number of bills in women's interest?

In order to test my second hypothesis, according to which gender quotas implemented by Democratic Party increased the number of bills proposed by Democratic Party deputies regarding women's interest (i.e., women's rights, violence, sexual harassment), over the last two legislatures (XVI and XVII), as compared to the previous two, I used binomial logistic regression.

The aim of analysis is to explore the differences between the probability to have bills regarding women's rights proposed by Democratic Party deputies before and after the introduction of voluntary gender quotas, controlling for the relevant control variables.

A first test of this hypothesis is offered by Figure 5.2, showing that the sum of bills proposed by deputies in women's rights category raises over time; however, we want to test whether the introduction of quotas in 2008 matters and especially whether the number of bills proposed by DP deputies in women's rights increased as compared to the previous two legislatures.

Figure 5.2 Sum of bills in 6 categories in legislatures XIV-XVII



As in the previous analysis, the formal hypothesis test makes use of a series of nested binomial logistic regressions. The regression equation that describes the baseline model is the following:

$$logit\ (WR) = a + b_1 PD + b_2 time + b_3 PD * time$$

where WR represents the bills proposed in the women's rights domain, ie., specifically targeted to women, such as bills concerning equal opportunities in politics and in the workplace, maternity leave, abortion, regulation of assisted reproduction, domestic and sexual violence, pension benefits for women, medical treatment of typically female illnesses, and so forth.

As in the previous analysis, the parameter of major interest in the model is the interaction between *PD* and *time*; for the hypothesis to be confirmed, the interaction should show an odds ratio greater than 1. The relevant covariates have been added to this model to check whether the probability of proposing bills in women's rights by DP deputy varied over time according also to education, age, social status or the territorial area of reference. All variables codings remained the same as in the previous analysis.

Table 5.3 shows the results of the baseline model (model F) and of four additional models that add a covariate at a time. As mentioned above, although unnecessary, standard errors are reported for completeness.

Table 5.3 Results of Second Hypotesis (odds ratios and standard errors)

	Model F	**Model G**	**Model H**	**Model I**	**Model L**
WR	OR (SE)	OR (SE)	OR (SE)	OR (SE)	OR (SE)
0	(base outcome)				
1					
1.PD	0.75 (0.12)	0.76 (0.12)	0.77 (0.12)	0.75 (0.13)	0.76 (0.13)
1.Time	0.65 (0.09)	0.62 (0.08)	0.63 (0.09)	0.61 (0.09)	0.59 (0.09)
PD#1.Time	1.34 (0.31)	1.34 (0.31)	1.32 (0.31)	1.50 (0.37)	1.51 (0.38)
Age		0.97 (0.42)	0.97 (0.42)	0.99 (0.04)	1.01 (0.05)
Age squared		1.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	0.99 (0.00)	0.99 (0.00)

1.University_Degree			1.24 (0.15)	1.13 (0.16)	1.15 (0.17)
Icams				1.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)
North East					1.45 (0.24)
Center					0.84 (0.15)
South					0.79 (0.12)
_cons	0.21 (0.01)	0.66 (0.70)	0.54 (0.58)	0.28 (0.36)	0.13 (0.18)

Model F shows that it is 34% more likely for a DP deputy (instead than deputies of other parties) to propose bills regarding women's rights after the introduction of the voluntary quotas, ie., in the XVI and XVI legislatures. Age does not affect this probability (Model G and I), while education lowers it slightly (Model H, from 1.34 to 1.32).

Model I shows that social status acts as a suppressor variable, in that (if not controlled for, as in models F and G) it shows the probability for DP deputies to propose a bills in women's rights to be lower than when it is controlled for (1.34 vs. 1.50), the difference being substantial. Finally, Model L adds the area of the electoral district in which the deputy was elected, showing another slight suppressor effect of this factor on the probability for a DP deputy to propose bills in women's rights.

As Table 5.4 shows, and as the value of BIC suggests, the best model is once again Model L, with all variables included in the regression.

Hence, my conclusion is that the probability for DP deputy, either woman or man (as opposed to other parties), to propose bills concerning women's rights (as opposed to other categories of bills) increased by 50% after the introduction of the voluntary quotas, once controlled for the relevant covariates.

Table 5.4 Results Second Hypotesis - BIC values

Model	BIC
F	2156.06
G	2164.08
H	2168.92
I	1988.59
L	1957.91

Then, we can conclude that the second hypothesis is confirmed. Voluntary gener quotas introduced by Democratic Party fostered not only a descriptive representation but also a substantive representation, i.e, speaking for and acting to support women's issues such as violence against women, sexual harassment by both women and men confirming previous studies (Krook and Hughes, 2017; Dahlerup, 2006).

5.3.1 Do women act more than men in their own interest?

The third hypothesis tests whether DP's women MPs propose more bills than DP men regarding women's interest, i.e., women's rights, violence, sexual harassment as compared to the previous two legislatures without gender quotas and as compared to men. We already know that DP deputies (irrespective of gender) are more likely to propose bills concerning women's interests in the third and fourth legislature I considered (hypothesis 2); now I aim at assessing whether this occurs because DP women promote more often their interest than men.

As in the two previous analyses, this hypothesis has been tested by means of a series of nested binomial logistic regressions. The regression equation that describes the baseline model of H3 is the following:

$$logit\ (WR) = a + b_1 gender + b_2 time + b_3 time * gender$$

However, in the present case, only DP deputies will be taken into account: indeed, my aim is to compare women to men within the Democratic Party, before and after the introduction of quotas. For this reason, deputies belonging to all other parties are irrelevant for testing this third hypothesis and were excluded from the analysis.

The dependent variable is *WR* which, as mentioned above, represents deputies' bills proposed in women's interests such as bills concerning equal opportunities in workplace and in politics, medical treatment of typically female illnesses, maternity leave, abortion, regulation of assisted reproduction, domestic and sexual violence, pension benefits, and so forth. All covariates have been coded as in the previous analyses.

Once again, the parameter of interest is the interaction between gender and time; for the hypothesis to be confirmed, this interaction should show an odds ratio greater than 1.

Table 5.5 shows the results of the baseline model (model M) and of four additional models that, as usual, add each covariate at a time.

Table 5.5 Results of Third Hypotesis (odds ratios and standard errors)

	Model M	**Model N**	**Model O**	**Model P**	**Model Q**
WR	OR (SE)	OR (SE)	OR (SE)	OR (SE)	OR (SE)
0	(base outcome)				
1					
Woman	4.29 (1.26)	4.09 (1.21)	4.25 (1.27)	4.22 (1.30)	4.24 (1.32)
1.Time	0.44 (0.13)	0.43 (0.13)	0.43 (0.13)	0.48 (0.15)	0.45 (0.14)

Time#Woman	1.86 (0.79)	1.97 (0.84)	1.96 (0.84)	1.96 (0.86)	2.04 (0.91)
Age		1.12 (0.11)	1.11 (0.11)	1.03 (0.11)	1.04 (0.12)
Age squared		0.99 (0.00)	0.99 (0.00)	0.99 (0.00)	0.99 (0.00)
1.University_Degree			0.77 (0.16)	0.72 (0.18)	0.71 (0.18)
Icams				0.99 (0.01)	0.99 (0.01)
North East					1.28 (0.37)
Center					0.71 (0.21)
South					0.73 (0.21)
_cons	0.10 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.10 (0.30)	0.08 (0.23)

Model M shows that it is 86% more likely for a DP woman (as compared to a DP man) to propose bills regarding women's interest in last two legislatures (XVI and XVII) as compared to the previous two legislatures. Interestingly, the baseline model shows an odds ratio which is lower than in all other models, pointing at the fact that all covariates (age, education, social status and geographical area of election) behave like suppressor variables. Therefore, it is especially important to keep them under control, if we want to appreciate the actual contribution of women to the promotion of their interests.

Table 5.6 shows that Model P and Q are equally fitting, since Bic values differ only by 2 points (Raftery, 1995). Hence, my conclusion is that the probability for a DP woman deputy (as opposed to that for a DP man) of proposing bills in women's interests doubled after the introduction of the voluntary quotas, once controlled for the relevant covariates.

Table 5.6 Results Third Hypotesis - BIC values

Model	BIC
M	709.46
N	720.63

O	726.09
P	686.29
Q	688.60

Then, we can conclude that the third hypothesis too is confirmed. After the introduction of gender quotas by the Democratic Party, women elected in this party propose more bills than men concerning their own interest, hence confirming previous findings (ie., Papavero, 2011; Meintjes, 2002; Hanks, 2015). Evidently, this stresses the importance of increasing women's presence in the Parliament. This finding suggests that, given the still large imbalance of power between women and men - in politics as in the larger society - it is unlikely that women's interests are pursued by both genders equally: men MPs tend to act in favor of interests other than those that specifically concern women, having the power to do so. It is true indeed that being a left-winger increases the chance of considering women's interests as everybody's interests, irrespective of gender (as H2 shows). However, as H3 shows, women are far more likely to take care of their own interests; hence, the more women in politics, the more women's interests will be promoted, the more equal the society becomes.

5.3.2 Do women act more than men in everyone's interest?

In the fourth and last hypothesis I wish to test whether DP women MPs propose more bills than DP men MPs regarding everyone's interest, i.e., welfare policies, health, environment, as compared to the previous two legislatures without gender quotas. We already know that DP women MPs are more likely to propose bills concerning women's interests in the third and fourth legislature I considered (H3); now I aim at assessing whether this occurs in the other categories of bills. This way, I wish to assess whether more women in the Parliament mean a different kind of

politics, more in everybody's interest, as suggested by previous studies (Franke, Crown and Spake, 1997; Beaman *et al.* 2012; Bank of Italy, 2012). As in the previous analyses, this hypothesis has been tested by means of a series of nested binomial logistic regressions.

The regression equation that describes the baseline model of H4 is the following:

$$logit\ (All) = a + b_1 gender + b_2 time + b_3 time * gender$$

where *All* summarizes bills proposed in the following categories:

- women's rights, as already detailed;
- children and family (issues related to family, marital status, parental leave, childcare, the protection of children from any kind of abuse);
- health (medical care and medical standards, public health, health care institutions and their organization and bills related to the medical personnel and its career);
- education (school, university and the personnel working in these public institutions);
- welfare policies (bills focusing on pensions, measures against unemployment and poverty, and specific provisions towards disabled people);
- Environment (issues such as pollution and environmental quality, natural parks and preservation of animals and plants).

All covariates were coded as in the previous analyses.

Once again, the parameter of interest is the interaction between gender and time; for the hypothesis to be confirmed, as before, this interaction should show an odds ratio greater than 1.

Table 5.7 shows the results of the baseline model (model R) and of four additional models that, as usual, add each covariate at a time.

Table 5.7 Results Fourth Hypotesis (odds ratios and standard errors)

	Model R	Model S	Model T	Model U	Model V
All	OR (SE)	OR (SE)	OR (SE)	OR (SE)	OR (SE)
0	(base outcome)				
1					
Woman	1.89 (0.47)	1.88 (0.47)	1.87 (0.46)	1.83 (0.46)	1.76 (0.45)
1.Time	0.92 (0.13)	0.91 (0.13)	0.91 (0.13)	0.93 (0.14)	0.91 (0.14)
Time#Woman	1.90 (0.60)	1.87 (0.60)	1.88 (0.60)	1.98 (0.65)	2.04 (0.68)
Age		0.99 (0.06)	0.99 (0.06)	0.98 (0.06)	0.99 (0.07)
Age squared		1.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)	0.99 (0.00)
1.University_Degree			1.03 (0.14)	0.91 (0.15)	0.96 (0.16)
Icams				1.00 (0.00)	1.00 (0.00)
North East					1.25 (0.26)
Center					1.06 (0.21)
South					1.01 (0.19)
_cons	0.78 (0.08)	1.14 (1.73)	1.08 (1.66)	0.82 (1.50)	0.65 (1.20)

Model R shows that it is 90% more likely for a DP woman (as compared to a DP man) to propose bills regarding all categories (concerning everyone's interests) in the last two legislatures (XVI and XVII) as compared to the previous two legislatures. As in the H3, the baseline model shows an odds ratio which is lower than in all other models, pointing at the fact that all covariates (age, education,

social status and geographical area of election) behave like suppressor variables (1.90 vs 2.04). Therefore, it is especially important to keep them under control, if we want to appreciate the actual contribution of women to the promotion of bills in everyone's interests.

As Table 5.8 shows, and as the value of BIC suggests, the best model is Model V, with all variables included in the regression.

Hence, my conclusion is that the probability for a woman deputy elected in the DP (as opposed to that for a Democratic Party man) of proposing bills in everyone's interests doubled after the introduction of the voluntary quotas, once controlled for the relevant covariates.

Table 5.8 Results Fourth Hypotesis - BIC values

Model	BIC
R	1336.52
S	1349.72
T	1356.56
U	1251.05
V	1248.73

Then, we can conclude that the H4 too is confirmed. After the introduction of gender quotas by the Democratic Party, women elected in this party propose more bills than men concerning everyone's interest. Once again, this result suggests the importance of increasing women's presence in the Parliament. Both H3 and H4 suggest that, the more women in politics, not only the more women's interests will be promoted (H3), but also the more common interests will be promoted (H4) to the benefit of the whole society, as indicated by previous empirical findings.

Conclusions

Women's participation in politics has increased significantly over the past 100 years. Indeed, in 1890 women did not have the right to vote anywhere in the world, while nowadays 81% of the world's countries have at least 10% of women in their Parliaments.

Although women have made remarkable inroads into traditionally male occupations (and higher education), the political sphere remains an area where women still have far to go (Paxton and Hughes, 2017). In other words, politics remains an area dominated by men.

This should not come as a surprise, as women's exclusion from the public sphere has its roots in the Ancient World, where women were segregated into the private domain of their homes and families.

In an effort to change this trend, many countries have adopted gender quotas mechanisms (reserved seats, party quotas, legislative quotas) in order to increase women's representation (Schwindt-Bayer, 2009:5; Krook 2005; Norris 2004; Dahlerup, 2006). With their century-long history, gender quotas are not new on the world stage as a means to increase women's representation. In addition, some institutional arrangements and institutional bodies (e.g., the Beijing Platform, Council of Europe, the European Union, the African Union) have recently

contributed to the rise of women's presence in parliaments, also helped by a "contagion effect" that accelerated the spread of quotas across countries.

However, the impact of gender quotas on the number of women in politics is still modest (the world average is around 24%, the European average is 28%, in Italy instead is 35%[104]). In relation to the presence of women in politics, there is a common factor that can be found in virtually every country, i.e., gender horizontal segregation, and gender vertical segregation. Concerning horizontal segregation, defined as the over- or under-representation of a certain social group in specific occupations or sectors, which is not supported by any factual criterion (Bettio and Verashchagina, 2009; Regini, 2007), it is considered as a constant in the labour market in all Western countries (Rubery and Fagan, 1993; Anker, 1998).

Horizontal segregation is also deeply rooted in history. As for politics, the distribution of women and men ministers by type of portfolio indicates that men continue to hold most of the key positions, such as economics and finance, foreign and international affairs and defense. On the contrary, women continue to hold the so-called "soft" portfolios with socio-cultural functions (as we explored in Chapter 2).

On the other hand, vertical segregation occurs when the opportunities for career developments within a sector are severely reduced or denied to a given group (Bettio and Verashchagina, 2009:32). As a result, vertical segregation tends to keep women out of the top positions in private and public organisations (Maron and Meulders, 2008) as well in politics (Reskin, 2000). Closure connected to the concept of vertical segregation is glass ceiling, defined as an invisible barrier which prevents women to achieve the highest positions of power. Data suggest that, even when a woman breaks the glass ceiling, she is likely to slip in a situation of horizontal segregation and is often relegated to issues traditionally considered more suitable

[104] Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union. Situation as 1st September 2019. Website: data.ipu.org

for women. Another common outcome is that women break the glass ceiling only to find themselves in a typical “glass cliff” scenario, that is, high-risk situations where women are called to manage a corporation in times of crisis, at great peril for their career (Ryan and Haslam, 2005).

These lingering issues notwithstanding, it can be argued that the presence of quotas in parties' electoral lists, as well as the double preference option, are important mechanisms in order for women to become policy-makers.
Regarding the impact of the different types of gender quotas, the Global database of Quotas for Women suggests that all three types of quota measures (reserved seats, party quotas and legislative quotas) adopted around the world produce similar ranges in terms of their impact. The difference that we can observe goes beyond the mere number of women in politics and has to do with whether the growth of women in parliament has an impact on the kind of output (bills) of the parliament itself.
Indeed, a new wave of quota research focuses on the implications of quotas in terms of descriptive representation, that is, the question of whether an increased number of elected women leads to greater attention to women’s issues in the policy making process (Krook and Zetterberg, 2016:2).

Moving on to the specific focus of this research, there were three main aspects taken into consideration.

First of all, the analysis concentrated on the effectiveness of voluntarily adopted gender quotas. In 2008, the Italian Democratic Party introduced gender quotas in its electoral lists. In order to determine whether gender quotas have to an increase in the number of women elected in the Chamber of Deputies, we considered the two legislatures prior to the introduction of quotas, and the two legislatures that followed (from the XIV to the XVII legislature, from 2001 to 2018). By considering different control variables, such as age and education level, social status in

connection with a deputy's career and the geographical area of the electoral district in which she or he was elected, and by means of binomial logit regressions, the hypothesis has been confirmed.

Secondly, it was important to test the hypothesis that whether an increased number of female representatives, elected mainly thanks to the quota mechanism, has led to an increased focus on issues concerning women's interests (i.e., women's rights, violence, sexual harassment), by representatives of both genders. In other words, I wanted to test the existence of substantive representation, i.e, speaking for and acting to support women's issues such as violence against women, sexual harassment and so on (Krook, 2007; Dalehrup, 2006) by both women and men. Indeed, several studies show that an increased number of elected women leads to greater attention to women's issues in the policy making process (Krook and Zetterberg, 2016). The results of the second hypothesis confirm previous studies (see for example Krook, 2007; Dalehrup, 2006; Krook and Zetterberg, 2016).

Thirdly, I sought to verify whether women representatives elected in the Democratic Party, more than their male colleagues, tend to propose bills in women's interest. The results, as outlined in Chapter 5, show that this is indeed true, thus bringing the following question: if female elected officials better represent women's interests, as shown by the changes that have occurred after the introduction of gender quotas, then who had been representing women's interest in the past?

Finally, I considered whether the women elected with the Democratic Party after the introduction of quotas have proposed more bills not only concerning women's interests, but also in other fields such as children and family, health, education, welfare policies and environment, as domains of common interest for the society as a whole. Results indicate that Democratic women deputies, elected after quotas were established, are indeed more active than their male counterparts in

proposing bills in all the above-listed fields, not only in those directly connected with women's interests and rights.

In light of this, it can be concluded that an increased number of women in politics would not only benefit women themselves, but everyone in the larger community.

This is why I would like to draw attention on the expression “glass ceiling”, defined as the invisible, yet unbreakable barrier that prevents women from reaching the top positions in politics, and suggest to call it “asbestos barrier” instead, as it is as harmful as asbestos itself. The lack of women at the top in politics seems to be harmful to society, and it is harmful to women and men alike, as well as to future generations, because a higher number of women in parliament leads to greater benefits for society as a whole. This confirms what Samuel Roundfield Lucas (2008, 2013) theorized and found: discrimination afftects not only its intended targets, be it women, ethnic minorities, migrants, etc.; it affects everybody, those subject to it and those who think they gain from preventing others – selected on the basis of sheer prejudice – to gain what they enjoy, including true freedom and the possibility to develop as a person. In fact, discrimination shapes a lose-lose situation, which should be the strongest reason for a change.

Appendix

Table A.1 European Countries: electoral system - quota type - women MPs - 2018

Country	Quota Type(s)	Results last election	% of women MPs
Albania	Legislated quotas for the Single/Lower House	39 of 140	27.9%
(List PR)	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level		
Austria	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level	63 of 183	34.4%
(List PR)	Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties		
Belgium	Legislated quotas for the Single/Lower House	59 of 150	39.3%
(List PR)	Legislated quotas for the Upper House		
	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level		
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Legislated quotas for the Single/Lower House	9 of 42	21.4%
(List PR)	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level		
Croatia	Legislated quotas for the Single/Lower House	19 of 151	12.6%
(List PR)	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level		
	Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties		
Cyprus	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level	10 of 80	12.5%
(List PR)	Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties		
Czech Republic	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level	44 of 200	22%
(List PR)	Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties		
Denmark	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level	67 of 179	37.4%
(List PR)			
France	Legislated quotas for the Single/Lower House	224 of 577	38.8%
(TRS)	Legislated quotas for the Upper House		
	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level		
	Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties		
Germany	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level	218 of 709	30.7%
(MMP)	Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties		

Greece	Legislated quotas for the Single/Lower House	59 of 300	19.7%
(List PR)	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level		
	Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties		
Hungary	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level	19 of 199	9.5%
(MMP)	Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties		
Iceland	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level	24 of 63	38.1%
(List PR)	Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties		
Ireland	Legislated quotas for the Single/Lower House	35 of 158	22.2%
(STV)			
Italy	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level	225 of 630	35.7%
(Parallel)	Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties		
Kosovo	Legislated quotas for the Single/Lower House	40 of 120	33.3%
(List PR)	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level		
Lithuania	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level	30 of 141	21.3%
(Parallel)	Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties		
Luxembourg	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level	14 of 60	23.3%
(List PR)	Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties		
Macedonia, former Yugoslav Republic (1993-)	Legislated quotas for the Single/Lower House	38 of 123	30.9%
(List PR)	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level		
Malta	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level	10 of 65	15.4%
(STV)	Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties		
Moldova, Republic of	Legislated quotas for the Single/Lower House	21 of 101	20.8%
(List PR)	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level		
Montenegro	Legislated quotas for the Single/Lower House	19 of 81	23.5%
(List PR)	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level		
Netherlands	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level	54 of 150	36%
(List PR)	Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties		
Norway	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level	70 of 169	41.4%

(List PR)	Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties		
Poland	Legislated quotas for the Single/Lower House	125 of 460	27.2%
(List PR)	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level		
Portugal	Legislated quotas for the Single/Lower House	72 of 230	31.3%
(List PR)	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level		
Romania	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level	68 of 329	20.7%
(List PR)	Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties		
Serbia	Legislated quotas for the Single/Lower House	85 of 250	34%
(List PR)	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level		
Slovakia	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level	30 of 150	20%
(List PR)	Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties		
Slovenia	Legislated quotas for the Single/Lower House	32 of 90	35.6%
(List PR)	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level		
	Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties		
Spain	Legislated quotas for the Single/Lower House	137 of 350	39.1%
(List PR)	Legislated quotas for the Upper House		
	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level		
	Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties		
Sweden	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level	152 of 349	43.6%
(List PR)	Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties		
Switzerland	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level	64 of 200	32%
(List PR)	Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties		
Ukraine	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level	49 of 450	10.9%
(Parallel)			
United Kingdom	Legislated quotas at the Sub-national level	208 of 650	32%
(FPTP)	Voluntary quotas adopted by political parties		
Source: The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance - www.idea.int			

Table A.2 Legislated candidate quotas around the world - 2018

LEGISLATED CANDIDATE QUOTAS AROUND THE WORLD		
This table lists all countries with legislated candidate quotas in the lower or single house in 2018		
Country	**Number of women elected**	**% women**
Albania	41 of 140	29.3%
Algeria	119 of 462	25.8%
Cameroon	56 of 180	31.1%
Cape Verde	17 of 72	23.6%
Chile	35 of 155	22.6%
Colombia	32 of 171	18.7%
Congo, Democratic Republic of	50 of 500	10%
Croatia	31 of 151	20.5%
El Salvador	26 of 84	31%
Greece	56 of 300	18.7%
Guinea	26 of 114	22.8%
Ireland	35 of 158	22.2%
Italy	225 of 630	35.7%
Kyrgyzstan	23 of 120	19.2%
Lesotho	28 of 122	23%
Liberia	9 of 73	12.3%
Libya	30 of 200	15%
Mali	13 of 147	8.8%
Mauritania	31 of 157	19.7%
Moldova, Republic of	26 of 101	25.7%
Mongolia	13 of 76	17.1%
Montenegro	19 of 81	23.5%
Nicaragua	41 of 92	44.6%
Poland	134 of 460	29.1%
Republic of The Congo (Brazzaville)	17 of 151	11.3%
San Marino	15 of 60	25%
Senegal	69 of 165	41.8%
Solomon Islands	2 of 50	4%
Thailand	79 of 500	15.8%
Timor-Leste	26 of 65	40%
Togo	15 of 91	16.5%
Tunisia	68 of 217	31.3%
Venezuela	37 of 167	22.2%
Viet Nam	132 of 494	26.7%
Total countries:	**34**	
Average % women:	**23.1%**	
Source: The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance - www.idea.int		

Table A.3 Reserved seats quotas around the world - 2018

RESERVED SEATS AROUND THE WORLD		
This table lists all countries with reserved seats quotas in the lower or single house in 2018		
Country	**Number of women elected**	**% women**
Afghanistan	68 of 250	27.2%
Bangladesh	72 of 350	20.6%
Burundi	44 of 121	36.4%
China	742 of 3000	24.7%
Djibouti	17 of 65	26.2%
Eritrea	33 of 150	0,22
Haiti	3 of 118	2.5%
Iraq	83 of 329	25.2%
Jordan	20 of 130	15.4%
Kenya	76 of 350	21.7%
Morocco	81 of 395	20.5%
Nepal	90 of 275	32.7%
Niger	29 of 171	0,17
Pakistan	69 of 342	20.2%
Rwanda	49 of 80	61.3%
Samoa	5 of 50	0,1
Saudi Arabia	30 of 151	19.9%
Somalia	67 of 275	24.4%
South Sudan	109 of 400	27.3%
Sudan	133 of 426	31.2%
Swaziland	5 of 69	7.2%
Tanzania, United Republic of	145 of 393	36.9%
Uganda	160 of 465	34.4%
Zimbabwe	86 of 270	31.9%
Total countries:	**24**	
Average % women:	**24.9%**	
Source: The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance - www.idea.int		

Table A.4 Voluntary political party quota around the world - 2018

VOLUNTARY POLITICAL PARTY QUOTA AROUND THE WORLD				
This table lists all countries with voluntary political quota in 2018				
Country	**Party**	**Acronym**	**Official Name**	**Details, Quota provisions**
Argentina	Justicialist Party	PJ	Partido Justicialista	The national statutes state that at all levels within the party, as well as on electoral lists, the representation of women must be respected. This is specified in the provincial party statutes, percentages varying between 30 and 50 percent.

Australia	Australian Labor Party	ALP		In 2002 the ALP introduced a 40 per cent quota for party positions, union delegations and for pre-selection for public office and positions at a State and federal level, building on a 35 per cent quota introduced in 1994. Either of the sexes shall be represented by no less than 40 per cent on party electoral lists. (National Platform and Constitution 2009, Article 10a.) The ALP has adopted a 50 per cent gender diversity target for government boards to be achieved within the first term of a Labor government and 40 per cent for women's representation in Chair and Deputy Chair positions on government boards by 2025 (National Platform 2018)
Austria	The Greens-Green Alternative	GA	Die Grünen-Die Grünen Alternativen	GA has a 50 per cent quota for women on party lists (1993).
Austria	Austrian People's party	ÖVP	Österreichische Volkspartei	ÖVP has a 33.3 per cent quota for women on party lists (1995).
Austria	Social Democratic Party of Austria	SPÖ	Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs	SPÖ has a 40 per cent quota for women on party lists (1985).
Bolivia	National Unity Front	UN	Unidad Nacional	In Article 31 of its founding statutes from 2003, UN writes that women shall be represented by 50 percent at all levels of the party structures, including candidate lists. This has not always been put into practice.
Botswana	Botswana Congress Party	BCP		In 1999 the Botswana Congress Party introduced a 30 percent quota for women on electoral lists. The party has not always met this target. However, in the 2010 national congress elections the party managed to reach the 30 percent target.
Botswana	Botswana National Front	BNF		In 1999 the Botswana National Front introduced a 30 percent quota for women on electoral lists. The party has not always met this target.
Cameroon	Cameroon People's Democratic Movement	RDPC	Rassemblement démocratique du Peuple Camerounais	In 1996 the Cameeroon Peoples Democratic Movement introduced a 25-30 percent quota for women on electoral lists.
Cameroon	Social Democratic Front	SDF	Front Social Démocrate	SDF has adopted a 25 percent quota.
Canada	New Democratic Party	NDP		In 1985 the NDP adopted a target of 50 percent women among its candidates at federal elections. It has also adopted (and is enforcing) a policy whereby, in each federal riding, at least one woman must be in the running at the nomination stage.
Canada	Liberal Party of Canada	LPC		In 1993 the LPC set a target to elect 25 percent women.
Chile	Party for Democracy	PPD	Partido por la Democracia	Neither men nor women should be represented on electoral lists by more than 60 percent (Party statutes, article 7). However, this provision has been weakly enforced (Ríos Tobar, et al. 2008, p. 18, 24).
Chile	Socialist Party of Chile	PS	Partido Socialista de Chile	Since 2003, the quota has been twofold: Neither of the sexes shall be represented on electoral lists by more than 60 percent; neither sex shall occupy more than 70 percent of the seats in parliament (Party statutes, Article 40). However, this provision has not been adhered to in practice (Ríos Tobar, et al. 2008, p. 18, 24).
Chile	Christian Democratic Party	PDC	Partido Demócrata Cristiano	According to article 105 of the party statutes, PDC has a 20 percent quota for women on electoral lists. This provision was adopted in 1996 but has been weakly enforced (Ríos Tobar, et al. 2008, p. 18, 24).

Costa Rica	National Liberation Party	PLN	Partido Liberación Nacional	PLN alternates men and women candidates on electoral lists (Article 85 and 108, party statutes; Jager Contreras 2008, p 15-19).Nominations to be defined by provincial election in National Plenary Assembly, is to respect the representation of at least 40% for each gender. (Article 85, Partido Liberacion Nacional Estatuto).
Costa Rica	Christian-Social Unity Party	PUSC	Partido Unidad Socialcristiana	PUSC alternates men and women candidates on electoral lists (Article 65, party statutes; Jager Contreras 2008, p 15-19). In the integration of all party structures, no more than 60% of its members shall be of the same gender, except for the District Assemblies and the Womens Front. (Article 10, Partido Unidad Social Cristiania Estatuto). The configuration of all candidate lists to elected office shall be held in such a way that no more than 60% of the members are of the same gender. (Article 61, Partido Unidad Social Cristiania Estatuto).
Costa Rica	Citizen Action Party	PAC	Partido Accion Ciudadana	50 percent of the candidates must be women, placed at every second place (zipper system) on electoral lists (Article 36, party statutes; Jager Contreras 2008, p 15-19).
Costa Rica	Libertarian Movement Party	PML	Partido Movimiento Libertario	At least 40% of the seats to be allocated, in a possible government of the Libertarian Movement Party, will be occupied by women. Future internal party structures shall be formed with at least 40% women. The positions to elective office that are presented by the party must be integrated of at least 40% of women, who must be placed in electable positions. (Article 72, Partido Movimiento Libertario Estatuto).
Cote d'Ivoire	Ivorian Popular Front	FPI	Front Populaire Ivoirien	Since 2001 the Ivorian Public Front has a 30 percent quota for women at all levels of its structures, including electoral candidate lists. The quota has not always been put into practice. (FPI statutes, article 14, June 2009.)
Croatia	Social Democratic Party	SDP	Socijaldemokratska Partija Hrvatske	In 1996 SDP introduced a voluntary party quota of 40 percent. In 2000 the party adopted a formal 40 percent quota for men and women on electoral lists, but no rank-order rules.
Cyprus	Movement of Social Democrats	KISOS	Kinima Sosialdimokraton	KISOS has a 30 percent quota for women.
Cyprus	Democratic Rally of Cyprus	DISY	Dimokratikos Synagermos	DISY has a 30 per cent (30%) gender quota in its candidates for the parliament, municipal and European elections, as well as for the party's internal structures.
Czech Republic	Social Democrats	ČSSD	Česká strana sociálně demokratická	25 percent of those elected by the party must be women. If a local party organization has failed to nominate 25 percent women among its top candidates, then the Social Democratic Women's Organization has the right to nominate extra women.
El Salvador	National Liberation Front Farabundo Mart	FMLN	Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional	FMLN has a 35 percent quota for women (party statutes of 1996, article 9).

Equatorial Guinea	Social Democratic Convergence	CPDS	Convergencia para la Democracia Social	Social Democratic Convergence has adopted a gender quota.
Ethiopia	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front	EPRDF		In 2004, Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front has a 30 percent party quota.
France	Socialist Party	PS	Parti Socialiste	The PS has a 50 percent quota for electoral lists (1990).
Germany	Social Democratic Party of Germany	SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	At least 40 % of each gender in boards and lists (Party Statutes, Article 11 [2], Electoral Code of the Party, Article 4 and 8 [2]).
Germany	The Left Party		Die Linkspartei	On nomination lists, the first two and then every other place are reserved for women (Party Statutes, Article 10 [5]).
Germany	Alliance 90/The Greens		Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	Since 1986, Alliance 90/The Greens have had a 50 percent quota for women on party lists (Geissel 2008, p. 61).
Germany	Christian Democratic Union	CDU	Christlich-Demokratische Union	At least one-third of CDU electoral lists and party officials should be women (1996). If this quota is not met, the internal elections have to be repeated (Party Statutes, Article 15 [2-3]; Geissel 2008, p. 62).
Greece	Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement	PASOK	Panellenio Sosialistiko Kimena	PASOK has a 40 percent minimum quota for women on party lists (Socialist International Women).
Guatemala	National Unity for Hope Party	UNE	Unidad Nacional de Esperanza	UNE has a 40 percent quota for women on electoral lists since 2007 (López Robles 2008, p. 15).
Guatemala	Guatemalan Revolutionary Unity	URNG	Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca	At least 30 percent of each sex should be represented on electoral lists (2002; López Robles 2008, p. 14).
Hungary	Hungarian Socialist Party	MSzP	Magyar Szocialista Párt	MSzP has a 20 percent quota for women (Ványi, 2016; Fodor, 2013).
Hungary	Politics Can be Different	LMP	Lehet Mas a Politika	In the party's National Assembly and European Parliament electoral lists maximum two repeated candidates of the same sex may follow each other.
Iceland	The Social Democratic Alliance	S	Samfylkingin	At electoral lists, the main rule is to strive towards gender equality. In all elected bodies within the party, each sex should be represented with no less than 40 percent. If, among the candidates, one sex is represented by less than 40 percent, these candidates will be nominated without a vote. (Party statutes 1999, article 2:10.)
Iceland	The Left-Green Movement	VG	Vinstrihreyfingin-grænt framboð	When candidates are chosen for positions at all levels in the party structure, as well as for electoral lists, gender equality shall be observed. (Party Statutes 1999, article 3.)
Iceland	Progressive Party (Centre Party)		Framsóknarflokkur	When choosing candidates to all levels of the internal party structures and for electoral lists, each sex must be represented with at least 40 percent, unless for obvious and manifest impediments.(Party statutes 2005, article 13:8.)

Iceland	The Women's Party		Kvennalistinn	An all women's party. The Party existed 1982-1999, and received up to 10 percent of the votes in parliament.
Israel	Israel Labor Party	ILP	Ha'avoda	At least 20% of the party list must be filled with women, 2 out of each 10 names. The (minimal) reserved places on the party's candidates list are: 5, 9, 14, 19, 24, 29 (and also 34, 36, 39, 42, 45).
Israel	Meretz-Yachad			At least 40% of each sex must be represented on the party list, 2 out of each 5 names (besides the 1th on the list, which is the party's chairman or chairwoman). The (minimal) reserved places for the under-represented sex on the party's candidates list are: 4, 6, 9, 11
Israel	Likud			The (minimal) reserved places for women on the party's list of candidates are: 10, 20, 24, 29, and 34.
Israel	The Jewish Home		Haba'it Ha'ye'hudi	The (minimal) reserved places for women on the party's candidates list are: 4, 8.
Israel	National Democratic Assembly		Balad	At least 33% of the party list must be filled with women candidates, 1 out of each 3 names.
Italy	Democratic Party	PD	Partito Democratico	PD has a 50 percent quota for women, placed with strict alternation on electoral lists. (Party statutes 2008, article 19).
Kenya	Democratic Party	DP	Democratic Party	The Democratic Party has a policy of affirmative action that reserves one third of all seats for women (which has not always been put into practice).
Kenya	SAFINA Party	SAFINA	SAFINA Party	Constitution : The party Election Rules and Procedures provide that at least 1/3 of all elected officials in the branch or national level should be of either gender. (Article 1.1 Pg.18 Nomination rules and Procedures Parliamentary and civic Candidates)
Kenya	National Rainbow Coalition	NARC	National Rainbow Coalition	Constitution: party's gender policy is that 1/3 of all nominated persons should at a minimum come from each gender.
Korea, Republic of	Grand National Party	GNP	Hannara Dang	GNP supports quotas of 30 percent for women candidates. (see Kim 2000)
Lithuania	Social Democratic Party	LSDP	Lietuvos socialdemokratų partija	SDP has a quota on at least one-third of either sex.
Luxemburg	Christian Social People's Party	CSV	Chrëschtlech Sozial Volleкspartei	The party is targeting a 33 percent quota for women on their party lists.
Luxemburg	The Left		Déi Lénk	The party applies a 50 percent quota in the party body and on the electoral lists.
Luxemburg	Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party	LSAP	Lëtzebuerger Sozialistesch Arbechterpartei	LSAP has adopted a quota for internal positions (about 33 percent). The target is parity.
Luxemburg	The Green Party		Déi Gréng/Les Verts	The party seeks to apply parity in party bodies, positions and on lists.
Malawi	United Democratic Front	UDF		The UDF aims to have 25 percent of its parliamentary seats held by women, according to the party constitution.

Malawi	Malawi Congress Party	MCP		The MCP aims to allocate 33 percent of the seats to women at all levels of the party structure. Additionaly, according to the party Manifesto, MCP will 'ensure that women occupy 30 per cent or more of all decision, policy and managerial positions in the government' (MCP Manifesto of 2004, article 6.6a).
Mali	Alliance for Democracy in Mali	ADEMA - PASJ	Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali/Parti Africain pour la Solidarité et la Justice	ADEMA - PASJ has a 30 percent quota. (Gerapetritis, G. 2015. Affirmative Action Policies and Judicial Review Worldwide, page189)
Malta	Labour Party	MLP	Partit Laburista	The Labour Party has 20 percent quota for women on party lists.
Mexico	Institutional Revolutionary Party	PRI	Partido Revolucionario Instituional	PRI has a 50 percent quota for women (article 38, party statutes).
Mozambique	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique	FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique	FRELIMO has used gender quotas since 1994. The party's policy requires that 40% of candidates to national assembly and local government should be women. In addition, the quota system was accompanied by a commitment to balance the distribution of men and women through the list. Currently, FRELIMO holds 191 seats of a total of 250 in the national assembly, in effect a three-fourths majority.
Namibia	South West Africa People's Organisation	SWAPO		SWAPO has a 50 percent quota with a zebra-system (alternation between men and women) for women on electoral lists for local elections.
Netherlands	Labour Party	PvdA	Native name	National lists are in principle alternated between men and women, although other concerns such as age and ethnicity are also considered. Congress has the last say on the composition of lists (1987).
Netherlands	Green Left	GL	GroenLinks	GL has quotas for women (percentage not confirmed).
New Zealand	The Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand			The Green Party adopted a 50/50 % quota in 2015; “In Government, it will ensure half of all Green Cabinet Ministers are women”
New Zealand	Labour			The Moderating Committee must, in determining the list, ensure that for any percentage of the Party Vote likely to be obtained, and taking into account the electorate MPs likely to be elected with that level of Labour support, the resultant Caucus will comprise at least 50% women (Party constitution, article 8.47)
Nicaragua	Sandinista Front for National Liberation	FSLN	Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional	FSLN has a 30 percent quota for women (Party statutes, Article 106; Samqui 2008, p. 8). PLC has a combined 40 percent quota for women and youth on electoral lists (Party statutes, Article 76; Samqui 2008, p. 8). FSLN has a 30 percent quota for women (Party statutes, Article 106; Samqui 2008, p. 8).
Nicaragua	Liberal and constitutionalist party	PLC	Partido Liberal Constitutcionalista	PLC has a combined 40 percent quota for women and youth on electoral lists (Party statutes, Article 76; Samqui 2008, p. 8). PLC has a combined 40 percent quota for women and youth on electoral lists (Party statutes, Article 76; Samqui 2008, p. 8).

Nicaragua	Sandinista Renovation Movement	MRS	Alianza del Movimiento Renovador Sandinista	Candidate lists must consist of at least 40 percent women and men, respectively (Party statutes, Article 7; Samqui 2008, p. 8). Candidate lists must consist of at least 40 percent women and men, respectively (Party statutes, Article 7; Samqui 2008, p. 8).
Niger	National Movement for a Society in Development	MNSD-NASSARA	Mouvement National pour la Société de Développement	Prior to multiparty elections in the 1990s, the MNSD set aside 5 seats for women through the quota system adopted by the party. In 1999 the party adopted a 10 percent quota for women on electoral lists (party statutes, article 93).
Norway	Socialist Left Party	SV	Sosialistisk Venstreparti	Since 1975, SV has had a 40 percent quota for both sexes on electoral lists (Freidenvall, et. al. 2006, p. 71).
Norway	Norwegian Labour Party	DNA	Det Norske Arbeiderparti	In all election lists there is a 50 percent quota for both sexes, and both sexes shall be represented in the first two positions (Party Constitution, §12:9). Quotas first used in 1983 (Matland 2005).
Norway	Centre Party	SP	Senterpartiet	There is a 40 percent quota for either sex in all elections and nominations, since 1989 (Laws of the Centre Party, §4:4).
Norway	Christian People's Party	KrF	Kristelig Folkeparti	KrF has had a 40 percent quota for both sexes since 1993 (Freidenvall, et. al. 2006, p. 71).
Paraguay	National Republic Association	ANR	Asociación Nacional Republicana/Partido Colorado	ANR has a 30 percent quota for women on electoral lists (Party statues 2001, Article 72; Pereira and González 2008, p. 4-5).
Paraguay	Authentic Radical Liberal Party	PLRA	Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico	One third of candidates on electoral lists must be women (Party statutes 2006, Article 9; Pereira and González 2008, p. 4-5).
Paraguay	National Union of Ethical Citizens	UNACE	Partido Unión Nacional de Ciudadanos Éticos	UNACE has a 30 percent quota for women on electoral lists (Party statutes 2002, Article 76; Pereira and González 2008, p. 4-5).
Paraguay	Party for a Country of Solidarity	PPS	Partido País Solidario	PPS has a 30 percent quota for women on electoral lists. There is also a rank-order rule for the first third of places on electoral lists, stipulating that male and female candidates are placed alternately (Party statutes 2002, Article 76; Pereira and González 2008, p. 4-5).
Philippines	Gabriela Women's Party			An all Women's party, representing 250 women's organisations. The party got 4.2 percent of the votes in the 2016 national elections.
Philippines	Philippines Democratic Socialist Party	PDSP	Partido Demokratiko-Sosyalista ng Pilipinas	PDSP has a 25 percent quota for women.
Philippines	Akbayan		Akbayan Citizen's Action Party	Instituted a quota to ensure that at least 30% of its leadership positions are occupied by women (Article II, sec.6. a.)
Romania	Social Democratic Party of Romania	PSDR	Partidul Social Democrat Romania	The PSDR had a 25 percent quota for women on party lists. The party is now, since 2001, a member of the Partidul Social Democrat (PSD), the Social Democratic Party.
Romania	Democratic Party	PD	Partidul Democrat	The Democratic Party has adopted a 30 percent quota.

Romania	Social Democratic Party	PSD	Partidul Social Democrat	In 2001 PSDR (Romanian Social Democratic Party) and PDSR (Socialist Democratic Party of Romania) merged into a new political party; PSD. Prior to the 2004 election PSD adopted a 30 percent gender quota.
Slovakia	Communist Party of Slovakia	KSS	Komunistická strana Slovenska	One woman among the eight first candidates. The party is not represented in parliament after the 2006 election.
Slovakia	Alliance of the New Citizen	ANO	Aliancia Nového Obcana	ANO has an informal 33 percent quota for women. The party is not represented in parliament after the 2006 election.
Slovakia	Party of the Democratic Left	SDL	Strana Demokratickej Lavice	SDL had a 20 percent quota for women on party lists. The party merged with the social democratic SMER. SMER has no quota for women.
Slovakia	People's Party - Movement for a Democratic Slovakia	HZDS	Ľudová strana - Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko	HZDS has a parity target.
Slovenia	Social Democrats	SD	Socialni Demokrati	In 1992 the United List of Social Democrats introduced a firm 33 percent quota for both genders. In the 1996 election 42 percent of the party's candidates were women, but not even one of these got elected. The quota was changed from firm to soft in 1997, and the party has currently a 40 percent target. (In 2005 the party shortened it's name to Socialni Demokrati).
Slovenia	Liberal Democracy Party	LDS	Liberalna Demokracija Slovenije	In 1998 the quota was changed to a gender neutral 25 percent, but is supposed to increase by 3 percentage points in every upcoming election until it reaches 40 percent.
South Africa	African National Congress	ANC		In 2006 ANC adopted a 50% gender quota in local elections. The quota was extended to national elections as well in 2009. The party statute reads: 'the provision of a quota of not less than fifty percent of women in all elected structures' (ANC Constitution, Article 6 [1]). Currently, ANC has won 264 seats in the national assembly, little less than two-thirds majority.
Spain	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	PSOE	Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol	Since 1997, PSOE has a 40 percent quota for either sex (party statutes, 2009, article 7k). The party first introduced a quota rule, at 25 percent, in 1988.
Spain	United Left	IU	Izquierda Unida	Since 1997, IU has a 40 percent quota for either sex (party statutes 2008, article 7). The quota was first introduced in 1989, at 25 percent.
Spain	Socialist Party of Catalonia	PSC	Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya	PSC has a 40 percent quota for either sex (2000). The quota was first introduced in 1982 (12 percent) and enlarged in 1987 (15 percent), 1990 (25 percent) and 1996 (30 percent).
Spain	Initiative for Catalonia- Green	ICV	Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds	ICV has a 40 percent quota for either sex (2002). The quota was first introduced in 1991 (30 percent).
Spain	Republican Left of Catalonia	ERC	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya	ERC has a 40 percent quota for either sex (2004).
Spain	Nationalist Galician Block	BNG	Bloque Nacionalista Galego	Quotas were approved by BNG in 2002 (40 percent quota for either sex).
Spain	Canarian Coalition	CC	Coalición Canaria	A 40 percent quota for either sex was approved by CC in 2000. (Party statutes, 2008, article 4:18.)
Sweden	Social Democratic Party	S	Socialdemokraterna	Party quotas: Zipper system (one sex alternates the other on party lists) (1993). Internal quotas since 1978

Sweden	Left Party	V	Vänsterpartiet	Party quotas: A 50% minimum quota for women on party lists (1993). First party quota rule introduced in 1987. Internal quotas since 1978.
Sweden	Green Party	MP	Miljöpartiet de Gröna	Party quota: A 50 % gender quota on party lists, plus or minus one person (1997). First party quota rule introduced in 1987.Internal quotas since 1981.
Sweden	Moderate Party	M	Moderaterna	Party quotas: Two women and two men shall be placed on the top four positions on the party list for the election to the European Parliament in 2009.
Switzerland	Social Democratic Party of Switzerland	SPS/PSS	Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz	The party has a 40 percent quota for women on party lists.
Tanzania, United Republic of	Chama cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party)	CCM		Section 204 of the 2010 CCM Manifesto set out to attain 50-percent women representation in all elective bodies by 2015(CCM Manifesto 2005:127).
Thailand	Democrat Party	DP	Pak Prachatipat	The Democrat Party has a target of 30 percent women candidates for election
Turkey	People´s Democracy Party	HDP	Halklarin Demokratik Partisi	The People's Democracy Party (HDP) has a gender quota of 50%. "We're nominating woman candidates from the first spots for each and every local assembly elections across Turkey. We're enacting the 'zipper system'. As a result, HDP has nominated 39 woman co-chairs for the 39 provinces of Istanbul and a total of 333 women to run for local assemblies." (HDP Official Website).
United Kingdom	Liberal Democrats			Article 2.5: "Whenever this Constitution provides for the election by party members to a Federal Committee, not less than 40% or, if 40% is not a whole number, the whole number nearest to but not exceeding 40% of those elected shall selfidentify as men or non-binary people, and self-identify as women or non-binary people respectively" (The Federal Constitution of the Liberal Democrats, 2018).
United Kingdom	Labour Party			The Labour Party's commitment is that 50% of all winnable parliamentary seats will select from All Women Shortlists.
Uruguay	Socialist Party of Uruguay	PS	Partido Socialista del Uruguay	In the 1980's PS adopted a quota for women. The quota is dependent upon the percentage of women members of the Party in each jurisdiction. (Statutes 2003, Art. 65)
Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front	ZANU-PF		ZANU-PF is committed to ensure that at least one-third of all candidates are female. However, this quota has not been systematically applied.
Zimbabwe	Movement for democratic change AM	MDC-AM		-
Source: The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance - www.idea.int				

Table A.5 Percentage of women MPs by country - world classification - 2018

Percentage of women in national parliaments by country									
WORLD CLASSIFICATION									
Rank	Country	Lower or single House				Upper House or Senate			
		Elections	Seats*	Women	% W	Elections	Seats*	Women	% W
1	Rwanda	16.09.2013	80	49	61.3%	26.09.2011	26	10	38.5%
2	Cuba	11.03.2018	605	322	53.2%	---	---	---	---

3	Bolivia	12.10.2014	130	69	53.1%	12.10.2014	36	17	47.2%
4	Grenada	13.03.2018	15	7	46.7%	27.03.2013	13	2	15.4%
5	Namibia	29.11.2014	104	48	46.2%	08.12.2015	41	10	24.4%
6	Nicaragua	06.11.2016	92	42	45.7%	---	---	---	---
7	Costa Rica	04.02.2018	57	26	45.6%	---	---	---	---
8	Sweden	14.09.2014	349	152	43.6%	---	---	---	---
9	Mexico	07.06.2015	500	213	42.6%	01.07.2012	128	47	36.7%
10	South Africa	07.05.2014	394	167	42.4%	21.05.2014	54	19	35.2%
11	Finland	19.04.2015	200	84	42.0%	---	---	---	---
12	Senegal	30.07.2017	165	69	41.8%	---	---	---	---
13	Norway	11.09.2017	169	70	41.4%	---	---	---	---
14	Mozambique	15.10.2014	250	99	39.6%	---	---	---	---
15	Spain	26.06.2016	350	137	39.1%	26.06.2016	266	101	38.0%
16	France	11.06.2017	577	225	39.0%	24.09.2017	348	102	29.3%
17	Argentina	22.10.2017	257	100	38.9%	22.10.2017	72	30	41.7%
18	Ethiopia	24.05.2015	547	212	38.8%	05.10.2015	153	49	32.0%
19	New Zealand	23.09.2017	120	46	38.3%	---	---	---	---
20	Iceland	28.10.2017	63	24	38.1%	---	---	---	---
21	Belgium	25.05.2014	150	57	38.0%	03.07.2014	60	30	50.0%
22	Ecuador	19.02.2017	137	52	38.0%	---	---	---	---
23	The F.Y.R. of Macedonia	11.12.2016	120	45	37.5%	---	---	---	---
24	Denmark	18.06.2015	179	67	37.4%	---	---	---	---
25	United Republic of Tanzania	25.10.2015	390	145	37.2%	---	---	---	---
26	Slovenia	13.07.2014	90	33	36.7%	22.11.2017	39	4	10.3%
27	Burundi	29.06.2015	121	44	36.4%	24.07.2015	43	18	41.9%
28	Netherlands	15.03.2017	150	54	36.0%	26.05.2015	75	26	34.7%
29	Italy	04.03.2018	630	225	35.7%	04.03.2018	320	113	35.3%
30	Portugal	04.10.2015	230	80	34.8%	---	---	---	---
31	Belarus	11.09.2016	110	38	34.5%	30.08.2012	56	17	30.4%
32	Austria	15.10.2017	183	63	34.4%	N.A.	61	19	31.1%
33	Serbia	24.04.2016	250	86	34.4%	---	---	---	---
34	Uganda	18.02.2016	449	154	34.3%	---	---	---	---
35	Monaco	14.02.2018	24	8	33.3%	---	---	---	---
36	Zimbabwe	31.07.2013	250	83	33.2%	31.07.2013	79	38	48.1%
37	Nepal	26.11.2017	275	90	32.7%	07.02.2018	59	22	37.3%
38	Switzerland	18.10.2015	200	65	32.5%	23.10.2011	46	7	15.2%
39	Timor-Leste	22.07.2017	65	21	32.3%	---	---	---	---
40	Andorra	01.03.2015	28	9	32.1%	---	---	---	---
41	United Kingdom	08.06.2017	650	208	32.0%	N.A.	805	207	25.7%
42	Guyana	11.05.2015	69	22	31.9%	---	---	---	---
43	Tunisia	26.10.2014	217	68	31.3%	---	---	---	---
44	Cameroon	30.09.2013	180	56	31.1%	25.03.2018	100	?	?
45	Trinidad and Tobago	07.09.2015	42	13	31.0%	23.09.2015	31	9	29.0%
46	Germany	24.09.2017	709	218	30.7%	N.A.	69	27	39.1%
47	Angola	23.08.2017	220	67	30.5%	---	---	---	---
48	Sudan	13.04.2015	426	130	30.5%	01.06.2015	54	19	35.2%
49	Philippines	09.05.2016	292	86	29.5%	09.05.2016	24	6	25.0%
50	Australia	02.07.2016	150	43	28.7%	02.07.2016	76	31	40.8%

51	South Sudan	04.08.2016	383	109	28.5%	05.08.2011	50	6	12.0%
52	Luxembourg	20.10.2013	60	17	28.3%	---	---	---	---
53	Poland	25.10.2015	460	129	28.0%	25.10.2015	100	14	14.0%
54	Albania	25.06.2017	140	39	27.9%	---	---	---	---
55	Afghanistan	18.09.2010	249	69	27.7%	10.01.2015	68	18	26.5%
56	Peru	10.04.2016	130	36	27.7%	---	---	---	---
57	Israel	17.03.2015	120	33	27.5%	---	---	---	---
58	Lao People's Democratic Republic	20.03.2016	149	41	27.5%	---	---	---	---
59	Kazakhstan	20.03.2016	107	29	27.1%	28.06.2017	47	5	10.6%
60	Canada	19.10.2015	337	91	27.0%	N.A.	94	43	45.7%
61	Dominican Republic	15.05.2016	190	51	26.8%	15.05.2016	32	3	9.4%
62	Estonia	01.03.2015	101	27	26.7%	---	---	---	---
63	San Marino	20.11.2016	60	16	26.7%	---	---	---	---
64	Viet Nam	22.05.2016	494	132	26.7%	---	---	---	---
65	Algeria	04.05.2017	462	119	25.8%	29.12.2015	143	10	7.0%
66	Suriname	24.05.2015	51	13	25.5%	---	---	---	---
67	Iraq	30.04.2014	328	83	25.3%	---	---	---	---
68	Mauritania	23.11.2013	147	37	25.2%	---	---	---	---
69	Dominica	08.12.2014	32	8	25.0%	---	---	---	---
70	China	05.03.2018	2980	742	24.9%	---	---	---	---
71	Turkmenistan	25.03.2018	125	31	24.8%	---	---	---	---
72	Somalia	23.10.2016	275	67	24.4%	23.10.2016	54	13	24.1%
73	Bulgaria	26.03.2017	240	57	23.8%	---	---	---	---
74	Cabo Verde	20.03.2016	72	17	23.6%	---	---	---	---
75	Montenegro	16.10.2016	81	19	23.5%	---	---	---	---
76	Djibouti	23.02.2018	65	15	23.1%	---	---	---	---
77	Singapore	11.09.2015	100	23	23.0%	---	---	---	---
78	Republic of Moldova	30.11.2014	101	23	22.8%	---	---	---	---
79	Chile	19.11.2017	155	35	22.6%	19.11.2017	43	10	23.3%
80	United Arab Emirates	03.10.2015	40	9	22.5%	---	---	---	---
81	Ireland	26.02.2016	158	35	22.2%	25.04.2016	60	18	30.0%
82	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	06.12.2015	167	37	22.2%	---	---	---	---
83	Lesotho	03.06.2017	122	27	22.1%	11.07.2017	32	8	25.0%
84	Czech Republic	20.10.2017	200	44	22.0%	07.10.2016	80	15	18.8%
85	Eritrea	01.02.1994	150	33	22.0%	---	---	---	---
86	Guinea	28.09.2013	114	25	21.9%	---	---	---	---
87	Kenya	08.07.2017	349	76	21.8%	08.07.2017	68	21	30.9%
88	Bosnia and Herzegovina	12.10.2014	42	9	21.4%	29.01.2015	15	2	13.3%
89	Lithuania	09.10.2016	141	30	21.3%	---	---	---	---
90	Seychelles	08.09.2016	33	7	21.2%	---	---	---	---
91	Honduras	26.11.2017	128	27	21.1%	---	---	---	---
92	Romania	11.12.2016	329	68	20.7%	11.12.2016	136	19	14.0%
93	Pakistan	11.05.2013	340	70	20.6%	03.03.2018	104	20	19.2%
94	Morocco	07.10.2016	395	81	20.5%	02.10.2015	120	14	11.7%
95	Bangladesh	05.01.2014	350	71	20.3%	---	---	---	---

96	Cambodia	28.07.2013	123	25	20.3%	25.02.2018	60	10	16.7%
97	Uruguay	26.10.2014	99	20	20.2%	26.10.2014	31	9	29.0%
98	Equatorial Guinea	12.11.2017	100	20	20.0%	12.11.2017	72	11	15.3%
99	Slovakia	05.03.2016	150	30	20.0%	---	---	---	---
100	Saudi Arabia	02.12.2016	151	30	19.9%	---	---	---	---
101	Indonesia	09.04.2014	560	111	19.8%	---	---	---	---
102	United States of America	08.11.2016	431	84	19.5%	08.11.2016	100	22	22.0%
103	Kyrgyzstan	04.10.2015	120	23	19.2%	---	---	---	---
104	Madagascar	20.12.2013	151	29	19.2%	29.12.2015	63	13	20.6%
105	Tajikistan	01.03.2015	63	12	19.0%	27.03.2015	32	7	21.9%
106	Croatia	11.09.2016	151	28	18.5%	---	---	---	---
107	Greece	20.09.2015	300	55	18.3%	---	---	---	---
108	Panama	04.05.2014	71	13	18.3%	---	---	---	---
109	Sao Tome and Principe	12.10.2014	55	10	18.2%	---	---	---	---
110	Armenia	02.04.2017	105	19	18.1%	---	---	---	---
111	Zambia	11.08.2016	167	30	18.0%	---	---	---	---
112	Cyprus	22.05.2016	56	10	17.9%	---	---	---	---
113	Togo	25.07.2013	91	16	17.6%	---	---	---	---
114	Jamaica	22.02.2016	63	11	17.5%	10.03.2016	21	5	23.8%
115	Gabon	17.12.2011	117	20	17.1%	13.12.2014	102	18	17.6%
116	Mongolia	29.06.2016	76	13	17.1%	---	---	---	---
117	Niger	21.02.2016	171	29	17.0%	---	---	---	---
118	Republic of Korea	13.04.2016	300	51	17.0%	---	---	---	---
119	Azerbaijan	01.11.2015	125	21	16.8%	---	---	---	---
120	Barbados	21.02.2013	30	5	16.7%	06.03.2013	21	5	23.8%
121	Malawi	20.05.2014	192	32	16.7%	---	---	---	---
122	Saint Lucia	06.06.2016	18	3	16.7%	05.01.2012	11	3	27.3%
123	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	09.03.2014	687	112	16.3%	---	---	---	---
124	Fiji	17.09.2014	50	8	16.0%	---	---	---	---
125	Georgia	08.10.2016	150	24	16.0%	---	---	---	---
126	Latvia	04.10.2014	100	16	16.0%	---	---	---	---
127	Libya	25.06.2014	188	30	16.0%	---	---	---	---
128	Uzbekistan	21.12.2014	150	24	16.0%	13.01.2015	100	17	17.0%
129	Russian Federation	18.09.2016	450	71	15.8%	N.A.	170	29	17.1%
130	Jordan	20.09.2016	130	20	15.4%	27.09.2016	65	10	15.4%
131	Colombia	11.03.2018	166	25	15.1%	11.03.2018	102	31	30.4%
132	Egypt	17.10.2015	596	89	14.9%	---	---	---	---
133	Turkey	01.11.2015	549	80	14.6%	---	---	---	---
134	Paraguay	21.04.2013	80	11	13.8%	21.04.2013	45	9	20.0%
135	Guinea-Bissau	13.04.2014	102	14	13.7%	---	---	---	---
136	Saint Kitts and Nevis	16.02.2015	15	2	13.3%	---	---	---	---
137	Syrian Arab Republic	13.04.2016	250	33	13.2%	---	---	---	---

138	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	09.12.2015	23	3	13.0%	---	---	---	---
139	Bahamas	24.05.2017	39	5	12.8%	24.05.2017	16	7	43.8%
140	Chad	13.02.2011	188	24	12.8%	---	---	---	---
141	Ghana	07.12.2016	275	35	12.7%	---	---	---	---
142	Guatemala	06.09.2015	158	20	12.7%	---	---	---	---
143	Palau	01.11.2016	16	2	12.5%	01.11.2016	13	2	15.4%
144	Ukraine	26.10.2014	423	52	12.3%	---	---	---	---
145	Liechtenstein	05.02.2017	25	3	12.0%	---	---	---	---
146	Malta	03.06.2017	67	8	11.9%	---	---	---	---
147	India	07.04.2014	542	64	11.8%	23.03.2017	244	29	11.9%
148	Mauritius	10.12.2014	69	8	11.6%	---	---	---	---
149	Congo	16.07.2017	151	17	11.3%	31.08.2017	71	14	19.7%
150	Antigua and Barbuda	21.03.2018	18	2	11.1%	26.03.2018	17	9	52.9%
151	Burkina Faso	29.11.2015	127	14	11.0%	---	---	---	---
152	Brazil	05.10.2014	513	55	10.7%	05.10.2014	81	12	14.8%
153	Cote d'Ivoire	18.12.2016	255	27	10.6%	---	---	---	---
154	Nauru	09.07.2016	19	2	10.5%	---	---	---	---
155	Malaysia	05.05.2013	222	23	10.4%	N.A.	68	15	22.1%
156	Gambia	06.04.2017	58	6	10.3%	---	---	---	---
157	Myanmar	08.11.2015	433	44	10.2%	08.11.2015	221	23	10.4%
158	Hungary	06.04.2014	199	20	10.1%	---	---	---	---
159	Japan	22.10.2017	465	47	10.1%	10.07.2016	242	50	20.7%
160	Samoa	04.03.2016	50	5	10.0%	---	---	---	---
161	Liberia	10.10.2017	71	7	9.9%	20.12.2014	30	3	10.0%
162	Qatar	01.07.2013	41	4	9.8%	---	---	---	---
163	Botswana	24.10.2014	63	6	9.5%	---	---	---	---
164	Belize	04.11.2015	32	3	9.4%	13.11.2015	13	2	15.4%
165	Brunei Darussalam	13.01.2017	33	3	9.1%	---	---	---	---
166	Marshall Islands	16.11.2015	33	3	9.1%	---	---	---	---
167	Democratic Republic of the Congo	28.11.2011	492	44	8.9%	19.01.2007	108	5	4.6%
168	Mali	24.11.2013	147	13	8.8%	---	---	---	---
169	Central African Republic	14.02.2016	140	12	8.6%	---	---	---	---
170	Bhutan	13.07.2013	47	4	8.5%	23.04.2013	25	2	8.0%
171	Bahrain	22.11.2014	40	3	7.5%	07.12.2014	40	9	22.5%
172	Tonga	16.11.2017	27	2	7.4%	---	---	---	---
173	Benin	26.04.2015	83	6	7.2%	---	---	---	---
174	Tuvalu	31.03.2015	15	1	6.7%	---	---	---	---
175	Kiribati	30.12.2015	46	3	6.5%	---	---	---	---
176	Swaziland	20.09.2013	65	4	6.2%	30.10.2013	30	10	33.3%
177	Comoros	25.01.2015	33	2	6.1%	---	---	---	---
178	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	26.02.2016	289	17	5.9%	---	---	---	---
179	Maldives	22.03.2014	85	5	5.9%	---	---	---	---
180	Sri Lanka	17.08.2015	225	13	5.8%	---	---	---	---
181	Nigeria	28.03.2015	360	20	5.6%	28.03.2015	108	7	6.5%

182	**Thailand**	07.08.2014	250	12	4.8%	---	---	---	---
183	**Kuwait**	26.11.2016	65	2	3.1%	---	---	---	---
184	**Lebanon**	07.06.2009	128	4	3.1%	---	---	---	---
185	**Haiti**	09.08.2015	118	3	2.5%	20.11.2016	28	1	3.6%
186	**Solomon Islands**	19.11.2014	50	1	2.0%	---	---	---	---
187	**Oman**	25.10.2015	85	1	1.2%	07.11.2015	85	14	16.5%
188	**Micronesia (Federated States of)**	07.03.2017	14	0	0.0%	---	---	---	---
189	**Papua New Guinea**	24.06.2017	106	0	0.0%	---	---	---	---
190	**Vanuatu**	22.01.2016	52	0	0.0%	---	---	---	---
191	**Yemen**	27.04.2003	275	0	0.0%	28.04.2001	111	2	1.8%
192	**El Salvador**	04.03.2018	84	?	?	---	---	---	---
193	**Sierra Leone**	07.03.2018	144	?	?	---	---	---	---

Source: The data has been compiled by the Inter-Parliamentary Union on the basis of information provided by National Parliaments by 1st June 2018 - www.ipu.org

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