Collective bargaining in Europe: towards an endgame

Volume II

—

Edited by

Torsten Müller, Kurt Vandaele and Jeremy Waddington

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European Trade Union Institute (ETUI)

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Chapter 16
Italy: institutionalisation and resilience in a changing economic and political environment

Roberto Pedersini

Industrial relations and collective bargaining have traditionally been regarded as a key part of the employment regulation system in Italy (see Table 16.1). The labour representation system was strengthened by the mobilisation of the late 1960s, which took place first and foremost in metalworking. In the early 1970s, the Italian labour relations landscape included strong confederations, well-established industry federations responsible for the pivotal industrial agreements and renewed workplace representation structures, with a broad legitimation basis and an important role in organising workers, administrating industry-wide collective agreements and negotiating plant-level deals. The divisions between the three major trade union confederations, the Italian General Confederation of Labour (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro, CGIL), the Italian Confederation of Workers' Trade Unions (Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori, CISL) and the Italian Union of Labour (Unione Italiana del Lavoro, UIL) in terms of ideology and political orientation did not hamper cooperation at the bargaining table and at workplace level. A long period of 'joint action' was inaugurated and the idea of establishing unitary organisations gained momentum in the 1970s, with the notable examples of the Federation of Metalworkers (Federazione Lavoratori Metalmeccanici, FLM) and the Unitary Federation of Chemical Workers (Federazione Unitaria Lavoratori Chimici, FULC).

In this period, employer representation was similarly well rooted (Cella and Treu 1998; Lanzalaco 1998). In the private sector, the leading role played by the General Confederation of Italian Industry (Confederazione Generale dell'Industria Italiana, Confindustria) in cross-industry employment relations after the Second World War was supplemented by the consolidation of industrial associations. Public employers in manufacturing, such as metalworking, telecommunications and electronics, as well as in the petroleum industry were also important. They had their own associations, the Employer Associations of State-owned Enterprises (Associazione Sindacale Intersind, Intersind) and the Employer Association of Petroleum Enterprises (Associazione Sindacale Aziende Petrolifere, ASAP), respectively, and often played a leading role in industrial relations, for instance in the introduction of decentralised bargaining in the 1960s and information and participation rights in the 1970s and the 1980s.

During the early 1970s, tripartite relations were not institutionalised, but the mobilisation capacity of trade unions and their links with the main parties in the governing coalitions and in the opposition alike made them important actors in the political arena, while governments were often keen to act as mediators when bipartite relations became tense or reach a stalemate. Efforts to establish a tripartite framework for political exchange

intensified during the late 1970s and early 1980s, but relations with the government and among the social partners remained unstable (Carrieri and Donolo 1987).

The economic crisis, industrial restructuring and political tensions in the 1970s and 1980s put the system under strain, but, despite the re-emergence of divisions between the major confederations, notably on the reform of the sliding-scale mechanisms in the mid-1980s, social partners and industrial relations preserved their key position in regulating employment relations at all levels, with some distinctions between the central level, where divisions remained important, and the decentralised company level, where cooperation and pragmatism prevailed, leading to a form of 'hidden micro-concertation' of industrial reorganisation (Regini 1995: 111–26; Contarino 1998).

The 1990s were marked by a number of important tripartite social pacts aimed at restoring macroeconomic stability (Baccaro *et al.* 2003; Cella 1995; Giugni 2003; Regini 1997) and particularly at reducing inflation (1992 and 1993), ensuring the viability of the pension system (1995, with an accord between the government and unions only), reforming the labour market (1996) and institutionalising tripartite concertation (1998).

Compared with the previous decade, industrial relations in the 2000s were more problematic, for two reasons. First, the inclusion of collective bargaining in the incomes policy framework steered by the 'planned inflation rate' ensured a system of wage restraint that was particularly stringent because the government used the threshold of collective pay rises to drive the price index down. Incomes policy was successful, as inflation decreased and converged with the Maastricht criteria, but it led to the erosion of real wage levels because bipartite negotiations could not fill the systematic gap between actual and planned inflation. Trade unions grew progressively dissatisfied with such a regulatory framework and pressure for higher pay rises strengthened, especially in industries such as metalworking, where demands for distributing average industrial productivity gains emerged.

Second, the centre-right governments led by Silvio Berlusconi (2001–2006 and 2008–2011) introduced a new stance on social concertation, which reasserted the government's prerogative in labour and social policies. On this view, tripartite agreements on reforms should not be considered necessary and thus no social partner can hold a veto. Agreements with only some social partner organisations are possible and effective, while the government may decide autonomously on matters covered by 'social dialogue'. This new approach led to the 2002 'Pact for Italy', which was not signed by CGIL. The pact envisaged a number of labour market measures, which were only partly implemented. The highly controversial partial and temporary suspension of the rules on reinstatement in cases of unfair individual dismissal, for example, was never introduced.

These two sources of tensions became particularly apparent in metalworking, which had long been regarded as the key and pace-setting industry for employment relations in Italy. Divisions between the three major industry-wide trade union organisations emerged in the negotiations over the industrial agreement renewals. FIOM-CGIL did

Table 16.1 **Principal characteristics of collective bargaining in Italy**

Key features	2000	2016/2018
Actors entitled to collective bargaining	All trade unions and employer associations. They are ordinary private law associations with no specific establishment or registration requirements.	Same as before. Cross-industry agreements introduced rules on representativeness for unions and envisaged the possibility of extending them to employer associations. The implementation of representativeness rules for trade unions is still under way in early 2019. No legal requirements have been introduced.
Importance of bargaining levels	Industrial agreements provide the main regulatory framework for basic wage rates, which must be defined in accordance with the incomes policy parameter of the 'planned inflation rate' and normative conditions (until 2008). Decentralised deals, especially at company level, cover the implementation of industrial rules and their adaptation to local conditions. They also cover performance-related pay, which should distribute productivity gains generated at workplace level.	Industrial bargaining retains its key importance for both basic wage rates and normative conditions. Wage developments are now linked to actual inflation, with a view to preserving their purchasing power. New possibilities for 'opening clauses' were introduced by cross-industry agreements (since 2009), with a coordination role for industrial agreements and their signatory parties. A legislative measure passed in the summer of 2011, during the sovereign debt crisis, now allows derogation from industrial agreements and partly from legislation by local deals, with no specific coordination requirement.
Favourability principle/derogation possibilities	No legal favourability principle, but coordination rules introduced by collective agreements with weak enforcement capacity, as jurisprudence favours bargaining autonomy at the various levels. No derogations are possible for basic wage rates, which are protected by the prevailing jurisprudential interpretation of Art. 36 of the Italian Constitution on fair remuneration.	The lack of a legal favourability principle is now sanctioned by Art. 8 of decree law 138/2011. The protection of basic wage rates remains unaltered.
Collective bargaining coverage (%)	Industrial agreements: around 90% Decentralised agreements: around 30%.	Same as before
Extension mechanism (or functional equivalent)	No formal extension mechanism. For basic wage rates only, the prevailing jurisprudential interpretation of Art. 36 of the Italian Constitution on fair remuneration identifies collectively-agreed minimum wage rates as the pay floor.	Same as before
Trade union density (%)	35	37
Employers' association rate (%)	62	56

Source: Appendix A1.

not sign the industry-wide deals in 2003 and 2009. Moreover, FIOM took the lead on many occasions in publicly criticising the government's initiatives and reinforced its antagonistic approach within the trade union movement.

Among the most controversial issues that marked industrial relations developments in the 2000s was collective bargaining decentralisation, with the potential erosion of the binding role of the industrial agreement and further reforms of the labour market. The first trend was accompanied by a number of developments in both collective bargaining and legal regulation. Cross-industry agreements on the reform of the bargaining structure (January 2009) and on competitiveness (November 2012) provided more scope for flexibility and derogations at decentralised level. Neither agreement was signed by CGIL because of this shift towards decentralisation. Between 2011 and 2014, however, CGIL, CISL and UIL signed, with Confindustria, a number of cross-industry agreements on representativeness, which comprised rules on the validity of derogatory decentralised deals, within a framework of vertical coordination.

Particularly significant for the collective bargaining structure was the dispute over industrial reorganisation at Fiat in 2010 and 2011, which led to the establishment of a separate group-level collective bargaining system outside metalworking in 2012 (Corazza 2016). Finally, the controversial legislation on derogations through local agreements (Art. 8 of decree-law 138/2011) introduced the legal possibility of derogating industrial collective agreements and, within certain limits, legislation. This provision legally established the autonomy of the different bargaining levels, a principle already supported by Italian jurisprudence. Without a favourability principle, coordination is left to bipartite rules and the social partners' organisational capacity.

In summary, since 2000, the environment of industrial relations in Italy has changed significantly, although the basic institutional features are relatively stable (see Table 16.1). First, the political climate moved from pro-union to neutral, with some growing criticism of the role supposedly played by trade unions in labour market segmentation and in the disparities in protection levels. In policymaking, social concertation has been replaced mainly by governments' unilateralism (Colombo and Regalia 2016). Second, the economic difficulties experienced by firms and prices verging on deflation put great pressure on collective bargaining, with a number of difficult agreement renewals. The 'systemic opt-out' pursued by Fiat, which left the established industrial representation and bargaining system, although it has not become a model, certainly shows the importance that growing international competition can play for collective employment relations, especially for larger companies, which have the resources and capabilities to pursue independent strategies.

Industrial relations context and principal actors

In the early 2000s, Italian industrial relations remained anchored to the traditional system of social partner self-regulation. State intervention was limited and focused mainly on promotional measures of 'admission', with some 'corrective' interventions to achieve collective goals (Bordogna and Cella 1999), as in the case of the constraints imposed on wage bargaining by the incomes policy framework. Voluntarism still held sway, although under-institutionalisation had been remedied by specialisation and coordination rules introduced by the July 1993 tripartite agreement.

The same agreement had confirmed a long-lasting feature of the Italian representation system: the combination of bargaining and information and consultation entitlements in a single workplace structure. Following the model of the 'single channel' of representation, the July 1993 tripartite agreement extended and further detailed the representation system formerly envisaged by a 1991 framework deal signed by CGIL, CISL and UIL, which had introduced the Unitary Trade Union Workplace Representation Structure (Rappresentanza Sindacale Unitaria, RSU) as the general workplace representation body. The RSU is elected by all workers at an establishment on trade union lists presented by the organisations' signatories to the industrial agreement applied in the workplace and by other unions with at least 5 per cent support in the relevant establishment. The July 1993 tripartite agreement provided that one-third of the seats be reserved for the signatories of the industrial agreement applied in the establishment, as a means of enhancing coordination between industry and workplace levels. CGIL, CISL and UIL had committed to distributing such seats among themselves equally in order to strengthen inter-union solidarity. This reserved quota was abolished by the January 2014 joint text on representation signed by Confindustria, CGIL, CISL and UIL. Despite this change, the RSU remains an important organisational element in the overall coordination of the bargaining system.

Representative pluralism is a distinctive feature of the Italian system, which comprises among the highest number of peak associations in Europe, on both sides of industry (Pedersini and Welz 2014). The division between the three major trade union confederations follows political and cultural lines, with CGIL associated with the socialist and communist tradition, CISL with the social-Christian tradition and UIL with social democracy. Besides the three major confederations, independent unionism is widespread and related mainly to occupational unions and the public sector, often both at the same time. Independent unions are present in the private sector and in manufacturing. In manufacturing, probably the major example is the Independent Trade Union of Metalworkers and Related Industries (Sindacato Autonomo Metalmeccanici e Industrie Collegate, FISMIC), originally established as a company-level union in the Fiat car company in the 1950s and nowadays a signatory of the Fiat Group (FCA-CNH-Ferrari) first-level agreement, an adherent signatory of the metalworking industry agreement, as well as present in other industries.

There are a number of peak independent union confederations, including the General Union of Labour (Unione Generale del Lavoro, UGL) which can be associated with the conservative corporatist tradition, the Italian Confederation of Independent Workers' Trade Unions (Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Autonomi Lavoratori, CISAL) and the General Confederation of Independent Workers' Trade Unions (Confederazione Generale dei Sindacati Autonomi dei Lavoratori, CONFSAL), two confederations of traditional independent unions, and the Rank-and-file Workers' Union (Unione Sindacale di Base, USB), a radical left-wing confederation of grassroots unionism.

In the public sector, where the assessment of representativeness is formally required by legislation, with a 5 per cent threshold of the mean between the membership and the electoral results, as many as nine confederations were deemed representative for the 2016–2018 period. The latest elections for RSUs in public administration were

Table 16.2 **List of employers' associations in Italy**

Name	Full name	Organisational domain
Confindustria	Confederazione Generale dell'Industria Italiana (General Confederation of Italian Industry)	General representation of enterprises
Confcommercio	Confederazione Generale Italiana delle Imprese, delle Attività Professionali e del Lavoro Autonomo (Italian General Confederation of Enterprises, Professions and Self-Employment)	Particularly present in commerce, tourism and hospitality
Confesercenti	Confederazione Italiana Imprese Commerciali, Turistiche e dei Servizi (Italian Confederation of Trade, Tourism and Service Enterprises)	Particularly present in commerce, tourism and hospitality
Confartigianato	Formerly, Confederazione Generale Italiana dell'Artigianato (Italian General Confederation of Artisanal Enterprises), now Confartigianato-Imprese (Confartigianato-Enterprises)	Artisanal enterprises
CAN	Confederazione Nazionale dell'Artigianato e della Piccola e Media Impresa (National Confederation of Artisanal and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises)	Artisanal enterprises
Casartigani	Confederazione Autonoma Sindacati Artigiani (Independent Confederation of Artisanal Trades)	Artisanal enterprises
Legacoop	Lega Nazionale delle Cooperative e Mutue (National League of Cooperatives and Mutual Organisations)	Cooperatives
Confcooperative	Confederazione Cooperative Italiane (Confederation of Italian Cooperatives)	Cooperatives
AGCI	Associazione Generale delle Cooperative Italiane (General Association of Italian Cooperatives)	Cooperatives
CONFAPI	Confederazione Italiana della Piccola e Media Industria private (Italian Confederation of Small and Medium-sized Private Enterprises	Small- and medium-sized companies
CONFIMI INDUSTRIA	Confederazione dell'Industria Manifatturiera Italiana e dell'Impresa Privata (Confederation of Italian Manufacturing and Private Enterprises)	Private enterprises in various sectors

Source: Author's compilation.

held in April 2018. According to the first unofficial data published by the public sector trade union federations the unions affiliated to the three major confederations received some 70 per cent of the votes cast (ARAN 2019). In the private sector, although present, independent unions are far less important, especially in terms of seats in RSUs.

As far as the employers are concerned, the specialisation of representation, as well as traditional divisions along ideological lines, have contributed to shaping a pluralistic landscape. While Confindustria associates firms of all sizes and industries, other associations organise specific types of enterprises, as outlined in Table 16.2.

In recent years, two opposite trends have developed. First, traditional divisions based on ideological orientations faded away, as the political system was marked by the transformation or even dissolution of former major parties, such as the Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana, DC), the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI) and the Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano, PSI), following the 'clean hands' ('Mani pulite') scandals and investigations of the 1990s. In this direction, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the start of the transition to democracy and market economy of the former Soviet bloc played an important role too. The coming closer of the various organisations later led to the establishment of cartel alliances within the remit of SME representation, with the creation of R.ETE. Imprese Italia, which combines Confcommercio, Confesercenti, Confartigianato, CNA and Casartigiani, and among cooperative organisations with the establishment of the Alleanza per le Cooperative. Second, more recently, new organisations have emerged with no established representativeness, but nevertheless they are signatories of industrial agreements. This latter development led in late February 2018 to a call for the introduction of representativeness criteria for employers, besides those already introduced for unions, in order to hinder the multiplication of industry-wide agreements signed by organisations with uncertain representativeness and lower protection levels, so-called 'pirate agreements' (see below).

The traditional links between unions and political parties have been eroded since the 1960s and are nowadays rather weak. First, the mobilisation and strengthening of the trade union movement of the late 1960s helped labour organisations to assert their independence from their 'reference' parties, the PCI and the PSI for CGIL and the DC for CISL (Table 16.3). Second, as already mentioned, the overhaul of the political system that took place during the 1990s led to the disappearance of the reference parties. Today, although a certain closeness remains between the major trade unions and the centre-left of the political spectrum, there are no systematic or tight links and the unions, especially CGIL, have harshly criticised some of the reforms introduced by recent centre-left governments, especially the 2015 Renzi government's Jobs Act.

Table 16.3 **Major trade union confederations in Italy (membership and density 2017)**

	Active workers	Retired	Total
CGIL	2,654,730	2,545,000	5,199,730
CISL	2,329,085	1,711,738	4,040,823
UIL	1,682,983	573,091	2,256,074
Total	6,666,798	4,829,829	11,496,627
Density	37.7%	–	–

Source: Websites of CGIL, CISL e UIL, accessed on 19 June 2018.

Table 16.4 **Major employer confederations in Italy (enterprises and association rate,* 2009)**

	Firms <50 employees		Firms >50 employees		Total	
	Number	Rate	Number	Rate	Number	Rate
Confindustria	127,791	29.4	21,497	71.9	149,288	32.1
Artisanal firms**	549,368	37.5	–	–	549,368	37.5
Commerce***	321,354	21.6	–	–	321,354	21.6

Notes: * % members out of total firms in the respective industries; ** Confartigianato, CNA, Casartigiani; *** Confcommercio, Confesercenti.
Source: Feltrin and Zan (2014), Table 1.9, p. 83.

Employment relations in public administration have been affected by radical transformations since the early 1990s (Bordogna 2016). Nevertheless, they maintain some distinctive characteristics, which are clearly linked to the public nature of the employer. The first important change took place in 1993, when Legislative Decree 29/1993 introduced the principle that private law provisions will cover public employment, which will also be regulated by individual and collective contracts, thereby substantially reducing the role that legislation had formerly played in this field. Such changes did not eliminate the many specificities that characterised public employment, for instance, in terms of job security, trade union representation and restructuring processes. A number of further reforms followed to clarify and extend the scope of such 'contractualisation' of public employment. Altogether, these reforms tried to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of public administration by bringing employment relations in line with those of the private sector. The employer role was entrusted to an independent agency, the Agency for the Representation of Public Administrations in Collective Bargaining (Agenzia per la Rappresentanza Negoziale delle Pubbliche Amministrazioni, ARAN), in order to better distinguish managerial and political responsibilities. Collective bargaining became the standard way to regulate employment, under strict budget constraints, to keep personnel expenditure under control. The public administration adopted the two-level bargaining structure sanctioned by the July 1993 tripartite agreement for the private sector, including with a view to supporting performance improvements at workplace level. The results of the reform did not fully meet expectations, in terms of either improved performance or better financial control. The persistence of financial pressures, as well as the stronger emphasis on managerial prerogatives in the public administration supported by the centre-right governments, led to a reform that reduced the scope of trade union representation and collective bargaining in 2009. The blockade of collective bargaining, the freeze of individual wages and the cap on turnover introduced in 2010 brought the system almost to a complete halt. The formal relaunch of collective bargaining in 2016 led to the signing of new agreements only at the end of 2017 and beginning of 2018.

Extent of bargaining

Despite the significant variations in the institutional and relational context of industrial relations and collective bargaining depicted above, the basic collective bargaining indi-

cators remained essentially stable. As far as the extent of bargaining is concerned, in a two-tier system such as Italy's we need to look at the coverage of both industrial collective agreements and second level agreements, which are usually signed at company level.

The first institutional element that we must consider is that no legal extension mechanism is in place for multi-employer agreements. Although Article 39.4 of the Italian Constitution envisages such a possibility, it has never been enacted because it would require the establishment of a formal procedure for registering trade unions and they have always been against legislative intervention in this field.

A well-established jurisprudential argument, however, has consistently adopted minimum wage levels set in industrial agreements as the yardstick to assess the appropriateness of actual wages in case of dispute. Article 36 of the Italian Constitution establishes that 'workers have the right to remuneration commensurate with the quantity and quality of their work and, in all cases, to an adequate remuneration ensuring them and their families a free and dignified existence' (Article 36.1). It is broadly accepted that such jurisprudence has served to promote the voluntary application of collectively-agreed minimum wage rates by employers who are not affiliated to signatory organisations. It should be stressed that this refers to the application of minimum wage rates only, whereas none of the other normative provisions on employment terms and working conditions included in multi-employer deals are covered.

Moreover, the presence of a plurality of employer associations and trade union federations in any specific industry, including a number of independent organisations on both sides, produces a multiplicity of agreements. This provides scope for variations of wages and employment relations in the same industry. For instance, a recent survey carried out by the National Institute of Statistics (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, ISTAT) identifies 200 'main' industrial collective agreements applied in private sector firms with at least 10 employees (CNEL and ISTAT 2016). The official register of industrial collective agreements maintained by the National Council of the Economy and Labour (Consiglio Nazionale dell'Economia e del Lavoro, CNEL) recorded as many as 884 valid industry agreements in September 2018 (CNEL 2018), with an increase of over 100 per cent since the almost 400 agreements of 2008 (Olini 2016). Such a multiplication of collective agreements has lately brought into the debate the issue of the assessment of employers' representativeness, whereas the administrative difficulties involved in implementing the cross-industry agreements on trade union representativeness are fuelling support for legislation in this area. Indeed, the cross-industry agreement on collective bargaining signed by CGIL, CISL, UIL and Confindustria on 9 March 2018 underlines the need to extend the certification of representativeness to employer associations and aims to stop the proliferation of industrial agreements signed by organisations lacking representativeness.

The absence of official time-series data on the coverage of industrial collective agreements makes it particularly difficult to identify levels and trends in the extent of bargaining. The importance of industrial relations at national level and the abovementioned institutional support provided by the rules on 'appropriate' wage levels have always suggested high coverage rates. Estimates on bargaining coverage in recent decades

have been consistently stable at around 80 per cent of all employees. The stability of employer associational membership at about 60 per cent and of trade union density at around 35 per cent (see Appendix A1); the resilience of industry-wide agreements as the pivotal element of the bargaining structure; and the persistent reference to collective agreements for assessing the appropriateness of wages all indicate continuity in high coverage levels. Recent survey data collected by ISTAT confirm such a view, as they put coverage levels at very high levels. In particular, data collected in 2012–2013 indicate that coverage in private companies (excluding agriculture) with at least 10 employees is above 90 per cent (CNEL and ISTAT 2016).

If the coverage of the economic terms of collective agreements can be regarded as very high – at least above the relatively low threshold of 10 employees in private enterprises – second-level bargaining has far lower coverage and is certainly linked to size. Overall, some 21 per cent of enterprises with at least 10 employees are covered by decentralised agreements. The share of covered enterprises increases from 18 per cent for smaller-sized firms (10–49 employees) to above almost 70 per cent in the larger ones, with at least 500 employees (Table 16.5). If we consider coverage in terms of employees, it has been estimated that decentralised agreements affect some 34 per cent of the overall private sector workforce, including micro-firms below 10 employees and excluding agriculture and household workers (Birindelli 2016).

Because these data are based on a one-off exercise, no longitudinal data are available and no specific comparison is possible. The only reference is a similar study on pay, work flexibility and company-level bargaining carried out by ISTAT on the same reference population in 1995–1996 (ISTAT 2000). At that time, the overall diffusion of company agreements involved 10 per cent of private-sector firms with at least 10 employees, and almost 40 per cent of their respective employees. The current study covers territorial agreements, too, which are particularly important in construction, tourism and the artisanal industry, where SMEs prevail. Because the study puts the coverage of territorial agreements at 8 per cent of enterprises, company agreements involve a slightly larger share of firms compared with 1995–1996, namely 13 per cent compared with 10 per cent. Although the two datasets are not strictly comparable, the results seem to indicate overall stability, with no particular signs of erosion or diffusion of decentralised bargaining.

Table 16.5 **Extent of decentralised collective bargaining by size and industry, Italy, 2012–2013 (% of enterprises)**

	10–49	50–199	200–499	500 and over	Total
Manufacturing	19.7	46.4	75.6	86.0	25.1
Construction	25.9	41.0	63.8	72.6	27.1
Market services	14.0	32.7	49.5	59.4	17.1
Social and personal services	15.2	27.1	41.8	59.0	18.3
Total	17.5	38.5	60.5	69.1	21.2

Source: CNEL and ISTAT (2016).

In the public sector the coverage of both industrial and decentralised levels can be considered to be 100 per cent.

Although the role of trade union density is certainly important in supporting the resilience of the extent of industrial collective bargaining in Italy, the importance of membership in employers' associations seems crucial in explaining the high coverage in SMEs. The long tradition and well-established institutions of employer representation in the artisanal industry, in retail, commerce and tourism, and in construction provide a solid footing for industry-based employment relations, as well as for territorial second-level bargaining, although it does not cover all regions or provinces in the relevant industries. The presence of decentralised collective agreements at company level is almost directly linked to the presence of union members and of a local workplace union structure (Table 16.4).

Security of bargaining

The Italian Constitution recognises the role of trade unions and collective bargaining, although the specific provisions on the general, *erga omnes*, effectiveness of industrial agreements have never been implemented. The freedom of trade union association (Art. 39) and the right to strike (Art. 40) provide the basic legal framework in which trade union representation and action can develop. The right to strike is considered an individual right, which must be exercised collectively, so that it has to be organised by a group of workers. In practice, this means that the role of trade unions in industrial conflict is clearly recognised. The exercise of the right to strike is regulated in essential public services run by either public or private operators. Essential public services are those that concern rights protected by the Italian Constitution, so that a balance must be found if a clash emerges between equally guaranteed rights. This happens, for instance, in health care, where the right to receive assistance and care must be accommodated with the right to strike of doctors and nurses. Essential public services include transport, health care, education and the courts, among others. In these cases, special rules must be observed when calling a strike in terms of notice period, duration and guarantee of minimum standards, covering, for instance, emergency services in hospitals or local commuter transport in peak hours.

As in voluntarist systems, the regulation of industrial relations is essentially left to the autonomy of the social partners, with a fundamental role played by the bargaining power of the two parties, depending on the various phases of economic and political cycles. The Workers' Statute (Statuto dei Lavoratori, Law No. 300 of 20 May 1970), however, introduced important provisions to reinforce individual workers', as well as trade union rights. In the section on workers' freedoms and dignity, for example, the Workers' Statute provides that a trade union representative may assist employees in individual disputes. As for trade union freedoms, it asserts the right to establish and join a trade union and carry out trade union activities at the workplace. It defines as discriminatory any sanctions or differential treatment based on participation in trade union activities. It specifies protection against unlawful individual dismissals, which originally provided for the reinstatement of workers and now mainly envisages economic redress; and

it provides specific procedures and sanctions in case of anti-union behaviour by employers hampering union freedoms and the right to strike. Moreover, it established a set of trade union prerogatives in workplaces with more than 15 employees (or five in agriculture). These include the possibility that unions signatory to collective agreements applied in the workplace can set up a trade union representation structure and that union representatives can organise workers' assemblies and referenda and have paid and unpaid time off to perform union tasks, including in territorial and national union bodies. Such a fundamental piece of legislation, which was passed at a crucial juncture for Italian labour relations, certainly contributed to strengthening trade union and bargaining security and to consolidating the industrial relations system.

Since the early 2000s, legislation has mainly confirmed the role of collective bargaining, in two ways. First, a number of provisions on work flexibility, including the utilisation of non-standard work or the definition of working time arrangements, envisage that collective bargaining shall define implementation rules, so that specific work flexibility instruments can be activated only through collective agreements. Similarly, legislation sometimes allows collective agreements to introduce more flexible rules in specific areas. Collective agreements, for instance, may establish higher thresholds for the utilisation of fixed-term work or indicate which tasks and positions may be covered through 'collaboration contracts', a sort of semi-subordinate freelance contract that remains under the coordination of the employer. Second, a number of economic incentives have been introduced to support the diffusion of decentralised company bargaining on performance-related pay and welfare benefits via the reduction of taxation and/or social contributions on such collectively agreed economic elements.

A highly controversial regulation, Art. 8 of decree law 138 of 2011, may also be seen as contributing to foster the role of decentralised bargaining, although in the very specific manner of derogating general rules, with the potential for the 'extreme' flexibilisation of work arrangements, without any form of higher-level coordination (Imberti 2013). This legal provision was introduced after a joint letter by the then Presidents of the European Central Bank and the Bank of Italy, Jean-Claude Trichet and Mario Draghi, was sent to the Italian government in early August 2011 to demand, among other things, stronger decentralisation of the bargaining structure. The new piece of legislation entrusts local actors with signing agreements in the form of 'proximity agreements' that may be concluded at both company and territorial levels, and to derogate industrial deals and, to a certain extent, even legislation. It is possible to introduce derogations if a deal is aimed at supporting or preserving employment, enhancing the quality of employment contracts, promoting employee participation, combating undeclared work, improving competitiveness and wages, managing industrial reorganisation and restructuring, supporting investment and launching new economic initiatives. The social partners, particularly the trade unions, have harshly criticised the norm, because it could erode and even disrupt the existing industrial relations system by jeopardising the bargaining coordination mechanisms. Similar criticism has been directed at later pieces of legislation, including the so-called Jobs Act of 2015, which entrusts all bargaining levels with the same prerogatives to complement or specify legislative provisions. This new approach has abandoned the traditional precedence assigned to industrial bargaining, which maintained the main regulatory power, while

decentralised agreements had only an implementation role, within the framework set by industry agreements.

In the area of union representation, one important novelty in the early 1990s was the introduction of the RSU, with the aim of replacing the workplace representation bodies introduced by the Workers' Statute (Workplace Trade Union Representation Structure, Rappresentanza sindacale aziendale, RSA). While the latter represent individual unions, the RSU brings all the workplace unions into a single structure and is therefore supposed to facilitate negotiations. In particular, the July 1993 agreement regulated this new joint representation structure in order to ensure a better connection between the local representation structures and the industrial unions that are signatories to the industry-wide agreement applied in the workplace.

More recently, since 2011, joint regulation by social partners has introduced a set of rules on representation and representativeness, with a view to clarifying the framework for collective bargaining and strengthening the effectiveness of agreements. Such rules have been defined at cross-industry level and therefore follow the articulation of employer representation, so that we can find different arrangements depending on the signatory parties. The reference framework has been defined between Confindustria and the confederal unions CGIL, CISL and UIL through a set of agreements signed between 2011 and 2014. These agreements, which include the single text on representation of January 2014, provide the rules for participation in negotiations on national industrial agreements, as well as on the validity of decentralised agreements and include procedural norms on renewals and peace clauses.

In Italy, trade unions are not involved in the administration or provision of unemployment benefits, as in the Ghent system. The role of social partners and industrial relations in the welfare and vocational systems, however, has increased in the past two decades or so. Besides holding some institutional representation in the

Table 16.6 **Trade union representation structures and employers' association rate by size and industry, Italy (% of enterprises)**

	10–49	50–199	200–499	500 and over	Total
RSU	7.5	34.7	58.8	61.5	12.1
RSA	8.4	28.3	41.8	57.6	11.8
EWC	0.1	0.9	3.9	10.3	0.4
Eos	43.9	69.9	81.4	85.2	48.0
	Manufacturing	Construction	Market services	Social and personal services	Total
RSU	21.4	7.2	6.5	7.3	12.1
RSA	13.3	8.9	10.6	16.2	11.8
EWC	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4
Eos	58.8	50.6	38.8	47.6	48.0

Source: CNEL and ISTAT (2016).

governing bodies of certain social security and welfare institutions, the social partners have become progressively more important in the definition of welfare benefits, starting with the introduction of supplementary pensions at the industry level in the 1990s. In recent years, industrial contractual health funds have become increasingly common. Moreover, the social partners jointly manage cross-industry training funds introduced in 2000, which administer the proceeds of a special wage-bill contribution to provide the employees of affiliated companies with continuing vocational training.

Indeed, a special system of providing and administering welfare benefits through joint 'bilateral' bodies has been traditionally present in certain industries dominated by SMEs, such as the artisanal industry. During the recent economic crisis, this system was reinforced and extended to new industries and showed a tendency to become a general model, also because of increasing recognition and support from the public authorities.

The presence of workplace trade union representation structures is a supportive institutional feature of company bargaining. According to available data, trade union representation structures are established in some 20 per cent of enterprises with at least 10 employees. RSAs are as common as RSUs, although the two types of structure are distributed differently across industries, with RSUs more common in manufacturing and RSAs in services. EWCs are active in some 10 per cent of larger companies and in 4 per cent of medium-sized enterprises (Table 16.6).

Similarly, membership in employer associations is an essential element in supporting the coverage and diffusion of multi-employer collective bargaining. Data show that almost half of all enterprises with at least 10 employees are affiliated to employer associations, peaking at 85 per cent for the larger ones. Manufacturing firms are more often members of employer organisations, while those in market services are less likely to be affiliated (Table 16.6).

Level of bargaining

In Italy, there are various bargaining levels, related to the content of negotiations and the industry. The pivotal role in regulating the employment relationship is traditionally played by industry agreements, which can be supplemented by secondary-level agreements, notably at company level. Secondary-level bargaining has both an integrative character, represented mainly by negotiations on performance-related pay and, lately, by deals on company welfare, and a normative one, for implementing industrial provisions and adapting them to local circumstance (notably regarding the various dimensions of work flexibility, such as working hours and schedules, tasks and job classifications, as well as the use of non-standard work).

Within this general system, other important bargaining levels are cross-industry bargaining, especially for setting general rules on industrial relations and collective bargaining, or some special topics, such as apprenticeships and training. No wage negotiations take place at this level. Employer representational domains structure these

negotiations and thus there are separate bargaining units that involve, among others, Confindustria and various employer associations covering SMEs and cooperatives in manufacturing and artisanal industry, as well as in trade and services. On the workers' side, the trade union confederations CGIL, CISL and UIL are the main bargaining parties. In addition, the traditional secondary level of negotiations in certain industries, such as construction, is local territorial bargaining (instead of the company level). In particular, second-level negotiations take place at provincial level in agriculture and tourism and at regional level for artisanal firms.

As already mentioned, tripartite social pacts played an important role in collective bargaining in the 1990s, but since then they have become less frequent and relevant. In the 1990s, social pacts covered key topics such as wages, labour costs and the bargaining structure (1990, 1991, 1992, 1993), employment and development policies (1994 and 1998), the pension system (1995) and labour market reform (1996). After 1998, governments sought the agreement of social partners on fewer occasions and negotiations became more difficult. Centre-right governments reaffirmed their autonomy and refused to adopt tripartite relations as the standard approach in devising employment and social policies. Additionally, divisions emerged among the trade unions about the opportunity to engage in talks with the centre-right governments, notably on policies such as labour market deregulation. In some cases, CGIL did not sign the agreements: for example, in 2002 on labour market reform, and in 2009 on the revision of the bargaining system. In 2007, an agreement was signed on the welfare system with the centre-left government in office at that time (Carrieri 2008). After 2009, governments, irrespective of their political composition, rarely involved the social partners in talks about new policies and initiatives. Indeed, the quite broad pension and labour market reforms of 2011 and 2015, respectively, were not discussed with the social partners. Tripartism, in sum, characterised a relatively brief phase of Italian industrial relations and there are no particular signs of its revitalisation.

In contrast to the reduced importance of tripartism at national level, it is worth mentioning that the involvement of social partners in policymaking and implementation at local level can be substantial, although it is variable and depends on local traditions and circumstances. Such involvement takes place at regional level, as it depends on the regulatory competences of regional administrations. It often covers labour market policies, with a special emphasis on requalification and placement, but it can more broadly concern vocational training and education, social policies, and industrial and innovation policies.

As a two-tier bargaining system, the issue of vertical coordination between the industrial and the decentralised levels is key. The lack of a legally enforceable favourability principle (Treu 2017) has made joint regulation by the social partners particularly important. Cross-industry agreements, as well as industry agreements have introduced a number of principles and explicit rules to ensure that decentralisation takes place in an orderly and organised manner. Conversely, legal regulation has lately jeopardised the traditional hierarchy between industrial and decentralised deals by establishing equal regulatory power of all bargaining levels, thereby confirming the lack of any favourability principle, but reversing formerly well-established practices.

As a consequence, vertical coordination remains anchored to the rules laid down in cross-industry and industry agreements. The joint text on representation of January 2014, signed by Confindustria, CGIL, CISL and UIL, provides that company bargaining take place on the matters and according to the procedures laid down in industry agreements or in law. Decentralised agreements are valid if signed by the majority of RSU delegates or by the RSA representing the majority of union members. Company agreements can derogate from industrial agreements, including in an experimental and temporary manner, to support growth and employment creation. Derogatory agreements must be concluded in accordance with the procedure laid down in the relevant industry agreement. Negotiations typically involve the workplace representation bodies, as well as the territorial structures of the organisations signatory to the industrial agreement applied in the workplace. Derogations can concern job tasks, working time and work organisation (see Security of bargaining) and they cannot affect basic wages and, typically, other fixed elements of pay, such as seniority.

The main instrument of horizontal coordination is the preservation of the purchasing power of wages, as assigned by the cross-industry agreement of January 2009 to industry agreements. This means that basic wage rates are expected to move in line with inflation in all industries. Because the rules and practices of establishing pay rises across industries are not homogeneous, such coordination still allows room for differences across industries. Pattern bargaining, which has traditionally seen the metalworking agreement acting as reference, is currently weak and differences in regulatory patterns across industries are increasing.

Depth of bargaining

The depth of bargaining concerns the internal organisation of trade unions and employer associations. Employer associations tend to assign to representative bodies responsibility for decisions about collective negotiations and agreements, without establishing special procedures for consulting individual members. On the trade union side, it is possible to distinguish a set of processes that accompany and aid in the preparation of the different bargaining rounds. These involve various union structures, from national secretariats to territorial and workplace representation bodies. In particular, drawing up the platform of demands for the renewal of industrial agreements usually involves extensive consultations within the organisational structure on a draft prepared by the national bargaining committee. This committee includes delegations from the various unions that jointly participate in the bargaining round, such as the industrial federations of the confederations CGIL, CISL and UIL. The final platform of demands at the outset of negotiations, as well as the text of the preliminary agreement at the end of the negotiations are then submitted to the workers, in assemblies or referenda, for their approval.

Formally, the industry federations' statutes can establish different procedures for the consultation of workers and restrict them to members or extend them to all workers. The general rule, often included in confederation statutes, is that members shall be involved and consulted in all phases of the negotiation process, from preparation

to assessment of the final results, but variations may exist. The CGIL-affiliated metalworkers' union FIOM, for instance, envisages that all workers covered by any platform of demands or collective agreements shall be consulted through referenda (Statute, Art. 7.e), whereas the CISL-affiliated metalworkers union FIM indicates that union members shall be consulted (Regulation, Art. 2). In practice, consultation over platforms and preliminary agreements is usually carried out in assemblies of all workers. If a vote takes place, it can be reserved to union members, but this can vary depending on the circumstances and the traditions of individual workplaces. In any case, various and extensive procedures are in place to ensure the involvement of members and workers in the different phases of negotiations, both for industrial agreements and even more so for company deals.

Degree of control of collective agreements

The degree of control is relatively high and articulated around the role played by local and workplace delegates. The combination of the broad scope of bargaining (see next section) and coordination between industrial and decentralised levels ensures detailed regulation of the employment relationship by collective bargaining. Individual and collective disputes about the application of collective agreements are dealt with directly by the company management and the workplace representation structures, without any formal procedures. If no agreement is reached at workplace level, the controversies are reported to the territorial structures of the signatories and, if no solution is found locally, to national organisations.

Clegg's (1976) broad definition of collective bargaining is particularly apt to describe practice in Italy. The substantial lack of formal arbitration or conciliation procedures related to the implementation of collective agreements makes day-to-day monitoring and negotiations crucial for the correct and full application of agreements. Moreover, individual grievance procedures envisage voluntary assistance by trade union representatives, which may be mandatory in case of the application of collectively agreed provisions. This also contributes to strengthen the degree of control.

Having said that, it must be underlined that such a system is fully in place only where trade union representatives and decentralised collective bargaining are present. Because their diffusion in the private sector is relatively limited (see Table 16.5), this weakens the overall depth and degree of control. At the same time, the enforcement system includes the labour inspectorate and the judiciary. Labour inspectors and judges, as part of their respective responsibilities, have to verify the proper implementation of the relevant collective agreements, besides ensuring the enforcement of legislation. These administrative and judicial enforcement mechanisms, however, suffer from important limitations, due to the necessarily partial coverage of inspections and the dependence on individual law suits.

The crucial importance of workplace trade union representation in ensuring the effective administration of collective agreements points to a marked difference between the private and the public sector. The virtually complete coverage of representation and

decentralised bargaining in public administration means that the degree of control of collective agreements is highest there.

Scope of agreements

The scope of industrial collective agreements is fairly broad and covers all dimensions of the employment relationship, from recruitment to termination, as well as industrial relations and trade union prerogatives. Typically, an industry agreement includes a first section on the industrial relations system in the industry, which, for instance, defines information and consultation rights and establishes a number of joint committees on topics such as training, equal opportunities, health and safety. A second section usually covers trade union rights and prerogatives, building on the provisions of the Workers' Statute. It covers the premises and facilities that must be granted to workplace trade union structures, time off, the rights to organise assemblies and provide information to workers, and job protection for union representatives. On substantive matters, the agreement specifies the activities it covers, its duration and renewal timing and procedure. It can include a special clause on the after-effects of the agreement and what happens if no renewal is signed.

A substantial part of each industrial agreement is devoted to regulating the individual employment relationship. It generally includes provisions on recruitment, probation, employment contracts, job classification, working time, wages and other pay elements, performance-related pay, welfare benefits, disciplinary procedures and sanctions, resignation and dismissal. The regulation afforded by collective agreements is quite broad and detailed. This means that, in unionised workplaces with a trade union workplace structure, the administration of the collective agreement requires continuous activities and exchanges between the trade union representatives and the company management.

Table 16.7 **Topics included in company agreements, Italy, 2012–2013 (% of enterprises)**

Topic	Percentage
Fixed pay elements	61.1
Performance-related pay	58.9
Working time and work organisation	50.7
Vocational training	44.6
Welfare benefits	38.5
Restructuring and reorganisation	31.9
Employment contracts	25.3
Industrial relations and union prerogatives	24.7
Job classification	22.8
Equal opportunities	15.7

Source: CNEL and ISTAT (2016).

Although they also cover a broad range of issues, secondary-level agreements focus on more specific topics (OCSEL 2018; Pavolini *et al*. 2013). According to the available data company agreements mainly cover economic issues and performance related pay. Other bargaining issues appearing in many company agreements include working time and work organisation, vocational training and, lately, welfare benefits (Table 16.7).

Conclusions

Since the early 2000s, industrial relations in Italy have been marked by the partial erosion of the importance of the social partners in national policymaking; a change in the balance between industrial and company agreements, with more scope for decentralisation and potentially for derogations from higher-level deals; and a transformation of the content of collective agreements, with significant wage moderation, a growing focus on work flexibility and performance-related pay, and the increasing prominence of contractual welfare benefits.

The basic indicators of industrial relations remained essentially stable. Trade union density, after the steady decrease from the peak of around 50 per cent in the late 1970s, stabilised at some 34 per cent in the early 2000s and thereafter it has even marginally increased. The extension of industrial bargaining remains quite high and covers almost all firms with 10 employees and more, according to recent official data. At the same time, the shift to decentralised bargaining is yet to happen, as secondary-level coverage has been stable during the past two decades. The change in the content of bargaining and especially the combination of wage moderation at industry level, more performance-related pay at decentralised level and more contractual welfare benefits, seem to accommodate the transformation of the economic environment, with increased competition and retrenchment of public welfare. In the context of more intense and international competition, the employers' association rate has remained relatively stable, although in this case longitudinal data are hard to find. Conversely, the defections of Fiat and other companies, as well as the signs of fragmentation of the employer representation system signal the emergence of potential fractures in the overall industrial relations system, which should be taken into consideration (Bellardi 2016).

The double-dip recession that hit the country between 2008 and 2014 and the sluggish recovery thereafter have resulted in increased poverty rates and growing inequality (see Appendix A1). Employment has risen, but unemployment remains high at around 11 per cent. Low productivity remains a structural problem, which hampers the prospects of economic growth and wage developments. The government established with a post-electoral deal between the Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle, M5S) and the League (Lega) in early June 2018, after a long negotiation phase, has introduced a number of initiatives in the field of labour market regulation. These concern the implementation of more constraints on non-standard employment, the possibility to anticipate retirement over a three-year period and income support measures, with the introduction of a citizen's income. Moreover, the introduction of a legal minimum wage may also come onto the government's agenda in the near future. This programme must

take into consideration the rules of the EU Stability and Growth Pact and the European Semester, however. From the point of view of industrial relations, it is not clear whether the government will try to re-establish some sort of social concertation or will continue with the substantially unilateral stance that has characterised recent governments. Due to the content of the announced measures, which are certainly controversial among the social partners, and to the political attitude of the governing parties, which seem to prefer engaging directly with their constituencies rather than with intermediate representative actors, no substantial resumption of tripartism at national level seems in sight.

In any case, bipartite industrial relations will probably continue along the lines of reshaping the relationship between industrial and decentralised agreements within a system of organised decentralisation. In this, the major social partners may support the introduction of legislative rules on the representativeness of both unions and employers, with a view to reinforcing the effectiveness of collective agreements and increasing the transparency and reliability of collective representation and joint regulation. A number of underlying issues remain to be addressed, notably the diffusion of secondary-level agreements, which is a fundamental question in the rebalancing of the two-tier bargaining system; the potential role of wage developments in supporting growth and reducing inequality; and the promotion of participatory practices at workplace level, which have long been discussed as a possible means of increasing productivity in the public debate, but in practice have never become a key issue in Italian industrial relations.

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Abbreviations

AGCI	Associazione Generale delle Cooperative Italiane (General Association of Italian Cooperatives)
ARAN	Agenzia per la Rappresentanza Negoziale delle Pubbliche Amministrazioni (Agency for the Representation of Public Administrations in Collective Bargaining)
ASAP	Associazione Sindacale Aziende Petrolifere (Employer Association of Petroleum Enterprises)
Casartigiani	Confederazione Autonoma Sindacati Artigiani (Independent Confederation of Artisanal Trades)
CGIL	Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (Italian General Confederation of Labour)
CISAL	Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Autonomi Lavoratori (Italian Confederation of Independent Workers' Trade Unions)
CISL	Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori (Italian Confederation of Workers' Trade Unions)
CNA	Confederazione Nazionale dell'Artigianato e della Piccola e Media Impresa (National Confederation of Artisanal and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises)
CNEL	Consiglio Nazionale dell'Economia e del Lavoro (National Council of the Economy and Labour)
CONFAPI	Confederazione Italiana della Piccola e Media Industria privata (Italian Confederation of Small and Medium-sized Private Enterprises)
Confartigianato	Formerly, Confederazione Generale Italiana dell'Artigianato (Italian General Confederation of Artisanal Enterprises), now Confartigianato-Imprese (Confartigianato-Enterprises)
Confcommercio	Confederazione Generale Italiana delle Imprese, delle Attività Professionali e del Lavoro Autonomo (Italian General Confederation of Enterprises, Professions and Self-Employment, also known as Confcommercio-Imprese per l'Italia)
Confcooperative	Confederazione Cooperative Italiane (Confederation of Italian Cooperatives)
Confesercenti	Confederazione Italiana Imprese Commerciali, Turistiche e dei Servizi (Italian Confederation of Trade, Tourism and Service Enterprises)
Confindustria	Confederazione Generale dell'Industria Italiana (General Confederation of Italian Industry)
CONFSAL	Confederazione Generale dei Sindacati Autonomi dei Lavoratori (General Confederation of Independent Workers' Trade Unions)
DC	Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats)

FIM	Federazione Italiana Metalmeccanici (Italian Federation of Metalworkers)
FIOM	Federazione Impiegati Operai Metalmeccanici (Federation of Blue- and White-collar Metalworkers)
FISMIC	Sindacato Autonomo Metalmeccanici e Industrie Collegate (Independent Trade Union of Metalworkers and Related Industries)
FLM	Federazione Lavoratori Metalmeccanici (Federation of Metalworkers)
FULC	Federazione Unitaria Lavoratori Chimici (Unitary Federation of Chemical Workers)
Intersind	Associazione Sindacale Intersind (Employer Associations of State-owned Enterprises)
ISTAT	Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (National Institute of Statistics)
Legacoop	Lega Nazionale delle Cooperative e Mutue (National League of Cooperatives and Mutual Organisations)
PCI	Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)
PSI	Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)
RSA	Rappresentanza sindacale aziendale (Workplace Trade Union Representation Structure)
RSU	Rappresentanza Sindacale Unitaria (Unitary Trade Union Workplace Representation Structure)
UGL	Unione Generale del Lavoro (General Union of Labour)
UIL	Unione Italiana del Lavoro (Italian Union of Labour)
USB	Unione Sindacale di Base (Rank-and-file Workers' Union)