

Attitudes on populism
A comparative enquiry across countries and parties

IRENE ESTEBAN
Università degli Studi di Milano
and
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

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ABSTRACT

Esta tesis aborda el populismo desde el lado de la demanda. La disertación se centra en las actitudes populistas, sus diferentes dimensiones, interacciones con otras actitudes políticas y la relación entre diferentes tipos de populismo y diferentes actitudes populistas. En suma, este trabajo pretende llenar un vacío en la literatura con la exploración y expansión de las actitudes populistas en distintos contextos Europeos.

INTRODUCCIÓN

Se ha dedicado un extenso y creciente cuerpo de literatura al estudio de los partidos populistas y las actitudes populistas. Hoy en día, los partidos y líderes populistas están presentes en la mayoría de las democracias y sistemas de partidos occidentales. En los últimos cinco años, una literatura en expansión ha explorado y tratado de explicar el surgimiento de los partidos populistas y su atractivo para el electorado. En este intento, algunos estudios se han centrado específicamente en las actitudes populistas, investigando las actitudes de los votantes de los partidos populistas y, más ampliamente, las inclinaciones populistas de la ciudadanía en su conjunto. Sin embargo, a pesar de que las actitudes populistas reciben mayor atención en la literatura académica, faltaba un estudio exhaustivo sobre las diferentes teorías, medidas y la relación entre las actitudes populistas y otras actitudes políticas similares. En esta disertación, combinamos y clarificamos teorías previamente desarrolladas sobre actitudes políticas, y ofrecemos amplias pruebas empíricas sobre una variedad de casos y partidos. Más específicamente, nuestro objetivo es aportar claridad a la discusión sobre la definición, conceptualización y medición del populismo, incluido lo que los hace diferentes de otras actitudes políticas. Validamos nuestras hipótesis a través del análisis del comportamiento de votación de los ciudadanos con actitudes populistas.

Queremos resaltar que este trabajo se presenta como una compilación de documentos y no como una monografía. Esto se debe a que queríamos dedicar capítulos diferentes y separados al estudio del populismo y su relación con otras actitudes políticas. Sin embargo, reconocemos que este no es un estudio absoluto en sí mismo, y aún tiene espacio para una exploración más profunda del tema; específicamente, ciertas actitudes y dimensiones no podrían incluirse debido a la extensión de este trabajo. Por lo tanto,

creemos que es mejor presentar esta disertación como capítulos que pueden estar solos, no necesariamente en el marco de una monografía, y pueden pertenecer a un estudio más amplio sobre actitudes populistas. La línea argumentativa que los conecta a todos es la exploración de actitudes populistas en diferentes aspectos: teóricamente, en su medición empírica, en su relación con otras actitudes políticas y en su impacto en el comportamiento electoral. Por lo tanto, todos los capítulos están dedicados al estudio de las actitudes populistas, en diferentes casos de estudio.

De la misma manera, como se trata de una colección de documentos, se tuvieron que utilizar diferentes operacionalizaciones e indicadores en diferentes capítulos, también debido al hecho de que tuvimos que confiar en datos secundarios. Esto es menos que ideal; sin embargo, creemos que muestra tanta consistencia como sea posible y motivamos y explicamos al lector por qué se hacen las diferentes elecciones, cuando hay una variación en las variables utilizadas.

El primer capítulo trata sobre el concepto de populismo y actitudes populistas. Este capítulo ofrece una revisión de las diferentes definiciones proporcionadas en la literatura, que parecen converger sobre cómo definir las actitudes populistas. También presenta una descripción conceptual que establece el marco teórico para la disertación.

El segundo capítulo ofrece un enfoque metodológico de las actitudes populistas, reflexionando sobre la medición de las actitudes populistas y sus limitaciones. Como todavía no hay acuerdo sobre la medición de estas actitudes, el capítulo dos presenta los indicadores más utilizados y confiables, lo que significa que la medición de otras actitudes políticas también debe incluirse para evitar posibles superposiciones. Este capítulo se presentó en la conferencia de la Asociación de Ciencias Políticas del Medio Oeste en Chicago, el 7 de abril de 2018.

El tercer capítulo analiza dos dimensiones clave de las actitudes populistas utilizando datos de Bélgica: centrismo popular y anti-establecimiento. Indicamos que estos componentes son claramente distinguibles, tanto teórica como empíricamente, y que los ciudadanos que varían en sus niveles de personas, centrismo y anti-establecimiento tienen un comportamiento de voto diferente en Bélgica. Este documento fue presentado en la conferencia Politicologenetmaal, en la sesión '¿Erosionando el apoyo a la democracia? Celebrado en la Universidad de Leiden (Leiden, Países Bajos) el 1 y 2 de junio de 2017. Se presentó una versión revisada en la conferencia anual de Elecciones,

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En el cuarto capítulo, investigamos las diferencias entre las actitudes populistas y la democracia stealth y su impacto en la votación en el caso de Finlandia. Mostramos que las actitudes populistas y las actitudes stealth están correlacionadas, pero que son distinguibles teórica y empíricamente. Además, las actitudes stealth parecen tener un impacto en las actitudes populistas y afectan negativamente la relación entre las actitudes populistas y el voto populista. Este capítulo se presentó en la conferencia de la Asociación de Ciencias Políticas del Medio Oeste en Chicago, el 8 de abril de 2018 y en el seminario de investigación de la Chaire de recherche en démocratie électorale y la Chaire de recherche en études électorales en Université de Montréal el 10 de abril, 2018 y en la conferencia Politicologeenetmaal (Universidad de Leiden) los días 7 y 8 de junio de 2018.

En el capítulo cinco, investigamos el caso italiano, donde dos partidos populistas exitosos que formaron el Gobierno juntos: el Movimento Cinque Stelle y la Lega. Nos sumergimos en las diferencias entre estos partidos para comprender cómo dos partidos etiquetados como populistas pueden convivir y tener éxito en el mismo espacio electoral. Mostramos que la superposición en las actitudes populistas de los votantes de estos partidos solo ocurre con un elemento: el disgusto de los políticos. Por lo tanto, como hay otros problemas (nativismo) que impulsan fuertemente el voto por uno de ellos (Lega), la competencia electoral es posible en buenos términos para ambos partidos.

En el capítulo seis, analizamos los casos de España y Portugal, en los que los partidos populistas de derecha aún no han aparecido, o aparecieron muy recientemente en el sistema de partidos, a pesar de los factores políticos y económicos necesarios para tal aparición. Mostramos que, en el caso español, la derecha dominante estuvo atrayendo con éxito durante mucho tiempo a ciudadanos con el perfil de actitud de los votantes de la derecha populista. Sin embargo, no encontramos evidencia de nuestra hipótesis en el caso de Portugal. Este capítulo fue presentado en la Conferencia DAAD sobre Populismo, Prejuicios y Perspectivas en Frankfurt, Alemania, el 11 y 12 de noviembre de 2016, en la Tercera Conferencia de Populismo de Praga "El populismo actual en Europa y el papel de los medios de comunicación" en el Panel "Izquierda y Populismo de derecha en la Península Ibérica" en la Universidad Charles (Praga, República Checa) los días 22 y 23 de mayo de 2017 y en el Primer Congreso Español de la Encuesta Social Europea (Madrid, España) los días 20 y 21 de septiembre de 2018.

Con esta disertación, ofrecemos la conclusión de que las actitudes políticas populistas y de otro tipo, como el cinismo político y la democracia stealth, están estrechamente relacionadas y se afectan entre sí, afectando específicamente el comportamiento electoral. El estudio de las actitudes populistas debería tener en cuenta estas otras actitudes políticas, en la medida de lo posible, para capturar con precisión el populismo.

INTRODUCTION

An extensive and growing body of literature has been devoted to the study of populist parties and populist attitudes. Nowadays, populist parties and leaders are present in most Western democracies and party systems. Over the last five years, an expanding literature has explored and tried to explain the rise of populist parties and their appeal to the electorate. In this attempt, some studies have focused on *populist attitudes* specifically – investigating the attitudes held by voters of populist parties and, more broadly, populist inclinations of the citizenry as a whole. However, even though populist attitudes receive heightened attention in the academic literature, a comprehensive study on the different theories, measurements, and the relationship between populist attitudes and other similar political attitudes was lacking. In this dissertation, we combine and clarify previously developed theories on political attitudes, and offer wide empirical testing over a variety of cases and parties. More specifically, we aim to bring clarity to the discussion on the definition, conceptualisation, and measurement of populism, including what makes them different from other political attitudes. We validate our hypotheses through the analysis of the voting behaviour of citizens with populist attitudes.

We want to highlight that this work is presented as a compilation of papers and not as a monograph. This is because we wanted to devote different and separate chapters to the study of populism and its relationship with other political attitudes. However, we acknowledge that this is not an absolute study by itself, and it still has some room for further exploration of the topic – specifically, certain attitudes and dimensions could not be included due to the length of this work. Therefore, we believe that it is best to present this dissertation as chapters that can stand alone by themselves – not necessarily in the framework of a monograph, and can belong to a larger study on populist attitudes. The argumentative line connecting all of them is the exploration of populist attitudes in different aspects: theoretically, in their empirical measurement, in its relationship with other political attitudes and in their impact on electoral behaviour. Hence, all the chapters are devoted to the study of populist attitudes, in different cases of study.

In the same way, as this is a collection of papers, different operationalisation and indicators had to be used in different chapters, also due to the fact that we had to rely on secondary data. This is less than ideal; however, we do believe that it shows as much

consistency as possible and we motivated and explained to the reader why the different choices are made, when there is a variation in the variables used.

The first chapter is about the concept of populism and populist attitudes. This chapter offers a review of the different definitions provided in the literature, which seem to be converging on how to define populist attitudes. It also presents a conceptual overview establishing the theoretical framework for the dissertation.

The second chapter offers a methodological approach to populist attitudes, reflecting on the measurement of populist attitudes and the limitations of it. As there is no agreement on the measurement of these attitudes yet, chapter two presents the most commonly used and reliable indicators, nuancing that the measurement of other political attitudes should also be included in order to avoid possible overlaps. This chapter has been presented at the conference of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago, the 7th of April, 2018.

The third chapter looks at two key dimensions of populist attitudes using data from Belgium: people centism and anti-establishment. We indicate that these components are clearly distinguishable – both theoretically and empirically – and that citizens who vary in their levels of people centism and anti-establishment have a different voting behaviour in Belgium. This paper was presented in the Politicologenetmaal conference, in the session 'Eroding support for democracy? Celebrated in Leiden University (Leiden, The Netherlands) the 1st and 2nd of June, 2017. A revised version was presented in The annual conference of the Elections, Public Opinion and Parties (EPOP) celebrated in Nottingham University Nottingham (Nottingham, United Kingdom) the 8th, 9th and 10th September 2017.

In the fourth chapter, we investigate the differences between populist attitudes and stealth democracy and their impact on the vote in the case of Finland. We show that populist attitudes and stealth attitudes are correlated, but that they are theoretically and empirically distinguishable. Furthermore, stealth attitudes seem to have an impact on populist attitudes and negatively affect the relationship between populist attitudes and populist vote. This chapter was presented at the conference of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago, the 8th of April 2018 and in the research seminar of the Chaire de recherche en démocratie électorale et la Chaire de recherche en études électorales en Université de Montréal the 10th April, 2018 and in the conference Politicologenetmaal (University of Leiden) the 7th and 8th June, 2018.

In chapter five, we investigate the Italian case, where two successful populist parties that formed Government together: The Movimento Cinque Stelle and the Lega. We dive into the differences between these parties to understand how two parties that are labelled as populists can cohabit and be successful in the same electoral space. We show that the overlap in populist attitudes of the voters of these parties only occurs with one element: the distaste of politicians. Hence, as there are other issues (nativism) which drive strongly the vote for one of them (Lega) the electoral competition is possible in good terms for both parties.

In chapter six, we analyse the cases of Spain and Portugal, in which right-wing populist parties have either not yet appeared, or appeared very lately in the party system – despite the political and economic factors necessary present for such an appearance. We show that, in the Spanish case, the mainstream right was for a very long time successfully attracting citizens with the attitudinal profile of the voters of the populist right. However, we do not find evidence for our hypothesis in the case of Portugal. This chapter was presented in the DAAD Conference on Populism, Prejudices and Perspectives in Frankfurt, Germany the 11th and 12th November, 2016, in the Third Prague Populism Conference “Current Populism in Europe and the Role of the Media” in the Panel “Left and Right Populism in the Iberian Peninsula” at Charles University (Prague, Czech Republic) the 22nd and 23rd May, 2017 and in the First Spanish Congress of the European Social Survey (Madrid, Spain) the 20th and 21st September, 2018.

With this dissertation, we offer the conclusion that populist and other political attitudes such as political cynicism and stealth democracy are closely related and affect one another, specifically effecting electoral behaviour. The study of populist attitudes should take these other political attitudes into account – to the extent possible – in order to accurately capture populism.

Theoretical section

Chapter 1

Populism: A conceptual and theoretical examination

Irene Esteban

1.1 Defining the concepts

Populism is a widely discussed concept in the literature in the last decades. In this dissertation, we attempt to provide a better understanding of how populist attitudes take place at the mass level, and how these populist attitudes are related to other close political attitudes. The following pages will attempt to draw some conceptual clarification on some basic terms, to understand what populist attitudes are, based on the supply side of the populist phenomenon. After that, we explain the different relationships between populist attitudes and a constellation of attitudes and terms frequently used in overlap with the concept of populism.

We believe that to design a proper conceptual map about populism, other key concepts such as cynicism, stealth democracy, political disaffection, and authoritarianism should also be taken into consideration.¹ These concepts are selected to be discussed over this conceptual exercise because all of them share a core of characteristics with populism. We attempt to fill this gap in the literature of populist attitudes in the demand side, by reflecting on all these relationships between concepts before diving into the study of populist attitudes *per se*. There is some conceptual “fuzziness” around the definition of the concept populism, and consequently, the relationships with other political attitudes are not always portrayed clearly in the literature. We believe that a study discussing how populist attitudes are placed in the general framework of political attitudes is necessary and useful for the general study of populist attitudes. Here, the relationships between these concepts are discussed, first, to understand the effects of these concepts between each other, and second, to hypothesise their relationships. Populism, cynicism, stealth democracy, disaffection and authoritarianism as

¹ For more on the study of Populism and related concepts the reader can review the following readings: Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2018). Studying populism in comparative perspective: Reflections on the contemporary and future research agenda. *Comparative Political Studies*, 51(13), 1667-1693. And Rooduijn, M. (2019). State of the field: How to study populism and adjacent topics? A plea for both more and less focus. *European Journal of Political Research*, 58(1), 362-372.

concepts have their shared conceptual cores, but also peripheral aspects in which some of them overlap. This chapter attempts to define what are the core elements and which are the “grey” areas where these concepts are connecting.

1.1.1 Populism

We begin by examining the concept of populism. When speaking of populism, first the problem of defining the term must be addressed. Populism has been defined using the “elitist” point of view: referring to the supply side of populism such as party strategy, leaders and their discourse. Therefore, we need to approach this perspective first to comprehend populism from a top-down perspective, while we will later present what the literature has developed so far on populist attitudes at the mass level, to understand the bottom-up perspective and the connection between both levels.

The elitist approach

There are three main paradigms on populism from the elitist approach: considering it to be an ideology, a discourse, or a political strategy. One of the main characteristics of populism is the special style with which it creates the in-group. As some authors point out, ‘populism worships the people’ (Ionescu & Gellner 1969, p. 4). This means that populism is very thorough when building an identity, trying to create a solid and united group. This is specially addressed by authors conceiving populism as an ideology (Laclau, 1979). This conception of “the people” is developed, among other strategies, by a process in which individual demands are transformed into collective demands. Individual needs are “neglected” and instead, populism assumes that whoever belongs to the group “the people” has the same, collective needs. Accepting that *individual* needs correspond with *collective* needs means the annulment of individualism and diversity. Therefore, a monism – in which it is attempted to reduce

individual beings to one idea – is implicit in the populist program. Only the interests belonging to “the people” are considered legitimate, denying the legitimacy of other groups' aims and concerns.

In the most often cited definition of populism – and widely accepted by most scholars so far – Cas Mudde (2004) refers to populism as an ideology. However, he considers populism a “thin ideology”, meaning that it lacks a conception of the whole scenario of how a society should be organized. The term thin ideology comes from the political theorist Michael Freeden and it refers to ‘those ideologies whose morphology, whose conceptual patterns and arrangements, were insufficient to contain the comprehensive solutions for the full spectrum of socio-political problems that the grand ideological families have customarily sought to provide’ (Freeden, 2017, p. 2). This constitutes an important point when defining populism, because considering it to be an ideology, and specifically a *thin* ideology, has strong consequences.

First of all, considering populism a thin ideology means that it has a “smaller” core than a regular ideology, and therefore appears combined with different kinds of ideologies. However, what is not clear from the theorists of populism that refer to it as a thin ideology, is whether this attachment to other ideologies is a necessary condition because as a thin ideology populism cannot stand alone due to its “narrow” views. If this was the case, then we would struggle to find examples of pure populism, and only find examples of parties who combine populism with other ideologies at the same time. We see that this is the case in most cases, although we have to make an exception when referring to Movimento Cinque Stelle, the populist Italian party. However, finding that most examples of populist parties are combined with other ideologies is not proof itself that populism cannot stand alone in the political competition – again, one can look to Movimento Cinque Stelle – but we should not forget that political parties first and foremost look for one main thing: electoral success. In this case, we could say that populism itself has not proven to be sufficient in most cases to gain electoral benefit as a stand-alone ideology. Hence, most parties implementing a populist ideology

combine it with another ideology to make themselves salient in the electoral competition. This could be the case, but that is far from stating that populism cannot be a “regular” ideology by itself, again, if we make clear the distinction between ideology and electoral competition within a party.

As a last interesting remark in the debate whether populism is an ideology or not, we must bring up the opinion of the theorist who came up with the concept of the thin ideology, Freedon himself. For Freedon (2017, p. 2), the term of thin ideology has been misused by the theorists of populism: ‘I coined the term “thin-centered ideologies” to denote a different phenomenon. (...) I argued that thin-centered ideologies abstained from offering their brand of programs about, say, social justice, or the conditions for individual development. They either restricted themselves to a narrow core, becoming single-issue or at most double-issue political advocacy discourses.’ As the author highlights, he did not ascribe populism to the group of thin ideologies when he developed this concept: ‘I made no mention of populism in my 1996 book. But then several scholars, (...) attached the notion of thin-centered ideologies to populism, a practice that has since spread to other populism-related literature. I have no objection to anyone employing that device in their theorizing (...). Yet we should entertain considerable doubts about the applicability of thin-centrism to populism. The various populisms do not easily conform to the thin-centered ideological variant’ (Freedon, 2017, p. 3). For Freedon, populism does not fit in the category of thin-ideologies because it does not have clearly defined and well-articulated ideological elements that are required to label it as such. Furthermore, while thin-centered ideologies are open to incorporating elements of traditional ideologies, according to Freedon, European populisms are too ideologically thin even to be thin, and this might be related to the fact that Freedon perceives populism as a modifier, as mainly rhetorical.

Therefore, we see that there is still a strong ongoing discussion on the "status" of populism, and although a large group of authors accepts this definition of thin-ideology, there are some dissenting voices. As we will explain later, some authors in this sense have decided

to take a more abstract approach by defining populism as a “set of ideas” which includes but does not limit to the understanding of populism as an ideology. In Chapter 2 some of these examples are shown and further analysed.

However, even when populism is defined as a thin-centered ideology, it does not mean that it lacks a final aim. Contrarily, the “utopian” component of populism is based on the implementation of mechanisms of direct democracy – changing the role of liberal representation. Populism and the contestation of the liberal conception of representation is another characteristic that needs to be underlined when approaching a definition of the term. The role of liberal representation involves the mediation of political conflicts through the institution of political parties. By doing so, and through the democratic procedures – with this, we refer to processes for making binding decisions, that set the agenda and decide the outcome with the adoption or rejection of a policy (Dahl, 1989) such as deliberation – a specific conception of the common good is translated into public policy.

Next, when addressing populism as a political discourse, we refer to populism as the logic of creating political boundaries. Although there are common points between this and the ideological conception, there are also important differences: the methodological approach when considering populism as a discourse is performed on the political expressions of it (Bos et al., 2013), which makes the analytical procedure challenging due to the volatile nature of communicative statements.

Populism is also described as the medium to make a political unit, a rhetoric. This is the usual form in which people, media and public opinion normally refer to populism. We argue that referring to populism as a way of implementing a specific communicational style – which involves the creation of a political group – is not the most suitable. Political discourse is generally devoted to the creation of boundaries and inclusion/exclusion. These characteristics do not belong to populism, but to politics in general (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Panizza, 2005; Westlind, 1996). Populist actors perform very well at it, but it is not exclusive of the populist phenomenon.

One of the characteristics identified by authors defining populism as a discourse is related to the portrait of the society that it offers in antagonistic terms; this Manichean division is normally characterized for its anti-establishment nature. However, this anti-establishment conception is not exclusive of populism, many thick ideologies apply it as well. The specificity of populism in its anti-establishment position is declaring this establishment or elite as a minority by some social, ethnic or political status. With this approach, the *status quo* is defined as a minority. That underlines how populism does not recognise opposition as a group of society. But from populism, there is also a devaluation of the decision-making model developed by liberal representation, and a lack of recognition of the conflict among legitimate groups within the society, which, altogether, constitute a pessimistic view of politics. Normally, populism is considered monist due to the homogeneous conception of the people that it makes, but in the populist approach, it is visible that recognition of a cohesive group is also conceived together with a denial of the minority.

It is difficult to find a common ideological denominator for all the populist parties and movements. The answer could lie in its conception of totality and equality of aims. If this equality would be real, then politics would lose an important part of its function. We refer here to politics conceived as the management of diverse equally legitimate demands, connected with the conflicting nature of democracy. This will constitute for us one of the principal components of "core" populism – where the combination with other ideologies is absent, the conception of politics without conflict. We have seen examples of populist leaders trying to invalidate the left-right axis competition, claiming that the ideological division is obsolete. However, the aforementioned conception is also shared by technocracy, in which the understanding of politics implies a lack of conflict, but a different procedure is proposed as a solution. Both technocracy and populism criticise the same: party democracy (Bickerton & Accetti, 2015). Some authors state that their approach is inverse: populism as politics without policy, and technocracy as policy without politics (Schmidt, 2006). In "core" populism, politics are conceived as an artefact, injected by the elites.

To summarise, we can define the core elements of populism as the special style of creating an in-group (in which monism between its members is assumed) and a critical position towards the liberal role of representation and the role of political parties and its particular rhetoric. Another fundamental characteristic would be the Manichean division of society, essentially anti-establishment and defining that establishment as a minority. As a last distinctive trait, populism embraces a conception of politics in which conflict is disregarded and if present, it is conceived as being injected by elites.

We would like to emphasize for the reader that in this work, we do not explicitly choose one of these classifications of populism as defined by the elitist approach – the supply side – and we do it consciously. This is because these different conceptualisations belong to the supply side of populism, and in this thesis, we specifically focus on the demand side of populism. However, it is important to highlight that supply and demand theories of populism are very connected and share an important number of attributes, as the reader will see later in the next section – and with more detail in chapter two. Hence, the different ways of conceiving populism on the demand side – the electorate – are the theories that we will mostly consider through this work. While the populist entrepreneurs try to mobilize (mainly) people holding these populist attitudes, some of the different conceptualisations and elements of populism on the supply side are less relevant for us while studying the demand side. Moreover, we would not want to imply that populist attitudes respond to these possible supply-side strategies. For us, populist attitudes are like many other political attitudes, and regardless of being mobilised by a supply-side actor – or not – they will be present among the citizens anyhow. In this way, and by not choosing a specific "classification" in the supply literature, we do not confine ourselves to one specific theory.

Why is populism profitable electorally?

We have already explained the elitist approach to populism and how populism is related to

politics in general. However, we have not mentioned why populism is so profitable electorally in the last decade. For authors such as Kriesi, the success of populism is based on economic reasons, and he portrays populism as ‘a productive force that may serve as the catalyst for a profound realignment of West European party systems – a realignment that brings the West European party systems more in line with the transformed conflict structures of West European societies’ (Kriesi, 2014, pp. 361-362). In this line, Kriesi developed the theory of “losers of globalisation”, in which he argues that the new challenges of globalisation have created structural social conflicts which divide citizens between the ones who are better off with these globalisation dynamics – hence, “winners” – and the citizens that struggle in this new system of economic and professional fashion – the “losers” of globalisation. For Kriesi, especially the right-wing populist parties have been able to articulate this conflict in a way that has provided electoral benefits, by opposing “losers” and “winners” reinterpreting in their terms (Kriesi, 2014, p. 369).

Nevertheless, it is not only the right-wing populist parties that have been able to articulate this new conflict; also left-wing populist parties as Podemos found an electoral niche in this economic and political crisis. The main difference lies in how left- and right-wing populism interpret who belongs to “the people”. The people, in this case, can be interpreted in three main ways: the political people (sovereign), the economic people (referring to class) and the cultural people (in terms of nation/nativism) (Meny & Surel, 2002). For some authors, right-wing populist parties are associated with the notion of the people as cultural (nation), while the left-wing populism refers to the people as a class (economic people) (Kriesi, 2014, pp. 361-362).

The other big explanation for the electoral success of populism, in general, is related to culture, and more precisely, to cultural backlash. In words of Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, ‘the cultural backlash thesis suggests that the surge in votes for populist parties can be explained not as a purely economic phenomenon, but in a large part as a reaction against progressive cultural change’ (Inglehart & Norris, 2017, pp. 2-3). According to this theory,

people developed a cultural change to postmaterialist values due to the cultural changes occurring in developed Western societies, which ‘triggered a counter-revolutionary retro backlash, especially among the older generation, white men, and less educated sectors, who sense decline and actively reject the rising tide of progressive values, resent the displacement of familiar traditional norms, and provide a pool for supporters potentially vulnerable to populist appeals’ (Inglehart & Norris, 2017, p. 3).

These two explanations for populist vote are also connected, and normally it is difficult to draw a clear line separating economic and cultural factors driving the populist vote. Nevertheless, we must take into account these two explanations when approaching the study of populism, and especially when looking for variables that affect voting behaviour.

One last remark related to the success of populism has to do with the special approach that it takes towards processes, as opposed to most parties that focus on policies. Even though many voters might cast a vote for a populist party based on specific proposed policies, most populist parties pay great attention to criticise political processes and aim to change processes as they are. Most populist entrepreneurs even use this complaint about actual processes as a salient topic for electoral competition. Many authors have highlighted the importance of processes of political decision-making for voters such as John R. Hibbing and Elisabeth Theiss-Morse, who created the term *stealth democracy*, to describe a specific kind of decision-making that some citizens prefer – and which is intimately related to populism. Many other authors have also reflected about the relationship between populism and other kinds of decision making (Bickerton & Accetti, 2015), about process preferences and whether they are issue dependent (Wojcieszak, 2014), and the different dimensions of process preferences and their relation to different kinds of representation (Font, Wojcieszak, & Navarro, 2015). Later in this section – and more deeply in Chapter 4 devoted to the case of Finland – we highlight the importance of decision-making and its relationship with populism. As the reader can imagine, this issue alone could have a dissertation devoted to it. However, even when that is not our aim, we want

to highlight for now – and for the sake of our argument – that process preferences are a major predictor when voting for a populist party, and a chapter of this dissertation is devoted to exploring that relationship, as well as the electoral consequences that it has in a specific case of study – the Finnish case.

For that matter, we consider it crucial to understand which attitudes of the electorate should be taken into account when measuring populist attitudes and their impact on voting behaviour. We emphasise this point because throughout this dissertation the reader will observe that the populist vote is not only driven by socio-demographic characteristics (which are sensitive to the explanations described before such as the economic and cultural drivers), but also intrinsically related with political attitudes and preferences – and not only with specific policy proposals.

This is why, in this dissertation, we devote great attention to the impact of attitudinal characteristics – not only on populist attitudes but in general in the voting behaviour – and examine how these attitudes affect the vote choice. During so, we will examine the mass approach to populism (attitudinal) together with the major political attitudes that we will take into consideration in this dissertation. While these attitudes have already been studied and theorised, their relationship with populism remains mostly unexplored. One of the take-home messages of this dissertation is exactly that point: for the study of populism, we cannot leave out of the scope several political attitudes that relate and overlap with populist attitudes. This is why we believe that the mass-level approach is decisive for the study of the topic, and in fact, it will be the main framework for this research, leaving slightly aside from the elitist view, that has been more developed in the past.

The mass-level approach

As we mentioned in the previous section, most studies on populism so far approached the topic with a special focus on party politics or leadership characteristics. In this scenario, citizens enter the picture as voters for a party that has been defined to be populist, and their attitudes are analysed depending on this vote choice. Less attention has been devoted to the study of populist attitudes among the citizenry (Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove, 2013; Hawkins, Riding & Mudde, 2012; Schulz et.al., 2017; Stanley, 2011; Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018). In this thesis, we will focus on public opinion, first, independently of voting behaviour, and it will try to investigate how “purely” populist attitudes are if there are any.

From what we can extract from the elitist approach, we could expect populist attitudes to be monist, anti-establishment and anti-traditional political elites, conceiving society as separated into two groups and disregarding conflict or evaluating it as not genuine. If we reflect on these features, “purely” populist attitudes might regard not so many attitudes towards the *contents* of politics, but rather attitudes on how democratic politics works – or should work.

However, we must explore first the literature of populist attitudes at the mass level and see whether these traits have a reflection in the citizenry. A few studies have tried to address this problem, providing an important benchmark (Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove, 2013; De Koster, Achterberg, & Van der Waal, 2013; Hawkins, Riding, & Mudde, 2012; Rooduijn, 2018; Spruyt, Keppens, & Van Droogenbroeck, 2016; Stanley, 2011). In Chapter 2, we will thoroughly explore the different studies devoted to capturing populist attitudes in the last years and many elements present in other attitudes will be highlighted and tested during the empirical part of this thesis.

1.1.2 Political cynicism

Cynicism is conceived as a disposition to disbelieve in the sincerity or goodness of human motives and actions, questioning the selflessness of human action (Pattyn et al., 2012, p. 566). Political cynicism is the transposition of these attitudes to the political world. It is an attitude, held by individuals who feel cynical about politics: either the individuals (politicians), the institutions (parties, the Parliament), or the political system as a totality (Dekker & Meijerink, 2012). Political cynicism entails a disdain for politicians and their actions, and a distrust not based on knowledge but on a lack of reflexivity, and it does not lead to political action, but to inactivity (Krouwel & Abts, 2007), which connects very well with the pessimistic view of politics that we defined before for populism too.

Political cynicism is often confused with other terms such as scepticism and political alienation. There are basic differences, and this topic has been already discussed by authors as Krouwel and Abts (2007). In summary, we can say that cynics do not doubt their distrust towards politics and political actors, therefore, they are not willing to change their minds (Kanter & Mirvis, 1989). This is the reason why authors as Dalton (2004) define political cynicism as a threat to democracy. Political cynicism has also been treated as the extreme of a continuum in which political trust is the opposite. However, many authors already argued that political cynicism can be differentiated from political trust, and it constitutes an entire concept not only captured by the absence of confidence (Krouwel & Abts, 2007).

Political cynicism and populism both have a negative view of political actors (corruption and unresponsiveness), together with the belief that politicians cannot deal with problems effectively (Krouwel & Abts, 2007). However, where populist offers a solution by using alternative ways of participation (Webb, 2013), cynics do not offer a straightforward alternative. Cynical citizens, in general, refuse to take action against these complaints in a political way. This is one of the most distinctive differences between populism and cynicism,

while populism tries to mobilize the discontent politically, cynicism does not engage in political action to react to the complaints they have from the system and political actors.

1.1.3 Stealth democracy

The next important concept that we want to take into account in our conceptual chapter is stealth democracy. This concept, created by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002), captures the attitudes of citizens who are dissatisfied with the way democracy works, but who do not want to be active participants of the democratic processes and want their problems to be solved by experts.

People could prefer to have experts making the political decisions because of several reasons: first, because they fear unresponsive politicians, and think that their opinions are not taken into account – again we see the element of a pessimistic view on politics. Consequently, citizens would prefer to avoid the deliberative part and trust expert advice instead. It could also be the case that people would prefer stealth democracy because they believe that deliberation is good, but the deliberative process is not being well developed. Constraints as party discipline make it difficult to believe that any deliberation happening in Parliament is going to change a party's decision on a specific issue.² Then, the process of how deliberation is made is not satisfying to citizens, leading to dissatisfaction with the processes. Normally political participation is connected to resentment and dissatisfaction rather than to legitimacy and trust, as people's main goal is just trying not to be taken advantage of by the political actors. This is why political dissatisfaction is often considered as a good characteristic in democracy because it keeps citizens alert from the misbehaviour of political elites (Austin & Pinkleton, 1995; Di Palma, 1970, p. 30; Dalton, 1988). However, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse

² Party discipline is a complex phenomenon and it functions in many different ways, in its relation between MPs and electors and parties within themselves. For a thorough exercise on the clarification of the concept please consult Bowler, S., Farrell, D. M. & Katz, R. S. (1999). *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

(2002, p. 9) state: 'we believe that Americans' motivation to avoid politics is deep and not the result of particular defects in the current system. It is politics they do not like, not a particular version of politics.' We believe that this negative conception of politics is related to the management of conflict.

A second possibility is that citizens want experts instead of politicians to make the decisions because they think that there is an objective and impartial form to proceed with problem-solving. According to the thesis of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, citizens seem to perceive that a "common good" exists and that if it is not achievable it is because people's selfishness or politicians and political actors get in the middle. However, differences are inherent to social cohabitation and finding mechanisms to cope with these legitimate different points of view is one of the purposes of politics. Social conflict is not always made up or has a clear good versus bad position, but comes from the clash of diverse ideas and it is part of how to cope with the challenges of social interaction (Knight, 1992, p. 16).

Finally, it could also be the case that even though stealth democrats want to turn the duty of the decision making on someone else, these citizens want to know that the possibility to be involved in the process is available – even when they do not want to make an explicit use of it (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002). So, regarding policies, people are less concerned with obtaining a concrete policy outcome than preventing others from abusing the process – they want to prevent mainly the decision-makers and politicians to take advantage of their position. People desire responsiveness and accountability to be unnecessary because politicians and public servants are making their work correctly. Nevertheless, accountability mechanisms were created because we assume the necessity of a society to be vigilant of their elites, so they have no option but to be responsive to their actions. In that sense, the desire to be able to demand accountability when it is considered necessary must be kept as a right of the citizenry. As it has been discussed in the literature, people are not only concerned by policies, as Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002 p. 6) state: 'contrary to popular belief, many people have vague policy preferences and crystal-clear process preferences.'

We are not so sure about this assertion; what we believe is that people do know which kind of processes they do not like, but we not so sure that they have clear alternative models in mind. If people think processes are simple, this could be because normally decision-making processes are not entirely known by the citizenry, and from this lack of awareness, they could conclude that processes are somehow simpler than policies – which are discussed more regularly. This could happen because policies are meant to be discussed, but processes are meant to stay the same (we know there are special procedures for specific policies, but the general process for the decision-making is assumed to be one concrete procedure). Likewise, as Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002, p. 56) address: ‘parties do not move on process space because they cannot move (...). Shifting positions on process space is much more challenging for parties and candidates than shifting positions on policy space (...) it is difficult to change process.’

In Western Europe, parties are trying to differentiate from each other in their processes by changing their internal functioning (implementing primaries systems, assembly systems, etc.), and some of them are also including proposals for a different kind of participation in the political institutions.³ In any case, the process alternatives proposed are not that many and citizens' experiences with different processes are not too broad. This could make it difficult for citizens to have a clear perspective of the alternative processes to promote or support, even though their existent dissatisfaction with the actual panorama. In the U.S., citizens do not tend to see different process proposals in parties: ‘we believe people see the parties as similar in the processes they favor (...) when people complain about the similarities of the parties they are not thinking of the policies of the parties but rather of the processes promoted by the parties’ (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002, p. 45). However, we do think that at least in Western

³ The party Podemos in Spain, for instance, proposes to include citizen participation in the Parliament by creating a “citizen seat”: ‘Creating mixed spaces of deliberation during legislative processing, where political representatives, technical personnel and citizens can participate.’ (Point 227 of Podemos manifesto – in Spanish – <http://lasonrisadeunpais.es/programa/>).

Europe, people understand that certain parties are linked to different process preferences. And that is also influencing voting behaviour.

1.1.4 Political disaffection

Political disaffection has been defined as ‘the subjective feeling of powerlessness, cynicism, and lack of confidence in the political process, politicians, and democratic institutions, but with no questioning of the political regime’ (Di Palma, 1970, p. 30). Disaffection in politics also refers to ‘the primarily emotional and passionate condition of absence of a “sense of belonging”, not “feeling at home” in the political community, marginalization, perceived lack of representation, institutionally mediated lack of capability to make one’s voice heard, deprivation of political resources’ (Offe, 2006, p. 26).

Why is disaffection different from populism? While we see the similarities between populism and disaffection, in which populism implies a conception of how the political scene is being unsuccessful in its aim at covering the needs of “the people”, and disaffection is a negative attitude that an individual has towards the political system; the basic difference between both of them is that, while disaffection opts for withdrawing from the political community, populism offers a new approach, and tries to emphasise that the political actors at that moment are not accomplishing their functions and that the flaws of the system can be changed through the system itself. Somehow like communism and socialism, one strategy chooses for operating outside of the institutional structures, and the other one thinks that change can be perpetrated from within the system.

For this reason, normally disaffection leads to a rupture or hostility from politics and traditional forms of participation (Torcal, 2006). It is also important to understand that, for some authors, the appearance of political disaffection does not imply a crisis of the acceptance of the democratic regime (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995; Kavanagh, 1997), and it can be

also independent of its legitimacy (Torcal & Montero, 2006). For some other authors (Dalton, 2004, p. 7) disaffection can lead to ‘weakening ties to the political community in a democratic system might foretell eventual revolution, civil war, or the loss of democracy.’

Whether disaffection has a negative impact on the citizenry is still a matter of discussion, and so are its consequences. As Offe (2006, p. 43) affirms:

Distrust and even some measure of cynicism concerning the ‘political class’, its members, and its procedural routines may be considered a syndrome that positively strengthens democracy, as it helps to reduce participation and attention in ‘normal politics’ to tolerable levels, maintains a repertoire of capacity for mobilization for ‘extraordinary’ causes and critical conditions, and activates the search for additional and alternative modes of mobilization and representation, such as new social movements.

However, there can be different objects of disaffection. A challenge to traditional parties such as the one posed by populism does not imply the same as the questioning of the whole party system, for instance. And the different kinds of disaffection can have diverse claims, such as institutional reforms, law changes, or leader replacements.

There are different explanations proposed in the literature for the reasons why citizens are disaffected: processes of dealignment of citizens with the existing parties (Dalton, 2004), the problematic relationships between citizens and institutions, legitimacy of the nation-state policymaking (Warren, 2008), misunderstanding of the nature of the political process (Stoker, 2006), or depoliticisation (Hay, 2007). However, as Dalton explains: ‘since political trust is decreasing in most advanced industrial societies, this is likely due to factors that go beyond a single political leader or a single administration. To really alter systemic trends, systemic changes may be required in the polity or the political system’ (Dalton, 2004, p. 47). This statement is a good starting point: we have to wonder what is happening at a structural global

level and why citizens, although not unhappy about democracy itself, feel let down by their political systems, parties, and representatives.

Furthermore, widespread apathy towards the political system has been understood as an indicator of consent and diffuse support (Easton, 1965), even political apathy, in particular, has been understood in different ways, not always negative. Authors like Lipset point out that ‘the belief that a very high level of participation is always good for democracy is not valid (...). As the events of the 1930s in Germany demonstrated (...) an increase in the level of participation may reflect the decline of social cohesion and the breakdown of the democratic process; whereas a stable democracy may rest on the general belief that the outcome of an election will not make too great a difference in society’ (Lipset, 1963, pp. 32-33).⁴ So apathy and political disaffection do not always have to come together with a bad view on democracy specifically.

Political disaffection has been conceived as independent of support for the democratic regime and has different behavioural consequences. The academic literature has created a specific term for this phenomenon: *disaffected democrats*. We should not confuse this term with the popular *dissatisfied democrats*. The latter term refers to citizens dissatisfied with political institutions but supportive of democratic principles (Dalton, 2004). Dissatisfied democrats are ‘critical citizens, who value democracy as an ideal yet who remain dissatisfied with the performance of their political system, and particularly the core institutions of representative government’ (Norris, 1999, p. 269).⁵ This kind of dissatisfaction is considered

⁴ For a further elaboration of this argument, the interested reader can check: JONES, W. H. (1954). In Defence of Apathy: Some Doubts on the Duty to Vote. *Political Studies*, 2(1),25–37.

⁵ As we emphasised in the text, disaffection is not dissatisfaction with government performance or, with general democratic performance. For this concept, authors like Torcal and Montero (2006) proposed the term of political discontent, which can be also described as the expression of displeasure resulting from the belief that the performance of the government is falling short of the citizens' wishes or expectations (di Palma, 1970, p. 30). Disaffection would refer to the feeling of being estranged of the political community which one belongs, or completely detached from it.

a common attitudinal pattern in advanced industrial democracies (Dalton, 2004) and also in third-wave democracies (Torcal, 2006). The term disaffected democrats refer to ‘citizens with low levels of all kinds of political participation, including voting in elections, citizens’ neglect for the public realm in general and politics in particular’ (Magalhães, 2006, p. 988).

Connected to this notion, Norris developed the concept of “critical citizen”, a citizen that has ‘become increasingly critical of the major institutions of representative government’ (Norris, 1999, p. 26). Norris highlights how the consequences of these attitudes amongst citizens can be very negative: ‘the erosion of support (...) may be seen as a worrying development which may gradually undermine faith in democratic values. If people cannot trust parliaments, public officials, parties or the police, and the regime performs poorly, then they may come in time to be disillusioned with democracy as an ideal. This may have serious consequences since public adherence to democratic values is usually regarded as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the long-term stability of democracies, to tide regimes over bad times’ (Norris, 1999, p. 27). But it also can have a good impact on how democracy works: ‘Alternatively these trends may prove a more positive development which will ultimately strengthen democratic government (...). Criticism does not necessarily imply disengagement. It can mean the reverse. (...). Established democratic regimes, and core institutions like parties and parliaments, may be adopting and evolving to meet new challenges, not declining (...). Too much blind trust by citizens and misplaced confidence in leaders, for good or ill, can be as problematic for democracy as too little. The consequences of declining support for government institutions therefore remains open to debate’ (Norris, 1999, p. 27). So we see how this disenchantment with politics and politicians has been theorized by different authors, and how it can be understood as a healthy or a damaging issue for democracy.

At the same time, when making a deeper analysis, political disaffection can be divided into two sub-dimensions defined in the literature: political disengagement and institutional disaffection (Torcal & Montero, 2006, p. 6). The former refers to a general distrust of politics and lack of engagement with the political process (by political process we refer to ‘the process

of the formulation and administration of public policy usually by interaction between social groups and political institutions or between political leadership and public opinion' (Merriam-Webster, 2019). The latter relates to the sentiment of an absence of responsiveness by political authorities and institutions, and thus a lack of confidence in them.

We will define the core of disaffection as the feeling of detachment from the political community. We do not discuss in this chapter whether disaffection is good or bad for democracy itself. The reason why citizens are disaffected has been theorized in different directions: the decline of party identification, misidentification with institutions and the lack of understanding – or dislike – of the political processes. The last point is where disaffection connects with stealth democracy, populism, and cynicism as well as in their negative – or directly corrupt – conception of political actors.

1.1.5 Authoritarianism

We could define authoritarianism as the desire or tendency to impose one's own will on others. Adorno and colleagues, in their seminal book (1950), portrait authoritarianism as a personality trait in which an adult would submit to authorities and be intolerant of those who would not. However, it has been arduously discussed whether authoritarianism has a personal or a social origin – for authoritarianism as a socially learned cluster of attitudes see Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996), as well as the measurement proposed for it (Duckitt, 1989).

Authoritarianism also connects with the concept of totalitarianism, which, according to the Encyclopaedia Britannica⁶ is a 'form of government that theoretically permits no individual freedom and that seeks to subordinate all aspects of individual life to the authority of the state (...) [it] attempts to control and direct all aspects of individual life through coercion and repression (...). Traditional social institutions and organizations are discouraged and

⁶ <https://www.britannica.com/>

suppressed, making people more willing to be merged into a single unified movement' (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1998).

The main difference between authoritarianism and totalitarianism, then, is that even though both want to discourage individual freedom, totalitarianism tries to achieve it by having total control over the lives of the citizens, while authoritarianism seeks the 'blind submission of its citizens to authority' (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1998). Hence, while totalitarian states tend to have a highly developed guiding ideology, authoritarian states usually do not.

It has also been difficult to determine the core of the concept of authoritarianism because of its overlap with concepts as intolerance and conservatism (Feldman, 2003). Feldman, for instance, proposes that 'a useful way to develop a conceptualization of authoritarianism is to consider people's orientations toward society and, in particular, conflicts between individual rights and the well-being of the social unit' (Feldman, 2003, p. 42). The base of authoritarianism lies in the tension between the desire for autonomy and desire for social restrictions of behaviour – seeking stability and physical protection as human beings. Again, we come up with a recurrent topic in our chapter: how to deal with social conflict. Authoritarianism is related to the way that citizens perceive that dealing with social conflict should be. 'Those who strongly value social conformity should be highly sensitive to those threats and should react by denigrating groups that are seen as a threat and by supporting action to eliminate the threat by limiting the liberties and rights of those seen to be responsible' (Feldman, 2003, p. 66).

There is also a second approach for what authoritarianism could be interesting to some citizens, which consists of authoritarianism conceived as group identification (Duckitt, 1989; Stenner, 1997). For Duckitt, authoritarianism could come from a strong in-group identification and the corresponding demand for group cohesion. Similarly, Feldman (2003) and Sumner (2013) conceive authoritarianism as related to in-group cohesion, but also adding outgroup hostility. This idea builds on the conformation of social identities, in which insecure social

identities show elevated discrimination (Duckitt, 1989). Insecure social identities come from status differentiations that are unstable and vulnerable to change or even reversal (Duckitt, 1989, p. 77) This discrimination is more powerful when intergroup differentiations favourable to the in-group have become insecure or threatened.

With respect to the conception of authoritarianism, Duckitt (1989) proposed a sort of continuum which in one extreme would have the belief that personal needs should be subordinated to the cohesion of the group, and the other extreme would promote that the group cohesion is subordinated to autonomy and self-regulation of the individuals (Duckitt, 1989, p. 71). The desire for group cohesion in Duckitt's model derives from group identification, and it is understood as normative beliefs – what people should do, and not attitudes or values. As a result, it is possible for the same individual to be highly authoritarian in the context of a group and not at all authoritarian in another group context. The most basic implication of the approach to authoritarianism in terms of group identification is that to understand it, one must take into account the behaviours of the collectives between them and not just the individuals. In Feldman's conceptualisation, authoritarianism comes from the desire for social cohesion motivated by a concern for social order.

Authoritarianism and the ideological right-wing

Authoritarianism is a concept that has been related to right-wing ideologies and even measured together in the same scale, the scale of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) developed by Altemeyer in 1981. However, Lipset in his article of 1959, reflects on the relationship between authoritarianism and right-wing ideologies.

For Lipset (1959), the situation of people in lower classes and with lower education, make them susceptible to perceive politics in rather “simplistic” terms – black and white, good and evil. That is why, all things being equal, people from these classes and educational levels will

‘prefer extremist movements which suggest easy and quick solutions to social problems and have a rigid outlook rather than those which view the problem of reform or change in complex and gradualist terms and which support rational values of tolerance’ (Lipset, 1959, p. 483). He also highlights how the lower strata are relatively more authoritarian, and how they tend to be more attracted to extremist movements than moderate and democratic ones because survey data suggests that the lower strata are less committed to democratic norms than the middle classes.

As it happened with the explanation of populism and political disaffection, it seems that authoritarianism in these terms favours a simplified view of politics, failing in its understanding of the arguments of different groups in society, and its capacity of tolerance and compromise integrated within the political procedures.

One of the reasons suggested for this preference toward more extremist movements is related to the lack of economic and psychological security in these citizens. Economic insecurity affects the political and attitudinal responses of groups, but Lipset explains that low class and low education are intervenient variables in the relationship with authoritarianism. However, regarding populism, disaffection and stealth democracy, there are not socio-economic traits that can explain the preferences for all of them yet.

Authoritarianism and the role of threat

Not only lower strata are susceptible to threatening conditions. Stevens et al. (2006) found that perceptions of economic threat elevate elite levels of authoritarianism and authoritarian attitudes among elites. As what happened at the mass level, the perception of threat – economic or political – can trigger the preferences for an authoritarian style. However, the literature has debated on the specific impact of a threat on authoritarianism. Altemeyer (1998) suggests that threat mediates the impact of authoritarian predispositions, while others (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Rickert, 1998; Feldman, 2003) propose that threat and its

perception moderates authoritarian predispositions, stating that: 'it is not that levels of authoritarianism rise under conditions of threat but that the relationship between authoritarianism and various political attitudes and behaviours strengthens' (Stevens et al., 2006, p. 608).

The proposal of Feldman and Stenner (1997) takes into account the moderation hypothesis as an explanation in which authoritarians would be individuals with a pessimistic view of human nature, not necessarily learned by socialisation or people who want to follow group rules because of an identification with that group in particular. Therefore, they do not conceive authoritarianism as a personality trait, because they understand that authoritarianism is moderated by the perception of threat towards the group.

Making a general reflection on the arguments that we presented up to now, we believe that – as mentioned before – authoritarianism is linked to the creation of strong in-group identification and we will add that this preference is also related to the desire of conflict avoidance that the group provides. This desire for authoritarianism is especially triggered when the group faces a perceived threat. We believe that this perceived threat is related to class miss-identification or loss. Traditional political ideologies are not able to inspire people's affects anymore because citizens are no longer attached so strongly to their nationality or class. Countries are losing their executive powers due to supra-national organisations and classical economic classes are not identifiable anymore, due to the expansion of higher education and the different labour market structures, which are becoming more globalised. Those alterations combined with the context of a global economic crisis and the sign of threat that it implies, plus the growing level of political disaffection, provide the ideal scenario for a new "strategy/ideology" to be offered in the political supply, because the political market suffers a failure leaving new spaces for political entrepreneurs. Class or nationality does not work anymore, so another "reference category" is offered: the people. And the concept of the people is attractive because of the need for belonging inherent to the human being. And this new category offers a new channel of the discontent in a political fight, in which citizens can again

form part of a group that is easy to identify with. When class and nationality lost their power of identification, populism offers a new exit. This exit is also coherent with the need for conflict avoidance because by belonging to a group, you can equalise the members of that group and the needs of the group will be the ones taken into account.

1.1.6 External efficacy

We have reflected all along with this work about the role of the citizens in the political community, and how citizens feel about it. Therefore, we feel that some reflection must be done on the concept of political efficacy. Political efficacy is divided into internal and external efficacy. Internal efficacy refers to the ‘beliefs about one’s own competence to understand and to participate effectively in, politics’ (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991, p. 1407). Feeling that one has internal political efficacy is central to the idea that individuals can and should decide on major political issues, being the central actors on the decision-making processes. When voters think that they do not understand politics enough or that they cannot participate effectively, they will feel detached from the decision-making system and will not want to be a key part of it. External efficacy is defined as ‘the feeling that individual political action does have or can have, an impact upon the political process, (...) It is the feeling that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change’ (Campbell et al., 1954, p. 187). Concretely, external efficacy measures: ‘expressed beliefs about political institutions rather than perceptions about one’s own abilities (...). The lack of external efficacy (...) indicates that the public cannot influence political outcomes because Governments and leaders are unresponsive to their needs’ (Millner et al., 1980, p. 253). Hence, internal and external political efficacy, although different, are strongly linked. If a person feels that they are competent enough to make decisions about politics, but that the system surrounding them is inefficient and their opinion will not have an effect on the outcome, they will also feel discouraged and not participate, or they will demand that the processes change to hear and be responsive to them.


As the reader can understand, both concepts are intrinsically related to the primary demands of populism, and as we will explain in Chapter 2, external efficacy has been used in different studies as a proxy for populism (with some problems and some advantages when indicators on populism are not available for the researcher). We think that in general, the feelings of distaste towards political action such as political efficacy can frequently be influenced by a larger – and often negative – view of the political scenario related to populism and political disaffection, and we have seen how in the literature, different authors have explained the connection between these two concepts (Akkerman, Mudde, & Zaslove, 2013). However, little reflection has been done on the exact relations and consequences of these associations. Therefore, in this thesis, we would like to bring some clarification about these unanswered questions and we will incorporate political efficacy as an indicator in some of our empirical chapters. This is why even though in our theoretical general framework political efficacy does not appear *per se*, we define it already with the intention that the reader contemplates how political efficacy plays a role in the whole attitudinal scenario and understand its use during the empirical chapters.

1.2 Defining the relationships between concepts

Once we have defined the concept of populism and the different political concepts related to it, we would like to reflect theoretically about the implications of their relationships. We believe this is a good theoretical exercise to later understand how to approach methodologically the measurement of populist attitudes.

With this purpose, we elaborated a figure trying to convey how the relationships between all these concepts develop (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1 Overlap of populism and other political attitudes



Source: Own elaboration

Core concepts

From Figure 1.1 we can see that there are three levels of attributes between these concepts: First, we have a small group of core characteristics that all concepts share, second we see some characteristics shared by some concepts together, and third, we see specific characteristics of each of the concepts.

Let us begin with the core concepts, shared by all of them. We believe that there is an "inner" core, which concepts are: a simplified view of politics, the failure in understanding the diversity

in society, and a pessimistic view of politics. Then, we have an "outer" core – shared by one concept more than others – where we find the belief that there are quick solutions for political problems, conflict avoidance, a critical view of liberal representation, and the believe that politicians are unresponsive.

In political cynicism, for instance, there is a strong sense of corruption and unresponsiveness from the system, together with the fact that politicians and the political system cannot deal with problems effectively (Krouwel & Abts, 2007). This belief implies a simplified and pessimistic view of politics – all politicians are the same and are corrupt – together with a high criticism of liberal representation and the belief that politicians are unresponsive.

In stealth democracy, there is the belief that there is one way to solve the political problems for everyone – this is where it connects with populism, with the difference that stealth democrats believe that there is an objective technical solution for political problems (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002) while populism states that there is an equality of goals and the “common people” all want the same objectives (Laclau, 2005). Again, we witness a simplified and pessimistic view of politics with a critical view on politicians, an aim to solve political problems quickly and avoiding conflict and the failure of understanding the diversity of views and aims present in society. Politics – in democracy – are conceived to face diversity, equally legitimate differences, and to establish a dialogue between legitimate positions to arrive at a compromise (Bellamy, 1999; Canovan, 1999; Rustow, 2015). But the solutions to avoid this heterogeneity, present in these different concepts, seem to be comforting to citizens because they promote something desirable: the absence of conflict. And this idea is attractive to citizens.

Disaffection also shares these core characteristics, and even though it is a more complex concept than the rest, it connects with them because it reflects a deep disconnection from the political community which ‘has the potential of undermining the loyalty, commitment, and confidence of citizens’ (Offe, 2006, p. 44). Disaffection reflects discontent

with politics, and ‘as a result, many citizens fail to fully appreciate that politics in the end involves the collective imposition of decisions, demands a complex communication process and generally produces messy compromise’ (Stoker, 2006 p. 10). Therefore, we see how disaffection connects with the in- and out-core concepts with its pessimistic view and criticism with liberal representation.

For authoritarianism, it is key to develop a solid group homogeneity for the members of society and provide the base for them to feel they "belong" to a collective of similar people. By offering to citizens the comfort that the homogeneous group provides, authoritarianism connects also with conflict avoidance and quick solutions of political problems, which are managed in the same way for everyone in the group. We see that this view is closely related to what populism offer, in the case of populism being the solid group "the people" which offer different connotations not present in authoritarianism. However, we see how these last concepts also connect with the core characteristics, because in the way that authoritarianism conceives the development of society there is, again, a simplified view of political problems, and a failure of understanding the diversity present in society. Authoritarianism is also implicitly critical with politicians and liberal representation because it offers a very different view on how to organize political power and what is the place for the leaders and the rest of the members of society.

Other characteristics

For the rest of the attributes, we see that some are shared between populism and the different concepts. For instance, in the case of cynicism and populism, we see that sometimes they are also confused in the literature. This confusion is – to some extent – understandable, because populist and cynical citizens, as we already have mentioned, share a view of a corrupted and unresponsive system. However, the “solution” they offer to this problem is different. In populism, the proposal is to bring power to the people, by creating common goals and

implementing mechanisms of direct democracy. For cynics, the solution is not that clear. Being cynical seems to be related to being systematically distrustful and refuse to do anything about it. This is not a shared attribute between populism and cynicism, and populism is different because it wants to mobilize the existing discontent. We argue that this is one of the major differences between populism and cynicism: cynical citizens could become populist, but then they would have to disregard a part of cynicism which is the lack of involvement or their unwillingness to "battle" the situation. From this difference, we can deduce that cynical citizens will have low external political efficacy and populists will have high external political efficacy because the former do not believe that their political actions could make an impact, while the latter are expected to participate and try to change the system from its structures and processes – but counting on “outsiders” to that political world – because they think that their political actions have repercussions that could change the actual situation.

One last difference that can be found between populist and cynical citizens is how they conclude that the political system is not worth their support. In populist attitudes, we expect citizens to have reflected on the reasons why they believe the system does not work, while political cynical citizens have a distrust not based on knowledge, observation or informed argumentation (Krouwel & Abts, 2007).

In the overlap between stealth democracy and populism, we have seen that what they had in common was mainly proposing that there is one "correct" way to solve problems. In that sense, populism could be portrayed as a simplified version of democracy, proposing the idea that there is an easy way out of conflict. However, there is not. If citizens would recognize that differences are legitimate, the role of deliberation would be much more appreciated (Kock, 2007). Stealth democracy, in the same sense, would simplify politics by proposing an expert manner of solving problems, which is not always possible because some political decisions are a matter of ideology, morals, and ethics, and not of objective technical solutions.

However, stealth democracy and populism are not the same. In populism, the belief exists that the political elite is corrupt and the processes are not functioning properly, and they must

be changed by new parties and – usually – not professional politicians. In stealth democracy, it is the entire dimension of politics – deliberation, decision – that ought to be avoided, not by the same means – in this case, new parties and leaders – but by leaving political decisions out of politics, and giving that responsibility to professionals out of the sphere of politics. It is politics *sui generis*.

Concerning disaffection, Offe (2006, p. 43) suggests that ‘the spread of disaffection creates space and opportunities that might be exploited by anti-liberal and/or anti-democratic political entrepreneurs and their populist projects.’ We think that the purely populist discourse is not anti-democratic in its principles, as neither is disaffection. Furthermore, they also share the important aforementioned characteristic of the failure of "appreciating the politics" in the words of Stoker (2006). Disaffection and pure populism connect in that exact point, in its misconception and considerations of the democratic processes – we are considering here the liberal representative democracy model.

Last, with relation to populism and authoritarianism, both develop a solid group homogeneity as we have mentioned already, and by proclaiming the homogeneity of a certain group, a powerful difference is raised on the way the members of the group perceive the people out of their "community". Not only the outsiders are conceived as different, but also as a threat. In the case of authoritarianism, that threat is controlled using coercion. In the case of populism, the threat is restrained imposing the will of the majority with mechanisms of direct democracy.

Both solutions are "quick", in the sense that they do not require neither to acknowledge the necessities or desires of the out-group nor to give them a voice or negotiate to arrive at a compromise. These solutions are based on imposing the will of the group onto the others, without any recognition or legitimacy of their needs. With these approaches, a simple solution is offered to deal (or better said, not to deal) with social conflict.

1.2.1 How are these concepts related to attitudes?

During the empirical part of this thesis, we will be looking at how the different concepts that have been already defined are related to each other, and whether they have any effect on each other. We will do so measuring the different attitudes that citizens hold (and that are related to these concepts) and see how these different attitudes interact – as such complex concepts cannot be directly measured. Hence, we believe that it is important to first lay out some explanation on how the characteristics from the different concepts explained above manifest in the attitudes of the citizens, making them measurable and allowing us to test for interactions. As populism is the central concept of this work and due to its complexity, Chapter 2 is entirely devoted to exploring this issue on populism.

On the attitudes that reflect stealth democracy on citizens, we can see how the overlap between populist attitudes and stealth democracy manifests in the attitudes of the citizens in different ways. Concerning how process preferences are related to attitudes, Dahl (1989, p. 164) states that ‘the democratic process is itself a form of justice (...) the democratic process is packed to the hilt with substantive values.’ If people are demanding different processes, it could be because their attitudes towards processes of liberal democracy are not positive and they are looking for a change. And with a negative conception of liberal democracy, we expect certain attitudes such as low legitimacy, trust, etc.

The measurement proposed by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse is different from classical measurements of political efficacy and trust because, as previously mentioned, they capture the idea of leaving political decisions out of the sphere of politics, implying that political conflict is created at the elite level, and not in the citizenry. This conception of politics is also related to political trust and efficacy but is intrinsically different to affirm to have low trust in the political system than wanting political representation to be merely testimonial. That is why we should investigate further to understand how holding these stealth attitudes is related to the liberal role of representation and liberal democracy.

Concerning preferences of experts to be the decision-makers, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002, p. 44) argue that 'people may be dissatisfied with the dominance of institutions and elected officials in the political process, but this does not mean they have a desire for ordinary people to take over the process. They embrace direct, popular rule no more than detached, distant institutions (...) although they also desire centrist processes, they do not believe they are getting them.' In their work, the authors discover that, as what happens with policies, in processes, people's preferences are central in a spectrum from direct democracy to the total delegation. However, as people understand it, elites process preferences and citizen process preferences are on opposite sides. This poses a position of "us against them" because although there is a spatial conception of how processes could be, with two extremes, parties should be able to move in this space. But regarding processes, that seems unlikely to voters. We think this issue leads to dissatisfaction.

Dissatisfaction is usually conceived from perceptions of how the government performs or the outcomes it produces. But if we follow the literature stating that citizens hardly care about any policy (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002) it makes sense that they are more sensitive towards processes. Especially when processes are conceived to be benefiting the elites and being an already set procedure with no space for change in the direction desired by citizens. This is why dissatisfaction based on policy outcomes is more susceptible to variation, because once in a while the citizen might obtain the desired outcome; but dissatisfaction based on process dissatisfaction is stable because it is not usual that parties pressure in this issue.

Dissatisfaction with the process could result in the questioning of the existing processes and therefore an aspiration to reform them or to support candidates who would make process change the main issue of their campaigns. Therefore, some research must be conducted to see if dissatisfaction with processes is linked – and if so, how – with attitudes towards democracy and voting behaviour.

As for political disaffection, its impact on citizens has been discussed arduously. High levels of political disaffection in a particular country might not necessarily

have a priori negative connotations. Political disaffection might influence behaviour in different ways depending on the political context in which it has originated and developed. But in other countries political disaffection may be contributing to enlarge the distance between citizens and their representatives, to strengthen political inequalities, and to make institutional or political change much more difficult. In many new democracies, higher levels of political disaffection do not lead to higher levels of non-conventional political actions, but rather to generally low levels of political involvement. Political accountability may also be altered since political disaffection is associated with lower levels of political information among voters, biased informational sources (Gunther et al., 2007), and even changes in their use of informational shortcuts. Consequences of political disaffection may, therefore, vary in different political contexts.

The reader could think that disaffection, as defined, could not have a big impact on electoral democracy. Even though those feelings of distrust appear in the minds of many citizens. However, if citizens distrust the government, it could affect the political process. Liberal democracy relies on the participation of its citizens as a basis of legitimacy and to produce representative decisions, then decreasing involvement as a consequence of distrust can harm the democratic process (Dalton, 2004, p. 11).

Furthermore, disaffection may also affect other political attitudes. If one feels detached from her/his political community, it seems reasonable that interest towards the political community declines. Political interest has been negatively conceived in southern European societies (Segatti, 2007). However, as we mentioned before, declarations of lack of interest in politics are more a matter of a general dislike of the world of politics in general and not a special disinterest of politics. We wonder if that could also be the case of disaffection, that citizens, in general, feel a dislike for the political community and therefore they are over declaring themselves detached but in reality, they do care or feel more close to the political community than they are willing to admit. As Segatti (2007) explored, when citizens declare

to have interest in politics, competence and education were important predictors for interest in politics. Should we expect the same from disaffected citizens?

Once we have discussed in which ways the different political attitudes overlap with the concept of populism, and explained the possible different relations between them, we go on to the next chapter to analyse with more detail how populism has been operationalized in the literature devoted to the demand side.

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Chapter 2

The operationalisation of populist attitudes

Irene Esteban

We already provided an overview on the different concepts and theories linked to populism, and as a next step we would like to establish the whole approach of this thesis, that focuses specifically on the demand side of this phenomenon. Hence, we will be looking during this chapter at how populist attitudes unveil on the citizen side. How do these attitudes manifest, and what should be researchers looking at? What are the dimensions of the concept and which specific indicators have been used?

We will walk the reader through the different major works existent up to date and systematically analyse them, in order to provide a clear summary on how these concepts discussed in the first chapter take contact with reality during the research process. As a first step, we will provide an overview on how different studies have dealt with the conceptualisation of the concept of populism, and which definition and dimensions are specified by each study. Second, we will analyse the data used, the operationalisation of the concept and the indicators used. Last, we give an overview of the methods used by the different works.


2.1 Concept validity

Despite populism being a widely studied concept – theoretically and empirically, a new field of research has boomed in the last ten years, focused on populist attitudes among the citizenry and how to measure them. Over the last decade, researchers have been trying to accomplish a good measurement for this construct and there is some disagreement in the literature still present nowadays. In this chapter, we try to present a guideline for future research attempting to measure populist attitudes, while providing an overview of the operationalisation and measurement of this concept. We do not make a claim in this chapter on which measurement is best, because there is too much discrepancy between the different current scales. However, we make a conscious effort to bring a critical view on how the topic has been tackled by different authors, and we provide and compare the methodological information of the different operationalizations. The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with an overview of the existing scales to measure populist attitudes, so s/he can decide for her/himself which measurement to use.

We believe that, as a first step, it is important to go through how each of the different studies on populism has tackled the process of concept validity for the study of populism. Concept

validity is a first action that the researchers must accomplish, in order to transition from a theoretical construct to an operationalised construct. When going from the theoretical to the empirical level, the researcher needs to reduce the complexity from the theoretical dimensions of the construct. As Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet, (2009) assess: ‘The theoretical language contains terms that may refer to unobservable events and is thus much richer than the observation language’ (Carnap 1956, p. 38). Therefore, researchers must perform an exercise of precision and definition when trying summarise the construct in a more manageable way for its empirical treatment. They do so in two phases: first by defining the construct, and second by determining the dimensions in which the construct can “composed of”. These dimensions will afterwards be “specified” in indicators, capable of measuring observed variables. That following step – from an operationalised construct to an observed variable – is called measurement validity. For some authors, the whole process from the definition of a theoretical construct to the decision of the indicators in order to measure an observed variable is a dynamic process, because it is an exercise in constant revision by the researcher (Billiet 2016).

Figure 2.1 From theoretical concept to observed variable



Source: Adapted from Billiet (2016)

2.2 Definitions in the different studies measuring populist attitudes

Across the studies devoted to measure populist attitudes, we find different definitions and dimensions of populism. In this section, we present an overview of how populism has been conceptualized so far in this field of research. But first, we believe that it is necessary to mention to studies that, without providing a specific definition of populism, are fundamental for the development of its conceptualisation.

A first-time paper finding an attitudinal profile the author labels as populist attitudes (or more precisely, cluster of populist indicators) was written by Axelrod in 1967. The author

claims that (Axelrod, 1967, p. 57): ‘an appropriate name for this scale is “populism” because one of its extremes corresponds to many of the attitudes of the American Populist movement of the 1890’s.’ In fact, we argue that this is exactly the main problem with this scale: it is too embedded in its own context and historical frame, and it could not be possible to use this scale to find examples of populism in other place or time. Authors as Hawkins, Riding and Mudde (2012) also explicitly share this view. Therefore, we decided not take this study into account when analysing populist measures but we acknowledge its existence and in the Appendix we provide the details of this scale.

The second study proposing a measurement on populist attitudes is authored by Farrell and Laughlin in 1976. In this work, there is no specific definition of populism, but what the authors call ‘a historical summary of American populism’ (Farrell & Laughlin, 1976, p. 34), in which they specify the demands of the party and the primary base of its voters. The authors define them as ‘aggrieved agrarians who felt victimized by economic and political developments of the period’ (Ibidem). However, they follow the approach of placing populism in the mainstream of American democratic reform movements (Ibidem). This paper belongs to the field of psychology and it does not go into depth in the theory or the conceptualisation of populism itself, however, it describes a set of “dimensions” of populism displayed in Table 1. Unfortunately, it shares the limitations we previously highlighted in the work of Axelrod, therefore we believe that it is important to acknowledge its existence – because the measurement of populist attitudes started with these two studies. However, nowadays these are not the most useful examples of the theoretical or empirical development on populist attitudes in the literature.

Having explained these two important previous studies, we find some later works devoted to measure populist attitudes, in which different definitions and dimensions of populism can be identified. The first definition of “modern” populism, present in this study is the same developed by Cas Mudde (2004) in his theoretical work on populism (Mudde, 2004, p. 543): ‘an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people.’ This conception of populism as a “thin-ideology”, has been used by Stanley (2008), Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2013) and Schulz and colleagues (2017). The term thin-ideology normally refers to the fact that populism “combines with other, more established, ideologies” (Stanley, 2008, p. 258). This term comes from the definition of Freedon (1998), which stresses that thin ideologies are considered as such because of their incapacity to give ‘a solution to questions of

social justice, distribution of resources, and conflict management which mainstream ideologies address' (Freeden, 1998, pp. 750-751). However, there is some controversy surrounding this conception because, as already mentioned in the previous chapter, Freeden himself, stated how there are 'considerable doubts about the applicability of thincentrism to populism' (Freeden, 2017, p.3) and that, for him, populism does not fit in the thin-centered ideology category: '[t]o return to the notion of a 'thin-centered' ideology, populism displays a slightly different trait. It not only falls short of comprehensiveness but short of nuanced specificity in what it does offer' (Freeden, 2017, p. 10). However, the author considers only right-wing populism in his argumentation.

A second way of conceiving populism, involves the thin-centered approach but in a broader manner, and it considers populism a set of ideas. Hawkins, Riding and Mudde (2012), for instance, have used this approach and the authors consider populism a thin ideology but within the view of populism as a set of ideas: 'we treat populism as a set of ideas. Specifically, we refer to populism as a discourse or what some scholars call a thin-centered ideology: a coherent set of basic assumptions about the world and the language that unwittingly expresses them' (Hawkins et. al, 2012, p. 3). Other authors, consider populism as exclusively a set of ideas, without including the thin-ideology aspect, such as Spruyt, Keppens and Van Droogenbroeck (2016), and Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel (2018).

We believe that there is a certain degree of vagueness when scholars follow this ideational approach to populism. And as Spruyt et al. (2010, p. 10) reflect, there are still debates within the "ideational" conception of populism, because it can include the thin ideology approach (e.g., Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012), a discourse approach (e.g., Hawkins 2009), or a frame approach (e.g., Aslanidis, 2016, while other scholars argue that the exact form populism is context-dependent (Van Kessel, 2014). For instance, Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel (2018, p. 69) argue that populism can have a preference for organisational and stylistic aspects as charismatic leadership and and simplistic language but that they are not defining properties of populism as such.

2.3 Dimensions of populism in attitudinal studies

As a further step in the operationalisation of the concept, these different studies had to "separate" the construct of populism into different dimensions. The first study attempting to do so was the work of Farrell and Laughlin (1976). As we explained before, the idea of populism

of this study was very context dependent, and it is not in the line of the studies performed nowadays, however we believe that it is worth to devote some lines to explain their conception.

Farrell and Laughlin (1976) were the first presenting a scale which shows some dimensions of populism. In their case, the scale they developed represents, according to the authors opinions: ‘domestic political and economic policy, social welfare policy and personal pessimism and disillusion with the political process’ (Farrell & Laughlin, 1976, p. 35). For the authors, a citizen with a high score in their scale (a populist – according to them): ‘perceives an unjust distribution of wealth and power, which results in excessive influence by the wealthy and powerful on political and economic issues. Consequently, this person seeks tax revision, governmental regulation of business, and social welfare programs. The high respondent also tends to a personal pessimism and disillusion with the political process’ (Farrell & Laughlin, 1976, p. 36). These dimensions however, are neither defined as dimensions nor specified prior to the analysis of their results, and they are observed only post-hoc.

Contemporary studies, then, conceive populism differently, and we find a greater theoretical effort to dive in this concept. The studies developed use reflections from different theoretical works of scholars such as Canovan (2005), Mudde (2004) and Fieschi (2004). As we saw in the previous chapter, the “theoretical” literature on populism defined the core elements of it as: the special style of creating an in-group (in which monism is assumed), a critical position towards liberal representation, political parties their rhetoric, a Manichean division of society (anti-establishment), and the idea that politics should have no conflict. However, most attitudinal studies on populism find mainly two dimensions of this phenomenon in peoples’ attitudes: the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite (the Manichean division of society) and the idea of popular sovereignty (the in-group creation in which the people are central). As the reader can observe in Table 2.1, some of these studies also try to capture other dimensions, but attitudinal studies seem to converge strongly in these two traits when analysing the transition from the populist “manifesto” to the actual attitudes present in the citizens.

The most common dimension defined is the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite. It is defined as such by Stanley (2011) and Spruyt, Keppens and Van Droogenbroeck (2016). For Hawkins, Riding and Mudde (2012), this dimension is understood as “a belief in a conspiring elite” while for Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2013) it is just portrayed as the opposition to the elite. Finally, Schulz et al. (2017, p. 4) define this dimension as ‘an anti-elitism approach with elites seen as corrupts, betraying and deceiving the people.’

The second most important dimension is the idea of popular sovereignty, defined by Stanley (2011), Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2013) and Spruyt, Keppens and Van Droogenbroeck (2016). The rest of the dimensions considered are: a Manichean view of politics, defined by Hawkins, Riding and Mudde (2012) and also by Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2013) as ‘the Manichean division between “good” and “evil”’; The existence of two homogeneous units of analysis: “the people” and “the elite” Stanley (2011) and Spruyt, Keppens and Van Droogenbroeck (2016); the positive valorisation of “the people” and denigration of “the elite” Stanley (2011) and Spruyt, Keppens and Van Droogenbroeck (2016) and last a reified popular will defined by Hawkins, Riding and Mudde (2012).

When analysing these dimensions, some authors use populism compared to other concepts, to highlight its own differences. In the case of Hawkins, Riding and Mudde (2012, p. 3) the authors develop the idea of how populism presents the opposite to pluralism, because ‘populism craves moral clarity and (...) treats dissent as suspect and dangerous (...) populism sees a world that is naturally antagonistic.’ In the case of Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2013, pp. 1327-1328), the authors reflect and compare populism and elitism, stating that even though theoretically elitism and populism are opposites, they share the Manichean vision of society, and in practice populism and elitism have a more ambiguous relationship that one could expect from theoretical reflection (Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove, 2013, p. 1328).

Other authors, stress how populism is not only but the sum of all its parts – in this case, dimensions – and cannot be understood without all of them present: as Spruyt, Keppens and Van Droogenbroeck (2016, p. 2), who emphasize how the combination of the four dimensions that they believe populism to be divided into is what constitutes populism, and makes its “specific, discursive logic” (Ibidem). Or Schulz et al. (2017, p. 2) for whom populist attitudes are a latent second-order construct made up of three lower order dimensions and argue that ‘a unidimensional model fails to adequately describe populist attitudes, as it does not account for the different political ideas that have been identified as distinct yet correlated facets of a populist ideology.’

In Table 2.1 we find an overview of the different definitions and dimensions established by the aforementioned scholars in the last years.

Table 2.1 Overview of definition and dimensions of populism in different studies

Study	Definition	Dimensions
Farrell & Laughlin, 1976.	Not given.	Excessive influence by the elite on politics and economy. Unjust distribution of wealth and power. Disillusion with the political process.
Stanley, 2011.	Thin ideology.	Two homogeneous units of analysis: “the people” and “the elite”. Antagonistic relationship between the units. Belief in popular sovereignty. Positive valorisation of “the people” and denigration of “the elite”.
Hawkins et al, 2012.	Set of ideas, thin-centered ideology.	Manichean view of politics. Belief in popular sovereignty. Belief in a conspiring elite.
Akkerman et al, 2013.	Thin-centered ideology that attaches to others.	Opposition to the elite. Sovereignty of the people. Manichean division.
Spruyt et al, 2016.	A set of ideas.	Societal division in two homogeneous groups: the people and the elite. Antagonistic relationship between them. Virtuosity of the people and denigration of the elite. Popular sovereignty considered the ultimate source of legitimacy.
Schulz et al, 2017.	Thin-centered ideology comprising a set of political ideas about the structure of power in society.	Anti-elitism. Belief in unrestricted popular sovereignty. The people” are homogeneous and virtuous.
Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018.	Set of ideas.	Manichean division between corrupt “elites” and virtuous “people”. Popular sovereignty.

Source: Own elaboration.

2.4 Measurement validity

Measurement validity is the process by which the researcher goes through an operationalised construct to an observed variable. Therefore, first, to go from a construct to an empirically measurable variable we have the necessary but not sufficient condition of concept validity (Billiet, 2016). Concept validity will make the researcher go from the theoretical construct to an operationalised construct, which is less abstract (in the case we are illustrating, from a definition of populism to the dimensions of populism). However, there is still an important part of the process left: obtaining from those dimensions specific indicators that will measure accurately the dimensions of the construct.

In the case of populism, it is more complicated because normally it is argued that populism is a concept that should be measured by means of a latent variable. A latent variable is ‘an empirical realization of a theoretical construct’ and latent variables are ‘not directly observed but inferred from other variables that are observed’ (Billiet, 2016, p. 195). Therefore, coming up with a measurement model for populist attitudes is even more challenging.

Data used

First, we believe that is important to know the different sources used by the authors of the studies we are analysing, because there are important differences across samples and countries. In this section, we offer a brief overview of the data used by the different studies, but more information is provided in Table 2.2.

In the study by Axelrod, the information of their data is scarce, and we only know that this data was gathered as part of the 1956 national survey conducted by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center (Axelrod, 1967, p. 52).

In the study by Farrell and Laughlin, the authors use historical sources (not defined) to write a scale with 100 items they tested in a sample of 100 adults in Illinois, US (Farrell & Laughlin, 1976, p. 35).

Stanley (2011, p. 262) uses data from a representative post-electoral survey of 1,203 Slovak citizens with responses weighted for sampling bias. The survey belongs to the Comparative Survey of Electoral Systems (CSES, Slovakia 2010) with information on voting behaviour, socio-demographics, and questions on attitudes on populism, nationalism, economic

and cultural values. The author used multiple imputation because of the high levels of non-response in some variables.

In Hawkins et al, (2012, p. 1) the authors used measures in pilot surveys over the latter part of 2007 and early 2008 and deployed them in two large, representative surveys conducted around the US general election in November 2008: The Cooperative Congressional Elections Survey (CCES) and the Utah Colleges Exit Poll (UCEP).

In the study by Akkerman et al (2013, p. 1330) the authors used a web-based survey of over 600 Dutch citizens in which the participants were recruited online by a survey company. The survey was held in November of 2011.

Spruyt and colleagues (2016, p. 5) used a random sample of the population of Flanders in the fall of 2013. The survey was conducted by means of a mail questionnaire, had four waves and 1,577 respondents returned the questionnaires.

Schulz et al. (2017, pp. 4-5) developed two online surveys in Switzerland in 2014 and 2015, the first one with a nation-wide sample of 400 citizens and second with a Swiss sample from Zurich and surrounding regions of 1,260 citizens. In both surveys, respondents were recruited and quotas were applied for age and gender.

Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel (2018, p. 74) use data from an original cross national survey part of the LIVEWHAT project with 18,368 respondents, which was collected between June and August of 2015. It includes nationally representative samples of nine European countries (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, United Kingdom). All their national samples have quotas to match national population on gender, region, age and educational level.

2.5 Operationalisation and indicators of the construct

Operationalised constructs and items to measure our construct are the natural next step in this procedure. Researchers aim to design items that capture behaviour that can be measured, even though indicators not only measure incompletely the constructs, but also capture things that are not intended such as method effects and response style (Billiet, 2016). In the case of populist attitudes, we will explore what items are the most commonly used and what other items have only been used by specific authors.

Indicators

When talking about indicators, authors want them to tap in specific attitudinal traits, and therefore be similar (which in many cases will imply correlation), however, each item needs to have its own specificity. ‘Items (indicators) of a construct (latent variable) correlate together because they all reflect the same underlying construct or “true” score’ (Billiet, 2016, p. 198). However, for some authors correlation does not imply content. This is something to have in mind when exploring different indicators for a measurement.

In Table 1.2 we present an overview of the most common used indicators to measure populist attitudes and show which studies incorporate them. After that, we explain in detail which other items the authors included in their measurement models (if they did) and in the Appendix the reader can find the list of all the items used by study.

Table 2.2 Most used indicators to measure populist attitudes

N°	Item	Stanley 2011	Hawkins et al, 2012	Akkerman et al, 2013	Spruyt et al 2016	Schulz et al, 2017	Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018
1	The people, not the politicians, should make our most important policy decisions		x	x	x	x	x
2	The politicians in Parliament need to follow the will of the people		x	x	x	x	x
3	The differences between ordinary people and the ruling elite are much greater than the differences between ordinary people			x	x	x	x
4	Politicians talk too much and take too little action			x	x	x	x
5	What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles	OP		x	x		x
6	I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a professional politician			x	x		x
7	Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil	SIM	x	x			
8	Ordinary people share the same values and interests	OP				x	
9	Established politicians who claim to defend our interests, only take care of themselves	OP			x		

OP= item asking the same but formulated for the respondent to answer in an opposite way. SIM= item with a similar wording.

As we can see in Table 2.2, the most commonly used items are related to the centrality and importance of “the people”: “the people should make the decisions” and “politicians need to follow the will of the people”. Next, we see criticism to politicians and the distance between politicians and “the people”, and in the least used we have items on values and again differences between the two opposed groups.

In the study of Axelrod (1967), the author uses six indicators to capture what he labels as populism. However, as we already explained these indicators are too focused on the specific case of the US in that moment in time, so we will not take these indicators into account for our revision¹. With the work of Farrell and Laughlin we face a similar problem: their study takes the 20 items with the highest correlation in the item score to create their final scale of populist attitudes, obtaining a final scale of 10 positively worded and 10 negatively worded items. However, this scale is also too focused on a specific case, so we will not take these indicators into account for our analysis, but they are available in Appendix.

Stanley (2011) does not create a measurement model (scale or latent variable) but he considers the indicators separately as predictors of an OLS model to test their impact on voting behaviour. In this sense, the author does not build up like the other scholars a solid “conglomerate” for populist attitudes. He uses categorical questions treated as a scale, ranging from total agreement to total disagreement with a statement. The author explains that ‘the statements were formulated to be provocative, in keeping with the nature of populists appeals’ (Stanley, 2011, p. 262). For instance, Item 8 is written in a “reversed” way ‘The ordinary people are divided by many different values’, as item 9 ‘Not all politicians are the same; some genuinely care about what the people want’ and item 5 in ‘Democracy is about finding compromise between different interests and opinions’. The he introduces item 7 with a similar wording found later in other studies ‘Modern politics is in essence a struggle between the good, honest people and the evil elite’. The items included by Stanley which do not belong to the most used are the following:

¹ The list of indicators is available for the interested reader in the Appendix.

- St.1) The ordinary people are divided by many different values.
- St.2) The people who belong to the political elite are divided by many different values.
- St.3) Ordinary people are prevented from improving their lives by the actions of unaccountable elites.
- St.4) Ordinary people are unable to make the correct decisions about the future of our country.
- St.5) The majority of politicians are honest people.

According to the author, the first two items (St.1 and St.2) capture the views on homogeneity on the people and the elite. For the author, disagreement with these items connotes populism. Then, some items try to measure the antagonistic view on politics, for the author, agreement with St.3 and disagreement with item 9 of the general battery, indicates populism. Then the author uses two items to measure attitudes towards democracy: Item 5 of the general battery for a majoritarianism concept of democracy, and St.4 measures direct versus representative forms of decision-making. For the author, disagreement with these connotes populism. Last, the moral aspect is tapped by St.5 and item 7 of the general battery. (Stanley, 2011, pp. 262-263).

Hawkins and colleagues (2012) use items 1, 2 and 7 of the battery of most common items, and also added:

- H.1) The power of a few special interests prevents our country from making progress.

In both surveys used by Hawkins and colleagues, respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with these statements. In the CCES, a 4-point scale was used, with labels for each response 1=strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= agree, 4= strongly agree. In the UCEP, respondents were given a 5-point Likert-type scale with labels only for the extremes: 1= strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree (Hawkins et al, 2012, p. 8)

Akkerman et al (2013) use seven indicators to measure populist attitudes: items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. Items 1, 2, 3 and 6 according to the authors (Akkerman et al, 2013, p. 1332), attempt to capture ideas on representative government, and the division between the people and the politicians (the elite) who do not represent the true will of the people. In addition, for them item 3 focuses on the similarity among the people and the differences with the elite. The authors want to capture with their scale 'a view of the popular sovereignty combined with a negative view of representative government' (Akkerman et al, 2013, pp. 1332-1334). With items 4 and

7 they aim to capture the Manichean division of society and item 5, tries to reflect on the openness to compromise between different viewpoints in politics. In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to rate their agreement with the populism questions on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (I very much disagree) to 5 (I very much agree) (Akkerman et al., 2013, pp. 1330-1331).

Spuyt et al (2016) include in their measurement model eight indicators. Besides the ones included in Table 2 they include an additional item:

Sp.1) The established elite and politicians have often betrayed the people.

From the general items presented in Table 2 they use items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 9. According to the authors, items 1, 2 3 and 6 attempt to capture the people-centrism by reflecting on representative government and also try to represent the people as a homogeneous group. (Spruyt et al, 2016, p. 6). Items 4, 5 9 and Sp.1 capture how politicians do not represent the true will of the people either in a descriptive way or accusing politicians of taking advantage from “the people,” where they introduce more explicitly introduce the moral antagonism between the people and the elite (Ibidem). Items 9 and Sp.1 are original and explicitly articulate the moral dimension of politicians’ behaviour (Ibidem).

The authors claim that the originality of their measure resides in capturing populism as more than a broad anti-establishment attitude. Furthermore, they claim that this scale adopts the language expressed by Flemish politicians (Ibidem).

Schulz et al. (2017) gathered 15 items, and they use from the general battery items 1 to 6.

They also add the following items:

Sc.1) MPs in Parliament very quickly lose touch with ordinary people

Sc.2) People like me have no influence on what the government does

Sc. 3) The people should have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums

Sc. 4) The people should be asked whenever important decisions are taken

Sc. 5) Ordinary people all pull together

Sc. 6) Ordinary people are of good and honest character

Sc. 7) Although the Swiss are very different from each other, when it comes down to it they all think the same

According to the authors the items Sc.1, item 3, Sc. 2 and item 4, reflect on anti-elitism attitudes. Then, items Sc.3, Sc.4, item 1 and item 2 measure a demand for popular sovereignty and items Sc.5, Sc.6, Sc.7, item 8 and Sc.7, capture the belief in a homogeneous and virtuous people. The items had 5-point Likert scales from 1=strongly disagree to 5= strongly agree (Schulz et al., 2017, p. 5).

Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel (2018) use items 1, 2 3, 4 5 and 6 of the general battery, plus two others:

Vh.1) The particular interests of the political class negatively affect the welfare of the people.

Vh. 2) Politicians always end up agreeing when it comes to protecting their privileges.

All individual items consist of five-point Likert scales, with higher values indicating higher levels of populist attitudes.

As we observe in this section, the literature seems to be settling for at least five strong indicators of populism (items 1 to 5 of the general battery) and then it depends on the conception of the authors on populism or the empirical analyses they must perform that opens the possibility to include some other items.

2.6 Validity assessment of the measured construct

In the following section, we want to test whether the proposed indicators sufficiently reflect the variables they intend to measure and how “reliable” are the different measures. We believe there is so much diversity in this studies – in the methodological aspect – such as sample size and sampling method, methods used to test the scales or a latent variable and the use of discriminant validity, that a broader analysis is needed. Our intention is to gather all the data used from this studies, and analyse it with the same methods, in order to understand which scale is more reliable in a methodological sense. However, at the moment we do not have this data. We do present in Table 2.3 an overview of the methodological details that the authors provide in their work.

As we can see in table 2.3, the studies vary across countries with the first studies very present in the US and the interest moving towards Europe; number of respondents in the sample (the smallest study that we have information of the sample is the one of Farrell& Laughlin and the biggest one the one of Van Kessel; the types of sample are diverse and the methods from 2011 on are mainly exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. Most of them have discriminant validity and we show the coefficient of different tests of the measurement such as Cronbach's Alpha and the Eigenvalue of the factors.

Table 2.3 Methodological aspects from papers measuring populist attitudes.

Study	Country	(N)	Sample	Method used	Discriminant validity	Inter-item correlations	Ch's Alpha	Eigenvalue	All positive worded?
Axelrod 1967	USA	No info	No info	Cluster analysis	Yes: liberalism and foreign policy .	-	-	-	Yes.
Farrell & Laughlin 1976	USA/ East central Illinois	100	Not random	Item analyses/correlations of item score with the sum of all items.	No.	-	-	-	No.
	USA/Central and Northern Illinois	222	Not random	Item analyses/correlations of item score with the sum of all items.	No.	-	-	-	No.
Stanley 2011	Slovakia/ CSES	1,203	Not random, weighted	OLS	-	-	-	-	No.
Hawkins et al, 2012	USA CCES	1,000	Matched random sampling	Principal component factor (PCA) analysis with orthogonal varimax rotation.	Yes: stealth democracy.	0.31	0.65 /0.73*	2.54**	Yes.
	USA-Utah UCEP	1,052	Representative	PCA with orthogonal varimax rotation.	Yes: pluralism.	0.26	0.59	0.45	Yes.
Akkerman et al, 2013	The Netherlands	631	Weighted	PCA/ from factors to sumscales.	Yes: pluralism, elitism	Yes	0.82	4.21	Yes.
Spruyt et al 2016	Belgium/ Flanders	1,577	Random sample	Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA).	Yes: lack of external pol. efficacy.	-	0.86	***	Yes.
Schulz et al 2017	Switzerland	400	Nation-wide sample	Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) with promax rotation and CFA.	No.	-	Separated by dimensions	Separated by dimensions	Yes.

Van Kessel 2018	Switzerland European countries ****	1,260 18,368	Swiss sample only taken from the city of Zurich and its surrounding regions Representative	EFA with promax rotation and CFA. Item Response Theory (IRT)	Yes: elitism and pluralism No.	- -	Separated by dimensions 0.88	Separated by dimensions -	Yes. Yes.
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* If stealth democracy indicators added, ** With stealth democracy indicators, *** RMSEA 0.062, **** France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden and United Kingdom

Through this chapter, we offered a comprehensive view on the different studies on populist attitudes: the definition used, how they approach the division on dimensions, which indicators are used and which methods have been implemented. From here on, we will present our empirical chapters. In these chapters we will investigate the relationship between different dimensions of populism in the case of Belgium, the relationship between populism and stealth democracy in the case of Finland, the types of populist voters present in a case like Italy with different and successful suppliers, and the populist attitudes of cases like Portugal and Spain, in which populist right-wing parties have taken long time to appear (or not appeared yet).

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Empirical section

Chapter 3

Two of a kind? People centism and anti-establishment compared

Irene Esteban and Koen Abts

3.1 Introduction

In chapter 3 we focus on the Belgian case in order to explore to of the key dimensions of populist attitudes: people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes. As we already highlighted, in the empirical part of the thesis we will focus on the the demand side of populism. We already discussed several articles in which the authors try to explain the impact of populist attitudes on populist vote, and also how different variables explain populist attitudes and which dimensions form the variable “populism” (Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018; Spruyt, Keppens & Van Droogenbroeck, 2016, Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove, 2013).

However, it is still unclear how the different dimensions of populism relate to each other. This is an important matter, because in order to measure populism correctly, researchers need to make sure not only that the indicators used to measure populism allow to capture correctly the phenomenon, but also that all the different indicators account for distinct elements of a same variable – populism. We believe there is also a gap in the literature with almost no validated explanatory model for these attitudes, and specifically, a test to know whether different dimensions of populism have the same predictors. This chapter will set the grounds to allow future research to predict better the different dimensions of populism and the variables having an effect on them.

Through this chapter, we will analyse how two main dimensions of populism are related: people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes. We argue that both sets of attitudes are devoted to a similar general topic – populism – but also that these attitudes are capturing different phenomena that may be differently related to social characteristics and political involvement.

Our study has three objectives. First, we introduce an analytical examination between two major dimensions of populism: people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes. Second, we test the measurement of these two dimensions using Belgian data by means of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). Third, making use of the literature on cynicism, we test whether both dimensions are explained by the same predictors. We make use of the Belgian National Election Study 2014.

This study shows that, in Belgium, anti-establishment and people centrism are separated concepts. Moreover, using the same predictors for both attitudes, we prove that our explanatory models work reasonably well – specially to predict anti-establishment attitudes – and that the same predictors have a different impact the two dimensions.

3.2 Theory and hypotheses

3.2.1 Populist definition and the measurement of populist attitudes

To begin with, we recap with a short overview on the different studies that tested the measurement of populist attitudes, look to their definition made of populism, and the dimensions that the different authors specified.

As we already highlighted in the beginning of this thesis, the most common definition of populism is the one referring to it as a “thin-ideology”, adopted by authors like Stanley (2008, p. 258), Hawkins, Riding and Mudde (2012, p. 3), Akkerman and colleagues (2013, p. 1326) and Schulz and colleagues (2017, p. 2). And the second most common definition describe it as a “set of ideas”. This definition is used by authors like Hawkins, Riding and Mudde (2012, p. 3), Spruyt, Keppens and Van Droogenbroeck (2016, p. 2), Schulz and colleagues (2017, p. 2) and Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel (2018, p. 69).

With respect to the dimensions of populist attitudes, there are at least two in which the authors generally agree: **(1) people centrism** and **(2) anti-establishment/elite sentiments**. These two dimensions are defined by authors like Stanley (2008); Hawkins, Riding and Mudde (2012); Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2013); Spruyt, Keppens and Van Droogenbroeck (2016); Schulz et al. (2017) and Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel (2018).

Some authors describe as dimensions of populism also the existence of two homogeneous units “the people” and “the elite”, with an antagonistic relationship between them (Stanley, 2008; Spruyt, Keppens & Van Droogenbroeck, 2016), the Manichean view of politics/society (Hawkins, Riding and Mudde, 2012; Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove, 2013; Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018) and the valorisation of the people as virtuous (Stanley, 2008; Spruyt, Keppens and Van Droogenbroeck, 2016; Schulz et al, 2017).

In this study, we will focus in the two main dimensions of populism in which there is wide agreement of their existence: people centrism and anti-establishment/elite attitudes.

3.2.2 Explanations of populist attitudes

In the previous chapters we explained what populism is and what dimensions it is made of. We now provide a short overview on what are the variables explaining these populist attitudes. After that, we explain the different explanatory models that have been tested in order to explain these populist attitudes.

There have been several studies testing explanatory models for populist attitudes, with some findings as the negative effect of education on populist attitudes and the positive effect of lower income/economical vulnerability on populist attitudes (Hawkins, Riding and Mudde, 2012; Spruyt, Keppens & Van Droogenbroeck, 2016).

Some additional findings are the positive effect of conservatism, ideological polarisation, and anti-immigrant stances on populist attitudes (Hawkins, Riding and Mudde, 2012), the positive effect of populist attitudes on the vote for a populist party (Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove, 2013), the negative effect of external political efficacy (Spruyt, Keppens and Van Droogenbroeck, 2016) and the fundamental opposition to compromise in politics from populist voters (Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove, 2013).

Although these studies are a good first attempt, we think there are – essentially – three important shortcomings.

There is a lack of explanatory elements related with disaffection and other attitudinal aspects. These studies do not take into account feelings of discontent (Hawkins, Riding & Mudde, 2012) or cynicism and see how they articulate with populist attitudes – strongly linked with discontent with traditional politics. Without these considerations, the study of populist attitudes in depth feels incomplete.

A second aspect is that the definition and measurement of populist attitudes has sometimes been done, in a *negative comparative* way – by defining or measuring what populist attitudes are not, instead of providing a better in-depth approach defining what populist attitudes are. The problem with a negative approach is that, when defining or measuring a concept by exclusion of what other concepts are not, first, there is a lack of specificity in the definition (in this case, lacking a clear distinction of what populist attitudes are by themselves) and second, being opposed to something (liberal democracy, elites, etc.) does not imply an explicit support for the opposite behaviour. A negative definition could be dangerous when tackling such complex concepts as populism. In our study, we advocate for defining our concepts in a positive way, looking for the dimensions and indicators that can capture the phenomena we measure.

The third and last problem that we face with previous literature, is the use of many different conceptualisations and operationalisations of the concept populism, while the measurement of its dimensions is still not clear. This fact has methodological consequences, and those are the use of exploratory tools instead of more robust analyses. With these methods, the explanations are more data-driven and this could explain why some studies have contradictory findings, like being highly populist and elitist at the same time (Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove, 2013).

By testing the measurement of different dimensions of populism, we disentangle whether they are concepts distinguishable empirically. Moreover, we treat populism as a part of public opinion, which means that we investigate attitudes, and we do not look for populist citizens by identifying first their voting preferences – usual in the literature until 2014. However, we test the validation of the different dimensions through voting behaviour, to understand the impact of these attitudes on vote choice.

We also provide an explanatory framework to understand which citizens hold these attitudes, and why. We bring an explanation of why certain citizens can feel an appeal from people centrism and anti-establishment, and analyse whether some of these citizens' characteristics and skills are relevant to hold these attitudes. We provide clear hypotheses and test confirmatory models in order to explain the appeal of people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes at the mass level.

Last, we integrate the literature on populism and cynicism together, because we incorporate cynicism as a part of populism and we make all of this process in a positive comparative way, by determining what populism is, and what attitudes are included in populism.

3.2.3 Cynic ideology, similarities and differences between cynicism and populism

Political cynicism, has been considered as a negative “consciousness” (Sloterdijk, 1987; Stanley, 2008) meaning that it is a consequence of a particular kind of reasoning. It has also been defined as the disbelief in the goodness of others' actions (Rosenthal & Van Schendelen, 1977) or “lost belief” (Chaloupka, 1999 p. 24). In a different approach, cynicism is considered ‘the extent to which people hold politicians and politics in disrepute’ (Agger, Goldstein & Pearls, 1961, p. 47). From these definitions we understand that being cynic implies a deep distrust in political actors and institutions. Furthermore, cynics do not doubt of their distrust, therefore, they are not willing to change their mind

(Kanter & Mirvis, 1989). This is the reason why political cynicism is sometimes perceived as a threat to democracy (Dalton, 2004).

Why does cynicism arise? It could be because of disbelief in the good will of political actors in the first place. Some authors affirm that it is a defence mechanism (Stanley, 2008). Cynicism could be a way to avoid conflict, an excuse for not taking part in political action, even though one acknowledges things are working wrong. For other authors (Gao, 2016, p. 53) ‘cynics believe that [they] are one step ahead, and so (...) never feels fooled or deceived and takes pride at having suspicions validated.’ By doing so, cynics develop a false sense of superiority and security, because anyway they belong to that flawed system. However, for Gao, cynical individuals ‘still sustain and reproduce the environments that allow these conditions to continue.’ So cynicism is a moral high ground, but a useless one (Gao, 2016, p. 56).

As for their relationship, political cynicism and populism share the sense of corruption and unresponsiveness from the system and its actors, together with the fact that politicians and the political system cannot deal with problems effectively (Krouwel & Abts, 2007). The “solution” to this problem normally offered by populism is bringing power back to the people, by means of mechanisms of direct democracy. Despite the fact that many populist parties and leaders opt for other options such a strong leadership (Mudde, 2007) or support for alternative types of democracy direct democracy solutions are strongly linked to populism (Webb, 2013) and its specific criticism on liberal democracy. For cynics, however, the solution is not that clear. Being cynical is related to be systematically distrustful and refuse to do anything about it, as some authors asses: ‘The modern cynics are not interested in public defiance’ (Gao, 2016 p. 53) and ‘cynicism refuses to act on its own critique’ (Stanley, 2008 p. 392).

In sum, we could say that populism and cynicism share some of their origins as attitudes (dissatisfaction with the representative system, feelings of unresponsiveness and the inability of the system and actors to deliver satisfactory solutions to their problems). However, we still need to clarify what are the reasons behind the development of these attitudes in different individuals, some theoretical background to distinguish between both. What are the different explanations offered up to date to understand why different people develop these attitudes?

3.2.4 Predictors of attitudes on people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes

We present three approaches that help explaining why some citizens have stronger people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes. The first approach is the “**losers of globalization**” theory (Kriesi et al. 2006). This theory proposes that, due to globalization, economic and cultural competition, a growing number of people will face difficulties to find a place in society – especially in the labour market. Low-skilled, manual work is condemned to disappear in Europe, leaving those who cannot afford to learn these skills in a vulnerable position.

As a consequence, people in a situation of vulnerability – working class and less educated people – feel out of place, misidentified and not belonging to the community (Spruyt, Keppens & Van Droogenbroeck, 2016). Moreover, these citizens feel let down by the elites, they feel that their voice is ignored by the political actors, who are incapable to solve their problems. Kriesi argues that this situation may result in a crisis of representation, leading to different political demands (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015), and relating this to the upsurge of populism (Spruyt, Keppens & Van Droogenbroeck 2016; Kaltwasser 2015; Bornschieer 2010). In this case, populism can be identified as the main dimension of people centrism and “bringing back” power to the people after being let down by political actors.

We argue that “losers of globalisation” will hold higher levels of people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes, as they are two signs from disappointment with political elites. Citizens in favour of people centrism will choose to “fight back” by demanding more civil participation and mobilizing politically. Citizens with anti-establishment attitudes will detach from the political community and embrace a role of disbelief and demobilizing completely.

Our second approach is based on **political involvement and political expertise**. We argue that, as a result of their knowledge and experience with politics, voters will develop anti-establishment attitudes, withdrawing from politics because they feel estranged and disappointed from it. Previous research indicates that levels of political knowledge affect political participation: ‘The more knowledge citizens have of civic affairs, the less likely they are to experience a generalized mistrust of, or alienation from, public life’ (Galston, 2001, p. 224). Popkin and Dimock (1999) also show that less informed citizens will evaluate politicians in a more irrational way. This approach connects to the “losers of

globalisation” theory because previous research also highlighted the relationship between education, race, gender and political interest with political knowledge (Galston, 2001).

We argue that citizens declaring to have less interest in politics, and less politically knowledgeable, will have higher anti-establishment attitudes, because they abandoned their engagement with the political environment around them. On the contrary, we expect citizens who are still interested in politics and follow more political information to be more people centred, because – even though dissatisfied with their outcomes – they still want to participate from the democratic processes and therefore are more engaged than anti-establishment citizens. When a citizen wants to actively participate in politics to change them, they need information to sustain their own arguments against the status quo. Therefore, political knowledge is vital, as it helps citizens understand and direct their interests. ‘The more knowledge we have, the better we can understand the impact of public policies on our interests, and the more effectively we can promote our interests in the political process’ (Galston, 2001 p. 223).

Our last approach is related to **political satisfaction**. We argue that citizens with negative attitudes towards government and democracy, will have higher levels of people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes. We expect that, when citizens are unhappy with political actors, they have higher feelings of people centrism. In a general way, these citizens support democracy, because they remain politically engaged and they still believe in the utility of democracy to bring change. However, even though they support democratic mechanisms in general, we expect these citizens to be deeply discontent with the actual functioning of democracy, because they are unhappy with the present actors of the political scenario. As for citizens disappointed with government and democracy, we expect them to hold high levels of anti-establishment attitudes, as they are completely segregated from the political system as a whole. Therefore, we expect both citizens with negative attitudes towards government and democracy to hold high levels of people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes.

Nevertheless, with respect to willingness to vote, we expect citizens to behave differently depending on whether they have high feelings of people centrism or anti-establishment attitudes. Despite the fact that voting in Belgium is compulsory, we expect citizens who would want to vote if it was not compulsory to have high feelings of people centrism. We argue that, among the citizens who would want to mobilise we will find the supporters of populist alternatives. Even though these citizens are unhappy with

democracy and government, they will want to mobilise to support their party choice. While on the contrary, we expect citizens who do not want to vote to hold higher anti-establishment attitudes, because they do not perceive voting as an effective mechanism to bring effective change, and they do not want to mobilise because they have already given up on the political system.

In conclusion, we expect citizens who are negative about government and democracy, and less hypothetically inclined to vote to hold higher anti-establishment attitudes than those who do not. Citizens negative about government and democracy, but more hypothetically inclined to vote are expected to hold higher people centrism.

3.2.5 Hypotheses

Based on the losers of globalisation, involvement/knowledge and trust/dissatisfaction approaches, we can derive three sets of hypotheses.

Regarding losers of globalisation, we expect people with worse opportunities to make a living in the new globalised market to hold higher levels of people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes. Therefore, we expect an effect of age (**H1**), education (**H2**) and job type (**H3**) on people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes. We expect older people, lower educated individuals and manual workers to be more people centered and anti-establishment than the rest.

With respect to involvement and political knowledge, we expect a negative effect of interest (**H4**) and knowledge in politics (**H5**) **only in anti-establishment attitudes**.

For satisfaction with government (**H6**) and democracy (**H7**), we expect a negative relationship with **people centrism** and **anti-establishment attitudes**. The less satisfaction with government and democracy, the more people centered and anti-establishment individuals will be.

Last, we expect an effect of vote intention: the fewer hypothetical inclination to vote, the higher the **anti-establishment attitudes** (**H8**) and the more hypothetical inclination to vote, the higher the **people centrism** (**H9**).

3.3 Data and methods

3.3.1 The case of Belgium

We use Belgian data in our case study because we believe it offers the perfect characteristics for our purposes in this paper: First of all, Belgium has a proportional electoral system, which results in ‘one of the most fragmented party systems of any

modern democracy' (De Winter, Swyngedouw & Dumont, 2006, p. 933; De Winter & Dumont, 1999), providing a variety of options for voters to show their preferences in a more nuanced manner.

Furthermore, Belgium consist of two separate party systems (one for the Dutch-speaking region and one for the French-speaking region), with a different party fragmentation and diversity in its party competition and its electorates (De Winter, Swyngedouw & Dumont, 2006). This context allows us to examine our hypotheses in a comparative manner, and also previous studies have focused on this particular case (Dassonneville & Stiers, 2018; Art, 2008; Hooghe, Maddens & Noppe, 2006). In fact, in Flanders there are and have been successful populist parties with different ideologies (Spruyt, Keppens & Van Droogenbroeck 2016; Pauwels, 2011; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007), making it an interesting case to study, even more in the comparison with Wallonia in which a clear populist party is absent.

Second, in Belgium turnout is compulsory and, even though the punishment/penalty for not turning out is not extremely severe (Hooghe & Pelleriaux, 1998), participation levels are really high (89.4 percent of voters in the elections to the Chamber of Representatives of 2014).¹ However, this implies that dissatisfied electors will still choose from the party options available or decide to cast a blank or invalid vote (5.8 percent of the votes in the elections to the Chamber of Representatives of 2014). We will acknowledge the differences between this kinds of electors – the non-voters, the voters for parties and the voters of blank/invalid option – in order to understand whether cynical and populist attitudes have an impact when choosing for one of this options.

3.3.2 Dataset

To test our hypotheses, we use the Belgian National Study of 2014 developed by the Institute for Social and Political Opinion Research at the University of Leuven (ISPO-KU Leuven) and CLEO-Université de Liège (Abts et al., 2015). This study consists of a post-electoral survey conducted on a registered-based probability sample of Belgians entitled to vote in the 2014 election. First, a personal interview – with a 47 percent of response rate, and second, respondents were asked to complete a drop-off questionnaire sent to them, with a specific battery of questions on populism. A 74 percent of the respondents completed the drop-off questionnaire (N = 1403). Only respondents of the

¹ Via <http://www.electionresources.org/be/chamber.php?election=2014>

drop-off were taken into account in our analyses, as a consequence of one of the dependent variables (populism) is only developed in the drop-off questionnaire.

3.3.3 Indicators

People Centristism – Each of these attitudes are measured asking the respondent on her/his agreement with six different Likert-items, which were part of the drop-off questionnaire. The items refer to core questions such as who should take political decisions, who represent citizens better and who should have the power. The items were the following: (d22_1) ‘The people and not the politicians should take our most important political decisions’, (d22_2) ‘The people would be better represented by ordinary citizens than by specialized politicians’, (d22_3) ‘The power should be returned entirely to the common people’, (d22_4) ‘Political debates in parliament are nonsense, it would be better if politicians just followed the will of the people’ and (d22_6) ‘Ordinary people know better than politicians how the country should be governed’. The answers ranked from 1 to 5 being: (1) completely disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neither disagree nor agree, (4) agree and (5) completely agree.

Anti-establishment attitudes - was measured by four Likert-items dealing with the importance of voting, and views on politicians. The respondents were asked on their opinion about the following statements: (q104_1) ‘There’s no sense in voting; the parties do what they want to do anyway’, (q104_2) ‘Parties are only interested in my vote, not in my opinion’, (q104_3) ‘Most politicians promise a lot, but don’t do anything’ and (q104_4) ‘As soon as they are elected, politicians think they are better than people like me’. Answers could vary from: (1) completely disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neither disagree nor agree, (4) agree and (5) completely agree.

Control variables – In line with some studies that approach populist voters according to non attitudinal variables (Rooduijn, 2018) we also include traditional socio-demographics as control variables: *gender* (a dummy with value (1) for men and (2) for women), *age* (in years), *educational level* ((1) none and lower education, (2) lower secondary education, (3) higher secondary education, (4) higher and University) and Oesch scale for occupation (Oesch, 2006) in 8 categories ((1) self-employed professionals and large employers, (2) small business owners, (3) technical semi-professionals, (4) production workers, (5) associate managers, (6) clerks, (7) socio-cultural semi-

professionals and (8) service workers).² We also included *region* (a dummy with value (1) for Wallonia and (2) for Flanders), *ideological self placement* (an eleven-point scale from 0 – very left-wing – to 10 – very right-wing –), *political knowledge* (pre-constructed variable – included in Appendix – from 0 to 4 correct answers), *political interest* (in a five Likert-item ranking from (1) no interest, (2) little interest, (3) somewhat interested, (4) reasonably interested and (5) very interested), *satisfaction with government* ((1) dissatisfied or very dissatisfied, (2) neither dissatisfied nor satisfied and (3) satisfied or very satisfied), *satisfaction with democracy* ((1) not at all or rather satisfied, (2) neither satisfied nor dissatisfied and (3) rather or very satisfied) and *would you vote* – if it were not compulsory – ((1) always, (2) generally or sometimes and (3) never). In order to control for the cultural backlash hypothesis (Norris, & Inglehart, 2019) we include an index created for anti-immigrant attitudes. The continuous variables or the ones treated as continuous were standardised in order to make easier the interpretability of the results (age, L-R scale, political knowledge and interest in politics). Descriptives of these independent variables (also for Flanders and Wallonia separately) can be found in the Appendix.

3.3.4 Statistical modelling

The statistical analysis is carried out in two major steps. First, in order to study whether the items belong to a same or different concepts, we estimate a confirmatory factor model. All reported models are estimated using Mplus version 5.

Second, in order to study whether the determinants for holding people centrism or anti-establishment attitudes are shared or specific, we conduct a linear regression (OLS). These models estimate the effects of the predictors in our two dependent variables (people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes).

3.4. Analyses

3.4.1 Dimensionality of people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes

To test the dimensionality of our concepts, we estimate a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) in three steps (Table 3.1): testing all items in one factor – model 1, testing two factors (anti-establishment and people centrism) – model 2, and testing two factors with

² For more information please see: Oesch, D. (2006). Coming to Grips with a Changing Class Structure: An Analysis of Employment Stratification in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. *International Sociology*, 21(2), 263-288.

an error correlation between two items.³ Fit indices improve substantially by specifying two dimensions instead of a single factor. Global model fit indices (Table 3.1) show that the two-dimension models perform better than the uni-dimensional one. Furthermore, model 3 performs substantially better than the previous ones and yields the most satisfactory model fit. This confirms that even though they are dimensions of a same concept, people centrist and anti-establishment attitudes are two separated attitudes and can be distinguished empirically.

Table 3.1 Fit indexes of CFA models.

Model	Description	χ^2	d.f.	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI
1	Single factor model	1400.024	27	0.190	0.103	0.740	0.654
2	Two factor model	228.143	26	0.074	0.033	0.962	0.947
3	Two factor model with correlated errors	107.088	25	0.048	0.028	0.984	0.978


N=1403

Source: Belgian National Study of 2014

We present the detailed results of the CFA of model 3 with the factor loading of the items (Figure 3.1).

³ The two items are: q104_1 'There is no sense in voting; the parties do what they want to do anyway' and q104_2 'Parties are only interested in my vote, not in my opinion'. We understand that, as they both refer to vote, some of the error measurement can be related in these two items

Figure 3.1. Results of the CFA for attitude dimensions



Source: Belgian National Study 2014

The indicators used to construct the latent variable of people centrism are:

D22_1: The people and not the politicians should take our most important political decisions.

D22_2: The people would be better represented by ordinary citizens than by specialized politicians.

D22_3: The power should be returned entirely to the common people.

D22_4: Political debates in parliament are nonsense, it would be better if politicians just followed the will of the people.

D22_6 Ordinary people know better than politicians how the country should be governed.

The indicators used to construct the latent variable of anti establishment are:

Q104_1 There is no sense in voting; the parties do what they want to do anyway.

Q104_2 Parties are only interested in my vote, not in my opinion.

Q104_3 Most politicians promise a lot, but don't do anything.

Q104_4 As soon as they are elected, politicians think they are better than people like me.

As we can see in Figure 3.1, the factor loadings are quite high (mostly >0.60 ; many >0.70), indicating that items are sufficiently valid and reliable measurements. We have five items loading in the dimension of people centrism and four in the dimension of anti-establishment attitudes. The items with a better loading on people centrism refer to people knowing better than politicians (D22_3) and the importance on leave the power on the hands of the people and the unhappiness with the actual dynamics of political representation (D22_4 and D22_6). Interestingly, the weaker fit is for the indicator which suggests that people should take the most important political decisions (D22_1). It seems to be the case that, at some level, people want the power in their hands but they are not entirely convinced that the citizens themselves should take major political decisions.

In the dimension of anti-establishment attitudes, we see that the loadings are higher compared to the indicators of people centrism, which signals that the indicators are more accurate in capturing this latent variable. The indicators show the weariness of citizens with the political “class” (Q104_3 and Q104_4).

As for the correlation between the two variables, we can see that there is a correlation between the two attitudes, but still the correlation is not so strong that we can talk about one unique concept.

3.4.2 Explanatory models

Table 3.2 presents our regression models of the latent variables people centrism (people) and anti-establishment (anti-e) – estimated in a factor score – in three models. In model 1 we introduced socio-economic predictors (sex, age, education level, Oesch scale and region), in model 2 we add the political attitudes and skills (L-R self placement, political knowledge, interest and anti-immigrant attitudes (Norris, & Inglehart, 2019)), in model 3, we add satisfaction and attitudes on vote (satisfaction with government, satisfaction with democracy and attitudes towards voting).⁴

⁴ We also explored attitudinal differences between Flanders and Wallonia, available for the interested reader in Appendix. As there are no strong differences in the results, we do not present them in the main text.

Table 3.2 Regression on people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes in Belgium.

	People Model 1a	Anti-e Model 1b	People Model 2a	Anti-e Model 2b	People Model 3a	Anti-e Model 3b
Sex (ref=male)						
Female	0.11**	0.12**	0.02	-0.01	0.03	0.01
Age (st)	-0.02	0.06*	-0.03	-0.01	-0.00	0.02
Education level (ref= lower secondary)						
None & lower	0.01	0.18*	-0.03	0.12	-0.05	0.08
Higher second	-0.11	-0.11	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	-0.02
High & University	-0.56***	-0.65***	-0.39***	-0.36***	-0.33***	-0.27***
Oesch scale (ref= production workers)						
Self employed & large employers	-0.20	-0.35**	-0.05	-0.10	-0.04	-0.10
Small business	-0.07	-0.15	0.00	-0.10	0.01	-0.09
Tech semi professional	-0.13	-0.05	-0.06	0.05	-0.07	0.05
Assoc. managers	-0.35***	-0.29***	-0.21*	-0.10	-0.21**	-0.11
Clerks	-0.33***	-0.28***	-0.25***	-0.19**	-0.25***	-0.19***
Socio cultural professionals	-0.24**	-0.22**	-0.16	-0.07	-0.14	-0.03
Service workers	0.01	-0.10	0.03	-0.06	0.05	-0.03
Region (ref=Flanders)						
Wallonia	0.11**	0.26***	0.05	0.27***	0.05	0.28***
L-R (st)			-0.10***	-0.02	-0.09***	-0.01
Know (st)			-0.06**	0.03	-0.06**	0.04
Interest (st)			-0.09***	-0.20***	-0.03	-0.10***
Anti-immigrant attitudes			0.17***	0.35***	0.11***	0.26***
Sat government (ref= Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied)						
Dissatisfied & very dissatisfied					0.03	0.09*
Satisfied & very satisfied					-0.04	-0.00
Sat democracy (ref= Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied)						
Not satisfied/rather dissatisfied					0.24***	0.28***
Satisfied/very satisfied					-0.17***	-0.20***
Would vote if not compulsory (ref= always)						
Would vote generally					0.21***	0.36***
Would vote never					0.31***	0.63***
Constant	0.34***	0.29***	0.26***	0.14**	0.14	-0.16*
Observations	1,154	1,165	1,154	1,165	1,154	1,165
R-squared	0.14	0.20	0.18	0.35	0.23	0.47

Source: Belgian National Study 2014

These results show the following conclusions (Table 3.2): First, neither age nor gender are a good predictor for people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes. Even though in the baseline model gender and age are significant (age is significant only for anti-establishment attitudes), when more predictors are included in the model, their effect disappears. Thus, we can reject H1 for people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes.

Following the losers of globalisation approach, we see that a key element, education, is a good predictor for people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes. We expected that the less educated held higher feelings of anti-establishment attitudes and people centrism, however, our analyses show the other side to the same story. In this case, for the highest level of education, individuals are significantly less likely to show attitudes of people centrism or anti-establishment. Therefore, we can partially accept H2, because the more education, the less people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes, meaning that the more prepared for the demands of globalisation processes are less related with these two dimensions.

With respect to occupation, also included in the approach of losers of globalisation, we can observe that some professions are significantly related with lower levels of people centrism and/or anti-establishment attitudes. Compared to production workers – one of the groups we expect to be worse-off because of changes brought by modernisation, associate managers and clerks have lower levels of people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes. Our analyses also show that socio-cultural professionals are less likely to score high on people centrism, however, once the models are expanded with more independent variables, this effect disappears. For H3, we can accept that manual workers – a group damaged by modernisation and globalisation – have higher levels of people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes than associate managers and clerks, but find no evidence that they have higher levels of anti-establishment attitudes than other professions except for those previously mentioned.

With regard to the explanatory value of region – being from Wallonia compared to being from Flanders – this variable is relevant when predicting anti-establishment attitudes: citizens from Wallonia score higher on values of anti-establishment than citizens from Flanders. For people centrism however, the effect of region region loses its explanatory value when more predictors are included in the model. Interestingly enough, ideological self-placement is a good predictor for people centrism but not for anti-establishment, in which the effects are annulled by anti-immigrant attitudes. Hence, anti-establishment attitudes in Belgium are more related to anti-immigrant attitudes than the left-right divide. For people centrism, the more to the left an individual is self placed, the more likely to have people centric attitudes.

Interest in politics is non significant for people centrism in the complete model 3a, and negatively related with anti-establishment so we accept H4. Political knowledge is negatively related to people centrism, but has no effect on anti-establishment attitudes,

therefore, we reject H5. In this sense, it seems that for citizens, people centrism is more about how confident they feel about politics and their expertise on them, while with anti-establishment is about how much interest they have in the topic, being the most interested less anti-establishment.

Anti-immigrant attitudes have a positive significant effect in Belgium for both people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes. Hence, the more anti-immigrant attitudes, the more likely to have people centrism or anti establishment attitudes. We also see that this predictor explains more for anti-establishment attitudes than for people centrism in Belgium. When we observe the complete model 3, we see that this effect is still present, but slightly smaller.

Satisfaction with government does not provide significant results on people centrism, therefore we reject H6 for it. For anti-establishment attitudes, being dissatisfied and very dissatisfied compared to being neither satisfied nor dissatisfied is positively related with anti-establishment attitudes. Consequently, we can accept H6 for anti-establishment.

Satisfaction with democracy is a good predictor for both attitudes: compared to being neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, being not or rather satisfied with democracy is positively related with scoring high on people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes. Meanwhile, compared to being neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, being rather or very satisfied is negatively related with people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes which leads us to accept H7. One of the interesting findings of these analyses is that, in Belgium, there is a stronger effect of satisfaction with democracy on people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes than satisfaction with government.

As in Belgium turnout is compulsory, we included a question on the willing to vote if it was not an obligation. Compared to individuals who would always vote, those who would generally vote have significantly higher levels of people centrism and anti-establishment. Also, those who would never vote – if it was not compulsory – have higher levels of people centrism and anti-establishment, confirming H8 and rejecting H9.

For the overall fit of the models, models 3a and 3b have the best predicting fit with an R-squared of 0.23 and 0.47 respectively. In this case, the models are much better predicting anti-establishment attitudes than people centrism.

3.4.3 People centrism and anti-establishment at the regional level: the impact on vote choice

After performing several analyses (available in Appendix) we find that, at the regional level, the regression models also behave similarly in Flanders and Wallonia separately. When examining the vote choice, we check the effect of people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes separately in Flanders and Wallonia, as they have separate party systems.

In Flanders, the party system is conformed by the Christian Democrats (Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams – CD&V), the Socialists (Socialistische Partij Anders – SP.A), the Liberal party (Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten –Open VLD), and the Flemish Nationalist parties: the conservative Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) and the right-wing Vlaams Belang (VB). In Wallonia the party system has a Christian Democrat party (Centre démocrate humaniste – cdH), the Socialist party (Parti socialiste – PS), the Liberal party (Mouvement Réformateur –MR), the workers’ party (Parti du Travail de Belgique – PTB-GO!) and the Green party Ecolo.

In Flanders, the anti-establishment vote is capitalized to some extent by Vlaams Belang, but they stand out more for the people centrism profile of their voters. In Wallonia, there is no party which, compared to MR, stands out for being more people centered or anti-establishment, only people who cast a blank or invalid vote seem to be less people centered in Wallonia. This situation seems to leave the room open for future political entrepreneurs.

In addition to the models we analysed, we also performed a multinomial logistic regression, with vote choice as dependent variable (see Appendix). Afterwards we calculated the relationship between the level of people centrism or anti-establishment and the probability for the vote to a certain party, cast a blank or invalid vote, or not vote at all. The results are shown from Figure 3.2 to Figure 3.9.

Results for Flanders:

Figure 3.2. People centrism and probability to vote for a party in Flanders (I)





Figure 3.3. People centrism and probability to vote for a party in Flanders (II)



These results show that, in Flanders, the more people centrism the less the probability to vote for parties as N-VA or Open VLD, and higher to vote for Sp.a and Vlaams Belang, and also higher the probability of not voting.

Figure 3.4. Anti-establishment and probability to vote for a party in Flanders (I)





Figure 3.5. Anti-establishment and probability to vote for a party in Flanders (II)



With respect to anti-establishment, we see a similar trend, where more anti-establishment is related with less probabilities to vote for CD&V and Open VLD. For N-VA and Groen, anti-establishment has almost no impact on the probability for the vote, and it seems to be related with a slight higher probability to vote for Vlaams Belang, vote blank or invalid, or not vote.

Results in Wallonia:

Figure 3.6. People centrist and probability to vote for a party in Wallonia (I)





Figure 3.7. People centrism and probability to vote for a party in Wallonia (II)



In Wallonia, we see that the higher the people centrism, the higher the probability to vote, especially for MR, and in a smaller proportion, also for cdH. For PTB-GO! We also see a slight higher probability on vote vs not voting for more people centred citizens. On the contrary, the higher the people centrism, the less probability to vote for Ecolo or vote blank or invalid.

Figure 3.8. Anti-establishment and probability to vote for a party in Wallonia (I)





Figure 3.9. Anti-establishment and probability to vote for a party in Wallonia (II)



With anti-establishment, the situation in Wallonia is quite different. First of all, we see that the more anti-establishment the individuals, the less probability to vote for MR. And for PS the more the anti-establishment, the higher the probability to vote for them. We also observe how this happens for Ecolo and cdH, but in a “softer” trend. For the rest turnout options, anti-establishment does not seem to have a big impact.

3.5 Concluding remarks

In this chapter, our objective to fill the gap in the literature by introducing an analytical examination between two major dimensions of populism, people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes. Second, we wanted to test the measurement of these two dimensions, and investigate whether both phenomena were explained by the same predictors. Our aim was to make a strict comparison and validation of the dimensions of populism at the individual level.

We discovered that people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes are closely related but empirically distinguishable in their measurement. We also observed that the indicators used in this chapter predict considerably better anti-establishment attitudes than people centrism attitudes: education, job type and region have an effect on people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes. One of the most interesting findings is that, in Belgium, rightist citizens less people centred – even though there is a populist party in the right. Overall, the losers of globalisation hypothesis seem to work when predicting people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes, but with nuances. As for political involvement, expertise, satisfaction and turnout, they play different roles when we try to predict anti-establishment or people centrism. On voting behaviour, people centrism attitudes seem to be important for the vote in Flanders but not in Wallonia, and anti-establishment voters are spread among most parties.

One possible limitation of our study is that our study only addresses a single case study, and we cannot compare whether these findings are supported in other cases, so generalisation of the results is difficult. A second limitation of this study is that not all dimensions of populism are measured and compared, but we considered the two major dimensions in which there is wide agreement.

However, we believe this is a good step towards a better understanding of populist attitudes at the individual level, which will allow to explain the populist phenomenon further. Also to understand how the dynamics of globalisation are affecting citizens and, consequently, the change in the political scenario.

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Chapter 4

Same problems, different solutions.

Stealth democracy and the vote for a populist party

Irene Esteban and Dieter Stiers

In this chapter, we explore heterogeneity in the relationship between criticism of contemporary representation and voting for a populist party. More specifically, we argue that numerous citizens are critical of modern political elites and procedures, but that not all are attracted by populist parties' appeal. In particular, while citizens with stealth democratic attitudes hold criticism of contemporary representation – similar to citizens with populist attitudes – voters with high levels of stealth democracy hold different process preferences than the proposed by populist parties. Hence, although stealth democrats hold similar critical attitudes, they will not be appealed to vote for a populist party. Analyses using the data of the Finnish Election Studies provide support for our hypotheses.

4.1 Introduction

The global rise of populism has led to a growing research interest in the causes and consequences of populist parties' electoral success. One of the proposed explanations for this trend is the increasing levels of criticism of contemporary representation. Previous studies have shown that voters holding this criticism are more likely to support populist parties in their claim that they can bring the power back to the people (Spruyt, Keppens and Van Droogenbroeck 2016). However, less attention has been devoted to the demand side of populism, and in particular to the effects of voters' process preferences on populist voting. In this study, we explicitly investigate heterogeneity in process preferences, and its effect on the relationship between criticism of political representation and voting for a populist party. While we do not object previous research findings of discontent to be related with populist voting, we argue that there are voters who identify with the message of the shortcomings of contemporary representation without voting for a populist party, primarily because of their process preferences.

We identify such a group in citizens holding *stealth democracy* attitudes (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002), and argue that, even though stealth democrats identify the same problems as citizens holding populist attitudes, they are not attracted by the answers that populist parties provide (Caramani 2017). More specifically, populism wants to bring power back to the people, while stealth democracy implies a mostly passive role for citizens, in which they only intervene if they want to. Hence, based on their process preferences, their voting behaviour will diverge.

We test our hypotheses using the data of the Finnish Election Study – allowing us to build on recent work investigating this case (Agerberg 2017; Arter 2010; Bengtsson and Mattila 2009; Rapeli 2016; Westinen 2014) and for claims of generalisability. We find that, overall, criticism of contemporary representation makes voters more likely to support a populist party. However, although criticism and stealth democracy are substantially correlated, we find that higher levels of stealth attenuate the relationship between criticism of contemporary representation and voting for the populist party.

While it is commonly believed that criticism of current-day political representation has been capitalised by populist parties and leaders, not all critical voters will be inclined to vote for a populist party, as they hold diverging views on how these problems should be addressed. Therefore, while malaise with contemporary representation makes up an important part of populism, process preferences should be taken into account as well in order to distinguish populist citizens and other profiles of critical voters.

4.2 Theory and hypotheses

This study starts from the observation that criticism of contemporary political representation is an important driver of populist parties' electoral success. Several studies have discovered a substantial correlation between variables such as political discontent, protest voting and criticism of the political establishment, and voting for populist parties (Lubbers and Scheepers 2000; Lubbers et al. 2002; Rooduijn, van der Brug and de Lange 2016; Schumacher and Rooduijn 2013; Swyngedouw 2001). For these parties, political elites, and consequently political representation, stand in the way of the general will of the people (Rooduijn, van der Brug and de Lange 2016). Therefore, contemporary political representation is highly criticised by populist parties and leaders, who try to capitalise this criticism to obtain political and electoral benefit from it.

While the relationship between critical attitudes towards contemporary democracy and support for populist parties has been widely studied, up to our knowledge, there has been no study on the role of *process preferences* in this relationship. We argue that an important part of the criticism of contemporary

representation originates in current-day political processes. Hence, to gain a more detailed insight in the relationship between critical attitudes and populist support, opinions on the specific proposals on how the problems of contemporary representation can be solved should be taken into account as well. More specifically, even though many citizens are critical with contemporary representation, some of them will refrain from voting a populist party, based on their process preferences.

Populist parties usually propose to implement mechanisms of direct democracy with a double aim: to allow ‘the people’ to express their general will and to solve problems created by contemporary representation (Canovan 1999). However, some voters disagree with contemporary representation but also do not want to be more actively involved themselves. We identify such a group in stealth democrats.

4.2.1 Populist voters and stealth democrats: antagonising contemporary democratic processes

As we previously mentioned in this work, the concept of stealth democracy proposes that there are citizens who are dissatisfied with the way democracy works, but who do not want to be active participants in the democratic process themselves. The stealth democratic vision proposes a simplification to political problem-solving by suggesting technical solutions instead of representation (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002).¹ Previous research has expanded the study of stealth democratic attitudes in different countries (Atkinson et al. 2016; Bengtsson and Mattila 2009; Coffé and Michels 2014; Font et al. 2015; Rapeli 2016; Webb 2013), and also explored the relationship between holding stealth attitudes and supporting different types of democracy or different types of representation (Bengtsson and Mattila 2009; Font et al. 2015; Rapeli 2016). However, although highly correlated – empirically and theoretically – so far, there has been no empirical research on how stealth attitudes are related to criticism of contemporary representation, and to the vote choice. This paper fills this gap in the literature.

We argue that both populist voters and stealth democrats share their views and objections towards contemporary political representation. As Bickerton and Accetti

¹ Stealth democracy has, then, also been used to refer to ‘expert democracy’ or ‘technocracy’ (Rapeli 2016).

(2017: 329) explain: ‘The affinities between populism and technocracy (...) begin to emerge when we consider what they both stand against’.

Populist voters and stealth democrats have the perception that political elites are corrupt and unresponsive, and that politicians lack knowledge about what the real problems are and how to accurately respond to them. They agree that common goals in society exist and that these can be identified and solved. This idea is derived from the thought that there is an unequivocal way to solve problems, and that there is a unique solution which is suited for everyone: ‘in both (...) [populism and stealth] there is the idea of a unitary, general, common interest of a given society’ (Caramani 2017: 60).

Furthermore, both approaches claim that political decision processes are not functioning properly, as they are unable to solve people’s problems. They aim to get rid of the traditional political intermediates and want political processes to be substantively different from what they are nowadays, because ‘in both cases, parties are seen as noncredible’ (Caramani, 2017: 58). Thus, populist voters and stealth democrats coincide in their aspiration of taking politics ‘out’ of the contemporary representation processes, and they do so by bringing alternative proposals to substitute representative democracy (Caramani 2017; Font et al. 2015). Other studies have found that the same characteristics correlate with supporting either stealth democracy or populism – such as low education, low political knowledge, and lack of external efficacy (Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove 2013; Bengtsson and Mattila 2009).

Hence, although criticism of contemporary representation is often assumed to be monopolised by populist views, it is a fundamental part of stealth democracy as well. However, this does not mean that populist parties can valorise the criticism among stealth democrats. We argue that, even though populist voters and stealth democrats share their understanding of the problems that political representation faces, they will hold strongly diverging process preferences – i.e., different views on how these problems should be solved.

4.2.2 Where populist voters and stealth democrats diverge: legitimacy and solutions

Populist voters and stealth democrats coincide in their critique on the current political actors and processes. However, even though their views on the problems of

contemporary representation are similar, they strongly diverge in the solutions they offer to these problems.

First, populist entrepreneurs and advocates of stealth democracy propose two very different processes as solutions to the problems they identify. In their critique of the unresponsiveness of the politicians, populist parties offer to implement mechanisms of direct democracy (Bowler, Donovan and Karp 2007). As Canovan (1999: 2) states, populist parties consider direct democracy to be the core of electoral democracy: '[Populists] favour "direct democracy" – political decision making by referendum and popular initiative. Their professed aim is to cash in democracy's promise of power to the people'. For populism, mechanisms of direct democracy are so important that they would downplay other preferences if that means obtaining more direct democracy. On the contrary, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) describe how people do not want to be directly involved in political decision making. Stealth democrats want political processes to function adequately (i.e., according to the people's wishes) in a latent way, without citizens having to intervene – hence 'stealth' democracy. Thus, stealth democracy opts for technical solutions to political problems: leaving the political decisions to experts and other external actors, but allowing citizens to intervene when they consider their involvement necessary.

Second, although in both populism and stealth democracy there are 'correct and unique' solutions to social conflict, they hold a different legitimisation of this solution. In populism, legitimacy is derived directly from the people and their general will: there is a belief that there is an equality of goals and that the 'common people' all want the same objectives (Laclau 2005). In stealth democracy, in contrast, the optimal solution is provided by reason: it is believed that there is an objective solution for political problems (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). As Caramani (2017: 62) explains: 'For populism, the general interest can be identified through the will of the people. For technocracy, the general interest can be identified through rational speculation and scientific procedures'.

Third, also on a broader level, populism and stealth have different aims. Besides implementing mechanisms of direct democracy, the populist proposal is to replace the political elites by means of new representatives – mainly by non-professional politicians – and new parties. Stealth democracy, contrarily, aims to avoid the entire dimension of representative politics. According to the stealth argument, decisions should not be taken

by new parties and leaders, but by taking political decisions out of politics, and giving that responsibility to professionals not linked to parties, out of the sphere of politics. It is politics *sui generis*.

4.2.3 Expectations: Procedural preferences as a three-sided relationship

This study explores differences in voting behaviour of citizens that are critical of contemporary representation, based on their process preferences – i.e., their views on how to solve political representation problems by means of different decision-making alternatives. Traditionally, process preferences have been conceived as a two-sided continuum, with on the one side liberal political representation – promoted by most traditional parties – and on the other side direct citizen participation – most commonly promoted by populist parties (Font et al. 2015). The stealth proposal of external management of the political processes offers a new, third, possibility to the citizenry. Hence, direct democracy and external management ‘present two alternative ideal forms of representation to party government, both criticize a specific conception of representative democracy and, obviously, they challenge also one another in a triangular relationship’ (Caramani 2017: 55). In this paper, we follow the literature arguing that procedural preferences constitute a three-sided relationship (Caramani 2017; Font et al. 2015), with contemporary representation on the one side, and direct democracy and stealth on the two other sides respectively. This implies that procedural preferences are to some extent mutually exclusive, so that citizens have to choose between the three different proposals for specific decision-making processes. Consequently, the preference for one of them will limit the preference for the others.

This leads us to our two expectations. While our first hypothesis states that voters critical on contemporary representation should be more inclined to vote for populist parties, the second expectation is that, although stealth democrats identify with their message, this relationship should disappear if voters hold higher levels of stealth democratic attitudes. Even though populist voters and stealth democrats hold similar critical attitudes, they will diverge in their vote choice:

H1: Holding critical attitudes towards contemporary representation increases the probability of voting for a populist party.

H2a: Voters holding stealth democratic attitudes are more likely to hold critical attitudes towards contemporary representation.

H2b: Stealth democratic attitudes weaken the relationship between criticism of contemporary political processes and the vote for a populist party.

4.3 Data and methods

To test our hypotheses, we use the data of the Finnish Election Studies of 2011 and 2015 (Borg and Grönlund 2011; Grönlund and Kestilä-Kekkonen 2015).² These studies consist of post-electoral face-to-face interviews, supplemented with self-administered questionnaires. In 2011, the sample was based on quota on age, gender, and province of residence of the respondents, and interviews were conducted using the starting point method. Furthermore, additional steps were taken to ensure the representativeness of the sample by for instance imposing additional quota for Swedish-speaking respondents. In 2015, the sample was based on a multistage probability design. Using data of several election studies decreases the possibility of findings to be caused by factors specific to one electoral campaign and thus adds to the generalisability of the results. Furthermore, since the second part of the survey consisted of a self-administered questionnaire, the number of valid responses was rather low.³ Using the data of multiple election studies assures that the models have sufficient statistical power.

The Finnish party system is highly fractionalised, with a high number of parties gaining stable representation in the Parliament (Westinen 2014). Its stable party distribution allows us to test the effect of stealth attitudes on populist voting. Furthermore, investigating this case allows building on previous studies focusing on the Finnish context (Bengtsson and Mattila 2009; Rapeli 2016).

The populist party under investigation is the Finns Party (FP). The FP was founded in 1995 and it is the successor of the agrarian populist Finnish Rural Party (FRP). The Finns Party has been defined as a radical right-wing party (Arter 2010) and

² More election studies are available, but the question-wording of the core variables differs. Furthermore, our dependent variable is voting for the True Finns, and in the elections held before that of 2011, only a marginal proportion of the electorate supported this party.

³ More specifically, in 2011, 1298 persons were interviewed face-to-face, while 806 of those respondents filled in the self-administered questionnaire. In 2015, 1587 persons were interviewed, of which 684 completed the questionnaire.

a centre populist party (Niemi 2013). In general, there is wide agreement in describing the FP as a strong anti-establishment and anti-elite party with a solid national appeal/nativism (Agerberg 2017; Mudde 2007; Westinen 2014). Hence, while classifying a party as populist is always delicate, the literature has shown wide agreement on labelling the Finns Party as a populist party (Arter 2010; van Kessel 2015). Although the FP does not have the advantage of other European populist parties of presenting themselves as newcomers in the political scene, their leaders managed to criticise the style of bigger and ‘mainstream’ parties. Since its creation, it has had fluctuating success in the elections. Since the 2000s the party has gained more electoral support with its highest point in the elections of 2011, in which it won 19.1 percent of the vote share.

The Finns Party responds to a typical populist party and their rhetoric is based on references to ‘common man’ – while at the same time expressing their explicit dislike for traditional politics (van Kessel 2015). They capitalised many of the issues that are also traditionally claimed by populist parties in other European countries, such as Euroscepticism and a strong anti-immigrant discourse. Regarding process preferences, the Finns Party has advocated for some procedures of direct democracy in order to allow citizens to voice their demands (specifically in the European issue). Thus, in terms of the parties under investigation, the Finnish case does not deviate strongly from other European contexts. Hence, although the empirical analyses focus on one country only, there are no strong reasons to expect the findings to be different in other countries – in which the necessary data are currently unavailable.

In the analyses, we include several variables of interest. First, we operationalise criticism of contemporary representation using the answers on four questions that were probed in both election years. In these questions, respondents were asked to what extent they agreed with certain statements on a scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’. The first indicator reads: ‘Politicians are not interested in the opinions of ordinary people’. This indicator captures the idea of the unresponsiveness of the politicians and their lack of interest about the aims of the people, a main critique to contemporary representation and also a recurrent topic in the populist discourse. Similar indicators have been used by Spruyt, Keppens and Van Droogenbroeck (2016), and Stanley (2011). The second indicator is: ‘Political parties are only interested in people’s votes, not in their opinions’. This indicator, similarly to the first one used in our selection, measures the discontent with the actual mechanisms of representation.

Concretely, it taps the utilitarianism of the elections, and how preferences are not correctly translated into mandate, but just a mere transfer of power that does not come with a compromise between electors and elected candidates.

The third indicator that we use to measure criticism of contemporary representation is: ‘Members of parliament would help our country more if they stopped talking and concentrated on solving real problems’ (Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove, 2013; Spruyt, Keppens and Van Droogenbroeck, 2016). This indicator reflects on the problems and flaws of representation, and the inaction of the elites perceived by citizens. Our final indicator reads: ‘What making compromises in politics really means is selling one’s principles’. This indicator taps into the traditional role of representatives to discuss, understand and give voice to the diversity present in society. In fact, this indicator presents compromise as something negative, in line with the view of unique and correct solutions of populism and stealth attitudes (Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove, 2013); Spruyt, Keppens and Van Droogenbroeck 2016).

For stealth democracy, we use the three original indicators that were used by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002: 138), which aim to capture the preferences of the citizens for different types of decision-making. Other studies have also used these indicators to capture stealth democratic attitudes (Atkinson et al. 2016; Bengtsson and Mattila, 2009; Coffé and Michels 2014; Font et al. 2015; Webb 2013). The first indicator is: ‘Things would be better in Finland if successful corporate managers made the decisions.’ The second indicator is: ‘Things would be better in Finland if independent experts made the decisions instead of politicians and citizens.’ The third indicator is: ‘The Finnish government would function better if it were managed like an enterprise’.

Both criticism of contemporary representation and stealth democracy are latent concepts that need to be measured with several indicators. In order to assess whether they are latent concepts, we conduct a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) in three steps to be sure that the indicators capture the theoretical concepts. Model 1 shows all the indicators loading in one latent variable, model 2 the indicators loading separately for criticism of contemporary representation and stealth and model 3 includes one error correlation between two indicators with similar wording.⁴ The results are summarised in

⁴ The two items refer to the interest of politician’s in people’s opinion. The items are ‘Politicians are not interested in opinions ordinary people’ (ITEM1) and ‘Political parties are only interested in people’s

Table 3.1, showing that the best fit is model 3 – indicating that criticism and stealth are two distinct latent variables. The results for the years separately are summarised in Appendix B, and are in line with the results presented here.

Table 4.1 Fit indexes of CFA models in Belgium

Model	Description	χ^2	d.f.	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI
1	Single factor model	782.167	14	0.138	0.106	0.719	0.579
2	Two factor model	294.349	13	0.087	0.070	0.897	0.834
3	Two factor model with error correlation	81.394	12	0.045	0.032	0.975	0.956

N=2,876

Data: Finnish Election Study

Figure 4.1. CFA Model of criticism of contemporary representation and stealth attitudes.




Figure 4.1 displays our final measurement model (model 3). In this model, all loadings have an absolute value larger than 0.40 and most higher than 0.59. This indicates a sufficiently valid and reliable measure of the concept by the items proposed. An important point to take into account is the correlation between our latent variables.

votes, not in their opinions'(ITEM2). In order to correct this model, we apply a modification, correlating the errors of these two items.

Figure 4.1 shows that the correlation between criticism of representation and stealth democracy is quite high: 0.543. This means that criticism of representation and stealth democracy are strongly correlated concepts – support for hypothesis 2a. Therefore, even though they measure separated phenomena, criticism and stealth democracy are related concepts. It is important to note that, despite the high correlation between the concepts, this correlation is not too high to introduce problems of multicollinearity when including both into one model.

As the goodness-of-fit for the model tests indicate these measures to make up a reliable scale, for the vote choice models, we create a sumscale adding up the values on the items and dividing it by the number of items.

Next to criticism of contemporary representation and stealth attitudes, additional variables are included in the analyses to control for their impact on voting for a populist party. The exact wording and coding of all variables, as well as descriptive statistics, are included in Appendix A. First, the traditional socio-demographic controls age, sex, and educational level are included. Sex is included as a dummy with male respondents as reference category. Education is included as a categorical variable with three categories: (1) low educated respondents who completed primary education only, (2) middle educated respondents, who completed lower secondary education, and (3) higher educated respondents who obtained a higher degree than lower secondary education.

Next to these standard socio-demographics, following the design of Hooghe and Oser (2016: 30), we control for political trust, since ‘an important motive for populist voting is a lack of confidence in the established political institutions’. Respondents could indicate their level of trust in various institutions on a scale ranging from 0 (don’t trust at all) to 10 (completely trust). Political trust is included as a sumscale of this self-reported trust in institutions, as these items load on one factor (see Appendix A for more details). We also include controls for two common theories of populist voting: economic inequality and cultural backlash (Inglehart and Norris 2016). In order to control for consequences for economic resentment, we include the answer to the question whether the voter’s personal or family’s financial situation got better, stayed the same, or got worse compared to the past two years. With respect to cultural backlash, we include anti-immigrant attitudes not only because they have been extensively used in the literature on the vote choice, but because in the case of the vote for the Finns Party, ‘the party has clearly contributed in bringing critical sentiment

towards immigration to the public discussion' (Niemi 2013: 79). To this aim, we use the respondent's assessment of the proposition of Finland to have more immigration. Respondents could rate this proposition on a scale from 0 (very bad proposition) to 10 (very good proposition). This scale has been reversed so that higher values indicate higher opposition against immigration. Additionally, we control for the respondent's self-reported satisfaction with democracy, ranging from 0 (not at all satisfied) to 3 (very satisfied), the respondent's ideological position – included as the self-reported position on the ideological left-right axis, with 0 indicating the most left position, and 10 the most extreme right position, and the respondent's interest in politics – measured using a self-reported interest on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all interested) to 4 (very interested).


To test the hypotheses, logistic regression models predicting the probability of voting for the populist party are estimated. To get a detailed view on the factors determining the vote for every party, we estimate multinomial logistic regression models. To take into account that observations within election years are not independent of each other, the standard-errors are clustered by election year. Furthermore, to take into account the differences in vote share for the populist party between the years, an election year-dummy for the 2015 election is included in the analyses as well.

4.4 Analyses

Our aim in this chapter is to investigate the impact of criticism of contemporary representation and stealth democracy attitudes on the vote for a populist party. To get a detailed insight in the relationship between criticism, stealth, and the vote, we estimate multinomial logistic regression models predicting the vote for every party.⁵ As multinomial models are rather complicated to interpret, we present the table with the results in Appendix C to this chapter; in the text, we discuss predicted probabilities of voting for each of the parties dependent on levels of criticism of contemporary representation and stealth attitudes – as these are more straightforward to interpret. First, the effects of all our variables respectively on the probability of voting for the Finns party versus any of the other options are displayed in Figure 4.2.

⁵ A test for multicollinearity showed no problems, with an average VIF of 1.27 and a maximum of 1.52.

Figure 4.2. Average marginal effects on the vote for the populist party




Note: The Figure presents average marginal effects and 95% confidence-intervals of the coefficients reported in Table C.1 in Appendix C. Data: Finish Election Studies 2011, 2015.

The results presented in Figure 4.2 show that higher feelings of criticism of contemporary representation increase the probability of voting for the populist party. The results show that for every one-unit increase in feelings of criticism, the predicted probability of voting for the populist party increases with 9.29 percentage points. Furthermore, although we had no specific expectation regarding its direct effect, stealth democracy has a negative effect on populist voting, although it needs to be noted that, with -0.96, this effect is substantially small. Thus, with regard to the first hypothesis, we find strong evidence that attitudes of criticism of contemporary representation increase the likelihood of voting for a populist party. In terms of control variables, the results show that voters with more anti-immigrant attitudes will be more likely to vote for the Finns party, while higher educated voters are less likely to do so. In line with other research (Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2018), political interest seems to be positively related to populist voting. To provide a complete picture of the effects of our variables on the vote choice in Finland, Figure C.1 in the Appendix C to this chapter, displays the average marginal effects for all parties as well as abstention. It shows that stealth voters seem to be attracted to voting for the centre-right National Coalition Party, or to abstain from voting.

While the first part of the second hypothesis received support in the measurement models – with the correlation between criticism and stealth democracy amounting to 0.54 – the second part of the second hypothesis states that, although citizens who hold stealth democracy attitudes look similar to citizens holding attitudes of criticism of contemporary representation, they would not be attracted by the solutions offered by populist parties, and hence the effect of criticism of populist voting would be attenuated by higher levels of stealth democracy. To test this hypothesis, we include in the model an interaction between criticism and stealth democracy (see Table C.2 in the Appendix). To make the results easier to interpret, we display the average effect of criticism on the vote for the Finns party on different levels of stealth democracy in Figure 4.3.

Figure 4.3 Average marginal effect of criticism at different levels of stealth democracy



Note: The Figure presents average marginal effects and 95% confidence-intervals of criticism on populist voting. The full models are summarised in Table C.2 in Appendix C. Data: Finish Election Studies 2011, 2015.

The results in Figure 4.3 provide strong support for hypothesis 2b. At lower levels of stealth democracy, there is a large effect of criticism of contemporary representation on populist voting. Hence, for voters low in feelings of stealth, holding critical attitudes towards representation greatly increases their probability to vote for the populist party. While there is quite some uncertainty around the estimate, the average marginal effect of 13.21 percentage points is substantially large, as it indicates that for every one-unit

increase in criticism, the probability of voting for the populist party increases with 13.21 percentage points. However, the higher the feeling of stealth, the smaller this effect. Even more, from a certain level of stealth democracy attitudes on, there is no evidence for a relationship between criticism and populist voting. Hence, it seems that stealth democrats are not attracted to voting for the populist party – also if they are highly critical with the way the political processes work. To get a comprehensive view on the voting behaviour of critical voters at different levels of stealth democracy, Figure C.2 in Appendix C summarises the effect of discontent at different levels of stealth democracy for every party respectively.

While critical attitudes towards contemporary representation processes are widespread, taking into account voters' process preferences helps explaining why this criticism leads some voters to supporting the populist parties while for others it does not. Voters with high critical attitudes overall are more likely to prefer the solutions offered by a populist party, but if they hold strong stealth attitudes, they will not be attracted by its appeal. Hence, while these groups of voters identify similar problems, they diverge in their voting behaviour.

4.5 Concluding remarks

Over the past years, populist parties have been gaining high ground in elections, leading to an increased scholarly interest in the determinants of a populist vote. Following previous research, this study set out to investigate attitudes of criticism of contemporary representation, and their relationship to the vote for a populist party. We expected some citizens to identify with the populist message – being critical with contemporary representation – but to diverge in their behaviour when they have to support a specific party at the polls. On the one hand, there are citizens supporting populist parties in their strive for more direct democratic initiatives. On the other hand, however, we argued that stealth democrats will identify with the alleged problems as well, but as they prefer external decision making instead of direct democracy – and because these solutions are mutually exclusive – they will not be attracted to voting for a populist party.

Using data of the Finnish Election Studies, we found support for our hypotheses. First, as expected from previous research, higher levels of critical attitudes strongly increase the probability of voting for a populist party. Second, although we find a

substantial correlation between feelings of criticism and stealth democracy, holding more stealth attitudes *weakens* the effect of criticism on the vote for a populist party. Moreover, at high levels of stealth, there is no significant relationship between criticism of contemporary representation and populist voting. Thus, while these citizens look alike on the attitudinal level, they strongly diverge on the behavioural level. While we argue that the Finish case makes for a setting that is comparable to many other European contexts and hence that the findings should not be limited to Finland only, future research could explore whether the conclusions hold in other countries as well.

These results hold strong implications, both on the level of populist parties as well as on the level of voters. First, with regard to populist parties, the results show that, although populist parties capitalise feelings of criticism of contemporary representation, they are not able to monopolise this criticism – as some voters might identify with the alleged problems without supporting the populists at the polls. Second, on the level of the voters, the results allow for optimism. In general, voters who display high levels of criticism of contemporary representation have been categorised as being lowly educated and lowly interested in politics. Our results, in contrast, seem to imply that voters holding these attitudes act in a more knowledgeable way than commonly assumed, as they indicate that voters distinguish the narrative of problems with contemporary representation from their proposed solutions. More specifically, we find that stealth democrats adhere to the message of criticism capitalised by populist parties, but, as they do not agree with their proposed ways of solving the problems, they do not support populist parties when they cast their vote. Thus, contrary to what was commonly assumed before, voters who are very critical with current representation seem to be sufficiently rational to evaluate the solutions that are being offered, and make a well-considered vote choice.

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Chapter 5

Two kinds of Populism, two kinds of voters?

Italy and its many Populisms

Irene Esteban

5.1 Introduction

The upsurge in the last decades of populist parties all over Europe is not striking anymore neither to the literature, nor to the citizens. However, it is not so frequent to witness that several populist parties play a role in Government together. Normally, populist parties create agreements with parties of “thick ideologies” when negotiating an entrance in Government, because it is rare to find two parties that are labelled as populist that achieve at the same time big electoral success. Frequently, in European party systems, one populist party seems to cover all the “populist demand” in the electoral space.

One of the answers to this puzzle could be that these parties are responding to different needs of the populist citizens, combined with different positioning in issues that make them distinctive enough. However, to begin with, we would like to know how different these parties are within populism, to understand whether they are covering different dimensions of the same phenomenon that makes their appeal very different for the voters.

Hence, in this chapter we want to understand what is the effect of the distinct dimensions of populism on the vote for these two parties, in order to understand what are the differences that voters perceive from these parties in their populist appeal that makes possible for both to be so successful electorally. Specifically, our approach consists of exploring the characteristics of the Italian political landscape between 2013 and 2018, then offering an overview of the history of both parties, their rhetoric, the issues they own etc., and finally we investigate the ideological profile of the Italian voters before 2018. Then, we analyse the effect of several indicators of populism and nativism in the vote behaviour by means of multinomial and logistic regression.

We show that, while voters of both parties are populist, they are clearly two different kinds of populist voters. Voters of Movimento Cinque Stelle are concerned about representation and citizen involvement while disenchanted with politicians. Lega voters, even though they are also distrustful from politicians, that seems to be the only pure populist attitudinal trait that they share, as they have a strong nativist focus. When trying to categorize these parties based on the attitudes of their voters, the Lega fits best in a populist radical right category, whereas the Movimento Cinque Stelle should be placed on a general populist party classification, as their voters do not show traits of traditional inclusive populists.

5.2 Theory and Hypotheses:

In Italy we have witnessed a case of unprecedented electoral success of two very different parties at the same point in time: Lega Nord and Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S). While both parties have many differences in their creation and how they achieved their actual electoral success, both are linked by their populist appeal. However, this populism that unites them, seems to be understood and used in a different way – making otherwise very complicated that the two parties could be electorally successful at the same time.

In this chapter, we will provide an overview of the evolution of both parties up to their competition in the 2018 general election in Italy. Secondly, we will explore the position of their electorate in the ideological space, in order to understand how the left-right division is separating or uniting these parties. Last, we will discuss several ways in which populism has appeared in the last decades, in order to understand what kind of populism these two parties are embracing, and what are the key indicators to take into account to discriminate between different populist parties. After that, we present our hypotheses.

5.2.1 The Italian political landscape between 2013 and 2018

First, we want to provide the reader with a short overview on how the political landscape was in Italy between 2013 and 2018, starting with the vote distribution. To do so, we make use of the data from CSES 5- Unimi (defined and explained later in the data section) and present the vote recall for 2018 and 2013 of our sample. Displayed in Table 5.1 the reader can see for which party the voters of the Movimento and the Lega, voted previously – in the national elections of 2013.

Table 5.1 Vote in Italy in 2018 and vote in 2013 (percentages).

Vote 2013	Vote 2018									
	M5S	PD	Forza Italia	Lega	Fratelli	+Europa	Liberi e	Potere al	Other	Total
PD	36	91	6	19	8	64	70	38	38	48
S Eco Lib	2	1	1	1	0	8	17	19	6	3
Popolo	8	2	71	19	26	3	0	5	18	13
Lega Nord	1	0	4	40	13	0	4	0	9	7
Fratelli	0	0	3	4	34	0	2	0	3	2
M5S	48	2	3	10	8	8	6	5	6	20
Other	4	4	13	6	11	17	2	33	21	7
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: CSES 5-Unimi

In general, we see that there is quite some transference of votes in between parties, except for the PD, that shows the greatest stability between periods. This situation seems to happen because the main parties changed from 2013 to 2018. The only parties that competed in both elections are the PD, M5S, the Lega and Fratelli. From those, except for the PD, all have less than half of their votes coming from previous voters, while for the PD, 91 percent had voted for the party before.


Taking a look at the parties that we focus in this chapter, as the reader can see in Table 5.1, the majority of voters of the Movimento Cinque Stelle voted previously for the same party (48.2 percent), and the second source of voters comes from the Partito Democratico (35.7 percent of their voters). The third option is the Popolo della Liberta, with only an 8 percent of the voters choosing it in 2013. Hence, the Lega voters do not seem to vote for M5S, and in our sample only 1.2 percent of the M5S voters chose Lega Nord in 2013. These are interesting results because, according to the study of Paparo and Cataldi (2013) the PD was not especially affected electorally by the appearance of the Movimento. However, it seems that, in 2018, this is not the case anymore and the PD is the main source of voters coming from other parties to the M5S.

With respect to the Lega, Table 5.1 shows that most of their voters in 2018 also voted for Lega Nord in the previous election of 2013. As second source of voters, we see that both voters who in 2013 chose Partito Democratico and Popolo della Liberta, chose in 2018 to vote for the Lega. As for voters of M5S, we see that in our sample around 10.5 percent of voters of the Lega come from this party.

One last interesting insight from this table is that there seem to be a transfer of voters from the Movimento to the Lega from 2013 to 2018. We can see that in 2018, for our sample, 11 percent of the voters of the Lega come from voting in the previous election from the Movimento. So, there seems to be a transfer of voters between Cinque Stelle and the Lega, but not the other way around. Why? We believe that one of the reasons could be the left-right ideology, and that in some areas of the left-right divide these two parties are overlapping. Even though populist parties claim to be “outside” this axis, the left-right divide is a super-issue that gathers many other divisions across parties, and normally almost every party can find its place in one or another way in that axis. Furthermore, we know that voters still use the left-right continuum as a useful guide to place themselves and the parties (Meyer & Wagner, 2018). We will come back to this point later in the chapter, and we will explore whether these two parties are aligned on the left-right axis or not, and if so, how.

Next, we check the data on electoral volatility in Italy for the last years (Emanuele, 2015), and see how it is in the period between 2013 and 2018 (Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1 Aggregate volatility in Italy from 1948 to 2018



Source: Dataset of Electoral Volatility and its internal components in Western Europe.¹

¹ Update on 2018 data retrieved from <http://www.vincenzoemanuele.com/dataset-of-electoral-volatility.html>

As we can see in Figure 5.1, the aggregate volatility in Italy remained in relative stable levels before the 90s, and from 1992 there are extreme peaks especially in 1994 (the highest of all), 2001, 2013 and again on 2018. This is because in the last 25 years, Italy underwent three electoral earthquakes that changed completely the party system as a whole. This is because since the 90s Italian parties have approved many different constitutional and electoral reforms to try to find a solution to the problems of governance: ‘irrespective of what the reality might be, Italian politicians clearly believe that electoral reform is a vehicle to achieve political change—and notably in ways which favour their own parties. Once the long-standing proportional representation system was abandoned in the early 1990s and an element of the Italian political class apparently embarked on a mission to turn Italy into a so-called majoritarian democracy, electoral reform has figured high on the agenda’ (Regalia, 2018 p. 85).

The Italian Republic went from a proportional electoral system in the early 90s to the last reform – achieved in October 2017 – when the Parliament approved the Rosatellum, a mixed member proportional system that is not compensatory and similar for the two houses. In this system, 37 per cent of the seats are attributed through a first past the post system (232 out of the 630 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 116 out of the 315 seats in the Senate) and 63 per cent through a proportional system (386 seats in the Chamber and 193 in the Senate). In addition, parties can run alone or in coalitions, coalitions of parties are linked to the same candidate in the uninominal districts, voters have one single vote and no preference votes for list candidates. There is not the possibility to split the vote and gender quotas were introduced (Regalia, 2018).²

The aftermath of all these constitutional and electoral changes is that in the last decade, voters seem to vote for a higher number of parties, but the electoral system only allows a small part of them to enter the Chamber (Regalia, 2018 p. 86). The party system then, had two different dynamics (Tronconi, 2015): fragmented bipolarism, where two large parties had big power (1983–92 and 2006–08), or multipolar competition, a system with three to four parties with more power distribution (1994–2001 and 2013–2018).

Hence, as we have seen, the Italian party system has experienced some change, which in the words of Mair occurs ‘as a result of ideological, strategic, or electoral shifts, there is a transformation of the direction of competition or the governing formula. If, on

² For a very thorough review of the state of the party and electoral system please see: Regalia, M. (2018). Electoral reform as an engine of party system change in Italy. *South European Society and Politics*, 23(1), 81-96.

the other hand, the change involves simply the realignment of the social bases of party support, or the emergence of a new set of issue concerns, while leaving the pattern of competition essentially untouched, this might not be considered of major significance—at least in terms of the party system’ (Mair, 1997 p. 52). But this party change not only happens because of the modification of the constitutional or electoral rules, it is also something reflecting what happens in society: ‘conventional patterns of mass politics are challenged by the changing substantive concerns of voters, then so also do they appear vulnerable to a changed perspective of the relationship between the individual and the wider society. More widespread educational qualifications, a greater sense of individual competence, and a reluctance to tolerate simple elite direction all combine to suggest an increasing distaste for the conventions of mass party organizations (...). Thus, the traditional political alternatives qua organizations are more vulnerable; affective attachments have declined, and patterns of political representation are in flux’ (Mair, 1997 p. 47).

It is in the middle of these changes within the Italian party system when we see that these two parties have an important breakout together in the election of 2018.

5.2.2 The Lega

Extensive literature has been devoted to the Lega Nord on its first phase (such as Biorcio, 2003; Diamanti, 1996), a party that was born as a protest northern Italian regionalist party, which advocated for the secession of the north. This party aimed for the northern “people”, understood as ‘a single entity, ethnos and demos together’ (Tarchi 2003, p. 151). During the years, and even though better autonomy was achieved for the north, the regionalism of the Lega Nord was a cornerstone of the party until 2013 (Mazzoleni & Ruzza, 2018). However, previously to that, immigration started to become also a salient – and competition topic – for the Lega Nord (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2005; Bull, 2010; Geddes, 2008; Richardson & Colombo, 2013). Consequently, this party has been classified as radical-right populist (Mudde, 2007), with an emphasis on regionalism (Bobbà & McDonnell, 2016 p. 284).

The rhetoric of the Lega Nord is characterized by its anti-globalization speech which focus on a double threat: to the industry of Northern Italy and to the identity and authenticity of Northern Italians (Woods, 2009 p. 163). The Lega has had a strategy of

‘placing the Other at the centre of their ideological perspective and rhetoric, regional parties create a mindset that fears that the local identities they are under constant assault by global developments’ (Woods, 2009 p. 177), while using the concept of community to identify their “people” and creating a bond by establishing what that community is (Fremaux & Albertazzi, 2002).

When the Lega as had the opportunity to hold a position of power together with other parties, they have developed a good technique of influencing policies while maintaining their position as an “outsider” (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2010 p. 1319). And they did so by keeping consistent themes with the party’s communication: self-government of the North and security. In these two topics the Lega has established a clear issue ownership and appeared to their voters as effectively achieving results in policies – connecting with values of the centre-right voters (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2010).

However, in the last years we are witnessing a clear division within the Lega, which is transforming it into two different (and separate) parties: the old Lega Nord and Lega by Salvini. As explained in several news features³ the party is undergoing a transition since 2014 where at the moment two different parties co exists, but only one party will remain. The new formation called League for Salvini premier was created by Salvini himself, and it took a nationalist turn. The new party was formally defined with a statute of 35 articles that appeared last November 22, 2018. This text contains transitional provisions that refer to a regulation of the party and the management of the criteria for seniority and militancy. The Northern League deputies and senators are divided between the new League for Salvini premier and the old Lega Nord because it also has economical consequences for the party: the old Lega Nord has to pay a fine of 49 million euro to the State because of fraud.

Therefore, in a strategic manoeuvre to save the party from its problems with the State and at the same time having an opportunity to centre the party around himself, Salvini managed to take the party from Bossi and the rest of the Northern League establishment, took out the word “Northern” from the party, and embraced nationalism. This strategic movement put he Lega again in the middle of the Italian political life, thanks to a combination of Salvini’s strategic political instincts and very convenient

³ <https://www.giornalettismo.com/lega-nord-salvini-due-partiti/>,

<http://espresso.repubblica.it/palazzo/2018/07/13/news/matteo-salvini-ha-fondato-un-altro-partito-espulso-dalla-lega-1.324804>, <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/aug/09/how-matteo-salvini-pulled-italy-to-the-far-right>

external events. With this turn, a turn of values came: the focus was no longer on the exploitation of the north by the rest of the country, but on immigration, Roma encampments and the indifference of the European Union to Italy's problems. In the long run, it seemed to be a successful strategy, at least in terms of electoral results.

The Lega Nord obtained in 2013 a 4.09% of the popular vote and 18 seats in the Chamber, while in 2018, the Lega obtained a 17.35% of the popular vote and 125 seats to the Chamber. As the Lega was the party competing in the 2018 elections, we will refer to it during this chapter and we will focus on the study of its electorate.

5.2.3 Movimento Cinque Stelle

The Movimento cinque Stelle is a party officially born in October 2009, and it started as a personalistic party around the Italian comedian Beppe Grillo. The Movement began when Beppe Grillo started an online blog and 'invited his community of followers on the blog to organise themselves independently' (Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2013 p. 430). Things evolved quickly and in the local elections of 2008 several candidates competed under the name "friends of Beppe Grillo". After, the party was founded and also contended in the regional elections in 2010, where it obtained over half a million votes whilst competing in five regions, obtaining representatives in 75 of 1.177 municipalities, and in 18 of 23 provincial capitals.

The best electoral results of M5S occurred in the centre and the north of the country, and their worst results were registered in the southern part of Italy. From that moment on, the party was accumulating electoral successes as in 2014, when M5S ran for the first time in the European elections, receiving 21 percent of the votes and obtaining 17 Members of the European Parliament.⁴ At the national level, the Movimento competed for the first time in 2013 obtaining impressive results for a newcomer: it obtained a 25.56% of the popular vote for the Chamber of deputies and 109 seats – being the second party most voted. In 2018, it improved its results and the Movimento became the largest individual party in the Chamber with a 32.68% of the popular vote and 227 seats. After their 2018 results and many conversations and negotiations between the different parties, the M5S established a coalition government together with the Lega.

⁴ Source: elezionistorico.interno.gov.it


As for their rhetoric, the Movimento Cinque Stelle is known for having embraced the power of communication, specifically on social media: ‘Beppe Grillo is one of the first politicians to have embraced this transformational change, and by using social media as the primary medium of communication, recruitment and organisation, his movement has grown from practically nothing to a major political force in Italy in the space of three years’ (Bartlett, Froio, Littler & McDonnell, 2013 p. 13). This exceptional use of the new media, together with a strong message anti-politicians (Pasquino, 2014) and the ability to channel political mistrust and protest through a new proposal of citizen representation (Biorcio & Natale, 2013) was the backbone of the success of Grillo and consequently, of the Movimento.

However, after gaining power, the anti-establishment nature of the Movimento has been criticised based on their legislative supports, as the party learned how to navigate being part of the establishment while heavily criticising it. This meant that the Movimento had to redefine its goals and style of communication to adapt to the new institutional environment without losing the appeal of its original message (Tronconi, 2018). Moreover, as the party entered the Institutions so widely, another challenge appeared: recruiting many people quickly, that compromised the internal cohesion of the party (Tronconi, 2018 pp. 170-171). This affected and transformed the party itself losing some of its original characteristics and aspirations of radical renovation of the political process (Tronconi, 2018 p. 177).

On what the Movimento stands for, it is quite complicated to disentangle, as Ceccarini and Bordignon assess: ‘it has made some of the values of these political forces its own—values such as environmentalism, the critique of the actors of neoliberal capitalism (...), civil rights and their driving principles (...). The M5s also incorporates some of the positions of the radical, anti-European, anti-Euro, and at times xenophobic, right’ (Ceccarini & Bordignon, 2016, p. 154). For these authors, what connects the voters of the Movimento is not a specific position on the left-right continuum, but certain issues: ‘The issues are, however, ones that do not divide citizens along left–right lines. Rather they unify groups with contrasting ideological outlooks. For this reason, thanks precisely to its capacity to fish in different streams, once unconnected with one another, the M5s can be described as a “catch-all (anti-party) party”. The M5s is all of this at one and the same time’ (Ceccarini & Bordignon, 2016, p. 154).

In order to explore some of these issues for the M5S and Lega, we show the placement on different topics using the Chapell Hill expert survey of 2014 (Bakker et al., 2015).


Figure 5.2 Left-right general placement of the Italian parties (2014)



Source: Chapel Hill Data

As we can see in Figure 5.2, the placement of the parties done by experts puts the Lega in the most right of all of the parties available, while the Movimento is one of the parties most to the left in the spectrum, while it only has a middle left-right positioning (around 5). Again, this could be discussed depending on which political issue we take into account to place the M5S, as there is no firm consensus on where to place along this axis.


Figure 5.3 Orientation of the party leadership towards European integration (2014)



Source: Chapel Hill Data

Figure 5.3 presents us the orientation of each party leadership towards European integration, on a scale from 1 (strongly opposed) to 7 (strongly in favour). In this figure, we see that in general, Italian parties have a positive orientation towards the European integration. However, we see that M5S is the most negative party towards EU integration, even higher in dissent than the Lega, which is placed second to last.

Figure 5.4 Anti-elite salience of the Italian parties (2014)



Source: Chapel Hill Data

In Figure 5.4 we see the salience of anti-elite sentiment in the different parties. This seems to be the topic in which the M5S and the Lega are closer than any other. While the M5S has the highest anti-elite sentiment of all the parties (10) the Lega is quite close in a position slightly lower than 9.

We wonder then, if besides from specific policy issues, and if left or right as super issues cannot truly capture what is differentiating these two populist parties (because of the complicated nature of the M5S), how could we classify these parties in order to differentiate them?

5.2.4 The differences in populist parties

As we have explained in the previous section, the differences between these two parties could have something to do with ideology, but that part does not tell us the whole story.

Then, what are the things dividing the voters of these parties? Do they belong to separate “party families” within the populist parties or is it a matter of issues/attitudes?

Populist parties have been since several decades gathered in two big families: exclusive and inclusive. This division started at the beginning as geographical (Latin America had mainly inclusive populist parties and Europe mainly exclusive populist parties) but with the expansion with populism in Europe it became a matter of “right/cultural/nativist” versus “left/inclusive/economical” populism. For Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013, p. 155) exclusive populism is considered a family within populism itself and they have core features: ‘The parties that belong to this family share three ideological features – nativism, populism and authoritarianism – and their electoral fortunes have differed widely, (...) such as the Italian Northern League’. Exclusive populists do not propose a different type of democracy, but they do want democracy to prioritize the “native” people. In this exclusion is where European populist parties have been very successful (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013 p. 166). So, even though exclusive populists claim to be the “voice of the people”, it is always an ethnic people, excluding “foreign” people and values.

As for inclusive populism, authors like Filc (2015, p. 265), describe inclusive populist movements as: ‘the ones who stress the notion of the people as plebeians, (...) allowing the political integration of excluded social groups and, in the process, enlarging the boundaries of democracy’. The difference present in inclusive populism is based on the people versus the economical / political elite – and not based on cultural or national attributes. The discourse of inclusive populism centres around the redistribution of political power and allowing the citizens to have a voice, in opposition to the “corrupted” mechanisms of liberal representation that allow that the interests of few are represented, ultimately damaging the popular will.

However, in the last years more theories are arising claiming that those two categories or even trying to locate populist parties in the left-right continuum is obsolete, because populism opens a new “axis of competition” that goes beyond this spatial references. For instance, questioning liberal democracy itself without taking into account an ideological sign (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012), or the opposition to the EU and the focus on national issues (Rupnik, 2007) and the threat to European government in general (Kriesi, 2014).

An important theory, as we have explained in previous chapters, is the “losers of globalisation” which constitutes the criticism towards the processes of modernization

(together with the deterioration of living conditions) that have created new forms of protest such as populist parties). This theory focus on the creation of new social divides which go beyond the left- right division. As Kriesi et al. (2006, p. 921) explain: ‘[globalization] leads to the formation of a new structural conflict in Western European countries, opposing those who benefit from this process against those who tend to lose in the course of the events as a consequence of globalization’. The argument of Kriesi is economic – such as the one of economic and inequality by Inglehart and Norris (2016), and in some points it could be seen as a left or right issue, for both theories, we believe that the modernization/globalization problem goes beyond left-right ideologies in terms on how to propose a solution to it and how it affects our democratic systems.

Last, there is a related theory of “cultural backlash”, and according to it: ‘the surge in votes for populist parties can be explained not as a purely economic phenomenon but in a large part as a reaction against progressive cultural change. (...) the reactions to these developments triggered a counter-revolutionary retro backlash. (...) [sectors may] react angrily to the erosions of their privilege and status’ (Inglehart & Norris, 2016 pp. 2-3).

Hence, we see that there are diverse theories about what is the issue that divides populist parties (what they are focused on or want to rebel against). As theories are quite diverse, we decided to focus on the two general and bigger families of populist types: inclusive vs exclusive populism, knowing that these categories are far from perfect and generally one cannot find this “ideal types of populist parties” that fit perfect in the description of a specific type of populist party.

Based on this general overview, we present further in the chapter our hypotheses on the Italian case and the populist parties of Movimento cinque Stelle and the Lega. In order to test these hypothesis, we use the indicators available in the CSES round 5 study, and we are well aware of their limitations. However, we believe that these indicators are good enough to perform a first exploration on the effect of populism on the vote for these two parties, and at the same time explore its similarities and differences.

5.2.5 The importance of ideology: The left- right divide in the Lega and M5S

One of the main reasons why populist voters decide which populist party to vote for depends on ideology (in terms of left and right). Because, as we already mentioned, even when populist parties declared to be competing in a “different axis” from left and right, policies normally can be placed somewhere around the left vs right spectrum.


But with the position of a newcomer, and placing themselves in different issues either in the left or in the right, from where does the Movimento exactly gets its voters? What is their ideology? That has been a matter of discussion in the literature for the long time and, as we already mentioned, the party “refuses” to take a traditional ideological (left vs right) position (Franchino & Negri, 2018) and as highlighted by Bordignon and Ceccarini (2013 p. 427: ‘positioned “beyond” ideologies, (...) its electorate comes from various political families’. At the beginning of its electoral career in the 2010 regional elections, the M5s seemed to have more success among voters of parties of the centre-left coalition – particularly, from Italia dei Valori (IDV) – in regions like Torino, Genova, Milano, Bologna and Palermo (Paparo & Cataldi, 2013 p. 88). However, in the municipal elections from 2011 the M5S also started attracting voters from the right, including voters from the Lega Nord in Torino, Genova and Bologna, concretely. In the national elections of 2013, Paparo and Cataldi (2013) also show that an important electoral support from M5S comes from both the centre-left and centre-right voters in the regions aforementioned. The authors suggest that these results are possible due to ‘the use of differentiated political messages mobilizing more the locally stronger political coalition’ (Paparo & Cataldi, 2013 p. 89). However, the results must be observed with caution because only specific cases are analysed by these authors and the success of the M5S seems to be highly contextual depending on the region.

When examining the ideological self placement of the voters of these two parties, see the Lega has a clear position of its voters in terms of left and right. In Figure 5.5, we can observe that most voters of the Lega place themselves in the highest part of the left-right scale. However, for voters of Movimento 5 Stelle the distribution on the left-right axis is not that clear. Instead, voters of this party show a normal distribution with most people positioning themselves in the (ideological) centre. This could have different meanings: either that the party itself has not a clear ideological position and consequently, neither do their voters – as we have seen this is a quite likely hypothesis because even in the specialized literature there is a struggle to classify ideologically The Movimento 5 Stelle (Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2015; Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2014; Colloca & Corbetta, 2014); or that voters of the party themselves are truly centrist – which could be possible as almost 36% of the voters of Movimento 5 Stelle come from previously voting for the PD (a centre-left party). Some of the literature suggests that this vote transfer between the PD and the Movimento could be because of the agreement of former PD voters in some

issue positioning with the Movimento stances, such as a hard view on Europe and immigration (Vezzoni, 2013).

These results also seem to be stable in time, as we plotted the same graph for the vote in 2013 and results show the same: Lega Nord voters are skewed and showing a rightist profile, while M5S voters mainly place themselves in the ideological centre – for the interested reader the Figure is available in the Appendix. Hence, as we saw in the previous section, we confirm again how both parties have an overlap of rightist voters (small in the case of the Movimento) that are available for the Lega to attract as a rightist party.

Figure 5.5 Vote in 2018 and left-right self placement.



In order to take a deeper look, we also checked the respondents who refused to place themselves in the left-right axis: either because they could not place themselves in any of the positions of the scale (between 0 extreme left to 10 extreme right), or because they declared that they do not know where to place themselves (Table 5.2). Around 10% of the respondents who declared to vote for the M5S in 2018 could not place themselves in the left-right axis, and 15% of the respondents who voted for M5S in 2013 declared the same. For the Lega, 2% of the respondents who voted for them in 2018 could not place

themselves in the left-right and only 1% of respondents who voted for them in 2013 answered the same. Respondents who answered “do not know” are rather low: 2% of M5S voters in 2018, and 1% for voters of 2013 and for Lega 2% of voters of 2018 and 1% of 2013 voters. What these results tell us are in line with the results of Figure 5.5, that while Lega Nord voters have a clear idea of where they ideologically stand, it is not so clear for Movimento Cinque Stelle voters.

Table 5.2 Refuse to place themselves in left-right axis

	Vote Chamber			
	Vote M5S 2018	Vote M5S 2013	Vote Lega 2018	Vote Lega 2013
I cannot place myself in any position	9.8 %	15.3 %	2.5 %	1.3 %
I do not know	2.2 %	2.1 %	1.9 %	1.3 %

Source: CSES 5-Unimi

5.2.6 Expectations (hypotheses)

First, we present some general hypotheses in order to test whether the attitudes of the voters of Movimento Cinque Stelle and the Lega are attitudinally in line with their parties' vision:

1. We already know that both Lega and M5S supporters hold high populist attitudes, however, we will test whether those **populist attitudes are a strong predictor for their vote.**
2. We will also test the negative impact of **political efficacy**: we expect that the lower the external political efficacy, the higher probability to vote for a populist party. Based on the idea that their rejection of “mainstream politicians” (Tarchi, 2008) will drive them to have a lower political efficacy than the rest of the voters. We have already explored in previous chapters the complications and overlaps between the concepts of populism and political efficacy, so with this hypothesis we also aim to explore this relationship further in the Italian case.

Then, we will test a set of different hypotheses in order to understand which are the specific predictors driving the vote for these two different parties, in order to understand

if those predictors are the same or not and if they can be classified as a specific type of populist party.

3. For the Lega Nord, we expect to validate **exclusionary populist attitudes** as a strong predictor of their vote: we expect stronger nativist attitudes as well as anti- EU attitudes.
4. For M5S supporters, because of their ideological ambiguity, we expect **ideology not to be a predictor for the vote**, and we do not hold a priori expectations with respect to attitudes on immigration, the European Union or national identity.

In order to test not only these two parties, but also the context in which they are competing, we will examine a set of different variables as predictors of the vote for the four main parties in Italy: Movimento Cinque Stelle, Partito Democratico, Forza Italia and the Lega.

5.3 Data and methods

Our aim in this chapter is to determine whether there are differences between the electorates of M5S and the Lega based on different attitudes – and if so, in what they differ exactly. For this purpose, we make use of data from the 5th wave of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) – Unimi. This dataset was specifically focused on populism and its title is: “Democracy Divided? People, Politicians and the Politics of Populism”, therefore it allows us to test attitudes on populism because of its unique approach measuring populist attitudes across different democracies. The data of this module for Italy is a Post-Election Study (with interviewing starting within 6 months after the election). The elections in Italy were held on March 4, 2018 and the fieldwork ran from March 8, 2018 to May 2, 2018. The methodology of collection was mixed administered (50 % cati, 25 cawi and 25% cami-mobile phone).⁵ With this dataset, we

⁵ The interested reader can find more information on this specific dataset in:

http://www.cses.org/datacenter/module5/design/ITA_2018_Design.pdf. And more information on the CSES studies in particular in: <http://www.cses.org/datacenter/module5/module5.htm>.

will be able to compare the political and populist attitudes together with the voting choice of the voters of the main four political parties in Italy in 2018.

5.3.1 Exploratory analyses

As a first approach to our data, and in line with the theoretical part of our chapter, we will explore the distribution of populist and nativist attitudes of the voters of the four main parties of focus in this chapter: The Movimento Cinque Stelle, the Partito Democratico, Forza Italia and the Lega. Using the data from Unimi-CSES round 5, we constructed a two latent variables (one for populism and one for nativism) combining different indicators of attitudes on populism and nativism. For populism we used the following indicators: **Pols not interested** ‘Most politicians are not interested in what citizens think’, **Principal problems are pols** ‘The main problem in Italy are politicians’, **Citizens should take decisions** ‘Citizens, not politicians, should make the most important political decisions’ and **Pols care about rich and powerful** ‘Most politicians only do the interests of the rich and powerful’. We are aware that the first indicator (pols not interested) is mostly used to indicate political efficacy. However, and based on our previous research, we understand that it needed to be a part of the latent variable of populism as it overlaps and also captures the concept itself.

For nativism the following indicators were used: **Immigrants economy** ‘Immigrants are good for the Italian economy’ (recoded and inverted so agreement show anti-immigrant attitudes), **Immigrants culture** ‘Immigrants are harmful to Italian culture’, **Immigrants crime** ‘Immigrants increase crime in Italy’ and **Minorities should adapt** ‘Think now of ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities in Italy. Minorities should adapt to Italian customs and traditions.’

In order to test discriminant validity, we estimated a factor analysis with all the indicators together to be sure that every latent variable captures a specific attitude.

The results of the factor analysis are the following:

Table 5.3 Results of factor analysis for populism and nativism

Factor	Variance	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	1.59752	0.30638	0.7078	0.7078
Factor2	1.29115	1.23683	0.5720	1.2798
Factor3	0.05432	.	0.0241	1.3039

Number of observations = 1849. Retained factors =3. Sumber of parameters = 21. Method principal factors, rotation ortogonal varimax.

LR test: Independent vs. Saturated: chi2 (28) 0 3049.10 Prob>chi2 = 0.

Table 5.4 Result of factor loadings for populism and nativism

	Factor1	Factor2	Uniqueness
Pols not interested		0.4940	0.7310
Principal problem pols		0.5825	0.6133
Citizens decisions		0.4560	0.7065
Pols care rich/powerful		0.6261	0.5707
Immigrants economy	0.5633		0.6693
Immigrants culture	0.6454		0.5614
Immigrants crime	0.7114		0.4623
Minorities should adapt	0.4646		0.7425

(Blanks represent abs(loading)<.3)

With this procedure we are able then to create two latent variables, populism and nativism, clearly measuring different concepts. The reliability of the latent variables is the following:

Populism (Test scale = mean (unstandardized items)):

Average interitem covariance: 0.5936006

Number of items in the scale: 4

Scale reliability coefficient: 0.6743

Nativism (Test scale = mean (unstandardized items)):


Average interitem covariance: 0.6861026

Number of items in the scale: 4

Scale reliability coefficient: 0.7340


Next, we plot the results of populism by party (Figure 5.6).

Figure 5.6 Populist attitudes and vote for M5S, PD, FI and Lega in 2018



As we mentioned previously, the Lega has been usually classified as a typical exclusive European populist party in the literature. However, in Figure 5.6 we see that even though both voters of Movimento 5 Stelle and the Lega have the feelings of populism (especially when compared to voters of the Partito Democratico and Forza Italia), voters of Movimento Cinque Stelle are more populist than the voters of the Lega.

Figure 5.7 Nativist attitudes and vote for M5S, PD, FI and Lega in 2018.



When we look at nativism (one of the defining traits of exclusive populism), Figure 5.7 shows that the voters of the Lega are by far the most nativist, followed by the voters of Forza Italia. These figures seem to corroborate that the voters of the Lega still hold the attitudinal traits of exclusive populist and populist right party in accordance with the party position. However, the voters of Movimento Cinque Stelle, even though we see that they are more populist than the Lega voters, they have much less nativist inclinations and their attitudes are quite heterogeneous. We begin to see that not only the parties have different salient topics, but also their voters seem to have them as well.

5.3.2 Multinomial analyses

Our empirical strategy consists of estimating a total of five multinomial logistic regression models with a dependent variable of vote choice (with four categories):

Movimento Cinque Stelle (1), Partito Democratico (2), Forza Italia (3), and the Lega (4). For our analyses we use the Partito Democratico as a reference category.

Our *first model* acts a “control” for sociodemographics with the variables **gender** ((1) male and (2) female), and **age**. In our *second model*, we include general attitudes to control for: **interest in politics** ‘Could you tell me, in general, how much you are interested in politics?’ (on a scale –inverted – from (1) “Not at all”, (2) “Little”, (3) “Enough” and (4) “Very”), a variable measuring **satisfaction with democracy** ‘Overall, how satisfied are you with how democracy works in Italy?’ (on a scale – inverted – from (1) “Not at all satisfied”, (2) “Little satisfied”, (3) “Pretty satisfied” and (4) “Very satisfied” and a variable of **evaluation of the state of the economy** ‘According to you, the economic situation in Italy in the last year is ...’ (on a scale – inverted – from (1) “Much worse”, (2) “Enough got worse”, (3) “Left unchanged”, (4) “Pretty improved” and (5) “Much improved”). Our *third model* includes a **measure for ideological self placement**, which we recoded into the deviation from the mean position in the left right scale (6 in a scale from 1 to 11, now 0) in negative (-5 extreme left) or positive (+5 extreme right) ‘Many people when talking about politics use the terms "left" and "right". Where would you be on that scale?’. We also placed in the centre the people who did not want to place themselves in the scale or would not know where to place themselves. In addition to this, we included a **dummy for self-placement in the ideological scale** with value (0) “not placed in the scale” and value (1) “placed in the scale”. We will use this third model to test partly hypothesis 4. For the sake of clarity, and as all these variable act as control for general attitudes and sociodemographics, models 1, 2 and 3 are plotted together in Figure 5.8 and 5.9.

Our *fourth model* allow us in first place to test hypothesis 1, and therefore it includes several indicators which allow us to capture the respondents’ degree of populist attitudes (as we have highlighted previously in this work through the literature and empirical review on measurement of populism). We believe that, as we are trying to explain the differences between two populist parties, instead of including in our analyses an index of populism in which all populist attitudes are “aggregated” – like we presented in the first part of this chapter, it would be more insightful to introduce separately all the indicators of the aforementioned index. In this way, we are able to present to the reader the effect of every different component of populist attitudes separately which provides us

with a better view on what specific aspect of populist attitudes affects (and how) the probability to vote for M5S and the Lega.⁶

Those indicators are: **Understand political problems** ('You feel you understand what are the most important political issues in the country' on a scale – inverted – from (1) highly disagree, (2) quite disagree, (3) do not agree nor disagree, (4) agree, and (5) highly agree), **Making compromises** ('Making compromises in politics means actually selling off your principles' on a scale – inverted – from (1) highly disagree, (2) quite disagree, (3) do not agree nor disagree, (4) agree, and (5) highly agree), **Can trust pols** 'Most politicians can be trusted' on a scale from (1) highly agree, (2) agree, (3) do not agree nor disagree, (4) quite disagree, and (5) highly disagree, **Principal problems are pols** 'The main problem in Italy are politicians' on a scale – inverted – from (1) highly disagree, (2) quite disagree, (3) do not agree nor disagree, (4) agree, and (5) highly agree), **Strong leader** 'Having a strong leader in the government would do well to Italy, even if the leader were to bend the rules to get the results' on a scale – inverted – from (1) highly disagree, (2) quite disagree, (3) do not agree nor disagree, (4) agree, and (5) highly agree), **Citizens should take decisions** 'Citizens, not politicians, should make the most important political decisions' on a scale – inverted – from (1) highly disagree, (2) quite disagree, (3) do not agree nor disagree, (4) agree, and (5) highly agree), **Pols care about rich and powerful** 'Most politicians only do the interests of the rich and powerful' on a scale – inverted – from (1) highly disagree, (2) quite disagree, (3) do not agree nor disagree, (4) agree, and (5) highly agree).

In addition, and to be able to test hypothesis 2, we included also in our *fourth model* an indicator of external efficacy: **Pols not interested** ('Most politicians are not interested in what citizens think' on a scale – inverted – from (1) highly disagree, (2) quite disagree, (3) do not agree nor disagree, (4) agree, and (5) highly agree).


Our last and *fifth model* has the purpose of testing hypothesis 3, and it includes the factor variable previously used (Figure 5.7) for **Nativism** and the degree of agreement with **European unification** ('Some argue that European unification should go further. According to others, however, it has already gone too far. Where would you put your opinion?' in a scale from 0 "European unification has already gone too far" to 10 "European unification should go further").

⁶ However, we provide also the results of the analyses for the regression with the index of populism in the Appendix.

5.4 Analyses:


As mentioned before, we estimated a multinomial logistic regression model in which our dependent variable is vote choice for four different parties: Movimento Cinque Stelle, Partito Democratico, Forza Italia, and the Lega. Results are shown in Figure 5.8 and 5.9.

Figure 5.8 Average Marginal effects of the multinomial model for Movimento Cinque Stelle⁷



⁷ The table with the results of these multinomial regression models are available for the interested reader in Appendix. However, for ease of interpretation we plotted and displayed here the average marginal effects of all parties. The results presented in Figure 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10 show the effect of the respective party versus all other parties, and do not depend on the chosen reference category – as opposed to the results in Appendix where results are compared to the reference category.

Figure 5.9 Average Marginal effects of the multinomial model for Lega.



We will start by analysing the results of Figure 5.8 with the results for Movimento Cinque Stelle. In this figure, we can see that the Models 1, 2 and 3 show the effect of sociodemographics, general attitudes and ideology. With respect to sociodemographics, we see that age has no effect in the vote for the Movimento Cinque Stelle in any of our models. Gender does not have effect in our most basic model, but once we introduce general attitudes, there is a significant negative effect of being female and the vote for the Movimento, which remains constant also in Models 4 and 5.

As for general attitudes (Model 2), we see that interest in politics does not have an effect in the vote for the Movimento, while satisfaction with democracy and evaluation of the economy both have a negative significant effect. Hence, the less satisfied with the democracy and the worse the evaluation with the democracy, the higher the probability to vote for the Movimento, which are findings in line with expectations of voters of a challenger party.

With regard to left and right orientation (Model 3), we see a significantly negative effect of L-R orientation in the vote. Thus, the more a voter is deviated from the centre to the left of the ideological scale, the higher the probability to vote for the 5 Stelle (or the more to the right, the lower the probability to vote them). Which means that M5S voters are more to the left than the rest of the voters, excluding the PD ones. We also see that being self-placed in the left-right scale or not does not have any effect on the vote. This finding allows us to **reject our fourth hypothesis** because, despite the general centrist profile of their voters, ideology does have an impact on the vote for the Cinque Stelle relatively seen with the other parties. This is an interesting finding because, in the literature, many authors also struggle on where to position 5 Stelle exactly on the left – right axis, and even populist parties claim to “not compete” in an ideological axis, yet the vote for the Cinque Stelle can be partially predicted by ideology.

In Model 4, we see the effect of the indicators of populist attitudes and the indicator of political efficacy. We only see a positive significant effect on the vote for Cinque Stelle from two of the most important indicators to measure populist attitudes: first ‘citizens should make the most important political decisions’ and second, ‘politicians only care about the rich and powerful’. Both predictors are in line not only with populists’ attitudinal traits, but also with the nature and discourse of the Movimento 5 Stelle. The rest of the indicators of populism included in our model do not predict the vote for Cinque Stelle (making compromises, the main problem in Italy are politicians, etc.). Hence, we can **only partially accept our first hypothesis**, based on the positive effect of some

indicators of populist attitudes on the vote for M5S. As for the effect of political efficacy ‘Most politicians are not interested in what citizens think’ we see that this predictor does not have a significant effect on the vote for Movimento Cinque Stelle, so we need to **reject our second hypothesis**.

Last, we test our model 5 introducing nativism and attitudes towards the European unification. Neither of these indicators play a role in predicting the vote for Cinque Stelle.

As for the results of our models to predict the vote for the Lega (Figure 5.9), we see a rather different set of predictors affecting the vote compared to Movimento Cinque Stelle. First, we present Model 1 with sociodemographics, and neither gender nor age have an effect on the probability to vote for the Lega, which remains stable in the more complex models (2 to 5). In Model 2, we introduce general attitudes and we see that two of them “Interest in politics” and “satisfaction with democracy” do not have an effect either in the vote for this party, which also remains stable in the following models. However, for evaluation of the economy we see a significant negative effect on the vote for Lega (the worse the evaluation of the economy, the more likely to vote for the Lega). Next, when introducing ideology, we see that ideology of the deviation from the ideological centre has a significant positive effect for the vote of the Lega, which indicates that the more to the right a voter place her/himself on the left-right scale, the higher the probability to vote for the Lega. This finding is not surprising because as we have seen previously, the majority of the voters of the Lega place themselves in the right and far right. We see again that self-placement in the left-right scale does not have a significant effect on the vote.

Next, we present model 4, where we introduce the indicators of populist attitudes together with the indicator of political efficacy. From the set of indicators of populist attitudes, only one of them has a significant effect predicting the vote for the Lega: ‘making compromises in politics means actually selling off your principles’ we see a significant negative effect on the vote of this indicator which means that voters of the Lega in general disagree more than the rest of the voters with this statement. This finding actually contradicts what the literature explains on populist parties and compromise in politics, as we have seen in previous chapters. Hence, we need to **reject our first hypothesis for the Lega voters**, because none of the indicators of populist attitudes affects their vote in line with populist theories.


On political efficacy we see that the indicator ‘politicians are not interested in what citizens think’, has a significant positive effect on the probability on the vote for the

Lega, so we can **accept our second hypothesis for the Lega**, differently than for the Movimento Cinque Stelle. This is an interesting finding, because it indicates that Lega voters have less political efficacy than voters of the Movimento Cinque Stelle, which is striking taking into account that the Lega had been a part of the Italian political party system for quite a long time. It seems like the Lega is successfully “selling” to their electorate the idea that they still are the underdog of Italian politics, while the rest of the politicians do not care about the “real people”.

On Model 5, we test our hypothesis for Lega and exclusionary populist attitudes, for which we used the indicators on nativism European unification. We can see that nativism has a strong significant positive effect on the vote for the Lega and it is the most important predictor of the vote for this party. With respect to European unification, we see that it has a significant negative effect on the vote for the Lega. Hence, we can **accept hypothesis 3** as both nativism and negative attitudes towards the EU attitudes have a are predictors for the vote for Lega – in line with the literature on exclusive populism.

Next, we present the results for the full model 5 also for the Partito Democratico and Forza Italia (Figure 5.10), due to the importance of comparing these two parties within their electoral and party system context.

Figure 5.10 Results of Model 5 for Partito Democratico and Forza Italia



As we can see in Figure 5.10, when comparing the results of Movimento 5 Stelle and Lega with the Partito Democratico and Forza Italia, we see that, the vote for the Partito Democratico is affected by gender (women are more likely to vote for this party), and general attitudes such as a positive evaluation of the economy (the better evaluation of the economy, the higher probability to vote for the PD) and ideology (the more deviated from the centre to the left, the higher the probability to vote for PD). The populist indicators either do not have any effect on the vote for the PD, or have a negative effect (the less agreement with indicators ‘citizens should take the decisions’ and ‘politics only care about rich and powerful’ the lower probability to vote for the PD). As for nativism, we see that it has a negative significant impact in the probability to vote for the PD and European unification has a positive significant effect. Hence, to summarize, the voters of PD are more leftist, satisfied with the estate of the economy, anti-nativist and pro European unification. In addition, these voters do not show attitudinal traits of populism – they even show disagreement with some of them. Therefore, if we look only at the effect

of the predictors for the vote, voters of the Partito Democratico seem to be in some instances “opposites” to voters of both the Movimento 5 Stelle and the Lega.

On the other side, the vote for Forza Italia compared to the Movimento 5 Stelle, Lega and the Partito Democratico, is mainly affected by the deviation from the centre in the left-right placement, with voters who place themselves in the right part of the scale being more likely to vote for this party, like in the case of Lega. We see that the rest of general attitudes and sociodemographics do not have an effect on the vote for Forza Italia, and neither do the indicators on populist attitudes, the nativism or the attitudes on European unification. Hence, voters of Forza Italia seem to be mainly ideological voters, and they are not affected by any of the salient issues or needs present in the attitudinal profile of populist voters that we have explained through this chapter.

Based on these findings, we can affirm that even though both voters of Movimento 5 Stelle and Lega share some attitudes that have been identified in the literature with populism, but these attitudes are neither the same nor shared. While voters of the Movimento are basically left oriented, complain about the corruption of politicians and want the decisions to be taken by the citizens, the populist element of Lega voters is based on their distaste with politicians. Cinque Stelle voters are dissatisfied with politicians, democracy and the state of the economy while Lega voters are also dissatisfied with politicians but they do not seem to want a shift in the power towards the citizens. Lega voters are also dissatisfied with European unification, and are very influenced by their nativist character. Hence, even though these voters might be referred to as populist, we see that their motivation for voting are very different and come from different concerns.

5.5 Conclusions

After our analyses, we can conclude that voters of Lega and Cinque Stelle are both **populist, but different kinds of populist**. Their electorates are obviously different, because we observed how they have different needs and attitudes driving their vote.

On the one side, we have the voters of the Movimento Cinque Stelle: they are populist because they want the decision-making processes to involve the citizens, and they think that politicians do not care about normal people. So they want a shift in the political power and they are complaining about the status quo of representative democracy as it is nowadays. Hence, it seems like the Movimento Cinque Stelle does not

fit so much in a categorization of an inclusive populist party, but more based on its electorate it reflects a generalist populist party.

On the other side, we have the voters of the Lega, who are populist because of their distaste and distrust on politicians, but they do not express attitudes against representative democracy. Their populism is based on the reject of politicians and on strong exclusionary populist attitudes: focused on nativism and rejection of the European Union. Hence, we could place the Lega together **with the exclusive populist**, in a populist radical right category more than in a purely populist position.

Interestingly enough, we see that for voters of Movimento Cinque Stelle, their sense of political efficacy **does not differ significantly from the rest of the voters** while in the case of the Lega it does. So, voters of the Lega seem to be more frustrated in general with politicians than voters of the Movimento Cinque Stelle.

Voters of Movimento Cinque Stelle are also less rightist than the Lega voters, and voters of Movimento Cinque Stelle also have attitudes of the voters of a challenger party: dissatisfaction with democracy and negative evaluation of the economy. It seems like in the case of the voters of M5S, their attitudinal profile expresses a dissatisfaction in general with politicians, democracy, economy and distribution of power while for the Lega it is also about dissatisfaction with politicians but linked to an exclusionary nativist view and anti-EU values.

To summarize, as their only issue for competition is represented by the disenchantment with politicians, it is completely feasible that the two parties cohabit and compete in the same party system because they are covering different spaces and needs from their voters. The only grey zone is constituted by their shared sense of distaste with politicians, and maybe the most rightist voters of Movimento Cinque Stelle that could migrate to the Lega, but in general we have seen that the profile of these voters are too far apart to consider each other as electoral competition.

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Chapter 6

Are Iberians exceptional?

Explaining the long-standing absence of right-wing
populist parties in Spain and Portugal

Irene Esteban and José Ramón Montero

6.1 Introduction

The rise of right-wing populism is a reality in most European countries, and has led to a growing literature on the explanations of its surge. Right-wing populist parties are doing remarkably well in national elections and, in some cases, even become a part of the government. However, Spain and Portugal have for a long time been exceptions to this trend. Even though in both countries the political and economic conditions after the Great Recession seemed to be ideal for these parties to arise, up to very recently there were not right-wing populist parties able to capitalise the discontent directed to a right-wing voter with “nativist” or “exclusive” demands in these two countries.

In the Spanish case, the right-wing populist party VOX has become increasingly popular among the electorate since the end of 2018. It had its first important electoral breakthrough in the 2018 Andalusian regional elections, winning 11 percent of the votes --a remarkable result given that in the 2015, previous Andalusian regional elections only received a mere 0.45 of the vote shares. In the 2019 general elections, the electoral success of VOX was confirmed at the national level, where it obtained 10.26 percent of the vote and 24 seats (or 7 percent) of the Congreso de los Diputados, the lower House of the Spanish Parliament.

Why a right-wing populist has taken so long to appear on Spain? And why it did so far not appear at all on Portugal? Hence, our question--are Iberians exceptional? This chapter aims to provide answers focused on the demand-side in order to understand why these right-wing populist parties have taken so long to appear on Spain, and have not appeared at all on Portugal. Our main hypothesis is that the mainstream, established conservatives in both party systems were successfully attracting voters with similar attitudes to the populist right-wing voters in the rest of the Europe. As this thesis focuses on populist attitudes, and more specifically on voters with populist attitudes, we first want to know where the voters of the populist right-wing parties had gone. Did they previously vote for the mainstream conservative parties? In other words, do voters of the mainstream right in Spain and Portugal have right-wing populist attitudes? And in case they do, we aim to compare the extent to which those voters are similar to the populist right-wing voters in the rest of Europe.

Until now, the explanations for this absence are different for Spain and Portugal. In Spain, Sonia Alonso and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2015) argued that there was a demand for such a party in the Spanish electorate, but that this opportunity was blocked

by the combination of the cleavage structure, the electoral system, and the strategies carried out by the Partido Popular (PP), the leading conservative party. In Portugal, Oscar Luengo et al. (2016) claim that the conservative electorate, together with a strong stability of the party system and high levels of abstention, provide a difficult scenario for these parties to arise. Despite some research on these cases, it seems like there is no a demand-side explanation for the long-time absence of populist right-wing parties in both countries, despite their suitable conditions, and that the literature lacks a cross-country comparison of the individual-variables able to explain the long absence of these two phenomena.

We believe it is important to undertake a systematic analysis of these negative cases. In this chapter, we thus investigate some basic attitudes on the demand-side with individual-level variables in order to examine the potential voters of the populist right in Spain and Portugal. More specifically, we will compare to what extent these two electorates hold similar political orientations to the voters of right-wing populist parties in other Western European countries. Second, we will look at some explanations related to institutional factors, such as the party and electoral systems, the existing party-system fragmentation, the hegemony of the mainstream parties, and the competition with the regional parties. Third, we will analyse the existing supply in the past, and whether the mainstream conservative parties were successfully satisfying the expectations of those potential right-wing populist voters. Our main hypothesis is that the delay in the appearance of a populist right-wing party was related to the fact that citizens with right-wing populist attitudes felt represented by the extant conservative parties, and consequently they kept voting those parties. Therefore, the possibility for a populist right party to appear took longer.

6.2 Theory and hypotheses

6.2.1 The grounds for a populist radical right: a European perspective


Our first goal is to analyse to what extent the attitudinal profile of Spanish and Portuguese citizens are similar to those of European countries in which right-wing populist parties have appeared. We will thus analyze attitudes towards national and international institutions, aggregate data on economy and immigration, and political participation.

In Europe, during the last ten years we have witnessed an important change in citizens' attitudes (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019; Inglehart & Norris, 2019). The economic crisis,

corruption scandals, and as we previously mentioned in our theoretical chapter and in chapter 5, the changing dynamics of globalisation have contributed to distance voters and political leaders. Consequently, levels of anti-elitism, diffidence in political institutions, and contempt towards politicians have been growing ever since. Looking at aggregate indicators included in Eurostat in 2017,¹ the levels of confidence for national government in Spain were 18 percent in 2017, while the average of the rest of Europe was 40 percent. In Portugal, however, it reached a remarkable 52 percent, and in countries with populist right-wing parties such as the Netherlands, Sweden, or Finland confidence in national governments were 78, 72, and 66 percent, respectively. Levels of satisfaction with government, as shown in Figure 6.1 with longitudinal data from the European Social Survey (ESS), clearly represent a pattern of low satisfaction in Greece, Italy, Spain after 2006, and Portugal. Levels of satisfaction with the working of democracy, included in Figure 6.2, are in general a bit higher than those of government and also maintain declining trends in Southern European countries.

¹ Source Eurostat: <https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm>

Figure 6.1. Satisfaction with government in European countries, 2002-2014^a




^a Mean positions in scales from 0 (extremely dissatisfied) to 10 (extremely satisfied).

Source: European Social Surveys, 1st (2002), 2nd (2004), 3rd (2006), 4th (2008), 5th (2010), 6th (2012), and 7th (2014) rounds.

With respect to satisfaction with democracy, we observe in Figure 6.2 that it follows the trend of satisfaction with Government, but with higher values. Therefore, in general, in southern European countries, citizens seem to be more satisfied with democracy that with their own Governments.

Figure 6.2. Satisfaction with democracy in European countries, 2002-2014 ^a



^a Mean positions in scales from 0 (extremely dissatisfied) to 10 (extremely satisfied).

Source: See Figure 6.1.

To what extent does this climate of low satisfaction affect institutions as the European Union? This has been the case of populist parties that have often blamed the EU for its restrictive policies against the economic crisis, or for its mismanagement of the refugee crisis, or more generally for its limitations to national sovereignty (Hobolt & Tilley, 2014; Young & Semmler, 2011). According to Eurobarometer data², the levels of confidence in the European Parliament have plummeted in Spain (and in Italy) from more than 70 percent in 2000 to around 40 percent in 2017, while in countries like Belgium and the

²

<https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/78720>
<https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/search/trust/surveyKy/2173>

Netherlands it sits around 60 percent. In Portugal, confidence was around 55 percent in 2000 and somewhat lower than 50 percent in 2017 — changes were much more limited than in other Southern cases. The picture is not dissimilar as to what concerns confidence in the EU itself. According to Eurostat, levels in Spain are at 35 percent, while in Portugal is at 51 percent and the mean of EU28 is 47 percent. The country with the lowest confidence is Greece with 27 percent, and among the highest the Netherlands have a 64 percent. Again, Southern European countries share the lowest levels of confidence than their. Therefore, it seems that in general, Southern European countries are also less trusting in the European institutions than their European counterparts, with Portugal constituting to some extent an exception.

As we have already explained throughout this thesis, vote for radical right parties is based on the economic struggle provoked by the processes of globalization making the so-called “losers of globalization” reactive to the actual economic and political situation. (Kriesi et al. 2006). Some scholars affirm that the audience of right-wing populism is often found amongst young men, not-qualified workers, or unemployed.³ Hence, it is reasonable to look at whether, in the context of the economic crisis, a deterioration of living conditions in Spain and Portugal has happened and how much compared to other countries in which populist right-wing parties appeared sooner.

In Portugal, the levels of unemployment have risen above 10 percent of total population, and in Spain and Greece these levels reached 16-17 percent. These high levels of unemployment were at their peak in the years 2013 to 2015. In 2017, unemployment in Greece and Spain is still above 10 percent, but in Portugal it is lower than 6 percent. Both countries suffered much more economic hardship than most countries with right-wing populist parties – except for Greece, but Portugal seems to have recovered faster. As for levels of GDP per capita, Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal have, according to the World Bank data, the lowest GDP per capita since 2000 as compared to its European counterparts.⁴ With respect to levels of general government debt in percentage of the GDP, Portugal, according to Eurostat data,⁵ is the third country with higher debt within the EU28, with more than 120 percent of the GDP in debt, and Spain is the fifth with slightly less than 100 percent. First and second places are taken by Greece and Italy, and

³ For a review of the literature on the socioeconomic profile of the voters of the populist right in Europe, see Antón-Mellón and Hernández-Carr (2016).


⁴ <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.mktp.cd>

⁵ https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/SDG_17_40

Belgium is in the fourth--all of them with right-wing populist parties. Both Portugal and Spain are still in economical distress, according to objective economical indicators, which means that there are many people worse off who could have potentially been attracted by this kind of parties.

However, objective and aggregate-level data are not the best indicators of the “economical pressure” that citizens might be experiencing. We need therefore to use individual-level data from the ESS in order to explore how Portuguese and Spanish citizens feel about their household income nowadays. Figure 6.3 includes those feelings in our set of European countries. Their scale of the answers ranks from (1) “very difficult on present income”; (2) “difficult on present income”; (3) “coping on present income”, and (4) “living comfortably on present income”. In Spain the average feeling with the income is around item 2, so citizens in the sample feel like it is difficult to live with their present income. Meanwhile, there is a higher dissatisfaction with the household income, in Portugal, with an average feeling between 1 and 2. These levels are only comparable to those of Greece, whose citizens went through a bigger economic crisis—debt and job wise. The levels of Spanish citizens are comparable to those of Finland, France, and Italy. In this respect, it is more likely that Spanish citizens are probably more optimistic about their economic situation than the Portuguese, feeling less “vulnerable” to populist right-wing parties’ claims.

Figure 6.3. Feelings about household income nowadays in European countries, 2002-2014 ^a



^a Average positions in scales from 1 to 4.


Source: See Figure 6.1.

We have also confirmed in previous chapters, feelings with respect to immigration are one of the biggest drivers for voters to feel attracted to populist right-wing parties (Ivarsflaten, 2008). In Spain and Portugal, the situation with respect to immigration has been divergent. Spain have had a much higher flow of immigration, specially between 2005-2007 when, according to Eurostat data,⁶ it received between 700,000 and 950,000 long-term immigrants per year, respectively. In Portugal, contrarily, the number of immigrants stayed under 50,000 per year. Figure 6.4 represents now the evolution of

⁶ <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00176/default/table?lang=en>

attitudes towards immigrants With respect to attitudes towards immigrants along a scale from zero to ten, zero being the agreement with the statement that “immigrants make country worse place to live”, and ten with the phrase that “immigrants make country worse or better place to live”. In Portugal, feelings towards immigrants averagely around position 4, while in Spain was around 5. Portugal seems to be the second with higher anti-immigrant attitudes, following Greece. In Spain, levels are slightly better than in Portugal, but do not reach the low levels of anti-immigration sentiment of Sweden, Switzerland, or Finland—with some of the biggest nativist right-wing parties in Europe.

Figure 6.4. Immigrants make worse / better place to live in European countries, 2002-2014^a



^a Mean positions in scales from 0 (worse place) to 10 (better place).

Source: See Figure 6.1.

As could have been expected, Spanish attitudes towards immigration did not intensify under the crisis. Their increase was slower, and the levels stayed lower than in countries in similar economic circumstances (Méndez, Cebolla, and Pinyol, 2013; Cebolla and González, 2016). Some scholars argued that the feeling of vulnerability behind these attitudes has been more of a “material” than of a “cultural” kind (Cebolla and González, 2016). In other words, anti-immigrant attitudes are in Spain more related with the feeling that threaten insiders’ economic position than with a rejection of the outsiders’ cultural values. Its main explanation lies in the cultural origin of the immigrants (about one third come from Latin American countries, and share the same language and religion), and their sizable role of helpers (with jobs such as care-takers of elderly people). In addition, the jobs that immigrants were developing were not naturally covered by the labour market at that moment, and the arrival of the majority of the immigrants occurred within the explosion of the economic growth in Spain.⁷

In Portugal, attitudes against immigrants are strong as compared to the rest of the countries in our Figure 6.4. However, in the 2014 ESS round, respondents seem to be more positive towards immigrants than in previous waves. In other studies, Portugal has also been shown as one with the “least immigration-friendly attitudes” (Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009: 359). This could be explained because since 1990-2000 the immigration “has undergone a profound change... there has been a diversification of sending countries, and Eastern Europe, especially the Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Russia, has become a major origin of migrants. The majority have settled in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area, but there is dispersal to all parts of the country” (Fonseca, 2008: 525). After a “strong” inflow of immigration, some of these anti-immigrant attitudes tend to peek, as it seems to be the case in Portugal.

Finally, another factor as to why a populist right-wing party has not found a niche for a long time in the Spanish and Portuguese party system could be related to the apparent scarcity of voters placing themselves in the extreme right positions along ideological scales. Extreme right voters are the ideal constituency for populist right-wing parties, although in some cases populist right-wing parties can attract previous voters of leftist parties. Also, extreme right voters do not always necessarily place themselves in the right of the ideological scale as a consequence of the “spiral of silence” (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). Taking a look at the ESS data reproduced in Table 6.1, the percentages of

⁷ https://elpais.com/diario/2002/01/10/sociedad/1010617201_850215.html

European citizens that self-placed themselves in extreme right positions (values 9 and 10 of the left-right scale) in 2016 are quite limited.

Table 6.1. Self-placement of European countries in the extreme-right positions of ideological scales, 2016 (in percentages) ^a

Countries	Extreme right citizens
Austria	5
Belgium	3
Switzerland	4
Germany	1
Spain	4
Finland	7
France	8
United Kingdom	3
Ireland	6
Italy	9
The Netherlands	4
Norway	6
Portugal	6
Sweden	5

^aSelf-placement in positions 9 and 10 in a scale from 0 to 10; percentages are rounded.

Source: ESS round 8 (2016).

As compared to other Western European countries, very few Spanish citizens positioned themselves in the right extreme of the ideological scale, a characteristic usually considered a legacy of the long authoritarian Francoist, authoritarian regime (Horta, 2013, p. 13). The case of Germany is similar. However, these two situations have not impeded in both countries the remarkable electoral upsurge of their respective extreme right parties—Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in 2017 and VOX in Spain in 2019. In other words, the small number of Spanish citizens that openly positioned themselves in the extreme right is not a sufficient explanation for the absence of a populist right-wing party for so long in the Spanish party system. In Portugal, the situation is different. Its percentage of extreme-right citizens is relevant, only after Italy, Finland, and France.

Therefore, it seems that in Portugal there are enough potential right-wing voters that could be attracted by a populist right-wing party.

In sum, both Spain and Portugal had some favorable conditions for the rise of a populist right-wing party. In Spain, low confidence, low satisfaction with the working of democracy, and still lower levels of confidence in the government, all those attitudes being accompanied with high unemployment and public debt, feelings of difficulty with the economic situation, and large and sustained flows of immigrants. In Portugal, the conditions are no less relevant: low levels of satisfaction with government and democracy, high public debt, negative feelings about coping with the personal economic situation, high anti-immigrant attitudes, and a sizable sector of voters ideologically self-placed in the extreme right positions. That having being said, there are, however, other factors which seem to run in the contrary direction of those countries with populist right-wing parties. For instance, Spanish citizens do not seem to have neither strong anti-immigrant attitudes nor substantial preferences for the extreme right ideological positions. For Portuguese citizens, they have a high confidence in their government, suffer low levels of unemployment, and received a small flow of immigrants. In short, although there seems to be a potential demand for a radical right party in both Spain and Portugal, the context lacks what the literature would define as ideal conditions. Therefore, our next step is to examine what has been happening with the supply-side of politics and how institutional and political factors have affected the fortunes of populist right-wing parties for so long in these countries.

6.2.2 Why has it taken so long for right-wing populist supply to appear?

In this section, we will assess some of the supply factors that could have delayed populist right-wing parties from appearing on the Iberian electoral markets. In both countries, possible explanations for this long absence point at the nature of right-wing parties, the social divides structuring the party competition, and the electoral system. In Spain, the capacity of the conservative Partido Popular (PP) to attract extreme right voters is also significant, given its successful control of the political space on the right during many years. In Portugal, the Portuguese case, its counterpart, the PP-PSD/CDS-PP, has been also able to attract the voters on the right.

6.2.2.1 Explanations for the Spanish case

Until the end of 2018, neither the extreme right nor populist right-wing parties have been electorally successful in Spain. Even with the extraordinary relevance of the economic and political crises, only recently Vox, a new extreme right-wing party, was able to receive seats at the Congreso de los Diputados. Several factors are worth mentioning for explaining its absence for more than four decades.

First, the Spanish electoral system does not facilitate the entry of new parties. In spite of being a proportional system with a D'Hont formula, the difficulties for newcomers, small parties appear primarily with the reduced size of most of the districts, where the system has plurality effects. This reinforces the use of strategic voting, in which extremist electors have to choose a major party in order to maximize the utility of their vote, due to the unlikelihood of any extreme party to be represented (Lago, 2005). While not denying the importance of this factor, this explanation seems unsatisfactory in the light of recent changes in the party system, as three new parties have entered into the Congreso with considerable strength in the 2015 (Podemos and Ciudadanos [Cs]) and 2019 (Vox) general elections. Also, not even under the most favorable conditions of the very proportional electoral system for the 2019 European elections had any of the far right parties been able to get representation at the European Parliament.

A second explanation is related with the electoral competition. The Spanish party system is mainly divided into two axes of competition: the ideological left-right and the territorial centre-periphery. Usually, the left-right axis is considered as a super-issue which absorbs other possible salient issues of competition and makes it difficult for any party to bring up new salient topics — for instance, to populist parties to incorporate a new dimension of competition based upon the division between the people vs the elite. In many other European countries, the populist right-wing has been able to activate this dimension of competition with electoral success (Betz, 1993); this has been the case in Italy, Belgium, and to some extent the United Kingdom. In Spain, however, it seems like for a long time the strength of both the left-right and the center-periphery divides left less space for the creation of new dividing lines (Alonso, Rovira Kaltwasser 2015; Pardos-Prado 2012). Also in Spain, parties such as Podemos and Cs have managed to find an electoral space before populist right-wing parties adopted the people vs the elite divide;

more specifically, Podemos, a left-wing populist party in its first years, did use the argument of *la casta* as central in its manifesto and party positioning. Therefore, we cannot affirm that the existence of these strong axes of competition is enough of a barrier for a populist right-wing party to take so long to appear on the Spanish scene.

Some movements or organizations did work as suppliers in the recent history of Spanish extreme right. The extreme-right movement *Hogar Social* became more visible from 2014 to 2018, but so far it has been unable to organize itself “politically”. Before the entrance of Vox, there were a few extreme right parties that competed in both the European and national elections, but their electoral support was very weak.⁸ For some scholars, one of the main explanations of their electoral failure had to do with their incapability to break with their Francoist symbols (Rodríguez Jiménez, 1997). Others point to their fragmentation (Llamazares and Ramiro, 2006)—even gathering all their votes, they would not have been able to obtain representation in any of the elections for the European Parliament.

At the local level, one exception before the Vox’s relative success was the *Plataforma Per Catalunya*, a small party that in 2010 received some support from the Austrian FPÖ and the Belgian Vlaams Belang. Founded in 2002, the party built a populist discourse with strong local roots at several villages in the Barcelona province, and was highly noticed by the media (Hernández-Carr, 2011). However, it never achieved representation in either the Catalanian or much less so the Spanish Parliaments, and entered a period of decline after 2014 (Hernández-Carr 2012). As a consequence, some relevant party elite abandoned it and transferred in 2015 their allegiances to the “mainstream” conservative PP, and in 2019 to Vox.

In the context of the ideological right, a sizable number of nationalist and regionalist parties did compete with the PP along the two divides of left-right *and* centre-periphery axes. In these cases, the electoral system did not appear to be the problem, as there were nationalist *and* conservative parties with a remarkable electoral success as the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) in the Basque Country and *Convergència i Unió* (CiU) in Catalonia. However, until 2018, the PP proved to be successful at the national level in the appropriation of every Spanish nationalist symbol after the dictatorship (Béjar, 2008) and became the most effective advocate of every conservative value—from law and order

⁸ In the European elections of 2014, for instance, none of them reached 2 percent. In the general elections of June 2016 all of them received less than 50,000 votes. Most of these parties share with populists a clearly nativist discourse.

and neoliberal economics to a outspoken defense of the traditional family and Catholic moral dimensions. Consequently, there were virtually not an issue belonging to the ideological field of conservatism that the PP did not incorporated into its manifestos for electoral competition, leaving a much reduced space for an extreme-right, populist party to claim saliency.

6.2.2.2 Explanations for the Portuguese case

The Portuguese electoral system is similar in its architecture to the Spanish one — it belongs to the proportional representation family, as the D'Hondt formula, and has a limited district magnitude. Also as in Spain during almost four decades, and according to André Freire (2005: 28), “a strong bipartisan trend within the party system is evident... This trend has impelled change towards single-party and increasingly stable governments, with power being concentrated with the prime minister... In 2005, at 73.8 percent, the concentration of votes in the two main parties was greater than in 1987, when it was 72.4 percent”. There have been periods of quasi-majority PS governments with some parliamentary support from other parties (from 1995 to 2002) and some coalitions between 2005 and 2015. Hence, even though a proportional system is present, it does not seem that for new parties the access to government is a feasible goal.

In what respects electoral competition, it was rather limited before 2011 amongst the main parties. According now to Pedro Magalhães (2014: 184), “analysts have traditionally noted the lack of ideological differentiation between the main alternatives in Portugal’s party [“the Central Bloc”], their nature as “catch-all” or even “cartel” parties, and their pragmatic appeals to a centrist “marais” electorate”. After 2011, however, as Magalhães (2004: 185-6) also notes, ‘it shows a clear increase in the ideological polarization of party discourse in the Portuguese party system in 2011, driven both by a shift of the Communist Party to the left and an even more decisive shift of both the PSD and the CDS to the right. Although the analysis of the Socialists’ manifesto also denounces a smaller shift to the economic right... Throughout the campaign, the Socialists kept denouncing the PSD as a party composed by “conservatives” and “neoliberals” set on dismantling the Portuguese welfare state’ (Magalhães 2014 pp. 185-186). But, even though electoral competition on the left-right axis became more salient, it did not translate into the widening of the available space for competition in the far right. In

addition, political competition in this ideological segment is aggravated by the historical past, to a large extent similar to the Spanish case. In the last years in Portugal, but that fact does not automatically imply that there is available space for electoral competition in the far right. As Paul Taggart (1995, p. 46) explains, “the marginalisation of the far right in Portugal resulting from Salazar's period of military dictatorship in which he suppressed any movement of the far right as he saw this as a threat: the result was that the contemporary far right has been denied a historical basis” (Taggart, 1995, p. 46).

Spain and Portugal thus share the lack of success of the extreme right in electoral terms. As Jean-Yves Camus (2013, p. 265) concludes, “in the two former dictatorships, the Extreme Right has clung to the fundamentals of the Franco and Salazar era, eventually becoming no more than “cult movements” worshipping the defunct national-corporatist State. In Spain, the strong Catholic fundamentalist flavour of Fuerza Nueva, led by Blas Pinar, and of the so-called “bunker” Phalangists was totally out of tune with the expectations of the Spanish electorate, since the more pragmatic former Franquists in the technocratic Right had the wisdom to accept democracy and launch new parties such as Manuel Fraga’s Alianza Nacional, which later became Partido Popular. The same process took place in post-Salazar Portugal, where many supporters of Estado Novo switched to Partido Popular and CDS (the Christian-Democratic Party). This explains the bad fortunes of the Extreme Right in those countries: in the 2005 general election, the Partido Nacional Renovador polled 9.374 votes and, in 2004, the five parties which took part in the Spanish general election polled 0.18 percent.

Therefore, in both countries the legacies of the past have contributed for many years to the electoral failures of right-wing parties. However, this factor does not imply the absence of right-wing demands in the electorate. In the next section we will examine several facets of this demands along a number of different dimensions.

6.3 Data and methods

To what extent the attitudinal profiles of Spanish and Portuguese already existing conservative voters are similar to those of right-wing populist voters elsewhere in Europe? Using data of the ESS’s 8th round (2016), we will move our comparisons along several dimensions: immigration, political confidence, conservation values, and

European integration.⁹ In Figures 6.5 to 6.8, we will calculate the mean value for the attitudes per country, and set it to zero. Then, we will present the relative position of the voters of the different parties as compared to the mean of their own country, in order to take into account the respective country differences.

We decided to select a set of specific issues that have traditionally been owned by right-wing populist parties. As Taggart (2017, p. 250) writes, ‘the issues are appropriated by populist actors but also... act as vehicles for mobilizing a sort of latent populist possibility. By using these issues and by building an agenda, ... these parties bring the issues into wider contention. This then forces other actors in the party systems to react to them. The importance of populism often lies in the reactions that it engenders in others.’ We consider that those specific issues are key elements for populist voters in Western Europe (Taggart, 2017; Spruyt, Keppens, and Van Droogenbroeck, 2016), and therefore can indicate whether the electorates are similar or not in terms of their right-wing populism.


The parties we selected for the comparison are the following: FPÖ in Austria, founded in 1956; Vlaams Belang in Belgium, in 2004, and its predecessor, Vlaams Blok, in 1978; AfD in Germany, in 2013; Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark, in 1995; True Finns in Finland, in 1995, and its predecessor, Rural Finnish Party, in 1959; Front National in France, in 1972; UKIP in the United Kingdom, in 1993; Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, in 2006; Progress Party in Norway, in 1973, and the Sweden Democrats in Sweden, in 1988. Our first exploration suggests that, in general PP voters for Spain and PP-PSD/CDS-PP (labelled as PDP for simplicity) voters for Portugal differ from those of the different right-wing populist parties in Europe.

In Figure 6.5, we compare in the first place, as stated before, attitudes towards immigration of voters of these right-wing parties to the average value on attitudes on immigration of the specific country itself. In order to do so, we created an index combining answers to the following items: ‘allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority’, ‘allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe’, ‘immigration bad/good for country’s economy’, ‘country’s cultural life undermined/enriched by immigrants’, and ‘immigrants make country worse/better place to live’; negative responses had a low score, and positive responses, a high score.

⁹ In this chapter, we make use of the Schwartz’s theory of human values (Schwartz, 1992), specifically of the so-called conservation values—built from the combination of security and conformity values as a proxy for attitudes close to a pro law and order profile.

Therefore, if the score is placed to the left in each figure, those voters have an average of more *anti-immigrant* attitudes, while the more to the right, the more *pro-immigrant*. It is clear that (a) PP voters hold more negative attitudes towards immigrants than the average of the Spanish electorate, but that (b) their position is still relatively close to the mean. In Portugal, voters stand slightly above the mean value, so anti-immigrant attitudes are not different for these voters compared to the rest of the electorate. For the rest of the countries and voters, those of AfD in Germany are the furthest (most anti-immigrant) from the mean of its country, followed by Norway’s Progress Party and the France’s Front National.

Figure 6.5. Attitudes towards immigration in some countries and parties in Europe, 2016




Source: ESS, 8th round (2016).

In the second place, Figure 6.6 compares attitudes on political confidence through and index with answers to the following items: ‘Trust in country’s parliament’, ‘trust in

politicians’, ‘trust in political parties’, and ‘trust in the European Parliament’. As in the previous figure, we calculated this item separately for each country by setting the country mean to zero. The position of the voters of the different right-wing populist parties are relative to the mean of their own country. Voters have the same average position in confidence than the rest of the Portuguese electorate, while the average confidence of PP voters is higher than those voters of the rest Spanish parties. This outcome may respond to the fact that Spanish citizens have long been amongst the most distrustful citizens in Europe, and the economic and political crises have increased these sentiments. In contrast, the PP is a traditional systemic party that has been in office in many occasions, among them also when the ESS survey was undertaken. On the other side, voters of other right-wing populist parties such as Vlaams Belang in Belgium, AfD in Germany, and PVV in the Netherlands have the lowest political trust compared to their national average.


Figure 6.6. Attitudes on political trust in some countries and parties in Europe, 2016



Source: ESS, 8th round (2016).

Thirdly, Figure 6.7 presents voters’ attitudes of voters on conservation values – security and conformity – by means of an index with answers to the following items: ‘Important to live in secure and safe surroundings’, ‘important to do what is told and follow rules’, ‘important that government is strong and ensures safety’, and ‘important to behave properly’. To what extent are there significant differences between populist right-wing voters and the rest of voters in different European electorates? The are once again in the same position than the national average, while the PP voters are slightly more placed to the right, meaning that they are more pro conservation values – as we see in most of the voters of the populist right-wing parties in the rest of Europe. The most interesting finding is the position of Vlaams Belang voters in Belgium, who are the only ones below average on conservation values with respect to their national electorate. Up to now, the profile of PP voters in Spain seems more similar to the populist right-wing electorate in the rest of Europe, while voters in Portugal have similar attitudes to the rest of the national electorate in Portugal—in none of these key attitudes they exhibit a different position.


Figure 6.7. Attitudes on conservation values in some countries and parties in Europe, 2016



Source: ESS, 8th round (2016).

Finally, in Figure 6.8 we can observe the attitudes of European right-wing voters towards European Integration, asking respondents whether they think (0) ‘integration has gone too far’ to (10) ‘integration should go further’. Spanish and Portuguese voters are in a similar position to the mean of their national electorates, while the rest of the parties is far more negative towards European unification than the rest of the voters in their countries; the two most exceptional cases are Norway’s Progress Party, on the one hand, and Germany’s AfD, on the other.

Figure 6.8. Attitudes toward European integration values in some countries and parties in Europe, 2016



Source: ESS, 8th round (2016).


Our comparisons draw interesting differences between the Portuguese and the Spanish cases. While voters are completely in line with the position of the average voter in their country, not really standing out in any of the key issues distinctive of voters of populist

right-wing voters, PP voters hold stronger more anti-immigrant attitudes, express more political confidence, and have more pro conservation values than the average voter. They are also more similar to the populist right-wing voter but they still stay relatively close to the national average when comparing the relative position of other European populist right-wing voters.

6.3.1 Are populist right-wing voters represented in Spain and Portugal? The ability of the mainstream right to attract populist voters

We have already mentioned that one of the possible explanations as to why right-wing populist parties have taken so long to be successful in Spain (or have not been successful at all yet in Portugal) points at the ability of the mainstream, major conservative parties to attract citizens that would, should the supply were available, vote for a populist right-wing party.¹⁰ As we can observe in Figures 6.9 and 6.10, which represent the ideological self-placement amongst voters of the fourth biggest parties in Portugal and Spain, both the PP and the gather most of their voters from the right side of the political continuum. In Portugal, every major party has voters with a left-right self-placement until 6, and from then on is the which dominates the right.

¹⁰ In fact, in 2009 the Popular Party in Spain seemed to be aware of the threat that pended over their electoral space (Capilla and Sainz, 2009). What the authors of this report recommended was that the party competed directly with the far right – just like Nicholas Sarkozy had done with Marine Le Pen - and fragmented their message in order to reach the heterogeneous groups that could be capitalized by a populist party coming from the right.

Figure 6.9. Voters' self-placements in ideological scales and parties in Portugal, 2016 ^a

^a The ideological scales have eleven positions, from 0 (left) to 10 (right).

Source: ESS, 8th round (2016).


In Spain, the pattern is similar. Some PSOE and Unidos Podemos voters place themselves up to position 5-6, and only PP voters and some Cs voters remain in the right part of the ideological continuum, where the PP still has some voters in the extreme right. However, most Cs voters locate themselves in the position number 5, and the remaining are self-placed in non-extremist positions.¹¹ This could be either due to the true centrism of its voters or because the party has not been explicitly clear on its ideological position. In the case of Cs, the party tried to keep a lack of identification in the left-right axis (Rodríguez Teruel and Barrio, 2016) when the party changed the “electoral” focus from Catalonia to the national level, defining itself instead as “liberal progressive”.¹² However, it is quite

¹¹ However, there seem to be indications that the average self-placement is moving slightly to the right, according to the latest studies of the CIS (Spanish Government – Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas). http://www.cis.es/cis/opencms/ES/NoticiasNovedades/InfoCIS/2019/Documentacion_3248.html http://datos.cis.es/pdf/Es3248rei_A.pdf (page 72).

¹² <https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/nuestros-valores>

evident that Cs is lately occupying the more “progressive/centre” space of the voters on the right of the continuum, causing big electoral damage to the PP in that process.¹³

Figure 6.10. Voters’ self-placements in ideological scales and parties in Spain, 2016^a



^a The ideological scales have eleven positions, from 0 (left) to 10 (right).

Source: ESS, 8th round (2016).

How did it achieve it? In the case of the PP, the party followed a process of moderation that led it to its 1996 first electoral victory. Some could claim that precisely for that reason the extreme right could have been left unprotected. However, in general, the evidence on the effects of convergence between the mainstream parties is mixed (Golder, 2016).¹⁴ Also, the moderation strategy helped the party create an image of responsibility while implementing policies close to the scope of a populist right-wing party (i.e. terrorist,

¹³ https://elpais.com/politica/2019/04/28/actualidad/1556462369_564500.html,
<https://www.elmundo.es/espana/2015/09/29/5609dbaa268e3e4e6c8b45b1.html>,
<https://www.publico.es/politica/cs-pp-terreno-ciudadanos-ido-ganando-pp.html>

¹⁴ Others, however, have found that ‘the more to the right the mainstream right party, the greater the likelihood of an extreme right vote being cast, suggesting that a right-wing mainstream party may have a legitimizing effect on the policies of the extreme right’ (Arzheimer, Carter 2006).

education, religion, immigration, and territorial policies). Furthermore, in their manifestos for the 2011 and 2015 general elections, the emphasis was on policies related to the protection of the so-called “traditional families” and citizens’ security. Between 2000 and 2004, the PP moved to the right again, riding on its absolute majority and the extremely conservative policies adopted in strategic issues. This made things more difficult for a populist right-wing party to appear (Llamazares and Ramiro, 2006). In that sense, the conservative ideological positions were mostly covered by the PP, which also brought about a clear populist rhetoric. Indeed, many scholars (for instance, Balfour, 2006) have referred to the strategy of PP after the 2004 general elections with the term *populist*. This responds to the style of their strategies, centered on three topics: terrorism, nationalism, and traditional moral issues (Balfour, 2006).

In addition to these two key issues, the PP has also tried to make salient the immigration topic. In 2008, the integration of immigrants entered in the electoral campaign for the first time. However, the attempt by PP to capitalize on the immigrant issue backfired when the party started receiving accusations of xenophobic. The PP lost the elections, and the issue disappeared from the campaign for the 2011 general elections (Morales, Pardo-Prado, et al., 2015). Some excerpts on immigration taken from the 2011 manifesto provide an adequate illustration of the PP rhetoric. It states, for instance, that ‘the main way of integration for immigrants is through employment’; ‘through their own effort, immigrants can feel part of our society’ given that the ideal migrant pattern consist in ‘immigrants coming when there are jobs available, and return to their countries of origin when there are no jobs’. The PP also stressed that immigration should be “legal and organized”, and aim to finish the “massive legalization of migrants”. For the conservative party, migrants are merely instrumental for the economy, and there are no reasons to advance propositions for them to be integrated into Spanish society, or even belong to it further than the labor market. In its 2015 manifesto, the PP made references to common European policies of migration and asylum, and acknowledged migrants in their instrumental value: they propose to create more convenient policies for Latin-American workers because of their added value to the contribution of Spanish economy, to Latino students and scholars, and to foreigners who join the Army. However, again there is no further recognition whatsoever to migrants in the manifesto related to social exclusion, migrant difficulties, or how to handle social conflict.

Between 2009 and 2011, simultaneously with the economic crisis, the perceived PP competence in handling the immigration issue clearly went up amongst voters of all ideologies, and especially within those in the far right (Morales, Pardos-Prado, et al., 2015). According to these authors, what explains best the role of immigration issues is valence: parties only talk about it when voters are more concerned about it. In 2009, a report by Capilla and Sainz (2009) presented at a PP think tank recommended the party to compete directly with the far right and to fragment fragmented their message in order to reach the different and heterogeneous groups that could be capitalized by a populist party coming from the right.

As Mudde (2010: 8) has emphasized, ‘the answer is to be found in the supply side of issue politics, most notably in the struggles over the saliency of issues (particularly for the phase of electoral breakthrough) and over issue position ownership (especially for the phase of electoral persistence).’ However, it is usually an interaction of demand and supply factors that counts (Golder, 2016). That is why, in the following section, we test how demand and supply are related.

6.4 Analyses

6.4.1 Was the mainstream right successfully attracting right-wing voters?

We have seen so far that the attitudinal profile for a potential right-wing populist party demand existed in Spain and Portugal, and the possible obstacles for new parties to emerge in both party systems. Structural and institutional factors do not seem enough of an impediment to contain this appearance, as explained in the previous section. That is why we will examine in the following pages whether the existent conservative parties had been representing with some effectiveness the populist right-wing demands. For this purpose, we will compare the attitudes and voting behaviour of the right-wing populist citizens in both countries, using data from ESS for the period 2002-2016—which corresponds to the second through the eight rounds.¹⁵


¹⁵ Key variables such as confidence in political parties were not present in the first wave, undertaken in 2002, so it had to be excluded from our analyses.

Our strategy consists of three different steps, substantiated in three logistic regression models. The first will inform about whether Spanish and Portuguese citizens are participating in elections; this is Model 1, where the dependent variable is whether they have turned out in the previous general elections (1), or they have abstained (0). To the extent that they are not, it would be a clear indication of a niche for new parties to emerge. Secondly, we will investigate the extent to which citizens are more inclined to vote for the PP in Spain and for the PPD in Portugal than to other parties; it is Model 2, where we have only considered those who voted in the previous elections, the dependent variable being whether they did it for PP or the PDP (1), or for another party (0). Finally, as both parties gather a significant part of the electorate, we want to know whether voters who turned out and feel close to these parties share any of the attitudes that other populist right-wing voters hold in some European countries; this is Model 3, where we considered as dependent variable those who voted for PP or PDP and feel close to these parties (1) against those who do not (0).

As for the independent variables, we aim to test whether voters of the mainstream right in Spain and Portugal have similar characteristics of right-wing populist voters. Therefore, we include in our analyses key attitudes such as those towards migrants (included into the index discussed previously), as well a second one for measuring political confidence (as a proxy for anti-elitism), and a third one on preferences for conservation values (pro law and order). Unfortunately, attitudes on European integration were not available in all rounds, so they had to be excluded from our analyses. The indicators and the tests of the reliability and robustness of the indexes used are available in the Appendix to this chapter.

For examining the previous empirical findings based upon the relationship between economic struggle and a right-wing populist vote (Swank & Betz, 2003), we have also incorporated an independent variable on how comfortably one lives on their household's income. In addition, many scholars have underlined that populist right-wing voters in several countries share some common sociodemographic characteristics (Hawkins, Riding & Mudde, 2012; Spruyt, Keppens & Van Droogenbroeck, 2016; against, Rooduijn, 2018). We have thus considered as control variables sex, age, years of schooling, current main activity (considering also the possibility of unemployment), and their ideological self-placement. In the second model we have also considered the independent variable of feeling close to PP or PDP versus not feeling close.

Figure 6.11. How are voters with right-wing populist attitudes represented in Spain, 2004-2016? (logistic regressions)



Source: European Social Surveys, 2nd (2004), 3rd (2006), 4th (2008), 5th (2010), 6th (2012), 7th (2014), and 8th (2016) rounds.

Our first model in Figure 6.11 addresses whether those who did not vote, as compared to those who did, have attitudes that could a priori be exploited or attracted by a populist right-wing political party or a political entrepreneur. Theoretically, these citizens are in large extent “available” to be mobilized by such a party or entrepreneur. In Spain, with an abstention level slightly above 30 percent, the answer is negative. Habitual voters are older and more educated, express higher confidence in political institutions, declare less problems for living with their income, and self-place in the ideological continuum more on the left or right than on the centre. But, beyond their lack of political trust or their feelings that they are under economic struggle, it seems that non-voters are not characterized by the attitudes usually found in populist right-wing voters (as for instance anti-immigration or pro law and order), making therefore it difficult for a new party to

articulating an effectively attractive discourse in the line of others Western European right-wing populist parties.


Our second model considers only citizens who turned out in general elections and compare those who voted for the PP with those who did for all every other Spanish party. We want to test whether PP voters are significantly similar in their attitudes to those hold by right-wing populist voters in other countries. In Model 2, voters who declare negative attitudes towards immigrants are more likely to cast a vote for the PP. Their voters also seem to have higher conservation values—meaning that they have stricter views on issues of law and order, but not significantly more than the rest of the voters. Citizens more educated, with ages between 31 and 60, and doing housework are more likely to vote for the PP; and citizens permanently sick or disabled are less likely to do it. As expected, citizens in the right and extreme right of the ideological scale and declaring their identification with the PP also are more likely to vote for it. In summary, PP voters are older, have more years of schooling, and are definitely placed in the right-wing. On the attitudinal profile, the only significant difference lies in their anti-immigrant attitudes, shared with many other right-wing populists in Europe.

Finally, our Model of Figure 6.11 explores how are the PP voters who in addition declare to be close to the party as compared to the rest of the electors. This model is especially interesting. Besides attracting many moderate voters from the center and center-right, it is conceivable that an important part of the *core* of the PP voters—those who additionally declare their identification with the party--could fit more in the profile of a radical-right populism. If this the case, it would mean that the PP is successfully attracting voters who could be alternatively seduced by a potential competitor with a right-wing populist discourse. The answer here seems to be positive. In the third model, the attitudinal profile of conservative voters who also feel close to the PP is different from the rest of the party voters. While both groups share the anti-immigrant attitudes, those who constitute the core of the PP have more political confidence and declare high conservation values (i.e., they are more pro law and order). These core voters are older, and the more to the ideological right they are, the more likely they feel close and vote for the PP. In other words, the PP seems to be successfully attracting both party identifiers and party voters with attitudinal traits similar to other right-wing populist voters in Europe. The latter are the citizens who could potentially become voters of a populist right-wing party, hence, as they already show a strong attachment to the PP, a new party that

would look to attract them – and break this existing attachment to the PP – should incorporate and make very salient in their program key issues for extreme right voters.

How Portuguese parties compare along these variables? Figure 6.12 displays our three models for Portugal. In Model 1, we compare again voters and non-voters in their attitudes and characteristics. The former express higher political confidence and declare higher conservation values than the latter. However, there seems to be no differences between the two groups in terms of their attitudes towards immigrants—which points at a major difference with respect to Spain. As for the feelings towards their income, the same pattern applies in both countries. Also in the two countries, more education and self-placement more to the left and more to the right translate into more propensity to vote, whereas those unemployed, looking for a job, and permanently sick or disabled are less likely to vote.

Figure 6.12. How are voters with right wing populist attitudes represented in Portugal, 2004-2016? (logistic regressions)



Source: See Figure 6.11.

Model 2 compares citizens voting for PPD and the rest of voters. Its most important variable is the closeness to the voted party, as happened with the PP in Spain. There are some specific between the two major conservative parties, though. In the case of the Portuguese voters, the main attitudes of the right-wing populism (immigration, trust and conservation values) do not predict the probability to vote for them, while in the case of Spain the attitudes towards immigrants help to predict the vote for the PP. Also here, more years of schooling are related with a higher probability of voting for the PPD, and voters between 41 and 50 years old and more than 60 years old are more likely to vote for it compared to those under 30 years old. As in the case of Spain, voters in the moderate and extreme right are more likely to vote for the PPD than the rest of the voters. Hence, it seems like the PPD is attracting voters on the right and far right, old and more educated, but these voters do not stand out for having the attitudes that we would see in “typical” right-wing populist voters.

Finally, in Model 3 we compare citizens who declare to be identified with the PPD and who also vote for it with the rest of the electorate. In terms of attitudes – our variables of interest–, these voters only rank higher in their conservation values, but they are not different in their attitudes towards immigrants, their levels of political confidence, their feelings about their income, or their relationships with ideological scales. The Portuguese and the Spanish cases are thus different – for PPD voters, their vote and closeness to the party is driven by their law and order attitudes (conservation), which does not match the profile of the right-wing populist voter. Hence, it seems like these citizens would not easily cast a vote for a right-wing populist party – or at least not according to their attitudes.

To summarize, it seems like in the case of Spain it is clear that until 2018 the PP was appealing to a possible right-wing populist voter, especially based upon the attitudes hold by those voters who also are closely identified with the party. In the case of PPD, it seems like it did attract voters mainly characterized by their enforcement of law and order and their belonging to the right and far right positions in the ideological continuum. In terms of their potentiality for shifting their allegiances to a right-wing populist party, it is clear that Spanish PP voters have much more probabilities than the Portuguese PPD.

6.5 Concluding remarks

In this chapter, we provided evidence that PP and PPD voters are intrinsically different. Based upon our analyses, only the former resembles to other populist right-wing voters in the remaining Western Europe: PP voters are more anti-immigrant than the average Spanish voter, have more conservation values, and also declare more political confidence. However, both PP and PPD attract a large number of voters, so it is important to consider their internal heterogeneity. Consequently, we analyzed the voters' attitudes that also feel identified with these parties, and the impact of right-wing populist attitudes in their vote choice.

Our findings point in opposite directions. In the case of Spain, PP voters who felt identified with the party were the ones who more closely resemble the voters of right-wing populist parties in Europe. In the case of Portugal, further research is needed to determine whether these voters are, in fact, potential voters of a right-wing populist option. In Spain, the PP seemed to be attracting voters who had a similar attitudinal profile to right-wing populist voters in other Western European countries. We found that citizens who feel close and voted for the PP are more anti-immigrant, have higher political confidence, and high conservation values than the rest of the citizens. With the exception of their political confidence, which can be explained because of the long tradition of the PP as an incumbent party, their attitudes seem to be in line with what can be expected from right-wing populist voters. Instead, in Portugal it is not so clear that the PPD were attracting citizens that would feel potentially appealed by a typical right-wing populist entrepreneur. Voters who also feel close to the PPD are older, more educated, employed, and place themselves in the right and far right. Besides, they show more conservation values than the rest of the citizens. Therefore, there seems like a new right-wing populist party would appeal to voters only if it would focus strongly on law and order issues.

Some could object that these citizens more or less close to populist right-wing issues were voting for the PP and the PPD because there was no alternative. However, this was not the case for three reasons. First, because these voters could simply abstain not satisfied PP or could abstain; but we have found that those voters were the most likely to vote compared with the remaining voters, both in Spain and Portugal. Second, and

most importantly, those voters have shown a higher probability to both to identify with the PP and the PPD and to vote for them.

The key to the long absence of a right-wing populist party in Spain and Portugal seems to be related, at least in the Spanish case, to the ability of these mainstream conservative parties to attract voters that had similar attitudes to right-wing populist voters and place themselves in the right and far right. If this is so, why did such a party appear on the Spanish political scenario?

We do believe that, in addition to the electoral space that the PP left available for the far right in topics such as the high anti-immigrant attitudes, or those voters with low trust in institutions and politicians, there are several key issues in which the PP has underperformed in the eyes of far right voters. Such issues include the management of the Catalan crisis and its sedition judicial case, the corruption allegations against the PP, the vote of no confidence lost by the PP— following which the Socialist party took over the government—, and the internal disagreement with the leadership of Mariano Rajoy in the PP. These topics have resulted in an enormous electoral cost to the PP (that obtained 16.70 percent of the vote to the Chamber in the last 2019 general elections, losing more than 3.5 million votes compared to the previous election), and have provided many votes to Vox, a party by now that has taken its place in the far right. Unfortunately, the data to test these and any other hypotheses is not available by now, so this leaves us without the possibility of offering more specific hypotheses to how this party has successfully mobilized those voters. This will indeed be an interesting path for future research.

6.6 References

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Concluding remarks

The aim of this dissertation was to understand how populist attitudes take place at the mass level, and more specifically, how populist attitudes relate to other political attitudes. During this dissertation, we have presented several studies on populist attitudes, providing, in the first place, an overview of the concept of populism, and second a thorough review of the studies analysing populist attitudes in which we explained the major shortcomings that appear while measuring these specific attitudes. Once our theoretical and empirical framework was well established, four empirical chapters were presented. According to our findings, when measuring populist attitudes, it is decisive to consider not only the relationships between populism and other political attitudes, but the relationships within the dimensions of populism as well.

In chapter 3 we examined the two main dimensions of populism: people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes. As we could understand from chapter 2, not every empirical study on populism measures all dimensions of populism, and we wondered whether those dimensions were separate entities, and whether they could be predicted by the same variables – meaning that understanding the predictors of one of the dimensions would lead to understand the predictors on the other. Our goal with this chapter was to make clear that, if people centrism and anti-establishment were in fact different dimensions with different predictors, studies on populism must take both dimensions (and its predictors) into account when studying populist attitudes.

We corroborated that people centrism and anti establishment attitudes are correlated but can be measured separately, and that the same variables do not predict both dimensions in the same manner. In the case of Belgium, our independent variables – taken from the losers of globalisation theory – have a higher predictive power when they are related to anti-establishment attitudes. With respect to electoral behaviour, both dimensions also had different effects on vote. Therefore, we can emphasize how taking into account both people centrism and anti-establishment attitudes is essential in order to capture both effects on and effects of populist attitudes. Again, these findings emphasise how complex populist attitudes are, and make us underline the importance of considering the interaction of populism with different phenomena.

Chapter 4 focused on the relationship between populist attitudes, stealth democracy, and voting behaviour. We emphasised the similarities between these two concepts, and tried to explain empirically how they interact with each other – as well as with voting behaviour. We have seen that even though populism and stealth democracy identify the same problems with contemporary representation, process preferences are

crucial when deciding which party to vote for. In the Finnish case we found confirmation of our hypotheses, and we observed that stealth attitudes have an impact on populist attitudes. They are not only substantially correlated, stealth attitudes negatively affect the probability of voting for a populist party, at the same level of critical attitudes – to the extent that they cancel the effect of critical attitudes on the vote of populism when stealth attitudes are very high.

Once again, these conclusions lead to understand that citizens holding populist attitudes are more complex than often portrayed, and they are able to distinguish between the problems that they identify in society with the solutions they prefer for those problems. We also showed how other political attitude such as stealth democracy affects populist attitudes and consequently voting behaviour. Therefore, these interactions should be taken into account when studying populist attitudes. Furthermore, this chapter explored how populist entrepreneurs are not the only ones capitalising feelings of discontent with contemporary representation, and others can also exploit this discourse satisfactorily.

In chapter 5, we tested how the concurrence of two populist parties that are highly successful electorally in the same party system is possible, in the example of the Italian case. We explored the parties Movimento Cinque Stelle and Lega: their history, their evolution, how they affected their party system, and the strategies of their leaders and their rhetoric. We also investigated how the political landscape evolved in such a way that allowed those two parties to excel in the electoral arena at the same time, and we looked at similarities and differences across issues and ideology.

The answer that the demand side provided us was that populist attitudes were not the main predictor for the vote of neither of them, and while the Movimento Cinque Stelle voters have a profile of dissatisfaction with democracy and the economy, the success of the Lega was linked to its nativism and dissatisfaction with politicians. Hence, the only competition that they share is their disenchantment with politicians, which is a topic wide enough to allow both parties to exploit this salient topic while being distinctive enough to be successful in the same electoral arena at the same time.


In chapter 6, we explore why populist attitudes took so long or are not present in two cases of study in which a specific type of political entrepreneur did not appear until very recently – a populist right-wing party. We explored the possibility that, despite of the political and economic environment being ideal for the appearance of these parties, the mainstream right might be attracting right-wing populist voters in the first place,

preventing right-wing parties to be successful electorally. In this case, we wanted to approach populist attitudes by comparing them with the rest of cases in Europe in which right-wing parties find a demand. We wanted to explore how right wing populist attitudes are, in an environment where populist right-wing vote is not possible, because it does not find a supply.

We come to the conclusion that voters from the mainstream right in these two countries are substantially different from right-wing voters in other European countries. However, in Spain, the mainstream right attracts successfully voters with a right-wing attitudinal profile and on top of that, they feel close to their party. Consequently, we can say that the Spanish mainstream right was occupying for a very long time all the electoral space in the right in an optimal way, because right-wing voters were not looking for other voting alternatives. In Portugal, the situation is different because the mainstream right does not attract these right-wing voters, and they would have to change their strategy emphasizing values such as law and order to do so. Hence, the demand seems to be there but the existing supply is not a match in this case.

In Figure 7.1 we offer a conceptual map summarizing the findings and connections of our thesis.

Figure 7.1. Conceptual map of the conclusions of the thesis.



As we can see in the Figure, this thesis is just a small step on the body of the literature in populist attitudes, which connects two of the main overlapping political attitudes that we explored in Chapter 1 (populism and stealth democracy), showing the effect on one over the other, and in a third step their impact on the vote. We also included the most important dimensions of populism, and how exogenous factors affect the attitudes of certain citizens, that develop attitudinal traits of populism which at the same time also has an impact on the vote. The importance in this case of the supply side, requires of a space for a populist supply to appear in order to materialize that impact on the vote, as we have seen in Chapter 6.

From this study, we see that there is more room for exploration of populist attitudes and the relationships they have with other attitudes. However, this dissertation already started showing how, when taking populist attitudes into account, we bring much more to our research and it must be accounted for. Therefore, we believe that research on populist attitudes would not be complete if these intricate interactions are not taken into account. This illustrates a part of what populist attitudes are, and it should not be neglected.

We recommend for future research that, when studying populist attitudes, studies must account for all the dimensions of populism. Researchers should, in the first place, explore the relationships within these attitudes and whether their empirical models are capturing what they intent to capture. Second, they should create specific models for each one of their dimensions to make sure they measure they have an independent impact on their dependent variable. In a more general way, when studying populist attitudes and their effect on vote choice, stealth attitudes should be included as a part of a predictive model, because of their impact on populist attitudes and by extension on the vote choice. Last, when populist attitudes do not have a matching populist supply, populist voters behave differently depending on the context. These are some examples, but they allow us to create specific recommendations for future research, and create awareness that if researchers do not consider all these interactions, their research might be missing out some key aspects.

There is undoubtedly more room for future work after this dissertation. We still need to know how the rest of the political attitudes mentioned in our conceptual framework relate to populism: political disaffection, authoritarianism, and external political efficacy. Only after exploring all of them, we can start to understand how populism fits not only theoretically, but empirically, in a more general framework. And

there is, of course, the comparative perspective. Due to the disagreements on which empirical scales to measure populism should be used, and the lack of comparative surveys implementing these indicators, there is still a wide unexplored field in comparative research for populist attitudes. When these kind of studies start being developed, we will be able to find whether more general principles to explain populist attitudes can be found. Only future research will tell us whether populist attitudes can be explained despite their contextual characteristics. For now, we revealed how populist attitudes are much more than the sum of their dimensions, and how these attitudes cannot be explained without a combination of political attitudes and elements. As most concepts of social research, they cannot stand alone by themselves, and researchers should keep that idea in mind.

Observaciones finales

El objetivo de esta disertación era comprender cómo las actitudes populistas tienen lugar a nivel de masas, y más específicamente, cómo las actitudes populistas se relacionan con otras actitudes políticas. Durante esta disertación, hemos presentado varios estudios sobre actitudes populistas, proporcionando, en primer lugar, una visión general del concepto de populismo, y en segundo lugar una revisión exhaustiva de los estudios que analizan las actitudes populistas en los que explicamos las principales deficiencias que aparecen al medir estas actitudes. Una vez que nuestro marco teórico y empírico estuvo establecido, se presentaron cuatro capítulos empíricos. Según nuestros hallazgos, al medir las actitudes populistas, es decisivo considerar no solo las relaciones entre el populismo y otras actitudes políticas, sino también las relaciones dentro de las dimensiones del populismo.

En el capítulo 3 examinamos las dos dimensiones principales del populismo: el *people-centrism* y las actitudes anti-establishment. Como pudimos entender en el capítulo 2, no todos los estudios empíricos sobre populismo miden todas las dimensiones del populismo, y nos preguntamos si estas dimensiones eran entidades separadas y si podían predecirse por las mismas variables, lo que significa que comprender los predictores de uno de las dimensiones conducirían a comprender los predictores en el otro. Nuestro objetivo con este capítulo fue dejar en claro que, si el *people-centrism* y el anti-establishment de personas eran de hecho diferentes dimensiones con diferentes predictores, los estudios sobre populismo deben tener en cuenta ambas dimensiones (y sus predictores) al estudiar las actitudes populistas.

Corroboramos que las actitudes *people-centric* y anti-establishment de las personas están correlacionadas pero pueden medirse por separado, y que las mismas variables no predicen ambas dimensiones de la misma manera. En el caso de Bélgica, nuestras variables independientes, tomadas de la teoría de los perdedores de la globalización, tienen un mayor poder predictivo cuando están relacionadas con actitudes anti-establishment. Con respecto al comportamiento electoral, ambas dimensiones también tienen diferentes efectos en el voto. Por lo tanto, podemos enfatizar cómo es esencial tener en cuenta las actitudes *people-centric* y antiestablishment de las personas para captar tanto los efectos como los efectos de las actitudes populistas. Una vez más, estos hallazgos enfatizan cuán complejas son las actitudes populistas y nos hacen subrayar la importancia de considerar la interacción del populismo con diferentes fenómenos.

El Capítulo 4 se centró en la relación entre las actitudes populistas, la democracia *stealth* y el comportamiento de electoral. Destacamos las similitudes entre estos dos

conceptos e intentamos explicar empíricamente cómo interactúan entre sí, así como con el comportamiento electoral. Hemos visto que a pesar de que el populismo y la democracia stealth identifican los mismos problemas con la representación contemporánea, las preferencias de proceso son cruciales al decidir a qué partido votar. En el caso finlandés encontramos confirmación de nuestras hipótesis y observamos que las actitudes stealth tienen un impacto en las actitudes populistas. No solo están sustancialmente correlacionados, las actitudes stealth afectan negativamente la probabilidad de votar por un partido populista, al mismo nivel de actitudes críticas, en la medida en que cancelan el efecto de las actitudes críticas en el voto del populismo cuando las actitudes stealth son muy altas.

Una vez más, estas conclusiones conducen a comprender que los ciudadanos que tienen actitudes populistas son más complejos de lo que a menudo se describe, y son capaces de distinguir entre los problemas que identifican en la sociedad con las soluciones que prefieren para esos problemas. También mostramos cómo otras actitudes políticas, como la democracia stealth, afectan las actitudes populistas y, en consecuencia, el comportamiento electoral. Por lo tanto, estas interacciones deben tenerse en cuenta al estudiar las actitudes populistas. Además, este capítulo exploró cómo los empresarios populistas no son los únicos que capitalizan los sentimientos de descontento con la representación contemporánea, y otros también pueden explotar este discurso satisfactoriamente.

En el capítulo 5, probamos cómo es posible la concurrencia de dos partidos populistas que tienen un gran éxito electoral en el mismo sistema de partidos, en el ejemplo del caso italiano. Exploramos los partidos Movimento Cinque Stelle y Lega: su historia, su evolución, cómo afectaron su sistema de partidos y las estrategias de sus líderes y su retórica. También investigamos cómo evolucionó el panorama político de tal manera que permitiera a esos dos partidos sobresalir en la arena electoral al mismo tiempo, y observamos similitudes y diferencias entre temas e ideología.

La respuesta que nos brindó el lado de la demanda fue que las actitudes populistas no fueron el principal predictor del voto de ninguno de ellos, y aunque los votantes de Movimento Cinque Stelle tienen un perfil de insatisfacción con la democracia y la economía, el éxito de la Lega estuvo vinculado a su nativismo e insatisfacción con los políticos. Por lo tanto, la única competencia que comparten es su desencanto con los políticos, que es un tema lo suficientemente amplio como para permitir que ambos


partidos exploten este tema destacado mientras son lo suficientemente distintivos como para tener éxito en la misma arena electoral al mismo tiempo.

En el capítulo 6, exploramos por qué las actitudes populistas tardaron tanto o no están presentes en dos casos de estudio en los que un tipo específico de partido político no apareció hasta hace muy poco: un partido populista de derecha. Exploramos la posibilidad de que, a pesar de que el entorno político y económico es ideal para la aparición de estos partidos, la derecha tradicional podría estar atrayendo a los votantes populistas de derecha en primer lugar, evitando que los partidos de derecha tengan éxito electoralmente. En este caso, queríamos acercarnos a las actitudes populistas comparándolas con el resto de casos en Europa en los que los partidos de derecha encuentran una demanda. Queríamos explorar cómo son las actitudes populistas de derecha, en un entorno donde el voto populista de derecha no es posible, porque no encuentra una oferta.

Llegamos a la conclusión de que los votantes de la derecha tradicional en estos dos países son sustancialmente diferentes de los votantes de derecha en otros países Europeos. Sin embargo, en España, la derecha tradicional atrae con éxito a los votantes con un perfil de actitud de derecha y, además, se sienten cercanos a su partido. En consecuencia, podemos decir que la derecha tradicional española estuvo ocupando durante mucho tiempo todo el espacio electoral en la derecha de una manera óptima, porque los votantes de derecha no estaban buscando otras alternativas de voto. En Portugal, la situación es diferente porque la derecha tradicional no atrae a estos votantes de derecha, y tendrían que cambiar su estrategia haciendo hincapié en valores como la ley y el orden para hacerlo. Por lo tanto, la demanda parece estar allí, pero la oferta existente no coincide en este caso.

En la Figura 7.1 ofrecemos un mapa conceptual que resume los hallazgos y las conexiones de nuestra tesis.

Figura 7.1. Mapa conceptual de las conclusiones de la tesis.



Como podemos ver en la Figura, esta tesis es solo un pequeño paso en el campo de la literatura sobre actitudes populistas, que conecta dos de las principales actitudes políticas superpuestas que exploramos en el Capítulo 1 (populismo y democracia stealth), mostrando el efecto uno sobre el otro, y en un tercer paso su impacto en el voto. También incluimos las dimensiones más importantes del populismo, y cómo los factores exógenos afectan las actitudes de ciertos ciudadanos, que desarrollan rasgos de actitud del populismo que al mismo tiempo también tiene un impacto en el voto. La importancia en este caso del lado de la oferta requiere un espacio para que aparezca una oferta populista para materializar ese impacto en la votación, como hemos visto en el Capítulo 6.

De este estudio, vemos que hay más espacio para explorar las actitudes populistas y las relaciones que tienen con otras actitudes. Sin embargo, esta disertación ya comenzó a mostrar cómo, al tomar en cuenta las actitudes populistas, aportamos mucho más a nuestra investigación y debe tenerse en cuenta. Por lo tanto, creemos que la investigación sobre las actitudes populistas no estaría completa si estas intrincadas interacciones no se tienen en cuenta. Esto ilustra una parte de lo que son las actitudes populistas, y no debe descuidarse.

Recomendamos para futuras investigaciones que, al estudiar las actitudes populistas, los estudios deben tener en cuenta todas las dimensiones del populismo. Los investigadores deberían, en primer lugar, explorar las relaciones dentro de estas actitudes y si sus modelos empíricos están capturando lo que intentan capturar. En segundo lugar, deben crear modelos específicos para cada una de sus dimensiones para asegurarse de

que miden que tienen un impacto independiente en su variable dependiente. De manera más general, cuando se estudian las actitudes populistas y su efecto en la elección del voto, las actitudes stealth deben incluirse como parte de un modelo predictivo, debido a su impacto en las actitudes populistas y, por extensión, en la elección del voto. Por último, cuando las actitudes populistas no tienen una oferta populista coincidente, los votantes populistas se comportan de manera diferente según el contexto. Estos son algunos ejemplos, pero nos permiten crear recomendaciones específicas para futuras investigaciones y crear conciencia de que si los investigadores no consideran todas estas interacciones, su investigación podría estar perdiendo algunos aspectos clave.

Indudablemente, hay más espacio para el trabajo futuro después de esta disertación. Todavía necesitamos saber cómo el resto de las actitudes políticas mencionadas en nuestro marco conceptual se relacionan con el populismo: desafección política, autoritarismo y eficacia política externa. Solo después de explorarlos todos, podemos comenzar a comprender cómo el populismo encaja no solo teóricamente, sino empíricamente, en un marco más general. Y existe, por supuesto, la perspectiva comparativa. Debido a los desacuerdos sobre los cuales se deben usar las escalas empíricas para medir el populismo, y la falta de encuestas comparativas que implementen estos indicadores, todavía hay un amplio campo inexplorado en la investigación comparativa para las actitudes populistas. Cuando este tipo de estudios comiencen a desarrollarse, podremos ver si se pueden encontrar principios más generales para explicar las actitudes populistas. Solo investigaciones futuras nos dirán si las actitudes populistas pueden explicarse a pesar de sus características contextuales. Por ahora, revelamos cómo las actitudes populistas son mucho más que la suma de sus dimensiones, y cómo estas actitudes no pueden explicarse sin una combinación de actitudes y elementos políticos. Como la mayoría de los conceptos de investigación social, no pueden estar solos por sí mismos, y los investigadores deben tener esa idea en mente.

Appendices

Appendix to Chapter 2

(Axelrod, 1967) A scale to measure populist attitudes:

- (1) If cities and towns around the country need help to build more schools, the government in Washington ought to give them the money they need.
- (2) The government ought to help people get doctors and hospital care at low cost.
- (3) The government in Washington ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job.
- (4) The government ought to cut taxes even if it means putting off important things that need to be done.
- (5) The government ought to fire any government worker who is accused of being a Communist even though they don't prove it.
- (6) This country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world.

(Farrell & Laughlin, 1976) A scale to measure populist attitudes:

- (1) The Government in Washington ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job.
- (2) The average man makes enough money to live well these days.
- (3) What this country needs is a national health insurance program.
- (4) These days, if a person works hard, he can improve his situation without too much trouble.
- (5) Since they worked for their money, the rich generally deserve to be rich.
- (6) Taxes on corporations are too high
- (7) Wealth and power are unfairly distributed in America today.
- (8) It is the people, more than big business interests, who really determine the policies of the federal government.
- (9) The government ought to help people get doctors and hospital care at low cost.
- (10) In court, a poor man has a good chance as a rich man of winning his case.
- (11) The government should leave things like electric power and housing for private businessmen to handle.
- (12) A small group of bankers and financiers control the economic policy of the country.

- (13) The government should give the common people more access to federally backed mortgages.
- (14) The federal government should have more power to regulate corporations and take care of the needs of the people.
- (15) What is good for business is good for the working man.
- (16) Things are getting better for me all the time.
- (17) I favour increased federal aid to education.
- (18) Most politicians are most concerned with people like me.
- (19) The government ought to see to it that big business corporations don't have much to say about how the government is run.
- (20) What we need is tax revision –less taxes for the common people and more for the rich and corporations.

(Stanley, 2011) Items to measure populist attitudes:

- (1) The ordinary people are divided by many different values.
- (2) The people who belong to the political elite are divided by many different values.
- (3) Ordinary people are prevented from improving their lives by the actions of unaccountable elites.
- (4) Not all politicians are the same; some genuinely care about what the people want.
- (5) Democracy is about finding compromise between different interests and opinions.
- (6) Ordinary people are unable to make the correct decisions about the future of our country.
- (7) The majority of politicians are honest people.
- (8) Modern politics is in essence a struggle between the good, honest people and the evil elite.

(Hawkins et al, 2012) A scale to measure populist attitudes:

The power of a few special interests prevents our country from making progress.
The people, not the politicians, should make our most important policy decisions
The politicians in Parliament need to follow the will of the people
Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil.

(Akkerman et al. 2013) A scale to measure populist attitudes:

- (1) The politicians in the Dutch parliament need to follow the will of the people.
- (2) The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
- (3) The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.
- (4) I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.
- (5) Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.
- (6) Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil.
- (7) What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles.

(Spruyt et al. 2016) A scale to measure populist attitudes:

- (1) Politicians should follow only the will of the people.
- (2) The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
- (3) The political differences between the elite and the people are much larger than the differences among the people.
- (4) I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a professional politician.
- (5) Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.
- (6) What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles.
- (7) Established politicians who claim to defend our interests, only take care of themselves.
- (8) The established elite and politicians have often betrayed the people.

(Schulz et al. 2017) A scale to measure populist attitudes:

- (1) 4 first items are on anti-establishment, 4 following on people’s sovereignty and 4 last of peoples’ homogeneity and virtuosity.
- (2) MPs in Parliament very quickly lose touch with ordinary people.
- (3) The differences between ordinary people and the ruling elite are much greater than the differences between ordinary people.
- (4) People like me have no influence on what the government does.
- (5) Politicians talk too much and take too little action.

- (6) The people should have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums.
- (7) The people should be asked whenever important decisions are taken.
- (8) The people, not the politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
- (9) The politicians in Parliament need to follow the will of the people.
- (10) Ordinary people all pull together.
- (11) Ordinary people are of good and honest character.
- (12) Ordinary people share the same values and interests.
- (13) Although the Swiss are very different from each other, when it comes down to it they all think the same.

(Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018) A scale to measure populist attitudes:

- (1) The politicians in [country] need to follow the will of the people.
- (2) The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
- (3) The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.
- (4) I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialised politician.
- (5) Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.
- (6) What people call 'compromises' in politics are really just selling out one's principles.
- (7) The particular interests of the political class negatively affect the welfare of the people.
- (8) Politicians always end up agreeing when it comes to protecting their privileges.

Appendix to Chapter 3

Indicators used to construct the latent variable of populism:

D22_1 The people and not the politicians should take our most important political decisions

D22_2 The people would be better represented by ordinary citizens than by specialized politicians

D22_3 The power should be returned entirely to the common people

D22_4 Political debates in parliament are nonsense, it would be better if politicians just followed the will of the people

D22_6 Ordinary people know better than politicians how the country should be governed

Indicators used to construct the latent variable of cynicism:

Q104_1 There is no sense in voting; the parties do what they want to do anyway

Q104_2 Parties are only interested in my vote, not in my opinion

Q104_3 Most politicians promise a lot, but don't do anything

Q104_4 As soon as they are elected, politicians think they are better than people like me

Exact wording of the indicator for ideological self placement:

It is often said that people have left-wing or right-wing political ideas. We would like to know your political orientation. You can use card 40, where there is a scale from 0 to 10. "0" means that you consider yourself 'very left-wing' and "10" means that you consider yourself 'very right-wing'. Where would you place yourself on this scale?"

Political Knowledge is included in a pre-constructed variable in which knowledge questions on different aspects of the political system are asked. The categories depend on the number of questions correctly answered, from 0 to 4 correct answers. The questions used to construct the political knowledge were the following:

Q105 How many years do city council members serve in a term: 4, 5 or 6 years?

The answers provided were:

1. 4 years

2. 5 years

3. 6 years

There were 244 missing answers.

Q106 What is the name of the minister of the government of the French-speaking community/Flemish community? [The first three response options were given to the Flemish respondents, the latter three to the French-speaking respondents.]

The answers provided were:

For the Flemish respondents: Paul Magnette (1), Didier Reynders (2), or Elio Di Rupo (3)

For the Wallonian respondents: Geert Bourgeois (4), Kris Peeters (5) or Yves Leterme (6)

There were 438 missing answers.

Q107 Red is the color of the Sp.a/PS; orange the color of the CD&V/CDH; what is the color of the Open VLD/MR?

The answers provided were:

1. Green

2. Purple

3. Blue

There were 72 missing answers

Q108 Who is the current president of the European Commission? Angela Merkel, Jean Claude Juncke or Herman Van Rompuy?

The answers provided were:

1. Angela Merkel

2. Jean Claude Juncker

3. Herman Van Rompuy

There were 262 missing answers.

Wording of the political interest indicator: “Some people are very interested in politics. Others are not interested at all. Are you very interested in politics, or are you not at all interested?” Answers rank from (1) no interest, (2) little interest, (3) somewhat interested, (4) reasonably interested and (5) very interested.

Wording of the indicator for satisfaction with government: “Taking everything together, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the policies of the past 2.5 years by the former Di Rupo government of social-democrats, Christian democrats and liberals?” For methodological reasons, the five initial answers were recoded into three categories: (1) Dissatisfied or very dissatisfied, (2) neither satisfied nor dissatisfied and (3) satisfied or very satisfied.

Indicator for satisfaction with democracy: “Are you, generally speaking, very satisfied, more or less satisfied, more or less dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the functioning of the democracy in Belgium?” However, the answers were inverted to make them more intuitive and go in the same direction as the rest of the answers. They were also recoded from 5 to 3 categories being the

final coding: (1) not at all satisfied/ rather dissatisfied, (2) neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, (3) rather satisfied and very satisfied.

Wording of the indicator on attitudes on vote: If voting for parliament were no longer obligatory in Belgium, would you then always, generally, sometimes, or never vote? The answers were recoded into three categories: (1) Always, (2) generally/sometimes and (3) never.

Table 1. Descriptives of independent variables (Belgium)

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Gender	1403	1.51	0.50	1.00	2.00
Age	1403	51.70	17.53	18.00	93.00
Age standardized	1403	0.00	1.00	-1.92	2.35
Education level	1403	3.04	0.97	1.00	4.00
Oesch scale 8 categories	1247	5.32	2.04	1.00	8.00
Region	1403	1.35	0.48	1.00	2.00
L-R scale	1364	5.14	2.19	0.00	10.00
L-R scale stand	1364	0.00	1.00	-2.35	2.22
Political knowledge	1403	2.52	1.13	0.00	4.00
Political knowledge stand	1403	0.00	1.00	-2.22	1.30
Interest in politics	1402	2.92	1.14	1.00	5.00
Interest in politics stand	1402	0.00	1.00	-1.68	1.83
Satisfaction government	1388	2.07	0.75	1.00	3.00
Satisfaction Democracy	1397	2.29	0.80	1.00	3.00
Would vote	1396	1.72	0.80	1.00	3.00

Source: Belgian National Study 2014

Table 2. Descriptives of independent variables (Flanders)

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Gender	913	1.50	0.50	1.00	2.00
Age	913	52.38	17.53	18.00	92.00
Age standardized	913	0.00	1.00	-1.96	2.26
Education level	913	3.05	0.98	1.00	4.00
Oesch scale 8 categories	818	5.19	2.06	1.00	8.00
Region	913	1.00	0.00	1.00	1.00
L-R scale	889	5.40	2.05	0.00	10.00
L-R scale stand	889	0.00	1.00	-2.64	2.25
Political knowledge	913	2.74	1.11	0.00	4.00
Political knowledge stand	913	0.00	1.00	-2.46	1.13

Interest in politics	912	2.93	1.14	1.00	5.00
Interest in politics stand	912	0.00	1.00	-1.69	1.81
Satisfaction government	903	2.02	0.74	1.00	3.00
Satisfaction Democracy	907	2.33	0.79	1.00	3.00
Would vote	913	1.75	0.81	1.00	3.00

Source: Belgian National Study 2014

Table 3. Descriptives of independent variables (Wallonia)

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Gender	490	1.52	0.50	1.00	2.00
Age	490	50.43	17.47	18.00	93.00
Age standardized	490	0.00	1.00	-1.86	2.44
Education level	490	3.02	0.97	1.00	4.00
Oesch scale 8 categories	429	5.57	2.00	1.00	8.00
Region	490	2.00	0.00	2.00	2.00
L-R scale	475	4.64	2.35	0.00	10.00
L-R scale stand	475	0.00	1.00	-1.97	2.27
Political knowledge	490	2.12	1.07	0.00	4.00
Political knowledge stand	490	0.00	1.00	-1.99	1.75
Interest in politics	490	2.89	1.13	1.00	5.00
Interest in politics stand	490	0.00	1.00	-1.67	1.86
Satisfaction government	485	2.15	0.76	1.00	3.00
Satisfaction Democracy	490	2.21	0.83	1.00	3.00
Would vote	483	1.68	0.79	1.00	3.00

Source: Belgian National Study 2014

Results of CFA

Table 4. Results of the CFA for attitude dimensions (Standardised factor loadings)

Item n°	Item locution	Populism	Cynicism
D22_1	The people and not the politicians should take our most important political decisions	0.533	
D22_2	The people would be better represented by ordinary citizens than by specialized politicians	0.677	
D22_3	Ordinary people know better than politicians how the country should be governed	0.789	
D22_4	The power should be returned entirely to the common people	0.738	
D22_6	Political debates in parliament are nonsense, it would be better if politicians just followed the will of the people	0.724	

Q104_1	There is no sense in voting; the parties do what they want to do anyway	0.681
Q104_2	Parties are only interested in my vote, not in my opinion	0.707
Q104_3	Most politicians promise a lot, but don't do anything	0.851
Q104_4	As soon as they are elected, politicians think they are better than people like me	0.805

Correlations between the factors

Correlation between populism and cynicism 0.573

Source: Belgian National Study of 2014

All item loads are significant

Populism and cynicism at the regional level: the impact on vote choice

Table 5. Regression of populist attitudes in Flanders

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Sex (ref=male)			
Female	-0.02	0.01	
Age (st)	-0.03	-0.04	
Education level (ref= lower secondary)			
None & Lower	0.05	0.05	
Higher Secondary	-0.06	-0.07	
Higher & University	-0.35***	-0.36***	
Oesch scale (ref= production workers)			
Self employed and large employers	-0.20	-0.15	
Small business owners	-0.06	-0.04	
Technical semi-professionals	-0.01	0.01	
Associate managers	-0.18	-0.16	
Clerks	-0.23**	-0.25**	
Socio-cultural professionals	-0.25**	-0.24*	
Service workers	0.13	0.11	
L-R (st)	-0.06*	-0.04	
Knowledge (st)	-0.05	-0.05	
Interest (st)	-0.07*	-0.07*	
Sat government (ref= Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied)			
Dissatisfied/very dissatisfied	0.07	0.08	
Satisfied/very satisfied	-0.00	-0.01	
Sat Democracy (ref= Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied)			
Not/rather satisfied	0.18**	0.14	
Rather satisfied/very satisfied	-0.16**	-0.16**	
Would vote if not compulsory (ref= always)			
Would vote generally	0.24***	0.24***	
Would vote never	0.30***	0.27***	
Vote (ref=VB)			
CD&V		-0.40*	-0.76***

N-VA		-0.43**	-0.72***
Open VLD		-0.50**	-0.81***
Sp.a		-0.29	-0.55**
Groen		-0.38*	-0.86***
Blank, invalid vote		-0.25	-0.07
Did not vote		-0.23	-0.40*
Constant	0.18	0.57**	0.69***
Observations	730	730	730
R-squared	0.23	0.24	0.05

Source: Belgian National Study 2014

As Table 5 shows, for populism in Flanders, like populism in Belgium is significant having higher or university education (less populist), clerks and socio-cultural professionals are less cynical than production workers, people more interested in politics are less cynical and satisfied with democracy individuals are less cynical than neither satisfied nor dissatisfied individuals. People who would vote generally or would not vote are more populist than people who would always vote if turnout was not compulsory.

With regard to party choice, we set voters of Flemish Interest – Vlaams Belang – (VB) as the reference category, and we compare them with the rest of the voters. We see that all the other voters are less populist than the VB voters, but only voters from Christian democrats – Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams – (CD&V), New Flemish Alliance – Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie – (N-VA), Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats – Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten – (Open VLD) and The Green party (Groen) are significantly less cynical. For blank, invalid and did not vote, there are no significant results either.

We see in the “party model” that a 5 percent of populist attitudes can be explained by the vote choice in Flanders, however, when party choice is taken together with other social and attitudinal variables, the explanatory power of this model is not much better than the one without them (r-squared of 0.23 vs. 0.24).

Next, we present the result for populist attitudes in Wallonia. The structure of the models follows the same order as in the analysis of Flanders.

Table 6. Regression of populist attitudes in Wallonia

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Sex (ref=male)			
Female	0.20**	0.20**	
Age (st)	0.11*	0.10*	
Education level (ref= lower secondary)			
None & Lower	-0.22	-0.22	
Higher Secondary	-0.13	-0.15	
Higher & University	-0.44***	-0.48***	
Oesch scale (ref= production workers)			

Self employed and large employers	-0.20	-0.21	
Small business owners	-0.01	0.02	
Technical semi-professionals	-0.19	-0.17	
Associate managers	-0.43**	-0.44**	
Clerks	-0.28*	-0.24	
Socio-cultural professionals	-0.10	-0.07	
Service workers	-0.18	-0.16	
L-R (st)	-0.06	-0.06	
Knowledge (st)	-0.05	-0.04	
Interest (st)	-0.03	-0.04	
Sat government (ref= Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied)			
Dissatisfied/very dissatisfied	0.10	0.11	
Satisfied/very satisfied	-0.03	-0.05	
Sat Democracy (ref= Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied)			
Not/rather satisfied	0.38***	0.38***	
Rather satisfied/very satisfied	-0.24**	-0.24**	
Would vote if not compulsory (ref= always)			
Would vote generally	0.21**	0.23**	
Would vote never	0.27***	0.34***	
Vote (ref=MR)			
Ps		0.00	0.22*
CdH		0.07	0.04
Ecolo		-0.15	-0.13
PTB GO		0.08	0.57**
Blank, invalid vote		-0.55***	-0.02
Did not vote		-0.08	0.24
Constant	0.16	0.19	-0.14
Observations	366	366	366
R-squared	0.29	0.31	0.03

Source: Belgian National Study 2014

Table 7. Regression of cynical attitudes in Flanders

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Sex (ref=male)			
Female	0.03	0.05	
Age (st)	0.03	0.03	
Education level (ref= lower secondary)			
None & Lower	-0.03	-0.03	
Higher secondary	-0.15*	-0.14*	
High & University	-0.53***	-0.54***	
Oesch scale (ref= production workers)			
Self employed and large employers	-0.19	-0.15	
Small business owners	-0.13	-0.10	
Technical semi-professionals	-0.08	-0.07	
Associate managers	-0.15	-0.13	
Clerks	-0.19**	-0.21**	
Socio-cultural professionals	-0.09	-0.08	
Service workers	-0.01	-0.03	
L-R (st)	0.03	0.04	

Knowledge (st)	0.03	0.04	
Interest (st)	-0.09**	-0.09**	
Sat government (ref= Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied)			
Dissatisfied/very dissatisfied	0.09	0.09	
Satisfied/very satisfied	-0.02	-0.02	
Sat Democracy (ref= Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied)			
Not/rather satisfied	0.32***	0.29***	
Satisfied/very satisfied	-0.28***	-0.28***	
Would vote if not compulsory (ref= always)			
Would vote generally	0.46***	0.46***	
Would vote never	0.73***	0.69***	
Vote (ref=VB)			
CD&V		-0.39**	-0.89***
N-VA		-0.36**	-0.77***
Open VLD		-0.42**	-0.91***
Sp.a		-0.25	-0.80***
Groen		-0.30	-1.16***
Blank, invalid vote		-0.04	0.27
Did not vote		-0.21	-0.47**
Constant	0.10	0.43**	0.75***
Observations	740	740	740
R-squared	0.44	0.45	0.09

Source: Belgian National Study 2014

Table 8. Regression of cynical attitudes in Wallonia

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Sex (ref=male)			
Female	-0.03	-0.04	
Age (st)	0.19***	0.18***	
Education level (ref= lower secondary)			
None & Lower	0.17	0.16	
Higher secondary	-0.01	-0.03	
High & University	-0.27**	-0.29**	
Oesch scale (ref= production workers)			
Self employed and large employers	-0.13	-0.06	
Small business owners	-0.06	-0.02	
Technical semi-professionals	0.34	0.33	
Associate managers	-0.34**	-0.31*	
Clerks	-0.29**	-0.28*	
Socio-cultural professionals	-0.03	0.00	
Service workers	0.00	0.01	
L-R (st)	0.05	0.09**	
Knowledge (st)	-0.00	0.00	
Interest (st)	-0.17***	-0.17***	
Sat government (ref= Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied)			
Dissatisfied/very dissatisfied	0.10	0.11	
Satisfied/very satisfied	-0.02	-0.03	
Sat Democracy (ref= Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied)			
Not/rather satisfied	0.33***	0.34***	
Satisfied/very satisfied	-0.13	-0.13	
Would vote if not compulsory (ref= always)			

Would vote generally	0.37***	0.36***	
Would vote never	0.82***	0.83***	
Vote (ref=MR)			
Ps		0.20	0.19
CdH		0.20	0.15
Ecolo		0.16	-0.10
PTB GO		0.17	0.62**
Blank, invalid vote		0.08	0.76***
Did not vote		0.22	0.40*
Constant	-0.16	-0.29*	-0.22**
Observations	367	367	367
R-squared	0.46	0.47	0.06

Source: Belgian National Study 2014

SEM model

Table 9. SEM of populist and cynical attitudes in Belgium

	Populism	Cynicism
Sex (ref=male)		
Female	0.009	0.015
Age (st)	0.038	0.128***
Education level (ref= lower secondary)		
None & lower	-0.004	0.024
Higher second	-0.013	-0.031
High & University	-0.167***	-0.195***
Oesch scale (ref= production workers)		
Self employed & large employers	-0.024	-0.040
Small business	-0.009	-0.047
Tech semi professional	-0.023	-0.006
Assoc. managers	-0.077*	-0.074*
Clerks	-0.107**	-0.101***
Socio cultural professionals	-0.075	-0.044
Service workers	0.030	-0.004
Region (ref=Flanders)		
Wallonia	0.052	0.168***
L-R (st)	-0.091***	0.028
Know (st)	-0.073**	0.011
Interest (st)	-0.059	-0.140***
Sat government (ref= Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied)		
Dissatisfied & very dissatisfied	0.016	0.064*
Satisfied & very satisfied	-0.020	-0.017

Sat Democracy (ref= Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied)		
Not/rather satisfied	0.130***	0.140***
Satisfied/very satisfied	-0.113***	-0.150***
Would vote if not compulsory (ref= always)		
Would vote generally	0.112***	0.206***
Would vote never	0.157***	0.325***
Cynicism with Populism		0.398
Observations	1403	1403
Explained variance (R squared)	0.250	0.483

***: $p \leq 0.001$, **: $p \leq 0.01$, *: $p \leq 0.05$. Note: $\chi^2 = 597.859$, $df = 179$, $RMSEA = 0.041$, $CFI = 0.943$, $TLI = 0.925$, $SRMR = 0.020$.

The results of estimating the Structural equation are in the same line of our OLS regressions of populism and cynicism performed before. All the independent variables maintain their significance and sign of correlation except for two: The relationship between socio-cultural professionals and populism is not significant anymore and the self-placement of the left-right axis is not significant either for predicting cynicism. However, this were significant result at the lowest level (*: $p \leq 0.05$) and it could be the case that, as in the SEM test we have more respondents (due to the estimation of the missing values in the MPLUS software) those results could lose their significance due to using a larger N.

Table 10. Multinomial logistic regression on vote choice (Flanders) Ref cat= voting for Vlaams Belang

	CD V	N VA	Open VLD	Sp.a	Groen	Blank/invalid	Did not vote
Sex (ref=male)							
Female	2.32***	2.43***	2.58***	1.83**	2.76***	1.57	2.52***
Age (st)	-0.27	-0.40	-0.62*	-0.68*	-0.86**	-0.77	0.04
Education level (ref= lower secondary)							
None & Lower	-0.69	-0.33	-0.56	0.09	0.62	-0.47	-0.03
Higher Secondary	-1.29	-1.23	-1.51*	-1.61*	-0.94	-1.10	-1.48
Higher & University	-1.10	-1.31	-1.64	-1.40	0.05	0.28	-0.57
Oesch scale (ref= production workers)							
Self employed and large employers	12.89	13.33	14.39	12.63	12.94	-3.70	-2.28
Small business owners	-0.88	-0.83	0.10	-2.13*	-0.82	-2.39	-0.47
Technical semi-professionals	13.44	14.35	14.01	12.02	14.93	14.68	13.67
Associate managers	13.48	13.70	14.49	13.61	13.36	13.18	14.21
Clerks	-2.48***	-2.29**	-2.20**	-1.64*	-1.27	-2.02*	-1.87*
Socio-cultural professionals	-0.90	-1.10	-0.73	-1.63	-0.55	-1.81	-1.36
Service workers	-2.47***	-2.75***	-1.91**	-1.79*	-2.01*	-2.68**	-2.07**
L-R (st)	-0.41	-0.31	-0.49	-1.66***	-1.73***	-0.75*	-1.04***
Knowledge (st)	0.69**	0.57*	0.62*	0.40	0.06	0.81*	0.18
Interest (st)	-0.22	0.02	-0.11	0.08	0.12	-0.89	-0.01
Sat government (ref= Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied)							
Dissatisfied/very dissatisfied	-0.34	0.72	-0.07	-2.07**	-1.18	0.61	-0.57
Satisfied/very satisfied	-0.20	-0.67	0.31	0.45	-0.38	0.06	-0.31
Sat Democracy (ref= Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied)							
Not/rather satisfied	-2.73***	-2.07**	-2.01**	-1.17	-1.29	-2.24**	-1.37
Rather satisfied/very satisfied	-0.76	-0.62	-0.74	-0.04	0.30	-1.72	-0.10
Would vote if not compulsory (ref= always)							
Would vote generally	0.15	0.69	0.56	0.14	-0.24	13.72	1.01
Would vote never	-0.38	-0.37	-0.58	-0.85	-0.69	14.49	0.22
Populism	-0.50	-0.58*	-0.64*	-0.43	-0.53	-0.58	-0.36
Cynicism	-0.75*	-0.62	-0.73*	-0.40	-0.61	0.55	-0.42
Constant	5.62***	5.35***	4.52***	4.28***	1.88	-11.70	2.87*
Observations	728	728	728	728	728	728	728

Source: Belgian National Study 2014

Table 11. Multinomial logistic regression on vote choice (Wallonia) Ref cat= voting for MR

	PS	cdH	Ecolo	PTB GO	Blank/invalid	Did not vote
Sex (ref= male)						
Female	0.48	-0.03	0.95	-0.12	0.14	1.22*
Age (st)	0.26	0.14	0.25	0.39	-0.07	0.53
Education level (ref= lower secondary)						
None & Lower	0.91	1.85*	-13.66	1.10	1.19	-0.59
Higher Secondary	0.89	1.29*	1.54*	1.57*	0.22	-0.13
Higher & University	0.44	1.41*	2.44**	-0.12	-1.37	-0.70
Oesch scale (ref= production workers)						
Self employed and large employers						
Small business owners	-1.94	-1.70	-18.70	1.62	-15.21	-16.92
Technical semi-professionals	-2.48**	-0.79	-0.72	-0.98	0.27	-1.18
Associate managers	-0.64	0.18	-1.05	1.42	0.85	-14.47
Clerks	-2.14**	-1.70	-1.65	1.04	-15.44	-0.03
Socio-cultural professionals	-0.86	0.04	-0.12	-0.78	0.27	-0.45
Socio-cultural professionals	-1.69**	-0.83	-2.61**	-0.35	0.44	0.17
Service workers	0.10	-0.43	-0.87	0.39	0.25	0.67
L-R (st)	-2.89***	-0.97***	-2.08***	-2.04***	-1.71***	-1.42***
Knowledge (st)	-0.03	-0.01	-0.44	-0.03	0.30	-0.02
Interest (st)	-0.17	-0.17	-0.03	-0.71	-0.76**	0.45
Sat government (ref= Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied)						
Not/rather satisfied	-1.19*	-0.50	0.08	1.10	0.57	0.54
Rather satisfied/very satisfied	0.83*	-0.17	-0.52	-14.80	-0.14	-0.16
Sat Democracy (ref= Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied)						
Not/rather satisfied	-0.15	-0.31	-0.62	0.40	0.59	0.26
Rather satisfied/very satisfied	-0.01	0.20	-0.66	-0.55	-0.14	0.11
Would vote if not compulsory (ref= always)						
Would vote generally	-0.23	0.24	-0.62	0.52	1.47*	1.33*
Would vote never	-0.86	-0.94	-0.63	-0.11	1.78*	0.86
Populism	-0.35	-0.17	-0.56	-0.21	-1.34***	-0.40
Cynicism	0.64**	0.47	0.53	0.53	0.52	0.48
Constant	0.79	-0.63	-0.66	-2.16	-2.16*	-2.20*
Observations	360	360	360	360	360	360

Source: Belgian National Study 2014

Appendix to Chapter 4

A. Question wording and descriptive statistics of the variables in the analyses

-*Sex*: Sex of the respondent; code 0 for male respondents, code 1 for female respondents.

-*Age*: Age of the respondent in the election year.

-*Educational level*: Educational level of the respondent. Respondent are divided into three categories: (1) lowly educated – respondents who only received primary education (reference category); (2) middle educated – respondents having received lower secondary education; (3) high educated – respondents having received upper secondary education.

-*Ideological position*: An indication of the respondent's self-placement on an ideological scale ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right).

-*Political interest*: Respondent's level of interest in politics, on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all interested) over 1 (not very interested) to 2 (somewhat interested) and 3 (very interested).

-*Political trust*: Level of political trust of the respondent. For various actors and institutions, the respondent was asked to indicate her/his trust in this institution on a scale ranging from 0 (don't trust at all) to 10 (trust completely). As these items can be expected to measure one feeling 'of political trust', we included them in a factor analysis, the results of which are presented below:

Trust in...	Factor loading 2011	Factor loading 2015
Political parties	0.750	0.839
Parliament	0.872	0.886
The Government	0.818	0.884
Politicians	0.838	0.861
European Union	0.449	0.666
Judicial system	0.673	0.629
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland	0.640	0.657
Eigenvalue	3.757	4.282
Cronbach's alpha	0.872	0.910

As the results in the table indicate, these items load strongly on one factor, we construct a sumscales by adding up the scores on the items and dividing it by the number of items.

-Economic resentment: Answer to the question: ‘How do you think the following are now, compared to the past two years: Your personal or family’s financial situation?’ Respondents could answer with ‘Worse’ (code 0), ‘the same’ (code 1), or ‘better’ (code 2)

-Satisfaction with democracy: Answer to the question ‘how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Finland?’. Respondents could answer on a scale ranging from (not at all satisfied), over 1 (not at all satisfied), 2 (fairly satisfied) to 3 (very satisfied).

-Finland less immigration: Respondents were asked to rate the following proposition: ‘How would you rate the following propositions about what Finland should focus on: Increased immigration’. Respondents could answer using a scale ranging from 0 (a very bad proposition) over 5 (neither good nor a bad proposition) to 10 (a very good proposition). The scale was reversed so that higher numbers indicate increased immigration to be ‘a very bad proposition’.

-Criticism of contemporary representation: A sumscale based on the answers on the following questions:

2011	2015
Politicians are not interested in the opinions of ordinary people	Politicians are not interested in the opinions of ordinary people
Political parties are only interested in people’s vote, not in their opinions	Political parties are only interested in people’s vote, not in their opinions
Members of parliament would help our country more if they stopped talking and concentrated on solving real problems	Members of parliament would help our country more if they stopped talking and concentrated on taking action
What making compromises in politics really means is selling one’s principles	What making compromises in politics really means is selling one’s principles

For each statement, respondents could indicate whether they strongly disagreed, disagreed, agreed, or strongly agreed. As the models presented in the text show that these items load on one latent concept, we construct a sumscale by adding up the scores on the items and dividing it by the number of items.

-Stealth democracy: A sumscale based on the answers on the following questions:

2011	2015
Things would be better in Finland if successful corporate managers made the decisions	Things would be better in Finland if successful corporate managers made the decisions
Things would be better in Finland if independent experts made the decisions instead of politicians and citizens	Things would be better in Finland if independent experts made the decisions instead of politicians and citizens
The Finnish government would function better if it were managed like an enterprise	The Finnish government would function better if it were managed like an enterprise

For each statement, respondents could indicate whether they strongly disagreed, disagreed, agreed, or strongly agreed. As the models presented in the text show that these items load on one latent concept, we construct a sumscales by adding up the scores on the items and dividing it by the number of items.

Table A.1 Descriptive statistics of the variables in the analyses

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Sex	0.468	0.499	0	1
Age	53.685	16.674	19	91
Education	2.411	0.694	1	3
Ideological position	5.421	2.196	0	10
Political interest	2.114	0.751	0	3
Political trust	6.251	1.571	0	10
Satisfaction with democracy	1.863	0.582	0	3
Immigration	5.742	2.534	0	10
Economy	1.187	0.798	0	2
Criticism with cont. repr.	1.631	0.646	0	3
Stealth democracy	0.946	0.665	0	3

B. Results of the CFA models in 2011 and 2015 separately

Table B1. Fit indexes of CFA models 2011

Model	Description	χ^2	d.f.	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI
1	Single factor model	516.021	14	0.166	0.123	0.673	0.509
2	Two factor model	173.590	13	0.098	0.078	0.895	0.831
3	Two factor model with error correlation	33.734	12	0.037	0.033	0.986	0.975

N=1,295

Source: Finnish Election Study

Figure B1. Fit indexes of CFA model 3 (2011)





Table B2. Fit indexes of CFA models 2015

Model	Description	χ^2	d.f.	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI
1	Single factor model	346.329	14	0.123	0.092	0.742	0.614
2	Two factor model	153.250	13	0.083	0.073	0.891	0.824
3	Two factor model with error correlation	86.160	12	0.063	0.057	0.943	0.899

N=1581

Source: Finnish Election Study

Figure B2. Fit indexes of CFA model 3 (2015)



Appendix C. Full results of the multinomial logistic regression models

Table C.1. Multinomial logistic regression analysis explaining the vote choice

Party (ref.= abstention)	Social Democrats	Centre Party	National Coalition Party	Swedish People's Party	Christian Democrats	Green League	Left Alliance	Finns Party
Sex (ref.=male)	0.429 (0.520)	0.466 (0.332)	0.112 (0.133)	0.322 (0.183)	1.073* (0.422)	0.893* (0.454)	0.639 (0.771)	0.124 (0.411)
Age	0.056*** (0.010)	0.032*** (0.008)	0.036 (0.018)	0.036* (0.015)	0.038** (0.014)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.030 (0.019)	0.010 (0.016)
Education: middle (ref.=low)	-0.199 (0.890)	-0.593 (0.542)	0.379 (0.968)	0.639 (0.541)	1.107 (0.852)	-0.128 (1.869)	0.174 (1.073)	-0.368 (0.759)
Education: high (ref.=low)	-0.010 (1.006)	-0.543 (0.279)	1.651* (0.749)	1.550*** (0.338)	1.892*** (0.211)	1.111 (1.549)	0.762 (1.957)	-0.591 (1.005)
Ideological position	-0.352*** (0.041)	0.408** (0.085)	0.862*** (0.034)	0.435** (0.154)	0.232*** (0.057)	-0.233*** (0.062)	-0.890*** (0.270)	0.026 (0.119)
Political interest	0.833*** (0.210)	0.799 (0.452)	0.842 (0.473)	0.659 (0.610)	0.496 (0.687)	0.577* (0.290)	0.789*** (0.199)	0.901*** (0.235)
Political trust	0.232*** (0.023)	0.338** (0.024)	0.121* (0.053)	0.032 (0.017)	-0.207*** (0.014)	0.056 (0.187)	-0.017 (0.018)	0.181*** (0.004)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.309 (0.606)	0.199 (0.612)	0.656 (0.623)	0.770 (0.738)	0.659 (0.472)	0.153 (0.694)	0.132 (0.689)	-0.105 (0.696)
Finland less immigration	0.010 (0.069)	0.070* (0.030)	-0.003 (0.071)	-0.274*** (0.020)	0.028 (0.100)	-0.157* (0.070)	-0.037 (0.021)	0.302*** (0.002)
Economic resentment	-0.146*** (0.038)	0.186 (0.314)	0.048 (0.162)	0.120 (0.189)	0.008 (0.034)	0.321 (0.220)	-0.331 (0.228)	-0.050 (0.166)
Criticism of cont. rep.	-0.663* (0.319)	-0.760* (0.320)	-0.895*** (0.004)	-0.229 (0.513)	-1.161*** (0.351)	-0.832*** (0.064)	-0.787 (0.804)	0.236** (0.078)
Stealth democracy	-0.407* (0.183)	-0.100 (0.095)	0.338* (0.162)	-0.415 (0.277)	-0.411 (0.596)	-0.295 (0.153)	-0.177** (0.062)	-0.253*** (0.003)
Election year: 2015	0.157 (0.243)	0.659** (0.116)	-0.361** (0.127)	-1.617*** (0.093)	0.059 (0.276)	0.409*** (0.079)	0.217 (0.308)	0.791*** (0.033)
Constant	-2.235*** (0.078)	-6.458*** (1.001)	-10.039*** (1.262)	-6.259*** (1.078)	-4.465* (2.125)	0.488 (0.799)	1.910*** (0.249)	-4.475*** (0.366)


Note: entries are log-odds coefficients, standard errors included in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered for election-study and a year dummy was included as well. Data: Finnish Election Studies 2011, 2015. Significance levels: *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001. N: 946; pseudo R²: 0.256.

Table C.2. Multinomial logistic regression analysis explaining the vote choice, including interaction effect

Party (ref.= abstention)	Social Democrats	Centre Party	National Coalition Party	Swedish People's Party	Christian Democrats	Green League	Left Alliance	Finns Party
Sex (ref.=male)	0.436 (0.515)	0.491 (0.330)	0.143 (0.131)	0.368* (0.166)	1.048* (0.451)	0.903* (0.446)	0.648 (0.774)	0.118 (0.406)
Age	0.057*** (0.010)	0.032*** (0.009)	0.036 (0.019)	0.037** (0.013)	0.039** (0.015)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.030 (0.019)	0.011 (0.016)
Education: middle (ref.=low)	-0.177 (0.912)	-0.537 (0.619)	0.490 (1.052)	0.795 (0.777)	1.099 (0.808)	-0.087 (1.930)	0.214 (1.138)	-0.356 (0.768)
Education: high (ref.=low)	0.011 (1.015)	-0.489 (0.352)	1.748* (0.817)	1.672** (0.537)	1.887*** (0.176)	1.158 (1.613)	0.798 (2.009)	-0.582 (1.021)
Ideological position	-0.356*** (0.046)	0.411*** (0.080)	0.861*** (0.043)	0.439** (0.161)	0.222*** (0.044)	-0.231*** (0.063)	-0.894** (0.274)	0.024 (0.120)
Political interest	0.836*** (0.219)	0.805 (0.460)	0.851 (0.482)	0.671 (0.629)	0.482 (0.673)	0.582 (0.299)	0.793*** (0.179)	0.901*** (0.232)
Political trust	0.229*** (0.031)	0.343*** (0.024)	0.125* (0.052)	0.048*** (0.002)	-0.209*** (0.014)	0.059 (0.187)	-0.015 (0.022)	0.181*** (0.006)
Satisfaction with democracy	0.312 (0.609)	0.212 (0.602)	0.682 (0.610)	0.814 (0.705)	0.656 (0.488)	0.164 (0.690)	0.138 (0.694)	-0.124 (0.709)
Finland less immigration	0.011 (0.068)	0.070* (0.028)	-0.003 (0.067)	-0.266*** (0.009)	0.028 (0.105)	-0.156* (0.068)	-0.035* (0.018)	0.303*** (0.006)
Economic resentment	-0.150*** (0.031)	0.192 (0.297)	0.057 (0.146)	0.146 (0.131)	0.015 (0.035)	0.324 (0.208)	-0.332 (0.219)	-0.055 (0.173)
Criticism of cont. rep.	-0.726 (0.378)	-1.147*** (0.175)	-1.341*** (0.140)	-0.907*** (0.120)	-0.983 (0.781)	-1.113*** (0.289)	-0.924 (0.699)	0.427 (0.253)
Stealth democracy	-0.476*** (0.086)	-0.785 (0.421)	-0.383*** (0.081)	-1.851* (0.778)	-0.108 (1.331)	-0.823** (0.266)	-0.487 (0.253)	0.189 (0.287)
Criticism X stealth democracy	0.171 (0.222)	0.684*** (0.122)	-0.327** (0.114)	-1.554*** (0.122)	0.054 (0.288)	0.423*** (0.060)	0.232 (0.292)	0.790*** (0.004)
Election year: 2015	0.012 (0.172)	0.376* (0.171)	0.408** (0.144)	0.787 (0.529)	-0.255 (0.490)	0.293 (0.252)	0.146 (0.150)	-0.214 (0.123)
Constant	-2.088*** (0.023)	-5.960*** (0.899)	-9.537*** (1.189)	-5.628*** (1.189)	-4.533 (2.553)	0.858 (0.603)	2.126*** (0.152)	-4.840*** (0.729)


Note: entries are log-odds coefficients, standard errors included in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered for election-study and a year dummy was included as well. Data: Finnish Election Studies 2011, 2015. Significance levels: *: $p < 0.05$; **: $p < 0.01$; ***: $p < 0.001$. N: 946; pseudo R^2 : 0.258.

Figure C.1. Average marginal effects on the vote for the Finnish parties



Note: The Figure presents average marginal effects and 95% confidence-intervals. The full models are summarised in Table C.1. Data: Finish Election Studies 2011, 2015.


Figure C.2. Average marginal effects of criticism at different levels of stealth democracy for all parties




Note: The Figure presents average marginal effects and 95% confidence-intervals of criticism of contemporary representation on voting for each party respectively. The full models are summarised in Table C.2. Data: Finish Election Studies 2011, 2015.

Appendix to Chapter 5

Figure 1. Vote for Lega nord and M5S in 2013 and self placement in left-right axis.




Models with Factor of populism included




Legia


Models 1, 2, 3



Model 4



Model 5



Appendix to Chapter 6

Appendix A

Results for Portugal

Table 1a. Did you vote in the last election?

	Freq.	Percent
0 (NO)	3,789	27.09
1 (YES)	10,199	72.91
Total	13,988	100.00

Source: ESS

Table 2a. Vote for PP-PSD/CDS-PP

	Freq.	Percent
0 (NO)	11,861	81.18
1 (YES)	2,750	18.82
Total	14,611	100.00

Source: ESS

Table 3a. Vote for PP-PSD/CDS-PP and feel close to it

	Freq.	Percent
0 (NO)	12,972	86.71
1 (YES)	1,988	13.29
Total	14,960	100.00

Source: ESS

Table 4a. Descriptive of variables used

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Gender	14,988	1.60	0.49	1	2
Age (5cat)	14,986	3.50	1.50	1	5
Years of schooling	14,765	7.87	5.04	0	30
Main activ.	14,946	3.48	2.47	1	7
L-R cat.	11,012	2.93	1.22	1	5
Feel income	14,803	2.46	0.82	1	4
Trust Parliament	14,296	3.44	2.42	0	10
Trust politicians	14,699	2.24	2.06	0	10
Trust parties	13,161	2.23	2.06	0	10
Trust EU Parliament	12,956	3.99	2.44	0	10

Allow immigrants diff race	14,362	2.24	0.89	1	4
Allow immigrants poor countries	14,325	2.20	0.89	1	4
Immig economy	13,714	4.83	2.37	0	10
Immig cultural	13,620	5.33	2.30	0	10
Immig place	13,971	4.18	2.07	0	10
Imp safe	14,887	4.59	1.10	1	6
Imp gov safe	14,769	4.50	1.10	1	6
Imp rules	14,772	3.72	1.25	1	6
Imp behave	14,794	3.97	1.16	1	6
Index Att immig	10,080	0.47	0.19	8.88	1
Index Att trust	10,080	0.29	0.18	-4.17	1
Index Att conservation v.	10,080	0.63	0.15	-8.66	1

Source: ESS wave 2 to 8

Table 5a. Factor analyses to create the indexes of attitudes (unrotated solution).

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	3.53013	1.54486	0.5588	0.5588
Factor2	1.98526	0.83222	0.3143	0.8731
Factor3	1.15304	0.72489	0.1825	1.0556
Factor4	0.42815	0.28578	0.0678	1.1233
Factor5	0.14238	0.06102	0.0225	1.1459
Factor6	0.08136	0.17192	0.0129	1.1588
Factor7	-0.09056	0.01336	-0.0143	1.1444
Factor8	-0.10392	0.01107	-0.0164	1.1280
Factor9	-0.11499	0.01864	-0.0182	1.1098
Factor10	-0.13363	0.01020	-0.0212	1.0886
Factor11	-0.14383	0.05745	-0.0228	1.0659
Factor12	-0.20128	0.01347	-0.0319	1.0340
Factor13	-0.21475	.	-0.0340	1.0000

(N)= 10,080. Retained factors= 3. Method: principal factors. Number of parameters= 36.

LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(78) = 6.000$ Prob> $\chi^2 = 0.0000$

Source: ESS wave 2 to 8

Table 6a. Factor analyses to create the indexes of attitudes (Rotation = Orthogonal Varimax (Kaiser off))				
Factor	Variance	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	2.89769	0.30174	0.4587	0.4587
Factor2	2.59595	1.42115	0.4109	0.8696
Factor3	1.17480	.	0.1860	1.0556

(N)= 10,080. Retained factors= 3. Method: principal factors. Number of parameters= 36.

LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(78) = 6.000$ Prob> $\chi^2 = 0.0000$

Source: ESS wave 2 to 8

Table 7a. Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Uniqueness
----------	---------	---------	---------	------------

Trust Parliament		0.7204		0.4661
Trust politicians		0.8823		0.2137
Trust parties		0.8782		0.2197
Trust EU Parliament		0.6675		0.5348
Allow immigrants diff race	0.8266			0.3112
Allow immigrants poor countries	0.8270			0.3089
Immig economy	0.7080			0.4828
Immig cultural	0.7004			0.4981
Immig place	0.6871			0.4895
Imp safe			0.5758	0.6629
Imp rules			0.4622	0.7779
Imp gov safe			0.5831	0.6575
Imp behave			0.5309	0.7084

(Blanks represent abs(loading)<0.3)

Source: ESS wave 2 to 8

Table 8a. Factor rotation matrix

	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3
Factor1	0.7690	0.6328	-0.0906
Factor2	-0.6382	0.7681	-0.0519
Factor3	0.0367	0.0977	0.9945

Source: ESS wave 2 to 8

Cronbach's Alpha test for the different factors:

Trust:

Test scale = mean (unstandardized items).

Average interitem covariance: 3.186517

Number of items in the scale: 4

Scale reliability coefficient: 0.8710

Immigration:

Test scale = mean (unstandardized items).

Average interitem covariance: 1.563518

Number of items in the scale: 5

Scale reliability coefficient: 0.8174

Conservation values:

Test scale = mean (unstandardized items).

Average interitem covariance: 0.4292528

Number of items in the scale: 4

Scale reliability coefficient: 0.6546

Wording of indicators and scale of its responses:

Trust Parliament= 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust).
Trust politicians= 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust).
Trust EU Parliament= 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust).
Trust parties= 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust).

Allow immigrants diff race: Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority = The scale is inverted so it is not counterintuitive 1 (Allow none) 2 (Allow a few) 3 (Allow some) 4 (Allow many to come and live here).

Allow immigrants poor countries: Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe = The scale is inverted so it is not counterintuitive 1 (Allow none) 2 (Allow a few) 3 (Allow some) 4 (Allow many to come and live here).

Immig economy: Immigration bad or good for country's economy = from 0 (bad for the economy) to 10 (good for the economy).

Immig cultural: Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants = from 0 (cultural life undermined) to 10 (cultural life enriched).

Immig place: Immigrants make country worse or better place to live = from 0 (worse place to live) to 10 (better place to live).

Imp safe: Important to live in safe surroundings. We inverted the scale of the responses and the actual scale is: (1) Not like me at all, (2) not like me, (3) a Little like me, (4) somewhat like me, (5) like me and (6) very much like me.

Imp gov safe: Important that Government is strong and ensures safety. We inverted the scale of the responses and the actual scale is: (1) Not like me at all, (2) not like me, (3) a Little like me, (4) somewhat like me, (5) like me and (6) very much like me.

Imp rules: Important to follow rules. We inverted the scale of the responses and the actual scale is: (1) Not like me at all, (2) not like me, (3) a Little like me, (4) somewhat like me, (5) like me and (6) very much like me.

Imp behave: Important to behave properly. We inverted the scale of the responses and the actual scale is: (1) Not like me at all, (2) not like me, (3) a Little like me, (4) somewhat like me, (5) like me and (6) very much like me.

Table 9a. How are voters with right wing populist attitudes represented in Portugal? (logistic regressions)

	Model 1 Vote/Abstain	Model 2 Vote PPD/Others	Model 3 Voters PPD and close/others
Variables of interest			
Att. Immigrants	-0.00 (-0.28 - 0.27)	0.03 (-0.67 - 0.72)	0.18 (-0.23 - 0.58)
Trust	1.11*** (0.63 - 1.59)	0.42 (-0.19 - 1.03)	0.72 (-0.35 - 1.79)
Conservation values	1.38*** (0.81 - 1.95)	0.36 (-0.33 - 1.06)	1.50*** (0.52 - 2.49)
Household income (ref=living comfortably)			
Coping	0.01 (-0.13 - 0.16)	0.26* (-0.01 - 0.54)	0.14 (-0.15 - 0.44)
Difficult	-0.25*** (-0.42 - -0.09)	0.12 (-0.24 - 0.49)	0.06 (-0.29 - 0.42)
Very difficult	-0.58*** (-0.89 - -0.26)	0.07 (-0.37 - 0.51)	-0.09 (-0.50 - 0.31)
Closeness to PP (ref=no)		3.06*** (2.74 - 3.37)	
Control variables			
Sex (ref=male)			
Female	-0.07 (-0.18 - 0.05)	-0.00 (-0.19 - 0.18)	-0.17* (-0.37 - 0.02)
Years of education	1.41*** (0.85 - 1.98)	1.54*** (0.83 - 2.24)	1.21*** (0.49 - 1.92)
Age (ref=18-30)			
31-40	0.33** (0.05 - 0.60)	0.02 (-0.49 - 0.52)	0.03 (-0.42 - 0.49)
41-50	0.63*** (0.43 - 0.83)	0.25** (0.02 - 0.49)	0.25*** (0.06 - 0.44)
51- 60	1.30*** (1.03 - 1.58)	0.31 (-0.17 - 0.79)	0.52*** (0.30 - 0.74)
61 +	1.26*** (0.89 - 1.63)	0.45*** (0.27 - 0.63)	0.74*** (0.36 - 1.12)
Main activity (ref= paid work)			
Education	-0.63*** (-1.11 - -0.16)	-0.37 (-0.83 - 0.09)	-0.41* (-0.89 - 0.07)
Unemployed looking	-0.29*** (-0.50 - -0.08)	-0.35 (-0.79 - 0.08)	-0.29*** (-0.47 - -0.11)
Unemployed not look	-0.57* (-1.20 - 0.06)	-0.39 (-0.90 - 0.12)	-0.72*** (-1.15 - -0.29)
Sick or disabled	-0.48*** (-0.79 - -0.16)	-0.19 (-0.89 - 0.51)	-0.13 (-0.94 - 0.68)
Retired	-0.12 (-0.35 - 0.11)	-0.04 (-0.26 - 0.17)	-0.02 (-0.19 - 0.15)
Housework	-0.27 (-0.59 - 0.05)	0.00 (-0.19 - 0.20)	-0.27*** (-0.35 - -0.18)
ESS Round (ref= Round 2)			

Round 3	0.12*** (0.07 - 0.16)	-0.31*** (-0.39 - -0.22)	-0.15*** (-0.20 - -0.09)
Round 4	0.08*** (0.02 - 0.13)	-0.28*** (-0.33 - -0.24)	-0.21*** (-0.26 - -0.16)
Round 5	0.29*** (0.26 - 0.32)	0.12*** (0.07 - 0.17)	-0.08*** (-0.11 - -0.05)
Round 6	-0.11*** (-0.15 - -0.07)	0.06 (-0.02 - 0.15)	-0.70*** (-0.77 - -0.63)
Round 7	-0.27*** (-0.32 - -0.21)	-0.58*** (-0.66 - -0.50)	-0.44*** (-0.49 - -0.40)
Round 8	-0.09* (-0.19 - 0.01)	-0.01 (-0.12 - 0.10)	-0.01 (-0.12 - 0.11)
L-R self placement (ref=5)			
0-2	0.54*** (0.32 - 0.76)	-1.43*** (-2.13 - -0.73)	-1.99*** (-3.22 - -0.76)
3-4	0.69*** (0.51 - 0.87)	-1.03*** (-1.23 - -0.83)	-1.80*** (-2.36 - -1.25)
6-7	0.74*** (0.54 - 0.94)	1.04*** (0.62 - 1.46)	2.15*** (1.73 - 2.57)
8-10	0.99*** (0.82 - 1.15)	1.18*** (0.88 - 1.48)	2.90*** (2.48 - 3.32)
Constant	-1.25*** (-1.64 - -0.87)	-3.39*** (-4.20 - -2.58)	-4.10*** (-5.47 - -2.72)
Observations	7,055	7,055	7,055

Source: ESS wave 2-8

Appendix B

Results for Spain

Table 1b. Did you vote in the last election?

	Freq.	Percent
0 (NO)	2,679	19.27
1 (YES)	11,224	80.73
Total	13,903	100.00

Source: ESS

Table 2b. Vote for PP

	Freq.	Percent
0 (NO)	11,996	79.02
1 (YES)	3,185	20.98
Total	15,181	100.00

Source: ESS

Table 3b. Vote for PP and feel close to it

	Freq.	Percent
0 (NO)	13,717	88.55
1 (YES)	1,773	11.45
Total	15,49	100.00

Source: ESS

Table 4b. Descriptive of variables used

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Gender	15,500	1.51	0.50	1	2
Age (5cat)	15,456	3.17	1.49	1	5
Years of schooling	14,973	11.80	5.57	0	51
Main activ.	15,438	3.11	2.46	1	7
L-R cat.	13,308	2.72	1.15	1	5
Feel income	15,348	1.98	0.83	1	4
Trust Parliament	14,558	4.40	2.48	0	10
Trust politicians	15,148	2.87	2.35	0	10
Trust parties	13,480	2.80	2.32	0	10
Trust EU Parliament	13,573	4.52	2.40	0	10
Allow immigrants diff race	14,699	2.59	0.92	1	4
Allow immigrants poor countries	14,642	2.58	0.92	1	4
Immig economy	14,742	5.27	2.35	0	10
Immig cultural	14,673	5.97	2.36	0	10
Immig place	14,851	5.08	2.21	0	10

Imp safe	15,392	4.97	1.06	1	6
Imp gov safe	15,215	3.93	1.40	1	6
Imp rules	15,230	4.97	1.09	1	6
Imp behave	15,369	4.72	1.14	1	6
Index Att immig	10,509	6.54	0.95	-2.53	2.09
Index Att trust	10,509	-1.87	0.95	-1.73	3.12
Index Att conservation v.	10,509	-3.83	0.77	-3.80	1.55

Source: ESS wave 2 to 8

Table 5b. Factor analyses to create the indexes of attitudes (unrotated solution).

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	3.39400	0.89124	0.5086	0.5086
Factor2	2.50276	1.45809	0.3751	0.8837
Factor3	1.04466	0.56575	0.1566	1.0402
Factor4	0.47892	0.32769	0.0718	1.1120
Factor5	0.15123	0.14967	0.0227	1.1347
Factor6	0.00155	0.08140	0.0002	1.1349
Factor7	-0.07984	0.01136	-0.0120	1.1229
Factor8	-0.09120	0.01720	-0.0137	1.1093
Factor9	-0.10840	0.01970	-0.0162	1.0930
Factor10	-0.12810	0.01493	-0.0192	1.0738
Factor11	-0.14304	0.00743	-0.0214	1.0524
Factor12	-0.15047	0.04862	-0.0225	1.0298
Factor13	-0.19909	.	-0.0298	1.0000

(N)= 10,509. Retained factors= 3. Method: principal factors. Number of parameters= 36.

LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(78) = 7.000$ Prob> $\chi^2 = 0.0000$

Source: ESS wave 2 to 8

Table 6b. Factor analyses to create the indexes of attitudes (Rotation = Orthogonal Varimax (Kaiser off))

Factor	Variance	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	3.01843	0.26302	0.4523	0.4523
Factor2	2.75541	1.58784	0.4129	0.8653
Factor3	1.16757	.	0.1750	1.0402

(N)= 10,509. Retained factors= 3. Method: principal factors. Number of parameters= 36.

LR test: independent vs. saturated: $\chi^2(66) = 7.000$ Prob> $\chi^2 = 0.0000$

Source: ESS wave 2 to 8

Table 7b. Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances

Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Uniqueness
Trust Parliament		0.7408		0.4425
Trust politicians		0.9035		0.1814
Trust parties		0.8963		0.1942
Trust EU Parliament		0.7128		0.4810
Allow immigrants diff race	0.8524			0.2691

Allow immigrants poor countries	0.8480			0.2762
Immig economy	0.7045			0.4718
Immig cultural	0.6953			0.5036
Immig place	0.7247			0.4504
Imp safe			0.5808	0.6519
Imp rules			0.4463	0.7643
Imp gov safe			0.5596	0.6758
Imp behave			0.5436	0.6965

(Blanks represent abs(loading)<0.3)

Source: ESS wave 2 to 8

Table 8b. Factor rotation matrix

	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3
Factor1	0.8181	0.5632	-0.1164
Factor2	-0.5246	0.8138	0.2500
Factor3	0.2355	-0.1434	0.9612

Source: ESS wave 2 to 8

Cronbach's Alpha test for the different factors:

Trust:

Test scale = mean (unstandardized items).

Average interitem covariance: 3.809355

Number of items in the scale: 4

Scale reliability coefficient: 0.8893

Immigration:

Test scale = mean (unstandardized items).

Average interitem covariance: 1.747631

Number of items in the scale: 5

Scale reliability coefficient: 0.8296

Conservation values:

Test scale = mean (unstandardized items).

Average interitem covariance: 0.4494224

Number of items in the scale: 4

Scale reliability coefficient: 0.6565

Table 9b. How are voters with right wing populist attitudes represented in Spain? (logistic regressions)

	Model 1 Vote/Abstain	Model 2 Vote PP/Others	Model 3 Voters PP and close/others
Variables of interest			
Att. Immigrants	-0.23 (-0.51 - 0.05)	-0.69*** (-0.88 - -0.51)	-0.77*** (-1.22 - -0.33)
Trust	1.44*** (0.64 - 2.24)	-0.20 (-0.78 - 0.37)	1.35** (0.27 - 2.44)
Conservation values	0.35 (-0.17 - 0.87)	0.83 (-0.54 - 2.21)	1.45*** (0.79 - 2.10)
Household income (ref=living comfortably)			
Coping	-0.15** (-0.28 - -0.02)	-0.05 (-0.22 - 0.11)	-0.16** (-0.31 - -0.01)
Difficult	-0.39*** (-0.66 - -0.13)	-0.20* (-0.40 - 0.01)	-0.28* (-0.58 - 0.02)
Very difficult	-0.48*** (-0.76 - -0.20)	-0.07 (-0.54 - 0.41)	0.04 (-0.42 - 0.50)
Closeness to PP (ref=no)			
Yes		2.82*** (2.44 - 3.20)	
Control variables			
Sex (ref=male)			
Female	-0.02 (-0.15 - 0.12)	-0.15** (-0.28 - -0.02)	-0.12 (-0.42 - 0.17)
Years of education	1.84*** (0.91 - 2.77)	1.08* (-0.10 - 2.26)	0.38 (-0.70 - 1.46)
Age (ref=18-30)			
31-40	0.28*** (0.14 - 0.43)	0.34*** (0.25 - 0.44)	0.17** (0.01 - 0.34)
41-50	0.69*** (0.49 - 0.89)	0.54*** (0.35 - 0.73)	0.38*** (0.18 - 0.58)
51- 60	0.95*** (0.81 - 1.10)	0.39*** (0.24 - 0.53)	0.48*** (0.29 - 0.68)
61 +	0.73*** (0.31 - 1.16)	0.33 (-0.11 - 0.77)	0.54*** (0.24 - 0.83)
Main activity (ref= paid work)			
Education	-0.30 (-0.75 - 0.15)	-0.12 (-0.51 - 0.28)	0.24 (-0.13 - 0.60)
Unemployed looking	-0.09 (-0.29 - 0.11)	-0.23 (-0.56 - 0.10)	-0.06 (-0.38 - 0.25)
Unemployed not look	-0.22 (-0.59 - 0.16)	0.07 (-0.31 - 0.46)	-0.22 (-0.60 - 0.16)
Sick or disabled	-0.11 (-0.44 - 0.22)	-0.86*** (-1.19 - -0.53)	0.18 (-0.56 - 0.93)
Retired	0.31* (-0.01 - 0.63)	0.07 (-0.31 - 0.45)	0.19 (-0.14 - 0.52)

Housework	0.20 (-0.11 - 0.52)	0.36** (0.08 - 0.64)	0.05 (-0.26 - 0.36)
ESS Round (ref= Round 2)			
Round 3	-0.29*** (-0.32 - -0.26)	-0.29*** (-0.38 - -0.19)	-0.06** (-0.12 - -0.01)
Round 4	0.12*** (0.08 - 0.15)	-0.11** (-0.20 - -0.02)	-0.23*** (-0.28 - -0.18)
Round 5	-0.00 (-0.07 - 0.07)	-0.11** (-0.22 - -0.01)	-0.26*** (-0.37 - -0.16)
Round 6	-0.27*** (-0.38 - -0.16)	0.47*** (0.38 - 0.57)	-0.56*** (-0.69 - -0.43)
Round 7	-0.11** (-0.21 - -0.02)	0.30*** (0.20 - 0.40)	-0.23*** (-0.35 - -0.11)
Round 8	0.29*** (0.20 - 0.38)	-0.47*** (-0.61 - -0.33)	0.03 (-0.08 - 0.14)
L-R self placement (ref=5)			
0-2	0.70*** (0.44 - 0.96)	-2.78*** (-3.23 - -2.33)	-2.88*** (-3.84 - -1.93)
3-4	0.59*** (0.24 - 0.93)	-1.81*** (-2.14 - -1.48)	-2.94*** (-3.63 - -2.26)
6-7	0.55*** (0.29 - 0.81)	1.12*** (0.70 - 1.53)	1.96*** (1.59 - 2.32)
8-10	0.92*** (0.56 - 1.29)	1.47*** (1.00 - 1.95)	2.66*** (2.27 - 3.06)
Constant	-0.08 (-1.00 - 0.85)	-2.03*** (-3.32 - -0.74)	-3.57*** (-3.96 - -3.17)
Observations	8,238	8,238	8,238

Source: ESS wave 2-8