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The impact of care, gender and migration regimes on
migrant domestic work: a quantitative analysis at the European level

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Introduction

In the last decades, paid domestic work – which in its broad definition includes both housework and care work – has received increased attention in Europe, both at the academic and the policy level. The reasons for the increased attention paid to this often ‘invisible’ segment of the labour market are not only linked to the overall increase of the domestic sector in most European countries and globally, but also to the problems raised by this type of work, which, for a variety of reasons, seems to be different from any other employment relationship. On the one hand, the economic and societal changes that have occurred in the last few decades – the growing inequalities in the new global economy, but also among developed countries; societal, economic and demographic changes, such as the transformations in family models, the increased female participation in the labour market and the ageing of the population; and the general erosion of welfare states, among others – are often pointed as the main factors that have contributed to the increased externalisation of domestic activities. This, coupled with the tension generated by the persistent gendered division of labour, has generated a rich debate on the consequences of the externalisation of domestic services and also on its implications in terms of gender, class and race.

On the other hand, as highlighted by scholars, paid domestic work is different from other employment relationships, because it is performed in the private sphere, because it is based on a gendered and very private form of power relationships, because it is linked to the concept of *dirtiness* and because it involves both physical and emotional labour (Anderson, 2000; Lutz, 2008, 2010; Triandafyllidou and Marchetti, 2015). Additionally, some scholars have stressed that domestic work tends to raise questions of inequality – among couples, between the employer and the domestic worker and between wealthier and poorer regions of the world –, because it recalls the concept of servitude (Rollins, 1985; Cox, 2006) and because it can hardly be separated from the unpaid work traditionally performed by women. This partly

explains the fact that the attempts made by European governments for professionalising domestic work have generally failed. Even when domestic work is remunerated and even if today it is a recognised sector of the labour market in all European countries, it is generally characterised by the persistence of a low reputation, low value and poor working conditions. Despite this widespread low recognition of the importance of domestic services, significant differences exist between European countries, which have stimulated the academic interest. Scholarship on domestic work has emphasised both continuities with the past and emerging trends at European level, albeit with cross-country differences. While the massive concentration of women in domestic services and the persistence of poor working conditions in the sector represent the main continuities compared to the past¹, the main changes have occurred in the workforce composition. If the ‘profile’ of domestic workers seems to be more differentiated in terms of education and age (more and more highly educated migrants, from different backgrounds and of different ages), the most striking change of contemporary paid domestic work is its *ethnicisation*. According to the literature, in many European countries housework and care work are more and more performed by international migrants, so that the phenomenon of ‘migrant domestic work’ has been pointed as a new global theme (Parreñas, 2001; Lutz, 2008, 2010; Sarti, 2008; Yeates, 2009; Anderson and Shutes, 2014; Williams, 2014).

Although migrant domestic work is generally considered an emerging European phenomenon, the *ethnicisation* of domestic services across Europe is uneven, so that it has been defined as a ‘converging variation’ (Williams, 2012). The substantial difference between European countries in the proportion of the migrant labour force in the domestic sector – which, according to the EU-LFS 2015, varies from little more than 1% in some Eastern European countries to 65% in Cyprus and 50% in Italy, for instance – represents one of the most puzzling features of contemporary domestic work, and leads to at least two meaningful sorts of questions. First, in the light of these differences, can we really speak of a convergence among European countries with respect to the *ethnicisation* of the domestic labour force? Are countries with lower shares of migrant domestic workers simply at an earlier stage of a change that will eventually occur everywhere, at least in Europe? Or, is the different concentration of migrants a structural feature specific to each country? Second, which are the factors that determine these variations? Do these factors – if any can be identified – contribute

¹ As discussed in Chapter 1, a clear separation between continuities and discontinuities can be inaccurate, as certain features that appear to be new might have been visible at certain times in history. The feminisation of the domestic sector, for instance, can be considered a continuity of a trend that only started in the nineteenth century.

to a convergence towards a homogeneous domestic sector, or to a further diversification as to how paid domestic sector is not only regulated, but also conceived?

To answer these questions, different perspectives can be adopted, that focus on micro, meso and/or macro approaches. In the literature on domestic work, micro perspectives can be useful for understanding the role of individual choices of both client/families (the choice to externalise or not domestic tasks, family strategies about child rearing and care for dependent people, professional choices and life trajectories) and domestic workers themselves (individual preferences and professional strategies, life course events, migration trajectories when relevant, and so on). Similarly, examples of meso analyses in the field of domestic work proved to bring about important contributions, as they acknowledge the role of social networks and of the community at large² in generating outcomes in the domestic sector.

Without neglecting the importance of networks and agency in the making of individual choices and preferences of both domestic workers and the families that employ them, this research focuses on macro-structural elements that are thought to have an impact on the main features of paid domestic work, so as to contribute to explaining some of the cross-country differences in Europe.

The macro factors that are taken into consideration throughout this study are the care, gender and migration regimes, as defined by Lutz (2008, 2010). The broad concept of ‘regimes’ refers not only to the institutional context and state policies, but also “to cultures and practices, legacies, to major forms of social relations of power and inequality inherent in that domain” (Williams, 2014, p. 17). The reasons that make the above three regimes relevant for a study on migrant domestic work are multiple.

First, care regimes – which broadly speaking include the set of regulations that each state puts in place to deal with care responsibilities – can be useful to explain the reasons behind the externalisation of domestic and care activities and the way the provision and allocation of care is regulated at national level (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004; Bettio et al., 2006; Simonazzi, 2009; Saraceno and Keck, 2010; among others). For instance, the availability of quality and affordable services for the care of children or elderly people, the availability of financial incentives for the care of family members, the duration and compensation level of maternity, paternity and parental leaves are just a few examples of care policies that can influence the

² Networks are intended here as including all types of ties: family, friends, neighbours and the community at large. To use Granovetter’s distinction, they include both strong and weak ties, as both types of ties can be crucial in determining for instance the level of externalisation of domestic work by families (the use of networks as part of domestic and care strategies of families) and the workforce composition in the domestic sector (the use of networks as instruments for entering or leaving the domestic sector) (Granovetter, 1973).

way families build their own ‘care packages’ and thus the size and characteristics of the domestic sector.

Second, gender regimes – which for the purpose of this study are conceptualised as the combination of gender equality outcomes and the set of cultural and social norms that define the division of domestic and reproductive labour (the ‘gender contract’) – can provide insights on the gendered implications of specific institutional arrangements, as well as on the decisions to externalise domestic services (Anttonen and Spila, 1996; Daly, 2002; Pfau-Effinger, 2000; Gerhard et al., 2005; Lewis et al., 2008; Pfau-Effinger and Rostgaard, 2011, among others). For instance, while gender equality in a broad sense is generally associated with a more equal gendered division of labour, not all countries with high female participation rates and relatively high gender equality in the workplace experience the same level of externalisation of domestic activities, nor the same labour standards to domestic workers. The choice to outsource domestic services and the reputation of domestic work are also determined by the gendered social norms that operate in each country.

Third, migration regimes – which include migration policies and regulations on the entry and stay of non-nationals and which are influenced by concepts of cultural desirability – can have an effect on the international mobility of domestic workers (Parreñas, 2001; Koffman et al., 2005; Williams and Gavanas, 2008; Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009; among others)³. While the increased demand for domestic workers have pushed some governments to put in place specific arrangements for the entry and stay of migrant domestic workers, other factors, which can be included in the overall migration regime that operates in each country, have proved to encourage the arrival of migrant domestic workers and thus the ethnicisation of the domestic sector. Among these factors are, for instance, the pre-existence of a large informal economy and the existence of policy instruments such as regularisation programmes (add ref).

While the three regimes have been often studied individually and more rarely in combination, Helma Lutz observes that, for a deeper understanding of European migrant domestic work, these three regimes should be taken into account simultaneously (Lutz, 2008). Starting from the observation that, in Europe, domestic work is more and more delegated to migrant women, Lutz affirms that:

On the theoretical level, three different ‘regimes’ are at the heart of the phenomenon of ‘migrant domestic work’ in Europe. Firstly, *gender regimes* in which household and care work organisation can be seen as the expression of a specifically gendered

³ A detailed review of the existing studies on these three factors is provided in Chapter 2.

cultural script. Secondly, *care regimes* as part of the welfare regime, concerning a (multitude) of state regulations according to which the responsibility for the well-being of national citizens is distributed between the state, the family and the market. Thirdly, *migration regimes*, which for various reasons either promote or discourage the employment of migrant domestic workers.
(Lutz, 2008, p. 2; italics in the text)

Lutz's theory, as complex as it is, has not been empirically tested so far. Most literature on domestic work, but also on care, gender and migration regimes, tends to remain confined to the theoretical level and/or to be carried out only through qualitative methods. This is understandable, because of the very nature of concepts that are difficult to measure, and because of the richness of insights that are provided through qualitative methods of investigation. However, such methods also present some important risks. From a general point of view, qualitative evidence can be perceived as insufficient for building a sound theory. This is also due to the fact that generalisation is difficult, even more so when cross-country comparison is involved (i.e. at European level). From an epistemological point of view, a theory remains confined to the philosophical realm, rather than being 'scientific', unless empirically validated (or falsified)⁴. This in turn can prevent the theory from being used as a framework for future research or for directions at policy level.

The overall objectives of this research are the following:

- To investigate whether and to what extent the three regimes have an impact on the main features of paid domestic work, and in the degree of *ethnicisation* in particular.
- To investigate whether typologies can be a useful tool to explain the cross-national variation in the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector.

The research that is reported in this dissertation aims to empirically test the theory of the three regimes for the first time. The empirical test of this theory is carried out through a quantitative comparative analysis among European member states, which is developed in three phases.

The first phase is a descriptive analysis of the main features of contemporary paid domestic work in Europe, with a focus on the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector. The analysis, mainly based on the EU-Labour Forces Survey data 2015, focuses on three thematic areas: 1) the magnitude of the domestic sector; 2) the workforce composition; 3) the working

⁴ According to Popper, a theory can never be 'verified' empirically, as empirical observations can always contradict a theory. Thus, it is impossible to affirm that a theory is verified once and for all. On the contrary, in order to be 'scientific', a theory needs to be formulated so that empirical observation can falsify it. The result is that after testing a theory, instead of saying that the theory has been 'verified', we can only say that the theory has not been falsified by the empirical test (Popper, 1995; quoted in Meraviglia, 2004, p. 50).

conditions in the domestic sector. The magnitude of the domestic sector is analysed with a focus on both the increase of the domestic sector in recent years and a cross-country comparison of the current size of the domestic sector in Europe. The analysis of the workforce composition focuses on the feminisation and the *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector, through a comparative analysis of the concentration of women and of migrants in the domestic sector in all European countries for which data is available. A last set of descriptive analyses includes some aspects that can be used to define the working conditions of domestic workers: the income level, the job stability (proportion of temporary vs. permanent contracts) and the work on unusual working schedules (Saturdays, Sundays, evenings and nights). Although the main focus of this research is the degree of *ethnicisation* of domestic work, the objective of this first set of analyses is to confirm the trends that have been highlighted by scholarship with respect to the main features of the domestic sector and to highlight similarities and differences between European countries. Additionally, this first comparative analysis is helpful to empirically confirm that among the characteristics that are taken into account the most striking differences lie in the concentration of migrants in domestic activities.

The second part is the construction of three typologies, one for each regime under study, in order to identify countries that behave similarly with respect to the care, gender and migration regimes. In order to empirically analyse the three regimes and develop a typology of countries, a composite index based on a variety of indicators is built for each regime. The choice of the indicators selected for the typology of each regime is made based on the literature and the availability of reliable and harmonised data at the European level.

Specifically, for the typology of care regimes, the majority of the indicators are selected from the Multilinks database – and cross-checked with other international databases, such as the MISSOC database and the OECD Health Statistic database 2017 – and derived from the report *Developing personal and household services in the EU: a focus on housework activities*, so to cover both services and incentives for the care of children and elderly people, as well as incentives for the externalisation of domestic activities. The selected indicators are analysed through a Principal Component Analysis (PCA), which allows for the construction of two composite indexes that correspond to the ‘de-familialisation’ and the ‘generosity’ of care regimes. Finally, a cluster analysis is carried out to identify the clusters of European countries that behave more similarly with respect to the two indexes.

The analysis of the European gender regimes is carried out so to keep separate the two dimensions that are used for defining the gender regime, namely the gender equality outcomes and the ‘gender contract’. For the first dimension, which corresponds to gender equality, an

existing composite index (the Gender Equality Index 2015, elaborated by the European Commission) is used. For the second dimension, which corresponds to the ‘gender contract’, a series of indicators are selected from two European databases (the ad hoc module on ‘family work and well-being’ of the European Social Survey 2004 and the Special Eurobarometer 428/2014 on gender equality) and a Principal Component Analysis is carried out to construct the gender contract index. Finally, the typology of gender regimes is derived through a cluster analysis carried out on the two indexes.

For the construction of the typology of migration regimes, the indicators are selected so to cover elements of both integration and immigration policies, as per the traditional distinction made in the literature, as well as specific factors that may influence the *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector. The Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015 is used to cover the integration policy system, plus some elements of the immigration system. Additionally, three separate indicators are selected, so to cover specific dimensions of the migration regimes that can be relevant for the analysis of the domestic sector: the number of residence permits issued for employment reasons, the number of migrants from new accession countries and the size of the shadow economy. Finally, a cluster analysis is carried out to build the typology and identify the groups of countries that share the most similar migration regimes.

The third part is the empirical test of the theory of three regimes on migrant domestic work. The three typologies that result from the second step of the analysis are used to measure the impact of the three regimes on the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector. In this third step of the analysis – and in order to answer to the main research questions – the typologies of the three regimes are combined with the EU-LFS data 2015. This allows to investigate whether the three regimes have an effect on the actual outcomes of individuals in the labour market (in the domestic sector) and to measure the intensity of this effect.

The specific objectives of the last set of analyses, which include the comparison of a series of multinomial logistic regression models and the final analysis of the effects of the three regimes on the *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector, are the following:

- To investigate whether the three regimes – the care, the gender and the migration regimes – have an effect on the proportion of migrant domestic workers, compared to native domestic workers and on the proportion of migrant domestic workers, compared to migrants working in another sector.
- To investigate whether the three regimes have a stronger explanatory power when they are taken into consideration simultaneously.

- To investigate whether the three regimes are a better tool, compared to countries, to explain the main features of paid domestic work and in particular the degree of *ethnicisation* of the sector
- To analyse the specific effects of the three regimes on migrant domestic work.

The dissertation is organised in six chapters.

Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 present the theoretical framework and the review of the literature in this field. Chapter 1 provides a review of the literature on paid domestic work. It includes a brief historical overview of domestic work and highlights the main changes that have occurred over time, as well as the continuities. The chapter also provides an overview of the main features of contemporary paid domestic work and a discussion on the problems raised by domestic work in terms of gender equality and discrimination based on racial and class stereotypes. The last part of the chapter provides a definition of contemporary paid domestic work in Europe.

Chapter 2 presents the literature on care regimes, on gender regimes and on migration regimes. Since the analysis of the three regimes in this study is conducted through the use of typologies, an introduction on the use of typologies in literature is provided at the beginning of the chapter. Also, for each regime a particular attention is paid to the different typologies that have been developed over time. The literature review of the three regimes is introduced by a brief review of the literature on welfare regimes. This is due to the fact that the most influential typologies of care (and partly on gender) regimes have been developed based on the literature on welfare.

Chapter 3 presents the methodology and the data used in this research. The first part of the chapter provides a brief description of the methodology used in this research and of the main types of statistical analyses carried out, as well as a discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of secondary analysis of existing data. The following section is a detailed description of the different databases and sources that have been used for the analyses and includes a discussion on the main limitations of the available data. A particular attention is paid to the problems linked to the statistical definition of the domestic sector and the statistical definition of the migrant population, as well as the issues linked to the informal economy. The last part of the chapter addresses some additional problems encountered during the course of the research, which include problems linked to international comparisons and problems linked to specific statistical analyses.

The following chapters presents the analyses that have been conducted in the framework of this study, as well as the main results.

Chapter 4 presents a descriptive analysis of contemporary paid domestic work in Europe, based on the EU-Labour Forces Survey data. The analysis is divided into three thematic areas: 1) the magnitude of the domestic sector; 2) the workforce composition; 3) the working conditions in the domestic sector. The first part includes a section on the increase of the domestic sector in recent years and a section on the current size of the domestic sector in each European country included in the analysis. The second part focuses on the feminisation and the *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector. The last part analyses some aspects that can be used to define the working conditions of domestic workers: the income level, the job stability (proportion of temporary vs. permanent contracts) and the work on unusual working schedules (Saturdays, Sundays, evenings and nights).

Chapter 5 presents the analyses that I have conducted on the three regimes under study. In particular, the chapter provides a description of the main steps that have conducted to the creation of three typologies: selection of indicators, construction of new synthetic indicators, where relevant, and development of typologies – one for each regime.

Chapter 6 presents the last set of analyses conducted in the framework of this research. The first part of the chapter provides the specific hypotheses, based on the objectives of the research. The second part presents some descriptive bivariate analyses, similar to those presented in Chapter 4, where the information on the main features of the domestic sector is aggregated at the level of the typologies. The third part of the chapter presents description of the analyses that have been carried out, the comparison between the different models and the interpretation of the results. In the last part of the chapter I interpret the results in the light of the hypotheses presented at the beginning of the chapter.

Chapter 1

Understanding contemporary domestic work: challenges, continuities and discontinuities

This chapter is divided into three main parts and presents the state of the art of the literature on domestic services, the main challenges and problems linked to this type of work, as well as a definition of paid domestic work.

The first part starts with a brief historical contextualisation of domestic work, which highlights the main transformations occurred over time in the domestic sector, including changes in the definition of domestic services and in the way domestic work has been organised and regulated at different times in history. This part includes a separate section on the ‘resurgence’ of paid domestic work in recent years, where the main continuities and discontinuities compared to older forms of domestic work are highlighted.

The second part provides an overview of the main characteristics of contemporary paid domestic work in Europe and is organised in three main thematic sections: a first section dealing with the feminisation of domestic services, a second section dealing with the *ethnicisation* of domestic work and a third section dealing with the persistence of poor working conditions and low reputation of domestic work. This last section also tackles some of the main problematic issues linked to domestic work.

The last part of the chapter provides the definition of paid domestic work that will be adopted throughout the study, based on the transformations of domestic work occurred over time, on the main features of contemporary domestic work and on the definition of domestic workers provided by the International Labour Organisation (ILO).

1.1 From old to contemporary domestic work

*She could not, then, call me by my name, instead of saying all the time, "My girl," this, "My girl," that, in that tone of wounding domination which discourages the best wills and straightway puts such a distance, so much hatred, between our mistresses and us? Do I call her "little mother"? [...]
Oh! The cheek that they have, and the fuss that they make about nothing! And when I think that it is all done just to humiliate you, to astonish you!*
(Octave Mirbeau, *The Diary of a Chambermaid*, 1900)

My Hilda seemed a treasure. She could cook, she could read and write, she kept herself and the rooms clean and looked like a pink and flaxen doll. I could treat her as an equal without finding that this led to her stealing my clothes and doing no work.
(Freda Utley, *Lost Illusion*, 1948)

The European literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries abounds with descriptions of the life and work of the many domestic servants who were populating the houses of the aristocracy. This is not surprising given that the number of domestic workers had known a steady increase over the eighteenth century and an unprecedented pick in the nineteenth century (Sarti, 2008). Despite the 'invisibility' of this job, which was and still is carried out behind the doors of the household, literary works testify to the important role that servants have played in mirroring, but also shaping, the customs of societies at different times in history, as well as contributing to the definition of the cultural and class identity of the wealthy (Rollins, 1985).

Far from being a phenomenon linked to the past, domestic work still exists and is increasing in all developed countries (Cox, 2006; Lutz, 2010; ILO, 2013). Although the types of employment relationships, the statuses, but also the work itself, have known great transformations over time and the domestic servants described above no longer exist, it is not unusual that the word *domestic* still recalls similar images today. As it will be discussed in later sections, this could be explained by the fact that important continuities exist between older and new forms of domestic work, not least in the way this work is still considered a dirty and degrading job. As historians point out, studying contemporary domestic work is a difficult task, not only because it represents an often-hidden segment of society, but also because changes are intertwined with the reproduction of certain dynamics (Sarti, 2006).

The next section provides a brief overview of the history of domestic services, which includes the description of the gradual transformations in the way domestic work was organised and

conceived, as well as the changes in the work itself and in the role of domestic workers at different times. The objective is to identify the transformations intervened over time, but also to highlight the continuities from ancient to newer forms of domestic work. This will contribute to a better understanding of contemporary forms of paid domestic work, in the light of the European comparative analysis that will be presented in Chapter 4.

1.1.1 Historical overview

Paid domestic work, broadly intended as the set of domestic services performed by someone other than a family member⁵, is neither a novelty, nor a social phenomenon doomed to become extinct. As historical evidence shows, domestic work was already carried out by individuals external to the family in times as ancient as the Roman Empire and even before (Rollins, 1985). For a long time, domestic labour was typically performed by slaves, whose presence was abundant in virtually all ancient times. Although not all slaves were assigned domestic chores, there is evidence that domestic activities represented one of the two types of work considered more suitable for women slaves, the second being prostitution (Rollins, 1985). The fact that domestic work was initially carried out by slaves is important, as it probably represents the origin of the link between domestic labour and slavery, which still permeates the perception of this work today.

Before the nineteenth century and up to the Industrial Revolution in the second part of the 1800s, domestic servants were mainly working at the dependency of the aristocracy, which often employed a large number of personnel, in a complex hierarchy of assignments and statuses. Hence, the often-romanticised idea of the wealthy surrounded by a crowd of servants, ranging from butlers, cooks, housekeepers, maids, valets to other manual workers, performing tasks such as cleaning, cooking, gardening, repairing, watching over the security of the house and even providing counselling to the masters. The employment of a large number of servants in aristocratic households was based on a well-structured hierarchy of statuses among domestic workers, with those at closer contact with the members of the family generally enjoying better working conditions and higher prestige⁶. Therefore, if the distance between

⁵ The definition of domestic work is not unambiguous and has significantly changed over time. The definition of contemporary paid domestic work adopted in this study is provided in section 1.3.

⁶ Typically, butlers, housekeepers and cooks were enjoying the highest status among servants, while cleaners, chambermaids and personnel carrying out manual housework were at the bottom of the hierarchy. The distinction among the servants often implied that the chores performed by men were more valued than chores

the master and the servant was certainly common to all domestic workers, some scholars have argued that not all forms of domestic labour were considered as degrading, as some of them allowed servants to be in contact with the highest ranks of society (Sarti, 2006).

However, despite the hierarchical differences among servants, the idea of the domestic worker was closely associated with the idea of a low class, low-skilled worker, often single and living inside the premises of the house for which he/she was working. The same recognition of domestic labour as a 'real job' could not be taken for granted, insofar the actual wages were often replaced by in-kind gifts, food, accommodation, or simply by protection (Rollins, 1985). The master-servant relationship was one the main features of European pre-industrial societies, where the power of the master/mistress over his/her servants was similar to the power of the king over his subjects or that of the *pater familias* over the members of the family (Sarti, 2006). The paternalistic relationship between masters and servants – typical of the relationship between master and slaves – was characterised by total subordination and fidelity on the side of the servant, in exchange for protection by the master (J. S. Miller, 1869; Rollins, 1985).

The low status of the work and the enormous differences between the employer and the worker in terms of class, education, social and economic status were hardly questioned and employing a more or less important number of domestic workers was a matter of social prestige (Rollins, 1985; Sarti, 2006, 2008). The fact that these workers were hardly considered as real employees and that the work they were performing within the household was considered as a sort of unconditional help rather than a real work was a clear sign of the blurred separation between the condition of domestic workers and slaves.

The industrialisation period in Western Europe marked a significant change in the way domestic work was organised and conceived, as well as in the servant's profile. In terms of the number of domestic workers, the second half of the nineteenth century is the period that registered the highest number of domestic servants employed in private households (Rollins, 1985; Cox, 2006; Sarti, 2006). However, apart from the numerical increase, important changes had occurred in societies, which determined a shift in the features of the domestic service sector.

A first important change brought about by the industrialisation process was the decline of agriculture and the simultaneous urbanisation, which pushed a large number of young people to urban centres in the search for employment. This resulted in a change in the servant's

assigned to women. The discussion over the difference between female and male types of domestic labour is discussed later in this section.

profile. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the great majority of domestic workers were young women coming from the countryside, working as live-in domestic workers in urban families. If up to the eighteenth century the domestic service sector was populated by both men and women in an approximately equal share, during the nineteenth century women started to dramatically outnumber men. While industrialisation had generated new employment opportunities for low-skilled workers, it was generally men who had left the domestic service sector towards new opportunities. Women, on the contrary, remained for a long time confined to domestic services, for various reasons. First, due to common social values attached to the concept of respectability, domestic work was considered more suitable for women, compared to factory work. The fact of living within a family, especially for young women coming from the countryside, was considered a source of protection. Second, it allowed saving money on food and accommodation, while at the same time providing domestic training for life after marriage (Rollins, 1985). Additionally, given that women were generally less trained and had fewer opportunities for education, the exit from the domestic service sector was slower, compared to that of men.

The second important social transformation brought about by the industrialisation process was the emergence of a large urban middle class. While up to the middle of the nineteenth century the aristocracy was the main – if not the only – employer of domestic servants, now larger social strata could afford to employ domestic servants (Cox, 2006; Rollins, 1985). However, due to the costs of maintaining domestic personnel, new middle-class families could only employ a limited number of workers – often only one. A dramatic reduction in the number of servants per family was nonetheless registered among the aristocracy. The French Revolution, with its egalitarian ideals, had already fostered a fight against the privileges of the aristocracy and the employment of servants for the sake of showing their status, which in turn had affected the employment of domestic personnel (Sarti, 2006).

The reduction in the number of servants per household translated into a transformation of the servant's profile. On the one hand, it led to the extinction of certain jobs, within the range of domestic services. Profiles such as the driver, the butler, the lackey and the footman, which were typically profiles of male domestics, gradually disappeared and domestic work was generally re-centred around housework and cleaning activities, which were considered as more suitable for women⁷. On the other hand, the work itself and the duties associated with it experienced a series of transformations. While a large hierarchized structure of servants

⁷ The feminisation of domestic work, together with the discussion about the gender division of domestic labour, are discussed in section 1.2.2.

implied a strong specialisation of tasks among servants, each of them performing only a part of the domestic chores, the decrease in the number of servants employed per families implied a reunification of tasks on the same worker, who was now expected to provide for the full range of domestic services for the family.

The greater demands placed on each servant had consequences both on the severe physical and mental strains endured by servants, and on the relationship between masters and servants. Although generally wages were higher compared to the past, domestic workers started to find hard to meet the expectations of the new bourgeoisie. At the same time, given that the new employers were new to their role of masters and could not count on the unquestioned privileges of the aristocratic class, they strove to distinguish themselves from the servants by drawing a rigid class separation between the two. This inevitably led to a growing tension between servants and masters, which is mirrored by the proliferation of literary works devoted to the proper management of domestic personnel and resulted in a great turnover rate of domestic workers (Rollins, 1985).

This increased tension, together with social and economic transformations, led to the decrease in the number of domestic workers at the beginning of the twentieth century. Changes in social and family values, the availability of new job opportunities seen as suitable also for women – such as the emergence of white-collar jobs –, the decreasing size of middle-class families and technological progress facilitating household maintenance, all contributed to the decline of both the supply and the demand for domestic labour (Rollins, 1985). Additionally, higher educational attainments and changes in values and attitudes pushed many domestic workers to move towards other occupational opportunities, considered less degrading and demanding.

The trend towards the decline of domestic service – especially live-in but also live-out jobs – continued and was even reinforced in the second half of the century. During World War II, the absence of male soldiers had made necessary for many women to engage in larger sectors of the economy and after 1945 many former domestic workers did not re-enter the sector (Sarti, 2008). This trend was visible in all Western European countries, and even more in countries that provided the strongest welfare support to families, such as Northern European countries. At this point in history, it seemed that domestic service was deemed to come to an end in all modern societies (Sarti 2005; 2008).

1.1.2 The resurgence of paid domestic work

After the drop at the beginning of the twentieth century and after the War World II, the domestic sector started to increase again at the end of the century and has grown even more significantly in the last two decades (Cox, 2006; Sarti, 2008; ILO, 2013). The emblematic figure of the ‘domestic servant’ in the form of butlers, maids, cooks and valets serving the very rich was gradually replaced by a considerable number of nannies, cleaners, au pairs, caregivers and other domestic helpers, who make it possible for the middle and upper classes all around the world to live more comfortably (Cox, 2006).

Although historical trends seemed to point to the total extinction of the figure of the domestic servant, paid domestic work constitutes today a non-negligible segment of the labour market in many European countries. Some trends that were already visible at the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century are confirmed by recent developments of paid domestic work. The increased feminisation of the work and the gradual disappearance of live-in forms of work in favour of live-out domestic work are the two main continuities from previous centuries. However, even in this respect, some exceptions seem to contradict these trends, as a few European countries – such as Italy and Spain – have recently experienced a relative resurgence of both male domestic work and a return to live-in forms of jobs in the domestic sector⁸. Additionally, the low reputation and the poor and sometimes degrading working conditions that were already associated with this hard manual labour in the past seem to persist, despite the attempts that have been carried out in some European countries to professionalise and improve the status of the job.

The main novelty in what can be considered modern domestic work pertains to the profile of the domestic workers. First of all, many European countries have experienced an increase in the proportion of international migrants working in the domestic and care sector and the employment of female migrants in the domestic services is receiving a growing public attention. In some countries, the phenomenon has assumed enormous proportions and the domestic sector can be considered the main occupation of migrant women (Cox, 2006; Lutz, 2008). Although migration was already a feature linked to the domestic service sector in the previous century, the new migrant domestic workers are different in many respects. In the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century the migration of domestic workers was for the majority internal to each country and was linked to the mobility of young

⁸ The reasons for these seemingly contradicting trends in Europe is dealt with in section 1.2.2 on feminisation and in section 1.2.3 on the *ethnicisation* of domestic work.

people from the countryside to urban centres. On the contrary, the end of the twentieth century saw a dramatic increase in international migrants moving from poorer to richer parts of the world to work as domestic workers (Sarti, 2008).

However, despite the increased mobility from poorer to wealthier countries, the new migrant domestic workers are not necessarily poor themselves. Recent studies have highlighted that not only migrant domestic workers often belong to middle or higher classes in their country of origin, but also that they possess on average higher education, compared to domestic workers in the past (Lutz, 2008, 2010; Sarti, 2008). This inevitably leads to a redefinition of the relationship between the families and the workers in terms of class, social and cultural distance.

Another change regarding the profile of new domestic workers is that, contrary to the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, the age and the marital status of domestic workers are more differentiated. As discussed in the previous section, during the industrialisation period in Western Europe the vast majority of domestic workers were young and single women coming from the countryside, who were working as live-in domestics awaiting marriage. Today, not only domestic workers are on average older than their previous colleagues, but contrary to the past many of them are married and/or with children (Sarti, 2008). The phenomenon of transnational motherhood⁹, although not unknown to the past, perfectly fits the situation of the 'new' domestic workers. Although the literature on *global care chains*¹⁰ has been widely criticised for overemphasising the numerical importance of transnational mothers, and for neglecting the presence of more differentiated profiles among domestic workers, it nevertheless offers an important contribution to the study of new forms of domestic work.

If the above-mentioned transformations are of great importance for understanding the development of domestic work, one of the main changes pertains to the redefinition of the tasks assigned to domestic workers. Among these changes, it is the gradual inclusion within general domestic services of activities linked to the care of dependent people that has known the greatest development. If it is true that also in the past there were domestics in charge of the care of children and that some servants also cared for the elderly (Sarti, 2008), it is from the end of the twentieth century that the care of people has become a crucial dimension of paid domestic activities.

⁹ For literature on transnational motherhood, refer to Ehrenreich and Hoschild, 2003; Kraler et al., 2013; Parreñas, 2001, 2005, 2008.

¹⁰ For literature on global care chains, refer to Ehrenreich and Hoschild, 2003; Yeates, 2009.

The reasons that brought about this important redefinition of domestic tasks are discussed in the next section. What is important to mention here is that after a re-centring of domestic activities on housework-related services in the nineteenth century, there has been a new expansion of the activities that fall under the category of domestic work. The profile of the ‘caregiver’ has known an unprecedented expansion, so that care activities are today just as important as housework activities within the broad domestic service sector¹¹. This probably represents the most important discontinuity compared to the past.

1.2 The main characteristics of contemporary paid domestic work

This section presents an overview of the main characteristics of contemporary paid domestic work. The section is introduced by a first part, discussing some of the reasons that have generated the ‘resurgence’ of domestic services in Europe. This part is followed by the overview of the main features of paid domestic work, grouped around the following thematic areas: the feminisation of paid domestic work, the *ethnicisation* of paid domestic work and the working conditions in the domestic sector. This last part also includes a discussion of the main problematic issues that have been emphasised by the literature on domestic work and that make this type of work unique.

1.2.1 The increase in the size of the domestic sector

As mentioned in section 1.1.2, after an overall decline of domestic services in the twentieth century, up to a point that paid domestic work seemed destined to disappear (Sarti, 2008), the end of the century saw a sort of resurgence of domestic work, albeit with differences across countries. According to the ILO, conservative estimates suggest that today the number of domestic workers worldwide be around a total of 52,6 million, while other estimates count as much as 100 million domestic workers (ILO, 2013). Because it is often performed in the undeclared economy, estimates on the magnitude of the phenomenon vary depending on the source and depending on the classification used for data collection.

The main regions interested by the growth are Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and Middle East countries, where domestic work represents the highest share of total wage employment. However, even if at a lower rate, the last 20 years have seen an increase in

¹¹ The detailed definition of the activities that fall under the range of domestic activities is provided in section 1.3.

domestic work also in Western countries. France, Spain, Italy and the United States have the highest prevalence of domestic workers in absolute terms¹² (ILO, 2013). As national statistics show, at European level it is especially the care sector that has assumed a significant role in recent times and has become the centre of the attention of the public debate.

The structural factors determining the increase of the domestic sector

The reasons for the general increase of the domestic sector have been investigated at various levels. At structural level, scholars have identified a series of reasons that have contributed to the increase of both the supply and the demand for domestic services.

From the point of view of the supply, the increase is often associated with the growing inequalities in the new global economy (Cox, 2006; Parreñas, 2001). The development of a global economy and the spread of neo-liberal principles have caused an exacerbation of social inequalities, both at global scale and within healthier regions. In less developed countries, the worsening of economic and living conditions have generated a growing supply of the workforce to richer countries. Some countries, such as the Philippines and Sri Lanka, officially promote the emigration of massive numbers of female citizens, who are encouraged to work as domestics all around the world (Cox, 2006). Poverty in developing countries can also represent a pushing factor for migration. A number of domestic workers flee from their countries of origins for reasons linked to extreme poverty, armed conflict and/or violence (Anderson, 2000).

At the same time, the increased wealth in the global North has led to an increase of the demand for domestic workers, as more and more families can afford to buy external help. This further attracts migrants from the global South, even when governments are not directly favouring their emigration. The result is that domestic work has become a global theme traversing Europe (Ambrosini, 2015; Kofman et al., 2000, Lutz, 2008).

However, social inequalities are growing within developed countries as well. Better living standards have enabled some parts of the society – especially the middle class – to afford to pay domestic help, but this has not resulted in better salaries and living conditions for those who provide domestic services. The inequality between those who serve and those who are served is far from being resolved. The phenomenon of the ‘global cities’, as it has been theorised by Saskia Sassen (2002), perfectly applies to the situation of new domestic workers. If global cities generate more and more services, skilled jobs and consequently higher salaries

¹² Spain counts 747000 domestic workers, the US 667000 workers, France 590000 workers, and Italy 419000 workers.

and wealth, the other side of the coin is that more and more invisible helpers are needed to fill the gaps that this increased standard of living requires. Global cities produce a strong demand for low-wage workers and for services in particular. At the same time, the presence of a cheap and flexible labour force makes it possible even for middle and lower classes to afford to buy external help (Sassen, 2002; Lutz, 2010)¹³. Domestic work is no longer a luxury for the few, but one of many commodities available to potentially anyone.

The second main structural dimension that has been identified as contributing to the growth of the domestic sector has to do with societal, economic and demographic changes in developed countries. In particular, the increased participation of women in the labour market, together with the ageing of the population and the general erosion of the welfare state that occurred in developed countries, are pointed as important drivers for the expansion of the demand for domestic workers.

If we focus on Europe, the growth of the employment rates of women is a phenomenon that in the Scandinavian countries had already started in the 1950s and 1960s (Leira, 2002) and that later expanded throughout the continent. This ‘emancipatory’ movement of women from the private to the public sphere has been accompanied by a (partial) reshaping of the traditional family model, which shifted from the widespread male breadwinner model, to an ‘adult earner’ model, where both men and women are working (Lutz & Palenga-Mollenbeck, 2010). This has created a ‘need’ for domestic workers, because women are no longer fully available to perform housework tasks, and because the availability of a double salary makes it possible for families to outsource these services. The decreased availability of grandparents and of the extended family to provide occasional help, due to the participation of grandmothers in the labour market, as well as the modernisation of family models towards nuclear families (Gerhard et al., 2005; Esping-Andersen, 2009), also play a role in making the outsourcing of domestic services more and more popular.

The decline of fertility rates, combined with the ageing of the population, represents another change that is crucial for the increased demand for domestic help. Increasing numbers of old and very old people already determined a growing demand for caring services in many European countries. The trend towards policies that promote cash allowances, instead of residential care services for the elderly, the fact that in some European countries long-term

¹³ According to Saskia Sassen, the fact that these workers are cheap and flexible goes against the ‘historical nexus’. The increase of high-wage professionals and consequently of the demand for domestic services should suggest that domestic workers be paid higher salaries. Also, the strengthening of the sector should lead to the emerging of a strong “class”, with a consequent empowering effect. Instead, the invisible nature of domestic service creates a dynamic that goes against the prediction and leaves workers unempowered.

care is still predominantly family oriented, combined with the transformations in family structures (increased geographical distance, the decline of the enlarged family, etc.) are all factors that contribute to the expansion of the care sector (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004).

Finally – and linked to the above-mentioned changes – is the general erosion of welfare states in Europe and the important cuts in the provision of services, especially for the care of children and the elderly, albeit with significant national differences (Degavre and Nyssens, 2012). The increased participation of women in the paid economy has not been adequately accompanied by an increase in services, especially for the care of children, the elderly and people with disabilities. In many European countries, taken apart the Northern countries, which have a more solid history of public provision of care, public affordable childcare for children under the age of 3 and public residential homes for the elderly are unavailable and/or unaffordable for the majority of the families, who have to opt for private solutions available in the market. Private services are more and more promoted as the only option, but when they are too expensive families have to find individual solutions. This often means buying these services directly in the market, often from (irregular) migrants, who offer the cheapest available prices at the best flexible conditions (Simonazzi, 2009).

Other reasons explaining the increase of the domestic sector

Although all these factors have played a crucial role in determining the increase of the demand for domestic workers, they are not the only explanations of the phenomenon. First of all, even if employment rates of women have increased everywhere in Europe and in other developed countries, it is not the first time that women work outside their homes. Women were already present in the formal paid economy in the past, and sometimes worked very long hours (Gerhard et al., 2005). Second, if it is true that the increased employment rates of women have been accompanied by an increase in domestic outsourcing, because a new ‘need’ has resulted from less available time at home, not all women who have entered the labour market (even in full-time jobs) have hired external help (Goñalons-Pons, 2015). In the light of these facts, scholarship on domestic work has investigated other factors that might have contributed to the increase in the number of waged domestic workers.

Some scholars have argued that it has to do with the profile of new working women. While in the past female employment was only common within the working class, now it is middle-class women who have entered the labour market (Lutz, 2008; Cox, 2006). This has somehow changed the perspective and the behaviour with regards to paid and unpaid housework. When middle-class women enter what Rosie Cox calls ‘career structured jobs’, they are exposed to

the traditional employment culture, which in turn is influenced by the traditional breadwinner model. This means that women have to adapt to males' standards and have to sacrifice some of their home duties, if they want to be treated equally and compete with men in the labour market. Therefore, changing expectations in the labour market may affect the patterns of domestic work and push women to outsource it (Cox, 2006).

According to feminist scholars, the key reason for the increased outsourcing of domestic activities is that all the above-mentioned changes (increase in female employment rates, demographic changes, the restructuring of traditional family models and so on) have not been accompanied by a transformation in the gender division of labour and this has created a tension (Lewis, 1992; Giele, 2006; Gerhard et al., 2005). The alleged 'liberation' of women, who are more and more participating on an equal basis in the labour market, is not reflected in the division of household tasks, which remains the domain of women.

To sum up, if the presence of women in the labour market has been welcomed as a strong sign of empowerment and of – at least formal – gender equality, two main issues have not been solved so far. The first is that women had to adapt their careers to male standards (such as long working hours, unbroken careers, etc.), instead of being offered different solutions or instead of creating their own way of 'having a career'. This means that a woman who chooses a career may have to sacrifice her family (Giele, 2006; Gerhard et al., 2005). The second is that the traditional division of labour, which assigns domestic tasks to women, has not been questioned. Domestic chores are still overwhelmingly performed by women – no matter if they work part-time or full-time – and the amount of time allocated to housework and care for family members has not been redistributed among the sexes (Cox, 2006). The private sphere is still considered a female responsibility, and women are still expected to find a solution for replacing 'their' domestic work, if they choose to have a career.

Some qualitative research (Cox, 2006; Anderson, 2000; Rollins, 1985) have found that the division of household tasks between men and women represents a crucial matter of conflict for couples and that hiring domestic help is the easiest way to avoid such conflict. According to these studies, instead of pushing forward the claims for gender equality also within the household by fully involving men in the equal sharing of the tasks, women have chosen to avoid the conflict and rather outsource what is socially perceived to be *their* work (Anderson,

2000; Cox, 2006). The result is that household and care tasks have simply been redistributed among women¹⁴.

Thus, the transformative potential of the increased gender equality in the labour market remains limited (Goñalons-Pons, 2015) and it rather reinforces unbalanced gender relations. First, it reinforces inequality between the sexes, because women can only choose between doing the ‘double shift’ and outsourcing their tasks. Second, it reinforces the inequalities between affluent middle-class women, who can somehow pursue better gender equality in their careers, and domestic workers, whose gender inequality is maintained and intensified even in their employment place. Gender equality for some women acts at the expenses of gender equality for domestic workers (Sarti and Scrinzi, 2010).

1.2.2 The feminisation of paid domestic work

Before talking about the feminisation of the domestic sector, an important distinction has to be made between paid and unpaid domestic labour. Although male domestic workers existed and still exist today – albeit in very low numbers – domestic activities have a long history of being associated with women. From a sociological point of view, the origins of the traditional view of domestic chores as female activities can be traced back to two fundamental dichotomies.

The first one is the ‘private/public divide’, which has a strong gendered connotation, as it assigns the private domain to women and the public domain to men (Anderson, 2000). While the economic and public function pertains to men, domestic activities belong to the private sphere and are considered the responsibility of women. According to feminist scholars, this dichotomy, which still permeates our societies, can be challenged only as long as women maintain their private role. This means that women can move into the public sphere, but without losing their private responsibilities. Hence, domestic activities, be them unpaid or under the form of a regular employment contract, remain among women (Cox, 2006; Lutz, 2010; Gerhard et al., 2005).

The second dichotomy, which was first stressed by Marxist feminist scholars, makes a distinction between productive and reproductive labour. Based on this distinction, productive labour is any type of work that brings an economic surplus to the nation and corresponds to

¹⁴ As Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Hochschild have argued with regards to childcare, “the presence of immigrant nannies does not enable affluent women to enter the workforce; it enables affluent men to continue avoiding the second shift” (Ehrenreich & Hochschild, 2002).

work that generates goods and services that have a monetary value. On the contrary, reproductive work is intended as the physical, mental and emotional labour that individuals do for themselves and for the care of others, but which does not bring a monetary value. Domestic activities, such as cooking, cleaning, caring for children, and so on, fall under the category of reproductive labour. This distinction, which had been taken as given by most economic analysis, started to be questioned by feminists at the beginning of the twentieth century, as it did not take into consideration the social and economic value of the reproductive work¹⁵ (Anderson, 2000; Lutz, 2010).

While unpaid domestic services have been universally associated with the female domain, it was not always the case as to paid domestic work. Historians observed that before the nineteenth century nearly as many men as women were populating the paid domestic sector (Rollins, 1985; Sarti, 2005; 2008; Cox, 2006). It was only starting from the nineteenth century that the sector became more and more feminised. Today, according to institutional data from the ILO (2013), the great majority of domestic workers in the world are women. According to some authors, the very ‘resurgence’ of paid domestic work would be the result of the almost entire feminisation of the work (Lutz, 2007).

However, although for a long time and at different times in history male domestics were common, a few considerations are worthy to be mentioned. First, as Judith Rollins argues, even in ancient times, when domestic labour was performed by male slaves it was always to replace the responsibilities of women (Rollins, 1985). In other words, the need to possess a slave to be used for domestic labour depended on whether or not this labour could be performed by women. Therefore, domestic work as a female responsibility seems to belong to very old times.

Second, historical evidence shows that differences existed between male and female domestics in many respects. As mentioned in section 1.1.1, before the nineteenth century, domestic workers were mainly employed in aristocratic families, in a hierarchy of different statuses and privileges. Within this hierarchy, the positions that enjoyed a closer contact with the members of the family and thus better working conditions and higher prestige were held by male domestics¹⁶. On the contrary, apart from a very few female positions that held a

¹⁵ The claims for compensating reproductive labour saw its biggest expression in the “Wages for Housework Campaign”, during the 1970s. Feminists’ claims started from the assumption that reproductive labour is key for the reproduction of the nation, as it provides the units (men) necessary for productive labour. Therefore, reproductive labour should be recognised as labour producing an economic value and should be compensated accordingly.

¹⁶ Among the highest positions in the hierarchical structure of the domestic personnel in aristocratic families were the butler, the house steward, the man-cook, the baker, the valet, the gardener and all the confidential advisors and

special status – such as the housekeeper – women domestics were assigned manual tasks linked to cleaning and housework activities, which were already seen as more suitable for women. Another sign that testifies for a gendered difference within domestic servants was the introduction in the eighteenth century, in England and in France, of special taxes on male domestics. Contrary to their female counterparts, male domestics were considered ‘luxury items’ (Sarti, 2006; Cox, 2006) and therefore officially recognised as more valuable. This can be interpreted as a clear sign of the different value attributed to the work of men and women, the latter representing a lower form of labour that does not need formal recognition.

Third, historical evidence shows that the feminisation of paid domestic work was the consequence of a few trends: i) the emergence of new working opportunities available for men, who were thus able to escape domestic service, ii) the disappearance of typically male positions and their displacement outside the home¹⁷, and iii) the re-centring of domestic work on housework and cleaning activities. In this sense, domestic work was re-feminised the moment it became linked to the activities that are traditionally seen as female activities (cleaning, ironing, cooking, washing, and so on).

These changes led not only to a numerical increase of female domestic workers, but to the “feminisation of the very notion of the servant” and to the de-valorisation of the job (Sarti, 2006, p. 20). In fact, because the work started to become more and more similar to housework – and thus it started to coincide with the unpaid work that is seen as the ‘natural’ competence of women – it was also not considered as a real job.

According to scholars, the gradual ‘naturalisation’ of domestic work, combined with the debate on productive vs. reproductive labour, which was gaining pace in economic theories, contributed to a general devaluation of domestic work (Sarti, 2006). It is only during the twentieth century, with the emphasis on the distinction between market and non-market activities, that paid domestic work started to be considered productive work. However, as it is discussed in section 1.2.4, its inclusion within market activities did not necessarily translate into a real professionalisation of domestic work.

personal attendants of the master (Rollins, 1985). If it is true that also low-status male servants existed, the comparison with women’s position show that the highest positions were indisputably those of men.

¹⁷ While some domestic functions (such as butlers, valets, grooms) became obsolete, other jobs gradually moved outside the home. For instance, jobs like the gardener, the driver and the secretary moved away from the domestic sector and became professionalised occupations.

1.2.3 The *ethnicisation* of paid domestic work

In the last decades, many European countries have experienced an increase in the proportion of migrants working in the domestic sector and the employment of female migrants as cleaners and/or carers for children and the elderly has received a growing public attention. According to the ILO (2013), an almost universal feature of domestic work today is that it is a heavily female-dominated sector and that it is predominantly carried out by migrants and other disadvantaged groups.

Although it is not always stressed by the literature, domestic work already had a strong migration dimension in the past (Cox, 2006; Sarti, 2008). However, while previous migrant domestic workers were mainly internal migrants, moving from rural to urban areas within the same country, in globalised societies domestic work is more and more performed by international migrants. Before the twentieth century, international migration of domestic workers was only linked to colonialism, and the few international migrant domestic servants were moving from richer to poorer countries¹⁸. Conversely, today the migration of domestic workers has assumed an international and inter-continental character, following a pattern that is mainly directed from poorer to richer areas of the world (Sarti, 2008). The new geography of mobility of domestic workers to Europe follows a pattern from East to West and from South to North and it seems to be determined, at least partly, by the growing inequalities between these regions of the world (Lutz, 2008; Sarti, 2008). In the EU, the arrival in recent years of many domestic workers from Eastern Europe also determined a change in the type of migration, which has partially shifted from settlement to temporary migration (Morokvasic, 2004; Lutz, 2008).

As already mentioned in section 1.1.2, recent studies have highlighted a few important changes concerning the characteristics of the new migrant domestic workers. In the nineteenth century, domestic work was mainly performed by young women without dependants, as it was considered to be a type of employment especially suitable for girls before they got married and founded their own family. Today, on the contrary, it is more and more performed by migrant women of all ages, often with dependants, and these women are generally more educated than their predecessors (Sarti, 2008; Lutz, 2010). These women emigrate as domestic workers, often leaving behind their families and their caring responsibilities. A

¹⁸ Although part of the servants of colonialist families were recruited *in loco* and were mainly employed in the most manual types of work, it was not uncommon that families brought with them some of the domestic personnel recruited in the country of origin. These workers were usually the highest among the hierarchy of domestic servants: housekeepers, maids, teachers, etc.

flourishing literature has recently developed around the phenomenon of *global care chains*¹⁹, which was first theorised by Hochschild to identify the movement of care workers from poorer to richer countries. Hochschild defines the ‘care drain’ as “the importation of care and love from poor countries to rich ones” (2002, p. 17): women from poorer countries move to care for other people’s children, the elderly and disabled in rich countries, delegating their own caring responsibilities to other women, be them women from the family or paid workers. It is a phenomenon similar and parallel to the *brain drain*, but it is somehow more insidious and difficult to quantify, because of the hidden nature of domestic and care work.

The reasons for the growing concentration of migrants in the domestic sector have been investigated at various levels. The principal argumentation is based on a combination of push and pull factors. The increased supply of labour on one side of the world, mainly due to economic reasons but also to more affordable transports and ease in communication technology, meets the growing demand for domestic labour in the richer parts of the world, including Europe (Lutz, 2008). As discussed in section 1.2.1, the growing demand for domestic labour is in turn determined by the combination of multiple factors: the increased female participation rates in the labour market, the degree of welfare support to families, demographic changes, changes in family models, as well as transformations in values and attitudes of women.

Among the various reasons that make migrant labour force particularly suitable for this specific sector, two seem to play a key role. On the one hand, the persistence of low wages and poor working conditions (unfriendly working hours, unsafe environments, hard physical work, among other issues), coupled with the low reputation associated with domestic chores, make domestic work unattractive to local women. On the other hand, migrant domestic workers often represent a cheaper and more flexible option, compared to locals, and tend to accept lower wages (and sometimes off-the-books work) and worse labour conditions, which makes them more attractive to employers.

This is due to a series of reasons, which are directly linked to the migration process. First, wages in Western European countries are usually higher than those in the countries of origin of migrant domestic workers. This means that even a poorly remunerated job can represent an important source of income for migrants and for their families in the country of origin. Second, migrants, especially in the first stages of their migration project, cannot count on social protection in the host country and therefore are more vulnerable than locals in the

¹⁹ For literature on *global care chains*, refer to Parreñas, 2001, Hochschild, 2002; Kofman, 2013; Lutz & Pallenga-Möllenbeck, 2012; Williams, 2012; Yeates, 2009, 2012.

labour market. This means that, at least at the beginning, they are willing to accept low-wage jobs as a first way of survival. In economic terms, they have lower reservation wages, compared to locals²⁰ (Sciortino, 2004). Third, because they are often without dependants – at least in the host country –, migrant domestic workers are usually more prepared to accept jobs that require unsocial working hours and harsh conditions, including live-in jobs (Anderson, 2011).

The case of live-in jobs is emblematic, as in many European countries live-in jobs are almost universally occupied by migrants. Although the trend towards a shift from live-in to live-out types of domestic work is common to all developed countries, in some European countries live-in employment is regaining momentum, mainly due to the increased demand for care workers. This is particularly true in some Mediterranean countries, such as Italy and Spain (Ambrosini, 2012, 2015).

As scholarship has pointed out, the employment of migrants in live-in jobs is advantageous both from the point of view of employers and of migrants themselves (Ambrosini, 2015). From the point of view of employers, migrants are particularly suitable, because in the majority of the cases they do not have to attend their own families and can potentially be available 24 hours per day. Even if a growing number of female migrants do have family dependants (children, parents, disabled relatives), their dependants often live in the countries of origin, either because of restrictive measures that make family reunification difficult, or because of migration strategies²¹. In addition to the geographical distance from their families, newly arrived migrants often lack a network of social relations in the countries of destination, which makes them particularly suitable for live-in jobs²².

From the point of view of migrants, live-in domestic work can also be advantageous. First of all, it solves all at once the problems related to employment and accommodation, thus allowing repaying more quickly the costs of the migration process. At the same time, it can be

²⁰ In labour economics, the reservation wage is defined as the minimum wage rate at which a worker would consider accepting a certain job. A lower wage rate would therefore be rejected by the worker. The reservation wage of an individual typically evolves over time, depending on different factors. For instance, the birth of a child, the age of the individual, new qualifications or education tend to increase the reservation wage, as the worker will need a higher wage rate to consider being in employment. Also, the type of job (pleasant or unpleasant), personal preferences or specific events of the life course can have an influence on the reservation wage. For instance, a worker could be willing to accept a poorly paid job if the job is seen as an opportunity of a new professional career, or if the job is seen as temporary, before better opportunities might arise.

²¹ Due to the great differences in the costs for living between countries of destination and countries of origin, the choice to leave their families behind can be voluntary, because the economic benefits of migration are greater if dependants remain in the country of origin.

²² The isolation experienced by many domestic migrants, due to their migration status and to the work in private homes, makes them particularly vulnerable to long hours and other exploitative practices.

particularly sought-after by female migrants, as it represents a sort of shelter from the external world: it provides physical protection from an unknown environment, but it also provides social and legal protection. This can be particularly useful for undocumented migrants, who might find domestic work in private households more secure, as it decreases the risk of being tracked by the authorities. Therefore, relatively low earnings and unfriendly working hours can be part of the migration strategy of domestic workers, because the economic function of the job is entirely directed to the country of origin and because they do not have the reproductive burden of their families in the receiving countries. Additionally, contrary to local women, for migrant women the fact of working in the domestic sector is usually seen as a temporary situation, be that because the professional situation might evolve once settled, or because the migration project itself is seen as temporary (Anderson, 2011).

A last, but not less important, factor that can explain the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector is linked to discrimination issues. Racism and stereotypes around migrants are just as strong drivers as gender stereotypes with regards to the choice of domestic workers (Anderson, 2002). Racial stereotypes play an important role in the choice of domestic workers, because they can be used by employers to justify class differences.

As qualitative research has highlighted, many employers find it easier to deal with foreign domestic workers compared to native ones, as it justifies their position of superiority in the employment relationship (Anderson, 2002; Rollins, 1985; Kordasiewicz, 2015; Kofman, 2004). Since employers tend to feel a sense of guilt at the idea of being served by someone who is perceived to be equal in terms of class or education²³, they use ethnic reasons or simply nationality as a way to build the distance with their employees. The idea that the domestic worker belongs to another ethnic group or another nationality creates the necessary distance that legitimises the very act of employing her/him²⁴. The greater the perceived distance between the employer and the employee, the stronger the legitimisation (Kordasiewicz, 2015).

Additionally, some studies have pointed out that in countries where the presence of migrants in the domestic sector is very strong, employers build a hierarchy of more or less wanted nationalities and/or ethnic groups (Ambrosini, 2013). This phenomenon, sometimes referred to as ‘statistical discrimination’, functions as a process of categorisation of domestic workers based on some qualities (or faults), which are attributed to certain ethnic groups or

²³ Literature on domestic work showed that the class and educational distance between middle and lower-class employers and migrant domestic workers have come to decrease in recent years.

²⁴ In migration studies, it is common to refer to the concept of ‘otherness’, meaning the construction of a separation between autochthones and foreigners as a way to justify discriminatory behaviours.

nationalities. Based on these categorisations, some foreigners are considered as more or less suitable for certain types of domestic work²⁵ (Ambrosini, 2012).

1.2.4 Low reputation and poor working conditions

Today, paid domestic work in Europe is considered a low-skilled job and it is characterised by poor working conditions and low reputation, with no exception. This represents the strongest continuity with the past.

As discussed in section 1.1.1, in the eighteenth century certain domestic functions were not considered as degrading, but on the contrary enjoyed quite a social prestige. However, the relatively good reputation of the work was only applicable to certain positions, namely those that required high responsibilities and that were not purely linked to manual work. Starting from the nineteenth century, these positions either disappeared or became more professionalised and paid domestic work came to be strongly associated with work of low-skill and low value. This coincided with the feminisation of domestic work, so that the low status of the job is often associated with the ‘natural’ inclination of women to perform these tasks. Additionally, because it is traditionally performed for free by the female members of the family, it is considered to have no value²⁶ (Cox, 2006; Lutz, 2010).

Although contemporary paid domestic work is officially recognised as part of the labour market in all developed countries and despite the recent attempts to professionalise the sector²⁷, domestic workers are among those suffering the worst conditions among all waged

²⁵ For instance, women from less developed countries are generally assumed to be more suitable for cleaning and housework, compared to care work (Cox, 2006). However, as qualitative studies have shown, discriminations can be even more specific. In certain contexts, for example, African women are thought to be lazy and slow in housework tasks, while they are welcome as child-carers, as they are thought to be more maternal. Similarly, Filipino women can be sought-after (hence better paid), as they have a reputation of being submissive and hard workers (Parreñas, 2001; Rollins, 1985) and so on.

²⁶ The low-skilled nature of domestic chores is contradicted by the fact that employers do require specific skills. Usually these requirements are not only limited to objective competencies (ironing, cooking, speed at executing tasks, etc.), but they include what are commonly defined as “soft skills”: the ability to manage time, to prioritise, to perform multiple tasks at once, but also listening and showing empathy to the needs of the employers, among others. Although a renewed attention has been paid to the importance of soft skills, the belief that domestic work is unskilled is so deeply anchored that all attempts to professionalise the sector have failed so far (Anderson, 2000). A growing gap exists between professionalised work – jobs that require skills and that are more likely to be performed also by men, such as nurses, teachers, gardeners, etc. – and non-professionalised work – jobs that have the lowest possible status and that continue to be performed only by women.

²⁷ Among the efforts made in recent years to professionalise paid domestic work and to improve the working conditions of domestic workers, the most significant at international level is the work of the International Labour Organisation. The ILO Convention 189 and the Recommendation 201 on “Decent Work for Domestic Workers”, adopted in 2011, are the most powerful instruments adopted at international level for the protection of domestic workers and the improvements of their working conditions.

workers. The hours are long, the pay is low and the benefits associated with it generally poor, the work requires strong physical and emotional efforts and the commuting for live-out workers can be exhausting. It is a work that can be monotonous and both live-in and live-out domestic workers can experience situations of profound isolation. Moreover, domestic work is attached low status and low reputation and in the vast majority of cases it is considered degrading. As Bridget Anderson states, “paid domestic work looks in many ways like just another undesirable job” (2002, p. 104).

As it has been recognised by scholarship, the reasons for the persistence of poor working conditions are partly linked to the peculiarity of the job. Domestic work is different from any other employment relationship, mainly because i) it is based on power relationships that recall those between masters and slaves; ii) it is performed in the private sphere; iii) it involves emotional labour; and iv) it is linked to the idea of *dirtiness*. (Rollins, 1985; Lutz, 2008, 2010; Anderson, 2002, 2006; Triandafyllidou & Marchetti, 2015).

First, the power relation between employer and domestic worker is particularly insidious, as it is embedded in classes, races, nationalities and genders and it recalls the concept of servitude (Anderson, 2000; Cox, 2006; Parreñas, 2001). Although the relationship employer/worker is by definition an asymmetrical relationship, the distinctive feature of domestic work is that the very nature of the work implies a logic of servility and justifies a strong demarcation between superiority and inferiority. No matter how good the relationship employer/worker is, there will always be someone who serves and someone who is to be served. This can make the worker vulnerable to exploitation. Additionally, contrary to other power relationships, domestic work creates hierarchies and asymmetries among women: some women hold power and exercise it over other women. This has a strong impact on the reproduction of gender stereotypes and the intersection between gender, class and race issues.

According to Rollins, the two extreme ways through which the exercise of power can be manifested are either an openly exploitative behaviour, or a ‘maternalistic’ attitude (Rollins, 1985). Both behaviours reinforce class separation, but maternalism can be particularly dangerous, because it is hidden and because it creates a strong psychological dependence of the worker. The relation of dependence is especially strong for undocumented migrants, who fear to lose their job if they show insubordinate behaviour. Like paternalism, maternalism is based on an exchange: it provides protection in exchange for work and obedience (Rollins, 1985).

Second, domestic work is always performed in the private and intimate space of the ‘home’, which is a very special place of employment, and this has consequences at various levels

(Lutz, 2011; Triandafyllidou & Marchetti, 2015). On the one hand, the private sphere is socially and politically constructed as antithetical to the public and what happens within the private sphere cannot be considered as real work. Domestic workers find themselves in a space between the public and the private: they facilitate the movement of middle-class women into the public sphere, but they assume the private responsibilities of these women (Anderson, 2000).

On the other hand, the sharing of the intimate space between the employer and the employee can generate a series of issues. For one thing, it makes the work invisible and workers vulnerable to physical, sexual and psychological violence. The fact that labour inspections are not allowed in private homes makes particularly difficult to monitor working conditions and punish abuses. Furthermore, the relationship itself can generate ambiguity. The relationship employer/worker usually fluctuates between extreme closeness and extreme distance: domestic workers may either be treated as ‘one of the family’, and hence expected to show feelings of gratitude, or treated as inferiors, hence excessively controlled or even brutally abused²⁸ (Rollins, 1985; Anderson, 2000). In general, the fact that the work is performed in the private sphere prevents domestic workers from the full exercise of their rights²⁹.

Third, domestic work does not simply require physical labour, but it involves an emotional dimension. As far as domestic work is concerned, physical labour and emotional labour cannot be disentangled (Andersen, 2002; Lutz, 2008; Triandafyllidou & Marchetti, 2015; Zdravomyslova, 2010). This raises important questions about the commodification of domestic work and of care work in particular³⁰. While employers are in a better position for handling the emotional bond that goes together with domestic work, this can reveal particularly problematic for the workers. Emotional ties tend to be recognised or denied, depending on the employer’s interest: they are reinforced when the worker is expected to love and care as one of the family, while they are denied when the worker is no longer wanted.

A last feature that contributes to the low status and low reputation of the job is its close association with the concept of *dirty*. It has to do with the low status traditionally

²⁸ Qualitative researches show that employers typically treat workers as ‘one of the family’ when it comes to hours and flexibility (e.g. working extra hours, being ‘on call’ 24h per day, performing tasks which are not part of the job description, and so on), but as employees when it comes to workers entitlements (e.g. claims for extra holidays or permits, unjustified dismissals of the worker, and so on) (Rollins, 1985; Parreñas, 2001; Anderson, 2002).

²⁹ For instance, domestic workers are among the least represented in trade unions and associations, which reduces their protection and collective bargaining power.

³⁰ The recognition of the emotional dimension typical of domestic work has stimulated a debate over the appropriateness of externalising this type of work. In other words, can emotional labour be bought? Can money buy love? Despite the increase in the demand for care workers, the commodification of care work is still questioned by many.

attributed to people who deal with dirt as a profession³¹. Although dealing with his/her own dirt is considered to be normal, being paid for dealing with other people's dirt is automatically associated with a lower status. The status of the worker becomes inseparable from the status of the work (Cox, 2006). This partly explains why attempts to professionalise the sector and promote the dignity of domestic work have often failed: low wages, low reputation and low status of domestic workers continue to go hand in hand.

In the light of the transformations occurred over time in the way paid domestic work is regulated and organised, as well as the main features of the contemporary European domestic sector, the next section provides a definition of paid domestic work today. This definition will be adopted throughout the research.

1.3 The definition of contemporary paid domestic work

The definition of domestic work is controversial, and this is reflected both in the various categorisations and employment statuses attributed to domestic workers at national level and in the way domestic sector is coded in international and national statistics. Additionally, as historians who have analysed the development of domestic services has repeatedly emphasised, the definition of paid domestic work has changed over time.

The complexity of the definition of domestic work is not only theoretical, but it also derives from practical issues. The invisibility of the work, due to its private nature, makes it difficult to monitor. Also, due to the variety of tasks that can be performed by domestic workers, a common definition has not been agreed upon so far.

In its broad definition, and taking into consideration the transformations in domestic work occurred over time, modern paid domestic work includes both housework – cleaning, ironing, cooking, polishing, shopping, and all activities whose aim is to take care of the house – and care work – all tasks related to the care of children, the elderly and/or the disabled³². However, even this simple definition can be problematic, as often the two dimensions overlap. The fact that performing care work often requires that the worker do some housework-related task (cooking for children and the elderly, washing body dirt, tidying, etc.), or that housework is

³¹ Stephen Castles has used the concept of the “3-D jobs” (Dirty, Demanding and Dangerous) to describe the work of foreign women in the domestic and care sector.

³² One of the main novelties of contemporary domestic work, compared to older forms of domestic services, is the overwhelming increase of a ‘care dimension’ within domestic tasks. In Europe, as in other developed regions, care work represents an important segment of the domestic sector. Details about the changes in the proportion of care work, compared to the past, are provided in section 1.1.2.

ultimately intended to make the life of the family members more comfortable (hence, to take care of them), makes the separation blur.

To overcome the problem of listing the specific tasks performed by domestic workers, which vary from country to country and may also vary over time, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) provides a general definition of domestic workers as all workers who work for private households. In particular, the Domestic Workers Convention (N. 189) adopted in 2011, which constitutes the international reference framework for all statistical definitions of domestic workers, defines domestic work as follows:

- a) the term “domestic work” means work performed in or for a household or households;
- b) the term “domestic worker” means any person engaged in domestic work within an employment relationship;
- c) a person who performs domestic work only occasionally or sporadically and not on an occupational basis is not a domestic worker.

The definition of the ILO is interesting, because instead of providing a list of activities, it focuses on the nature of the work. In particular, point a) of the definition emphasises the private nature of domestic work and thus excludes all workers who provide domestic services for institutions (kindergartens, hospitals, nursing homes, orphanages, retirement homes, and so on). Also, according to the Convention, domestic work may involve a variety of tasks, such as “cooking, cleaning the house, washing and ironing the laundry, general housework, looking after children, the elderly or persons with disabilities, as well as maintaining the garden, guarding the house premises, and driving the family car” (ILO, 2011).

According to point b) of the definition, domestic work includes domestic workers on a part-time basis, domestic workers who are engaged with multiple employers, national and non-national domestic workers, and live-in and live-out domestic workers. It is important to notice that the employer can be either a member of the household for which the work is performed, or an agency/enterprise that employs domestic workers and make them available for a private household. This definition excludes self-employed domestic workers.

According to point c) of the definition, only who performs domestic work on an occupational basis can be considered a domestic worker. This means that a clear distinction has to be made between domestic work and home work, the latter being the work carried out by an individual in his/her own home, rather than in the home of the employer.

Based on the transformations of domestic work over time, on the main characteristics of contemporary domestic work and on the definition provided by the ILO, the definition of paid domestic work adopted in this study is the following:

- Tasks/activities: it includes both housework and care activities³³.
- Nature of employment: it includes only work performed in or for a private household or households³⁴.
- Type of employment: it includes only the work performed on an occupational basis and therefore excludes the domestic work performed in his/her own home.
- Qualifications: it includes only low-skilled work (work for which no qualifications are required)³⁵.

These features set the theoretical definition of domestic work adopted for the purpose of this study. However, as it is presented in Chapter 3 on methodology, various problems arise when the theoretical definition is translated into a statistical definition.

³³ This is based on the recent developments of paid domestic work and on the increase of the demand and supply of care domestic workers (see section 1.1.2). The advantage of the inclusion of both housework and care work is that it solves the problem of the overlap between the two dimensions.

³⁴ This is based on the definition of the ILO Convention N. 189 (2011).

³⁵ This allows drawing a distinction between domestic workers and more professionalised positions. This distinction is useful especially for the classification of care workers. For instance, care workers working for private households will be considered domestic workers only when no official qualification is required to perform the job. On the contrary, when care workers (typically those paid by public authorities) need a formal training to perform care tasks, they will not be included in the domestic sector.

Chapter 2

Care, gender and migration regimes and the use of typologies in literature

This chapter presents the main contributions of the literature on care, gender and migration regimes. Since the analyses of the three regimes under study ultimately result in the construction of typologies, an introduction on the use of typologies in the literature is presented as a separate section. This introduction can be useful, as it provides an overview of the main philosophical and empirical argumentation in favour (or against) the creation of typologies. Another section that precedes the debate on the three regimes under study is a brief review of the literature on welfare regimes.

The reason for presenting a separate section on welfare regimes is based on three considerations. First, care regimes are part of welfare regimes, as they include welfare policies and regulations that define the division of caring responsibilities among the state, the family and the market. Thus, a general review of welfare regimes seems necessary for a thorough review of care regimes. Second, the tradition of welfare studies provides one of the richest contributions in terms of creation of typologies and thus it also represents a useful methodological tool. Third, as it emerges from the review of the literature on care and gender regimes, many existing classifications have been inspired, at least partly, on welfare studies.

Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 present the review of the literature on the care, the gender and the migration regimes. For each regime, the most influential theorisations and classifications developed in the literature are reviewed. The specific examination of the three regimes and the overview of the most influential classifications developed by scholarship is meant to lay the ground for the analysis of the three regimes, which is presented in Chapter 5. In each section only some of the most influential typologies that have been created and that have a direct impact on the study of paid domestic work are reviewed. Also, for a matter of relevance,

I only mention the most prominent theories, namely those that have generated the widest debate and the largest aftermath for both political economy and sociology³⁶.

2.1 Typologies in the literature

2.1.1 The use of typologies in the literature: advantages and disadvantages

Before examining the typologies that are most relevant to the study of paid domestic work, it seems necessary to introduce the use of typologies in the literature and how the formulation of ideal types has been either encouraged or criticised. Economists, political economists and sociologists, among others, have always been interested in analysing similarities and differences in national institutions and the deriving systems. One way to explore such differences, as well as common trends, has been to classify countries according to typologies. In academic research, typologies have been used for different purposes: in order to simplify the reality, in order to facilitate the comparison between different realities or objects and to highlight common features and differences, but also in order to build new theories to explain social phenomena.

The main theoretical and methodological questions about the creation of typologies concern, on the one hand, the scientific validity of typologies and, on the other hand, the usefulness and the explanatory power of ideal types.

Concerning the scientific validity of typologies, the debate can be traced back to the philosophical question over what type of knowledge can or cannot be considered as ‘science’. Although classifications and typologies as a ‘natural’ instrument for understanding the reality have always been used and accepted, their use as a tool to produce science has been either encouraged or strongly criticised at different times in history. The main resistance to the use of classifications in scientific research draws from the division between natural and social sciences and their status as sciences and focuses on the ‘scientific fallacy’ of classifications and typologies (Marradi, 1990, p. 150).

³⁶ Due to the richness of the scientific literature that has developed around the three regimes, it is impossible to account for all the contributions in the field. For the purpose of this study, only a reduced selection of authors is mentioned. The choice, which is by no means exhaustive, is based on the relevance of the classifications to the analysis of domestic work (namely, classifications that use indicators that are somehow relevant for analysing the outsourcing of domestic activities) and the magnitude of the debate that they have generated (namely, the most known classifications that have inspired the literature).

According to positivists, given the difference in the object of study between natural and social sciences, different methods have to be adopted, the former being objective, while the second being necessarily subjective (or empathic) (Meraviglia, 2004). While natural sciences use scientific methods from which they derive exact laws, social sciences aim to understand social phenomena through general theories and classifications. Similarly, logical empiricists in the nineteenth century maintained that for social sciences to be recognised the same scientific status as natural sciences, methods of classification should be abandoned in favour of exact measurement, the latter being superior to the former (Marradi, 1990).

Typologies, instead, have been defended on different grounds by many scholars. One of the most prominent defender of typologies is Weber, who recognises the elaboration of ideal types as a proper method for scientific research (Weber, 1958, quoted in Meraviglia, 2004). In opposition to positivists, Weber believes that the object of study in social sciences does not preclude from objectivity and that this objectivity can be achieved through a rigorous method. The construction of ideal types is one of the crucial parts of the method elaborated by Weber. According to him, ideal types are abstract constructions, or models, to which the reality can be compared. Ideal types are constructed by emphasising some traits that are present in reality, but which are not necessarily present at the same time or with the same intensity. They can be considered as extreme concepts that never correspond to the reality. The usefulness of typologies lies in the fact that the reality can be measured and compared to ideal types and that it can thus reveal its constitutive elements. Since ideal types do not correspond by any means to real types, typologies are instruments of analysis that can be useful to social scientists in order to understand the conceptual categories that he/she is using. In this, typologies guarantee the objectivity of the analysis (Weber, 1958, quoted in Meraviglia, 2004). An important part of the Weberian definition of ideal types is that they should not be used as an end in itself, but rather to clarify social phenomena.

Concerning the usefulness and explanatory power of typologies, a constant scepticism derives from the fact that real phenomena can rarely be unambiguously assigned to ideal types. If certain real types bring much resemblance to a given ideal-type, this is not the case for all social phenomena. The proof is that, the typologies being equal, a certain real object might be assigned to different ideal types, depending on the measurement or simply on individual judgement. However, as Weber already stressed in his work, this does not constitute a problem, as ideal types are by definition abstract conceptualisations, which never exactly correspond to the reality. It is exactly in the distance between real and ideal types that lays the

explanatory power of typologies: the power to compare social phenomena, the power to measure the intensity of a certain phenomenon, and so on (Meraviglia, 2004).

The emphasis on the usefulness of typologies for comparative purposes has been largely emphasised by literature. According to Watkins, comparing real types to pure types – which obviously implies knowledge of both types – enables the emergence of deviations from the ideal and therefore the measurement of reality (Watkins, 1969, quoted in Arts and Gelissen, 2002). Using the words of Arts and Gelissen, through the comparison between real and ideal types ‘the deviations of the “impure” real types are contrasted with the “purity” of the ideal-type’ (Arts and Gelissen, 2002, p.139). Therefore, typologies can be used as conceptual tools for empirical validation.

Additionally, according to some scholars, typologies are not only useful for comparative purposes, but they may be useful tools for building new theories. As Boucher and Gest affirm, “aside from [their] empirical contributions, robust typologies allow scholars to analyse and deepen existing theory” (2014, p. 3). In this sense, they can be useful to introduce innovative theories and new ways of investigations.

Another controversial issue highlighted by scholars concerns the use that should be made of typologies. As mentioned above, according to Weber ideal types should not be used as an end in itself, but only to clarify social phenomena. Similarly, other scholars have asserted that ideal types have a value if and only if they are not a goal in themselves, but they are oriented towards other goals, which should be real phenomena. According to Klant, ideal types are of no value if they are not created with the explicit intent of using them for explaining the reality (Klant, 1984).

From a methodological point of view, different types of classifications/typologies³⁷ exist, depending on the goal they pursue and depending on the methodology used for their construction. One of the clearest distinctions between different types of classifications is the one elaborated by Marradi. According to him, classifications can be carried out through two main families of operations³⁸. What he calls ‘intensional classification’ refers to the process of conceptual elaboration of typologies. Based on theory, a concept at a certain level of generality can be subdivided into further concepts or groups. On the contrary, the ‘extensional classification’ refers to the process of grouping objects or events, based on their properties or

³⁷ For matters of simplicity, I use the terms ‘classification’ and ‘typology’ almost interchangeably. Although no clear semantic definition exists and despite the close similarity between the two terms, classifications generally refer to the process of classifying, while typologies to the result of this process. For a more detailed discussion over the correct terminology to be used, refer to Marradi, 1990.

³⁸ Marradi identifies a third type of classifications, not mentioned here, which refers to the process of assigning objects or events to existing classes. This type of classification usually results in taxonomies (Marradi, 1990).

their perceived similarity. In simple words, while intensional classifications start from the theoretical level and are then confirmed by the observation of the reality, extensional classifications build typologies starting from the characteristics of the object. The main criterion applied for extensional classifications is to maximise the homogeneity among groups and the heterogeneity between groups (Marradi, 1990).

Although the typologies presented in the following sections correspond to either of the two types of classifications, the construction of the typologies in this study (presented in Chapter 5) falls under the extensional type of classifications.

2.1.2 The welfare regime

In Europe and in other developed countries, the attempt to classify countries for comparative reasons has become of crucial importance in the last decades and even more today. Much of the debate, be that in economic, political or social terms, focuses on whether global trends such as globalisation, liberalisation and technological advancement are meant to bring about convergence among countries or whether national differences will persist.

A typical approach, which represents one angle from which to explore differences and similarities between developed societies, has been to explain the economic behaviour of nation states by looking at how institutions (mainly the state and the market) interact and generate different institutional combinations that influence the economy and society at large. To investigate and explain economic behaviour, political economists and economists have used different approaches, by giving prominence to one or more aspects that might determine economic and institutional stability and that might meet the social and economic challenges brought about by the modernisation of societies. Thus, various typologies exist, which focus either on the labour market regulations, on the role of the state, on welfare regulations, and so on³⁹.

In this section I concentrate on the elaboration of typologies of welfare regimes. As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the justification for a separate section specific to welfare regimes derives from three factors. First, care regimes – which are one of the focuses

³⁹ One of the most influential contributions to explain institutional variations was developed by Peter Hall and David Soskice, who proposed the ‘varieties of capitalism’ (VofC) approach. Based on two main indicators – coordination and complementarities – they developed a classification that distinguishes between two ideal-types: liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs) (Hall and Soskice, 2001). In liberal market economies, the relationship between firms and other actors is determined by market relations, while in coordinated market economies it is mainly based on non-market relationships.

of this research – are part of welfare regimes, whose prior description seems therefore necessary. Second, welfare literature provides one of the richest examples of classifications. Third, many classifications of countries in terms of care and gender regimes are carried out based on existing typologies of welfare.

2.1.2.1 The Welfare state typologies

Some of the most successful and well-known typologies developed in sociological and economic studies are those addressing the differences among welfare states in developed countries. Although the creation of welfare states in Europe is usually traced back to the end of the 19th century, it took several generations before it was recognised and labelled as such. The need to classify welfare states started to become pressing in the post-war period, when the restructuring of developed societies urged the reorganisation of welfare institutions and the definition of social rights (Flora and Heidenheimer, 1976)⁴⁰.

The definition of welfare state itself is not without contradictions. Generally speaking, welfare is considered the instrument through which the state guarantees a certain degree of economic and social well-being to its citizens⁴¹. As defined by Pöder and Kerem (2011, p. 56), “welfare regimes refer to institutional arrangements between the market, the state and the family, in which the state has a central role in protecting individuals against market risks”. In the traditional economic distinction between the state, the market and the family, welfare constitutes the state intervention where market and families fail to guarantee the survival and a decent standard of living to individuals (Esping-Andersen, 1990).

While welfare states can be more or less interventionist in the degree of support they provide, their existence always implies a certain degree of recognition of social rights, in addition to civil rights. Various differences exist in the way social rights have been adopted and translated into welfare policies. Such differences, and the evolution of national welfare states,

⁴⁰ The welfare state originated in Germany with the policies implemented by the German Chancellor Otto von Bismark, who introduced a programme of social protection (old age pensions, accident insurance and medical care), so to win the support of the working class. In the United Kingdom, welfare state emerged at the beginning of the 20th century, when the first liberal welfare reforms were introduced, and became a proper model with the Beveridge Report in 1942 (Flora and Heidenheimer, 1976). Today, Bismark and Beveridge have come to identify two distinct models of welfare.

⁴¹ Some definitions of welfare consider that a real welfare exists only when the majority of state activities are oriented towards the wellbeing of households and individuals, or when its support addresses the whole population. So, strictly speaking and based on these definitions, no real welfare state was present before the 1970s, the time when governments in western democratic countries started to acknowledge the existence of social rights and adapt their structure to accommodate social policies (Esping-Andersen, 1990).

have generated a long tradition of comparative social policy literature and still constitute a rich subject of studies today.

2.1.2.2 The three worlds of welfare capitalism

Among different classifications of welfare states developed in the last decades, the one proposed by Esping-Andersen (1980-1990) is the one that has received the greatest attention and that has shaped the following literature. In his seminal work on welfare states – *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* – Esping-Andersen proposes a three-group typology of welfare regimes⁴², based on the different relationship between the state, the market and the family that can be identified in modern capitalist democracies.

While previous attempts to classify welfare systems were based on the total level of social expenditure, Esping-Andersen starts from the observation that not all social expenditures count equally and they do not necessarily reflect social solidarity. According to him, welfare regimes can be classified based on the combination of two indicators: the degree of de-commodification and the degree of social stratification in a given country. The concept of ‘commodification’, which is a feature shared by all capitalist societies, is based on the idea that in capitalist societies workers are seen as commodities, whose well-being depends on the market. In countries where the level of commodification is high, the survival of individuals and their standard of living depend on their attachment to the market and their performance in the market. On the contrary, in countries with a high degree of de-commodification, individuals’ well-being does not entirely depend on the market, but it is guaranteed as a social right. Individuals are de-commodified when they have the choice not to work and they are still able to conduct a decent life. If a certain degree of de-commodification is part of every welfare system, the way it is pursued and the extent to which de-commodification is achieved varies greatly from country to country.

The second indicator that Esping-Andersen considers in his analysis of welfare regimes is social stratification, understood as the way certain social policies determine the kind of stratification in place in a given country and which kind of solidarity they pursue. The type of social stratification will be different, depending on the set of social policies promoted by the

⁴² In the preface of the book *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Esping-Andersen makes a distinction between the term welfare state and the term welfare regime. While the first one is narrowly associated with social aid policies, the latter includes all the features that characterise the relationship between the state and the economy. Since the aim of the author is not to analyse social programmes, but to reconceptualise welfare systems in terms of political economy, he systematically adopts the terms “welfare capitalism” or “welfare regimes”. Without neglecting the existence of semantic nuances, in my overview of welfare I will use the terms “welfare regimes”, “welfare systems” and “welfare states” interchangeably.

state and in particular depending on which among social assistance, social insurance and universalistic policy system predominates⁴³.

Based on the degree of de-commodification and the degree of social stratification resulting from social policies, Esping-Andersen recognises three distinct types of welfare capitalism. 'Liberal welfare states' are characterised by low levels of de-commodification. In these countries, social assistance schemes prevail over other types of state support and the market is seen as the only instrument that can 'free' people. These systems determine a high level of stratification, low de-commodification and strong polarisation between poor stigmatised individuals and the rest of the population. The United States, Britain, Canada and Australia are identified as the core of the liberal welfare state model.

In 'corporatist-conservative welfare states', the focus on the market is weaker and social rights are commonly accepted. The state assumes the role of substitute to the market in guaranteeing well-being to its citizens, but the state intervenes only when the family or the market fail⁴⁴. In line with the corporatist tradition, entitlements to social rights depend on contributions and therefore on employment, and tend to reinforce classes and privileges. Although the enforcement of social rights is not questioned, in corporatist-conservative countries the level of de-commodification is not very high, as the level of provision depends on hierarchies and statuses. Austria, Germany, France and Italy are the countries that better represent this typology.

Finally, 'social-democratic welfare states' are based on solidarity and equality. The insurance system is universalistic and social protection is provided as a universal right, without any link to the market. In social-democratic countries, the level of de-commodification is high, as individuals are not dependent on the market for their well-being. They can choose whether or not to work and they receive social benefits even if they are outside the market. Insurance

⁴³ For instance, while both social assistance schemes and social insurance schemes are intended to provide a certain level of support to citizens, they are somehow going in the opposite direction in terms of de-commodification. Social assistance, as it addresses only the weakest segments of the population – those who are not able to participate in the market – paradoxically creates a stronger dependence of people from the market. In countries where social assistance is the dominant model, a strong polarisation between the very poor and all other individuals emerges: the social stigma associated with social assistance forces people to rely on the market, which becomes then the only instrument for achieving a decent standard of living. While social insurance generally covers larger social strata, it is not however an instrument of de-commodification and can sometimes exacerbate the dependency of workers on the market. Since social insurance is typically linked to employment, it maintains statuses and privileges, based on the position of the individuals in the labour market. Through social insurance schemes the state typically guarantees the fidelity of public servants through specific privileges.

⁴⁴ Since conservative countries are highly influenced by the Catholic church, the family ideology is particularly strong. Because families are seen as the natural providers of care and mothers as dependant from their male counterpart, women are not supported in their decision to enter the labour market, spouses are not covered by individual social insurance and services for children are lacking.

benefits are universally provided, independently of social contributions linked to employment⁴⁵. If in the corporatist-conservative welfare type the state intervenes only where family and the market fail, in social-democratic countries the state intervenes in advance, so to guarantee a certain degree of well-being to all. Scandinavian countries are those identified as the core countries representing this model.

An interesting feature of this welfare type is that, although de-commodification is highly reached for, the market is nevertheless a crucial element of the system. Even if citizens are entitled to choosing between working or not, the participation in the labour market is highly encouraged, as work is considered a universal right. Since full employment – also of women – is the ultimate goal and it is considered as a state responsibility, it follows that childcare and elderly care services and all other services aimed at facilitating the combination of work and family responsibilities are highly developed.

2.1.2.3 New ways to look at welfare states

Much of the literature on welfare of the last two decades has taken the three ideal types of Esping-Andersen as the basis for the comparison of welfare regimes and for the classification of welfare states. While I will not linger over a theoretical or methodological evaluation of the typology developed by Esping-Andersen, I will nevertheless mention the main criticisms raised at his classification, in that they enabled the construction of new ways to look at welfare regimes and to make international comparisons⁴⁶. The main criticisms raised against Esping-Andersen classification can be summarised in the following: i) the systematic inclusion of Mediterranean countries in the conservative welfare regime and the lack of a specific Southern group; ii) the definition of liberal and conservative countries; iii) the lack of a gender perspective in the overall architecture of the classification.

⁴⁵ Although these welfare states are far the most egalitarian, the universalistic nature of benefits makes them very costly for governments, which are often unable to provide high levels of compensations. If welfare states fail to guarantee a real choice between inside or outside the market, because benefits are too low, the risk is a polarisation between the very poor and the middle-class. According to Esping-Andersen, the Scandinavian countries, which represent the core of this typology, managed to provide benefits that are high enough to cover the middle-class and so avoid a social polarisation between the rich and the poor.

⁴⁶ For the purpose of this research, I will not enter into the debate on whether or not Esping-Andersen typology of welfare regimes is still valid today, whether it was ever useful on empirical grounds, or whether it possesses any explanatory power or any theoretical legitimation (for further details about the theoretical and empirical value of his work, see Arts and Gelissen, 2002). I will rather use Esping-Andersen typologies, as well as other typologies resulting from criticisms to his work, in order to provide an overview of the various comparative perspectives in welfare studies.

For the review of the main welfare typologies deriving from Esping-Andersen classification, I refer to the reviews of Arts and Gelissen (2002) and of Bambra (2007), from which I selected the typologies that are most significant for the purpose of this study. The typologies are divided into the type of criticism from which they derive. Each table presented in the section – one for each type of criticism – shows a chronological list of the selected typologies and includes the name of the author, the measure/indicator on which the model is constructed and the typologies, including the countries that according to each model better fit into each cluster.

Distinctiveness of Southern countries

In his original classification, Esping-Andersen included Italy in the conservative group, while other Mediterranean countries were not taken into account. While he acknowledged the similarity among Mediterranean countries, all characterised by a strong Catholic influence and strong family ideology, Esping-Andersen considered these countries as a sub-group of the conservative type.

As presented in Table 1, many scholars underlined the lack of the distinctiveness of Southern countries and remodelled the original classification, so to form a specific cluster of Southern countries.

What is interesting to notice is that, despite the use of different indicators, all authors identify three ideal types of welfare state, which are similar to those developed by Esping-Andersen. The main innovation is the recognition of a fourth ideal-type, represented by Mediterranean countries. However, as it is often the case when typologies are constructed by means of different indicators, some differences exist in the attribution of certain countries to each ideal-type. While Scandinavian countries, as well as Greece, Portugal and Spain on the one side and Austria and Germany on the other side seem to constantly represent the core of each group (Northern, Southern and Continental, respectively), there are countries that belong to different clusters depending on the type of measurement. For instance, while all authors include France in the conservative/Bismarckian group, in Leibfried's analysis France is part of the group of Southern countries, which corresponds in his classification to a rudimentary model of social protection. Similarly, while Italy shares in all classifications the same characteristics of other Southern countries, Navarro and Shi assign it to the Christian Democrat cluster.

Table 1: Welfare state typologies - distinctiveness of the Southern group

Author	Indicators	Welfare regimes			
Esping-Andersen (1990)	- De-commodification - Social stratification	Liberal: Australia Canada Ireland New Zealand UK USA	Conservative: Finland France Germany Japan Italy	Social-democratic: Austria Belgium Netherlands Denmark Norway Sweden	
Leibfried (1992)	- Poverty policy - Rights - Basic income - Social insurance	Anglo-Saxon: Australia New Zealand UK USA	Bismarck: Austria Germany	Scandinavian: Denmark Finland Norway Sweden	Latin Rim: France Greece Italy Portugal Spain
Ferrera (1996)	- Eligibility rules and coverage - Financing and organisation of social protection	Anglo-Saxon: Ireland UK	Bismarck: Austria Belgium France Germany Luxembourg Netherlands Switzerland	Scandinavian: Denmark Finland Norway Sweden	Southern: Greece Italy Portugal Spain
Bonoli (1997)	- Social expenditure - Social expenditure via contributions	British: Ireland UK	Continental: Belgium France Germany Luxembourg Netherlands	Nordic: Denmark Finland Norway Sweden	Southern: Greece Italy Portugal Spain Switzerland
Navarro and Shi (2001)	- Political tradition	Liberal-Anglo Saxon: Canada Ireland UK USA	Christian Democrat: Belgium Netherlands Germany France Italy Switzerland	Social Democratic: Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Austria	Ex-fascist: Spain Greece Portugal

Redefinition of the liberal and/or conservative types

While for some authors the principal omission in Esping-Andersen's classification was a distinct Southern group, other authors focused on the possible internal differences of the liberal and/or the conservative types. Table 2 shows a selection of alternative typologies that highlight this issue.

Table 2: Welfare state typologies - redefinition of the liberal and conservative types

Author	Indicators	Welfare regimes				
Esping-Andersen (1990)	- De-commodification - Social stratification	Liberal: Australia Canada Ireland New Zealand UK USA	Conservative: Finland France Germany Japan Italy	Social-democratic: Austria Belgium Netherlands Denmark Norway Sweden		
Castles and Mitchell (1993)	- Welfare expenditure - Benefit equality	Liberal: Ireland Japan Switzerland USA	Conservative: Germany Italy Netherlands	Non-right hegemony: Belgium Denmark Norway Sweden	Radical: Australia New Zealand UK	
Kangas (1994)	- De-commodification	Liberal: Canada USA	Conservative: Austria Germany Italy Japan Netherlands	Social-democratic: Denmark Finland Norway Sweden	Radical: Australia Ireland New Zealand UK	
Korpi and Palme (1998)	- Social expenditure (% GDP) - Institutional features	Basic security: Canada Denmark Ireland Netherlands New Zealand Switzerland UK USA	Corporatist: Belgium France Austria Germany Italy Japan	Encompassing: Finland Norway Sweden	Targeted: Australia	
Pitruzello (1999)	- De-commodification	Liberal: Canada Ireland UK USA	Conservative: Netherlands Germany Switzerland	Social Democratic: Belgium Denmark Norway Sweden	Conservative-Bismarckian: Austria Finland France Italy Japan	Radical: Australia New Zealand
Bambra (2005)	- Healthcare services - De-commodification	Liberal: Australia Japan USA	Conservative: Austria Belgium Canada Denmark France Italy	Social Democratic: Finland Norway Sweden	Conservative subgroup: Germany Switzerland Netherlands	Liberal subgroup: Ireland UK New Zealand

Again, although the three ideal types identified by Esping-Andersen remain at the core of all classifications, by considering different indicators (social protection and distribution, the degree of poverty and inequality, public health and health inequalities and so on), new clusters of countries emerge. Without entering the debate over the classification of

Antipodean countries (Australia, New Zealand) and of the USA, what is interesting to notice is that several authors have not only added one or more clusters, but they have also rearranged the configuration of the existing ideal types, according to the set of indicators upon which their typology rests.

Adding a gender perspective

A last set of critiques raised to Esping-Andersen's typology is the lack of a gender perspective. As highlighted by Orloff (1996), the vast corpus of literature that takes into consideration gender as a framework of analysis of welfare states has developed around two different but complementary schools of thoughts. First, the welfare state can be seen as contributing to the reproduction of gender hierarchies. This way of analysing welfare regimes emphasises the way the state, through multiple mechanisms, reinforces and maintains traditional gender roles. In this case, the way the state promotes the access to social rights and to power resources can be used as indicators for a gender-sensitive analysis (O'Connor, 1993). Second, since the welfare is ultimately meant to address citizens' well-being, it is also meant to have a positive impact on social inequality, including gender inequality. This way of analysing gender regimes focuses on the gender-differentiated outcomes in terms of poverty reduction and reduction of inequalities.

Additionally, according to feminist scholars, the fact that care work was not included in the traditional typology as a distinct area of social policy led to a gender-blind model of welfare. Feminist scholars have identified in Esping-Andersen's typology at least three problematic issues: i) the lack of a gender perspective in the very concept of de-commodification, ii) the lack of a systematic analysis of the gendered division of unpaid labour (especially care and domestic work) and in particular of the welfare provided by families, and iii) the lack of recognition of gender as a means of social stratification (Bambra, 2007).

Although gender analyses of welfare states are numerous and have brought about a crucial contribution to welfare studies, many authors point at a lack of comparative studies in this field⁴⁷ (O'Connor, 1993; Orloff, 1996). If many authors have identified new and sophisticated indicators that take into account the gender dimension of welfare states, they have often focused on one single system or on two-country comparisons. Therefore, despite the rich contributions on the relationship between gender and welfare, very few examples of multi-country classifications exist with this respect.

⁴⁷ Among the most influential feminist contributions to welfare studies are Diane Sainsbury, Julia S. O'Connor, Ann Orloff, Jane Lewis, Birte Siim, Mary Ruggie.

Table 3 reports some examples of alternative typologies developed once gender is included in the analysis⁴⁸.

Table 3: Welfare state typologies - adding a gender perspective

Author	Indicators	Welfare regimes			
<i>Esping-Andersen (1990)</i>	- De-commodification - Social stratification	<i>Liberal:</i> Australia Canada Ireland New Zealand UK USA	<i>Conservative:</i> Finland France Germany Japan Italy	<i>Social-democratic:</i> Austria Belgium Netherlands Denmark Norway Sweden	
<i>Sainsbury (1993)</i>	Type of welfare claims (social assistance, social insurance, or universal entitlements)	<i>Liberal:</i> USA	<i>Conservative:</i> Netherlands	<i>Social democratic:</i> Sweden	<i>Mixed type:</i> UK
<i>Gustafsson (1994)</i>	Childcare policies	<i>Market provision:</i> USA	<i>Support mother caregiving:</i> Netherlands	<i>Public services:</i> Sweden	
<i>Wennemo (1994)</i>	Employment benefits and family allowances	<i>Continental Europe</i> (wage system, benefits to men)	<i>English speaking and Scandinavian countries</i> (public family allowances)		
<i>Siaroff (1994)</i>	- Family welfare orientation - Female work desirability - Family benefits paid to women	<i>Protestant Liberal:</i> Australia Canada New Zealand UK USA	<i>Advanced Christian-democratic:</i> Austria Belgium France West Germany Luxembourg Netherlands	<i>Protestant Social-democratic:</i> Denmark Finland Norway Sweden	<i>Late female mobilisation:</i> Greece Ireland Italy Japan Portugal Spain Switzerland

As shown in Table 3, the ideal types identified by Sainsbury and Gustafsson reproduce more or less the same groups as Esping-Andersen's, but they introduce indicators/measures that take into account the gendered outcomes of care policies and family benefits, as well as the type of benefits (between universalistic benefits and benefits based on social assistance and/or social insurance). Similarly, Wennemo makes a distinction between welfare states that allocate benefits based on employment in the labour market and welfare systems based on

⁴⁸ More examples of the alternative ways to look at welfare in a gender perspective will be presented in the sections on care regimes (2.2) and on gender regimes (2.3).

public family allowances, and distinguishes between two main groups: continental European countries, on the one hand, and English-speaking and Scandinavian countries, on the other hand.

A different approach is offered by Siaroff, according to whom the lack of a gendered perspective can be overcome by looking at the relationship between welfare states and the religious tradition. The alternative presented by the author is constructed by differentiating between the Protestant and the Catholic tradition. The resulting typology identifies a cluster of countries – the late female mobilisation group – characterised by poor welfare provision and the persistence of the family ideology, typical of the Catholic tradition.

Adding new countries to the picture: the post-communist type

I conclude the section on the review of the main welfare regimes with an extremely recent debate, related to the introduction in the welfare regimes typologies of the new European member states. Post-communist countries and generally Eastern European countries have been generally omitted from comparative policy studies, mainly because the features associated with the transition period they were facing made them difficult to classify. When scholars tried to fit them into existing typologies, the conclusion was often that the ‘European model’ was absent from the social policy asset in these countries (Ferge, 2001), because of the financial problems they were facing and their dependency on foreign capital, among other features. Another issue encountered when dealing with post-communist countries was that these countries were not homogeneous enough as to justify the introduction of a distinct cluster (Fenger, 2005). Despite the controversies in literature, some authors have attempted to fill this gap in recent years.

Table 4 shows the comparison between Esping-Andersen typology and the typology proposed by Pöder and Kerem, showing one possible alternative when Baltic countries are added in the picture. Their conclusion seems to point to a certain level of convergence between continental and Mediterranean countries, but also to the persistence of a clear separation between Nordic countries and all other countries. Additionally, according to their analysis, a clear group of countries emerges – that of post-communist countries – characterised by quite high levels of commodification (with the exception of Poland and Slovakia) and low levels of social protection. Therefore, a post-communist group is emerging, which combines features of the liberal type and of the Mediterranean group.

Table 4: Welfare state typologies - adding new countries: the post-communist group

Author	Indicators	Welfare regimes				
Esping-Andersen (1990)	- De-commodification - Social stratification	Liberal: Australia Canada Ireland New Zealand UK USA	Conservative: Finland France Germany Japan Italy	Social-democratic: Austria Belgium Netherlands Denmark Norway Sweden		
Pöder and Kerem (2011)	- Commodification - Social protection	Mediterraneans: Italy Czech Republic Hungary Spain Greece	Continental: Germany France Austria Belgium	Anglo-Americans: USA Ireland UK Portugal	Nordics: Denmark Finland Norway Sweden	Post-communists: Latvia Lithuania Estonia Poland Slovakia

Three main conclusions can be drawn from this schematic overview of selected typologies. First, although some authors have added further types to the original typology, mainly by focusing on one or another area of social policy, the three core typologies of Esping-Andersen seem to remain at the basis of all classifications. In other words, even by changing the perspective and the angle through which looking at welfare states, there seems to be a robust distinctiveness in Europe, where liberal, conservative and social-democratic models can be identified. This also suggests that no clear sign of convergence is visible at European level, and that on the contrary the differences identified two decades ago are still topical.

The second consideration that is worth mentioning is that in all typologies of welfare states some countries emerge as the closest possible variations of ideal types, while other countries are included into one or another ideal-type, depending on the classification. This means that countries such as Sweden (for the social-democratic), Germany (for the conservative), the UK (for the liberal) hold a majority of coherent features that make them the prototype of the core groups. On the contrary, other countries can be more difficult to fit into a certain group, because they possess features that belong to different clusters. The result is that, by nature of their mix type of welfare policies, some countries seem to be particularly problematic in each classification⁴⁹.

⁴⁹ This is the case, for instance, of the Netherlands and Switzerland, which are pointed at as outliers in Esping-Andersen typology, because of their hybrid characteristics in welfare provision.

A last consideration has to do with the type of measurement adopted for the construction of welfare models. If all the presented typologies suggest that the clusters vary according to the kind of indicator used for the analysis, they also show that a comprehensive classification of welfare states, which takes into consideration all possible aspects related to social policy and welfare provision, is a complicated task. This could suggest that rather than strive for a typology that provides a comprehensive picture of welfare regimes, an alternative solution could be to acknowledge the multitude of elements that determine the welfare regime and focus on one or the other element (political tradition, health policies, policies aimed at combating poverty or social stratification, care provisions, labour policies, family policies, social protection, education policies, and so on) depending on the social phenomenon that is to be studied.

2.2 The care regime

The concept of care regime started to be used systematically in the 1990s and is widely used today as a framework of analysis of welfare states. Although different definitions might give prominence to one or the other aspect and to micro or macro levels of analysis (Degavre and Nyssens, 2012), care regimes are usually thought as including the set of regulations, policies and general arrangements that each nation state puts in place to deal with care responsibilities. Since they include welfare policies that affect directly or indirectly family well-being and the support to families with respect to caring responsibilities, they are part of the welfare regime and they are often used as a category of analysis of welfare states (Daly and Lewis, 2000; Degavre and Nyssens, 2012). According to Kofman and Raghurma, “care regimes are conceptualised as the institutional and special arrangements (locations) for the provision and allocation of care” (2005, p. 4). In an earlier study, Knjin and Kremer (1997, p. 328) define care regimes as the “caring dimension of the welfare state”, where the care-giving and the care-receiving are the focus of the analysis of welfare systems.

To use the traditional distinction employed by economists, care regimes focus on the repartition of caring responsibilities among the state, the market and the family – or, additionally, the third sector (Lewis, 2002, Degavre and Nyssens, 2012; Pavolini and Ranci, 2008). The concept of care regimes helps understand how the responsibilities for domestic and caring activities are shared among different actors through national implicit or explicit regulations. Although the state is generally assumed to take in charge at least a certain level of

individual well-being and therefore a certain degree of care responsibilities (Degavre and Nyssens, 2012), in Europe the way care is produced and allocated differs from country to country, so that at national level various care strategies can be identified. These strategies define how and to what extent the state secures the individual's right to receive care and the right to benefit from time for care⁵⁰, in different combinations. Additionally, they also define how actors other than the state or the family are involved in the process.

Structural changes in societies and the introduction of new regulations in the field of care have engendered changes in the way care is perceived and the way care is provided in the private and in the public sphere. This has an obvious impact on the organisation and the characteristics of the domestic sector, as it determines not only the degree of externalisation of care and domestic activities, but also the different combination of formal and informal care adopted by families.

Although many policies and regulations might affect care regimes in a way or another, examples of care measures include incentives for housework activities (voucher systems, tax deductions and other types of cost reduction), incentives for childcare (availability of childcare facilities, child allowances, tax deduction for children-related costs, maternal, paternity and parental leaves, etc.), incentives for the care of the elderly (availability of residential services, cash-for-care schemes, pension and minimum contributory schemes, etc.) and any other instrument aimed at providing support to families and its members with respect to domestic and care activities.

2.2.1 Who is responsible for providing care?

In order to understand recent changes in the domestic sector, it is crucial to ascertain who is responsible for the family well-being and for care (with a special focus on children, elderly people and other dependant people) among the state, the market or the family itself. On the one hand, the level and the extent of support provided by the state to families in their traditional caring role have a direct impact on the functioning of modern societies, in that they favour – or on the contrary they reduce – the capacity of citizens to reconcile family and work lives. This in turn generates tangible outcomes in the labour market and therefore on economies. On the other hand, recent changes – at the family level, in the labour market and

⁵⁰ Care policies can define the right of an individual to receive care when needed, but also the right of an individual to dispose of free time to allocate for the care of others (for instance, maternity and parental leaves and time off from work belong to the latter).

in societies at large – have made urgent in all countries the restructuring of care systems and the introduction of policies addressing specifically the repartition of caring responsibilities.

Although the state has always assumed a certain degree of support for caring needs, domestic and care activities have been traditionally performed by family members, usually women, in a completely voluntary and unpaid way (Daly & Lewis, 2000; Bettio and Plantenga, 2004; Lutz 2011; Pfau-Effinger, 2013). For a long time, the family was recognised as the only, or at least the main, provider of care for both children and dependent people, at least until serious health situations demanded the intervention of health professionals. The family was also considered responsible for domestic activities, unless the family was wealthy enough to externalise them. This was the situation at the end of the nineteenth century and up to the second half of the twentieth century in virtually all European countries. The fact that the care of dependent individuals was considered the natural role of the family, and of female family members in particular, can be ascribed to the traditional division of labour between men and women and to the more or less explicit ‘male breadwinner model’⁵¹ (Lewis, 1992; Davis, 1984; Daly and Lewis, 2000; Letablier, 2009).

In the male breadwinner model, which had a strong influence on the construction of welfare states, the economic function of supporting the family with income was linked to the employment of men, while women were in charge of the care of family members and financially in charge of men. Men were entitled to social rights, in that part of the labour market, and all social risks taken in charge by the welfare state were linked to their employment relationship. On the contrary, women were not entitled to social rights insofar (often) not actively participating in the paid labour market, and their rights were ‘derived’ from those of their male counterparts (Letablier, 2009; Frericks et al., 2013). Women were able to engage in paid work, but only as long as it did not interfere with family care responsibilities. As soon as one family member had to renounce to paid work for taking care of other family members, women were more or less explicitly expected to assume the care responsibilities, because they were financially covered by the male income and the social rights linked to male employment.

⁵¹ From an historical point of view, the male breadwinner model became an ideological reference model only in the post-war period, when the return to the labour market of male soldiers translated into the promotion of the role of women as housekeepers. However, as stressed by feminist scholars, the gendered division of labour that assigns to men the public/market role was already present in more ancient times. For instance, according to Lewis, the male breadwinner model was already strong for middle class women at the end of the nineteenth century, despite the fact that women from the working classes were engaged in paid labour (Lewis, 1992).

2.2.1.1 The reorganisation of care in modern welfare states

In pre-industrial societies, the family was the main provider of welfare and the biological differences linked to breast-feeding and childbearing were translated into social differences. In post-industrial societies, and following the changes in the labour market, caregiving arose as one crucial problem that made it necessary a redefinition of responsibilities (Daly and Lewis, 2000; Giele, 2006). Although the welfare state had more or less engaged in some sort of support to families also with respect to children and elderly members in the past, it is a series of emerging trends in post-industrial societies that required a full redefinition of care provision. Scholars have identified some structural economic and societal changes that brought about this new phenomenon.

Increased female participation in the labour market

First of all, despite the fact that women were already engaging in paid work in previous times to different degrees, depending on the geographical area and depending on the prevalent economic model (rural, industrial, and so on), female participation rates in the labour market started to dramatically increase only in the second half of the twentieth century. In some countries, such as the Scandinavian countries, women started to massively enter the labour market already in the 1950s and 1960s and by the end of the 1970s women's participation rates were already similar to those of men (Leira, 2002). The rest of Europe joined the trend only in the 1990s and to different degrees (OECD, 2016).

Although significant differences still exist in Europe, with some countries where female participation rates remain far below the European average and far below the participation of men, women have massively entered the labour market, and for various reasons.

On the one hand, the increase of precariousness in the labour market, the growing unemployment rates and the general erosion of income stability of households have required a second income, so to contribute to the overall economic well-being of the family. The increase of lone-parent families has also contributed to the participation of women in paid employment, as lone mothers could no longer count on the male income. Some studies showed that mothers' income is the main instrument for protecting children from poverty (Saraceno, 2011). So, if at the end of the nineteenth century it was mainly working-class women who had to engage in paid work for economic reasons, in post-industrial societies wider segments of the population started to have the economic need for a double income.

On the other hand, the increased recognition of women's rights in engaging in the labour market on equal terms as men, together with the improvements achieved in many European countries in terms of gender equality at work, also had an impact on the massive entering of women in the labour market (Lutz, 2011; OECD, 2016). The exceptional increase in educational attainments by women in the nineteenth century (due to their severe under-schooling in previous times as compared to men) is another factor that explains the increase of female participation rates in the labour market. This means that not only financial constraints, but also changes in women's expectations have contributed and still contribute to the phenomenon.

The fact that the European Union and the majority of its member states set the increase in female participation rates as one of the main objectives of their programmes (European Commission, 2014) is the most visible sign of the recognition of the importance of women's work, be that for economic reasons or for gender equality matters. However, the persistent idea that a female family member should provide care when needed is in direct conflict with the targets set at the European level in the Lisbon agenda, where the increase of the female labour force participation is one of the principal objectives (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004; Anderson, 2012)⁵². As Helma Lutz (2011) argues, women's full integration in the labour market, as it is encouraged by the European Union, cannot be pursued without taking into account the issue of care work, which is not accounted for in the public debate and which remains a problem to be solved at the individual level. Additionally, while gender equality and anti-discrimination issues have long been introduced in the European Union principles, the reconciliation of family and professional life has received less attention so far⁵³.

The fact that more and more women engage in paid labour also means that women are no longer fully available for the provision of care to family members and for household tasks and that new solutions have to be found to cover the gap left by women. In the male breadwinner model, the solution for working women was either to count on the availability of the extended family or other relatives and neighbours to provide some help in care and domestic activities,

⁵² According to the Lisbon European Council 2000, one of the targets for the year 2010 was to increase the female employment rate to more than 60% in Europe

⁵³ During the 1970s and 1980s, the European Commission took different measures aimed at advancing gender equality and the equal treatment of men and women in work. While the European Economic Community (EEC) already set in 1957 the principle of "equal pay for equal work", starting from the 1970s the EC introduced a series of Directives, not only extending the principle of equal pay for work of equal value, but setting standards regarding equality between men and women in working conditions, access to training, access to social security systems and fight against different types of discrimination. The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 explicitly introduced specific advantages for the "underrepresented sex and introduced the concept of gender mainstreaming. Starting from the 1990s, the employment of women started to be considered a crucial aspect of employment policies (Gerhard et al., 2005).

or to exit the labour market whenever the care burden was too hard to carry. This was typically the case in topic moments of the life course, such as the birth of a child or when a member of the family required long-term care (Bettio et al., 2006). Today, often the help of the extended family, when available, is not enough to cover care needs (Bettio et al., 2006) and families have to be supported at least partly by external help (the state, the market or the third sector).

Demographical changes

The second main change that occurred in recent years and that is requiring a reorganisation in terms of care arrangements derives from demographic changes. The fall in fertility rates, that in many European countries are below the replacement rate and the consequent ageing of the population translate in an accrued burden of care towards the old and very old population, and in an increased financial contribution on the side of families and the state (Anderson, 2012). This trend is stronger in Mediterranean countries, where estimates of the WHO show that the number of dependent people aged over 60 will constantly increase until 2040 (Bettio et al., 2006)⁵⁴. According to the “Population ageing in Europe” report of the European Commission (2014), predictions indicate that Europe overall will experience an intensive population ageing until 2060, accompanied by the shrinking of the population in working age. These estimates foresee that in Europe the proportion of people aged 65 or more will increase from 17.4% to 25.6% in 2030, and that altogether the population of elderly people will almost double from 87.5 million in 2010 to 152.6 million in 2060. Also, the proportion of the very old (aged 80 or over) will rise from 5% to 12% by 2060. Although a longer life expectancy also means healthier lives, the massive increase of the population over 65 and especially over 80 years old will necessarily bring about an important care burden on younger generations. This, coupled with the increase in the retirement age and the engagement of women in the labour market, implies that additional solutions will have to be found to provide long-term care inside or outside the home.

Changes in family models

In addition to these two main factors, other structural changes occurred in the last decades that contributed to the redefinition of family models and thus of the solutions offered to families to

⁵⁴ As an illustrative example of the trend, Bettio et al. report the estimates of the World Health Organisation for Italy, which show that the number of dependent people over 60 will go from a base value of 100 in 2000 to a value of 142 in 2040, before decreasing only in 2050 (Bettio et al., 2006).

cope with caring responsibilities. The current transformations in family models can be summarised in the trends towards pluralisation, deinstitutionalisation and polarisation (Gerhard, 2005)⁵⁵. The passage from the extended family to the nuclear family (polarisation), the deterioration of the importance of traditional ties and institutions (deinstitutionalisation) and the increasing differentiation of family forms (pluralisation), all played a role in stimulating the adoption of different solutions to meet care needs.

While the traditional standard family was characterised by internal cohesion and strong geographical connections and relationships of interdependence with the extended family, today new family types, as well as the increased mobility of families, necessitate the adoption of a multiplicity of solutions. Lone parents, families living far from the extended family, working grandmothers, both parents working long hours are just some of the most common examples of the constraints faced by families in their care needs. In the light of this increased burden, families can no longer provide the totality of care required by dependent family members, which in turn calls for a redefinition of responsibilities.

The 'culture' of care

Finally, although care regimes are influenced by demographic changes, women's participation rates and other societal structural changes, they also depend on ideals and culture about the role of the family and about care, which differ greatly from country to country. If social policies are important in defining care regimes and in stimulating families' behaviour, social practices are equally important and cannot be underestimated (Gerhard et al., 2005). The care culture can in turn contribute to shaping labour market patterns, fertility rates and other developments (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004). This means that care regimes are at the same time the result and the driver of social and economic changes⁵⁶.

⁵⁵ The erosion of the traditional family and the deterioration of the family ideal as the foundation of society has been widely criticised. First, the focus on the family as the primary unit of society is associated with the deterioration of values, which is often considered as dangerous for society and for the state as a whole. Second, the pluralisation of family types cannot be considered as a new historical phenomenon, as it was part of many phases of social changes in history. Third, the same widespread idea of the passage from the extended family to the nuclear family is thought to be nothing more than a myth in many contexts (Laslett, 1972, quoted in Gerhard, 2005). However, for the purpose of this study, what is important to notice is that starting from the 1970s there are indeed signs of convergence of European family styles, which include an increased diversity and differentiation of family models (Gerhard et al., 2005).

⁵⁶ This aspect will be tackled in section 2.3 on gender regimes.

2.2.2 Convergence or divergence?

In the last two decades, all European welfare states have introduced reforms aimed at redefining the structure of the division of care and meet care needs of families, while at the same time trying to limit the growing costs of care. Although some common patterns have emerged in Europe in the way welfare states are addressing the care problem (Simonazzi, 2009), each country has put in place a combination of policies and of formal and informal arrangements that vary from country to country. These combinations are the result of a complex set of factors that include social, political and economic reasons, but also historical and cultural elements.

Concerning the signs of convergence among European countries with respect to care provision, scholars have emphasised the overall trend towards the growing marketization of care, coupled with the increased individualisation of service supply (Degavre and Nyssens, 2012; Pavolini and Ranci, 2008). This trend has the direct result of increasing the diversification of care providers and the competition among them. At the same time, the emphasis of care policies on the empowerment of the user ('free choice' of the customer) contributes to changing the logic of care provision, when the user is more and more encouraged to act as a client, or a 'customer' (Pavolini and Ranci, 2008; Anderson, 2012).

Within this general convergent trend towards the marketization and individualisation of care provision, and in line with the above-mentioned changes, scholars have identified three main trends that characterise recent reforms of care systems in Europe. These trends are ascribable to the general attempt to reduce entitlements, while at the same time reducing costs related to care (see, among others, Degavre and Nyssens, 2012; Simonazzi, 2009; Anderson 2012).

From residential services to home services

First of all, there is a shift from residential/external care services (care for children, residential homes for seniors and disabled people, etc.) to home services. This trend is more visible in countries with a stronger tradition of residential care provision, such as the Scandinavian countries and France (Simonazzi, 2009). The rationale behind this trend is linked to both economic reasons and motivations associated with individual choices and well-being. Concerning economic reasons, the shift towards home-based services significantly reduces the public funding, while increasing the burden on families and individuals. Concerning individual choices, home provision is more and more publicly encouraged based on the idea that home care better meets individual needs for both children and elderly people.

Regarding children, the argument draws from the lack of consensus over the question of who should care for children. Although mothers are more and more encouraged to work, in many EU countries there is still no agreement on whether children should be cared for in external non-family settings or within family boundaries (Saraceno, 2011). In many countries, mothers' participation in the labour market is still seen as detrimental for children's well-being, and caring solutions within the family settings are regarded as more appropriate for the emotional development of the very young. Concerning elderly people and other dependent people, the justification for the increase of home provision is based on the assumption that the natural preference of the individual is to be cared for at home, rather than in external facilities (Anderson, 2012). This rationale is especially popular in countries with strong familialistic traditions, such as Mediterranean countries, characterised by a strong aversion towards the institutionalisation of the elderly, but also in the Anglo-Saxon model, where the discourse of the 'free choice' has acquired importance in the last decades (Pfau-Effinger, 2013). In both cases, the general opinion is that home care is more suitable to individual preferences, even when care is not provided directly by a family member.

The trend towards the provision of home care has different results. In countries characterised by a weak care provision from the side of the state, such as Mediterranean countries, there has been a massive increase of home care provided by private carers (services bought directly in the market), especially by migrants. In the countries with a stronger tradition of residential care provision, such as the Scandinavian countries, France and Belgium, the change has affected the reorganisation of the entire chain of care and has required different measures (reallocation of investments between hospitals, nursing homes and the community, redefinition of responsibilities among actors, closer coordination of home care services, monitoring of job quality and services, and so on) (Simonazzi, 2009).

From public to private provision of care

The second trend identified by scholars is the shift from public to private provision of care, mainly in the form of the contracting out of services by local authorities in charge of care provision. This trend is more visible in the UK, where the public provision of care is more and more guaranteed only to the weakest segments of the population and the full privatisation of care has been favoured, in line with government choices. However, also in the Mediterranean countries the subcontracting of care provision by municipalities to profit and non-profit organisations is becoming more and more popular (Simonazzi, 2009). In Northern European countries, this feature is less visible, as the state still controls the majority of both

in-kind and home services. Scholars have highlighted that the increased privatisation of care and the deriving competition among private providers could potentially bring about risks, especially in terms of the quality of care and the quality of jobs in the domestic sector (Simonazzi, 2009).

From in-kind services to monetary transfers

The third trend that has been observed in Europe in the last two decades is the shift from in-kind services to monetary transfers. This has generated an increase in the direct purchasing of care services by families, either directly in the market, or via public or private intermediate actors (Degavre and Nyssens, 2012). The main reason explaining the proliferation of reforms introducing cash allowances and reducing in-kind services is linked to financial issues and is mainly due to the fact that cash transfers are less costly than in-kind services for governments. Cash allowances vary across countries as for the level of financing, the way they are allocated and the way they are monitored. Mediterranean countries tend to rely almost entirely on cash transfers, rather than on public in-kind services, but the allowances are relatively low and are generally not bound to state control. The result is that families often use these allowances to buy services directly in the market, usually finding the cheapest available options in the services provided by migrant carers. On the contrary, countries like Germany and Austria, although they do heavily rely on cash benefits, also exert a stronger control on the way cash allowances are used. The result is that in these countries the care markets, as well as the quality of care and the quality of care jobs, tend to be more regulated, compared to Mediterranean countries (Simonazzi, 2009). Another result is that while in Mediterranean countries families are more and more encouraged to act as employers in the labour market, in countries where tied allowances are prominent the care process is mediated by intermediate actors, be that public or commercial. However, no matter the type and the degree of generosity of monetary transfers, they all result in the increase of the role of the market in care provision, compared to the past, and the introduction of a multiplicity of actors involved in the process of care provision.

Despite these emerging trends, which seem to suggest a certain level of convergence in Europe, the organisation of care provision, as well as the combination of care strategies, varies greatly across Europe. This is partly due to the differences in the way welfare regimes developed, as well as in social, economic and political factors that influence policy orientations and preferences on the side of families and individuals (Anderson, 2012).

The great difference that exists at national level with respect to the way care needs are conceived and covered by public and private funding suggests not only that European countries follow a different logic in the way they support families and allocate care, but that there is no common agreement over the best care model towards which national strategies should converge. Prominence is given to either type or target beneficiary of care, depending on financial and political constraints, but also depending on generally accepted understanding of what is considered good care. Therefore, there are reasons to believe that a uniformity of care regimes is unlikely to be reached, at least in the near future.

2.2.3 Classifying care regimes

Many attempts have been made by scholars to classify European countries and create typologies based on their care regime. However, the complexity of the task makes the exercise particularly arduous, for various reasons.

First, even if care and domestic tasks tend to be more and more externalised, as families cannot bear alone their full burden, at least a part of care is still performed by families in all European countries, and it is likely to remain so (Saraceno, 2011). The complex combination of formal, informal, public and private solutions adopted by families to meet care needs makes the classification of care regimes particularly complex.

Additionally, the variety of tasks that can be performed under the common label of ‘care’ can be performed by different kinds of workers and the separation between health, social and domestic services can be a source of ambiguity. For instance, activities linked to elderly care can include medical care (medical treatments, drug administering, etc.), general health care (hygiene and personal cleaning activities, etc.), emotional care (keeping company, listening, etc.) and helping out with domestic and housework activities (cleaning, cooking, grocery shopping, and so on)⁵⁷.

Second, the lack of reliable and harmonised data at the European level is another issue that makes cross-national comparisons difficult. As mentioned above, various activities, which are not necessarily classified as care activities, can coexist and a clear definition of care to be applied to different countries can be difficult⁵⁸. This means that, depending on the way care is acknowledged and provided within each welfare state, care and domestic workers may be classified as belonging to different sectors of the labour market, ranging from more

⁵⁷ See methodological chapter for the problems linked to the definition of domestic and care work.

⁵⁸ See previous footnote.

professionalised medical or semi-medical occupations to unskilled workers. Also, the public budget allocated to the provision of care may be included in different budget lines, depending on the type of care and depending on the country. For instance, public expenditure for long-term care (LTC) for elderly people can be partly covered by the public health system, by the social assistance, or by the budget deriving from contributions and pension systems.

If the issue of the lack of reliable data is common to international comparisons in virtually all fields, there are a series of problems which are typical of care regimes. The first issue is that contrary to other types of classifications, care regimes cannot simply be classified in terms of generosity of welfare. Although generosity of provisions is certainly important in defining care systems, there are other aspects that need to be taken into consideration. For instance, the type of provision, such as in-kind services vs. financial benefits, is of crucial importance for an international comparison of care regimes⁵⁹.

Another issue that complicates the picture is that policies towards care are not addressing all types of care coherently and in the same way. Thus, childcare, elderly care and domestic services can be treated separately and can be offered different types of incentives and services, which are not necessarily coherent one with another. Research in this field has shown that in the majority of European countries the prominence is given to one or the other dimension between childcare, elderly care and domestic activities, and that some countries can have significantly different approaches in addressing one or the other dimension, depending on political interests, but also on cultural ideals and historical reasons (Saraceno and Keck, 2010; Saraceno, 2011; Pfau-Effinger 2013; Lutz, 2011).

Another problem that is typical of care regimes is that, contrary to other social fields, there is no clear definition and no agreement on what is the best model of care and which should be the ideal type towards which societies should tend. On the contrary, care policies can pursue different objectives and have different intentions. This means that while in some countries the more or less explicit objective – dictated by traditional values and/or economic reasons – is to keep the family as the principal care provider, other countries tend to see the state as the main actor responsible for providing care services to citizens. In the two cases the policies put in place will differ: in the first case, they will push care towards a familialisation of care, while in the second case policies will ultimately aim to de-familialise care.

⁵⁹ Significant cross-national differences exist with respect to this aspect. For instance, there are countries such as Sweden and Belgium, where the care provision has traditionally been oriented towards the provision of services, rather than cash allowances, while other states have historically opted for an economic support to families, offering limited in-kind services. The main classifications based on this distinction are dealt with in the next section.

2.2.4 How can care regimes be classified?

Due to the complexity of welfare policies addressing care, care regimes have been analysed and classified based on different criteria. The resulting classifications do not always coincide and the same European countries have been grouped differently, depending on the parameters included in the analysis and on the type of measurement used for the classification. In this section I present some selected classifications, which exemplify the main approaches that have been used to classify care regimes and the different outcomes derived from this exercise. The main typologies of care regimes developed by scholarship have combined one or more of the following distinctions: i) familialisation vs. de-familialisation; ii) childcare vs. elderly care; iii) formal vs. informal provision of care.

2.2.4.1 Familialisation vs. defamilialisation

One of the main problems when trying to classify care regimes is that different policies can produce different outcomes along the spectrum that goes from familialisation to de-familialisation. While certain policies directly translate into a high degree of de-familialisation (which corresponds to the externalisation of care responsibilities from families to the state, the market or the community), other policies directly or indirectly push towards a familialisation – or a re-familialisation⁶⁰ – of caring responsibilities within the family.

The way policies are implemented at national level, as well as their intended outcome in terms of de-familialisation, derive from multiple factors. If economic reasons might play a role in the degree of familialisation of care policies – as a voluntarily pursued logic of de-familialisation is more costly for the state –, historical, cultural and ideological arguments also contribute to the way care is financed and allocated by the welfare state (Pfau-Effinger, 2012, 2013; Frericks et al., 2013).

Countries with strong familialistic traditions, such as Mediterranean countries, generally tend to promote more familialistic packages of care arrangements, as the family is considered the principal provider of care. Conversely, countries where historically and socially it is more accepted to externalise care and domestic activities, such as Nordic countries and France, tend

⁶⁰ The expression ‘re-familialisation’ is used to describe the shift occurred in some countries from de-familialising to more familialising policies. An example is Finland, where the provision of childcare services for children aged 0-3 has recently been coupled with a system of direct cash transfers for those parents who opt for caring for children at home (Leira, 2002).

to show higher levels of de-familialisation also in the way care regimes are conceived. However, policies directed towards the familialisation of care responsibilities do coexist with de-familialisation measures in virtually every European care regime (Leitner, 2003). Additionally, if it is true that Scandinavian countries have a longer history of de-familialisation, a pure de-familialistic model is not only unlikely to exist, but it is also hardly sought for (Saraceno, 2011).

One problem in attempting to classify policies based on this dichotomy is that not all policies are uncontroversially pointing towards one or the other direction along the familialisation/de-familialisation spectrum. If certain incentives can clearly be measured through this scale⁶¹, other policy measures are more difficult to classify.

For instance, while long and generously compensated maternity leaves are commonly recognised as familialistic incentives, as they promote the care of children within family settings (Saraceno, 2011), paternity and parental leaves can hardly be considered as encouraging the familialisation of care. The reason behind this difference is that the main risk associated with long maternity leaves in terms of familialisation is that they tend to result in obstacles for women in entering or reintegrating the labour market (the so-called ‘child penalty’), especially when quality and affordable childcare services are unavailable. On the contrary, paternity and parental leaves, since they actually contribute to the sharing of responsibilities among couples, are known to have opposite outcomes in terms of the reintegration of women in the labour market after the birth of a child. Some research has found that when parental leaves are more equally shared between men and women, mothers tend to show a stronger attachment to the labour market and a dual-earner/dual-carer model tends to be promoted⁶² (Saraceno, 2011; Leira, 1998).

⁶¹ Policies that are uncontroversially pushing towards a familialisation of care responsibilities include maternity leaves and all types of monetary transfers for both childcare and elderly care. Policies that are uncontroversially pushing towards a de-familialisation of care responsibilities include incentives for the externalisation of housework activities and the availability of public in-kind services for both childcare and elderly care (childcare facilities, residential and nursing homes, etc.). See also Leitner (2003) and Bettio and Plantenga (2004).

⁶² It should be noticed that the professional behaviour of women is not only influenced by care policies such as maternity and parental leaves, cash allowances etc., but it depends on other factors. Some scholars have analysed the relationship between women’s attachment to the labour market and the educational level, and found that the higher the educational level, the higher the probability that the mother will re-integrate the workplace, even in the presence of long maternity leaves (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004; Saraceno, 2011). The same is valid for cash allowances formally given to mothers to stay home to care for children. Also in this case, social class differences might be strengthened, as it is more likely that low class mothers would opt for staying at home in exchange for the allowance (Saraceno, 2011).

Usually, a distinction is made between parental leaves where men have the option to take time off to care for children, and specific ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ quotas for fathers⁶³. The latter is commonly considered to be the best possible incentive to promote equality among couples and in the labour market, as it reformulates the work-family issue as a concern of both parents. In this sense, compulsory quotas for fathers can be seen as a potentially radical approach to combat gender stereotypes (Leira, 2002).

Another example showing the complexity of a clear demarcation between what is familialistic or not is the use of monetary transfers. If it is true that cash allowances are generally intended to reallocate care responsibilities to families (contrary to in-kind services), and in this sense they promote a familialisation of care work, it is not uncommon that such monetary transfers are used by families to directly purchase services in the market. In this sense, cash benefits can simultaneously promote familisation (families are responsible for all the choices related to care) and de-familialisation (families shift from care providers to care managers⁶⁴) (Saraceno & Keck, 2008).

Table 5 reports two examples of typologies of care regimes that classify care regimes using the concept of familialisation/de-familialisation.

Saraceno and Keck (2010) use a complex set of indicators to cover four dimensions of care⁶⁵: financial support for children; childcare services; financial support for elderly people; and services for elderly people. Based on the selected indicators, they differentiate between ‘unsupported familialism’, ‘supported familialism’ and ‘de-familialisation’, with the possibility of a hybrid form between the last two groups. In the unsupported familialism, financial support for family care is underdeveloped and there are neither public alternatives, nor financial support for care within the family. In the supported familialism, policies support families in their care responsibilities, usually through financial transfers (cash-for-care benefits, but also tax deductions and paid leaves). The final aim of these policies is to support family members, and women in particular, to maintain their caring role within the family. The

⁶³ The potential of take-it-or-leave quotas for fathers is best exemplified when we look at the actual use of parental leaves made by fathers in different European countries. In countries such as Italy, Portugal and Germany, where the parental leave for fathers is available but not compulsory, fathers tend not to use the leave, leaving it entirely to mothers. On the contrary, in countries with the take-it-or-loose-it system (which is where a part of the leave can be used only by fathers), such as some of the Nordic countries, the instrument proved to be effective and fathers are more and more using parental leaves (Leira, 2002).

⁶⁴ This phenomenon is very common in Mediterranean countries, where the low level of state provision has engendered an informal market of caregivers, where families act as employers. For more information about the ‘managing role’ of families refer to Ambrosini (2013).

⁶⁵ The indicators used by Saraceno and Keck include, but are not limited to: child allowances, tax deductions for children, legal obligations towards children, duration and compensation of maternity and parental leaves, services for children, minimum contributory pensions, legal obligations towards the elderly, residential services for elderly, cash-for-care allowances.

de-familialisation is based on the individualisation of social rights (such as the right to receive care, minimum social provisions, etc.), which is meant to reduce family responsibilities for care

The authors observe that usually the higher the degree of familialism, the higher its gender specificity, with women considered as the natural providers of care. One of the main findings of their analysis is that due to the complexity of care packages it is impossible to identify robust clusters of countries. Each country behaves differently with respect to financial provision and service provision, and also with respect to childcare and care for the elderly. Therefore, countries may show similar approaches, but only when one or the other dimension is considered separately. The only exception is represented by Nordic countries, which show high levels of de-familialisation on all dimensions. At the extreme end of the spectrum, there is a group of countries with high levels of familialism in almost all dimensions, which includes Italy, Poland, Spain, Greece and Bulgaria.

Table 5: Care regimes typologies - Familialisation vs. De-familialisation

Author	Indicators	Care regimes			
<i>Saraceno and Keck (2010)</i>	- Financial support for children - Childcare services - Financial support for elderly - Services for elderly	<i>Unsupported familialism:</i> Poland Portugal Cyprus Italy Netherlands Spain Ireland Slovakia Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Austria	<i>Supported familialism:</i> Estonia Czech Republic Hungary Finland Bulgaria Germany Greece	<i>De-familialisation:</i> Denmark Sweden Norway France	Hybrid (de-familialisation with limited support): Belgium
<i>Leitner (2003)</i>	- Time rights - Cash transfers - Social rights	<i>Explicit familialism</i>	<i>Optional familialism</i>	<i>Implicit familialism</i>	<i>De-familialism</i>

In her theoretical study on how care responsibilities can be distributed among actors, Leitner identifies four ideal types of care regimes, depending on the level and the type of familialism that characterise welfare institutions. The identification of the ideal types is based on three main indicators that represent the institutional structures that can be used to strengthen familialism: time rights (which usually include maternity, paternity and parental leaves, as well as leaves to care for dependent people), cash transfers (such as tax reductions, cash for

care benefits, etc.) and social rights attached to caregiving (such as pensions, social security schemes, pensions for wives, etc.). Based on different combinations of these familialising structures, four ideal types emerge: i) explicit familialism, where the caring role of families is strengthened and no alternatives are provided in terms of care provision; ii) optional familialism, where both familialistic policies and services are provided; iii) implicit familialism, where neither the caring function of the family nor the de-familialisation are directly supported; and iv) de-familialism, where there are strong de-familialising structures, in the form of service provision provided either by the state, the market or the voluntary sector.

Two considerations that emerge from this classification are important to mention. First, care structures and policies have a gendered dimension. Since de-familialising structures are meant to relieve families from the burden of care and promote women's employment, they might discourage the breadwinner model. Therefore, they can have a de-gendering effect and promote gender equality in the labour market. On the contrary, familialising structures implicitly and explicitly reinforce traditional gender roles. Because they strengthen the caring function of the family, and because women are in most cases those in charge of providing care within the family, they contribute to the reproduction of the gendered division of care labour. In this sense, they have a gendering effect. Only when familialistic policies include incentives for the sharing of responsibilities between men and women (i.e. use-it-or-lose-it parental leaves for fathers), they can also have a de-gendering effect. Second, each welfare system shows its own 'profile' of familialism and each system can evolve over time from one to another type⁶⁶.

2.2.4.2 Childcare vs. elderly care

In the great majority of classifications of care regimes, a distinction is made between childcare and care for the elderly, while housework incentives are usually not taken into consideration. The reason behind the choice to maintain the two dimensions separate is that wide differences exist in the way the provision of childcare and elderly care are covered and supported by the state. Some countries might be more generous in supporting the care for children compared to elderly care, while other countries might have an opposite behaviour. The most cited examples of this 'inconsistency' are the UK and the Netherlands, where care

⁶⁶ Leitner (2003) shows the case of Belgium, which after a first period of de-familialism turned into a gendered form of optional familialism, with the potential of becoming a de-gendered form of familialism in the future.

policies for children are underdeveloped, while both services and generosity for elderly care are among the highest in Europe (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004). Also, some countries might promote familialistic policies with respect to childcare and de-familialisation policies for the care of senior people. For instance, while childcare is everywhere supported through a certain degree of familialism – at least concerning time incentives (maternity and parental leaves) – and considered to be primarily a family responsibility, the responsibility for elderly care is more taken in charge by the state, either through public services or through monetary incentives (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004).

Table 6 reports some selected examples of classifications of care regimes, where a clear distinction between care strategies for children and for elderly people emerges.

Table 6: Care regimes typologies - Childcare vs. elderly care

Author	Indicators	Care regimes				
<i>Bettio and Plantenga (2004)</i>	- care strategies for children - care strategies for the elderly	<i>Group 1:</i> Italy Greece Spain Portugal Ireland	<i>Group 2:</i> UK Netherlands	<i>Group 3:</i> Austria Germany	<i>Group 4:</i> Belgium France	<i>Group 5:</i> Denmark Finland Sweden
<i>Saraceno and Keck (2010)</i>	- Financial support for elderly - Services for elderly	<i>Unsupported familialism:</i> Estonia Italy Spain Hungary Poland Lithuania Bulgaria	<i>Supported familialism:</i> Slovenia Greece Latvia Czech Republic Portugal	<i>De-familialisation:</i> Denmark Netherlands Sweden Belgium France Austria Luxembourg Ireland	<i>Hybrid:</i> Finland Germany UK	
<i>Saraceno (2011)</i>	- effective childcare coverage (early childcare gap)	<i>Group 1:</i> Poland Ireland Italy Cyprus Portugal Spain (Netherlands)	<i>Group 2:</i> Former communist block	<i>Group 3:</i> Denmark Belgium Sweden France Norway		
<i>Frericks et al. (2013)</i>	- cash benefits for family caregiving	<i>Informal family care regime:</i> All other countries	<i>Semi-formal family care regime:</i> Germany Netherlands	<i>Formal family care regime:</i> Denmark		

Based on the elaboration of six indexes for both childcare and elderly care⁶⁷, Bettio and Plantenga (2004) identify 5 clusters of countries, depending on the care strategies towards childcare and elderly care. Each of the 5 clusters are characterised by a different combination of care strategies. As mentioned above, the UK and the Netherlands (group 2) are the countries that show the widest difference in the approach over the provision of care for children and the elderly. In both countries, the provision of care for children is low – in the Netherlands because the family is considered the natural provider of care, and in the UK because childcare services are largely privatised. Concerning the care of dependent people in both countries the state is thought to be the main provider. The other groups have more homogeneous care policies, albeit characterised by great differences in the degree of public provision (medium levels in Austria and Germany and higher levels in France, Belgium and Nordic countries).

While the above-mentioned classification includes both childcare and elderly care and highlights the differences in the public provision for the two dimensions, the other typologies reported in Table 6 are examples of classifications that focus on either of the two dimensions. In two separate studies, Saraceno develops classifications based on either childcare or elderly care. Frericks et al. (2013) analyse the public provision for senior citizens. They offer an innovative type of classification (of ‘family care regimes’) in that they take into consideration recent policies aimed to financially support family members who provide care⁶⁸.

2.2.4.3 Formal vs. informal care

Some scholars have analysed care regimes with a focus on the separation between formal and informal provision of care. When talking about care work, the distinction between formal and informal can refer to two different definitions.

According to the first definition, the informal care indicates all activities linked to the unpaid care and domestic work performed by family members. It is the work traditionally performed by female family members, and includes domestic activities, care for children and care for

⁶⁷ Based on available indicators, the authors elaborate six indexes to measure the level of provision for children and for the elderly: index of leave facilities, index of financial provisions, public services for children, index of public pension schemes, residential care and community care.

⁶⁸ Their study starts from the observation that although family care (care towards the elderly performed by a family member) has traditionally been considered a voluntary activity, rather than real work, recent policies in various European countries are increasingly recognising this activity as a real job. This is the result of the recognition of social rights both to senior citizens (right to receive care) and to family members to provide care. Therefore, in some countries family care is now treated as a “normal” employment relationship, where the state acts as the employer and the family member as a paid care worker.

older members of the family and other dependent individuals. It can be a job performed by either relatives external to the nuclear family or by close friends or neighbours, with the common feature that it is an activity performed on a voluntary basis. According to this definition, the formal provision of care indicates all paid working activities performed by either publicly or privately funded workers.

The second definition focuses on the distinction between the formal provision of care, intended as the care provided in one or another form by the state, and the informal provision of care, intended as the lack of such public provision and the consequent proliferation of informal care arrangements. In this sense, a formal care market indicates a professionalised market put in place by state policies, while informal care can indicate both the unpaid work performed by family members, or the development of an informal market of – often irregular – carers (Simonazzi, 2009). The fact that in recent years some European countries have introduced instruments to partly professionalise the unpaid work of family members, adds up to complicate the picture.

Table 7 reports two examples of classifications of care regimes that focus on the distinction between formal and informal provision of care.

Table 7: Care regimes typologies - Formal vs. informal provision of care

Author	Indicators	Care regimes	
<i>Bettio and Plantenga (2004)</i>	Index of informal care intensity (time budget data)	Heavy informal care users: Greece Italy Spain Ireland UK Netherlands	Weak informal care users: Finland Denmark France Portugal
<i>Simonazzi (2009)</i>	Level of in-kind provision vs. cash benefits	Formal provision (in-kind provision and tied benefits): UK Sweden France	Informal provision (untied benefits): Germany Austria Italy

Starting from the first definition of formal and informal care, as the separation between unpaid and paid work, Bettio and Plantenga (2004) identify different groups of countries, depending on the way each country implicitly or explicitly tends to promote one or the other type of care. Based on their ‘index of informal care intensity’, the authors distinguish between heavy and weak informal care users. According to their findings, Greece, Italy, Spain and

Ireland belong to the group of heavy informal care users, which confirms the traditional importance of family ties in these countries. Surprisingly, also the UK and the Netherlands belong to the group of heavy informal care users. On the other side of the spectrum, there are countries like Finland and Denmark. France and Portugal also belong to this group, which is more unexpected (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004).

Based on the second definition of formal and informal care, Simonazzi (2009) operates a distinction – only regarding elderly care – between policies characterised by a high level of in-kind and service provisions and policies where unconditional cash allowances prevail. According to this author, these two types of policies engender opposite outcomes in terms of the formality of the care market. The bestowal of in-kind services and tied financial benefits⁶⁹ tend to favour the development of a formal care market. In this case, the state plays an important role in the provision of care and also in the regulation of the care market (it defines, for example, the working conditions of care workers, the eligibility conditions of beneficiaries, etc.). On the contrary, the granting of untied (or unconditional) cash benefits, for which there is no control by the state over the use of the allowance, encourages the development of an informal market, be that unpaid work or remunerated work directly purchased in the market. Therefore, based on the type of support provided by the state and the way care is financed, the author recognises two main groups of countries. The first group includes countries that rely mainly on in-kind provision, either through the provision of services (residential homes, home-based care) or through tied cash allowances, over which the states maintain a certain degree of control. These countries include the UK and Sweden, as far as services are concerned, and France, with respect to conditional cash allowances. As mentioned above, the policies adopted in these countries tend to promote a formal market for care. The second group includes countries that rely mainly on untied cash allowances, either in the form of care insurance schemes, as it is the case in Germany and Austria, or in the form of unconditional cash benefits, as in Italy. These countries are characterised by a large informal care sector. This classification is intended to show that the way the financing for care is operated influences both care regimes and the structure of the care market (Simonazzi, 2009).

Another way of employing the dichotomy between formal and informal care provision is to distinguish between two ideal types of care regimes: the informal care model and the service-led model (Anderson, 2012). The first model is characterised by a limited governmental responsibility. The state has a regulatory function, rather than an active role in providing care,

⁶⁹ Tied benefits are care allowances granted under certain conditions, where usually beneficiaries have to prove that they have used them to buy care.

and care responsibilities are entirely on families. The second model is characterised by the extensive provision of care services by the state, thus reducing the responsibilities left to families. As Anderson underlines (2012), both models are currently raising issues: while in the first one families are encountering more and more difficulties in supplying care to the increasing number of dependent people, in the second model the high costs related to the provision of services is generating a strain in the financial capacities of the state.

2.2.4.4 Dual vs. triangular employment relationship

A further way to classify care regimes is to analyse the way care and domestic work are externalised. The way care regimes are conceived and care financed and allocated generate different outcomes in the degree of marketization of care. Although the marketization of services is more visible in countries where the state provision is weaker, the trend towards the marketization of care services is visible in every care regime, be that a service-oriented system or a system that more heavily relies on informal arrangements⁷⁰. In countries where untied cash allowances are the prominent instrument of care provision, families are encouraged to employ informal carers directly in the market. In countries characterised by a strong provision of services or in countries where cash allowances are subject to a strict control by local authorities, care services are more and more outsourced by the government to both profit and non-profit external actors.

Depending on the care strategies implemented by each welfare state, the care employment model is different, both in terms of the type of employment relationship to which domestic workers and carers are subject, and in terms of job quality and conditions in the domestic sector. An example of classification based on the type of employment model of service provision is the distinction between a 'direct employment model' and an 'employment in service provider organisations', as identified by Farvaque (2013). The first employment model is based on a dual relationship and is characterised by the direct recruitment of domestic and care workers by private individuals or households. The second employment model is based on a triangular relationship, in which the family is not the direct employer, but there is the intermediation of a third party. In the latter case, workers are employed by an organisation, which can be public or private. According to this classification, the direct employment model is typical of Southern countries, but it is more and more used in other

⁷⁰ Camargo and Rea (2013) talk about a shift from a social policy to a labour market policy.

countries, such as Germany and Austria. The second employment model dominates in Northern countries, Belgium and partly in France (Farvaque, 2013). The detailed classification is provided in Table 8.

Table 8: Care regimes typologies - Employment models of care provision

Author	Indicators	Care regimes			
<i>Farvaque (2013)</i>	- Care activities (NACE 88) - Housework activities (NACE 97)	Direct employment: Cyprus Spain Portugal Italy Greece (Germany) (Austria)	Employment in service providers: Denmark Finland UK Ireland Belgium	Mixed model (both): France Luxembourg	Mixed model (neither): Eastern countries

An alternative way of classifying countries based on the employment model, which also takes into consideration the distinction between public and private service providers, would be to distinguish between three main models: 1) a direct employment model; 2) a triangular employment model, where either the market or the third sector act as an intermediary (private service provision); 3) a triangular relationship, where the state acts as the intermediary (public service provision).

The first model is typical of Mediterranean countries. The lack of public care services, the low level of care allowances and the untied nature of cash allowances engender the creation of a direct form of employment relationship, where families become employers and care workers are employed directly by families, without any form of intermediation. In this model, families search for the most flexible and cheapest available option directly in the market, and their expectations are often matched in the employment of a migrant workforce. The risk of this model is linked to the deregulation of the employment relationship, the increase of irregular types of contracts and the weakening of working conditions of domestic and care workers.

In the second model, typical of countries that rely more heavily on tied cash allowances, but also countries where the state outsources services directly, the employment relationship is characterised by a triangular relationship, where an intermediary – that can be both a profit or non-profit actor – mediates between the workers and the clients (families). The UK could be a country belonging to this group. Also in this case, some risks can arise, as the proliferation of competing actors has proved to decrease both the quality of services and the quality of jobs.

In the third model, typical of countries where care regimes are more service-oriented or where the use of cash allowances is strictly controlled by the state, the employment relationship is triangular, as in the second model, but directly mediated by the state. In this model, public agencies or local authorities mediate between the workers and the clients (families). Since there is a more or less direct employment relationship between the state and the workers, domestic and care workers become public employees. This model seems to engender fewer risks, both in terms of quality of services and in terms of working conditions of care workers. France and Belgium could be examples of countries belonging to this group.

However, it is interesting to notice that the French and Belgian voucher systems include features of both the second and the third model. On the one hand, the state intervenes directly, especially through the allocation of consistent public funding and through a strict control over the quality of services and the quality of jobs. On the other hand, the intermediate actors are not public agencies but private actors.

2.3 The gender regime

The importance of introducing the gender regime as a framework for the analysis of paid domestic work derives from the fact that different gender regimes are likely to produce different outcomes in the way paid domestic work is regulated and conceived. On the one hand, whether welfare promotes or not gender equality has an impact on both the degree of externalisation of domestic activities and the characteristics of the domestic sector. On the other hand, collective representations and cultural attitudes and values about gender equality and about the sharing of responsibilities between men and women may influence the degree of externalisation of domestic and care tasks and the way both unpaid and paid domestic work are conceived⁷¹.

2.3.1 What is the gender regime?

The introduction of the gender regime as a conceptual framework came as a response to the shortcomings of the literature on welfare states. As mentioned in section 2.1.2, the typology

⁷¹ For this last point, I refer to the concept of ‘social representations’, as they have been defined by Moscovici (1961, quoted in Moscovici and Duveen, 2001). Drawing from Durkheim’s separation between ‘individual’ and ‘collective’ representations, Moscovici builds a theory that combines sociological and psychological elements. In his idea of social representations are included the set of values, ideas, beliefs and practices that are shared among the members of a certain group and that orient them in the social world.

of welfare states elaborated by Esping-Andersen's has been criticised by feminist scholars, because of a lack of a gender perspective (see, among others, Lewis, 1992; Sainsbury, 1994; Williams, 1995). Since one of Esping-Andersen's main assumptions was that labour coincides with paid employment, all unpaid care work and the relationship between the state and family in reconciling work and family life was absent (Lutz, 2008; Pfau-Effinger, 2000). According to these scholars, welfare regimes also depend on – and can be classified accordingly – the importance attributed to care, that is, whether the care for children and dependent people is considered a public or a private responsibility, the way care is acknowledged, whether care is accounted for in social security schemes, and so on.

From a gender perspective, whether care and domestic activities are considered a public or a private responsibility has also an impact on the gender division of labour within families, as female family members, without remuneration, have traditionally performed care and domestic work. Therefore, according to feminist scholarship, any analysis of welfare states should take into consideration the way policies acknowledge the traditional gender division of labour and the way they encourage, or on the contrary discourage, a more equal sharing of care responsibilities within couples.

In this perspective, the allocation of care by the state should be oriented towards gender equality, in order to avoid reinforcing gender stereotypes and the gender division of labour (Gerhard et al., 2005). To give a typical example, maternity leaves, when they are not accompanied by a parallel – possibly obligatory – parental leave to be shared with fathers, tend to prevent women from re-entering the labour market and therefore reinforce the traditional 'maternal' role of women.

Whereas there is no unique definition of gender regimes, for the purpose of this study I conceptualise them as the intersection of two main dimensions. Firstly, they include all policies that are directly or indirectly addressing gender equality, as well as their outcomes in terms of gender equality in all fields (economy, politics, work, health, power, education, and so on). Secondly, they address what feminist scholars have defined the 'gender contract', which includes traditional and cultural beliefs and understandings of gender roles and the 'natural' or more suitable arrangements in terms of division of responsibilities. Defining gender regimes as the combination of these two dimensions means to introduce a more subjective and culturally determined element to what is usually employed as the reference point of any study addressing gender equality – which is the analysis of the attainments in terms of gender equality resulting from different policies.

While most of the literature has separated these two dimensions, it seems fundamental to combine gender equality outcomes with the overall gender culture for different reasons. First of all, they do not necessarily coincide, as better performances in terms of gender equality in the labour market or in any other social sphere may not be accompanied by an equal sharing of care and domestic responsibilities between men and women, or in a change of gender stereotypes linked to domestic and care work. Additionally, taking into consideration the gender contract and the gender social norms that operate within societies is key to understand the choices of families with respect to care and domestic activities and therefore to understand the different combinations of paid and unpaid domestic work adopted by households. Thus, if the implementation of gender sensitive policies in all fields and of policies addressing specifically gender stereotypes is crucial in encouraging a better sharing of domestic responsibilities, the actual behaviour of men and women can and is influenced by the social norms and the traditional culture of gender.

Thus, while gender equality in its broader form is part of the gender system in any given country, the literature agrees on the fact that gender regimes include something more difficult to capture, but even so of crucial importance for explaining labour market, family and social behaviours of men and women. For instance, recent research on female employment rates showed that women do not base their decision to work outside the home solely on the availability of childcare services or financial allowances and tax deductions that allow them to reduce the costs for childcare. On the contrary, attitudes of women towards paid work are also influenced by social norms and cultural elements (Gerhard et al., 2005; Duncan and Pfau-Effinger, 2000). This means that the labour market behaviour of women cannot be fully explained by welfare support, and that social practices are equally important in their decisions (Gerhard et al., 2005).

2.3.2 The importance of the gender contract

Whereas the gender contract has been theorised so to include various elements, such as changes in women's roles, new mechanisms to reconcile work and family life, the search for gender equality and gender expectations, among others, the very nature of the concept makes it hard to measure. Also, while some attempts have been made to classify countries through the lens of the gender contract and to identify transformative changes occurred over time, the

main limitation is that the majority of the studies have remained more descriptive than analytic (Giele, 2006).

From a purely theoretical point of view, the literature usually refers to the gender contract to emphasise the informal gender arrangements between men and women, which determine how they act in society, within their families and in the relationship with each other. The gender contract includes the gendered division of both paid labour and family and work responsibilities, but also the common and accepted understanding of gender roles and what is considered to be the 'right' and 'natural' place for women and men.

Social norms concerning gender roles often operate routinely, whether they are recognised or not. For example, they can define what is considered to be 'good care' for either children or dependent people, what is acceptable or unacceptable for family well-being, and also whom and to what extent, among the state, the market and family, is responsible for family well-being.

The concept of gender contract draws from the concept of the social contract between the sexes (Fouquet, 1999, quoted in Letablier, 2009), which looks at the employment activity of women and at the different forms of entitlement to social rights, be that rights acquired through the direct participation in the labour market, or derived from the professional activity of the spouse. In this sense, the gender contract can be used as a tool for investigating how the social division of labour attributes certain rights and certain roles to men and women in a gender-differentiated way.

Scholarship identifies a traditional gender contract – common to all pre-industrial and industrial societies – which is based on the social differentiation between men and women and their responsibilities with respect to the caring function within the family (female role) and with respect to the economic function of family well-being (male role). The traditional gender contract, which was the dominant model of all western industrial societies, assigns women domestic tasks such as cleaning and caring for dependants and implies that women are recognised as 'experts' in the sphere of everyday life (Zdravomyslava, 2010), hence their numerical predominance also in paid domestic work.

Using the words of Lutz (2011), the traditional gender contract can be defined as 'an implicit contract between genders whereby the public [...] and the private [...] spheres are specifically differentiated by gender. Within this division, professional employment enjoys high social esteem, whereas the work of caring for the family is regarded as trivial. Thus the gender-specific differentiation also constitutes a hierarchical distinction'. Also, in the traditional gender contract, the unequal and gender differentiated roles of men and women within the

family is institutionally supported and encouraged by the state and by society at large (Zdravomyslava, 2010).

The gender division of productive and reproductive work was denounced by feminists in the early 1970s, where the campaign for the ‘wages for housework’ was launched. The demand for payment for domestic work, which inflamed a long debate and was widely criticised, did not aim to obtain an actual wage for reproductive labour. Instead, it was both a criticism of the patriarchal society and a quest for reshaping the way capitalist societies encourage this implicit contract between sexes⁷².

According to the literature, a general convergence can be identified in the way family models and the social recognition of productive and reproductive work are identified in all Western post-industrial societies. A main change intervened in the last decades, namely the transition from the traditional gender contract to a more egalitarian implicit contract between the sexes, which corresponds to the transition from the traditional ‘male breadwinner model’ to the new adult-earner or dual-earner model (Lewis, 2001).

While the expression ‘male breadwinner model’ was introduced to identify the gendered repartition of paid and unpaid labour, where the male family member is responsible for the economic well-being of the family, the dual-breadwinner model represents a redefined, more egalitarian and more individualistic family model towards which all modern societies tend (Leira, 2002). In the male breadwinner family, which was the dominant model in the post-war period, the husband had the unquestioned role of participating in the paid labour market and he was the only responsible for the economic subsistence and the well-being of the family⁷³. On the contrary, the participation of the wife in the paid labour market was not necessary, as her primary role was to take care of the family in the private sphere. Even when women – especially working-class women – were forced by circumstances to be active in the labour market, their economic function was thought as secondary, compared to that of men. In specific moments of the life course, for instance after the birth of a child, or when the domestic and care burden was to increase, it was the wage of the female member of the family – usually the lowest – that was sacrificed.

⁷² As Lutz points out, paradoxically none of the early feminists demanding wages for housework would have imagined that this metaphorical demand would have translated in the 21st century in a real phenomenon: that of the actual de-commodification of domestic labour (Lutz, 2011).

⁷³ In her overview of the change from the male breadwinner model to the adult-worker model, Lewis (2001) observes that although a pure breadwinner model never existed, there have been historical periods where the breadwinner model more closely described the social reality compared to that in other periods. One example is the decades between the post-war and the last quarter of the twentieth century.

From a common and unquestioned traditional gender contract, a more differentiated and egalitarian vision of gender roles started to develop in certain contexts, be that encouraged by institutions, by society or by individuals. This resulted in the development of the adult/dual-breadwinner model, where both adult family members share the same economic function within and outside the family (Lewis, 2004; Lutz and Palenga-Mollenbeck, 2010). Indeed, in this new model, both spouses' wages are equally important for the economic well-being of the family and a more egalitarian sharing of domestic and care responsibilities within couples would be the consequence of this change.

The reasons for the shift from one to another model cannot be traced exclusively to macro-structural changes in society; other relevant factors are the increased educational attainments of women and the change in family values.

While social scientists all seem to agree on the more or less visible transition from the male breadwinner to the adult-breadwinner model, the change has not assumed the same proportion in all contexts. Actually, some countries have reached a virtually egalitarian model, where men and women equally share professional and private responsibilities⁷⁴; in other countries, however, the traditional gender contract seems to resist societal changes and the 'family ideology' seems to persist unquestioned⁷⁵. Instead of a simple transformation of the male breadwinner model into an egalitarian system, as it was foreseen by Davis (1984)⁷⁶, post-industrial societies show an increased within-role complexity (Giele, 2006).

2.3.3 Existing classifications of gender regimes

The development of typologies of gender regimes has drawn the attention of many scholars along the years, since the mid-twentieth century. While the term 'gender regime' is only

⁷⁴ Although in some countries (such as Scandinavian countries) social norms, institutional norms and family values seem to point towards a virtually egalitarian society, the idea that a completely egalitarian family model exists in Europe is widely criticised. Studies that employ time-budget surveys to analyse the repartition of professional and family responsibilities between men and women show that a great difference still exist between the time allocated by men and women to domestic tasks. Researches have observed that if the time allocated by men to family tasks has increased, not only it has not reached the same amount of time spent by women in domestic chores, but the fathers' involvement in domestic activities has increased only in certain types of activities, namely those linked to the care of children (Saraceno, 2011).

⁷⁵ The concept of the family ideology is linked to the male breadwinner model, in that it is based on the social division of labour, where men and women have differentiated roles and women are 'in charge' of men. For a detailed explanation, refer to the classification of M. T. Letablier, later in the text.

⁷⁶ According to the functionalist theory of K. Davis (1984), the breadwinner system was about to be replaced by an egalitarian system, as this model was not 'functional', because of its unequal foundations. The unequal foundations of the breadwinner model were bringing about its own destruction, as this system could not solve the problem of the reconciliation between female's work and childrearing.

explicitly employed by some of these classifications, all the typologies presented in this section take into consideration either the system of gender equality, or the idea of the gender contract. Although each scholar has focused on one or another aspect defining gender roles, they all somehow tackle the problem of the gender division of labour and of work and family responsibilities. In this view, they all address one or more specific aspects that define gender regimes.

A well-known classification of welfare regimes that takes into account the gender contract is the one proposed by Jane Lewis (1992), who classifies countries based on their strong, modified or weak male breadwinner model. According to Lewis, all welfare states developed upon a male-breadwinner family model that was subsequently modified to different degrees in different countries. Examples of 'strong male breadwinner' countries are Ireland and Britain, with high rates of female part-time and very weak state support in conciliating work and family life. These countries are characterised by a lack of childcare services, poor maternity rights and a strong inequality between sexes with regards to social security. Public and private responsibilities are clearly separated, and care responsibilities belong to the private realm.

According to Lewis, the best example of the 'modified male breadwinner' model is France, where female full-time is more widespread and the state provides better support. In France, women benefit from the social security system, whether they are part of families with children or without. While the patriarchal system of the strong breadwinner model is embedded not only in the family but also in the institutions, in the modified family model it belongs to the private sphere, but not in collective institutions. In the public sphere, women can enjoy their rights as mothers and as workers.

An example of a 'weak male breadwinner' model is Sweden, the only one that intentionally decided to move towards a dual breadwinner system. In this model, women are encouraged to participate in paid employment and the conciliation is facilitated by the provision of childcare services (Lewis, 1992).

In her interesting analysis of the way national policies on childcare influence the changing of the traditional gender contract, Leira (2002) focuses on the Northern European countries and shows how three different types of childcare policies are linked to different gender contracts⁷⁷. Her analysis is based on the acknowledgment of a common trend in Nordic countries, pushing at the same time towards a de-familialisation of childcare and a re-familialisation of childcare.

⁷⁷ Her analysis of different models of gender contract is particularly interesting, because the author shows how countries that are commonly considered as offering similar care/welfare packages, do have important differences both in terms of the types of policies that are implemented institutionally, and in terms of the resulting family models.

The author takes into consideration three types of childcare policies – childcare services, paid leaves and cash benefits – which are linked to three different gender contracts. State-sponsored childcare services, when they are based on a universalistic and social right, facilitate the dual-earner model. Cash benefits encourage the gender-differentiated family model, as they encourage mothers to stay home to take care of children instead of entering the labour market⁷⁸. Parental leaves, especially in the form of fathers' quotas, target the transformation of the gender division of labour and can be powerful instruments for the redefinition of the gender contract.

Based on these indicators, Leira identifies four models within the Northern countries⁷⁹. In Denmark, the focus of governmental policies is on women's employment. The country offers the shortest paid leave but largely provides childcare facilities for children aged 0 to 3 years old. This system is based on the recognition of the right of mothers to work full-time. Little attention is paid on the sharing of responsibilities of care between men and women. Conversely, in Finland policies promote a re-familialisation of childcare, through a relatively long parental leave and a system of cash benefits, through which families can choose between public childcare services and parenting at home. Little attention is paid to the involvement of fathers in care activities.

In Sweden, the system of childcare policies promotes the sharing of responsibilities between mothers and fathers, together with the promotion of full-time work for both parents. State-sponsored childcare services are well developed and are intended to cover the needs of two full-time workers⁸⁰. A special attention is paid to encourage fathers to take their reserved leaves quotas. Finally, in Norway the state promotes a mixed model for the reconciliation of work and family life. A long parental leave, which foresees a father's quota, promotes the sharing of childcare responsibilities. At the same time, a cash benefit has been introduced, to offer the opportunity to prolong parental care at home. The provision of childcare services is mainly used on a part-time basis and mothers tend to concentrate in part-time jobs.

According to Marie Thérèse Letablier (2009), in every European country the welfare state was initially based on the 'family ideology', according to which family is the fundamental

⁷⁸ The author refers to the cash benefits that were introduced in Norway and in Finland, intended to families that choose not to use state-sponsored childcare facilities. The objective of these benefits is to provide an alternative to families and support them when they choose to provide care for their children at home.

⁷⁹ Technically, Leira does not elaborate a typology in the strictest sense of the word (typologies of countries cannot correspond to one single country, as the result is a description of the country instead of a generalisation). Her work is more intended to show that although Nordic countries are usually treated as a homogeneous block, they do in fact have significant differences.

⁸⁰ Although childcare provision is intended to cover the full-time employment of both parents, in Sweden a large proportion of mothers opt for part-time jobs (Leira, 2002).

social unit within which feminine and masculine roles are differentiated. Along the decades, welfare states started to differentiate, and some of them began to recognise the right of women to choose whether to work in the waged market or to rear their children at home. The result was, for instance, that the French welfare state became more supportive to women's efforts to conciliate family and work; countries like Germany and the Netherlands kept a fundamentally maternal ideology in their welfare; while Northern European countries got rid of the maternal ideology, based on the idea that women's participation in the labour market is the main instrument for achieving gender equality (Letablier, 2009). Based on these criteria, Letablier developed a classification of gender regimes that recognises five ideal types.

Birgit Pfau-Effinger (2012) stresses the importance of culture and social change as a theoretical approach to understand gender arrangements. Not only the social behaviour of individuals is strongly influenced by cultural values and ideals about the 'right' division of labour between the sexes, but also welfare state's policies are influenced by predominant ideals. Then, countries can potentially experience internal contradictions: policies might be more traditional than individual orientations about gender models and so they might constitute an obstacle for women; or, on the contrary, policies might be more innovative compared to the ideals of the majority of the population.

Pfau-Effinger (2002, 2005) classifies countries according to the cultural ideals about the gender division of labour ('gender culture') and to the cultural constructions in social institutions ('gender order'), and she recognises five different gender cultural models in Europe. The family economic model is the family model of agrarian and crafting families, where the whole family contributes to the subsistence and care is not seen as a specific task to be allocated to one family member. The male breadwinner/female home carer model is the family model in which the female member of the family is responsible for care. The male breadwinner/female part-time carer model is based on the idea that the family has to share at least part of the care responsibilities with other institutions, such as the market, the state or non-profit organisations. The dual breadwinner/external carer model is based on the idea that care should be mainly provided by external actors, such as the state, the market, or the non-profit sector. Finally, the dual breadwinner/dual carer model is based on the assumption that men and women should equally share care responsibilities within the family and that part of these responsibilities should be shared with external actors, such as the state, the market, or the non-profit sector (Pfau-Effinger, 2005).

Table 9 provides a summary of the selected classifications of gender regimes that were presented in this section.

Table 9: Gender regimes typologies

Author	Indicators	Gender regimes				
Parsons (1955), Myrdal & Klein (1956), Liljeström (1978)	- Family models	Specialisation of roles: Industrial societies	Women as second provider: 1950-60s	Shared roles model: Post-industrial societies		
Lewis (1992)	- female participation rates, social security rights, childcare provision	Strong male breadwinner model: UK Ireland	Modified male breadwinner model: France	Weak male breadwinner model: Sweden		
Leira (2002)	- childcare services - paid leaves - cash benefits childcare	Women's employment model: Denmark	Care at home model: Finland	Share of care model: Sweden	Mixed model: Norway	
Letablier (2009)	- family ideology	Maternalist regime: Germany Belgium Netherlands France Austria	Social-democratic regime: Northern countries	Family-ties regime: Mediterranean countries	Neo-liberal regime: UK Ireland	Residual regime: New EU members states
Pfau-Effinger (2005)	- gender culture - gender order	Family economic: Post-war period (FI)	Male breadwinner /female home carer: Post-war period (UK, NL, NO, DE)	Male breadwinner /female part-time carer: NL UK DE	Dual breadwinner /external carer: FR DK SE FI	Dual breadwinner/dual carer: NL NO

Although these are only some of the various typologies that have been developed in relation to gender regimes, they all stress the importance of the gender perspective in explaining cross-country variations in family models, welfare policies and care arrangements. Although each of them focuses on specific aspects of gender arrangements, all the presented typologies share the basic assumption that to fully understand the choices of households with respect to domestic and care arrangements it is necessary to take into consideration not only national policies, but also gender values and cultural and social norms. Therefore, a theoretical framework that takes into consideration gender regimes may help understand both the degree

of externalisation of domestic and care activities to the market, and the way the domestic sector is conceived and regulated by the state.

2.4 The migration regime

The importance of introducing migration regimes in a study of paid domestic work derives from the increased presence of international regular and irregular migrants in the domestic sector in many European countries (UNHCR, 2011; ILO, 2013). In some countries – namely, Mediterranean countries – the employment of female migrants in the domestic services and care services for children and the elderly has assumed enormous proportions, so that in these countries the domestic sector can be considered the main occupation of migrant women (Lutz, 2008)⁸¹.

As discussed in section 1.2.3, the main changes compared to older forms of mobility of domestic workers concern both the new geography of migration of domestic workers to Europe (which follow a pattern from East to West and from South to North⁸²) and the new ‘profile’ of domestic workers (international migrants, instead of internal migrants, more and more educated and coming from urban areas and from a middle-class background) (Lutz, 2008; Morokvasic, 2004, Sarti, 2008).

Scholars have identified some factors that have contributed to the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector. The principal argumentation is based on the rationale of a global *push-and-pull* model, where the enormous increase of supply of labour on one side of the world (due to economic reasons) meets the growing demand for domestic labour in the richer parts of the world, including Europe (Lutz, 2008). This contributes to increase the international and inter-continental mobility of domestic workers.

The growing demand for domestic labour is in turn determined by the combination of societal changes, such as the increased female participation rates in the labour market and

⁸¹ For literature on migrant domestic workers in the European countries where the proportion of migrants outnumbers that of locals in the domestic sector, refer to Parrenas for the US, 2008; Lutz-Palenga-Mollenbeck, 2010 for Germany, Leon, 2010 for Spain, Gendera, 2011 for Austria, Anderson, 2006 for the UK; Ambrosini 2011, Catanzaro and Colombo, 2009, Sciortino, 2011 for Italy.

⁸² The national diversity in the countries of origin of domestic workers in the different European countries is quite significant. However, without going into detail, it is visible a prevalence of Eastern European domestic workers in the new migration countries (Mediterranean countries), while in old migration countries, mainly due to historical reasons, female migrants from Africa and South America constitute the majority of the migrant workforce in the domestic sector. Moreover, because of international agreements, as well as specific public policies encouraging the emigration of domestic workers, migrants from countries such as The Philippines and Sri Lanka represent a large segment of the domestic sector in many European countries.

demographic transformations, and the persistence of poor wages and working conditions in the sector. On the one hand, the accrued participation of local women in the labour market means that local women are no longer available to perform all domestic and care tasks within their families *for love* (Anderson, 2011), as it was expected in the past. As it was discussed in section 2.2.1, the increased feminisation of the labour market and the ageing of the population, among other factors, combined with the lack of good quality and affordable public services available to families to meet care needs, encourage families to externalise domestic activities. On the other hand, the persistence of low wages and poor working conditions (unfriendly working hours, unsafe environments, hard physical work, among other issues), coupled with the low reputation associated to domestic chores, make domestic and care work unattractive to local women.

But what are the reasons that make migrants more suitable for domestic work?

Contrary to locals, migrant women are seen as more suitable for performing paid domestic work, because they offer domestic and care services at the most competitive prices and thus they represent the cheapest available option for households⁸³. In economic terms, they have lower reservation wages, compared to locals, and at least in the first stages of their migration strategy they tend to accept any type of job, including those that are very poorly remunerated⁸⁴ (Sciortino, 2004). In fact, since the migration project always involves high costs for migrants and since at least at the beginning migrants cannot count on social protection in the host country, newly arrived migrants tend to accept low-wage jobs as a first way of survival. Additionally, as wages in the receiving countries are typically higher than those in their country of origin, even a poorly paid job can represent an important resource for migrants in terms of remittances.

Moreover, migrant domestic workers represent a more flexible workforce, compared to locals. Because they are often younger and without dependants, they are usually more prepared to work unsocial working hours and endure harsh conditions (Anderson, 2011). However, even migrants with dependants might find advantages in the domestic work. As literature on *global*

⁸³ Sciortino (2004) employs an economic concept to describe the difference between domestic services and other jobs. According to this theory, domestic and personal services are subject to the 'Baumol cost disease'. The provision of services oscillates between the risk of a sudden reduction of supply (when wages in the domestic sector are too low) and the risk of a sharp reduction of demand (when demanded wages are too high). In many European countries, the solution to the Baumol cost disease is solved through the employment of migrant domestic workers, who foster the demand by accepting low wages.

⁸⁴ See footnote 20, p. 34.

*care chains*⁸⁵ has long highlighted, contrary to the past, more and more women with dependants (children and other dependent relatives) emigrate to work as domestic workers in wealthier regions of the world. For these women, domestic work, especially in the form of live-in work, can represent a way to save money for food and accommodation, while allowing them to send remittances to their families in the country of origin (Ambrosini, 2015)⁸⁶. Therefore, in the case of migrant women with dependants, relatively low earnings and unfriendly working hours can be part of their migration strategy, because the economic function of the job is entirely directed to the country of origin and because they do not have the reproductive burden of their families in the receiving countries. Additionally, contrary to local women, for migrant women the fact of working in the domestic sector is usually seen as a temporary situation, be that because the professional situation might evolve once settled, or because the migration project itself is seen as temporary (Anderson, 2011).

However, the above-mentioned factors cannot explain alone the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector, nor the significant differences that exist in Europe with this respect. First of all, the growing inequalities among regions of the world and the economic reasons that might encourage people in poorer regions to emigrate (*push-pull* argument) can neither explain the concentration of migrants in this specific sector, nor the choice of the destination country and the consequent cross-country variations in terms of migrant workforce. Also, as literature teaches, migration processes are engendered by a multiplicity of factors, which cannot be associated only to the economic rationale.

Some scholars suggested that the proportion of migrant care and domestic workers is not only determined by the increase of the demand and by the state withdrawal in terms of public services, but it is also voluntarily induced by policies (Sciortino, 2004; Anderson, 2011). In other words, the increase of migrant domestic workers in many European countries cannot be simply explained by the fact that local women are not prepared to carry out paid domestic work in the labour market because of low wages, or that there is a lack of appropriate public services. Instead, the increase of flows of domestic workers is “both demand-induced and policy-constructed” (Sciortino, 2004).

⁸⁵ For literature on *global care chains*, refer, among others, to Parreñas, 2001, Ehrenreich & Hochschild, 2002; Kofman, 2013; Lutz & Pallenga-Möllenbeck, 2012; Williams, 2012; Yeates, 2009, 2012.

⁸⁶ Literature on “global care chains” has pointed at the fact that more and more migrant women migrate alone from poorer to wealthier regions of the world to work as domestic workers. In the case of migrant women with dependants, usually they emigrate alone, leaving their children and dependants at the care of family, relatives or other paid workers in the country of origin. The family reunification – often partial – does intervene only at a later stage of the migration process and only when the migration project turns from temporary to a more stable project.

First of all, low wages and unfriendly working hours – which indeed attract less and less local women – are supported by policies. Even in countries that have adopted public measures to regulate the domestic sector, such as the voucher system in France and Belgium, the domestic sector is still characterised by poorer wages and working conditions, compared to national standard and compared to other low-skilled jobs (Gerard et al., 2013). The regulation of certain aspects of the work (regularisation of contracts, controls over the tasks to be performed, improved benefits) coexists with lower wages, compared to national wages, and a lower quality of jobs⁸⁷.

Second, migrant domestic workers represent the cheapest alternative to the lack of public provision, but usually only in the first phases of their migration project – namely, before their situation evolves towards the settlement or before they are entitled to welfare benefits and other social rights. To meet the demand for affordable domestic work, public policies tend to directly or indirectly promote a constant inflow of (often irregular) migrants to provide domestic and care services (Sciortino, 2004). In this sense, migration policies, combined with welfare and labour policies, are of paramount importance as they can encourage the arrival of domestic workers and set the conditions of work in the domestic sector.

Therefore, the analysis of migration regimes and of the migration policies regulating the entry and work of migrant domestic workers can be useful to understand the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector and the working conditions in the sector, as well as cross-European differences.

2.4.1 Migration regimes and domestic work

The concentration of migrants in the domestic sector in all European countries is influenced by migration regimes, both in the form of direct policies aiming at encouraging or controlling the entrance of domestic workers, and in the form of more general immigration policies, determining the entry, stay and work permits of foreigners. Although migration regimes

⁸⁷ The Belgian voucher system is symptomatic of the contradiction between a professionalised and regularised domestic sector and the creation of a lower work status in the labour market. As stated in the annual report of IDEA Consult on the Belgian voucher system, while certain aspects of the work are closely regulated by the state (the type of tasks allowed, the contractual situation, the regulation of working hours), the quality of the job remains lower, compared to other occupations. In particular, although the voucher system is covered by collective bargaining and therefore the wages cannot be lower than the minimum national wage, the collective agreement foresees lower benefits for domestic workers (holidays, travel expenses, etc.). Some researchers have argued that the voucher system was successful in regulating the sector and reducing irregular work, but it has failed in improving the working conditions of domestic workers and in actually professionalising the work (Gerard et al., 2013).

include all aspects linked to the entry and stay, as well as the regulation of the work permit of all foreigners, they have an impact on the domestic sector, as they can directly promote the employment of migrant domestic workers in different ways (Lutz, 2008).

National immigration policies usually reflect the different perceptions over the benefits vs. the disadvantages of including migrants in the national labour market (UNHCR, 2011). Concerning domestic workers, from the nineteenth century until some decades ago, many European countries had put in place migration policies aiming at controlling the arrival of domestic workers in their national territory (Sarti, 2008). Today, in the majority of European countries, there is a visible mismatch between immigration policies, which insist on demanding high-skilled and high-earning migrants, and the reality of the labour market, which demands low-skilled, cheap and flexible domestic and care workers⁸⁸ (Anderson, 2011). Only a few countries, such as Italy, Spain and to a lesser extent Germany, have recognised the enormous demand for migrant domestic workers and have enacted migration policies and provisions specifically addressing domestic workers (Kofman, 2005; Sarti, 2008), albeit with national differences in the type of measures that have been adopted. Although measures specifically addressing the need of migrant domestic workers do not seem to be sufficient to meet the increasing demand, they are nevertheless important because they show that certain governments have acknowledged the increase of the demand and the importance of migrant domestic workers in the receiving labour market. However, even in this case, these measures are generally limited to ex-post regularisations or specific (but limited) quotas for the entry of domestic workers, rather than permanent instruments that recognise domestic work as a type of work that warrants a specific visa and work permit (Sarti, 2008). In general, in Europe there is a lack of acknowledgment of the need of migrants in the domestic sector (UNHCR, 2011) and existing measures are insufficient and fragmented.

Concerning the entrance of migrant domestic workers into the territory, Bettio et al. (2006) identify three factors that, coupled with the general permeability of borders, determine the size of inflows: i) the size of the underground economy; ii) the use of regularisation programmes; and iii) the demand for care work.

⁸⁸ All definitions of domestic work agree on the low-skilled nature of the job. However, there is an increased awareness of the fact that this type of work requires other skills and competences ('soft skills') which are crucial for the employer and which include management of personal relationships, empathetic skills, knowledge of how to identify emergencies and how to physically take care of frail people, etc. (Anderson, 2011). Also, the fact that migrant domestic workers are included in the lower-skilled segments of the labour market does not necessarily mean that they have no education. On the contrary, more and more migrant domestic workers are medium to highly educated and the paradoxical situation of a domestic worker who has better education than her employer is not an exception in Europe (Sarti, 2008).

The pre-existence of a large informal economy has long been recognised as a factor encouraging the inflow of migrants (Ambrosini, 2015; UNHCR, 2011; Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009; Bettio et al., 2006). Contrary to common beliefs, a large informal labour market attracts migrants, rather than being the consequence of the arrival of important inflows of migrants (Bettio et al., 2006). When jobs are available in the informal labour market, migrants may find it easy to enter the territory and earn money even without a residence or a work permit. Moreover, the entrance of irregular migrants through clandestine routes constitutes the smaller segment of the irregular migrant presence in any country (Ambrosini, 2010). The vast majority of migrants enter the territory legally, usually through temporary permits or tourist VISA, and then overstay their permit and become irregular. In this case, the presence of a large and easily accessible underground economy allows migrants to remain on the territory, while waiting for regularisation opportunities.

The use of more or less frequent regularisation programmes as a policy instrument for the management of unauthorised migration also attracts large inflows of irregular migrants⁸⁹ (Ambrosini, 2010; Bettio et al., 2006). Exceptional regularisation programmes have been frequently used in Southern European countries in the last two decades, in the absence of other immigration policies and mechanisms. In these countries, regularisations have involved a very large number of migrants working in the informal economy and this has created expectations for both irregular migrants already present in the territory and for potential migrants (Bettio et al., 2006). The fact that two of the Italian regularisation programmes launched in recent years were specifically directed to domestic workers is a clear sign of the recognition of the importance of migrants for domestic work.

Concerning the demand for care workers, the high demand for domestic and care workers – which has already been discussed in previous sections – both retains migrants and fuels new waves of migration. The unprecedented concentration of migrants in households and the segmentation of the domestic sector by gender are symptomatic of the role played by female migrants that emigrate to work in the domestic sector (Bettio et al., 2006; Anthias and Lazaridis, 2000; Lutz, 2008, 2010).

⁸⁹ A distinction can be made between regularisation programmes, which are exceptional measures, usually limited in time and addressed to specific groups of migrants, and regularisation mechanisms, which are permanent measures, meant to regulate the status of certain groups of migrants (such as refugees, family members, etc.) (MPI, 2011; Ambrosini, 2010).

2.4.2 Migration regimes in Europe: current trends

This section provides an overview of the current European situation with regards to migration policies, with a focus on the existing classifications of migration regimes. As it emerges from this overview, migration regimes, as they are usually analysed, do not refer specifically to domestic workers and none of the typologies developed so far have taken into account the increased demand for domestic workers in many European countries. However, existing analyses of migration regimes are useful to understand both the historical legacies that influence the way immigration is perceived and regulated in different countries, and recent trends in Europe with respect to immigration and integration issues. This in turn is key to contextualise the emerging demand of migrant domestic workers and to investigate how this increased demand is fitted into existing migration regimes.

Overall, European migration regimes are influenced by the recent history of migration in Europe and by the affirmation of the rhetoric of the ‘control of the borders’, promoted by the European Union (Huysmans, 2000; Bosworth, 2008; Infantino, 2013). In the last decades, and more and more since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU has made efforts to harmonise policies on migration and to develop a common European legal migration framework, mainly through the adoption of directives on border control, legal migration, irregular migration, visa and the Common European Asylum System (European Parliament, 2015). However, immigration policies – especially those related to the integration of migrants in the host societies – still remain a competence of member states.

Although the common distinction between integration and immigration policies is still visible and it is adopted in most policy frameworks, both the European Union and national states seem to be concerned about creating a nexus between immigration, integration and citizenship (Carrera, 2006). In the majority of European countries, recent developments in the legal and policy framework suggest a trend towards a general restriction with respect to the entrance of migrants (immigration framework) and the introduction of binding integration programmes (integration/citizenship framework).

Restriction of immigration regimes

With respect to the immigration legal and policy framework, a state can be more or less favourable to the entrance and stay of migrants for different reasons, that vary from economic and demographic interests, historical and colonial links to emigration countries, the control of their borders, or humanitarian considerations (Bourhis et al., 2010). Regarding trends in

immigration policies, scholarship has observed that in the last three decades the European Union has repeatedly tried to discourage immigration and to restrict both entry and stay of migrants (Sciortino, 2004).

Although the inflow of migrants into the European Union is far from being dramatic, starting from the closure of labour migration in the 1970s and more and more in the 1990s, there has been a growing concern about the entrance of foreigners into the European territory. This has generated a shift from a focus on integration policies to a focus on entrance and control policies, which are currently given prominence both at European level (through the implementation of directives and soft regulations) and at national level (under the pressure of the EU). Also, due to the mediatisation of the debate about the threat of irregular migration, migration has generally turned into a 'security issue' (Huysmans, 2000; Infantino, 2013) and European migration policies tend to focus on restrictive measures, external control and exclusion policies (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009).

Countries at the border of the European Union – namely at the Northern coastlines of the Mediterranean and countries in Eastern border areas – are being particularly under pressure, because they are expected to adapt their national migration systems to the European restrictive policies and to 'protect' the European borders from unwanted and irregular migration. However, because the inflows of unwanted migration are still significant, Mediterranean countries are commonly designed as the 'weak underbelly' of the European control system and their migration system is regarded as weak and ineffective⁹⁰ (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009).

Despite the general emphasis on border control and the repression of irregular migration, the large extent of inflows of unwanted migrants constitutes a phenomenon that is more and more regarded as endangering national and European sovereignty (Ambrosini, 2010; Anderson, 2008). The increased concern over border control is in itself the result of the decline of the power of nation states under the forces of globalisation, which conversely emphasises free trade and free movement of people (Bosworth, 2008). The tension between the generalised restrictive dictate and the increase of unwanted migration is currently at the centre of the political debate and has become increasingly mediatised in all European countries. Although

⁹⁰ This is due to a multiplicity of factors. Southern countries, which have been for long time countries of emigration, were traditionally open to receive foreigners because of their economic dependence on tourism, and also because the arrival of migrants was mainly transitional (Bettio et al., 2006). When these countries progressively turned into immigration countries during the 1980s (Baldwin-Edwards and Arango, 1999) and started to depend more and more on foreign workforce in their labour markets, governments found themselves unprepared to receive large amounts of migrants. Following the demands of northern and continental Europe to reinforce the borders, they all had to intensify migration controls, but with limited results (Bettio et al., 2006)

different types of irregularity exist⁹¹ and although each EU member state defines and treats irregularity differently (Ambrosini, 2010), the fight against irregular migration is crucial to all European migration regimes. Because irregular migrants are those who enter in conflict with the rules defined by the state, the political-normative action of migration regimes is fundamental in creating categories of migrants, in a hierarchy that ranks migrants from the most to the least desirable⁹².

Although differences exist at country level in the way measures are implemented, the criteria according to which migrants are accorded entry, stay and work permits, as well as social and civil rights, unanimously encourage the migration of high-skilled / high-earning migrants, while discouraging the entry of low-skilled workers. This is due to the fact that high-skilled migrants are more accepted, both economically and politically. From an economic point of view, high-skilled / high-earning migrants are advantageous for the receiving country, as they contribute to the economic growth of the nation. From the political point of view, high-skilled migrants are better accepted by the local population because, in contrast with the negative perception of low-skilled migrants, they integrate faster in the receiving community and they do not compete with the local low-skilled workforce in the labour market and in the access to public welfare benefits (Boeri et al., 2012). Also, seasonal workers are welcome in many countries, because of the temporary nature of their migration project⁹³ and because of the high demand for low-skilled seasonal work in many countries.

⁹¹ A definition of irregular migrants is far from being uncontroversial. As it has been emphasised by Ambrosini, there are at least four types of irregular status under which migrants can fall: irregular entry, irregular stay permit, irregular work permit and irregular work status. The irregular situation of migrants can involve one or more of these types and can evolve over time (Ambrosini, 2010). Also, migration policies can concentrate on one or the other type of irregularity – typically, entry and stay permits (with an emphasis on security policies) – while tolerating other forms of irregularity – typically, work permits and work status. This means that the fight against irregular migration does not necessarily imply the repression of all types of irregular status.

⁹² Crucial to the definition of migration policies is the notion of the cultural desirability and the definition of whom – among all potential migrants – are ‘wanted’ and/or ‘accepted’ in the national territory. Therefore, migration regimes also include the regulation of whom will be granted entry, stay and work permits, as well as social, civic and political rights and access to naturalisation (Lutz, 2008). Modern migration regimes are based on the idea of ‘managed migration’ (Kofman et al., 2005) and tend to classify migrants according to desirability criteria. This in turn foments the polarisation between ‘good migrants’, who are welcome and even necessary (usually to the economy of the country) and ‘bad migrants’, who are associated with illegality and criminality (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009). Additionally, although the fight against unwanted migration seems to pervade all migration regimes, there are also hierarchical categories among irregular migrants, with some migrants being regarded as more irregular than others. As Ambrosini observes, EU nationals – even when irregular on one or the other aspect – are considered less irregular, thus less dangerous, compared to new accession nationals, to OECD countries nationals and to third-countries nationals, in a hierarchical continuum. At the same time, another type of hierarchy operates with respect to the ‘utility’ of migrants – namely to fill labour market shortages – and according to gender (Lutz, 2008; Ambrosini, 2010).

⁹³ A popular and often mediatised discourse denounces migrants as abusers of European welfare. More and more popular xenophobic discourses foment the idea that migrants are not attracted to better opportunities in the European labour markets, but rather to the high protection provided by European welfare states. Therefore,

The generalised restrictive policies and exclusionist regulations that characterise European migration regimes have two important consequences.

First, by restricting the criteria for regular migration, they paradoxically increase the number of irregular migrants, in that they increase the number of individuals that come into conflict with the rules of the normative apparatus. The increase in the proportion of irregular migrants generates the need of enforced measures to combat irregular migration. However, the repressive approach of migration policies cannot be pushed beyond a certain limit, as this would jeopardise the very basis of democracies (Ambrosini, 2010). The dilemma to which European democracies are currently confronted has to do with the willingness to refrain irregular migration and the moral imperative to respect human rights principles.

Second, since these policies do not take into consideration the demand for low-skilled migrant workers in the labour market, they create a tension between political restrictionist intents and the economic interests (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009). This can result in a further polarisation between wanted and unwanted migrants, an increase in the inflow of irregular migrants, as well as a mismatch between migration regulations and the actual practice. The mismatch between policies and practice is particularly visible in some countries, where low-skilled workers are needed to fill the labour shortages in certain sectors of the labour market, such as the construction sector and domestic services. Migrant workers who are employed in these sectors find themselves in an ambiguous situation, as they are politically and administratively refused, but economically accepted and even needed (Ambrosini, 2011).

Introduction of integration programmes

Concerning integration policy frameworks, there seems to be a clear trend towards the introduction of mandatory integration programmes for migrants in the host countries. Although not all European countries have already put in place a system of integration programmes, several countries are currently planning to introduce such systems and the mandatory character of these programmes is progressively becoming the norm in Europe (Carrera, 2006). Integration programmes usually include elements such as language classes and civic courses on the norms, history, values and traditions of the receiving country, and sometimes elements of professional orientation and training (Jacobs and Rea, 2007).

Although the introduction of integration programmes is generally seen as a common trend that interests all European countries, some differences exist in the way these programmes are

temporary migration is often regarded as more acceptable compared to settled migration, because seasonal migrants – due to the very temporary nature of their stay – are not entitled to welfare provisions.

conceived. First, the state can offer integration programmes without fees, as a public service aimed at helping migrants in their integration process, or can demand fees to migrants for courses attendance. Second, the target beneficiaries can vary, as programmes can be specifically directed to newly arrived migrants, to migrants living on social benefits, to the whole migrant population, or even to potential migrants in their countries of origin. Third, integration programmes can have different degrees of compulsoriness. While in some European countries, such as France and Belgium (Wallonia region) integration programmes are voluntary, in other countries (Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the Flemish part of Belgium) they are compulsory and their incompleteness may engender various juridical and social sanctions. The sanctions for not participating in integration programmes can vary from the withdrawal of entitlements to social benefits or restriction to certain services, monetary fees, or consequences on residence permits and the expulsion from the country (Jacobs and Rea, 2006; Carrera, 2006).

The introduction of integration programmes is based on the common assumption that migrants should have at least a general knowledge of the receiving society. What differs among European countries is the underlying philosophy of integration programmes and the reasons behind their use. The evolution in the requirements and the intents linked to such programmes over time opened the debate over the very nature of integration pursued by these instruments. Integration programmes were initially conceived as to offer migrants better chances of integration in the host country, such as language and other skills necessary to integrate the labour market. This is still the case in countries like Sweden and Finland. However, integration programmes can also be conceived as instruments to achieve other goals, such as assimilation and acculturation, as it is the case in the Netherlands and to some extent also in Denmark and Germany (Jacobs and Rea, 2006). Several scholars suggest that integration programmes are part of a general shift from multiculturalism to assimilation⁹⁴, as well as a shift in the responsibilities for integration from the state to the individual migrants (Carrera, 2006).

2.4.3 Typologies of migration regimes

European countries differ quite significantly in their system of immigration and integration policies and in their outcomes. This is due to different historical factors, institutional and

⁹⁴ A detailed explanation on the difference between multiculturalism and assimilation is provided in the following section *Integration/citizenship typologies*, p. 103.

economic forces, as well as political and popular perception of migration (Boucher and Gest, 2015). Many attempts have been made by scholars to classify migration regimes and identify how countries cluster together across different dimensions of migration regimes. As Boucher and Gest observe, contemporary classifications of migration regimes and the deriving typologies have developed by focusing on either of the following aspects: 1) integration regimes and 2) immigration regimes⁹⁵.

The first type of migration regimes (integration) covers the situation of the migrant population once settled in the receiving country. It includes elements such as access to the labour market, access to health services, access to education, political participation, participation in cultural and leisure activities, access to social benefits and services, participation in trade unions, and so on. The second type of migration regimes (immigration) covers the entry and admission criteria of migrants and includes visas, entry and work permits and the overall system of laws and regulations intended to manage the admission of migrants in the national territory. Classifications of both dimensions of the migration regime can be based on policy outputs (the policy apparatus, including laws, binding or non-binding decisions, implementation activities, etc.) or on policy outcomes (the result of policy implementation).

According to Boucher and Gest, the main limitation of current typologies of migration regimes lies precisely on the lack of comprehensive classifications that would take into account both dimensions – integration and immigration/admission. As it will be discussed in the next section, scholars have treated the two aspects separately and the interaction between the selection of migrants (admission) and settlement policies (integration) is currently under-explored.

Immigration/admission typologies

As shown in Table 10, most of the typologies that classify countries in terms of admission/entry policies are very much linked to the historical legacies of migration and tend to emphasise the nature and the type of migration flows in each country. A typical approach to classify immigration regimes is to distinguish between three main groups. The first group is that of ‘settler states’, characterised by the reception and settlement of extended inflows of international migration. This group includes old immigration countries, such as the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The second is the ‘guest workers’ group, which is

⁹⁵ Throughout this study, I will use the term migration regime to indicate the overall system of migration policies in a given country. The migration regime, as defined in this study, includes both integration and immigration/admission policies.

typical of Northern and continental European countries that have received large inflows of international migration through the guest-worker programmes after the Second World War. This group includes old immigration countries, such as Germany, the UK, France and Belgium. The third group is that of former sending countries, which became immigration countries only starting from the 1980s. This cluster includes Mediterranean countries, such as Italy, Spain and Greece. Other similar typologies of countries in terms of their immigration regimes have been developed by scholars. Table 10 provides a selection of these classifications.

Table 10: Migration/admission regimes typologies

Author	Indicators	Migration regimes			
<i>Hammar (1985)</i>	- Immigration control - Integration policies (qualitative)	Guest workers or rotation system: Germany Switzerland	Permanent immigration: UK Sweden	Post-colonial immigration: UK France Netherlands	
<i>Freeman (1995)</i>	- immigration in labour market - external pressures on immigration (qualitative)	English-speaking settler societies: US Australia Canada	Post-war immigration countries: France UK Germany Switzerland Netherlands Sweden Belgium	Former emigration countries: Spain Portugal Italy Greece	
<i>Cornelius and Tsuda (2004)</i>	- Immigration policies - Public support to immigration (qualitative)	Classic countries of immigration: US Canada Australia	Reluctant countries of immigration: France Germany Netherlands UK	Recent countries of immigration: Italy Spain Japan Korea	
<i>Joppke (2005)</i>	-Immigration selection (qualitative)	Settler states: US Australia	Post-colonial constellations: Northwest Europe Southwest Europe	Diaspora constellations: Israel Germany	
<i>Menz (2009)</i>	- Labour union / industry relations - Labour immigration selection (qualitative)	Established countries of immigration: France Germany UK	New countries of immigration: Ireland Italy Poland		
<i>Devitt (2011)</i>	- Flows of immigrants - Type of work of	Nordic regimes: Sweden Denmark	Conservative / continental model:	Southern / statist model: Italy	Liberal model: UK Ireland

	immigrants - Labour market design	Finland	Germany Australia Netherlands Belgium	Greece Spain Portugal France	
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** The selection of the typologies is based on the study conducted by A. Boucher and J. Gest (2015)*

What clearly emerges from all these typologies is that the type of immigration regimes and their outcomes in terms of immigration flows are influenced by historical factors (colonialist links, for instance), by the ‘age’ of their immigration (old vs. new countries of immigration) and by the type of immigration (settlement vs. temporary). The limitation of the majority of the typologies on immigration/admission regimes is that they are mainly based on a qualitative evaluation of policies and that they do not always specify the variables that have been taken into account (Boucher and Gest, 2015).

To overcome this problem, scholars have recently tried to systematise the efforts of classifying countries in terms of the restrictiveness of migration policies and a few databases have been constructed to this purpose (de Haas et al., 2015). Due to the difficulty in defining restrictiveness of immigration regimes in absolute terms, the majority of the databases provide information about the changes in immigration policies over time. The works of Mayda and Patel (2004) and later of Ortega and Peri (2012) cover policies of labour migration, asylum, family reunification and border control in 14/15 OECD countries. The Immigration policy database (ImPol), developed by Mezger and Gonzales-Ferrer in 2013, measures immigration policy changes in five Western countries. Among the databases that track changes in immigration policies, the most recent and complete both in terms of policies covered and in terms of the number of countries covered is the Determinants of International Migration database (DEMIG Policy database), which includes migration policy changes over the period of 1945-2013 in 45 countries. Although these databases are very useful for understanding the evolution of immigration policies over time, they are nevertheless less powerful for comparing the degree of restrictiveness across countries (de Haas et al., 2015).

Recently, some attempts have been made to create immigration policies databases that can be used for comparative purposes, in that they measure the degree of restrictiveness in absolute terms. The Immigration Policies in Comparison project (IMPIC) and the Immigration Policy and Law Analysis project (IMPALA) are among the most successful attempts in this respect. However, as many other databases on immigration policies, their main limitation is that they usually cover a limited number of countries and/or a limited set of policies (de Haas et al., 2015), which make their use limited to broad international comparisons.

Integration/citizenship typologies

Regarding integration regimes, various classifications have been developed, that take into account a variety of factors. The integration of migrants into host societies is achieved in very different ways, depending on historical, economic, demographic, political and cultural elements that influence the way minority groups are perceived and treated. It also depends on how the national community has been created and on which values it developed (Rodriguez-Garcia, 2010). In broad terms, the debate over integration models has rotated for a long time around the distinction between multiculturalism and assimilation⁹⁶.

Although many types of multiculturalism have been identified⁹⁷, the term multiculturalism (or pluralism) usually refers to policies that aim to preserve cultures and cultural identities of minority groups – usually migrants – within the society. In an ideal-type multicultural society, the state recognises equal status to all minority cultural and religious groups, with no one culture predominating over the others. A state based on multicultural policies tends to recognise legal status and legal protection to minority groups. The philosophical roots of multiculturalism are based on the assumption that although different nations' subcultures might be different, they all share common values and that unity can be achieved through difference.

On the contrary, assimilation (or cultural assimilation, or republicanism) aims to achieve integration of minority groups through the 'absorption' of these groups into the established dominant society. Since minority groups have to assimilate to national and cultural values, assimilation always implies a certain loss of the original characteristics of the group. Assimilation is based on the idea of a monocultural society, where rules and values of the established community are absorbed by minority groups, so that minority communities become virtually indistinguishable from the dominant one (Rodriguez-Garcia, 2010). In pure assimilation-based states, citizens are just treated as citizens, without differences. Integration regimes based on assimilation assumptions tend to legally forbid the recognition of minority groups as distinct communities, with their own religion, cultural identity and values.

⁹⁶ For information on multiculturalism/assimilation and on the debate over a possible European convergence towards assimilation, refer, among others, to Carrera, 2006; Joppke, 2007; Koopmans et al., 2012; Michalowski, 2009.

⁹⁷ Some authors distinguish between weak and strong multiculturalism (refer to the review of Rodriguez-Garcia, 2010), while some scholars have come to identify up to eight or nine types of multiculturalism (refer to the review of Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2010).

As it is always the case for classifications that identify two ideal types as the two extremes of a continuum, no such pure multiculturalist or assimilationist country exist. However, some countries are often pointed at as those that better exemplify the two models. Looking at North America, the US is considered the country that most closely exemplifies assimilation, while Canada has been often treated as the ideal-type of a multicultural society. In the European context, France and the UK have been identified as the two societies that better reflect assimilationist and multicultural values, respectively, while the Netherlands and Germany are often considered as in between the two models (Mangan and Borooah, 2009). In reality, all countries combine multicultural and assimilationist tendencies, depending on the region and depending on the historical period⁹⁸.

A third model of integration – which some scholars consider as a sub-group of multiculturalism – is the segregationist (or exclusionist) model, based on the fragmentation of ethno-cultural communities. This model is characterised by a rigid immigration legislation, where rigid refers to the conditions that must be satisfied to access the territory (Carrera, 2006). This model is typical of countries where the acquisition of citizenship is based on the *jus sanguinis* criterion⁹⁹, as it is the case in Austria, Germany and Switzerland (Rodriguez-Garcia, 2010).

Another typology that takes into account pluralistic and assimilationist approaches is the one developed by Castles and Miller (2009), who identify four types of integration: i) countries that integrate members or former members of multi-ethnic empires; ii) countries that focus on ethnic dimensions, such as culture and language; iii) countries that adopt a republican model, based on a constitution or on laws; and iv) countries based on a multicultural model, which focuses on a pluralistic approach.

As shown in Table 11, apart from the traditional typologies of integration regimes that distinguish between more or less multicultural/assimilationist models, various databases have been built in order to measure integration policies and outcomes. Among these instruments, Banting and Kymlicka proposed in 2011 the Multiculturalism Policy Index, which measures the type and strength of multicultural policies in 21 OECD countries. Similarly, the Migration Policy Group developed the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which takes into

⁹⁸ For instance, there is a current debate over the failure of the French assimilationist model, which would have pushed the country towards the recognition of multicultural values. To give another example, the Netherlands is seen as slowly turning from a multicultural to a neo-assimilationist society (see discussion in Rodriguez-Garcia, 2010).

⁹⁹ *Jus sanguinis* is a principle based on which citizenship is not determined by the place of birth (*jus soli*), but by the citizenship of one or both parents.

account broad integration policies in all EU member states and in Australia, Norway, Switzerland, Canada and the US. Other indexes, such as the Citizenship Policy Indicator developed by Howard, focus on the acquisition and loss of citizenship in Europe, while Janoski uses outcome-based indicators on naturalisation rates to classify citizenship regimes. A last example of integration measure is the Civic Integration Index, developed by Goodman, which measures the requirements of European member states in terms of language and knowledge of the culture and the values of the receiving country.

Table 11: Integration/citizenship regimes typologies

Author	Indicators	Integration regimes			
<i>Castles and Miller (2009)</i>	(qualitative)	<i>Integration of members or former members of multiethnic empires</i>	<i>Focus on ethnic dimensions (culture of language)</i>	<i>Republican model based on constitution or laws</i>	<i>Multicultural model, pluralistic approach</i>
<i>Banting and Kymlicka (2011)</i>	Multicultural policies	Multiculturalism Policy Index: 21 OECD countries			
<i>Migration Policy Group (2006)</i>	Labour market mobility, family reunion, education, political participation, long-term residence, access to nationality, anti-discrimination	Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX): EU member states + Australia, Norway, Switzerland, Canada and the US			
<i>Howard (2009)</i>	Measurement of jus soli, residency requirements, dual citizenship allowances	Citizenship Policy Indicator: 15 EU states			
<i>Goodman (2010)</i>	Naturalisation requirements of country knowledge, language and values agreement	Civic Integration Index: 15 EU states			

Chapter 3

Data, methodology and challenges

This chapter deals with the methodology of the research and is divided in five main sections. The first section provides the description of the methodology used in this study and of the main types of statistical analyses carried out (presented in Chapter 4, 5 and 6). The second section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of secondary analysis of existing data. The third section is a detailed description of the different databases and sources that have been used for the analyses and of the available data. The fourth section discusses the main limitations of each database used for the analysis. A particular attention is paid to the problems linked to the statistical definition of the domestic sector and the statistical definition of the migrant population, as well as the issues linked to the informal economy. Finally, the fifth section addresses some additional problems encountered during the course of the research, which include problems linked to international comparisons and problems linked to specific statistical analyses.

3.1 Methodology

This research is a comparison between European countries, which is conducted with quantitative methods of investigation. Namely, it intends to empirically test the theory, elaborated by scholar Helma Lutz, according to whom ‘migrant domestic work’ is influenced by three different regimes, which operate simultaneously.

Three main sets of analyses have been conducted, which are presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Due to the complexity of the work, other types of analysis have been explored – and in some cases tentatively carried out – which are not presented in this dissertation. Section 3.1.1

presents the three main sets of analyses conducted in the framework of this research, while section 3.1.2 presents a brief description of the statistical tools that have been used.

3.1.1 The three main analyses of this research

First analysis: descriptive analysis of the domestic sector

The first is a descriptive analysis of contemporary paid domestic work in all the European countries for which data is available. The objective is to confirm the main findings of the literature on domestic work and to highlight the main trends and cross-national differences. A particular focus is paid to the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector, as it represents the focus of this research. The data used for this analysis is the EU Labour Forces microdata, publicly available upon demand to Eurostat.

Due to the characteristics of this database and its limitations – which are addressed in section 3.4.1 – the descriptive analyses were limited to the following aspects: 1) the size of the domestic sector in all EU member states (1998-2015); 2) the feminisation of the domestic sector; 3) the *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector; 4) some aspects that can be used to define working conditions, namely: the income level; the prevalence of temporary work vs. permanent work; and unusual working hours (night, evening and weekend shifts) vs. normal hours¹⁰⁰.

The analyses presented in Chapter 4 are mostly carried out on the latest available EU-LFS data (2015), with the exception of the analysis of the presence of second generations of migrants in the domestic workforce, for which I have used the data of the EU-LFS ad hoc module 2014¹⁰¹.

Second analysis: construction of typologies

The second set of analyses is the construction of indicators and of three typologies, one for each regime that is taken into consideration in this study. These analyses are presented in Chapter 5. The choice to create new indexes, where relevant, and new typologies – one for each regime – is based on the fact that no synthetic (or composite) indicator exists, which

¹⁰⁰ In this research, bivariate analyses, mainly in the form of graphics (bar charts) and tables, are presented in Chapter 4 and in the first part of Chapter 6. In Chapter 4, they are used to analyse the main features of paid domestic work in the European countries for which data is available, while in Chapter 6 they are used to analyse the same features aggregated at the level of the three typologies.

¹⁰¹ The ad-hoc module 2014 of the EU-LFS is the only public data released by Eurostat that provides information about the country of birth of mothers and fathers.

could be used for the purpose of this study. Although some indicators exist that measures one or more aspects that define the three regimes, new indexes and new typologies were necessary because of the specific object of this study, namely, the domestic sector. In line with the literature that highlights the importance of using typologies (only) when they are intended to explain empirical social phenomena¹⁰², the three typologies created for the purpose of this research are not intended to have ‘validity’ *per se*, but rather to be used as empirical tools for the understanding of a social phenomenon. For this reason, each typology has been constructed so to best represent each regime *for this specific study on domestic work*.

One of the main challenges of this analysis was the selection of the best possible indicators, in terms of reliability, comprehensiveness, harmonisation between different countries and relevance for the regime under study. Several indicators have been selected from different databases and different sources.

For the analysis of care regimes, I have built two synthetic indexes: the De-familialisation index and the Generosity index. These two synthetic indexes were created based on indicators selected from different sources. Some of the indicators used for the de-familialisation index were selected from the Multilinks database¹⁰³, while others were derived from an EU report on personal household services. The indicators used for the generosity index were selected from the Multilinks database and from the OECD Health Statistics 2017 database¹⁰⁴. The construction of the two synthetic indexes was carried out by means of Principal Component Analyses¹⁰⁵. Finally, the typology of care regimes was constructed by means of a cluster analysis¹⁰⁶.

¹⁰² Here, I refer to the work of Weber (1958), but also to the following literature that has developed on the use of typologies. The discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of using typologies is presented in section 2.1.1.

¹⁰³ The Multilinks project has been carried out by a consortium of nine partners, led by the Berlin Social Science Center (WZB). Data were collected for the years 2004 and 2009 in 30 European countries (EU-27 and Norway, Georgia and Russia). The database is public and is available upon registration at the following link: <https://multilinks-database.wzb.eu/session/new>. More information on the database is provided in section 3.3.2.

¹⁰⁴ The online database OECD Health Statistics, released on 30 June 2017, includes data on health systems across countries. The database is available online at this link: http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=HEALTH_STAT. More information on the database is provided in section 3.3.2.

¹⁰⁵ Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a multivariate statistical procedure that allows finding the principal components of a multivariate data sample, based on the correlation between variables. In simple words, it reduces the number of highly correlated observed variables into a smaller number of principal components, which account for most of the variance of the observed variables. While the actual number of extracted components corresponds to the number of original variables, only the components that explain the majority of the variance are retained. The results of a PCA are usually discussed in terms of component scores (or factor scores) and loadings.

¹⁰⁶ Cluster Analysis is a multivariate statistical method used to classify a sample of observations, based on a set of variables, into a number of different groups, or clusters. The objective of the analysis is to identify clusters of

For the development of the typology of gender regimes, I have used two synthetic indexes, corresponding to the ‘gender equality’ dimension and to the ‘gender contract’ dimension. For the dimension of gender equality I used the Gender Equality Index 2015¹⁰⁷, which is an existing synthetic index developed by the European Commission. For the dimension of the gender contract, I have built a synthetic index, based on indicators selected from different sources, and obtained by means of a Principal Component analysis. The two synthetic indexes were then used to build the typology of gender regimes, through a cluster analysis.

The analysis of migration regimes was carried out so to measure two dimensions: the integration system and the admission/immigration system. For the integration system, one synthetic index was used, namely the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)¹⁰⁸. For the admission/immigration system, three indicators were selected from different sources. The indicator of the number of first residence permits issued for employment reasons was selected from the *Residence permits statistics* report of Eurostat¹⁰⁹. The indicator of the number of migrants from new accession countries was selected from the *2016 Annual Report on intra-EU Labour Mobility* of the European Commission. The indicator of the estimates of the informal economy was selected from “*Size and development of the shadow economy of 31 European and 5 other OECD countries from 2003 to 2015: different developments*” by Friedrich Schneider (2015). Finally, the typology of migration regimes was constructed by means of a cluster analysis.

objects that are similar based on the selected variables. The term cluster analysis encompasses a number of different algorithms for grouping the objects based on their similarity/dissimilarity (Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 1984). Although many clustering techniques can be performed, the types of cluster analysis that I have used for the construction of the typologies are hierarchical clustering, k-means and Partitioning Around Medoids (PAM). Hierarchical cluster analysis produces a tree-based representation, known as dendrogram, where the groups can be extracted by cutting the dendrogram at the desired similarity level. K-means and PAM cluster analyses are both part of the family of ‘partitioning clustering’, and use two different algorithms respectively to subdivide the data into a set of k groups, where the value of k is pre-specified. The main difference between these two methods is that while k-means chooses the mean of a cluster as its centre, PAM chooses data-points as centres of the clusters.

¹⁰⁷ The Gender Equality Index was elaborated by the Gender Equality Institute (GEI), following the “Roadmap for Equality between Women and Men 2006-2010”. It provides a measure of gender equality in all EU member states. A detailed description of the index is provided in section 3.3.3.

¹⁰⁸ The MIPEX is a database that provides a comparative instrument for the measurement of the integration of migrants in the receiving society. It is available online at this link: <http://www.mipex.eu/key-findings>. The detailed description of the database is provided in section 3.3.4.

¹⁰⁹ The detailed description of the sources used for the construction of the typology of migration regimes is provided in section 3.3.4.

Third analysis: measuring the impact of typologies

The third set of analyses was conducted in order to measure the impact of the three typologies constructed for the three regimes on the presence of migrant domestic workers in the domestic sector. This part is presented in Chapter 6.

The data used for these analyses includes both the EU-LFS 2015 microdata and the indexes and typologies of the three regimes. Although other explorative analyses have been carried out, only the results of the multinomial logistic regression models¹¹⁰ are presented in Chapter 6. Section 3.5 addresses the problems encountered for this last part of analyses and section 3.5.2.1 discusses the reasons why alternative statistical techniques (multilevel regression models and linear regressions on data aggregated at country level) could not be used.

3.2 Secondary analyses of existing data

All the analyses conducted in the framework of this research are secondary analyses of existing data. Secondary analysis can be defined as an analysis conducted on data produced by a third party. This data can be the result of institutional (but not only governmental) surveys, national or international research programmes, administrative records, or any other collection of numeric data (Danhier, 2016). The use of secondary analysis of existing data can have both advantages and disadvantages, which are worth mentioning because they influence both the work of the researcher and his/her results.

The first and probably most obvious advantage of secondary data is the reduced cost, both in terms of money and time. Data collection is a very expensive operation, as it includes the definition of the population, the development of selection procedures to achieve representativeness, the creation of the tool (survey, questionnaire, etc.), the administration of the tool and the transformation of the collected data into a suitable form. All these steps require technical competences, resources and time. Because secondary data has been collected by someone other than the researcher, the costs for the researcher are smaller than the ones engendered by data collection.

¹¹⁰ Multinomial logistic regression models are part of regression analysis techniques. When the dependent variable is numerical the regression is called linear, while when the variable is categorical it is called logistic. Logistic regression models are used to estimate the probability of a binary response ('0' and '1') based on one or more predictors. When we want to predict the membership to more than two categories, which is when the outcome variable has more than two categories, we use multinomial logistic regression.

The second advantage is that the data has presumably been collected by professionals, who have covered the expertise of the entire process of data collection. Competences can refer to techniques such as sampling design, weight constructions, and so on. Additionally, when data comes from official institutions, we can reasonably assume that a certain quality is provided (Danhier, 2016). Last, secondary data is certainly advantageous when conducting large-scale international comparisons, as data collection at international scale requires considerable resources and expertise.

Although the advantages – especially the reduction of the costs – make the analysis of secondary data extremely useful and popular, there are also some disadvantages that are worth mentioning. The main disadvantage is linked to the fact that the data has not been produced to address your own research questions. On the contrary, the original purpose of the collection of data can have originated from very different interests. This can make the existing data inappropriate to the interests of the researcher. The result is that either the hypotheses and the theoretical framework of the research have to be modified – sometimes deeply – or that the results of the research can be partially missed (Cheng and Philips, 2014).

A second disadvantage can be represented by the access to data. Some data can be restricted or unavailable, due to laws on the protection of the privacy, while other data can be accessible, but with time restrictions. Moreover, technical problems in the conversion of data can also reduce accessibility.

Another disadvantage of using secondary data is that, although it considerably reduces time and financial costs, it nevertheless demands a large amount of time for the researcher to familiarise with the data. Ideally, and especially in the case of institutional and administrative data, some documents are provided in order to guide the researcher (codebooks, guides and so on). However, and depending on the complexity of the data, the familiarisation can be very time consuming, even only to read codebooks and explore the variables. In addition to the process of familiarisation, the data must then be structured and adapted to the specific research. This can imply a great work for merging datasets, recoding variables, compressing the information and so on.

In addition to the above-mentioned disadvantages, each dataset can present a series of problems and limitations, which can make their use complex and limit the reliability of the results. Section 3.4 describes the main limitations of the databases that have been used for this research.

3.3 Description of the data

3.3.1 The EU-Labour Forces Survey

The European Union Labour Forces Survey (EU-LFS) is a large household sample survey conducted in the 28 EU member states, two candidate countries (Macedonia and Turkey) and three European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries (Iceland, Norway and Switzerland). The first year of data collection was 1983 and since then it has been conducted every year. As a general rule, the data are available for each country depending on their accession date to the EU.

The data are collected at country level, where each national statistical institute is responsible for the selection of the sample, the questionnaire, the face-to-face interviews and the coding of the data, according to the rules established by Eurostat. The data is then transmitted to Eurostat, which is responsible for harmonising them at the European level.

Anonymised EU-LFS microdata are made available by Eurostat, free of charge, for scientific purpose only. Although data is centralised by Eurostat, national statistical institutes remain the owners of their data. This means that there might be restrictions in the accessibility of certain information for specific countries. Moreover, since the LFS microdata contains information on individual units, they are confidential.

The EU-LFS data provides quarterly results on labour market participation and are an important source of information about the situation of the labour market in Europe and at country level. It covers residents in private households and includes both people inside and outside the labour market. In addition to quarterly surveys, which cover the core themes of the survey, each year a set of additional variables are added, to cover specific topics on the labour market (ad hoc modules).

The core variables of the survey cover demographic background, labour status, employment characteristics of the main job, time-related issues and underemployment, search for employment and modalities of search, education and training, previous work experience, employment situation one year before the survey and income¹¹¹. The labour status is at the core of the EU-LFS. The main goal is to classify individuals in three categories: employed, unemployed and inactive.

¹¹¹ The microdata released by Eurostat usually includes some 170 variables. However, the exact number of variables can vary depending on the year.

The definition of the employment situation and the labour status and occupation, as well as the classifications of country/areas and on educational attainments, are based on international classifications. Regarding the definition of the labour status, a number of variables are provided, based on different classifications. For the definition of the professional status, the International Standard Classification of Status in Employment (ISCE), elaborated by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) is used. For the definition of economic activity, the Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE) is provided. For the definition of the occupation, the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO), developed by the ILO, is provided.

Regarding the classifications of countries, they are coded based on the ISO 3166 (International Organisation for Standardisation, alpha-2 format). The classification of regions is based on the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS). It is important to notice that the classification of countries based on the ISO 3166 is not provided for the variable 'country of birth', for which only the region (NUTS) is provided.

Concerning the educational level attained and the field of education, the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), developed by the UNESCO, is provided.

3.3.2 Data used for the typology of care regimes

The Multilinks database

The Multilinks database is the source from which the majority of the indicators on childcare and elderly care used in this research were selected. The database is the result of a EU-FP7 project whose aim is to investigate how demographic change shapes intergenerational solidarity, well-being and social integration across different European countries¹¹². The reason for choosing this database is that it is the only available dataset that provides harmonised data at European level on social policies directly linked to care regimes. While the majority of datasets collecting indicators on social policies only include fragmented information regarding care policies and focus more on other types of welfare policies, the Multilinks

¹¹² The Multilinks project has been carried out by a consortium of nine partners, led by the Berlin Social Science Center (WZB). Data were collected for the years 2004 and 2009 in 30 European countries (EU-27 and Norway, Georgia and Russia). The database is public and is available upon registration at the following link: <https://multilinks-database.wzb.eu/session/new>

project specifically covers all public policies affecting and defining care responsibilities in an integrated approach¹¹³.

Since the objective of the construction of the database is to provide a full mapping of how each nation state regulates care responsibilities and intergenerational obligations towards children and the elderly, it offers a rich and complete set of indicators that are easy to use for international comparison. The database offers more than 70 indicators that provide empirical measurements in four domains: 1) responsibilities to care for children; 2) responsibilities to provide financial support for children; 3) responsibilities to care for frail older people; 4) responsibilities to provide financial support for older people¹¹⁴.

One of the main innovations of the database is that, contrary to other databases that focus on other dimensions (expenditure data, labour markets and other institutional dimensions), it has been conceptualised as to include a familialisation/de-familialisation approach, rather than a commodification/de-commodification approach¹¹⁵. Therefore, instead of focusing only on the level of national expenditure on care and on labour market indicators, it includes indicators that look at modes of provision, entitlements, benefit levels and coverage, so to enable a more specific measurement of the type of support provided by the state to families.

Another innovation of the database is that it also includes Eastern European countries, which have been traditionally excluded from comparative welfare and policy studies and which are still marginal in current typologies¹¹⁶ (Saraceno and Keck, 2008). However, the Multilinks database is also subject to a series of limitations, which are addressed in section 3.4.2.

¹¹³ The information contained in the Multilinks database is in turn derived from a series of sources, including – but not limited to – the MISSOC database, national statistical sources, existing studies (especially regarding Eastern European countries) and national informants. For more information, refer to the Conceptual report, available here: <https://multilinks-database.wzb.eu/info/documentation>

¹¹⁴ The full list of indicators included in the database is available in the Codebook, at this link: <https://multilinks-database.wzb.eu> .

¹¹⁵ The familialisation-defamilialisation approach has been introduced by the literature on care regimes, while the commodification-decommodification approach has been conceptualised by Esping-Andersen and it is mainly used in welfare studies. For more details about the two approaches, refer to sections 2.1.2 and 2.2.

¹¹⁶ Esping-Andersen's welfare typologies, as well as the majority of the following typologies using welfare indicators, have been developed only with regard to Western European countries, plus other non European countries (namely, the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand). Post-Soviet countries, with their distinctive historical roots, have been excluded for long time from comparative policy studies, for various reasons. First, their welfare state was considered radically different from – and not comparable to – the 'European Model'. Second, even the possibility of introducing a 'post-communist cluster' including Eastern European countries was discouraged, due to the high level of variety among these countries (Pöder and Kerem, 2011).

Developing personal and household services in the EU: a focus on housework activities
(report of the European Commission)

The information on incentives addressing the externalisation of housework activities has been derived from this report, promoted by the European Commission. Information on housework incentives is highly fragmented and has been largely neglected by literature. Also, it usually focuses on national initiatives and there is a lack of harmonised comparable information at European level. Taking apart the intense debate over some national experiences where housework has become the main focus of policies – namely, the case of vouchers in Belgium and France – a complete overview of policies aiming at regulating housework services in each EU country is currently lacking. This report is an attempt to provide comparable cross-country information.

While the report acknowledges the interconnection between care and domestic activities and the difficulties arising when trying to separate domestic activities in two domains (care and housework)¹¹⁷, the objective of the study is to focus only on household services, so to cover the existing gap in literature on housework services. Therefore, this study specifically concentrates on the tools that have been implemented in the field of domestic activities, leaving aside the care services as such.

The report provides an overview of the main policies that address housework, divided into four main domains that correspond to the objective pursued by governments: 1) reducing the price for households; 2) simplify the procedures (for hiring domestic workers); 3) regulating employment (in the domestic sector); and 4) fostering the emergence of a supply side. In the first domain, the main policies include the reduction of the VAT rate, the exemption from social contributions and tax reduction. In the second domain, the voucher system is the main tool analysed. In the third domain, there are indicators regarding the flexibilisation of work and cost reduction and specific regulations about housework. In the fourth domain there are indicators about the structure of the market and the quantity of formal suppliers.

OECD Health Statistics 2017 database

The OECD databases are among the most complete and reliable data used for international comparison. The online database OECD Health Statistics 2017, released on 30 June 2017, offers one of the most comprehensive sources of data on health systems across countries¹¹⁸. It includes data on five thematic areas: employment policies; health policies; social policies;

¹¹⁷ For information about the intersection of care and housework activities, refer to section 1.3.

¹¹⁸ The database is available online at this link: http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=HEALTH_STAT

families and children; pension systems; and international migration policies. For my analysis of care regimes, only one indicator on elderly care has been selected from this database (the level of expenditure on long-term care). However, this database has been used both to complete the missing information on other indicators and to verify the reliability of other indicators, when necessary.

Other sources

In order to complete missing information on both care provision and housework incentives, I have referred to national institutional data, when available, as well as data from the following sources: OECD, ILO, the European Commission and the Mutual Information System on Social Protection (MISSOC) database¹¹⁹.

3.3.3 Data used for the typology of gender regimes

The Gender Equality Index 2015

The Gender Equality Index 2015 (GEI) is an index elaborated by the European Commission¹²⁰, which provides a measure of gender equality in all EU member states. The GEI combines indicators of gender equality in different domains into a synthetic index, which provides a summary measure of gender equality overall. Although gender equality is a complex concept to measure, the idea is to provide comparable indicators that measure the overall situation and the level of achievement of each country with respect to certain policy areas. Due to the complexity and the multi-dimensionality of the concept of gender equality, as well as the different meaning that it can assume in different contexts, the GEI is based on a conceptual framework that draws from an analysis of the EU policy framework. It is based on a hierarchical structure that includes composite measures (and sub-measures) in six main domains: work, money, knowledge, time, power and health¹²¹.

The domain ‘work’ includes indicators that measure the level of participation in the labour market, the level of gender segregation and the quality of work. The domain of ‘money

¹¹⁹ Available online at this link: <http://www.missoc.org/INFORMATIONBASE/informationBase.jsp> .

¹²⁰ The Gender Equality Index was elaborated by the Gender Equality Institute (GEI), following the “Roadmap for Equality between Women and Men 2006-2010”. The first GEI was launched in 2013.

¹²¹ The GEI 2015 includes two satellite domains – violence against women and intersecting inequalities – which are not taken into consideration in the calculation of the overall GEI scores. The reason for the exclusion of these two domains is that, although they are related to gender equality, they represent an illustrative phenomenon and because they are related to women only (EIGE, 2013). In the construction of the indicators and the typology of gender regime, the overall scores of the GEI 2015, without the two satellite domains, will be used.

includes measuring financial resources and the overall economic situation. The domain of ‘knowledge’ includes indicators measuring the educational attainment, the segregation and the lifelong learning. The domain of ‘time’ includes indicators measuring the time devoted to economic activities, the time devoted to care activities and the time devoted to social activities. The domain of ‘power’ includes indicators measuring the level of economic, social and political power¹²². And finally, the domain of ‘health’ includes indicators that measure the health situation, the health behaviour and access to health services¹²³.

The GEI offers comparable data on all EU-28 countries on indicators that measure outcomes in each domain. The reason for the choice of using outcome variables, instead of variables evaluating policies, results from the idea that from a gender point of view it is better to focus on what has been achieved, rather than what the capabilities are.

Although different measures of gender equality exist at international level and based on reliable institutional data, the GEI was chosen for two main reasons. First, although valid and powerful measures exist at international level, they are often conceived for international comparisons at global level. This means that the indicators used have to reflect global differences, rather than differences between European countries. This often results in a loss of nuanced information, which is necessary when conducting comparisons at European level. The use of a measure with a reduced geographical range and focusing on European countries allows a more detailed intra-European analysis. Additionally, global measures often do not include data on all European countries – typically on new accession countries –, which can jeopardise the analysis. The second reason for the choice of the GEI 2015 is that not only it provides updated information on the most recent trends¹²⁴, but also it covers domains that are pertinent for the purpose of this study (see earlier in the text).

The European Social Survey

Selected indicators of the European Social Survey (ESS) ad hoc module on ‘family, work and well-being’ (round 2 - 2004) were chosen to construct the ‘gender contract’ index (Chapter 5). The European Social Survey is an international survey, carried out every two years in all EU member states, starting from 2002. The ESS measures attitudes, opinions and behaviours of

¹²² The level of economic and political power is measured through the number of ministerial and parliamentary representation (political) and the number of membership in boards and banks (economic).

¹²³ The full set of indicators used for the construction of the Gender Equality Index 2015 is available here: <http://eige.europa.eu/rdc/eige-publications/gender-equality-index-report>.

¹²⁴ The GEI is updated every two years, both in the overall structure of the measure, which aims to stay up to date with structural societal and economic transformations, and in the data of each indicator.

citizens, with the overall aim to analyse changes in the social structure, in living conditions and in social attitudes in Europe, and to interpret them in the light of the social, moral and political evolution in Europe. The ESS questionnaire consists of two main parts: a core questionnaire, which is carried out every two years, and rotating questionnaires (ad hoc modules), which are carried out only at certain ESS rounds. The rotating questionnaires offer thematic modules that offer specific focuses on social issues.

The ad hoc module on ‘family, work and well-being’ was carried out in two different rounds: Round2/year 2004 and Round5/year 2010. This thematic module focuses on the interconnection between work, family and well-being. The aim is to provide insights on the respondents’ satisfaction about their work-family issues, but also on the role of national welfare regimes in this process. The module combines more ‘objective’ indicators, which measure job quality, family structure and welfare services, with more ‘subjective’ indicators, measuring life satisfaction and attitudes, thus revealing values and preferences of citizens. This ad hoc module was introduced in order to evaluate the impact of changes of welfare systems (including the increase of atypical work and the up-skilling of work) and of family and household structures (including single-person households, dual-earner families, etc.) on the lives of individuals. The core questions of the module intend to answer important questions about the issues related to the conciliation of work and family lives and the impact of national policies and of new family models on personal life satisfaction. Due to the nature of the questionnaire, this module is particularly useful for analysing social cohesion in general, but also gender relations and the conflicts arising from work-family responsibilities.

The list of indicators that have been selected for the construction of the gender contract index is detailed in section 5.2.3.

The Special Eurobarometer on Gender Equality

Selected indicators of the Special Eurobarometer 428/2014 on ‘gender equality’ were chosen to construct the ‘gender contract’ index (Chapter 5).

The Eurobarometer is a European survey, established in 1974, whose aim is to measure public opinion on in-depth thematic issues. The general aim is to investigate motivations, perceptions and reactions of European citizens towards a given subject, which is considered to be a sensitive issue at a given time.

A number of Eurobarometer surveys focusing on gender equality were launched previous to the 2014 version¹²⁵. The Special Eurobarometer survey on gender equality (428/2014) aims to measure perceptions of gender inequalities in all member states. The core issues tackled in the survey include the widespread of inequalities between men and women, whether the situation has improved in the last years, the fields where men and women experience discrimination and are subject to stereotypes, and which are the most common stereotypes at country level. Additionally, it investigates attitudes towards gender equality in the workplace and at home, including the role of women and men within the household. The survey was carried out in 28 EU member states in November-December 2014 and gathered 27801 respondents from different socio-demographic groups¹²⁶.

3.3.4 Data used for the typology of migration regimes

The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)

The Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015 (MIPEX) is the most comprehensive tool for comparing integration regimes in Europe, both because it covers a large number of countries, including all European countries, and because it includes an extended spectrum of policy domains.

The first edition of the MIPEX, derived from the collaboration of different universities, think tanks and institutional bodies in Europe, was developed in 2004 with data on 15 EU member states. The fourth edition of 2015 includes data on 38 countries, including all EU member states, Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the USA.

The MIPEX database employs 167 policy indicators that provide a comparative instrument for the measurement of the integration of migrants in the receiving society¹²⁷. It is based on the idea that although the actual integration of migrants in host societies derives from a variety of factors that go beyond the policy framework, state policies can nevertheless contribute to eliminating obstacles for the integration of migrant communities and individuals.

¹²⁵ Although the first thematic Eurobarometer on gender equality was conducted in 2009, other Special Eurobarometer surveys investigating gender issues, equal opportunities and the relationship between men and women were launched as early as 1975. For more information about the previous versions of the Eurobarometer, refer to the following link: <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm> .

¹²⁶ The full questionnaire of the Special Eurobarometer on gender equality is available online at this link: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/documents/eurobarometer_report_2015_en.pdf .

¹²⁷ The full list of indicators of the MIPEX is available online at this link: <http://www.mipex.eu/key-findings> .

It measures policies that promote integration in the society, both in civic and in social terms, and it includes eight main policy areas, which are in turn divided into sub-domains. The covered policy areas and dimensions are the following:

- labour market mobility: access to the labour market, access to general support, targeted support and workers' rights;
- education: access, targeting needs, new opportunities and intercultural education;
- political participation: electoral rights, political liberties, consultative bodies and implementation policies;
- access to nationality: eligibility, conditions, security of status and dual nationality;
- family reunion: eligibility, conditions, security of status and rights associated;
- health: entitlements, access policies, responsive services and mechanisms of change;
- permanent residence: eligibility, conditions, security of status and rights associated;
- anti-discrimination: definitions, fields of application, enforcement mechanisms and equality policies.

As discussed in section 2.5.3, the principal limitation of existing indexes aimed to measure migration regimes is that they focus either on policy output or on outcomes, and that they analyse either integration or immigration policy frameworks. The MIPEX is part of those quantitative tools that measure output policy (vs. outcomes) and integration (vs. immigration/admission). However, due to the wide spectrum of policy areas, the MIPEX seems to be particularly suitable for the construction of robust typologies of migration regimes, as in addition to policies that specifically measure integration it also covers policies that can be partly used for the measurement of immigration/admission regimes. In particular, the domains of access to nationality, family reunion and permanent residence, as well as the subdomain that measures the access to the labour market, also cover policies on entry, stay and work permits and can provide information about immigration systems.

Size and development of the shadow economy of 31 European and 5 other OECD countries from 2003 to 2015: different developments – Friedrich Schneider, 2011

This source was selected among the different available sources, as it provides the most recent and the most reliable data on the informal economy for all EU member states. According to scholarship, the concept of shadow economy is complex, because “it comprises all currently unregistered economic activities that would contribute the officially calculated gross national

product if the activities were recorded”¹²⁸ (Schneider and Williams, 2016). The measurement of the informal economy is challenging because it requires estimating an economic activity that is typically hidden from all official sources. The measurement of the shadow economy can be carried out through the use of surveys, or through the use of statistical techniques, that estimate the shadow economy as an ‘unobserved’ variable. The main issue regarding the use of surveys for the measurement of the informal economy is that people always tend to hide the use of informal channels, which leads to the underestimation of the size of the underground economy. The problem linked to the use of statistical techniques is that they are complex and may differ in their assumptions, as well as their results (Schneider and Williams, 2016).

The calculation of the estimate of the informal economy used by Schneider is based on the combination of the ‘multiple indicator multiple cause’ (MIMIC) procedure and the ‘currency demand method’, which is used in order to calibrate the relative value of the MIMIC estimates¹²⁹.

The main advantages of the employment of the data from this study are that it covers all EU member states, thus providing easily comparable harmonised data, and that it employs advanced statistical techniques, thus overcoming the issue associated with the reliability of responses in surveys on the informal economy.

Eurostat Statistics Explained

The indicators on the number of residence permits issued by reason and on intra-European migration have been calculated based on Eurostat data available online. The website of Eurostat Statistics Explained¹³⁰ provides public data harmonised at European level, as well as statistical findings in different fields. It includes full datasets of public data, as well as reports and publications on different topics.

The indicator on the residence permits was calculated, based on the article *Residence permits statistics*, elaborated by Eurostat. The article presents statistical findings, based on national administrative sources, which are then harmonised by Eurostat.

¹²⁸ The shadow economy, as defined by literature, excludes all illegal activities that could be classified under the umbrella of crimes (such as burglary, robbery, drug dealing, etc.), as well as the informal work performed within the household (Schneider and Williams, 2016).

¹²⁹ Since the MIMIC method only provides relative estimates of the size of the informal economy, some other method is needed to calculate the absolute estimates. For details about the estimation procedure, refer to Schneider and Williams, 2013.

¹³⁰ Link http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Main_Page/fr

The indicator on the provenance of intra-European migrants was calculated, based on the data presented in the Eurostat report *2016 Annual Report on intra-EU Labour Mobility* (Fries-Tersch et al., 2017, European Commission). The disaggregated data on the country of origin of migrants, which was used for the indicator, derives from the EU-Labour Forces Survey.

3.4 Main limitations of the available data

3.4.1 The EU-LFS

3.4.1.1 Statistical definition of the domestic sector

One of the main problems when studying paid domestic work is the definition of which activities are to be included and what has to be excluded. The issue becomes even more complicated when using quantitative methods of investigation, as the statistical definition of the domestic sector is subject to problems of measurement and classification.

From a theoretical point of view, the domestic sector can be defined so to include both care and domestic work. Although a clear definition of domestic workers is far from being unambiguous, this research adopts the definition provided in section 1.3, which is partly based on the Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189) of the International Labour Organisation (ILO)¹³¹.

From a statistical point of view, the lack of a clear definition of paid domestic work is reflected in the way domestic and care activities are classified by national and international classifications. First of all, the unclear boundary between care activities and housework activities generates issues of classifications, as the same worker can be attributed to one or another statistical category, depending on the way the work performed is perceived (if the care or the housework dimension is seen as dominating). Second, the definition of the domestic sector is also determined by the objectives followed by public policies, which can be different depending on the country. In Europe, for instance, each member state can give priority to public policies addressing either housework activities, childcare, or elderly care. Since domestic services cover a wide range of activities, the issue of which services are

¹³¹ According to the Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189) of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), which represents the main authoritative sources at international level, domestic workers are defined as i) workers that perform a work in or for a household or households, ii) workers with an employment relationship, and iii) workers performing a work on occupational basis.

included in the scope of each category is a matter of debate and it also depends on different national approaches (Farvaque, 2013).

Concerning the statistical definition of domestic work, some attempts have been made recently as to provide internationally valid tools of measurement. However, since each government adopts a unique definition of domestic and care services, which is also reflected in their measurement instruments, there is not a unique international category that includes unambiguously all domestic and care tasks and the harmonisation of data at international level is still problematic¹³². This means that even at national level there is no official definition of the domestic sector and that any attempt to measure and/or to analyse domestic work is subject to a certain degree of discretion. This problem makes international comparisons especially complicated.

In the report *Domestic Workers across the World* (2013), the ILO provides some guidelines for measuring the domestic sector with the different available instruments. Each of them present advantages and shortcomings.

One way of classifying domestic workers is to use the ‘status-in-employment approach’. This approach, which is more common outside Europe, is based on the International Classification by Status in Employment (ICSE-93). This classification distinguishes between domestic workers and other employees. The main problem of this approach is that the separation between domestic workers and other employees is not very common in Europe and generates very different findings when compared to other approaches.

Another way of identifying domestic work is the ‘household-roaster approach’, which can be applied when the national labour forces survey (LFS) questionnaire captures the relationship of each household member with each other¹³³. This means that the questionnaire would report the presence of any live-in domestic personnel. The obvious limitation of this approach is that it systematically excludes live-out domestic workers, which constitute the majority of domestic workers today.

A third way of classifying domestic workers is through the ‘industry-based approach’. This approach – which is quite widespread, as it overcomes many of the issues related to the other approaches – is based on the International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic

¹³² Talking about the difficulties in measuring and analysing the domestic sector at both national and international level, some scholars have concluded that the measurement issue is not likely to be solved in the short run, and that the sector can be considered a ‘statistical non-reality’ (Devetter and al., 2015).

¹³³ According to the System of National Accounts (SNA-2008), the household is defined as a “group of persons who share the living accommodation, who pool some, or all, of their income and wealth and who consume certain types of goods and services collectively, mainly housing and food”. This includes domestic personnel in the definition of households.

Activities (ISIC, revision 3.1)¹³⁴. The advantage is offered by the fact that this classification includes a category of ‘activities of private households as employers of domestic staff’. Therefore, the great advantage is that it groups together all workers that are in an employment relationship with a private household, which represents the majority of domestic workers. Also, since it is based on the employment relationship and not on the fact of living within the household, it also includes activities that are performed outside the home. The main shortcoming of this approach is that it excludes all domestic workers that have an employment relationship with an external (public or private) party. This represents a severe limitation, as the recent trends in the domestic sector point at the increase of the marketisation of domestic services and the contracting-out of services to external agencies. In some European countries, the triangularisation of the employment relationship in the domestic sector has become extremely common¹³⁵.

A last approach that can be used for a statistical definition of the domestic sector is the ‘task-based approach’, based on the International Standard Classification on Occupations (ISCO-88 and ISCO-08). This approach is the one adopted in this study. The main advantages and limitations will be discussed in the next section.

ISCO 08 classification

The International Standard Classification on Occupations 2008 (ISCO-08) is a system of classification of occupations used in international surveys. It is the result of a major revision of the International Standard Classification on Occupations 1988 (ISCO-88) and it is the classification elaborated by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 2007 and then adopted in 2008. The aim of this classification is to provide statisticians a common framework to code internationally comparable data on occupations. While it does not replace national statistical classifications, the translation of national codes into ISCO-08 codes makes international comparisons easier.

¹³⁴ The same approach is used by the Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE). According to this classification, NACE category 97 includes all workers directly employed by households. One way of overcoming the issue of the exclusion of all domestic workers employed by third parties has been to couple category 97 with category 88, which includes employment in service provider organisations in social work activities. However, this category can include also professional fields and activities that are not part of the domestic sector (Farvaque, 2013).

¹³⁵ In countries like Belgium and France, where the voucher system includes the great majority of domestic workers (only cleaners for Belgium and both care and domestic workers for France), the use of the industry-based approach could be particularly problematic. However, also in other European countries, the use of both public and private intermediate is growing fast and makes this approach problematic. For more details about the different employment models in the domestic sector, refer to section 2.2.4.4.

The revision of the previous classification (ISCO-88) aimed to reflect the significant changes occurred both in technology and in the organisation of work in the previous 20 years (ILO, 2010). Following the revision, there has been a total restructuring of the classification, with the merging and splitting of groups and sub-groups, and the introduction of new groups of occupations. Although the theoretical framework remains unchanged from the ISCO-88 (same definition of skills, jobs and occupations), significant differences exist between the two classifications in the treatment of specific occupational groups. The differences are meant to overcome the specific issues related to the ISCO-88 and to update the classification after 20-year time.

The overall structure of the classification is a hierarchical division into Major groups (1 digit), Sub-major groups (2 digits), Minor groups (3 digits) and Unit groups (4 digits). Among the main changes that have been introduced after the revision, there are two changes that are of particular importance for the definition of domestic workers:

- “Occupations concerned with the provision of health services have been expanded, in order to provide sufficient detail to allow ISCO-08 to be used as the basis for the international reporting of data on the health workforce” (ILO, 2013, p. 8). This means that new subgroups, differentiating between more or less skilled workforce and more specific about the actual tasks performed, have been introduced. This makes the definition of care workers more precise and harmonised at European level.
- “The coverage and visibility of occupations that are significant in informal employment have been improved, leading to an associated increase in the number of sub-major groups in the ISCO-08 Major Group 9: Elementary Occupations” (ILO, 2013, p. 8). This means that occupations in the domestic sector, which are known to represent a high share of the informal market, are more likely to be captured by the new classification.

The main challenge for the definition of domestic workers in this research is due to the fact that the EU-LFS microdata provides the ISCO code only at 3-digit level, which leads to problems of over or underestimation.

Definition of care workers

Care workers are included in Major Group 5 (‘Services and sales workers’) in both ISCO-88 and ISCO-08. This group has undergone important revisions from ISCO-88 to ISCO-08. These changes include both modifications in the content description of occupations for each

Minor group (3-digit level) and the inclusion of new Minor groups and Unit groups. Table 12 presents the comparison between ISCO-88 and ISCO-08 for Major Group 5.

Table 12: Sub-major and minor groups in Major Group 5 - ISCO-88 and ISCO-08

ISCO-88 code	ISCO-88 title	ISCO-08 code	ISCO-08 title
5	Services workers and shop and market sales workers	5	Services and sales workers
51	Personal and protective services workers	51	Personal services workers
511	Travel attendants and related workers	511	Travel attendants, conductors and guides
512	Housekeeping and restaurant services workers	512	Cooks
513	Personal care and related workers	513	Waiters and bartenders
514	Other personal services workers	514	Hairdressers, beauticians and related workers
515	Astrologers, fortune-tellers and related workers	515	Building and housekeeping supervisors
516	Protective services workers	516	Other personal services workers
52	Models, salespersons and demonstrators	52	Sales workers
521	Fashion and other models	521	Street and market salespersons
522	Shop salespersons and demonstrators	522	Shop salespersons
523	Stall and market salespersons	523	Cashiers and ticket clerks
		524	Other sales workers
		53	Personal care workers
		531	Child care workers and teachers' aids
		532	Personal care workers in health services
		54	Protective services workers
		541	Protective services workers

Regarding the care for elderly people and other dependent individuals, new sub-groups have been introduced in ISCO-08, in order to reflect the changes in this type of occupation. While personal care workers were previously included either in professionalised health occupations (Sub-major group 22), or in Major Group 9 (Elementary occupations), depending on the skills associated to the type of work performed, a specific Sub-major group has been introduced for ‘Personal care workers’ (code 53). This Sub-major group includes code 531 (child-care workers and teachers’ aids) and code 532 (personal care workers in health services).

Table 13: Sub-major group 53 (Personal care workers) of ISCO-08 code

53 Personal Care Workers		
	531 Child care workers and teachers’ aids	
		5311 Child care workers
		5312 Teachers’ aids
	532 Personal care workers in health services	
		5321 Health care assistants
		5322 Home-based personal care workers
		5329 Personal care workers in health services not elsewhere classified

The Sub-major group 531 includes the Unit groups 5311 for childcare workers and 5312 for teachers’ aids. Unfortunately, it is only when ISCO-08 code is provided at 4-digit level that it is possible to distinguish between the two occupations. This means that including code 531 in the definition of domestic workers leads to an overestimation of childcare workers, while not including it leads to an underestimation. However, given that code 531 is the only available code for childcare workers, which constitutes a fundamental category of the definition of domestic workers¹³⁶, in this research code 531 has been included to define childcare workers. This is also based on the assumption that the majority of workers included in this type of occupation is more likely to be childcare workers, as the occupation of teachers’ aid is not widespread.

The Sub-major group 532 includes the Unit groups 5321 for health care assistants, 5322 for home-based personal care workers, and 5329 for personal care workers in health services not elsewhere classified. Since the code 5329 is likely to include low-skilled non-qualified care

¹³⁶ In the definition of paid domestic work used in this study, there are three main categories of occupations that are included: housework services (cleaning and house related tasks), childcare services (excluding professional childminders and Professional teaching activities) and care for elderly people and other dependant persons (excluding professional health services). For a detailed definition, refer to section 1.3.

workers¹³⁷, it can be concluded that it is part of the definition of the domestic sector. Since all three 4-digit subgroups are part of the definition of care workers, the code 531 is not problematic and can be included in the overall statistical definition of domestic workers, without issues of over or underestimation.

Therefore, the codes that have been used in this research to define care workers are the following:

- ISCO-88: code 513 (personal care and related workers)
- ISCO-08: code 531 (child-care workers and teachers' aids) and 532 (Personal care workers in health services)

The obvious great limitation when conducting analyses over time is the lack of a code in ISCO-88 that could capture childcare.

Definition of house-related workers

Domestic workers whose tasks are related to the maintenance of the house (cleaning, ironing, preparing meals, polishing, laundering, washing, and so on) are included in Major Group 9 (Elementary occupations). Despite the changes in Major Group 9 from ISCO-88 to ISCO-08, in both classifications cleaners are quite easy to identify: code 913 in ISCO-88 and code 911 in ISCO-08. However, both classifications present some drawbacks, as both codes include workers other than domestic workers, leading to problems of over-estimation. In code 913 of ISCO-88 are included both domestic and related helpers and launderers, the latter being excluded from any definition of domestic work. In code 911 of ISCO-08 are included not only domestic cleaners but also hotel and office cleaners.

The codes that have been used in this research to define house-related workers are the following:

- ISCO-88: code 913 (domestic and related helpers and launderers)
- ISCO-08: code 911 (domestic cleaners, hotel and office cleaners)

Domestic workers from ISCO-88 to ISCO-08

While the passage from ISCO-88 to ISCO-08 brought about significant ameliorations and a higher degree of sophistication in the occupational definitions, it also implied difficulties in terms of harmonisation and in terms of longitudinal comparisons. This means that

¹³⁷ Care workers working in health care but not included in other classifications, such as professional health professionals (code 22), are likely to be those health care workers who do not possess the qualifications to be included in more professionalised sectors. Therefore, they can be included in the domestic sector, as defined in this study.

longitudinal comparison (before and after the adoption of ISCO-08) on the size of the domestic sector are not completely reliable. Moreover, each classification has its own degree of approximation, with 3-digit codes including also other types of occupations.

Table 14 summarises the codes that have been included in the statistical definition of the domestic sector in this research.

Table 14: Definition of domestic work (3-digit level)

ISCO-88		ISCO-08	
		531 childcare	Risk: overestimation (includes teachers' aids)
513 personal care	Risk: general description	532 personal care workers	/
913 cleaners	Risk: overestimation (includes launderers)	911 cleaners	Risk: overestimation (includes hotel and office cleaners)

Although both definitions (as per ISCO-88 and ISCO-08) imply a certain degree of overestimation, these codes seem to be the 'best' possible definition of the domestic sector in the available data.

3.4.1.2 The informal labour market

One of the main problems when analysing the labour market with existing institutional data is that data cannot grasp the informal segments of the labour market. Due to the very high level of undeclared work in the domestic sector (see section 4.2.3), analysing the scope of domestic work becomes particularly challenging.

Similar to other multi-country datasets that focus on labour market participation, the EU-LFS data does not provide information allowing for the analysis of informality. The only available information about the type of contract is the variable that allows users to distinguish between permanent and temporary contract. However, since there is no 'no contract' response proposed to the respondents, it is impossible to recognise undeclared workers.

Although the EU-LFS does not exclude informal workers *a priori*, we can reasonably assume that the vast majority of undeclared workers would not be willing to disclose their irregular employment status and thus to participate in the survey. This is especially true for irregular migrants, whose presence in the domestic sector in some European countries is largely

documented, who might fear to be reported to the authorities. Therefore, if it is true that considering the domestic workers included in the EU-LFS as only regular workers does not correspond to the reality (as the survey is in principle open to any individual, irrespectively of his/her labour status), it is also true that we could expect the majority of irregular workers not to be grasped by LFS data. This represents a considerable obstacle and can lead to serious problems of underestimation of the domestic workforce, as well as important distortions in the comparison between countries¹³⁸. Unfortunately, this is an unavoidable problem that is common to all institutional data.

3.4.1.3 Statistical definition of the migrant population

The migrant population can be identified with the EU-LFS data through one main variable, which is the country of birth. The definition of migrants using (only) this variable can lead to three main problems.

First, the variable providing information on the country of birth only allows identifying first-generation migrants, that is individuals born in a country other than the country of residence. Therefore, based on LFS data, second (and third) generations cannot be distinguished from the local population. This might represent a strong limitation, especially for research that investigates issues of discrimination on ethnic grounds¹³⁹. This limitation is one of the main reasons for the choice, in this research, to concentrate only on first-generation migrants. However, in section 4.3.2.2, I show how the *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector would increase and how this would modify the comparison between EU member states, by adding second generations to first arrival migrants. For this part, I had to rely on the data of the ad hoc module 2014, which is the only one, among the files provided by Eurostat, which provides the information on the country of birth of mothers and fathers.

The second problem of the variable on the country of birth is that it is only provided in a disaggregated form at the level of ‘areas’ (and not at country level). This obviously results in a loss of information, especially when the origin of migrants constitutes the focus of the research. In the case of this research, for instance, it was only possible to differentiate

¹³⁸ In section 4.2.3, I show how the proportion of the domestic sector as a share of the total employment would change if we were to add the informal economy in the domestic sector. The result is that: 1) the domestic sector would become a significantly larger share of the total employment in all EU countries included in the analysis; 2) the comparison between EU countries would be completely different.

¹³⁹ Usually, discrimination on ethnic grounds is not based on the country of birth but rather on ethnic origins. Therefore, not only newly arrived migrants, but also second and third generations might be the object of prejudices and discrimination.

between third-country nationals (aggregated in large areas: South America, North America, Middles East, etc.) and EU nationals (aggregated in areas, such as old European countries, countries of new accession 2004, countries of new accession 2007, and so on). Therefore, a detailed comparison aiming to differentiate migrants depending on their specific country of birth cannot be conducted using the EU-LFS data.

The last problem for the identification of the migrant population derives from specific restrictions at country level, based on which the variable ‘country of birth’ is not provided for public use. Restrictions can involve one or more countries at a time, but can also change over time. This means that the variable ‘country of birth’ might be available for a given country only for some specific years, leading to obstacles for both cross-country comparisons and comparisons over time. This was probably the most significant problem encountered for this research, because it limited the number of countries included in the analysis. The countries for which the information on the country of birth was not available are Germany and Romania.

3.4.1.4 Comparability of data and national restrictions

Although the EU-LFS represents the largest harmonised survey on the labour market at European level, issues of comparability arise for different reasons. First, as mentioned in section 3.3.1, the availability of the survey for each country depends on their year of accession into the European Union. This means that a European comparison including the 28 current member states is possible only starting from the last accession in 2013 and that longitudinal analyses are possible only with old accession countries.

Another serious problem that affects comparisons – especially comparisons over time – is that the EU-LFS has undergone various changes in recent years. The changes concern both the questionnaires and the classifications used in the survey. Concerning the changes in the questionnaires, the problem is due to the fact that national statistical institutes are responsible for the questionnaires and they can modify, for instance, elements such as the questions, the sample design, the weighting method, and so on.

Concerning the changes in the classifications used in the survey, it is a problem common to all international classifications. Indeed, all classifications are subject to regular revisions and transformations, in order to adapt them to social and economic changes, which can generate breaks and inconsistencies in longitudinal analyses. In particular, the main classifications used to define the labour status and occupations (ISCO and NACE), which are the core themes of the survey, have undergone great transformations. As mentioned in section 3.4.1.1, the

transition from the ISCO-88 to the ISCO-08 has been particularly problematic for the analysis of the increase of the domestic sector over time.

A last important problem regards the restrictions that countries can impose on certain information. The main restrictions that caused difficulties in this specific research are two. As mentioned above, the first concerns the unavailability for Germany and Romania of the variable ‘country of birth’, which prevents from identifying the migrant population in the two countries. The second is the unavailability for some countries of the ISCO code at 3-digits, which prevents from identifying the domestic workers in these countries. The countries for which the ISCO code is only provided at 1 or 2-digit are Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland. This obviously reduced the number of countries that could be included in the final analysis (see Chapter 6).

3.4.2 Databases used for the typologies

The limitations of the databases that have been used for the construction of the three typologies can be summarised in two main issues:

- 1) the missing information, especially regarding Eastern European countries, which affects the comparison among European countries. When possible, the missing information was completed with the information available from national official sources. When it was not possible (that is, when no reliable source was found), some countries had to be excluded from the analysis. The result is that the three typologies do not include all 28 EU member states.
- 2) The difficulty of harmonising data on national policies. Since policies are embedded and reflect each country’s economic, social, political and cultural setting, they cannot be evaluated on the same basis¹⁴⁰. Therefore, it is crucial that policies are harmonised and weighted for the comparison to be reliable. The issue of harmonisation was particularly challenging for the selection of the indicators to be used for the construction of the typologies. While in certain cases missing information could be filled in through the use of different sources, this was only possible for some of the indicators. For the indicators that needed to be weighted I could only rely on pre-

¹⁴⁰ To give an example, the amount of the cash allowances allocated by governments for elderly care can be proportional to the income level of the recipient, or provided at a fixed amount. In the latter case the fixed amount can vary between countries and can be calculated based on different considerations.

harmonised information with the result that some countries were excluded from the analysis.

The specific limitations linked to each dataset used in this research are presented below.

Multilinks database

As any database, the Multilinks is also subject to a series of limitations.

First, while it offers a wide range of policy indicators, which are all pertinent to cover the dimension of childcare and elderly care, it does not include other indicators, which are commonly part of any study of welfare. These include for example health policies, unemployment benefits, income levels, etc. However, in line with the theoretical intent of the database, a choice had to be made on the indicators to be included, in order not to extend the inquiry too far from the core.

Second, due to the fragmented information available in this field of study, the information on some crucial indicators (such as the availability of cash-for-care allowances and the level of compensation of such benefits) is not available for all European countries. This makes comparisons challenging, as choices about the missing values inevitably engender some loss of information. The number of missing information is particularly large and problematic for Eastern European countries, Malta and Cyprus, and for the following indicators: child-rearing allowance, cash-for-care allowances, minimum and maximum care allowances per month.

The third limitation, which is linked to the complexity of care packages, is that the indicators cannot acknowledge on a number of issues, which are important for the understanding of care regimes. For instance, it cannot account for cross-country differences on attitudes and values about 'care', such as the definition of the family, the social pressure linked to the ideal of care for both children and elderly people, the social definition of care, and so on¹⁴¹. Also, although the authors of the database acknowledge the importance of the familialisation/de-familialisation approach, there is no uncontroversial way to classify policies in this perspective and the database cannot entirely account for this difference. This is inevitable, because outcomes in terms of familialisation/de-familialisation cannot be entirely predicted by the type of policy and because many measures of care provision are known to potentially generate either familialistic or de-familialistic outcomes (Saraceno and Keck, 2008). The result is that the use of the indicators in this perspective implies a certain degree of

¹⁴¹ In this research, I try to overcome this issue by combining the indicators of the care regime with the indicators of the gender regime, which acknowledges – at least from a gender perspective – part of these social/cultural differences. For details about the intersection of care and gender regimes, refer to section 2.3.

subjectivity¹⁴². Finally, the Multilinks database cannot account on outcomes in terms of the degree of marketization of care, nor on the type of employment relationship that they engender (direct vs. triangular employment relationship)¹⁴³.

A last general limitation of the database is that it does not include indicators on incentives for housework services (through tax deduction, public financial contribution, and so on, as it is the case in some European countries). For this reason, indicators on housework incentives were derived from other sources.

Developing personal and household services in the EU: a focus on housework activities (Farvaque, 2013, report commissioned by the European Commission)

The main limitation of this source is that it does not include all European countries. Another limitation, which makes cross-national comparisons difficult, is that some of the measures used in the report are neither numerical, nor categorical, but rather narrative. This means that variables have to be derived from descriptive accounts of policies, with the subsequent risk of loss of information and/or issues of interpretation. This is particularly challenging for measures of specific work regulations for domestic workers, the degree of flexibilisation of work and the structure of the market.

OECD Health Statistics 2017 database

One of the main disadvantages of this database is that, although it provides highly reliable data covering virtually all OECD countries plus other countries, not all indicators are available for all countries. Regarding Europe, some Eastern European countries and Portugal are among those presenting the highest numbers of missing values, which makes the use of these indicators problematic for a European cross-national comparison.

¹⁴² This issue will be discussed in section ¿??, where I explain how I have classified policies based on a familialisation/de-familialisation approach.

¹⁴³ Some welfare provisions can directly or indirectly favour the development of care provisions bought in the market. Such policies are of difficult interpretation if we want to investigate the role of the state and of families, without taking into account the results of such policies on the labour market. The policies that are generally thought to promote the development of private providers are all types of unconditional monetary transfers, which are cash benefits not bound to a control from the side of the state and that can thus be used to directly buy services in the private market. However, also tied cash allowances, as well as other types of incentives, can sometimes generate an increased marketization of services. Moreover, as mentioned in section 2.2.4.4, even governments that more consistently provide public services in the form of residential facilities, are recently sub-contracting those services to third parties – both profit or non profit – thus favouring the marketization of care services. This can in turn contribute to the creation of a secondary informal market (a quasi-market) of care givers (add ref. Degravre and al??).

The European Social Survey

The main limitation of the ESS ad hoc modules is that not all modules are available for all EU member states. In the case of the ad hoc module on ‘family, work and well-being’, a few missing countries in each Round do not allow for a comparison of all European countries. The missing countries of Round2/2004 are Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, while the missing countries of Round5/2010 are Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Romania. Therefore, although a more recent version of the same ad hoc module exists (Round5/year 2010), the Round 2 of year 2002 was chosen, as it includes all EU member states also included in this analysis¹⁴⁴.

3.5 Additional methodological limitations

Apart from the limitations linked to the available databases used in this study and of analyses of secondary data in general, there are other methodological issues specifically linked to this research. I mention the two main problems encountered during the research.

3.5.1 International comparisons

Although international comparisons are very powerful and useful tools in academic research, they are subject to a series of problems, which can be summarised in the following:

- the lack of data for all countries. For instance, concerning comparisons between European countries, rich and complete data are often available for the old European countries, while there is a constant lack of information on new European countries.
- Harmonising the data, while accounting for national differences. These can include structural differences, such as economic and social regulations, regulations of the labour market, etc., or differences in values and cultural beliefs. These differences can be reflected in the way statistics are collected and framed at national level. For this reason, harmonisation of data is key for the realisation of international comparisons.

¹⁴⁴ Italy, Latvia and Luxembourg were not included in the ad-hoc module Round 5/2010. Since these countries, especially Italy and Luxembourg, represent core countries in many of the typologies created in relation to welfare systems and gender regimes, it was important to include them in the analysis. Therefore, the two rotating modules (Round 2 and Round 5) were compared in order to check whether important differences in the attitudes of European citizens were visible. Since all responses were consistent from 2004 to 2010, the older version (2004) of the module, which includes all EU countries, was used.

However, despite the efforts in harmonising data at European level, we can reasonably assume that a more or less important risk of bias affects all European comparisons.

3.5.2 Statistical analyses with a limited number of countries

In addition to the problems that researchers might encounter when carrying out international comparisons, comparing countries with quantitative methods can be problematic, because the limited number of countries reduces the spectrum of statistical tools that can be employed by the researcher. In statistics, the minimum sample size that is considered as acceptable for obtaining unbiased and reliable results in most statistical analyses is a subject of debate and depends on the technique of analysis used. While different statistical techniques vary significantly as per the number of the minimum sample size required, most statistical manuals and academic articles stress the importance of having ‘large’ samples. Basically, for statistical theory and tools, the larger the sample, the more reliable the results. While most institutional secondary data do offer large samples in terms of individual units, working with countries or with data aggregated at country level can bring about problems of sample sizes.

The main ‘technical’ problems that I have encountered during the course of this research are linked to the problem of sample size. In particular, there are two types of statistical analyses that could not be performed, because of the limited number of the EU countries included in the analysis: the multilevel analysis and the validation of the indicators using Structural Equation Modelling (SEM).

3.5.2.1 Multilevel regression models

The concept at the basis of multilevel analysis is that individuals are influenced by – and interact with – the context (or the social groups) to which they belong. A popular way of quantifying the extent to which differences in outcomes are due to differences specific to groups is to conduct multilevel analysis. This type of analysis allows the researcher to create a hierarchy of units (level 1 corresponding to individuals and level 2, 3, ... corresponding to groups) and to analyse the interaction between the variables that define the individual level and the variables that define the group level. Multilevel regression models – which are a multilevel extension of multiple regressions – require the sample size at both the individual and the group level to be sufficiently large.

As Maas and Hox (2005) point out, this usually poses a problem for the level 2, which is the number of groups. Having the sufficient number of groups can be difficult to achieve, for two main reasons. First, while adding individuals can be relatively simple, adding new groups can be considerably costly (think, for instance, what it means in terms of costs to add new countries to a survey). Second – and this is especially problematic for comparisons of countries – the number of the groups can be limited because no other groups exist. For instance, conducting intra-EU comparisons means that by nature of the study no more than 28 countries can be included in the analysis. If we add the fact that in the great majority of ‘real’ studies¹⁴⁵ the actual number is reduced for problems linked to missing information, the result is that most European comparisons would include no more than 20 countries (Bryan and Jenkins, 2015).

Although conducting multilevel analyses using European countries can be theoretically attractive, as many researches aim to investigate the ‘country effect’ on individual outcomes, according to most findings it engenders serious problems of reliability. To answer the questions on how many countries are required for reliable estimates, the literature does not agree on the exact number but it agrees on the fact that multilevel analyses of European countries are in fact very risky and they are likely to bring fatal errors. To give some of the most influential ‘rules of thumb’, the less strict rules indicate a minimum number of about 20-25 groups for having at least reliable coefficient estimates of fixed effects¹⁴⁶. However, many authors agree that at least 100 groups should be included in order to have unbiased results. Maas and Hox (2005) find that at least 30 groups are needed, but only for fixed effects. The simulations conducted by Bryan and Jenkins (2015) suggest that linear models require at least 25 countries and logit models at least 30 countries.

Although these rules are not always taken into account – and this is mirrored by the number of published articles that do in fact use multilevel analyses for cross-European comparisons¹⁴⁷ – the multilevel logistic regression models that I have tentatively carried out for this research are not reported, as they are likely to be unreliable.

¹⁴⁵ By real studies I mean researches conducted on existing data, rather than on simulations.

¹⁴⁶ While coefficients of fixed effects are usually recognised to be somehow reliable even with reduced numbers of groups, for the interaction effects and the covariance parameters to be reliable, more groups are needed (Bryan and Jenkins, 2015).

¹⁴⁷ Taking into consideration only two well-known journals – the *European Sociological Review* and the *Journal of European Social Policy* – Bryan and Jenkins (2015) count as many as 45 articles (published in the first one between 2005 and 2012) and 111 articles (published by the second one between 2005 and 2009) that have used multilevel analyses using European countries.

3.5.2.2 Validation of indicators using SEM

Broadly speaking, the validity of indicators refers to the ability of indicators to measure the phenomenon for which they have been constructed. Since the selection of indicators is based on theoretical grounds but it is also influenced by external factors (such as the lack of existing data), the validation clearly represents an important methodological step in research that focuses on the development of indicators. Although an indicator cannot be considered as ‘wrong’ or ‘false’, it is nevertheless important that an indicator be able to do so. For this, the literature sometimes refers to some characteristics that indicators should have, such as ‘validity’, ‘reliability’, ‘specificity’, ‘sensitivity’, and so on¹⁴⁸ (Panerai, 1998; see also Cronbach and Meehl, 1995; Carmines and Zeller, 1979).

Indicators and indexes can be validated by different means, which – on the methodological level – include the correlation with other concepts and indicators that measure similar aspects (criterion validity), or the evaluation of how the proposed measure is consistent with other measures. On the empirical side, a statistical tool that can be useful to assess whether a series of indicators do measure the dimensions that they are supposed to measure is Structural Equation Modelling. This approach was tentatively carried out in order to validate the indicators used to develop the typologies of the three regimes under study. However, the model could not be generated, due to the problem of the limited number of countries included in the analysis¹⁴⁹.

This chapter provided a detailed overview of the methods and sources used in this research and listed the main limitations linked to both available data and to specific statistical techniques. Given these problems, and taking into consideration the limits of existing data, the analyses conducted in the framework of this research and presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, constitute the best possible use of the data and methods for such study.

¹⁴⁸ According to the Panerai (1998), validity refers to the overall ability of an indicator to measure what it is supposed to measure; reliability refers to whether similar results could be obtained if the same measurement was performed by other people in other circumstances; specificity refers to the immunity of the indicators to changes; sensitivity refers to the ability of the indicator to detect changes in what it is measuring.

¹⁴⁹ For information about sample size requirements for SEM, refer to Wolf et al. (2013), among others.

Chapter 4

Analysis of contemporary paid domestic work in Europe: similarities and differences among EU member states

Chapter 1 presented the state of the art of literature on domestic work, as well as an overview of the main features of contemporary paid domestic work in developed countries. It also provided an overview of the transformations occurred over time in the domestic sector and of the main trends that are visible in most European countries today. However, comparative analyses of the domestic sector in different European countries show that common trends coexist with significant differences at national level.

This chapter presents a descriptive analysis of contemporary paid domestic work in Europe. The overall objective of the chapter is to highlight similarities and differences between European countries. The analysis is based on available institutional data, mainly from the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the European Commission and the OECD, as well as on descriptive analyses that I have conducted on the EU-Labour Forces Survey data. These last analyses are mainly conducted on the data from year 2015, which corresponds to the last available data, unless stated otherwise.

The analysis is divided into three thematic areas: 1) the magnitude of the domestic sector; 2) the workforce composition; 3) the working conditions in the domestic sector. The first part includes a section on the increase of the domestic sector in recent years and a section on the current size of the domestic sector in each European country included in the analysis. The second part focuses on the feminisation and the *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector. The last part analyses some aspects that can be used to define the working conditions of domestic workers. In particular, three elements are taken into consideration: the income level, the job stability (proportion of temporary vs. permanent contracts) and the work on unusual working schedules (weekends, evenings and nights).

4.1 Introduction

The analysis of contemporary paid domestic work in Europe presented in this chapter is organised around thematic areas. Each thematic area first presents some available data from institutional sources¹⁵⁰, followed by my own analyses, based on the EU-Labour Forces Survey data, from Eurostat¹⁵¹. The objective is to provide an overview of the main trends in the domestic sector and to highlight the main similarities and differences among EU member states.

All the analyses on the EU-LFS data are based on a statistical definition of paid domestic work derived from the International Standard Classification on Occupations 2008 (ISCO-08), which is provided by Eurostat at a 3-digit level¹⁵². In particular, the domestic sector, as defined in this study, includes the ISCO-08 codes 531, 532 and 911 – which correspond to childcare, elderly care and housework respectively. All the analyses include the EU member states for which data is available. Depending on the issue that is investigated at each time, some countries are excluded from the analysis, because of missing information. In particular, Bulgaria, Poland, Slovenia and Malta are excluded from all the analyses, as the ISCO code provided for these countries does not allow for the identification of domestic workers¹⁵³. Germany and Romania are excluded from the analysis on the ethnicisation of the domestic sector, because the variable ‘Country of birth’ is not provided. The details about the limitations and problems linked to the statistical definition of domestic work based on the EU-LFS data are provided in Chapter 3, which deals with methodological issues.

¹⁵⁰ The main institutional sources used in this chapter are the International Labour organisation, the OECD and the European Union.

¹⁵¹ The EU-Labour Forces Survey data are public data coming from national institutional statistical bodies and then harmonised at European level by Eurostat. The data for this study were obtained by Eurostat in May 2015, upon request. An update, which included the last release on year 2015, was obtained in February 2016. For details about the EU-LFS database, refer to section 3.3.1.

¹⁵² The International Standard Classification on Occupations 2008 (ISCO-08) is a system of classification of occupations used in international surveys, which has been elaborated by the ILO. It is the result of a major revision of the International Standard Classification on Occupations 1988 (ISCO-88), which was adopted until year 2008. The overall structure of the classification is a hierarchical division into Major groups (1 digit), Sub-major groups (2 digits), Minor groups (3 digits) and Unit groups (4 digits). The data publicly provided by Eurostat only provides the classification at 3 digits. For details about the statistical definition of the domestic sector, refer to section 3.4.1.3.

¹⁵³ The ISCO-08 codes for these countries are only provided at 2 digits. This does not allow for a clear identification of domestic workers, as other types of workers are included at the level of Sub-major group.

4.2 The magnitude of the domestic sector

In the last decades, the domestic sector has increased significantly in all parts of the world. The increase is not only visible in absolute terms, but it is also an increase of domestic workers as a share of the total employment, so that domestic work has become in many areas of the world an important source of employment (ILO, 2013). However, due to the ‘invisibility’ of the work and the lack of a commonly agreed statistical definition of domestic work, it is difficult to obtain reliable data on the scope of domestic work, and estimates on the number of domestic workers worldwide differ greatly (Carls, 2012). According to conservative estimates provided by the International Labour Organisation, in 2010 there were at least 52 million domestic workers across the world. However, the ILO suggests that the extent of domestic work should be much greater and that estimates that take into account other elements could be close to 100 million domestic workers worldwide¹⁵⁴. In terms of the magnitude of the domestic sector compared to the total employment, domestic workers represent about the 3.6% of all waged employees in the world. The sector is particularly developed in Latin America and Caribbean, in the Middle East and in Asia. However, it is not negligible in the other parts of the world and in Europe domestic workers represent the 0.4% of all paid employees (ILO, 2013).

Concerning the increase that has occurred in the last twenty years, the ILO estimated that the number of domestic workers worldwide has grown from 33.2 million in 1995 to 52.6 million in 2010, which represents an increase of 19 million workers in only 15 years. Although the greatest increase in the number of domestic workers in the last decades was registered in South America, Middle East and Asia, also Europe has experienced a growth of the domestic sector in recent years. According to the ILO, from 1995 to 2010 there has been an increase of 210000 domestic workers in Western Europe and of 120000 domestic workers in Eastern Europe.

Within Europe, the greatest increase was registered in Spain, France and Italy, where the number of domestic workers more than doubled – mainly due to the employment of an

¹⁵⁴ For estimates on the extent of the domestic sector, the ILO employs official data, which are by definition more conservative, as they tend to undercount the number of domestic workers (because the way national questionnaires are formulated might fail in grasping some domestic activities, because of the fact that irregular workers – especially undocumented migrants – might be reluctant to reveal themselves, because paid domestic work can misleadingly be interpreted as home work, because children – who in some countries do work as domestics – are not included in labour surveys, and so on). The case of India is particularly striking as the discrepancies between official and non-official estimates vary as much as from 2.5 to 90 million domestic workers.

increasing number of migrant domestic workers¹⁵⁵. Overall, the increase was more marked at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, and a slight decrease has been observed around 2008. However, also the other European countries have generally experienced an increase of the domestic sector starting from the 1990s. In Germany, for instance, the number of domestic workers has increased by three-quarter in the period 1995-2010. According to the ILO, the only exceptions are the United Kingdom, which is one of the rare countries where the number of domestic workers has decreased over the last decades, and Nordic countries, where the number of domestic workers has not changed significantly.

4.2.1 The size of the domestic sector

According to the ILO data (data LABORSTA 2008, ILO 2013), a significant difference exists in the extent of the domestic sector between Western and Eastern European countries, both in terms of absolute numbers and in terms of the relevance of the domestic sector in the national labour market.

In Western Europe, about 3.7% of total employment takes place in private households. In absolute terms, the countries that counted the highest number of domestic workers in 2010 were Spain, with more than 740000 domestic workers, followed by France (590000 domestic workers) and Italy (420000 domestic workers). In terms of what domestic workers represent as a share of the total national employment, between 2007 and 2010 the greatest percentages were registered in Cyprus (4.4%), Spain (4%) and Portugal (3.4%). However, domestic work also represented a significant segment of the total employment in France, Greece and Italy (around 2%). Among Western European countries, the countries where domestic work represents the smallest percentage of the total employment are Denmark, the Netherlands (both 1%), Germany and the UK (both 0.5%).

Concerning Eastern Europe, the countries that counted the absolute highest numbers of domestic workers between 2006 and 2009 were Romania (29000 domestic workers) and Poland (11000 domestic workers). However, when domestic work is counted as the share of the total employment, all Eastern European countries show a percentage far below the 1%, which is a significantly smaller share compared to Western European countries.

The analysis of the domestic sector as a proportion of the total employment based on the EU-LFS data for year 2015 shows some dissimilarity, compared to the above-mentioned data.

¹⁵⁵ In Spain, from 1995 to 2010, the number of domestic workers increased from 355000 to 747000. In Italy, it increased from 200000 in 1995 to 419000 in 2010 (ILO, 2013).

Table 15 presents the total number of domestic workers, as well as the proportion of domestic workers as a share of the total employed population in each EU country for which data is available.

Table 15: Share of domestic workers among all other workers (2015)

Country	Domestic workers	Domestic workers (%)	All other workers	All other workers (%)
AT	5487	6.4	79864	93.6
BE	3655	9.1	36444	90.9
CY	1743	10.3	15221	89.7
CZ	782	4.2	17693	95.8
DE	9905	4.2	227445	95.8
DK	5997	10.1	53199	89.9
EE	581	5.0	11146	95.0
ES	3858	9.7	35946	90.3
FI	1156	9.7	10719	90.3
FR	22446	11.4	175309	88.6
GR	2717	3.7	70291	96.3
HR	503	3.7	12977	96.3
HU	3948	4.1	91823	95.9
IE	5849	7.4	72999	92.6
IT	16944	8.3	186075	91.7
LT	1217	4.5	26128	95.5
LU	1124	8.3	12448	91.7
LV	878	5.0	16510	95.0
NL	3074	7.4	38495	92.6
PT	6276	8.9	63988	91.1
RO	3270	3.2	99709	96.8
SE	18138	11.9	134222	88.1
SK	2209	5.8	36158	94.2
UK	3427	9.2	33960	90.8

Source: EU-LFS 2015

Figure 1 is the graphical representation of the proportion of domestic workers as a share of the total employed population in all EU member states for which data is available.

Figure 1: Proportion of the domestic sector compared to all other sectors in 24 EU member states (2015)




Figure 1: the vertical line is the EU average. The horizontal lines at the end of each bar are the confidence intervals. Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland are not included, because the information on the occupation (ISCO code) is not available.

Source: EU-LFS 2015

As it emerges from Figure 1, the countries where the domestic sector represents the biggest share of the total employment are Sweden, France, Cyprus and Denmark. However, also in Finland, the UK, Spain, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Luxembourg, it is significantly higher compared to the European average. On the contrary, the countries where the domestic sector is smaller compared to the total employment are Romania, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Denmark, Czech Republic and Lithuania, where it represents less than the 5% of the total employment.

In line with the official statistics from the ILO, the Eastern European countries show the lowest share of domestic workers as a percentage of all workers. However, among Western countries, only Germany confirms official institutional data, with a small domestic sector, while Denmark and the Netherlands present the biggest proportion, as expected.

If domestic activities are disaggregated into the three main components – housework, childcare and elderly care – the situation varies greatly among European countries, with some countries where the largest proportion of domestic workers is concentrated in housework activities (as it was common in the past) and other countries with a very large share of carers.

Figure 2 presents the three components of domestic activities as a share of the domestic sector in all the EU countries for which information is available. Annex 1 offers the detailed information on the three activities disaggregated (absolute numbers, proportions and graphical representation of each component separately).

Figure 2: Share of disaggregated activities in the domestic sector in 24 EU member states (2015)




Figure 2: The data displayed include all EU member states, apart from Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland, for which the information on the occupation (ISCO code) is not available. Source: EU-LFS, 2015

As it appears from Figure 2, in the majority of the EU countries the share of housework activities is larger than the share of care activities. In particular, Mediterranean countries (Cyprus, Greece, but also Italy and Portugal) and Eastern European countries are among those with the highest percentage of housework activities among all activities included in the domestic sector. This is also the case of some continental countries, such as Germany, Belgium and France¹⁵⁶. This suggests that housework-related activities are still predominant

¹⁵⁶ The large share of housework activities among domestic activities in France and Belgium is also attributable to the adoption of the voucher system, which is largely used to hire private live-out cleaners. While in France the system has been enlarged so to cover also care work, in Belgium it is strictly directed to housework activities. Research conducted on the French and Belgian voucher system have observed that not only the system met the

in the domestic sector, as it has always been the case in the past. The relatively small share of elderly care in Italy and Spain contradicts the most recent findings, which have identified the two countries as those with the highest number of elderly carers. This could be the result of the high share of undeclared work in the domestic sector, which is estimated to be particularly high in these two Mediterranean countries¹⁵⁷.

However, as it emerges from the graphic, there are countries where the share of care activities is larger than housework-related activities. These countries include all Northern countries and the islands, but also the Czech Republic and Estonia. In particular, the share of elderly care activities is in all countries far larger than the share of childcare activities. This can be due to a variety of reasons. First, private paid childcare is everywhere predominantly used on an occasional basis and therefore it mostly falls under undeclared work. This is due to the fact that public childcare is provided in all countries, albeit at different levels and in different forms, and also that it is often grandparents who are involved in the care of children to a certain extent. Additionally, individuals involved in sporadic types of childcare work are likely to have another occupational and/or educational status and not to define themselves as childcare workers at the moment of the interview. Second, elderly care, whose demand has known a tremendous increase in the last decades, is a type of activity that, contrary to childcare, usually demands long working hours. Therefore, contrary to child carers, elderly carers are more likely to perform this job as their primary occupational source.

In general, the important share of child- and elderly care in all countries confirm the important demand for care services everywhere, due to recent demographic trends, changes in family models and increased female participation in the labour market, among other factors.

4.2.2 The informal economy

One of the main problems when analysing the labour market with institutional data is that data inevitably fails to grasp the informal segments of the labour market. Due to the very high level of undeclared work in the domestic sector in many European countries (Farvaque, 2013), analysing the scope of domestic work becomes particularly challenging. The high prevalence of undeclared work in the domestic sector is due to a variety of reasons. First, it has to do with the hidden nature of the work, which is performed within private doors and is thus difficult to

growing need of families in terms of externalisation of domestic chores, but it also contributed to fostering the demand, due to the very affordable prices of vouchers (Gerard, 2013).

¹⁵⁷ The discussion about the role of the informal economy in the domestic sector is detailed in section 3.4.1.2.

monitor. Not only the working conditions of domestic workers can be hardly inspected, but the employment relationship is often made on informal arrangements. Second, as discussed in Chapter 1, the low value attributed to domestic activities, and the blurred dividing lines between professional housework and home work, determine resistance to fully recognise domestic work as a real job.

Furthermore, as it has been highlighted by literature, the domestic sector – especially in the form of live-in jobs – attracts many undocumented migrants, as it offers a shelter, food and accommodation and at the same time it offers a protection from inspections (Ambrosini, 2011). In some countries, their irregular administrative status is reflected in the irregularity of their employment relationship, and this contributes to increasing informal work in the domestic sector.

The measurement of undeclared work is difficult by definition, because of the hidden nature of this segment of the labour market. Concerning the measurement of the undeclared work in the domestic sector, some efforts have been made by national authorities and more recently at European level. In 2007, a special Eurobarometer was launched in order to investigate to what extent the population buys goods and services related to undeclared work. According to the findings, 11% of the population admitted that they had bought goods and services related to the informal economy and among these, 17% had bought domestic services. According to national and European reports that give account of the importance of the undeclared work in the domestic sector, estimates vary from 15% in Sweden to 70% in Italy and Spain and even 90-95% in Germany¹⁵⁸ (Farvaque, 2013).

Although estimates vary greatly among the different sources and usually include only a limited number of countries, it is interesting to show the extent of the undeclared work in the domestic sector for the few countries for which information is available. Figure 3 shows the extent of the undeclared work in the domestic sector in eight European countries, based on the estimates provided in the DGCIS report 2011 of the French Ministry of Economy and Industry.

¹⁵⁸ The main sources regarding the undeclared work in the domestic sector are the following: the European Commission Staff Working Document on exploiting the employment potential of the personal and household services, SWD (2012); “Étude sur les services à la personne dans sept pays européens, DGCIS, French Ministry of Economy and Industry (2011); “Creating formal employment relationships in the domestic services sector: successful strategies?”, IWAK (2012).

Figure 3: Formal and informal domestic workers in 8 EU countries




Figure 3: the dark grey bar corresponds to the number of domestic workers based on the EU-LFS 2015. The number of undeclared domestic workers (light grey bar) is calculated based on the estimates of the informal economy in the domestic sector provided in the DGCIS report 2011 (French Ministry of Economy and Industry) and the EU-LFS 2015.

Source: EU-LFS 2015 and DGCIS Report

As shown in Figure 3, in Italy and Spain the number of undeclared domestic workers is far greater than the number of regular workers. In both countries, the undeclared work in the domestic sector is estimated at 70% of the total employment in the sector. However, although in the remaining countries the undeclared work is smaller than the regular employment, the number of irregular employment in the domestic sector remains significant. In the UK, but also in Germany and in the Netherlands, the informal work represents almost half of the total employment in the sector (50%, 45% and 40% respectively), a figure that is far above the estimates on the shadow economy in the total employment of each country¹⁵⁹.

Figure 4 shows the proportion of the domestic sector compared to the total employment if the informal economy were to be added into the picture¹⁶⁰. For this, the number of irregular domestic workers was calculated based on the estimates of the DGCIS report, while the

¹⁵⁹ Official estimates on the informal economy at country level indicate 10.05% in the UK, 13.50% in Germany and 9.50% in the Netherlands (Schneider, 2013).

¹⁶⁰ Although the EU-LFS does not exclude informal workers *a priori*, there are reasons to expect that undeclared workers would not be willing to disclose their irregular employment status and thus to participate in the survey. This is especially true for irregular migrants, who might fear to be reported to the authorities. Therefore, if it is true that considering the domestic workers included in the EU-LFS as only regular workers does not correspond to the reality, it is also true that we could expect the majority of irregular workers not be grasped by LFS data.

number of irregular workers in all other sectors was calculated based on the official estimates on country level provided by Schneider (2013). The proportion of the domestic sector was then calculated, similarly to the one presented in Figure 3.

Figure 4: Proportion of formal and informal domestic sector compared to all other sectors in 8 EU countries




Figure 4: the dark grey bar corresponds to the number of domestic workers based on the EU-LFS 2015. The number of undeclared domestic workers (light grey bar) is calculated based on the estimates of the informal economy in the domestic sector provided in the DGCIS report 2011 (French Ministry of Economy and Industry) and the EU-LFS 2015.

Source: EU-LFS 2015, DGCIS report, estimates shadow economy by Schneider (2013)

Although this calculation should not be taken as a faithful representation of the reality, because the EU-LFS data could also include irregular domestic workers (see footnote 160), the graphic offers nevertheless an idea of the extent of the informal economy in the domestic sector. In particular, it shows how the relative importance of the domestic sector changes compared to the total employment when informal workers are added into the picture. As it is visible from the graphic, when the undeclared work is added to the domestic sector, the proportion of the sector as a share of the total employment becomes bigger in all countries included in the analysis. However, the major changes can be observed for Spain, Italy and the UK, where the proportion of the domestic sector increases significantly.

If we compare Figure 4 and Figure 1, what emerges is that if we were to add the informal work in the ‘official’ domestic sector Spain, Italy, the UK and France would be the European countries with the highest proportion of domestic workers, compared to the total employment.

Although estimates on the scope of the informal domestic sector are not available for the majority of EU member states, this exercise proves that, due to the great incidence of undeclared work in this specific sector, a cross-European comparison on the magnitude of the domestic sector with official data should be interpreted with caution.

4.3 The workforce composition

Literature on domestic work has highlighted that contemporary paid domestic work reveals both continuities and important changes in the profile of domestic workers. The main continuity regards the feminisation of domestic work, which had already started in the nineteenth century. The main changes have to do with the increased *ethnicisation* of paid domestic work: in many European countries, new domestic workers are more and more likely to be international migrants, compared to past, where the mobility of domestic workers was mainly internal to the country. Another novelty, compared to the past, is represented by the marital status, the age and the education of new domestic workers. Today, domestic workers – especially female migrants – are more likely to be better educated and often older and with dependants, compared to their predecessors¹⁶¹.

However, although the above-mentioned features do constitute visible trends in Europe, significant differences exist among European countries in the workforce composition in the domestic sector. This section focuses on the feminisation and the *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector and highlights the main similarities and differences at European level.

4.3.1 The feminisation of the domestic sector

Although men have been a constant presence in domestic services in more ancient times, in both Europe and other parts of the world domestic work has known a process of feminisation, so that by the late nineteenth century it has become an almost exclusively feminised job (Sarti and Scrinzi, 2010). The relatively high number of men in certain European countries is usually ascribed to the presence of migrant men, who constitute the majority of the male population of domestic workers (Beccalli and Ambrosini 2009; Sarti and Scrinzi, 2010). Today, paid domestic work is commonly considered as a typical female job. This is linked to the traditional gender division of labour within households, as well as the gendered

¹⁶¹ For details about the changes in domestic workers' profile, refer to section 1.2.

socialisation, which assigns to men the economic tasks and more broadly the public sphere and to women the domestic tasks performed in the private sphere (Anderson, 2006; Scrinzi 2011, Lutz, 2002). The work that was traditionally performed by women in their households is still considered as a female responsibility and women in general are seen as the natural providers of domestic services. What has changed is that this work is more and more externalised to other women, who are now waged workers in the formal (or informal) labour market (Lutz, 2011).

According to the ILO (2013), women account for 83% of all domestic workers worldwide. Also, there is virtually no country in the world where men outnumber women in the domestic service sector. The shares of women domestic workers range from little more than 60% in the Middle East to more than 90% in South America. This means that everywhere domestic work represents an important source of employment for women. However, it also means that the poor working conditions which are typical of domestic work disproportionately affect women virtually in every area of the world¹⁶². The situation in Europe is no different. Data from the ILO indicate that the domestic sector is highly feminised in all European countries, with female domestic workers accounting for more than 90% in Spain, 88% in Italy, 85% in France. According to the ILO (2013), the country with the lowest proportion of women in the domestic sector is the UK, with about 61% of female domestic workers.

The analysis of the EU-LFS data generally confirms the overwhelming feminisation of the domestic sector in Europe, despite slightly different findings at country level. Table 16 includes the number and the proportion of male and female domestic workers in the 24 European countries included in the analysis. Figure 5 shows the degree of feminisation of domestic work in the 24 European countries for which information is available.

As it emerges from the graphic, the feminisation of paid domestic work is a phenomenon that concerns all countries with no exception. In all European countries the number of women is significantly higher than that of men and ranges from 77.7% in Denmark to 97.8 in Cyprus. This is in line with literature and with the institutional sources presented at the beginning of the section.

¹⁶² Information on working conditions in the domestic sector is provided in section 1.2.4.

Table 16: Male and female domestic workers in 24 EU member states (2015)

Country	Male domestic workers	Male domestic workers (% of total domestic workers)	Female domestic workers	Female domestic workers (% of total domestic workers)
AT	494	9	4993	91
BE	264	7.2	3391	92.8
CY	38	2.2	1705	97.8
CZ	67	8.6	715	91.4
DE	981	9.9	8924	90.1
DK	1337	22.3	4660	77.7
EE	26	4.5	555	95.5
ES	278	7.2	3580	92.8
FI	123	10.6	1033	89.4
FR	2748	12.2	19698	87.8
GR	277	10.2	2440	89.8
HR	33	6.6	470	93.4
HU	405	10.3	3543	89.7
IE	751	12.8	5098	87.2
IT	2621	15.5	14323	84.5
LT	85	7	1132	93
LU	77	6.9	1047	93.1
LV	39	4.4	839	95.6
NL	305	9.9	2769	90.1
PT	246	3.9	6030	96.1
RO	317	9.7	2953	90.3
SE	3399	18.7	14739	81.3
SK	107	4.8	2102	95.2
UK	470	13.7	2957	86.3

Figure 5: Proportion of women in the domestic sector in 24 EU member states (2015)




Figure 5: the vertical line is the EU average. The horizontal lines at the end of each bar are the confidence intervals. Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland are not included, because the information on the occupation (ISCO code) is not available. Source: EU-LFS 2015

The countries with the more feminised domestic sector are Mediterranean and Eastern European countries, where female domestic workers account for more than 90%. Additionally, also Luxembourg and Belgium show a feminisation of the domestic sector, which is above the European average. The countries with the lowest shares of female work are Northern countries (especially Denmark and Sweden, but also Finland, at a lower degree), the UK, Ireland and France.

The only remarkable exception is Italy, which, contrary to the other Mediterranean countries, stands out with a relatively high share of men in the sector. However, when sex is cross-analysed with the country of birth it emerges that almost all men working in the domestic sector in Italy are migrants. This is both the remaining of a tradition where employing a live-in male domestic work was considered a status symbol for wealthier families (Andall, 2000), and also the consequence of the particularly poor reputation of such work, where migrants represent the biggest share of the workforce. According to recent research, in Italy there has been a re-masculinisation of domestic work, but only of migrant men, who choose to temporarily work in this sector because of the strong demand (Catanzaro and Colombo, 2009).

4.3.2 The *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector

In addition to the gender dimension, another emerging feature of paid domestic work is the growing *ethnicisation* of the job (Anderson, 2000, 2006; Lutz, 2010; Anthias and Lazaridis, 2000; Kofman et al. 2000). In many European countries, domestic work is more and more performed by migrant women, who represent the lower social strata that go to fill the gaps of labour demand that are not filled by locals. Although migrants were already employed in the domestic sector in ancient times, the link between international migration and domestic work has become more visible in recent times (Sarti, 2006), at the point that it has been defined a global issue that has generated a gendered and racialised division of labour (Andall, 2000; Parrenas, 2001; Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2003; Lutz, 2008).

According to the ILO, international migrants moving to Europe are often concentrated in the lower-skilled segments of the labour market, including domestic services, as they tend to encounter barriers in entering other parts of the labour market. Data from the 2004 European Community Labour Force Survey shows that among all female migrants those working in the domestic sector are the 36% in Spain, the 27.9% in Italy and the 21.1% in France (ILO, 2013).

Both in Italy and in Spain, the majority of domestic workers are foreign-born, with Italy counting 78.4% of migrant domestic workers in 2008 (ILO, 2013).

The analysis of the EU-LFS data confirms the general trend towards an *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector in certain European countries, but it also highlights the considerable differences that exist among countries. Table 17 shows the number and the proportion of migrant and non-migrant domestic workers for the European countries for which information is available¹⁶³.

Table 17: Migrant and non-migrant domestic workers in 22 EU member states (2015)

Country	Migrant domestic workers	Migrant domestic workers (% of total domestic workers)	Non-migrant domestic workers	Non-migrant domestic workers (% of total domestic workers)
AT	1793	32.7	3694	67.3
BE	1162	31.8	2489	68.1
CY	1138	65.3	605	34.7
CZ	34	4.3	748	95.7
DK	884	14.7	5108	85.2
EE	88	15.1	493	84.9
ES	794	20.6	3064	79.4
FI	90	7.8	1066	92.2
FR	3814	17	18628	83
GR	1072	39.5	1643	60.5
HR	101	20.1	401	79.7
HU	96	2.4	3852	97.6
IE	1442	24.7	4407	75.3
IT	7632	45	9312	55
LT	112	9.2	1105	90.8
LU	630	56	340	30.2
LV	139	15.8	739	84.2
NL	326	10.6	2729	88.8
PT	590	9.4	5686	90.6
SE	4389	24.2	13725	75.7
SK	27	1.2	2182	98.8
UK	641	18.7	2786	81.3

Source: EU-LFS 2015

The table excludes Germany and Romania, for which information on the country of birth is not provided.

Figure 6 shows the proportion of migrants in the domestic sector in the European countries included in the analysis.

¹⁶³ The migrant population is statistically defined using the information on the country of birth. The EU-LFS provides information about the country of birth aggregated in the following areas: native of own country; NMS3 (3 new member states of 2007 and 2013); NMS13 (10 new member states of 2004); EU15; EFTA countries; other Europe; North Africa; Other Africa; Near Middle East; East Asia; South East Asia; North America; Central America; South America; Australia and Oceania.

Figure 6: Proportion of migrants in the domestic sector in 22 EU member states (2015)




Figure 6: The data displayed include all EU member states, excluding Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland, for which the information on the occupation (ISCO code) is not available and Germany and Romania, for which information on the country of birth is not provided.
Source: EU-LFS 2015

As it emerges from Figure 6, the differences between European countries in terms of *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector are overwhelming. The proportion of migrants among the domestic workforce varies from 1.2% in Slovakia to 65.3% in Cyprus. Additionally, given the high prevalence of undeclared work in the domestic sector, and given that migrants are likely to concentrate in the informal economy, the figure clearly underestimates the presence of migrants who work in the domestic sector.

Cyprus is the country that shows the higher proportion of migrants in the domestic sector, together with Luxembourg¹⁶⁴. However, Italy, Greece, Austria and Belgium also have a significant high proportion of migrant labour force in the sector, compared to the European average. Indeed, many studies have highlighted the fact that Mediterranean countries, as well as Germany, Austria and Belgium, have recently experienced an increase of migrant workers in domestic services, but for different reasons. In the Mediterranean countries, welfare does not adequately support families with public services. This, combined with the low level of

¹⁶⁴ The case of Luxembourg is not commented further, as it represents an exception in the European landscape. According to the European Observatory of Working Life, in Luxembourg the high percentage of non-nationals is remarkable in every sector of the labour market, as the phenomenon of cross-border workers is typical of this country. Additionally, the migrant population in Luxembourg is mainly intra-European and is characterised by high education levels, which explains their presence in all levels of the labour market.

cash allowance, created a strong demand for cheap and flexible labour force and contributed to the development of a basin of an often undeclared migrant workforce (Catanzaro and Colombo 2009; Ambrosini, 2013). In the case of continental countries, such as France and Belgium, welfare traditionally offers a better support in terms of public services, albeit with cross-national differences. However, in these countries welfare policies are more and more shifting from in-kind services to conditional and/or unconditional cash allowances, leaving families 'free' to buy these services in the market (Simonazzi, 2009). Germany and Austria are somehow in between these two types of countries: their welfare state is traditionally more generous than that of Mediterranean countries, but they tend to be familialistic with respect to domestic and care work and they adopted a system of unconditional cash allowances to families (Simonazzi, 2009). As in the case of Mediterranean countries, families rely more and more on migrant women, as they represent a cheaper and more flexible workforce compared to local women.

The countries with the lowest shares of migrants in the domestic sector are Eastern European countries. Slovakia, Hungary and Czech Republic all have less than 5% of migrants in the domestic workforce. However, also Finland, Portugal and the Netherlands have a small concentration of migrants in the sector (7.8%, 9.4% and 10.6% respectively).

4.3.2.1 Countries of origin


The migrant population employed in the domestic sector in each European country differs not only in numerical terms, but also in terms of the countries of origin. If Figure 6 shows the enormous differences that exist in Europe in the concentration of migrants in the domestic workforce, just as many differences are observable when the origins of domestic workers are considered in detail.

To understand these differences, three main factors have to be considered. First, the international migration into Europe is not homogeneous and largely depends on the history of migration, which differs significantly from country to country. These historical differences are also mirrored in the characteristics of the migrant population employed in domestic services. Second, given the low reputation and poor working conditions of domestic work, the migrants who concentrate in this sector tend to be those that enjoy a lower status and who find more barriers to enter the labour market of the host society, be that because of administrative procedures, or because of racist and discriminatory issues. In particular, third-country nationals, especially those coming from less developed countries, are more likely to work in

low-skilled occupations, including domestic work. Third, as literature has pointed out, the European enlargements first of 2004 and then of 2007 and 2013 have generated a large flow of migration from Eastern European countries. For many of these migrants – especially for women – the domestic sector represents the main entry point in the labour market of receiving countries (Morokvasic et al., 2007).

Figure 7 shows the migrant domestic workers in Europe by country of origin, based on data from the EU-LFS¹⁶⁵.

Figure 7: Migrant domestic workers in Europe by country of birth (region)



- Country of birth:
- 1 = EU15
 - 2 = new member states (CY, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, MT, PL, SK, SI, BG, RO, HR)
 - 4 = EFTA countries (Switzerland, Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein)
 - 5 = other Europe
 - 6 = North Africa
 - 7 = other Africa
 - 8 = Middles East
 - 9 = South and East Asia
 - 10 = North America and Oceania
 - 11 = Central America
 - 12 = South America

The data displayed include all EU member states, apart from Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland, for which the information on the occupation (ISCO code) is not available and Germany and Romania, for which information on the country of birth is not provided.

Source: EU-LFS 2015


¹⁶⁵ The EU-LFS data only provides the country of origin aggregated in areas. For details, refer to footnote 147.

According to the EU-LFS data, the great majority of migrant domestic workers in Europe come from Eastern European countries (new accession countries following the 2004, 2007 and 2013 enlargements and other parts of Europe). The second region of the world from which domestic workers emigrate is Africa (codes 6 and 7 in the graphic). At a lower level is the presence of domestic workers from South and East Asia, from old European countries and from South and Central America (codes 11 and 12 in the graphic). Considerably less important is the number of domestic migrants from the Middle East and from richer areas of the world (EFTA countries, North America and Oceania).

Figure 8 shows the cross-country differences in the origin of migrant domestic workers. The figure overall confirms that cross-national differences in the origin of domestic workers depend, among other factors, on the different history of migration of European countries. In general, it can be observed that in countries of old immigration¹⁶⁶, such as the UK, Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Sweden, a large number of domestic workers come from Africa, South America and/or Asia. The prevalence of each area of origin seems to be linked to historical legacies.

¹⁶⁶ In migration studies, it is common to define ‘countries of immigration’ those countries where the immigration is considerably and systematically larger than emigration (positive net migration). The relative term ‘old’ is adopted with reference to countries where the positive net migration started sometime in the past. The term is used for comparison with countries where the surplus of immigration over emigration started in more recent times (countries of ‘new’ immigration) (Fassman and Reeger, 2012). In Europe, typical countries of old immigration are the UK, France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden, while countries of new immigration are Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy (Franchino, 2009).

Figure 8: Country of birth (by region) of migrant domestic workers in 22 EU member states



Country of birth:

1 = EU15

2 = new member states (CY, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, MT, PL, SK, SI, BG, RO, HR)

4 = EFTA countries (Switzerland, Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein)

5 = other Europe

6 = North Africa

7 = other Africa


8 = Middles East

9 = South and East Asia

10 = North America and Oceania

11 = Central America

12 = South America



Country of birth:

1 = EU15

2 = new member states (CY, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, MT, PL, SK, SI, BG, RO, HR)

4 = EFTA countries (Switzerland, Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein)

5 = other Europe

6 = North Africa

7 = other Africa

8 = Middles East

9 = South and East Asia

10 = North America and Oceania

11 = Central America

12 = South America

Source: EU-LFS 2015

For instance, many migrant domestic workers in the UK come from Africa and Asia. This can be due to the fact that for long time migration to the UK was linked to the former British Empire and many migrants were coming from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Caribbean Islands and Africa. Also, immigration to Belgium was for a long time linked to its colonies, especially to Congo, but immigration from North Africa and Turkey was also very consistent (Van der Bracht et al., 2014). This is reflected in the composition of the domestic workforce, where a large share of domestic workers is constituted by North Africans and other Africans (codes 6 and 7 in the graphic). The same can be said about France and its colonial links with Africa, which is also reflected in the composition of the workforce in the French domestic sector. In the Netherlands, the same link is visible between the number of domestic workers from Africa and Asia and its history of immigration, which was first characterised by ‘guest workers’ programmes with Turkey and Morocco and then by colonial links with Indonesia. This might suggest that the old immigration flows in these countries still have an effect on new migration flows¹⁶⁷, and at the same time that these new migrants tend to be overrepresented in low-skilled occupations, such as the domestic service sector.

However, the main novelty is that also in some countries of old immigration a medium to large share of domestic workers coming from Eastern European countries can be observed. In particular, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, but also Sweden and the UK, show a great number of Eastern European domestic workers. The only exceptions are represented by France, and to a lower extent by the Netherlands, where the presence of domestic workers from Eastern Europe is less pronounced.

Concerning Mediterranean countries, usually identified as countries of ‘new immigration’¹⁶⁸, it can be observed that the great majority of domestic workers come from Eastern European countries. This is particularly true for Italy and Greece. The situation is somehow different in Spain and in Portugal, where the largest share of domestic workers comes from South America and from Africa (only in Portugal). Again, as it is the case for countries of old immigration, this is mainly due to colonialist links to South America (for both Spain and Portugal) and to Africa (for Portugal).

¹⁶⁷ The migrant population in Figure 8 is defined based on the country of birth and therefore only includes new migrants, who are born in a country other than the country of residence.

¹⁶⁸ If we define immigration countries those with a positive net migration, also the majority of Eastern European countries fall under this definition. Additionally, they also have a recent history of immigration and can therefore be included in the definition of countries of new immigration (Fassman and Reeger, 2012).

Regarding Eastern European countries, which are also countries of new immigration, the picture is much more homogeneous, as migrant domestic workers are almost entirely coming from other Eastern European countries.

4.3.2.2 Second generations

Finally, it is important to notice that when second generations are added to the analysis, the *ethnicisation* of the sector in some countries might be considerably higher. To check whether adding second generations would change the degree of ethnicisation and for which countries, I have used the only database provided by Eurostat that includes information on the country of birth of mothers and fathers, namely the EU-LFS ad hoc module 2014. Figure 9 reports the proportion of migrants, second generations and natives working in the domestic sector in the European countries for which data is available¹⁶⁹.

As it emerges from the graphic, the degree of *ethnicisation* changes considerably when second generations of migrants are added to first generations. However, this is more visible for some countries, while in other countries second generations in the domestic sector are negligible. In particular, in France, Luxemburg and the UK, but also in some Eastern European countries, such as Latvia and Estonia, the presence of second-generation migrants among the domestic workforce is considerable, so that the degree of ethnicisation becomes significantly stronger when first and second-generation migrants are considered simultaneously. In other countries, especially Romania, Italy, Spain and Cyprus, the level of ethnicisation when second generations are added remains almost unchanged.

As expected, the differences in the presence of second-generation migrants among European countries are strongly linked to their history of immigration, with countries of old immigration showing a stronger presence of second generations and countries of new immigration showing the least presence of second generations. The exceptions are Estonia and Latvia, which both present a strong presence of second generations.

¹⁶⁹ Second generations are defined as individuals born in the country of residence, who have at least one of the two parents born abroad (variables ‘country of birth of mother’ and ‘country of birth of father’).

Figure 9: Proportion of migrants, second generations and natives in the domestic sector in 19 EU member states




Figure 9: The data displayed include all EU member states, excluding Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland, for which the information on the occupation (ISCO code) is not available and Germany, for which information on the country of birth and country of birth of mothers and fathers is not provided.
 Source: EU-LFS ad hoc module 2014

4.4 The working conditions in the domestic sector

As scholarship has long highlighted, domestic work is characterised by excessively poor working conditions. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the low status and low value of the job, which are linked to a variety of factors, are reflected in the working conditions, which remain persistently low, compared to any other type of employment (Anderson, 2000; Rollins, 1985; Parreñas, 2001; Cox, 2006). Public bodies, as well as third sector professionals working in the field, have recently started to pay attention and to denounce the inequalities suffered by domestic workers. These inequalities are visible not only in the economic exploitation of domestic workers in the labour market, but in some cases in their degrading treatment and psychological and physical abuse (UNHCR 2011; ILO, 2013). As UNHCR emphasises, in the most extreme cases – and especially in the case of the most vulnerable migrant population – these abuses can reach conditions similar to slavery and be linked to situations of human trafficking (UNHCR, 2011). The invisibility of the job, which is performed in private

environments, prevents from a close monitoring of the working conditions and from the punishment of situations of abuse and exploitation.

In the last decades, many attempts have been made in certain European countries in order to professionalise domestic services and improve the working conditions of domestic workers. The assumption behind any attempt to professionalise the sector is that the status of the job would change once the job is carried out on a professional basis (Lutz, 2010). In other words, the transformation from unpaid work to market-based employment would engender a transformation of the value attributed to the job. In most cases, reforms of the regulations of the domestic sector have been intended to reduce undeclared work and at the same time decrease unemployment by creating new jobs in the labour market (Kvist, 2012). The main instruments that have been adopted include the introduction of voucher systems, tax deductions and reduction of social security contributions for hiring domestic workers.

However, as the findings deriving from monitoring efforts point out, the professionalisation of the work has not automatically led to an improvement of working conditions and better job quality. Excessive working hours (especially for live-in domestic workers), involuntary part-time (mainly due to long commuting time), wages far below national standards and/or minimum wages, precarious forms of contracts, low benefits associated to the job (holidays, transportation, health insurance, etc.), lack of training and professional mobility are just some typical features of the working conditions in the domestic sector (Anderson, 2000; Lutz, 2010; ILO, 2013; UNHCR, 2016).


4.4.1 Income level

One of the main problems linked to the quality of jobs in the domestic sector is the low pay, which generally falls far below national standards and/or minimum wages. This is partly due to the unwillingness of employers to pay high wages for a job that is still considered a low-skilled occupation, of no value, and requiring no specific competence (Lutz, 2010). Even in the most successful cases of professionalisation of domestic services – namely, the voucher systems of France and Belgium – policy and academic findings emphasise that the success of the systems is due to the high public financial participation, which makes possible to keep the price for the employers (families) competitively low. On the contrary, the failure of the voucher system in Austria has been precisely identified in the relatively high price that

employers have to pay to hire domestic workers through the voucher system, compared to the informal market¹⁷⁰.

Figure 10 shows the distribution of the domestic workers by income deciles in Europe.

Figure 10: Income (deciles) of domestic workers in Europe




*Figure 10: Data not available for Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland, for which the information on the occupation (ISCO code) is not provided and Austria, Czech Republic, Spain, Hungary and Sweden, for which information on the income level is not provided.
Source: EU-LFS 2015*

As it clearly emerges from the figure, the income of the domestic workers in Europe concentrates in the lower deciles, which suggests that domestic workers are among the workers with the lower income among the entire employed population.

If we compare the distribution of income of domestic workers to that of other low-skilled workers, it emerges that in many European countries domestic workers are disproportionately concentrated in the lower income deciles, while the other low-skilled workers are better distributed in higher income deciles. Figure 11 provides the comparison between the income distribution of domestic workers and other low-skilled workers in all EU countries for which the information is available.

¹⁷⁰ Based on the Austrian *Dienstleistungsscheck* system (voucher system), the hourly price that families have to pay is 10.2 euro. Since the informal market rate for hiring domestic workers is about 7 euro per hour, the system is not attractive to employers. This explains the very limited use of vouchers by Austrians (IWAK, 2011).

Figure 11: Distribution of domestic workers and other low-skilled workers by income deciles in 19 EU member states (2015)



*Figure 11: Data not available for Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland, for which the information on the occupation (ISCO code) is not provided and Austria, Czech Republic, Spain, Hungary and Sweden, for which information on the income level is not provided.
Source: EU-LFS 2015*

Figure 11 shows that it is only in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and the UK that the income of domestic workers seems to be similar to that of other low-skilled workers¹⁷¹. In all

¹⁷¹ For the definition of ‘other low-skilled workers’ I used the ISCO classification and I included only codes ≥ 900 , which correspond to ‘Elementary occupations’.

the other countries, the income of domestic workers is over-represented in the lowest deciles of income.

4.4.2 Temporary work


Another feature that can be used to assess the quality of jobs in the domestic sector is the precariousness of the job, in terms of temporary vs. permanent type of contract. Table 18 shows the proportion of temporary and permanent contracts in the domestic sector and in all other sectors of the labour market in 24 European countries, according to the EU-LFS data for the year 2015.

Table 18: Proportion of temporary and of permanent jobs in the domestic sector and in other sectors in 24 EU member states (2015)

Country	Temporary work domestic sector %	Permanent work domestic sector %	Temporary work other sectors %	Permanent work other sectors %
AT	6.86	93.14	9.10	90.90
BE	12.16	87.84	8.79	91.21
CY	63.28	36.72	11.93	88.07
CZ	18.47	81.53	10.01	89.99
DE	15.74	84.26	12.53	87.47
DK	13.65	86.35	8.84	91.16
EE	2.27	97.73	3.21	96.79
ES	27.21	72.79	24.76	75.24
FI	26.26	73.74	12.80	87.20
FR	22.88	77.12	15.17	84.83
GR	26.77	73.23	11.87	88.13
HR	25.21	74.79	20.03	79.97
HU	24.88	75.12	14.09	85.91
IE	11.24	88.76	8.61	91.39
IT	11.47	88.53	14.42	85.58
LT	2.53	97.47	1.97	98.03
LU	9.05	90.95	9.45	90.55
LV	2.98	97.02	3.43	96.57
NL	20.09	79.91	19.70	80.30
PT	22.59	77.41	21.11	78.89
RO	3.94	96.06	1.31	98.69
SE	28.00	72.00	14.69	85.31
SK	17.12	82.88	10.08	89.92
UK	6.41	93.59	5.31	94.69

Figure 12 presents the proportion of temporary work, as a share of the total employment, in the domestic sector.

Figure 12: Proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector in 24 EU member states (2015)




*Figure 12: Data not available for Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland, for which the information on the occupation (ISCO code) is not provided.
Source: EU-LFS 2015*

As shown in Figure 12, only in Cyprus the share of domestic workers with a temporary work is higher than the share of domestic workers with a permanent job. In all the other countries, the share of temporary work in the domestic sector represents less than 30%. However, in Sweden, Spain, Greece, Finland, Croatia, Hungary, France, Portugal and the Netherlands the proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector is higher than the European average. In Eastern European countries – Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania – the share of temporary work in the domestic sector is significantly lower compared to the European average.

Figure 13 presents the comparison between the proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector and in all other sectors in the 24 countries included in the analysis.

Figure 13: Proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector and in the other sectors in 24 EU member states (2015)



*Figure 13: Data not available for Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland, for which the information on the occupation (ISCO code) is not provided.
Source: EU-LFS 2015*

As it emerges from the graphical representation, the share of temporary work in the domestic sector is larger than the share of temporary work in all the other sectors in the majority of the EU member states included in the analysis. The most significant differences are visible in Cyprus, Sweden, Finland, Greece and Hungary. Only in Austria, Estonia, Italy, Luxembourg and Latvia the share of temporary work in the domestic sector is lower than in all the other sectors, albeit with smaller differences.

However, it is important to notice that the share of temporary work might be underestimated, as the figure does not capture the large share of informal work in the domestic sector¹⁷².


4.4.3 Unusual working hours

A last feature that can be used to assess the quality of jobs in the domestic sector and that is typical of occupations characterised by poor working conditions, is the fact of working on unusual time schedules. This includes working on weekends, on evenings and on night shifts. Domestic workers are often required to work on atypical timetables, either to satisfy the needs

¹⁷² By definition, informal work is characterised by an informal employment relationship (no formal contract) and therefore by a high degree of precariousness.

of the employers or because the need – especially for care work – may arise at sudden times. For instance, families might require domestic workers to perform certain tasks at specific times, such as cleaning or cooking for specific occasions during the weekends, or very early in the morning or late in the evening, depending on the working hours of the family members. In the case of care work, workers might be needed at specific times because of the very nature of the work (children who need to be picked up very early in the morning or late in the evenings, depending on the timetable of other family members, or elderly people and other dependants whose health conditions require to work at nights and/or on weekends). The fact of working on shifts and on unusual working hours adds up to the emotional and physical strain of domestic work and contributes to worsening the working conditions of domestic workers.

Figure 14: Proportion of shift work in the domestic sector in 24 EU member states (2015)



*Figure 14: Data not available for Bulgaria, Slovenia, Malta and Poland, for which the information on the occupation (ISCO code) is not provided.
Source: EU-LFS 2015*

As presented in Figure 14, in many European countries more than 50% of domestic workers work on shifts (evenings, Saturdays, Sundays, nights). The proportion of domestic workers working on shifts is especially high in Croatia, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Greece and Sweden, with more than 55% of domestic workers whose work is performed in atypical hours. What is worth noticing here is that the two countries where the domestic sector is regulated through

the system of vouchers (France and Belgium) are the countries with the lowest share of shift work. This seems to suggest that the voucher system succeeds in regulating working hours in a sector where unusual time shifts are considered the norm.

Chapter 5

Measuring care, gender and migration regimes: construction of indicators and typologies

In Chapter 2, I have discussed the use of typologies to explain social phenomena and presented an overview of the main classifications that have been made to measure care, gender and migration regimes. In this chapter, I present the analysis that I have conducted on the three regimes and the construction of three new typologies. The objective is to measure the three regimes under study and to use these indicators and typologies as a tool for investigating cross-national variations in the degree of *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector. This chapter is divided into three main sections, each of them presenting the analysis of one of the three regimes taken into consideration. Each section includes the following steps: the presentation of the theoretical grounds on which each analysis is carried out, the presentation of the selection of the indicators, the analyses that have been carried out and their results, and finally the typologies deriving from the analyses.

5.1 Measuring the care regime

The objective of this section is to provide a tentative measurement of care regimes. First, the analysis presented in this section has the objective of covering the main thematic dimensions of care regimes, as they are defined in this study: care for children, care for elderly people and incentives for housework activities. While the academic literature has already investigated the national approaches with respect to care provisions and the ‘care dimension’ of policies, little or no attention has been given to policies specifically addressing housework services so far. For a thorough understanding of the impact of care regimes on the structure and functioning of the domestic sector, it seems crucial to add a further dimension that includes the incentives

for the externalisation of housework activities. Although the two main dimensions that have been analysed in the literature – care for children and care for the elderly – are at the core of the way welfare states support care responsibilities and therefore are fundamental in understanding the development of the domestic sector at national level, a more complete analysis should necessarily take into consideration also those policies that directly touch at housework services – which are the “non-care” dimension of the domestic sector.

The assumption is that policies and specific regulations addressing housework activities have an effect on outcomes in the domestic sector, as they might influence the choices of families in terms of the externalisation of housework services. For instance, the choice to externalise both care and cleaning services can be based on the availability or not of certain monetary incentives offered by the state, or by the availability of eased procedures to hire formal domestic personnel. The availability of such incentives or regulations can in turn influence the availability and the composition of the supply side.

The second objective of this analysis is to take into account both the generosity of policies and the degree of de-familialisation of policies, as it has been highlighted by research on care regimes.

The existing literature has highlighted the complex nature of care packages and of the different combinations of care policies at country level and the consequent difficulties encountered when trying to measure care regimes¹⁷³. Given the complexity of the task, and in order to provide a comprehensive picture of the way European countries can be grouped with respect to care policies, I have conducted an analysis meant to derive indicators that can be validated statistically and then used in the further analysis that will be presented in Chapter 6.

5.1.1 Construction of indicators and typologies of care regimes

The analysis was carried out in order to classify care regimes and create a typology based on two dimensions: 1) the degree of de-familialisation and 2) the generosity of welfare provisions with respect to care. The choice is based on the fact that both dimensions are crucial in determining households’ choices with respect to care and domestic responsibilities. This in turn is of paramount importance for the understanding of care regimes in the light of evaluating their impact on the domestic sector. In addition to the two above-mentioned dimensions, the measurement of care regimes and the construction of the typologies is meant

¹⁷³ For a detailed explanation of care policies and the difficulties in measuring care regimes, refer to section 2.2.3.

to cover the three domains which are part of my analysis of paid domestic work: childcare, elderly care and housework. This is based on the consideration that – although the last domain has usually been neglected in the evaluation of care regimes – housework incentives do constitute an important public instrument that can have a crucial repercussion on the degree of externalisation of domestic services, as well as on the way paid domestic work is regulated and conceived.

First of all, the generosity of care provisions and the extent to which they are allocated by the state can represent an incentive to families, as they provide families with the financial support to satisfy their care and domestic needs. The level of financial support provided by the state for the care of children (parental leaves, availability of public affordable childcare facilities), for the care of elderly people (availability of affordable public residential facilities, cash-for-care incentives to hire external help, social security schemes, etc.) and for housework services (financial incentives to externalise housework) has an impact on the degree of externalisation of domestic and care activities. When policy instruments are in place, but the level of financial support is not sufficient, families might decide not to benefit from the support and not to externalise care responsibilities. This is the case, for instance, of paternity and parental leaves, which in many European countries are not used by fathers, as the level of compensation is too low. Also, when residential facilities for dependent people and childcare services are too expensive, families might decide not to use them, especially when the income level of one family member – of women in particular – is not sufficient and makes the use of external services not worth it.

However, the degree of generosity of public provisions is not enough to understand care regimes, as policies that are part of care regimes can have different outcomes in the degree of externalisation of domestic and care tasks, and thus on the outcomes in the domestic sector. As highlighted by the literature (see Chapter 2), the measurement of care regimes along the spectrum that goes from familialisation to de-familialisation represents a more nuanced instrument for the assessment of care regimes. While a high level of generosity of care provisions tends to be associated with a higher degree of externalisation of care and domestic activities by families, not all policies are intended to offer public alternatives for alleviating the care burden from the shoulders of families. While the availability of quality and affordable services for the care of children and older people is always considered as a de-familialising type of policy, other types of state intervention are meant on the contrary to encourage families to assume their care responsibilities on their own. This is the case, for instance, of long and well-paid maternity leaves, which are known to push mothers to stay

home to care for their children, while making it difficult for them to re-enter the labour market.

5.1.1.1 Selection of indicators

The indicators were selected so to provide an empirical and valid instrument to measure the three domains taken into consideration for the assessment of care regimes: childcare provision, elderly care provision and incentives for housework¹⁷⁴. Additionally, indicators were selected in order to cover both the de-familialisation and the generosity dimension of care regimes.

Regarding the provision of care, the majority of the indicators were selected from the Multilinks database, after crosschecking the information with other public institutional databases, such as the OECD database, ILO databases and Eurostat. Only one indicator was selected from the OECD Health Statistics database. Regarding housework incentives, the selected indicators were derived from the report *Developing personal and household services in the EU: a focus on housework activities*, funded by the European Commission.

Table 19 provides the full list of indicators used for the analysis, as well as the sources from which indicators were selected:

Table 19: Indicators used for the analysis of care regimes

Area	Indicator	Source
Childcare	Effective maternity leave (obtained by weighting the maternity leave duration in weeks with the maternity leave compensation as a percentage of earned income)	Multilinks database
	Effective parental leave (obtained by weighting the parental leave duration in weeks with the parental leave compensation as a percentage of earned income)	Multilinks database
	Childcare usage for children under 3 years old (% of all children under 3)	Multilinks database
	Full-time childcare usage for children under 3 (% of all children under 3)	Multilinks database
	Child allowance for 1 st child (% of average net income)	Multilinks database
	Child allowance for 2 nd child (% of average net income)	Multilinks database
Elderly care	Residential care, people living in care institutions (% of population 65 years old or more)	Multilinks database

¹⁷⁴ Although the selected indicators and the following construction of indexes has been based on theoretical grounds and is meant to provide a scientific valid set of measurements, I am aware of the relativity and the normativity of the selection of the indicators.

	Home-based care recipients (% of population 65 years old or more)	Multilinks database
	Minimum social security (% of average net income)	Multilinks database
	Net replacement rate (% of average income)	Multilinks database
	Long-term-care expenditure (% of GDP)	OECD Health Statistics 2017 database
Housework	Voucher system (Y/N)	EC report
	Reduced VAT for housework services (Y/N)	EC report
	Tax deductions for housework services (Y/N)	EC report
	Reduced contributions for housework services (Y/N)	EC report

Regarding childcare provision, maternity and parental leaves represent one of the principal indicators used in any study on care regimes. Although the duration and level of compensation vary significantly, all European countries offer a certain combination of maternity and parental leaves. On the contrary, paternity leaves are not available in all countries. The choice not to include paternity leaves as such is based on the fact that they are less relevant for a comparative analysis, as they are almost identical in the majority of EU countries (usually, they consist in 5 to 10 day leaves, paid at 100%, that fathers can take immediately after the birth of the child). Additionally, due to their short duration, they cannot be considered as contributing to the familialisation or the de-familialisation of care.

The indicators on overall childcare usage and full-time childcare usage for children aged 0 to 3 years old have been selected because they mirror the availability of public childcare services at national level. Therefore, they constitute a very important source of information about the type of public service provision addressing children. The two indicators on child allowances have been selected as they provide important information regarding the level of financial support offered to families for the care of children.

Regarding elderly care, the indicators about residential care and home-based care (people living in residential homes for the elderly and home-based care recipients) have been selected as they mirror the availability of elderly care services provided by the state. Therefore, they provide information about the way and the extent to which the state takes in charge care responsibilities towards the elderly.

The indicators about minimum social security schemes and net replacement rates have been selected because they provide information about the level of support provided by the state to senior citizens. Unfortunately, there is no unique way to provide financial support to elderly people and each member state has its own system of social security provision for the elderly. Although there might be specific measures addressing the economic needs of elderly people,

the most common include the financial benefits in the form of pensions, social security and social insurance schemes. Although pension benefits are usually linked to the employment history of individuals and to the length of contributions, they nevertheless represent one of the most important measures for evaluating elderly care provision, as they are intended to provide the financial means to conduct a decent and autonomous life in old age. In this sense, information on pensions is useful as it defines the “public responsibility for the financial autonomy of the elderly irrespective of their children’s obligations” (Saraceno and Keck, 2008). Regarding the minimum social security scheme, they are either offered by the state as means-tested entitlements for old age or as more or less universalistic social assistance schemes. The combination of the two indicators is meant to provide an idea of the level of financial support to elderly people. The indicator on the level of long-term care expenditure as a percentage of the GDP has been introduced in the analysis as it provides an institutional measure on the level of the financial support that the state allocates to the care of senior citizens¹⁷⁵.

Concerning housework incentives, the four indicators have been selected as they represent the main type of measures offered by governments to facilitate the externalisation of domestic tasks. Although the report *Developing personal and household services in the EU: a focus on housework activities* identifies other types of public interventions that can one way or another facilitate the process (the overall flexibilisation and the type of structure of the labour market, the more or less explicit increase of the labour supply through for example specific immigration policies¹⁷⁶, etc.), the selected indicators are easier to use for international comparison, as they all measure one type of financial incentive specific to domestic work.

Concerning the selection of the indicators, the main limitation of this analysis is represented by the lack of information on some policies that can be crucial in defining both the level of generosity of care regimes and the level of de-familialisation achieved by such policies. The missing indicators that could have been beneficial for the analysis are the availability and the level of compensation of child-rearing allowances¹⁷⁷ (in the field of childcare) and the

¹⁷⁵ Although LTC expenditure cannot alone capture the whole public expenditure addressing care needs of the elderly, as different budget lines can include some aspects of elderly care support (health, social assistance, etc.), it nevertheless provides a specific measure that can be used for cross-national comparison.

¹⁷⁶ In this research, the immigration policies that directly or indirectly encourage the increase of the supply side (domestic workers) are included in the analysis of migration regimes, in section 5.3.

¹⁷⁷ Child-rearing allowances are specific incentives that exist in some countries intended to provide incentives for parents (usually mothers) to stay at home to care for their children, instead of re-entering the labour market. These incentives, that clearly belong to the familialisation types of policies, are special benefits, which are not part of the maternity or parental leaves, whose objective is to offer mothers the choice between caring for children at home or working outside the home. However, although they are meant to substitute paid work in the

availability and the level of compensation of cash-for-care allowances¹⁷⁸ (in the field of elderly care).

Since the analysis is intended to develop two separate indexes – a generosity index and a defamilialisation index – each indicator was attributed to one or the other dimension, depending on the relevance for each dimension. Even if almost all selected indicators could partly be used for measuring both dimensions¹⁷⁹, a distinction was made between those indicators that are more clearly indicating the degree of familialisation vs. defamilialisation, and those that are most useful to measure the level of generosity. Although there is no unanimity on which policies are intended to familialism and which to de-familialisation, and even less on which are the empirical results of these policies with this respect, the choice of the indicators was made based on the following considerations.

In principle, familialisation occurs when care and domestic responsibilities are privately and publicly acknowledged as being responsibilities of families, who have to find their own solutions to meet their needs, through unpaid family resources and various types of solidarity (extended family, friends, neighbours, etc.). On the contrary, de-familialisation occurs when families can count on external support in satisfying their care and domestic needs. This can be achieved through both the state and the market. However, as Saraceno and Keck underline (2010), the type of de-familialisation achieved through the market is different from the one achieved through public provision, as the externalisation via the market almost always implies

labour market, they usually consist in a low level of payment, which is not comparable to an income derived from employment in the labour market.

¹⁷⁸ For a thorough analysis of care regimes in terms of familialisation/de-familialisation it would have been useful to have indicators on the availability of cash-for-care allowances, on the level of such allowances and on the typology (bound to buy care services or unconditional allowances). Unfortunately, no exploitable indicator was found on cash-for-care allowances across European countries. The Multilinks database – from which the majority of indicators on care provision were selected – includes one indicator on the availability of cash-for-care schemes for the elderly in 2009 (Yes-No response type). However, the indicator could not be used, because after cross-checking the information with the most recent data at European level, it appears that in the last few years the situation has evolved and that today virtually all EU countries include some sort of cash-for-care scheme in their care packages. This makes a Yes-No indicator not exploitable (no difference between countries). The MISSOC Comparative Tables Database (available here:

<http://www.missoc.org/INFORMATIONBASE/COMPARATIVETABLES/MISSOCDATABASE/comparativeTableSearch.jsp>) offers a rich set of indicators on social policies, including long term care (LTC) and family benefits. However, the information about cash-for-care allowances for elderly people is of difficult interpretation and cannot be used for comparative purposes. This is due to the fact that the level of cash allowances is only provided for certain countries, while for the majority of countries only a verbal description of the policy and of the entitlements is provided, which renders the interpretation and the international comparison arduous. Therefore, no indicator on cash-for-care allowances was included in the analysis.

¹⁷⁹ All indicators – which correspond to policies in the field of care – include both a de-familialisation and a generosity dimension, which in some cases can be difficult to distinguish. For instance, all indicators that are universally used to measure the degree of familialisation vs. de-familialisation necessarily include a generosity dimension, as policies can include a different degree of financial support.

the intervention of the families. From this point of view, the direct purchase of care and domestic services in the market does not change the traditional role of families with respect to care and domestic responsibilities, and therefore can hardly be considered as a “real” de-familialisation.

Additionally, for a coherent assessment of policies through the familialisation/de-familialisation approach, the adoption of a gender perspective is necessary (Saraceno and Keck, 2008). From a gender perspective, the degree of familialisation can be evaluated through the degree of care and domestic responsibilities assigned to women and on the contrary the de-familialisation through the degree to which the unpaid labour of women is substituted by paid external labour. The combination of a familialisation/de-familialisation approach and the gender perspective has been taken as the framework for the distinction between the indicators that measure each of the two dimensions of the analysis.

Table 20 reports the subdivision of indicators that was made prior the analysis, distinguishing between the indicators used to construct the generosity index and those used to construct the de-familialisation index:

Table 20: Selected indicators for each dimension of the care regime

De-familialisation index	Generosity index
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effective maternity leave (obtained by weighting the maternity leave duration in weeks with the maternity leave compensation as a percentage of earned income) • Childcare usage for children under 3 years old (% of all children under 3) • Full-time childcare usage for children under 3 (% of all children under 3) • Residential care, people living in care institutions (% of population 65 years old or more) • Home-based care recipients (% of population 65 years old or more) • Housework incentives – derived from: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Voucher system (Y/N) ▪ Reduced VAT for housework services (Y/N) ▪ Tax deductions for housework services (Y/N) ▪ Reduced contributions for housework services (Y/N) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effective parental leave (obtained by weighting the parental leave duration in weeks with the parental leave compensation as a percentage of earned income) • Child allowance for 1st child (% of average net income) • Child allowance for 2nd child (% of average net income) • Minimum social security (% of average net income) • Net replacement rate (% of average income) • Long-term-care expenditure (% of GDP)

The indicators used for the de-familialisation index include all housework incentives, public services and facilities for childcare and elderly care, and maternity leaves. Concerning housework incentives, the choice to use them for the assessment of the degree of de-familialisation is based on the fact that the availability of such policies is known to have an impact on family choices with respect to the externalisation of housework activities, no matter the level of generosity of such incentives¹⁸⁰. The indicator on housework incentives was derived by the sum of the values of four dichotomous variables (Yes-No response): 1) voucher system; 2) reduced VAT; 3) tax deductions; 4) reduced contributions.

Concerning the indicators on the provision of public childcare and elderly care services (childcare usage, people living in residential care homes, home-based care recipients), the choice to use them for the measurement of the de-familialisation index is based on the literature, which uncontroversially stresses the de-familialising nature of these policies (Leitner, 2003; Saraceno, 2010, 2011, refer to Chapter 2)¹⁸¹.

The choice to include the indicators on child allowances and on social security schemes and pensions for elderly people in the generosity index is based on the fact that these incentives are aimed to provide a certain degree of financial support to families. Even if a higher financial support can contribute to the purchase of external care services, they are not usually high enough to determine households' choices in terms of externalisation of care work. Therefore, they seem to be more suitable for the definition of the overall generosity of care regimes. A different case is that of cash-for-care allowances for elderly care, which are more and more used in all European countries, and which are directly linked to the direct purchasing of care services in the market by families. In the case of cash-for-care allowances, the debate over their familialising or de-familialising nature is controversial. On the one hand, they can be considered as de-familialising policies, as they do encourage families to externalise care work by directly purchasing services in the market. On the other hand, they re-familialise care responsibilities, because, contrary to public services, they attribute to families the full responsibility of care (Simonazzi, 2009).

¹⁸⁰ Public incentives for the externalisation of housework services (voucher system, tax deductions, exemption from the payment of social contributions, etc.) seem to be powerful instrument in conditioning beneficiaries' choices. Recent academic literature, as well as institutional reports on the monitoring of public policies, underline the link between the presence of such incentives and the increased externalisation of domestic services. Contrary to old times, when only wealthier households could afford the externalisation of domestic tasks, today in many countries, and especially through public incentives, more and more middle-class families decide to externalise these services (Lutz, 2011; Gerard, 2013).

¹⁸¹ The availability of good quality and affordable care facilities constitutes one of the main instruments used by welfare states to relieve families from their role of unpaid care providers. Many researches have underlined that the higher the availability of such services, the higher the degree of externalisation of care activities (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004).

The indicator on the total expenditure of the state on long-term care (LTC) was selected, because it represents a powerful instrument for measuring the degree of generosity of care regimes with regard to elderly care.

The most seemingly controversial use of indicators for the construction of the two indexes is represented by the indicators on maternity and parental leaves¹⁸², because the first was used to construct the de-familialisation index, while the second was included in the indicators that measure the generosity of care regimes. The reason behind the inclusion of maternity and parental leaves in two separate dimensions is that while long and generously compensated maternity leaves are commonly recognised as familialistic incentives, as they promote the care of children within family settings (Saraceno, 2011), parental leaves cannot be considered as encouraging the familialisation of care¹⁸³. If we add to the familialisation/de-familialisation approach a gender perspective, the difference between the two policies becomes apparent. From a gender point of view, maternity leaves tend to promote the charge of caring responsibilities on female members of the family and result in obstacles for women in entering or reintegrating the labour market (the so-called ‘child penalty’). Although they are not explicitly intended to prevent women from pursuing a professional career, they actually create significant obstacles for the reintegration of women in the labour market, especially when quality and affordable childcare services are unavailable. On the contrary – and again from a gender perspective – parental leaves contribute to the sharing of responsibilities among couples and thus weaken the traditional gender division of labour. This in turn seems to have opposite outcomes in terms of the reintegration of women in the labour market after the birth of a child. Some research has pointed out that when parental leaves are more equally shared between men and women, mothers tend to show a stronger attachment to the labour market and a dual-earner/dual-carer model tends to be promoted¹⁸⁴ (Saraceno, 2011; Leira, 1998). Also, countries with the best parental leaves coverage are those with the highest women’s participation rates. Therefore, the effective parental leave indicator (obtained by weighting the parental leave duration with the parental leave compensation as a percentage of earned

¹⁸² As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the indicators on the length and on the level of compensation of paternity leaves – which correspond to the few days to which fathers are entitled after the birth of their child – were not included in the analysis, as they do not differ consistently among EU member states (in the majority of EU countries, fathers are entitled to 5 to 10 paid days of leave) and because they seem to neither encourage a more equal sharing of care responsibilities among couples, nor increase the degree of familialisation.

¹⁸³ For a detailed explanation about the difference between maternity and parental leaves in terms of their familialising power, refer to section 2.2.4.1.

¹⁸⁴ Usually, a distinction is made between parental leaves where men have the option to take time off to care for children, and specific “use-it-or-lose-it” quotas for fathers. The latter is commonly considered to be the best possible incentive to promote equality among couples and in the labour market, as it reformulates the work-family issue as a concern of both parents (Leira, 2002).

income) is used to measure the generosity of care policies, and not the degree of familialisation.

5.1.2.1 Construction of the de-familialisation index

As a first step for the construction of the de-familialisation index, the database was prepared so to include all the selected indicators. In order to analyse the indicators in terms of familialisation vs. de-familialisation, one variable had to be reversed – ‘effective maternity leave’ –, as it goes in the opposite direction in terms of de-familialisation¹⁸⁵. The complete database, with standardised variables, as well as the correlation matrix are reported in Annex 2.

After testing the correlation between the variables, a Principal Component Analysis (PCA)¹⁸⁶ was run on the six items and on the 22 countries for which the data are available¹⁸⁷. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis: KMO = .56, which is above the acceptable limit of .5 (all KMO values for individual items were > .49). Bartlett’s test of sphericity, $\chi^2(15) = 67.86483$, $p < .001$ indicated that the correlations between the items were sufficiently large for PCA.

An initial analysis was run to obtain eigenvalues for each component in the data. Two components had eigenvalues over Kaiser’s criterion of 1, but the first component alone explained 53% of the initial variance. Based on this information, as well as on the scree plot, only one component was retained in the final analysis. Information on the PCA is reported in Annex 2. Table 21 shows the factor loadings.

¹⁸⁵ While for the other indicators, the higher the value the higher the degree of de-familialisation, regarding the variable ‘effective maternity leave’ the opposite is true: the higher the value of the effective maternity leave, the higher the degree of familialisation. Therefore, the indicator must be reversed prior the analysis.

¹⁸⁶ Since a Factor Analysis based on a small number of cases (here 22) does not guarantee reliable results (see Field A. and al., 2012, ch. 17), a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was used instead. The PCA is a statistical technique that calculates linear combinations of k variables on the basis of their reciprocal correlations and estimates k principal components.

¹⁸⁷ Since data were missing for certain countries, the final dataset for this and the following analyses includes 22 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia and the UK.

Table 21: Summary of PCA (N = 22) - De-familialisation

Item	Factor loadings
Childcare usage under 3 years old	.94
Full-time childcare usage under 3 years old	.80
Residential care elderly	.88
Home-based care elderly	.70
Housework incentives	.54
Effective maternity leave	.35
Eigenvalues	3.20
% of variance	53
Cronbach's alpha	.8

Finally, the factor scores were calculated (see Annex 2).

If we translate the factor scores graphically, we can observe how European countries position themselves along the spectrum that goes from familialisation to de-familialisation.

Figure 15: De-familialisation index in 22 EU member states




Figure 15 shows that, based on the indicators included in the analysis (maternity leaves, childcare and elderly care public services and housework incentives), Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden and Finland), together with France and Belgium, show a higher degree of de-familialisation. These countries are characterised by a strong public support to families in terms of public services, both for children and for elderly people, which typically encourage the de-familialisation of domestic and care tasks. These are the countries with the strongest

and longest tradition of welfare state support, also with respect to care, and where the state takes in charge the majority of care responsibilities¹⁸⁸. In these countries, the state not only supports families and alleviate the care burden from the domestic sphere, but it also acts as the main care provider (Bode, 2011; Degavre and Nyssens, 2012).

Looking in detail at each indicator, it appears that Denmark is the country that offers the highest level of public services in all areas: childcare facilities (with the highest full-time coverage compared to the other European countries), elderly care public services (both in the form of residential care and home-based care), and a medium level of support for the externalisation of housework. Concerning maternity leaves, Denmark offers quite a long and well-paid leave to mothers, which on the contrary tends towards a familialisation of childcare. Overall, the care regime of Denmark is strongly pushing towards a de-familialisation of care, through a well-developed public provision of services, but at the same time it also supports mothers in their caring role after the birth of a child (familialising policy). This can be explained by the fact that while the externalisation of the care of elderly people and of housework services seems to be more generally accepted, the care of children tends to be at least partly familialised in all countries, as parents are considered as the natural providers for the overall well-being of children¹⁸⁹. Sweden offers the same strong support to families in terms of public services to both children and elderly people and a medium support for the externalisation of housework services. However, compared to Denmark, it also has a de-familialising approach to maternity leaves, as it offers a well-paid but very short maternity leave. This is the case also of Belgium, with a short and relatively well-paid maternity leave, coupled with an important public provision of childcare and elderly care services and a strong level of housework incentives. Therefore, in terms of de-familialisation, Sweden and Belgium seem to have the most coherent approach, as all the indicators taken into consideration in the analysis point at a de-familialising approach. Similar to Belgium, France has put in place policies for the externalisation of housework activities and offers a strong support in terms of provision of services (more evident for the provision of childcare facilities and residential homes for the elderly, and with a slightly less developed system of home-based care for

¹⁸⁸ In Esping-Andersen classification of welfare states, these countries correspond to the social-democratic group of countries, characterised by a strong and universalistic type of welfare state. For details on welfare regimes, refer to section 2.1.2.

¹⁸⁹ As presented in section 2.2.4.1, research has showed that a complete de-familialisation of childcare is not only unfeasible, but it is also not sought for. This is valid for all European countries, including those with the longest tradition of public childcare services. Indeed, concerning the care of children, psychological, social and cultural reasons point at the fact that the care of children will never be exclusively a state responsibility (Saraceno, 2008, 2010).

elderly people). Compared to Belgium and Sweden, France offers slightly longer and better-paid maternity leaves, thus supporting to a greater extent the traditional role of women as care providers.

Among the countries with the highest scores on the de-familialisation index, the Netherlands represents a peculiar case. While the maternity leave is similar to that of France, the overall childcare coverage is extremely high, but only for part-time services. This mirrors the labour force behaviour of women, who in this country tend to be concentrated in part-time jobs, especially after the birth of a child. Therefore, the relatively good provision of childcare services is mitigated by the almost exclusive use of part-time. Concerning the elderly care provision, the findings of this analysis confirm that in the Netherlands, just as in the UK, there is a strong difference between the provision of childcare and elderly care, the latter being extremely well developed (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004). Therefore, the strongest de-familialisation policy in the Netherlands is the one addressing the care of senior people, which is clearly accepted as a state responsibility.

The countries with the strongest familialistic approach with respect to care are Eastern European countries and Mediterranean countries. Concerning the provision of elderly care, all Eastern European countries included in the analysis (Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Latvia) offer a low coverage, with a more developed system of home-based care, compared to the provision of residential services¹⁹⁰. Among Mediterranean countries, Italy and Greece show the lowest elderly care provision, both in the form of residential and home-based care services, although in all Mediterranean countries elderly care provision is underdeveloped. Concerning childcare services, among Eastern European countries they are well developed in Estonia and in Slovenia, while they are heavily underdeveloped in Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. In the case of Mediterranean countries, the best childcare coverage, both part-time and full-time, is offered by Portugal¹⁹¹, while Spain and Italy show a medium overall childcare coverage, which is significantly lower in the case of full-time coverage. The lowest provisions in the Mediterranean area are that offered by Greece.

Regarding maternity leaves, the longest leaves are offered by Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Slovakia), followed by Mediterranean countries. When the effective maternity leave is taken into consideration (the duration of the leave

¹⁹⁰ The only exception is Latvia, where the provision of home-based services for elderly people is lower than that of residential services.

¹⁹¹ Among Mediterranean countries, Portugal represents a unique case, because of its historically high female participation rates in the labour market (Bettio et al., 2006). This explains the relatively high coverage in terms of childcare services, compared to the other Mediterranean countries.

weighted by the level of compensation), the most familialisatic maternity leaves are those offered by Estonia, Czech Republic, Poland, Portugal and Hungary. This confirms literature's findings, that point at the overdevelopment of maternity leave policies as a way to strengthen the traditional (Catholic) culture that considers mothers as the natural providers of care for children.

Overall, continental countries such as Germany, Luxembourg, Austria and the islands position themselves in the average score albeit wide differences exist in the combination of familialistic/de-familialistic policies. For instance, while Germany offers medium to low public services for both children and the elderly but has a more de-familialistic approach to maternity leaves, Austria on the contrary encourages a more familialistic approach through long and well-paid maternity leaves, but offers less public services for the care of children. In Austria, as it is the case in the Netherlands and the UK, there is quite a different approach between the care for children and the care for elderly people, the latter being more developed. The UK shows a relatively strong familialism with respect to maternity leaves, but a de-familialistic approach regarding public care provision. However, as mentioned above, a difference exists between elderly care provision, which is traditionally taken in charge by public authorities, and the care of children, which is under-developed, especially in terms of full-time services.

Overall, when only the familialisation/de-familialisation approach is taken into account, two main considerations can be drawn. First, countries differ considerably with respect to the degree of de-familialisation of their care policies, with Northern countries being the most striking examples of de-familialisation and Mediterranean countries the strongest promoters of familialism. Second, differences exist in the degree of de-familialisation depending on the policy area. While policies of de-familialistion seem to be stronger with respect to public provision of elderly care, all European countries overall present a stronger degree of familialisation in the field of childcare. Only Sweden and Belgium show an overall de-familialistic approach in all policy areas. However, as literature has shown, in the field of childcare provision a full de-familialisation is unlikely to happen and to be sought for (Saraceno, 2011). This is confirmed by the fact that, despite consistent differences, maternity leaves are part of any welfare state, no matter its de-familialisation intents.

5.1.2.2 Construction of the generosity index

As a first step for the construction of the generosity index, the database was prepared so to include all the selected indicators. The resulting database, with standardised variables, as well as the correlation matrix, is reported in Annex 2.

After testing the correlation between the variables, a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was run on the six items and on the 22 countries for which data are available. The usual indexes (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin and Cortest Bartlett's test of sphericity) confirm that a PCA can be performed on these data¹⁹².

The first component alone explains the 41% of the initial variance, while two components combined explain 69% of the variance. Since only two components had eigenvalues over Kaiser's criterion of 1, the analysis was rerun to extract two components. The full information on the PCA is reported in Annex 2, together with the factor loadings of the two components, which correspond to the childcare component and the elderly care component.

Table 22: Summary of PCA, oblique rotation (N = 22) - Generosity


Item	Loadings component 1 – Childcare	Loadings component 2 – Elderly care
Effective parental leave	.73	
Child allowance 1 st child	.94	
Child allowance 2 nd child	.91	
Minimum social security		.87
Net replacement rate		.45
LTC expenditure		.71
Eigenvalues	2.44	1.70
% of variance	41	69
alpha	.85	.47

The PCA confirms that, in line with the literature, European countries do not necessarily have the same behaviour in terms of generosity of policies addressing childcare and elderly care: some countries can be very generous in supporting families on their needs for childcare and less in supporting elderly care, and vice versa (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004).

Figure 16 shows the degree of generosity of policies addressing childcare in all European countries included in the analysis.

¹⁹² KMO = .6 (all KMO values for individual items were > .47). The Cortest Bartlett's test of sphericity, $\chi^2(15) = 52.83297$, $p < .001$, indicated that correlations between items were sufficiently large for PCA.

Figure 16: Generosity of childcare policies in 22 EU member states




As it emerges from Figure 16, when only the degree of generosity is taken into consideration, the countries that better support families in terms of generosity of childcare policies are Germany, Denmark, Luxembourg and Sweden, but also Hungary and Slovenia. Therefore, the most generous care regimes with respect to childcare are Northern countries, but also two among Eastern European countries. Germany and Hungary are the countries that offer better coverage, regarding both child allowances and effective parental leaves, with Germany offering the best parental leave coverage in Europe. Denmark offers a lower coverage of effective parental leaves, but provides high financial support in the form of child allowances. The less generous countries in terms of childcare policies are Greece, Spain and Portugal, with Italy showing a slightly higher support compared to the other Mediterranean countries, thanks to higher child allowances. Among continental countries, France and the Netherlands, together with the UK, offer quite poor financial support in the form of child allowances and with the exception of France an underdeveloped package of parental leaves. All Eastern European countries show a medium level of generosity for childcare, with good effective parental leaves and lower child allowances. However, it should be noticed that since the packages of parental leaves of Eastern European countries are not formulated as to encourage the participation of fathers in caring responsibilities (Saraceno and Keck, 2010), as they do not include any specific quotas to be taken by fathers, they tend to be used only by mothers, who add them up to their maternity leave.

By looking at the generosity of care regimes in meeting childcare needs, what clearly emerges is that Mediterranean countries offer the least support, while Northern, continental and Eastern European countries offer different degrees of support. In particular, France, the Netherlands and the UK show a particularly poor generosity of childcare policies.

Figure 17 shows the degree of generosity of policies addressing elderly care in all European countries included in the analysis.

Figure 17: Generosity of elderly care policies in 22 EU member states




The most generous countries among those included in the analysis are Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Ireland, while the countries that provide the least financial support for elderly care are Eastern European countries, together with Germany and Spain. In the latter countries, the care for elderly people seems to be considered as a family responsibility and the state only provides a limited support. The public expenditure in long-term care (LTC) shows that the countries that allocate less financial resources for the care of elderly people are Greece, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia and Poland, while Denmark, Belgium and Sweden allocate the most conspicuous resources. The most generous minimum social security scheme is offered by Denmark, while Germany, Spain and Hungary offer a less generous protection. Greece, Hungary and the Netherlands offer the strongest financial protection in the form of net replacement rates.

Overall, the most generous countries for elderly care are Northern countries, while the less generous are Eastern European countries. The behaviour of Mediterranean countries, and of Italy and Greece in particular, is peculiar: while they show low LTC expenditure and poor social security schemes, they score in the average position compared to all other countries. This is due to the fact that Mediterranean countries generally offer relatively generous pension schemes for elderly people, combined with limited social security (Jehoel-Gijsbers and Vrooman, 2008).

5.1.3 Results

Figure 18 shows the position of EU member states with respect to the generosity of policies towards children (x-axis) and towards elderly people (y-axis).

Figure 18: Generosity of care regimes in 22 EU member states



Two distinct behaviours are detectable. First, there is a group of countries that behave more or less coherently in terms of generosity towards children and the elderly, be that with higher or lower degrees of support. In this group of countries, we can identify a cluster of countries where both childcare and elderly care are well financed by the state. This group includes

Belgium, Ireland, Sweden, Luxembourg, Austria and Denmark. The latter is the country that offers the highest level of generosity in all care policies, far higher than any other country of the same cluster. Among the same countries, Belgium provides more financial support for elderly care, compared to childcare. This is mainly due to its care system, that privileges elderly care and childcare services and allowances/pensions, but offers less financial support in terms of paternity and maternity leaves. Still among the countries that behave quite coherently in terms of generosity, we recognise another group of countries, which on the contrary offer less generous support for both elderly people and children. This group includes Poland, Latvia, Slovakia, Italy, France, Czech Republic and the UK, whose care regimes are characterised by less generous policies on both fields. Spain also shows low generosity of care policies, but with a significant difference between childcare and elderly care. While childcare policies are among the less generous in Europe, together with Greece, generosity on elderly care seems to be slightly higher.

The second type of behaviour concerning generosity of care regimes is that of countries that show a wide difference between the care support for elderly care and for children. While the care regimes of Germany, Hungary, Slovenia and Finland are very generous in supporting childcare needs, they are consistently less generous for the care of elderly people. On the contrary, the Netherlands, Greece and Portugal offer generous support to elderly people, while they provide less support for childcare. This is particularly true in the case of Greece, whose policies addressing childcare needs are among the less generous in Europe. The Netherlands, in line with the findings of the literature, offers a very generous care support for senior citizens, but a less generous support for childcare.

The second group of countries testifies that the degree of support of welfare states is not unambiguous and that care policies closely depend on the way care responsibilities are understood as family or public responsibilities. In countries such as the Netherlands, but also in Mediterranean countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain and partly Italy) the care of elderly people seems to be recognised at least partly as a public responsibility, while the care of children is almost entirely conceived as a family matter. On the contrary, in countries like Germany, Hungary, Slovakia and Finland, the state assumes a large part of childcare responsibilities, while the care of senior citizens is not fully acknowledged as a public issue.

The differentiation between the generosity towards childcare and elderly care also shows that a great difference exists in Europe in the level of financial support to care needs. While Northern countries, and especially Denmark, offer a strong financial support to families, Eastern European and Mediterranean countries generally stand out as countries whose care


regime is the less financially supported. Surprisingly, France is part of the group of countries that offer the least financial support to care, despite the historical strength of its system of social provision. This can be partly due to the selection of the indicators, which might have excluded those fields where the care regime of France is stronger, but it could also be traced back to the fact that France has recently experienced a weakening of the traditional generosity of its welfare state. However, the case of France and the development of its care regime deserve further future investigations.

As a final step in the analysis of care regimes in Europe, the two dimensions – de-familialisation and generosity of care regimes – were combined together, in order to offer a multifaceted analysis. A synthetic index for generosity was obtained by calculating the average between the generosity towards childcare and elderly care. The reduction of the two generosity indexes to a synthetic measure is meant to facilitate the visual representation of the two main dimensions employed as a framework for this analysis. Although this oversimplifies the issue of the generosity of care regimes, as it reduces it to a single measure that does not differentiate between elderly care and childcare, it is nevertheless useful for an analysis that takes into consideration two different approaches to care.

Figure 19 shows the position of EU member states with respect to the de-familialisation index (x-axis) and the generosity index (y-axis).

A few interesting findings emerge from the combination of the two dimensions. First of all, Figure 19 clearly shows that only in a minority of European countries care regimes can be said to decidedly pursue the de-familialisation. Indeed, the great majority of care regimes concentrate in the first and fourth quadrant of the plot, which refers to familialisation. Second, among care regimes characterised by average or strong degrees of familialisation, a great difference exists in terms of generosity, with countries (mainly continental countries and the islands) providing a more generous support, and countries (mainly Eastern European and Mediterranean countries) providing a weaker financial support. Another element that can be derived from the graphical representation of the two dimensions is that, although France shows a relatively poor degree of generosity overall, no care regime seems to act in favour of de-familialisation of care responsibilities without providing a certain support in terms of generosity. In other words, findings seem to suggest that de-familialisation policies always imply a certain amount of state support, also from the economic point of view, while familialisation can be achieved either with public financial support or without a substantial financial support scheme.

Figure 19: Care regimes in 22 EU member states



5.1.4 A typology of care regimes


Based on the de-familialisation and on the generosity indexes, a cluster analysis¹⁹³ was conducted in order to identify cluster of countries that behave similarly with respect to the two dimensions. Different types of cluster techniques were used to find the most robust typology, including a first agglomerative hierarchical clustering that shows the main clustering path based on the two indicators, and subsequently two partitional cluster analyses¹⁹⁴. Annex 3 reports the dissimilarity matrix, the dendrogram of the hierarchical clustering and the results of the PAM cluster analysis.

Figure 20 shows the graphical representation of the PAM cluster analysis, based on the generosity and the familialisation indexes.

¹⁹³ For more details on cluster analysis, refer to section 3.1.1.

¹⁹⁴ After an explorative hierarchical clustering, a k-means cluster analysis and a Partitioning Around Medoids (PAM) cluster analysis were conducted. Although the results were almost identical, only the PAM – which offers the best results and is commonly considered as a more robust technique – is reported.

Figure 20: Typology of care regimes - PAM cluster analysis



According to the cluster analysis, three clusters of countries can be identified¹⁹⁵. A first cluster – which I name *de-familialisation* – includes Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands and France. This cluster includes all countries that are characterised by a high degree of de-familialisation, with a medium to high degree of generosity of care regimes. Although the care regime of Denmark is both the most generous and the one showing the highest degree of de-familialisation, all countries have in common care regimes that provide both public alternatives to family care and a certain degree of financial support. In these countries, the state takes in charge care responsibilities and the family is not regarded as the only care provider. In these care regimes, the unpaid work usually performed by women is partially substituted by paid external labour, be that domestic and cleaning work or care work. Domestic and care needs can be satisfied through public support, without the mediation of family resources or the solidarity of the extended family and networks (Leira et al., 2005; Bettio and Plantenga, 2004).

Looking specifically at care policies addressing childcare, this high degree of de-familialisation is usually achieved through relatively short but well-paid maternity leaves and

¹⁹⁵ The clustering techniques used for this analysis could justify the subdivision of countries in 3 or 4 clusters. However, all solutions with 4 clusters identified Denmark as a cluster on its own, due to the wide distance existing between this country and all other EU countries (Denmark is the European countries that shows far the highest scores on both indicators). However, the solution with 3 clusters was chosen, as Denmark can be grouped in with Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands and France, which all show high degrees of de-familialisation, albeit with lower scores compared to Denmark.

generous parental leaves, coupled with the availability of childcare facilities. Concerning elderly care, de-familialisation is achieved through generous elderly care policies, mainly in the form of public services (both residential homes and home-based care services). Additionally, if we consider policies providing incentives for the externalisation of housework activities, we see that the de-familialisation cluster includes the two countries – Belgium and France – that have introduced a voucher system for housework services¹⁹⁶ and that offer families strong incentives for externalising cleaning activities. However, also the other countries offer certain incentives for housework services, mainly in the form of tax deductions, reduction of the VAT and of contributions for housework services.

A second cluster – which I name *familialisation with state support* – includes Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Germany, the UK, Austria, Finland, Slovenia, Italy and Portugal. Although the care regimes of this cluster differ significantly in the way care policies are combined, they are characterised by a low level of de-familialisation coupled with a medium-to-high level of generosity. In these countries, the role of families as care providers is not questioned, but the state supports families in meeting their care and domestic responsibilities. This is usually achieved through monetary transfers, rather than public services.

Looking specifically at care policies addressing childcare, this cluster of countries is characterised by relatively long and well-paid maternity leaves and high child allowances, but medium to low provision of public childcare facilities. Regarding elderly care, the provision of public services for elderly people is quite poor (very poor in the case of Italy and Portugal) and the family needs towards the elderly are met mainly through financial transfers (pensions and social security)¹⁹⁷. Generally, these countries do not offer specific incentives for the externalisation of housework, apart from tax deductions (Germany, Finland, Italy and Luxembourg). Overall, this cluster refers to care regimes where domestic and care responsibilities are acknowledged as family responsibilities, but where the state provides a certain degree of (mainly monetary) support to families. In these countries, the care burden of families is not questioned, but only partly alleviated by public aid (Letablier and Jönsson, 2005).

¹⁹⁶ While both voucher systems cover housework activities, the French system allows the use of vouchers for both domestic and care services. In Belgium, the voucher system includes only housework (cleaning, ironing, preparing meals, buying groceries) and all other forms of work are strictly forbidden. There is currently a debate in Belgium on whether the voucher system should be open to care activities, but no action has been taken into this direction so far.

¹⁹⁷ Concerning elderly care, this cluster of countries is characterised by the extensive use of cash-for-care allowances, rather than public services. Unfortunately, no such indicator (on the availability and the level of cash benefits) could be included in the analysis. Therefore, this instrument will not be commented further.

As anticipated, among the countries that belong to this cluster wide differences exist, especially in the level of support provided by the state. The care regimes of Italy and Portugal are those that show the lowest degree of generosity and in the case of Italy also a low degree of de-familialisation, comparable to countries that belong to the third cluster. Looking specifically at the indicators included in the analysis, it becomes apparent that although Italy and Portugal share the same levels of scores and therefore are more similar to countries of the third cluster, their care regime is more generous with regards to policies addressing elderly care, mainly through relatively high pension schemes.

Finally, the third cluster – which I name *familialisation without state support* – includes the majority of Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Latvia, Estonia) and two Mediterranean countries (Greece and Spain). In these countries, the care regime is characterised by a very low public support for domestic and care activities. Families are largely recognised as the only care providers and the state provides neither adequate alternatives in the form of public services (childcare and elderly care facilities), nor a sufficient financial support to families to meet their caring needs. These care regimes implicitly and explicitly encourage the mediation of family resources and family solidarity, which goes in parallel with the scarce public care provision (Leire et al., 2005).

Looking specifically at the indicators included in the analysis, this type of familialism without state support is achieved through very long and relatively well-paid maternity leaves, relatively poor parental leaves and very low child allowances. Both childcare facilities and public services for elderly people are underdeveloped, especially in Eastern European countries and in Greece, and social security schemes and pensions are among the lowest in Europe (with the exception of Greece, which offers high pension schemes). No specific public incentives exist for the externalisation of domestic activities, apart from a system of reduced contributions for housework services in Spain.

As emphasised by the literature, the extremely low level of de-familialisation of care policies shows that the care regime in these countries is based on very traditional views about the role of families – and especially female family members – as care providers (Letablier and Jönsson, 2005; Gerhard et al., 2005). Care responsibilities are generally considered a family responsibility, and families have to choose either to sacrifice the paid work of one family member, or to mobilise family resources (extended family, neighbours and other networks), when available. When unpaid external help is unavailable and all family members are not able to provide unpaid care work, families have to buy domestic and care services in the market,

but a certain degree of financial burden remains on families, since public financial help is usually insufficient (Bettio et al., 2006; Catanzaro and Colombo, 2009; Ambrosini, 2011).

5.2 Measuring the gender regime

For the purpose of this analysis, the gender regime is conceptualised as the combination of two separate dimensions: 1) the gender equality and 2) the gender contract¹⁹⁸. The first dimension measures the outcomes of all types of policies that directly or indirectly have an impact on the different attainments of men and women, as well as policies specifically addressing the equality between men and women. This dimension includes indicators that measure different aspects of gender equality outcomes, such as employment status, economic situation, educational attainments, access to power, access to health and to other services, and so on. The second dimension – which is more difficult to measure – is what literature has often referred to as the ‘gender contract’. This dimension includes the general perception of gender roles in society and within the family and of what is considered to be the ideal sharing of work and family responsibilities between men and women. It also includes general views about what is considered to be ‘good care’ (for children, for the elderly and for other dependent people) and who is responsible for the general everyday well-being of the family (tasks related to house maintenance, cleaning, etc.). For the first dimension an existing index – the Gender Equality Index 2015 – was used, while for the second dimension an index measuring the gender contract was constructed.

The two dimensions have been kept separate throughout the analysis, based on the assumption that outcomes in terms of gender equality do not necessarily coincide with gender expectations, gender social norms and the institutional and individual perception of gender roles. Although there are reasons to expect that a positive correlation exists between the two dimensions, incoherence between gender equality outcomes and gender expectations could not be excluded.

In this section, a tentative measurement of the gender regime is presented, that takes into consideration the two above-mentioned dimensions of the gender regime. In the last section of the chapter, the construction of a typology of gender regimes based on the gender equality and the gender contract indexes is presented.

¹⁹⁸ For details about the conceptualisation of gender regimes and about the difference between gender equality and the gender contract, refer to Chapter 2, section 2.3.

5.2.1 Construction of indicators and typologies of gender regimes

Due to the complexity of the concept of gender regimes, a full understanding of the gender regime in place in a given country should take into consideration both gender equality in a broader sense and the overall perception of gender roles and individuals' attitudes about the gender division of labour¹⁹⁹. Therefore, the construction of the indicators to measure the gender regime and the subsequent development of a typology of gender regimes in Europe is based on the theoretical definition of gender regimes as the combination of two separate dimensions: the dimension that measures gender equality outcomes and the dimension assessing cross-country differences in terms of the gender contract²⁰⁰.

For the first dimension, the Gender Equality Index 2015 (GEI) was used. For the second dimension, a new indicator was constructed, based on selected indicators from two European publicly available datasets: the ad hoc module on 'family work and well-being' of the European Social Survey 2004²⁰¹ and the Special Eurobarometer 428/2014 on 'gender equality'.

The first dimension, which corresponds to the more 'objective' dimension of gender regimes, includes the attainments achieved in each country in relation to gender equality. Given the multifaceted and cross-cutting nature of the concept of gender equality, this dimension covers different domains, such as educational attainments, employment situation, political representation and participation, gender segregation, access to health and other services, and so on. The first dimension, for which rich institutional data is available, is easier to measure, as outcomes in terms of gender equality can be taken as instruments to assess the level of gender equality attainments at country level.

The second dimension, which corresponds to the more 'subjective' dimension of gender regimes, includes what literature has often referred to as the 'gender contract'. The introduction of this dimension in the definition of gender regimes intends to bring a

¹⁹⁹ The first dimension of the gender regime, as it is defined in this study, includes gender equality in a broad sense. This can be assessed either through the analysis of policies that directly or indirectly influence the degree of gender equality, or through the analysis of gender equality outcomes. For this analysis of gender regimes, it was chosen to use gender equality outcomes, rather than policies, as the assessment of the actual attainments seems more accurate than the evaluation of how gender equality is formally included into policies.

²⁰⁰ For more information about the theorisation of the gender contract, refer to section 2.3.2.

²⁰¹ Although a more recent ESS ad-hoc module on family wellbeing exists (Round 5, 2010), it does not include all European countries (in particular, data is not available for Italy and Luxembourg). Therefore, after verifying the consistency of the responses by country from 2004 to 2010, I have decided to use the 2004 version.

measurement of the overall gender culture, which includes, among other things, the general perception of the role of men and women in society and within the family, the most suitable combination of sharing of responsibilities among sexes and the accepted combination of sharing of domestic and care responsibilities among the family, the state and the market.

Although the majority of quantitative measurements that focus on gender-related issues are based only on the first dimension, I argue that the introduction of the second dimension is necessary for a deeper understanding of the impact of gender regimes on the domestic sector in Europe. Although it could be presumed that a strong correlation between the two dimensions exists, I posit that they should be kept separate, because they do not measure the same aspect of the gender regime and therefore they can potentially not coincide. For instance, a more traditional view about gender roles in the family can coexist with low gender gaps in the labour market and/or in educational attainments. On the contrary, a more progressive gender contract and a more equal sharing of responsibilities within couples could exist in contexts where gender equality outcomes are still relatively poor.

For the first dimension, European countries are ranged according to the Gender Equality Index 2015, from countries that have achieved higher outcomes in terms of gender equality to countries where gender inequalities in all fields are still prevalent.

For the second dimension, the aim is to range countries based on the type of gender contract that is dominant in a given place. Countries with lower scores in this dimension are countries where family and care responsibilities tend to be considered tasks to be performed within families, namely by women. On the contrary, countries with higher scores are countries where the division of labour between men and women is more equal and where at least part of family and care activities tend to be considered as a state responsibility. The idea is to position European countries in a scale that corresponds to the informal gender contract, where the lowest denotes more patriarchal approaches to care and family responsibilities, and the highest describes more progressive approaches.

The lowest extreme of the scale is a country where the overall perception of the gendered division of labour is that all activities related to the well-being of the family should be performed by the family, and by women in particular. In these countries, ideally women would not participate in the paid labour market and stay home to perform cleaning and care tasks for the sake of the family, while only men pursue a professional career. In these countries, childcare services, residential services for the elderly and the use of paid cleaning services are regarded as inappropriate and/or unacceptable.

On the contrary, the highest extreme of the scale is ideally a country where the traditional gendered division of labour is weaker, where a full-time job for women is not seen as detrimental for the sake of the family and where the use of paid external services (childcare facilities, residential services for the elderly and cleaning services) is considered as acceptable and appropriate. In these countries, people expect the state to support them in their family responsibilities and external public services are welcome.

5.2.2 Selection of indicators

As anticipated, for the first dimension an existing index – the Gender Equality Index 2015 – was used. This index, elaborated by the European Union, measures the national attainments in terms of gender equality, assigning to each member state an overall score, based on the outcomes in six sub-dimensions: work, money, knowledge, time, power and health. The index used in this analysis is the overall composite index, which includes the above-mentioned sub-dimensions and excludes the two additional satellite domains measured by the GEI (gender-based violence and intersecting inequalities)²⁰².

For the second dimension, a new indicator was constructed, based on two European publicly available datasets, namely the ad hoc module on ‘family work and well-being’ of the European Social Survey 2004²⁰³ and the Special Eurobarometer 428/2014 on ‘gender equality’. Several indicators were selected, based on relevance, to reflect and assess the second dimension that defines the gender contract. All selected variables measure the respondents’ opinions in each European country with respect to specific statements about gender roles and the sharing of house and childcare responsibilities²⁰⁴.

²⁰² For details about the Gender Equality Index, refer to section 3.3.3 of the methodology.

²⁰³ Although a more recent ESS ad-hoc module on family wellbeing exists (Round 5, 2010), it does not include all European countries (in particular, data is not available for Italy and Luxembourg). Therefore, after verifying the consistency of the responses by country from 2004 to 2010, I have decided to use the 2004 version. For details about the two Rounds, refer to section 3.3.3.

²⁰⁴ No indicator was found that assesses the respondents’ opinions about caring responsibilities of elderly people and dependant people, other than children. A few European surveys exist which focus on the ageing of the population and the availability of welfare services with respect to elderly care, but none aims specifically at evaluating individual opinions about caring responsibilities of elderly people. It is important to notice that the omission of opinions about the care responsibilities towards the elderly might represent a bias in the measurement of the gender contract, as the care for children and the care for other dependant people might be conceived and judged differently in different contexts. For instance, while the care for children is everywhere at least partially considered a family responsibility, this is not the case of elderly care, which in some countries is more accepted as being a state responsibility. For examples and existing literature highlighting this issue, refer to section 2.2.4.2.

Specifically, two variables were selected from the European Social Survey, round 2 (2004), where respondents were asked to evaluate the following statements, ranking from 1 to 5, where 1 is ‘strongly agree’ and 5 ‘strongly disagree’:

- 1) Women should be prepared to cut down on paid work for sake of family;
- 2) Men should have more right to job than women when jobs are scarce.

Another five variables were selected from the Eurobarometer survey, where respondents were asked to evaluate the following statements, ranking from 1 to 4, where 1 is ‘strongly agree’ and 4 ‘strongly disagree’:

- 1) All in all family life suffers when the mother has a full-time job;
- 2) Women are less willing than men to make a career for themselves;
- 3) Men should work more in childcare sectors, such as day nurseries;
- 4) Overall men are less competent than women to perform household tasks;
- 5) A father must put his career ahead of looking after his young child.

Table 23 provides the list of the seven items selected for the measurement of the second dimension, as well as the source.

Table 23: Indicators used for the analysis of gender regimes


Dimension	Indicator	Source
Gender equality	Gender Equality Index	Gender Equality Index – European Commission
Gender contract	Women should be prepared to cut down on paid work for the sake of family (1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree)	European Social Survey (2/2004)
	Men should have more right to job than women when jobs are scarce (1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree)	European Social Survey (2/2004)
	All in all family life suffers when the mother has a full-time job (1 = strongly agree, 4 = strongly disagree)	Special Eurobarometer 428/2004
	Women are less willing than men to make a career for themselves (1 = strongly agree, 4 = strongly disagree)	Special Eurobarometer 428/2004
	Men should work more in childcare sectors, such as day nurseries (1 = strongly agree, 4 = strongly disagree)	Special Eurobarometer 428/2004
	Overall men are less competent than women to perform household tasks (1 = strongly agree, 4 = strongly disagree)	Special Eurobarometer 428/2004
	A father must put his career ahead of looking after his young child (1 = strongly agree, 4 = strongly disagree)	Special Eurobarometer 428/2004

5.2.2.1 First dimension: the gender equality index

Based on the Gender Equality Index, countries are ranked in terms of the outcomes in six sub-domains of gender equality: work (participation in the labour market, level of segregation in the labour market and the quality of work), money (financial resources and overall economic situation), knowledge (educational attainment, segregation in education and the lifelong learning), time (time devoted to economic activities, time devoted to care activities and time devoted to social activities) and power (economic, social and political power).

Figure 21 shows the position of European countries based on the GEI 2015, ranking from the higher to the lower scores.

Figure 21: Gender Equality Index 2015 - overall scores EU-28



As shown by the graphical representation, the countries that position themselves above the European average are Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Finland, Denmark), continental countries (the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg), the islands (the UK and Ireland), plus Slovenia and Spain. On the contrary, the countries that score very poorly compared to the European average score are Eastern European countries (Romania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic) and Mediterranean

countries (Portugal, Greece and Italy). Countries like Austria, Estonia, Malta and Latvia show average scores, which are closer to the EU average and those of other continental countries.

What clearly emerges from the graphic is that Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands represent a definite group of countries, characterised by scores far above all the other European countries. These countries are far the most progressive countries in terms of gender equality outcomes. The difference among all the other EU countries is smaller, as they position themselves along a continuum from continental (higher scores) to Mediterranean and Eastern European countries (lower scores). Therefore, the overall attainments in terms of gender equality seem to be quite defined by geographical areas, with Northern and continental regions being more progressive and with better gender equality outcomes, and Southern and Eastern regions being less developed with respect to gender equality achievements. The only exceptions to the rule are Spain and Slovenia, which present relatively higher scores, compared to the EU average and compared to Mediterranean and Eastern countries.

5.2.2.2 Second dimension: the gender contract index

The selected indicators were first treated, in order to differentiate between more or less traditional views about gender roles and sharing of responsibilities between men and women, which correspond to a more or less traditional type of gender contract. Since all selected indicators were ordinal variables, ranking responses from 1 to 4 or from 1 to 5, the proportion of the responses that show the less traditional gender contract were calculated for each item and for each country by summing up the percentages of ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ responses, or ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’, in the case of reversed questions, and then by calculating the proportion compared to the whole set of responses²⁰⁵. The detailed responses for each variable, as well as the percentages of ‘agreement’ or ‘disagreement’ (depending on the wording of the statement), are reported in Annex 4.

The indicators were then merged into a single dataset, which includes seven indicators and where the values indicate the proportion of the more progressive views about gender roles

²⁰⁵ The total percentage of the most progressive responses in terms of gender contract was calculated as follow. The sum of ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘disagree’ was calculated for Variable 1 (Women should be prepared to cut down on paid work for sake of family), Variable 2 (Men should have more right to job than women when jobs are scarce), Variable 3 (All in all family life suffers when the mother has a full-time job), Variable 4 (Women are less willing than men to make a career for themselves), Variable 6 (Overall men are less competent than women to perform household tasks) and Variable 7 (A father must put his career ahead of looking after his young child). The sum of ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ was calculated for Variable 5 (Men should work more in childcare sectors, such as day nurseries). The proportion of total disagreement or total agreement was then calculated with respect to the full set of responses.

(gender contract) compared to the totality of responses. Countries for which the information was missing in either of the two datasets (ESS and Eurobarometer) had to be removed. The final dataset, presented in Table 24, includes seven variables and 21 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, the UK, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia.

Table 24: Final dataset for the second dimension (the gender contract)

Country	VAR1 Women should cut down on paid work for the sake of family	VAR2 Men should have more right to job when jobs are scarce	VAR3 Family life suffers when the mother works full-time	VAR4 Women are less willing than men to make a career	VAR5 Men should work more in the childcare sector	VAR6 Men are less competent than women in household tasks	VAR7 A father must put his career ahead of looking after children
AT	25	50	25	51	61	40	56
BE	44	54	41	68	51	64	73
CZ	20	38	38	58	30	48	61
DE	26	54	38	63	63	46	69
DK	62	84	65	67	85	77	84
EE	17	43	36	69	43	59	73
ES	25	56	26	79	75	40	56
FI	49	71	70	80	77	62	71
FR	29	57	46	84	63	67	82
GR	31	31	25	69	44	45	68
HU	23	29	22	55	43	28	48
IE	32	57	42	64	56	44	61
IT	35	33	26	60	53	27	52
LU	20	57	29	76	71	63	78
NL	46	65	53	65	36	78	79
PL	21	39	28	53	42	38	50
PT	14	40	20	65	67	42	74
SE	51	78	66	79	85	69	93
SI	31	58	38	67	57	51	72
SK	31	48	39	56	31	46	47
UK	26	52	49	77	57	60	70

Table 24: the values in the table indicate the percentage of the most 'progressive' views about gender roles as a share of total responses. This proportion was calculated by summing up the responses 'strongly disagree' and 'disagree' for variables 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 and the responses 'strongly agree' and 'agree' for variable 5. The proportion was then calculated based on the total responses.

A Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was run on the seven items and the 21 countries for which data are available²⁰⁶. The first component extracted by the PCA explains the 66% of the initial variance, while the second component explains 14%²⁰⁷. The eigenvalues, together with the result of the scree plot, justify the retention of only one component. This means that all selected indicators refer to one single component, which alone defines the gender contract. The full information on the PCA is reported in Annex 4. Table 25 shows the factor loadings of the PCA with the extraction of one component. Finally, the scores were calculated for the component.

Table 25: Summary of PCA, without rotation (N = 21) - Gender contract

Item	Loadings 1 component – gender contract
VAR 1 - Women should be prepared to cut down on paid work for sake of family	.76
VAR 2 - Men should have more right to job than women when jobs are scarce	.93
VAR 3 - All in all family life suffers when the mother has a full-time job	.88
VAR 4 - Women are less willing than men to make a career for themselves	.71
VAR 5 - Men should work more in childcare sectors, such as day nurseries	.67
VAR 6 - Overall men are less competent than women to perform household tasks	.87
VAR 7 - A father must put his career ahead of looking after his young child	.85
Eigenvalues	4.64
% of variance	66
Cronbach's alpha	.89

Table 26 reports the scores of both the Gender Equality Index and the Gender contract index.

²⁰⁶ The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis: KMO = .65, which is above the acceptable limit of .5 (all KMO values for individual items were > .47). The Cortest Bartlett's test of sphericity, $\chi^2(21) = 123$, $p < .001$, indicated that correlations between items were sufficiently large for PCA.

²⁰⁷ The eigenvalue of the second component is below 1, which according to Kaiser's criterion (Field et al., 2012) means that it should not be retained. For details about the analysis, refer to Annex 4.

Table 26: Scores of the Gender Equality Index and the Gender contract index


Country	Gender equality index	Gender contract index
AT	50.2	-0.83
BE	58.2	0.42
CZ	43.8	-0.88
DE	55.3	-0.11
DK	70.9	1.97
EE	49.8	-0.27
ES	53.6	-0.16
FI	72.7	1.45
FR	55.7	0.86
GR	38.3	-0.63
HU	41.6	-1.54
IE	56.5	-0.13
IT	41.1	-1.07
LU	55.2	0.35
NL	68.5	0.83
PL	43.7	-1.25
PT	37.9	-0.62
SE	74.2	2.00
SI	57.3	0.12
SK	36.5	-0.84
UK	58	0.36

5.2.3 Results

Since the analysis of the second dimension resulted in one single index for the definition of the gender contract, the two final indexes – addressing respectively gender equality outcomes and the gender contract – were plotted against each other, in order to show how European countries for which data are available behave in relation to the two combined dimensions (Figure 22).

What clearly emerges from the plot is that – as mentioned in section 5.2 – a positive correlation between the two dimensions exists, which means that countries that score high on the gender equality index and that have better gender equality outcomes also tend to be more progressive in their opinions about the roles of women and men and the division of family and work responsibilities. The result is that countries group themselves along a line that goes from the bottom left quadrant of the graph to the upper right one.

Figure 22: Gender regimes in Europe



Countries at the lowest extreme are those whose overall perception of the gender division of labour entails that all activities related to the well-being of the family should be performed by the family, and by women in particular. In these countries women tend not to participate in the paid labour market, especially when they have children aged 0 to 3 years old, and only men pursue a professional career without interruptions. In these countries, childcare services and the use of paid cleaning services are regarded as somehow inappropriate and/or unacceptable. On the contrary, at the highest extreme there are countries where the traditional gendered division of labour is weaker, where a full-time job for women is not seen as detrimental for the family and where the use of paid external services (childcare facilities and cleaning services) is considered as acceptable and appropriate. In these countries, people expect the state to support them in their family responsibilities and external public services are welcome.

The graphical representation already shows that countries can be grouped into three main clusters, which present a significant distance between each other. What is remarkable is that while Scandinavian countries emerge as having far the highest scores in both dimensions, all the other European countries position themselves at a considerable distance from the Northern

model. This seems to suggest that both gender equality and general attitudes about the gender division of labour are most progressive in the Scandinavian area, while the rest of Europe stands far behind. Among countries with the lowest scores, Hungary, Poland, Italy, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Austria show the most traditional views about gender roles, with the lowest scores on the gender contract index, irrespectively of the scores in terms of gender equality. All these countries have in common a very traditional gender contract, compared to the other European countries, while gender equality outcomes differ between them, with Slovakia at the lower extreme of the gender equality index and Austria with relatively higher scores. It should be noticed that these are all countries with a strong traditional Catholic background, which could partly explain the very traditional attitudes about the family ideology and the role of men and women inside and outside the family.


5.2.4 A typology of gender regimes

Based on the gender equality and the gender contract indexes, a cluster analysis was conducted in order to identify cluster of countries that behave similarly with respect to the two dimensions. As in the case of care regimes, different types of cluster techniques were used to find the most robust typology, including a first agglomerative hierarchical clustering that shows the main clustering path based on the two indicators, and subsequently two partitional cluster analysis. Due to the very definite dissimilarity matrix, where three clusters of countries can clearly be identified, all clustering techniques employed in this section provided identical results²⁰⁸. Annex 5 reports the dissimilarity matrix, the dendrogram of the hierarchical clustering and the results of the k-means and the PAM cluster analysis.

Figure 23 shows the graphical representation of the typologies of gender regimes resulting from the cluster analysis.

²⁰⁸ The only difference is represented by Austria and Estonia, which lie at the border of two clusters: the hierarchical cluster analysis includes both countries in the third cluster, while the partitional cluster analysis include Austria in the third cluster and Estonia in the second (see the explanation later in the text).

Figure 23: Typologies of gender regimes in Europe



According to the cluster analysis, three clusters of countries can be identified: 1) Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands; 2) Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Spain, France, the UK, Ireland, Luxembourg and Slovenia; 3) Austria, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Slovakia. The clusters resulting from this analysis of the gender regime only partly overlap with existing typologies of European countries.

The first cluster – which I label *modern gender contract*²⁰⁹ – includes three Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) and the Netherlands, and clearly stands out as a block of countries where gender equality attainments are higher and opinions regarding gender roles are the most ‘progressive’. These are countries that in Esping-Andersen’s classification correspond to the social-democratic welfare model. This cluster of countries is also coherent with the majority of the classifications developed by feminist theories (see Chapter 2). The only exception is the Netherlands, whose presence in this cluster is in contradiction with the majority of welfare classifications, which usually group this country together with other continental countries. Moreover, compared to the Scandinavian countries, not only the Netherlands shows considerably lower scores, but it also presents a mixed pattern,

²⁰⁹ The labels for each cluster emphasise the gender contract, because it is considered the most innovative element of this analysis of gender regimes.

as it seems to behave better in terms of gender equality outcomes, but to have more conservative views about gender roles.

The second cluster – which I label *gender contract in transition* – presents similar average scores on both dimensions and is positioned in the middle of the plot. Overall, this cluster is more heterogeneous, as it includes countries that in the majority of welfare classifications belong to different groups. According to Esping-Andersen's classification, this group includes both liberal (UK, Ireland) and corporatist-conservative (Belgium, Germany, France) welfare countries. According to the classification of Letablier, neo-liberal (islands), maternalist (continental countries) and family ties countries (Spain) are all present in this group. The country that presents the most surprising behaviour is Spain, as the majority of classifications associate it to other Mediterranean countries (Simonazzi, 2009).

Finally, the third cluster – which I label *traditional gender contract* – includes both Mediterranean and Eastern European countries. These countries score poorly on both dimensions and are positioned at the bottom left of the quadrant. This cluster seems to contradict Esping-Andersen's typology, which does not differentiate between continental and Mediterranean countries. Indeed, it seems that quite a pronounced difference exists – at least in terms of gender equality – between continental countries on one side, and Mediterranean and East European countries on the other.

5.3 Measuring the migration regime

Although one of the objectives of the European Union is to create a common immigration policy, the division of competences between the EU and member states remains problematic, as member states are unwilling to lose their competence in the field of migration, for political, historical and economic reasons (European Parliament, 2011). Since the Tampere summit in 1999 and more and more since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU has made efforts to harmonise policies on migration and to expand a common European legal migration framework, mainly through the adoption of Directives on border control, legal migration, irregular migration, visa and the Common European Asylum System. However, immigration policies – especially those related to the integration of migrants in the host societies – still remain a competence of member states²¹⁰. The result is that host societies have

²¹⁰ The competences of the European Union in the field of migration include: 1) regular migration: the EU can establish the conditions governing entry and legal residence in a member state, including for family reunification, for third-country nationals. However, the member states maintain the right to determine the volumes of

admitted and incorporated migrants in very different ways, depending on historical, demographic, economic and social characteristics of each country (Rodriguez-Garcia, 2010) and great differences exist between countries in terms of migration regimes.

Systematic comparative research on migration regimes has gained momentum in the last decade (Helbling et al., 2013). However, the measurement and classification of migration regimes is still problematic for a variety of factors. First of all, migration regimes include two different dimensions that are usually treated separately: the immigration/admission regime and the integration regime. The first covers the entry and admission criteria of migrants and includes visas, entry and work permits, border control and the overall system of laws and regulations intended to manage the admission of migrants in the national territory. The second covers the situation of the migrant population once settled in the receiving country. It includes issues such as access to the labour market, access to health services, access to education, political participation, participation in cultural and leisure activities, access to social benefits and services, participation in trade unions, and so on. So far, the attempts to provide comprehensive quantitative tools to compare countries in terms of both admission and integration criteria have been scarce and the two dimensions are still analysed separately. A comprehensive database covering both dimensions and able to provide a quantitative assessment of immigration policies is still needed.

Among the databases that cover one or the other dimension, those that have been developed to cover integration regimes are generally the most suitable for quantitative international comparisons. Conversely, the few attempts to construct measurement instruments that cover immigration policies are of difficult use for international comparison, either because they are often intended to track changes in immigration restrictiveness in single countries, or because they include a limited number of countries²¹¹.

Another issue when comparing migration regimes is that existing classifications and measurement tools usually focus on either output policies or outcomes. In particular, while

admission; 2) integration: the EU can provide incentives for measures of integration in the member states. However, there is no legal provision for the harmonisation of national laws and regulations. 3) combating irregular migration: the EU provides incentives for the reduction of irregular migration, in the respect of human rights principles; 4) readmission agreements: the EU can conclude agreements with third countries for readmission purposes (“Fact sheet on the European Union – Immigration policy”, online). As stated in official documents of the European Parliament, “The Union’s competence in connection with migration does not affect the competence of the Member States in connection with the integration of third-country nationals residing legally in their territories, the determination of volumes of third-country nationals admitted in order to seek work or the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security, The exercise of Union competence must take Members States’ social security interests into account” (European Parliament, 2011).

²¹¹ For details regarding the existing classifications and databases on both immigration and integration systems, refer to section 2.4.3.

the introduction of outcome indicators (such as the number of migrants in the labour market, the effective use of health and social services by migrants, the number of expulsions from the territory, family reunification, etc.) would be beneficial for measuring migration regimes, some of the most powerful tools developed to classify migration systems are only based on the evaluation of policy outputs and a database integrating both output policy and outcomes is lacking (Boucher and Gest, 2015).

Due to the lack of existing indices to measure both immigration and integration systems and for the purpose of an evaluation of the impact of migration regimes on the domestic sector, the measurement and classification of migration regimes in this study was carried out as to include three elements. The first element is the overall environment regarding immigration in a given country, which includes integration policies, such as access and integration in the labour market, access to services, education, long-term residence and naturalisation, but also some policies that can help assessing the immigration/admission dimension²¹².

The second element, which could be included in the immigration/admission policy framework, is the type of immigration. This element includes two indicators that assess the reasons for migration and the provenance of migrants. Specifically, one indicator measures the number of residence permits issued by reason and covers the immigration of third-country nationals. Another indicator measures the provenance of intra-European migrants, which is particularly important for a study on domestic work. This indicator is meant to measure differences in intra-European migration, which are not captured by indicators on residence permits, as they comprise only third-country nationals.

The third element that has been included in the measurement of migration regimes is the extent of the informal economy in a given country, which is known to influence the presence of low-skilled migrants, including domestic workers. Following literature on domestic work and migration, the informal economy, together with some policy measures such as regularisation programmes, act as pull factors for the presence of (mainly irregular) migrants in some sectors of the labour market, including domestic services²¹³. The inclusion of this

²¹² For information about the distinction between integration and immigration policy frameworks, refer to section 2.4.3.

²¹³ Although regularisation programmes have been identified as having an effect on the arrival of domestic workers, no indicators on regularisation programmes was included in the analysis. This choice was based on the following reasons: 1) regularisation programmes act as pull factors for low-skilled migrants only when they are intended to provide legal status to irregular migrants who already live and work in a certain country (MPI, 2011). This is not the case in every European countries. While regularisation programmes were initially introduced in the migration regimes of Northern European states, such as France, UK and the Netherlands, in the last two decades they have become the prerogative of Southern countries. However, regularisation programmes are now used differently depending on the state, with Northern countries using them almost exclusively for humanitarian

indicator is based on the findings of recent studies, which have identified a link between a pre-existing underground economy and the inflow of migrants in certain sectors of the labour market, especially in low-skilled jobs (Bettio et al., 2006; Ambrosini, 2010; UNHCR, 2011; Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009). The presence of a large and easily accessible underground economy allows irregular migrants to remain on the territory, while waiting for regularisation opportunities, and at the same time creates expectations for potential migrants, who might be encouraged by easily accessible jobs in the receiving country.

In addition to the three above-mentioned elements, the selected indicators cover both policy outputs and outcomes. The detailed explanation on the selection of the indicators is presented in the following section.

5.3.1 Construction of indicators and typologies of migration regimes

Female migrants represent in some European countries the large majority of the workforce in the domestic sector, so that it has been highlighted as one of the most significant trends in recent developments of paid domestic work. However, a great variation exists among European countries with respect to the proportion of migrants in the domestic sector, which deserves a thorough analysis in order to understand such differences. The construction of a typology of the migration regime for the purpose of a study on paid domestic work is based on theoretical considerations about the direct and indirect impact that migration regimes might have on the presence of migrant domestic workers in the domestic sector, on the size of the sector and on working conditions. In addition, the pre-existence of a large informal economy in a given country has been identified as a pull factor that encourages the constant renewal of migration flows that go to fill labour market shortages. Domestic services represent one of the main sectors of the labour market where newly arrived migrants – both in a regular and irregular situation – are likely to find a job.

For the integration regime, the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) was selected, as it represents the most comprehensive existing index on migration/integration policies.

reasons and Mediterranean countries using them to regularise migrant workers (MPI, 2011). 2) an indicator measuring the number of regularisation programmes launched over time can be a source of confusion with respect to the beneficiaries. For instance, domestic workers from Eastern European migrants, who are known to have largely benefitted from regularisation programmes in Southern Europe, were the main beneficiaries of these policy measures, but only prior the accession of their countries into the European Union. To assess when these migrants have passed from irregular status to a regular situation can be arduous, both because the accession of Eastern countries came at different moments (2004, 2007 and 2013), and also because some old European countries have put in place restrictions for nationals of new accession countries, which vary from country to country.

Regarding the extent of the informal economy, the number of residence permits issued by reasons and the provenance of intra-European migrants, different sources have been combined, in order to derive accurate indicators. The list of the sources used for the classification of migration regimes is provided below.

5.3.2 Selection of indicators

Drawing both from the literature on migration regimes and that on domestic work, the indicators were selected with the purpose to cover the following aspects:

- 1) integration policies;
- 2) immigration/admission policies, which have an impact on the arrival of both third-country nationals and European nationals;
- 3) the size of the informal economy.

The overall score of MIPEX 2015, which includes eight policy areas and sub-indicators, was selected and included in the analysis to cover the dimension of integration policies. Although the MIPEX predominantly covers aspects linked to integration regimes (access to education and to health services, political participation, anti-discrimination issues, and so on), it nevertheless covers a variety of policies that can be useful in assessing also immigration policy frameworks, because it includes policies that are somehow related to the entry, residence and work permits of migrants. As Carrera observes with regard to the nexus between immigration and integration, the social inclusion of migrants is closely related to the immigration policy framework and “policies on admission are therefore paradoxically converging with those of social inclusion” ²¹⁴(2006, p. 13). In particular, I argue that the indicators regarding eligibility and conditions for family reunion and permanent residence, as well as policies regulating the access to the labour market, are particularly suitable for investigating both integration and immigration regimes.

In addition to the immigration/admission policies already included in the MIPEX, the analysis includes two outcome indicators that assess the presence of both third-country nationals and European nationals. The first indicator measures the presence of third-country nationals who obtained a first residence permit issued for employment reasons. This indicator is useful for

²¹⁴ Carrera takes as an example integration programmes, which in addition to their principal objective of favouring the integration of migrants in the host society, can be also used as policy tools to refrain migration. Therefore, integration programmes can be used to evaluate the degree of openness or restrictiveness of a country with respect to the arrival of new migrants.

two reasons. First, it allows assessing the size of the migrant population from third countries who arrived for work reasons and who are thus active in the labour market of the host society, this being particularly useful for the purpose of investigating the presence of migrant workers. Second, it allows assessing the type of migration, as the reasons for issuing first residence permits are a good indicator of the history of migration in a given country. For instance, countries of old immigration are more likely to issue residence permits for family reunification, compared to countries of new immigration, because of the size of second and third generations already in the country. On the contrary, countries of new immigration are more likely to issue permits for economic and work reasons, because their migrant population mainly includes newly arrived migrants.

The indicator on the presence of intra-European migrants was included in the analysis, because it covers the migrant population that do not require residence and work permits, in that part of the European Union. In particular, the indicator provides the proportion of European migrants coming from new accession countries compared to the total intra-European migrant population. The choice to include this indicator is based on two considerations. First, intra-European migration is often excluded from analysis on migration regimes, as the mobility of Europeans within the EU cannot be captured by immigration policies that regulate the admission of foreign people²¹⁵. Second, a great difference exists in the workforce composition of the domestic sector, between EU nationals coming from old European countries and nationals of Eastern European countries, the latter being the great majority of domestic workers.

In addition to these two indicators, one specific indicator estimating the size of the informal economy in 2015 has been included in the analysis. This is based on theoretical assumptions and follows the findings of scholarship on domestic work, which has highlighted the importance of a large pre-existing informal economy as a pull factor for migration inflows that go to fill labour shortages in certain sectors of the labour market.

Table 27 provides a schematic overview of the selected indicators, the dimensions covered by the indicators and the sources.

²¹⁵ Although a few European countries had put in place restrictions in the admission of nationals from new accession countries, these measures were temporary and all nationals of the EU28 are currently granted access and residence in any European country.

Table 27: Indicators for the measurement of migration regimes


Dimension	Indicator	Source
Integration regimes	Overall score MIPEX 2015 (synthetic indicator, covering 8 policy areas)	Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015 (MIPEX) – Migration Policy Group + national experts
Immigration regimes	Overall score MIPEX 2015 (synthetic indicator, covering 8 policy areas)	Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015 (MIPEX) – Migration Policy Group + national experts
	Number of first residence permits issued for employment reasons (% of all first residence permits)	<i>Residence permits statistics</i> (Eurostat)
	Number of migrants from new accession countries (% of all intra-European migrants – age 20-64)	<i>2016 Annual Report on intra-EU Labour Mobility</i> (European Commission)
Informal economy	Estimates informal economy 2015 (% GDP)	Schneider, 2015

5.3.2.1 Indicator on integration and immigration policies – MIPEX 2015

European countries differ significantly in the way they promote or discourage the admission of foreign people and their integration in the host society. Each migration regime derives from the combination of different policies, which can be more generous on certain aspects and more restrictive on other aspects, with respect to both the admission and the integration of migrants. The overall score of the MIPEX is a synthetic indicator that includes eight policy areas and sub-areas. It provides the general scores of all migration policies combined, which range from access to education, health and other services, to access to permanent residence and nationality. Although the MIPEX has been developed with the goal of measuring the policies on the integration of migrants, this index can be useful to generally evaluate and compare EU countries with respect to their overall approach to immigration and the presence of migrants in the host society.

Figure 24 shows the overall scores of the MIPEX 2015 in all EU member states.


Figure 24: MIPEX 2015 - overall scores EU-28



As it emerges from the graphical representation, when taking into account all policy areas included in the MIPEX, the countries that show the lowest score compared to all EU countries are Eastern European countries, plus Cyprus and Greece. Conversely, the countries that show the most developed migration policy system in terms of integration are Sweden, Portugal, Finland and Belgium. Continental countries, such as Germany, the Netherlands, France and Luxembourg, the islands (the UK and Ireland) and Italy and Spain have similar scores, all above the EU average.

If we compare the MIPEX overall scores with the size of the immigrant population in each European country (see Figure 25), we observe that there is no apparent correlation between the two. This suggests that a more open and favourable integration policy system does not seem to stimulate larger immigration flows, compared to a more restrictive system in terms of access and integration. For instance, although the overall MIPEX scores of Portugal and Finland are among the highest in Europe, their foreign-born population is quite small, compared to other countries, such as Latvia, which on the contrary score low on the MIPEX index and has a large foreign-born population. This contradicts popular views that associate less restrictive migration and integration policies with massive inflows of migrants. In the same way, countries whose migration regimes are based on restrictive policies and an environment more hostile to the integration of migrants in the host society do not necessarily refrain immigration.

Figure 25: Foreign-born population and MIPEX in 22 EU member states




Source: Data on the foreign-born population are extracted from Eurostat Statistical Books, 2011. *Migrants in Europe. A statistical portrait of the first and second generation.* Data not available for Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Hungary.

If instead of the overall MIPEX index only the overall score of the policy area on the labour market is taken into account, which includes information on the access of migrants to the labour market and the possibility for migrants to find a job in the formal economy, a few differences are observable, compared to the overall score on integration.

Figure 26 shows the ranking of EU member states according to the scores of the policy area “labour market mobility” of the MIPEX.

Figure 26: MIPEX 2015 - Scores on labour market mobility (EU-28)




While Sweden and Portugal present the highest scores and Eastern European countries the lowest scores also on labour market mobility, other countries behave slightly differently. Belgium, which shows an overall policy framework that is very favourable to the overall integration of migrants, offers fewer opportunities of access and integration in the labour market, compared to other countries. The same is true for the UK, France, Luxembourg and Ireland, whose policy framework on the access and integration of migrants in the labour market are below the EU average, although the overall score on integration suggests that other integration policies are more favourable to the integration of the migrant population. On the contrary, Estonia seems to offer better opportunities to migrants in the labour market, despite the overall unfavourable integration environment.

5.3.2.2 Indicator on the informal economy

This indicator provides the estimate of the shadow economy as a percentage of the national GDP. The measurement of the informal economy is complex, as it is meant to capture economic activities that are not part of the official sources, and per definition it can never be completely reliable. However, estimates on the informal economy can be a useful indicator in order to provide a picture of the overall situation in Europe.

Figure 27 shows the extent of the shadow economy in the European countries included in the analysis, which are ranked from the largest to the smaller:

Figure 27: Estimates on shadow economy in Europe



Sources: Schneider (2013). Countries are ranked from those showing the largest segment of the shadow economy as a percentage of the national GDP to those showing the smallest share. The horizontal line represents the European average.

The graphical representation of the estimates of the informal economy in Europe clearly shows that, apart from Slovakia and the Czech Republic, all Eastern European and Mediterranean countries present a proportion of the informal economy which is higher than the European average. Among these countries, it is Eastern European countries that have the highest informal economy, as a percentage of the national GDP. Overall, two clear patterns are observable: an increase of the shadow economy from West to East, which is from old to new European countries, and an increase in the shadow economy from North to South, with Mediterranean countries showing highest estimates, compared to Nordic countries.


5.3.2.3 Indicator on first residence permits issued for employment reasons

This indicator measures the presence of third-country nationals who have obtained a first residence permit for employment reasons, compared to all third-country nationals present in the territory on a legal basis. Data are extracted from official Eurostat sources and include information for the year 2015 and for all countries included in the analysis. The indicator was

obtained by calculating the proportion of first residence permits issued for employment reasons, compared to all other reasons, which include family reunification, education and other reasons.

Figure 28 shows the proportion of employment-related residence permits in the countries included in the analysis.

Figure 28: First residence permits issued for employment reasons (% of all residence permits) in 22 European countries



As expected, the countries that show the highest number of first residence permits issued for employment reasons are Eastern European countries, which are among countries of new immigration. On the contrary, countries of old immigration, such as the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France, Austria, Denmark and Sweden show a considerably lower percentage of permits issued for employment reasons. This is partly due to their older immigration history and the presence of older generations of migrants, which is likely to require a higher number of permits issued for family reasons. Also, since these countries are among those showing the highest scores in the indicator measuring integration, they are expected to be more open to admit foreigners on a humanitarian basis.

Mediterranean countries constitute an exception, because despite their recent immigration history, the number of residence permits issued for employment reasons is significantly low. Italy and Greece are among the countries where permits based on employment reasons are the smallest percentage, and where the majority of the residence permits are granted for reasons

of family reunion. At least two elements could explain this finding. First, the large informal economy of these countries absorbs a large segment of the foreign population, which is more likely to be found in irregular employment situations and thus not grasped by data on legal residence permits. However, a large informal economy is also a characteristic of Eastern European countries, which on the contrary issue the majority of residence permits for employment reasons. The second explanation regards the origin of the foreign population, which greatly differs depending on the receiving country. Contrary to countries of old immigration, Mediterranean countries host mainly migrants from Eastern European countries, who have a regular status and therefore do not require residence permits²¹⁶.

5.3.2.4 Indicator on migrants from new EU accession countries


This indicator measures the proportion of migrants coming from new EU accession countries among the total intra-European foreign population, in each European country included in the analysis²¹⁷. Data refer to the year 2015 and are extracted from the European Commission report *2016 Annual Report on intra-EU Labour Mobility*. Contrary to the indicator on residence permits, this indicator covers the migrant population that does not require residence and work permits, in that it is part of the European Union. The inclusion of this indicator in the analysis of migration regimes is especially important due to the high presence of Eastern European migrants working in the domestic sector in certain European countries.

The variable was derived by calculating the proportion of the number of migrants from new accession countries compared to the total intra-European population. Figure 29 shows the proportion of migrants from the new EU accession countries as a share of the total intra-European migrant population for the year 2015.

²¹⁶ According to Eurostat data, the main countries of birth of migrants in countries of old immigration (Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, for instance) include Turkey and Morocco, for which a residence permit is required. On the contrary, the main country of birth of migrants in Italy is Romania, whose nationals constitute the 17% of the total foreign population (Eurostat Statistics in focus, 31/2012).

²¹⁷ New accession countries include: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta (EU enlargement 2004), Romania, Bulgaria (EU enlargement 2007) and Croatia (EU enlargement 2013).

Figure 29: Migrants from new EU accession countries as a share of the total intra-European migration in 22 EU member states (2015)



In line with literature on domestic work, Figure 29 shows that Italy, Greece and to a lesser extent Ireland and Spain, are the countries with the highest concentration of migrants from new accession countries. Eastern European countries also show very high shares of migrants from new accession countries, which is more understandable due to their geographical proximity. On the contrary, Northern and continental countries, which correspond to countries of old immigration, show a smaller presence of migrants coming from new EU accession countries. This confirms that the country of origin of the foreign population in each European country is strongly related to the type of immigration, the age of immigration and historical legacies of each nation-state.

5.3.3 A typology of migration regimes

Based on the four indicators selected to measure migration regimes – the MIPEX, the extent of the informal economy, the first residence permits issued for employment reasons and the migrants from new EU accession countries – a cluster analysis was conducted in order to identify clusters of countries that behave similarly with respect to the selected dimensions. The explorative analysis to identify the right number of clusters suggested the possibility of

dividing countries into 3, 5 or even 6 groups. Different types of clustering techniques were used to find the most robust typology, including hierarchical, k-means and Partition Around Medoids (PAM) cluster analyses with 3 and 5 cluster solutions²¹⁸. The k-means cluster analysis with the extraction of 5 clusters is the one presented here. Annex 6 reports the dissimilarity matrix, the dendrogram of the hierarchical cluster analysis and the results of the k-means analysis with 5 clusters.

Figure 30 shows the graphical representation of the k-means cluster analysis with a 5 clusters solution, based on the four indicators.

Figure 30: Typology of migration regimes - k-means cluster analysis




Figure 30 shows the result of the cluster analysis. Although only two dimensions are visible in the figure, the countries are positioned in the space based on the four dimensions used in the analysis.

The resulting typology includes five separate clusters of countries. Since a cluster including only one item cannot be treated as a real cluster, I consider Poland as an outlier, the result being a typology of four clusters.

In terms of similarity with other European countries with respect to its migration regime, Poland possesses features that are as distant as possible from any other country and can for no reason be associated with other countries. Looking in detail at the Polish model of migration, it can be noticed that it is characterised by a very low score in terms of integration system

²¹⁸ The option of dividing countries into 6 clusters was excluded, due to the limited number of countries included in the analysis.

(MIPEX) and a very large share of informal economy, similar to the other Eastern European countries. Moreover, Poland is unique in the European landscape, because of the high number of first residence permits issued for employment reasons, which corresponds to more than the double of the European average, and no immigration from new accession countries. This is due to the fact that Poland is mainly an emigration country and the immigration into the country is mainly based on employment of migrants coming from extra-EU countries, such as Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and Georgia (Grot, 2013).

Therefore, if we exclude Poland, which represents a peculiar case in the European landscape with respect to its migration regime, the four clusters derived from the analysis are the following²¹⁹:

- 1) Finland, Belgium, Portugal and Sweden.
- 2) Ireland, Austria, Germany, the UK, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg
- 3) Greece, Italy and Spain
- 4) Latvia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Estonia

The first cluster – which I label *old immigration and high integration* – includes countries that are characterised by a very high level of integration in the domains included in the MIPEX index. Additionally, these countries show the lowest percentage of migrants coming from new accession countries and a medium level of informal economy. Concerning the percentage of permits issued for employment reasons, these countries present a medium to low levels, which is in line with their old history of immigration²²⁰.

The second cluster – which I name *old immigration and medium integration* – includes other countries of old immigration (Austria, Germany, the UK, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) and Ireland²²¹. These countries are characterised by medium to high scores in terms of integration of migrants and a small segment of shadow economy. Also, in line with their immigration history, which is longer than all the other European countries, the share of residence permits issued for employment reasons is small. In these countries, characterised by large stocks of second and third generations, the majority of the residence

²¹⁹ For a matter of interpretation of the clusters, I reorder the clusters. Therefore, the number of the clusters does not coincide with that showed in Figure 30.

²²⁰ As mentioned earlier in the text, old immigration countries have a higher concentration of second and third generations of migrants, compared to new immigration countries. Therefore, a high number of residence permits is issued for reasons other than employment, such as family reunification.

²²¹ Contrary to the other countries included in this cluster, Ireland shares some characteristics with Mediterranean countries such as Italy and Spain, as during the 1960s and 1970s it was predominantly an emigration country. It is only recently, starting from the 1990s, that these countries have moved to being immigration countries (Eurostat, 2011).

permits are issues for family reunification reasons. Regarding the presence of migrants coming from new accession countries, in these countries it is smaller than in Eastern European and Mediterranean countries, despite the fact that an increase in the arrival of Eastern European migrants has been detected as a new trend also in these countries (Eurostat, 2011). In particular, Ireland, the UK and Austria already count a significant presence of migrants from new member states²²².

The third cluster – which I name *new immigration and medium integration* – includes three Mediterranean countries – Italy, Greece and Spain. These countries share common features with respect to the four indicators used for the analysis, albeit with greater differences compared to other clusters. The main common feature is a very high level of informal economy, just below that of Eastern European countries. Regarding the overall integration system, Italy and Spain share similar scores, while Greece is positioned below the European average. Additionally, the proportion of residence permits issued for employment reasons is low, with the exception of Spain, where the proportion of residence permits for work is comparable with that of countries belonging to the third cluster. Regarding the presence of migrants from new EU member states, Italy and Greece show the highest proportion compared to all other European countries. However, this is also a common feature of Spain, albeit to a lesser extent.

The fourth cluster – which I name *new immigration and low integration* – includes all the Eastern European countries, apart from Poland. These countries share the same features in all four indicators and constitute a very distinctive cluster. In particular, they are characterised by a large informal economy and low scores in terms of integration of migrants. The only exception is Estonia, which shows a more open integration system. Also, as it is typical of countries of new immigration, they present a high proportion of first residence permits issued for employment reasons, compared to all other types of permits. Finally, mainly due to the geographical proximity, they host a large share of migrants coming from new accession countries.

²²² While after each EU enlargement many countries had put in place temporary restrictions in the access of migrants from new member states, Ireland and the UK immediately allowed nationals of new EU countries to live and work in their country. This resulted in the reception of quite large shares of migrants from new member states (Eurostat, 2011).

Chapter 6

Measuring the impact of care, gender and migration typologies on migrant domestic work

This chapter presents the last set of analyses conducted in the framework of this research. In the first part, I recall the objectives of the research and based on them I formulate the specific hypotheses. The second part presents some descriptive analyses, similar to those presented in Chapter 4, where I aggregate the information on the main features of the domestic sector at the level of the typologies of the three regimes (instead of at the level of single countries). The third part of the chapter introduces the final analysis and the reasons for the choice of multinomial logistic regression analysis, instead of other types of inferential analysis (multilevel analysis and ‘aggregated analysis’). The fourth part shows the last analyses and includes the description of the analyses, the comparison between the different models that were carried out and the interpretation of the results. In the last part of the chapter I interpret the results in the light of the hypotheses presented at the beginning of the chapter.

6.1 Objectives and hypotheses

Before presenting the last set of analyses carried out in the framework of this research, it is necessary to return to the objectives of the study and to present the hypotheses that have been formulated in relation to the objectives. As stated in the introduction of the dissertation, the main objective of the research is to empirically test the theory that identifies care, gender and migration regimes as having an impact on migrant domestic work.

The specific objectives are the following:

- 1) To investigate whether and to what extent the three regimes have an impact on the share of migrants in the domestic workforce;

- 2) To investigate whether and to what extent the three typologies can be a useful tool to explain the cross-national variation in the main features of paid domestic work, and in the degree of *ethnicisation* in particular.

The first set of analyses – that is, the descriptive analyses presented in Chapter 4 – provided a description of the main features of contemporary paid domestic work in Europe and highlighted the main differences between European countries. As it emerges from the analyses, significant cross-country differences exist, especially with respect to the share of migrants in the domestic services workforce. Other differences, albeit less significant, include the size of the domestic sector as a share of total employment, the degree of feminisation of the domestic workforce and the three aspects used to investigate working conditions: the income level in the domestic sector compared to other low-skilled occupations, the share of temporary work vs. permanent work in the domestic sector and the prevalence of unusual working hours in the domestic sector (evening, night and weekend shifts).

The second set of analyses, presented in Chapter 5, allowed to create a typology of care regimes, a typology of gender regimes and a typology of migration regimes, based on a series of indicators and/or synthetic indexes specifically elaborated for the purpose of this study. The construction of synthetic indexes, where relevant, and of the three typologies was carried out in order to use these indicators and typologies to study a social phenomenon, namely the migrant domestic work.

In this third step of the analysis – and in order to answer to the main research questions – I combine the indicators and the typologies of the three regimes with the EU-LFS data. This allows me to investigate whether the three regimes have an effect on the actual outcomes of individuals in the labour market (in the domestic sector) and to measure the intensity of this effect.

Hypotheses

Based on the objectives of the research, and based on the literature, the following hypotheses have been formulated:

- 1) The three regimes – the care, the gender and the migration regimes – do have an effect on the main features of paid domestic work and in particular on the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector. Specifically, they have an effect:
 - on the proportion of migrant domestic workers, compared to native domestic workers

- on the proportion of migrant domestic workers, compared to migrants working in another sector
- 2) The three regimes have the highest explanatory power when they are taken into consideration simultaneously
 - 3) The typologies of the three regimes are a better tool, compared to countries, to explain the main features of paid domestic work and in particular the degree of *ethnicisation* of the sector
 - 4) The specific effects of the three regimes are expected to be the following:
 - 4a. The effect of the gender regime on the concentration of migrants is expected to be the following:
 - Cluster 3 of the gender regime (Traditional gender contract) is expected to have a positive effect on the degree of *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector, while Cluster 1 (Modern gender contract) is expected to have a negative effect on the degree of *ethnicisation*. This means that countries that belong to Cluster 3 are expected to have a higher concentration of migrants in the domestic sector, compared to Clusters 2 and 1 (Gender contract in transition and Modern gender contract). On the contrary, countries that belong to Cluster 1 are expected to have a more balanced workforce composition between migrants and natives. Countries that belong to Cluster 2 are expected to have a medium degree of *ethnicisation* (between Cluster 3 and 1).

This is based on the fact that where housework and care work are seen as a responsibility of families, and of women in particular (as in Cluster 3: Traditional gender contract), domestic work is associated with a work of no value and the professionalisation of the work is difficult to achieve. This reinforces stereotypes about the low reputation and the unskilled nature of the job, which in turn leads to the concentration in this sector of the weakest segment of the workforce, namely migrants. Conversely, in contexts where the gender division of labour is weaker and domestic and care activities are not entirely seen as a family responsibility, domestic work is supposed to be more professionalised and to enjoy a better reputation. Thus, in Cluster 1 the workforce in the domestic sector is expected to be more balanced, both in terms of feminisation and of *ethnicisation*.

- 4b. The effect of the care regime on the concentration of migrants is expected to be the following:

- Cluster 1 of the care regime (De-familialisation) is expected to have a negative effect on the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector. Clusters 2 and 3 (Familialisation with and without state support) are expected to have a positive effect on the degree of *ethnicisation*. In other words, countries that belong to Cluster 1 of the care regime are expected to have a lower proportion of migrants in the domestic sector, compared to countries that belong to Cluster 2 and Cluster 3. In particular, the positive effect of Cluster 3 on the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector is expected to be stronger than that of Cluster 2.

This is based on the fact that in countries characterised by policies that push to the familialisation of care and domestic tasks, families tend to find their own solutions to cover their needs for care and domestic services. Especially when the state does not guarantee adequate support either in the form of public services or in the form of monetary transfers (Cluster 3), families have to rely on the cheapest available option in the labour market, which is represented by migrants.

4c. The effect of the migration regime on the concentration of migrants is expected to be the following:

- Cluster 4 (New immigration and low integration) and Cluster 3 (New immigration and medium integration) are expected to have a positive effect on the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector. Cluster 2 (Old immigration and medium integration) and Cluster 1 (Old immigration and high integration) are expected to have a negative effect on the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector. In other words, countries that belong to Clusters 4 and 3 are expected to show the highest degree of *ethnicisation* in the domestic sector, compared to Clusters 1 and 2.

This is based on the fact that Clusters 4 (New immigration and low integration) and 3 (New immigration and medium integration) are characterised by a large informal economy, combined with low scores in the integration index. These are both features that suggest that migrants are more likely to be concentrated in the lower-skilled and less reputed segments of the labour market, which include the domestic sector. First, the informal economy has been proved to attract domestic workers (see Chapter 2); second, when migrants are less integrated in the host society, they are more likely to concentrate in poorly paid jobs, such as domestic services. On the contrary, countries that belong to Cluster 2 (Old immigration and

medium integration) and Cluster 1 (Old immigration and high integration) are expected to have a lower concentration of migrants in the domestic sector. First, in countries of old immigration, migrants are generally expected to be more integrated in the host society, which is confirmed by their higher score in the integration index; second, in countries characterised by less restrictive migration policies, migrants are supposed to integrate better and faster in other sectors of the labour market.

6.2 Bivariate descriptive analysis using the typologies

Before presenting the results of the inferential analyses carried out to conclude this study, it can be interesting to use descriptive bivariate analyses to show how the features of contemporary domestic work change based on the three typologies developed in this study. This can be useful in order to show the behaviour of each cluster within each typology with regard to the main feature of the domestic sector and thus to preliminary assess Hypothesis 1 (The three regimes – the care, the gender and the migration regimes – do have an effect on the main features of paid domestic work and in particular on the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector) and Hypothesis 3 (The typologies of the three regimes are a better tool, compared to countries, to explain the main features of paid domestic work and in particular the degree of *ethnisation* of the sector).


For these analyses, instead of aggregating the information on the domestic sector at country level (as presented in Chapter 4), I aggregate the information based on the clusters of each typology. To do so, I use the EU-LFS microdata, which I aggregate based on the clusters of the three typologies. For each feature of the domestic sector that is taken into consideration, a separate analysis on each regime typology is presented. Annex 7 reports the data based on which all the figures of this section have been created. Annex 8 reports all the tests that have been carried out to test the differences between the clusters of each typology for each feature.

6.2.1 Magnitude of the domestic sector

Care regime

Figure 31 shows the proportion of domestic workers compared to all other workers for the three clusters of the typology of care regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015.

Figure 31: Proportion of domestic workers in the 3 clusters of care regimes



The difference in the proportion of domestic workers compared to all other workers in the three groups of the care regime is statistically significant. As it is clear from the figure, the proportion of domestic workers is considerably higher in Cluster 1 of the care regime, which corresponds to ‘De-familialisation’. This can be explained by the fact that countries characterised by a stronger de-familialisation of policies tend to promote the externalisation of domestic and care tasks, while in countries characterised by familialisatic policies, care and domestic services are considered the responsibility of families.


However, literature has highlighted that the lack of public services and/or state support does not mean that domestic services are not externalised, as families do have increasing care and domestic needs that cannot bear on their own. This would suggest that in countries with familialising policies (Clusters 2 and 3) the share of the domestic sector should be just as important. The explanation for a relatively lower share of domestic workers compared to all other workers in Clusters 2 and 3 of the care regime can be attributed to the large share of informal work in the domestic sector²²³.

²²³ As stated in section 4.2.3 and section 3.4.1.2, although the EU-LFS data does not exclude *a priori* irregular workers, there are reasons to believe that irregular workers, especially when they also have an irregular migration status, are less likely to be captured by official surveys, compared to regular workers.

Gender regime

Figure 32 shows the proportion of domestic workers compared to all other workers for the three clusters of the typology of gender regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015.

Figure 32: Proportion of domestic workers in the 3 clusters of gender regimes




The difference in the proportion of domestic workers compared to all other workers in the three groups of the gender regime is statistically significant. Although the difference between the first cluster and the other two clusters is less flagrant than in the case of care regimes, Cluster 1 of gender regimes (Modern gender contract) emerges as the one with the higher share of domestic workers, compared to all workers. This is in line with the literature and with theoretical considerations regarding the gender contract. In countries of Cluster 1 (Modern gender contract) the externalisation of domestic and care services is expected to be more accepted – which justifies the importance of the domestic sector as a share of the full labour market. In countries characterised by more traditional views about gender roles (Clusters 2 and 3), families – and women in particular – are expected to assume the majority of care and domestic tasks and the externalisation of domestic work is less accepted.

Migration regime

Figure 33 shows the proportion of domestic workers compared to all other workers for the four clusters of the typology of migration regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015.

Figure 33: Proportion of domestic workers in the 4 clusters of migration regimes



While there is almost no difference between Cluster 2 (Old immigration and medium integration) and Cluster 3 (New immigration and medium integration), countries that belong to Cluster 1 (Old immigration and high integration) have a considerably larger domestic sector, compared to all other sectors, while countries of cluster 4 (New immigration and low integration) have considerably fewer domestic workers compared to all workers in their labour market. Again, as mentioned above, this difference can be due to the prevalence, in countries of Cluster 4, of a large informal economy, which would hide the presence of many domestic workers.


Overall, as stated in section 4.2.3 and section 3.4.1.2, there are reasons to believe that due to the high prevalence of informal work in the domestic sector, the analysis of the magnitude of the domestic sector with the EU-LFS data is likely to be very imprecise and results should be taken with caution.

6.2.2 Proportion of women the domestic sector

Care regime

Figure 34 shows the proportion of women in the domestic sector for the three clusters of the typology of care regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015.

Figure 34: Proportion of women in the domestic sector in the 3 clusters of care regimes




The difference in the proportion of women in the domestic sector in the three clusters of the care regime is statistically significant. In particular, countries belonging to Cluster 3 (Familialisation without state support) have a significantly higher share of women in the domestic sector, while countries that belong to Cluster 1 (De-familialisation) have a lower share of women in the domestic workforce. In line with literature, this seems to confirm that the familialistic nature of the care regime is reflected not only in the family (the family, and women in particular, are seen as the main providers of care), but also in the domestic sector. In other words, in countries characterised by familialism women are more likely to be those performing domestic and care tasks, either within their families, or in the labour market.

Gender regime

Figure 35 shows the proportion of women in the domestic sector for the three clusters of the typology of gender regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015.

Figure 35: Proportion of women in the domestic sector in the 3 clusters of gender regimes




While Cluster 2 (Gender contract in transition) and 3 (Traditional gender contract) of the typology of gender regimes show a similar (high) proportion of women in the domestic sector, Cluster 1 (Modern gender contract) is the only one that shows a relatively higher proportion of men in the domestic sector. This is understandable, due to the fact that, in countries with a more equal gender contract and a higher degree of gender equality in all aspects, gender stereotypes that assign domestic tasks to women are expected to be weaker. In other words, gender equality in both public and domestic sphere is reflected in a better gender balance also in the domestic sector, which is generally confirmed by data.

However, it is worth noting that even in countries characterised by a modern gender contract, the proportion of women in the domestic sector remains disproportionately high, compared to that of men.

Migration regime

Figure 36 shows the proportion of women in the domestic sector for the four clusters of the typology of migration regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015.

Figure 36: Proportion of women in the domestic sector in the 4 clusters of migration regimes




The cluster with the highest share of women in the domestic sector is Cluster 4 (New immigration and low integration). This can be explained by the fact that Eastern European countries are also countries with strong familialistic policies, as well as low scores in gender equality and a traditional type of gender contract. However, Mediterranean countries, which share the same features of familialism and traditional gender contract and which are part of Cluster 3 of the migration regime (New immigration and medium integration) present a lower concentration of women in the domestic sector, similar to that of Cluster 1 (Old immigration and high integration). This can be explained by the fact that in some Mediterranean countries, such as Italy, there has been a recent resurgence of male domestic work, where migrants constitute the strongest supply (see section 4.3.1).

6.2.3 Proportion of migrants in the domestic sector

Care regime

Figure 37 shows the proportion of migrants in the domestic sector for the three clusters of the typology of care regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015.

Figure 37: Proportion of migrants in the domestic sector in the 3 clusters of care regimes



While Clusters 3 (Familialisation without state support) and 1 (De-familialisation) of the care regime have similar shares of migrants in the domestic sector, Cluster 2 (Familialisation with state support) shows a considerably higher concentration of migrants in the domestic sector. This contradicts the Hypothesis 4b, which highlights the link between a lack of state support and the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector. According to the hypothesis, Cluster 1 is expected to have a significantly smaller concentration of migrants in the domestic sector, while Cluster 3 is expected to show the strongest *ethnicisation*. Indeed, theory suggests that the lack of support by the state (here Cluster 3), both in terms of financial transfers or public services, would encourage families to rely more and more on migrants, who offer the cheapest available workforce.

On the contrary, it is Cluster 2 that shows a considerably higher concentration of migrants in the sector, compared to the other clusters. This can be partially due to the fact that some Mediterranean countries, such as Italy and Portugal, which are usually pointed as countries with the least state support, are instead part of Cluster 2 (Familialisation with state support) in this typology²²⁴.


²²⁴ While the majority of European comparisons of care regimes had concentrated only on old European countries, in the typology developed in this study also Eastern European countries are taken into consideration, where possible. This obviously changes the perspective of the comparison. For instance, if it is true that Italy and Portugal do have a generally weak state support for care needs, compared to Northern countries, it is also true that when compared to Eastern European countries they do offer a higher support, especially with regards to elderly care.

Finally, it is interesting to notice that countries that belong to Cluster 1 (De-familialisation) have a similar degree of *ethnicisation* in the domestic sector as in Cluster 3. This seems to suggest that it is not only a weak support by the state in terms of care that influences the *ethnicisation* of the sector. A detailed analysis on the proportion of migrants in the domestic workforce is provided in section 6.4.

Gender regime

Figure 38 shows the proportion of migrants in the domestic sector for the three clusters of the typology of gender regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015.

Figure 38: Proportion of migrants in the domestic sector in the 3 clusters of gender regimes



Cluster 3 of gender regimes (Traditional gender contract) presents the highest concentration of migrants in the domestic sector among the three clusters. On the contrary, Cluster 2 (Gender contract in transition) and Cluster 1 (Modern gender contract) have a considerably lower share of migrants in the domestic sector. This overall confirms Hypothesis 4a and seems to confirm that in countries characterised by a traditional gender contract and low levels of gender equality, domestic work enjoys a bad reputation and poor working conditions, which in turn explains the concentration in this sector of the weakest segments of the labour market.


However, while a weaker *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector could be expected in countries characterised by a modern gender contract and better gender equality – as gender equality in

all fields is expected to be also reflected in the workforce composition of the domestic sector – the great difference between Cluster 2 and Cluster 3 is more puzzling and deserves further investigation.

Migration regime

Figure 39 shows the proportion of migrants in the domestic sector for the four clusters of the typology of migration regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015.

Figure 39: Proportion of migrants in the domestic sector in the 4 clusters of migration regimes



Overall, the Hypothesis 4c is not confirmed by this analysis. Cluster 3 of the migration regimes (New immigration and medium integration) shows a disproportionately higher share of migrants in the domestic sector, which corresponds to almost double the European average. Conversely, Cluster 4 (New immigration and low integration) is the group with the lowest share of migrants in the domestic workforce. Clusters 1 (Old immigration and high integration) and 2 (Old immigration and medium integration) present similar levels of *ethnicisation*, which fall in between the other clusters. In this respect, it should be reminded that this analysis includes only first-generation migrants and that countries that belong to Cluster 2 and Cluster 1 are likely to have a higher degree of *ethnicisation* if also second and third generations are taken into account. Nevertheless, countries of new immigration and low integration are clearly those where the *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector is more evident.

6.2.4 Working conditions: income

Care regime

Table 28 compares the income of domestic workers to that of other low-skilled workers in each cluster of the typology of care regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015²²⁵.

Table 28: Distribution of domestic workers and other low-skilled workers by income (deciles) in the 3 clusters of care regimes (percentages) (EU-LFS 2015)

	Care 1 - De-familialisation				Care 2 - Familialisation with state support				Care 3 - Familialisation without state support			
	Domestic sector		Other sectors		Domestic sector		Other sectors		Domestic sector		Other sectors	
	%	Cum. %	%	Cum. %	%	Cum. %	%	Cum. %	%	Cum. %	%	Cum. %
1	25.4	25.4	10.3	10.3	34.7	34.7	7.9	7.9	32.0	32.0	8.6	8.6
2	20.2	45.6	8.9	19.2	21.3	56.0	8.7	16.5	24.1	56.1	8.9	17.5
3	17.6	63.2	8.6	27.8	17.6	73.6	9.6	26.1	15.1	71.2	10.7	28.1
4	13.4	76.7	8.7	36.6	10.3	83.9	9.5	35.6	9.2	80.4	11.0	39.1
5	9.8	86.4	9.1	45.7	7.7	91.6	10.6	46.2	8.6	89.0	12.2	51.3
6	6.2	92.6	9.7	55.3	4.3	95.8	10.5	56.6	5.1	94.1	11.9	63.2
7	3.8	96.4	11.0	66.3	2.3	98.1	10.3	66.9	1.5	95.6	7.5	70.7
8	2.0	98.5	10.9	77.2	1.2	99.3	11.3	78.2	2.3	97.9	12.2	82.9
9	1.0	99.5	10.8	88.0	0.5	99.9	10.9	89.2	1.3	99.2	8.1	91.0
10	0.5	100	12.0	100	0.1	100	10.8	100	0.8	100	9	100

In all three clusters the median income of domestic and other low-skilled workers is clearly lower than that of workers in other sectors: in the first cluster (De-familialisation), the median income is found in the third percentile, while in other sectors it is the sixth one; in the second and third clusters (respectively Familialisation with and without state support), the median income is found in the second decile, while for workers in other sectors it is in the sixth and fifth decile respectively, the differences being statistically significant²²⁶.

²²⁵ The definition of 'other low-skilled workers' is based on the ISCO classification and includes only codes ≥ 900 , which correspond to 'Elementary occupations'. Although two of the three ISCO codes used to define domestic workers are part of the Major Group 5, I chose to compare domestic workers only with 'very low-skilled' workers. This should avoid comparing the income of domestic workers with occupations that are generally thought to be more prestigious.

²²⁶ The Mann-Whitney test was used to check whether the median values differ between domestic workers and workers in other sectors within each cluster. The results are the following: Cluster 1: $z = 98.7$, $p = 0.00$; Cluster 2: $z = 199.5$, $p = 0.00$; Cluster 3: $z = 59.9$, $p = 0.00$.

Gender regime

Table 29 compares the income of domestic workers to that of other low-skilled workers in each cluster of the typology of gender regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015.

Table 29: Distribution of domestic workers and other low-skilled workers by income (deciles) in the 3 clusters of gender regimes (percentages) (EU-LFS 2015)

	Gender 1 - Modern gender contract				Gender 2 - Gender contract in transition				Gender 3 - Traditional gender contract			
	Domestic sector		Other sectors		Domestic sector		Other sectors		Domestic sector		Other sectors	
	%	Cum. %	%	Cum. %	%	Cum. %	%	Cum. %	%	Cum. %	%	Cum. %
1	17.2	17.2	12.0	12.0	34.5	34.5	8.2	8.2	35.2	35.2	7.5	7.5
2	19.4	36.6	9.2	21.2	23.7	58.2	8.9	17.1	19.8	55.0	8.3	15.8
3	21.4	58.0	8.3	29.6	15.5	73.7	9.5	26.6	17.7	72.7	9.9	25.7
4	16.3	74.3	8.2	37.8	10.2	83.8	9.9	36.5	9.9	82.5	9.4	35.0
5	11.4	85.7	9.3	47.1	7.1	90.9	10.2	46.7	8.3	90.8	11.3	46.3
6	6.7	92.3	9.9	57.0	4.2	95.1	10.3	56.9	4.7	95.6	10.9	57.2
7	4.0	96.3	10.0	67.0	2.7	97.8	11.0	67.9	2.1	97.7	9.1	66.3
8	2.0	98.3	10.6	77.6	1.4	99.2	10.6	78.5	1.4	99.1	12.5	78.8
9	1.1	99.4	11.0	88.7	0.6	99.7	10.5	89.0	0.7	99.8	10.5	89.4
10	0.6	100	11.3	100	0.3	100	11.0	100	0.2	100	10.6	100

A similar picture emerges from the inspection of Table 29, showing the relationship between income of domestic workers and the gender regime typology. In this case too, the median income of domestic workers is much lower than that of other low-skilled workers. While in countries that belong to Cluster 2 (Gender contract in transition) and Cluster 3 (Traditional gender contract) the mean income of domestic workers is in the second decile, and that of low-skilled workers is found in the sixth decile, the situation in Cluster 1 (Modern gender contract) is slightly better (or less bad), since the median income of domestic workers falls in the third decile, thus reducing the gap between them and other low-skilled workers²²⁷.

Migration regime

Table 30 compares the income of domestic workers to that of other low-skilled workers in each cluster of the typology of migration regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015.

²²⁷ The results of the Mann-Whitney test for the gender regime typology are the following: Cluster 1: $z = 65.9$, $p = 0.00$; Cluster 2: $z = 150.5$, $p = 0.00$; Cluster 3: $z = 162.4$, $p = 0.00$.

Table 30: Distribution of domestic workers and other low-skilled workers by income (deciles) in the 4 clusters of migration regimes (percentages) (EU-LFS 2015)

	Migration 1 – Old immigration and high integration				Migration 2 – Old immigration and medium integration				Migration 3 – New immigration and medium integration				Migration 4 – New immigration and low integration			
	Domestic sector		Other sectors		Domestic sector		Other sectors		Domestic sector		Other sectors		Domestic sector		Other sectors	
	%	Cum . %	%	Cum . %	%	Cum . %	%	Cum . %	%	Cum . %	%	Cum . %	%	Cum . %	%	Cum . %
1	36.9	36.9	7.3	7.3	28.4	28.4	9.2	9.2	34.2	34.2	7.4	7.4	34.3	34.3	8.7	8.7
2	19.0	55.9	8.4	15.7	21.8	50.2	9.1	18.4	21.0	55.2	8.2	15.6	28.4	62.7	7.8	16.5
3	18.0	73.9	9.7	25.4	17.1	67.3	9.1	27.5	17.6	72.7	9.7	25.2	17.4	80.1	12.0	28.4
4	10.0	84.0	9.3	34.7	12.7	80.0	9.6	37.1	9.4	82.1	8.7	33.9	8.3	88.5	13.8	42.2
5	8.1	92.0	10.1	44.8	8.8	88.9	10.0	47.1	8.2	90.3	11.1	45.0	4.0	92.5	13.7	55.9
6	5.0	97.0	10.4	55.2	5.1	94.0	10.2	57.2	4.6	94.9	10.8	55.8	2.2	94.7	12.2	68.2
7	1.9	98.9	11.1	66.2	3.3	97.3	10.7	67.9	2.3	97.2	8.7	64.5	0.9	95.6	9.6	77.8
8	0.8	99.7	11.1	77.3	1.6	98.9	10.5	78.4	1.8	98.9	13.6	78.0	1.7	97.3	8.1	85.9
9	0.2	99.9	10.6	87.9	0.8	99.6	10.7	89.2	0.8	99.8	10.9	89.0	1.7	99.0	7.0	93.0
10	0.1	100	12.1	100	0.4	100	10.8	100	0.2	100	11.0	100	1.0	100	7.0	100

As shown in Table 30, the difference of the median income between domestic workers and other low-skilled workers persists if we consider the migration regime typology. In all clusters, the median income of domestic workers is found in the second decile, while that of other low-skilled workers is in the sixth decile²²⁸.


6.2.5 Working conditions: shift work

Care regime

Figure 40 shows the proportion of domestic workers doing shift work for the three clusters of the typology of care regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015.

²²⁸ The results of the Mann-Whitney test for the migration regimes typology are the following: Cluster 1: $z = 105.9$, $p = 0.00$; Cluster 2: $z = 144.5$, $p = 0.00$; Cluster 3: $z = 139.5$, $p = 0.00$; Cluster 4: $z = 44.1$, $p = 0.00$.

Figure 40: Proportion of domestic workers doing shift work in the 3 clusters of care regimes




The difference in the proportion of shift work in the domestic sector in the three clusters of care regimes is statistically significant. The cluster where the proportion of shift work in the domestic sector is lower is Cluster 1 (De-familialisation), while the cluster where it is higher is Cluster 3 (Familialisation without state support). This finding is not surprising, given that in countries where domestic and care work have a longer history of externalisation, the domestic sector is more likely to be ‘professionalised’, that is to also have more standard working conditions compared to the rest of the labour market. On the contrary, where familialisation is stronger, domestic work is more likely to be attributed low value, in accordance to the general view of domestic work as unpaid work.

Gender regime

Figure 41 shows the proportion of domestic workers doing shift work for the three clusters of the typology of gender regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015.

Figure 41: Proportion of domestic workers doing shift work in the 3 clusters of gender regimes




When the proportion of shift work in the domestic sector is analysed using the typology of gender regimes, the findings are unexpected. While Cluster 1 of gender regimes (Modern gender contract) seems to offer better working conditions to domestic workers in terms of income, it is not the case with respect to unusual working hours. Indeed, Cluster 1 is the group where the proportion of shift work in the domestic sector is higher. This seems to indicate either that domestic work demands specific working timetables (which corresponds to the reality, but then the difference between the clusters should not be so important), or that a more progressive gender contract does not necessarily translate into better regulation and better working conditions in the domestic sector.

The group of countries where the proportion of shift work is smaller is Cluster 2 (Gender contract in transition).

Migration regime

Figure 42 shows the proportion of domestic workers doing shift work for the four clusters of the typology of migration regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015.

Figure 42: Proportion of domestic workers doing shift work in the 4 clusters of migration regimes



The clusters that present the higher proportion of shift work in the domestic sector are Cluster 1 (Old immigration and high integration) and Cluster 3 (New immigration and medium integration). While this is not surprising for Cluster 3, as new immigration countries are characterised by a large informal economy and thus a more unregulated labour market, this is more surprising for Cluster 1, where the labour market, including the domestic sector, is expected to be more regulated, thus offering better working conditions to all workers. Overall, Cluster 2 (Old immigration and medium integration) is the one offering the most regulated domestic sector, at least regarding the working shifts.

6.2.6 Working conditions: temporary work


Care regime

Figure 43 shows the proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector for the three clusters of the typology of care regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015.

The clusters of the care regime where the proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector is higher are Cluster 1 (De-familialisation) and Cluster 3 (Familialisation without state support). Cluster 2 (Familialisation with state support) has the lowest share of temporary work in the domestic sector. The high share of temporary work in Cluster 1 is the least expected finding, especially if we consider that France and Belgium are part of this cluster. In fact, the voucher system that covers domestic work in Belgium and domestic and care work in France

is one of the examples of the most regulated systems of domestic work in Europe. We could then expect that the type of contract offered to domestic workers in these countries should be mostly a permanent contract, rather than a temporary contract.

Figure 43: Proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector in the 3 clusters of care regimes




The high share of temporary work in Cluster 3 is less surprising, given that in countries where the care regime is characterised by a weaker state support are those where the domestic sector is likely to be less regulated.

Gender regime

Figure 44 shows the proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector for the three clusters of the typology of gender regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015.

The cluster of the gender regime where the share of temporary work in the domestic sector is higher is Cluster 2 (Gender contract in transition), while the cluster where the proportion of temporary work is lower is Cluster 3 (Traditional gender contract). The latter is the most unexpected finding, as in countries with a strongly familialistic culture and more traditional views about gender equality and gender roles domestic work is strongly associated to the unpaid work of women and thus to work of no value. In these countries, the domestic sector is expected to be poorly regulated and contracts offered to domestic workers to be mostly of a temporary kind.


Figure 44: proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector in the 3 clusters of gender regimes



Migration regime

Figure 45 shows the proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector for the four clusters of the typology of migration regimes, based on the EU-LFS 2015.

Figure 45: Proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector in the 4 clusters of migration regimes



The clusters of the migration regime with the highest share of temporary work in the domestic sector are Cluster 1 (Old immigration and high integration) and Cluster 4 (New immigration and low integration), while the countries with the least share of temporary work are Clusters 2 (Old immigration and medium integration) and Cluster 3 (New immigration and medium integration). Since both Clusters 3 and 4 share some features, such as a large informal economy and presumably a less regulated labour market, we would rather expect them to have both a high share of temporary work. This is not the case for Cluster 3, where the proportion of temporary work in the domestic sector is the lowest among the groups of migration regimes.

Overall, concerning the working conditions in the domestic sector, these analyses seem to suggest that while the highest levels of income in the domestic sector are offered by countries that belong to Cluster 1 of the gender regime (Modern gender contract) and Cluster 1 of the care regime (De-familialisation), these clusters do not offer the best working conditions in terms of temporary work and unusual working hours. On the contrary, the countries that offer better working conditions in terms of temporary work are those belonging to Cluster 3 of migration regimes (New immigration and medium integration), Cluster 3 of gender regimes (Traditional gender contract) and Cluster 2 of care regimes (Familialisation with state support). Countries that offer better working conditions in terms of shift work are those belonging to Cluster 2 of migration regimes (Old immigration and medium integration), Cluster 2 of gender regimes (Gender contract in transition) and Cluster 1 of care regimes (De-familialisation).

6.3 Three types of inferential analyses

As anticipated in section 6.1, for the last set of analyses presented in this chapter I combine data on individual outcomes in the labour market with the data on the three regimes under study. From a statistical point of view, combining data on individuals with information aggregated at a higher level (the level of the group)²²⁹ is a situation that needs to be addressed with specific tools. This is based on the assumption that the group individuals belong to might influence their characteristics. In other words, individual outcomes of individuals belonging

²²⁹ In this case, the individual level is the EU-LFS data, while the group level is represented by the different clusters of each typology (or the indicators used for each regime).

to a certain group might be more similar to each other, compared to individual outcomes of individuals belonging to another group.

When using statistical methods, the effect that the group has on the individual level must be taken into account, to overcome the risk of correlated observations. Indeed, the fact that individuals belong to the same group and thus might share a series of characteristics of this group means that they are not completely independent. The independence of observations being one of the main assumptions of most statistical analyses, the problem of dependence has to be addressed with specific solutions.

According to Twisk (2006), there are three main ways to address this situation: i) the multilevel analysis; ii) the ‘aggregated analysis’; and iii) the ‘disaggregated analysis’.

All three methods have been explored for this last step of the research, but only the results of the third type are reported. Below is a brief description of each solution, with a brief discussion over the suitability of each technique for this specific research.

Multilevel analysis

The ideal solution to the problem of correlated observations is represented by multilevel analysis, which is specifically designed to acknowledge the presence of a hierarchical structure in the data (different levels of groups/clusters). It is a type of analysis that has revealed very useful in various fields, such as research on education, where pupils are nested within classes and schools, or medical research, where patients are nested within hospitals or doctors, and so on. It is also used for longitudinal studies, where the correlation of the observations on the same individuals is solved by nesting data within individual subjects (Hox, 1998).

In all these situations, multilevel analysis allows to measure the variability in the outcome that is attributable to the groups. The idea is that in a situation of nested (or hierarchical) data, the variability within groups is small, because individuals belonging to the same group are more likely to have similar characteristics or behaviours, and variability among groups, thus the effect of the group, is large.

Although the multilevel analysis represents the most powerful statistical tool to analyse hierarchical data, it cannot be applied to all situations, as it demands a series of assumptions to be met. In particular, it demands that both the number of individuals in each group and the number of groups (level 2 of the analysis) be large for results to be reliable (see section 3.5.2.1).

The results of the multilevel logistic regression models that have been tentatively carried out for this research are not presented here, for two main reasons:

- 1- the total number of groups (the clusters of the typologies developed for the three regimes) is 11, which is far below the minimum acceptable sample size. This jeopardises the reliability of both coefficient estimates and of the explained variance.
- 2- The explained variance, which is the total variance explained by the level 2 (groups) is very low (less than 5%). This does not justify the use of a multilevel analysis²³⁰.

Aggregated method

Similar to multilevel analysis, the aggregated method acknowledges the hierarchical structure of the data and the dependency of the observations. However, instead of constructing models that include both levels of data, it consists in analysing the group observations, instead of the individual observations. To do so, some sort of average or any other useful information (proportion, mean, etc.) must be calculated for each group. Then, this information (aggregated at group level) is used as the outcome variable in standard regression analyses.

Although the aggregated method could be an interesting alternative to the more sophisticated multilevel analysis, it has to meet the assumptions of standard regressions. The linear regression models that I have tentatively carried out following this method are not presented here, because they are likely to be unreliable, due to the very small number of observations²³¹.

Disaggregated method

Contrary to the multilevel analysis and the aggregated method, the disaggregated method does not acknowledge the correlation between observations, thus the nested structure of the data. This means that data is treated only at the individual level and the information on groups is included in the analysis in one single level. Although this clearly represents a limitation, as it violates the assumption of independence of observations, this is the only type of analysis that was made possible by the data in my possess. The next section presents the results of the multinomial logistic regression models that have been carried out.

²³⁰ The multilevel analysis is useful because data is supposed to be clustered in groups. When the variance is very low, it means that the contribution of groups (level 2) in explaining the variance is small. In other words, including the second level does not significantly contribute to explaining the variance.

²³¹ A series of linear regression models were carried out, where the outcome variables were for each regression the proportion of women in the domestic sector, the proportion of migrants, the domestic sector as a share of the total employment, and so on; the predictors were the groups derived from the three typologies. Although some significant regression coefficient resulted from the models, the results are not reported as the limited number of observations (the clusters of the three typologies) does not guarantee reliability.

6.4 Multinomial logistic regression models

Several multinomial logistic regression models were estimated to investigate the effect that the three regimes under study have on the probability to be a migrant domestic worker in Europe. In order to do so, a new dummy variable was created in the EU-LFS database 2015, which was derived from the variables 'ISCO08' (occupation) and 'Country of birth'. The new dummy variable has three categories: 1) migrant domestic worker; 2) native domestic worker; 3) migrant working in another sector. This variable was used as the dependent variable (outcome) in all the analyses, so to investigate the effect of other variables and of the three regimes under study on the probability to be a migrant domestic worker, compared to a native domestic worker, and the probability to be a migrant domestic worker, compared to a migrant working in another sector. A fourth category is logically possible, and also present in the data, namely that of native workers in other sectors. However, the contrast between this additional category and that of migrant domestic workers would be out of the scope of testing the aforementioned hypotheses, since it would entail neither the condition of being a migrant, nor that of working in the domestic sector.

The database was prepared so to include only employed individuals aged more than 16 years old and less than 80 years old, and so to exclude all missing cases on the variables included in the analysis²³². The valid sample includes 219353 individual observations. In addition to the variables provided by the EU-LFS, new variables were created addressing the different clusters of each typology (care, gender and migration regimes) and each indicator used for the creation of the typologies.

As for the analytical strategy adopted, in a first step a set of nested multinomial regressions was carried out, including only the control variables provided by the EU-LFS database. Starting from a simple model that includes just one control variable (gender), each model progressively adds up one control variable at a time, with the last model including all control variables: gender, age, higher educational attainment and marital status. All of these variables were previously prepared in order to adapt them to the regression analysis²³³. Having checked

²³² Since the dummy dependent variable includes only three categories out of the four logically possible, all other workers – namely, natives working in any other sector of the labour market – are excluded from the valid sample.

²³³ The variable 'Sex' was re-levelled, so to use 'male' as the reference category in the regressions. The variable 'Highest educational attainment' was recoded, so to eliminate the categories that present few or no occurrences. The resulting variable is categorical and includes three categories: 1= 'low education' (no education and primary education), 2= 'medium education' (secondary education and similar) and 3= 'high education' (higher secondary education, university and PhD). The category 'low education' was used as the reference in the regressions.

that the fit of the model improves from the most basic model to the model that includes all the above-mentioned independent variables²³⁴, this last model was used as the base model (Model 0) to which compare the further models that were carried out.

The second step consists of multinomial regression models that include the information on the three regimes under study, targeted at testing the hypotheses presented in section 6.1. Thirteen models were estimated, whose description is reported in Table 31.

Table 31: Analytical strategy

Name	Variables
MODEL 0	Gender, Age, Education level, Marital status
MODEL 1	Model 0 + Country
MODEL 2	Model 0 + Care typology
MODEL 3	Model 0 + Gender typology
MODEL 4	Model 0 + Migration typology
MODEL 5	Model 0 + Care typology + Gender Typology + Migration Typology
MODEL 6	Model 0 + Interaction Care X Gender typology
MODEL 7	Model 0 + Interaction Care X Migration typology
MODEL 8	Model 0 + Interaction Gender X Migration typology
MODEL 9	Model 0 + Interaction Care X Gender typology + Migration typology
MODEL 10	Model 0 + Interaction Care X Migration typology + Gender typology
MODEL 11	Model 0 + Interaction Gender X Migration typology + Care typology
MODEL 12	Model 0 + Interaction all 3 typologies

6.4.1 Comparison between models

Table 32 provides the information on the fit of the 12 models that were estimated, plus the base model (Model 0). The fit parameters included in the table are the AIC and the BIC. The models are ordered according to the increasing value of the BIC, which corresponds to a ranking from the best to the worst fit²³⁵.

Concerning the variable ‘marital status’, the category ‘married’ was used as the reference, against the categories ‘single’ and ‘separated’.

²³⁴ The AIC constantly decreased from the most basic model to the last model (AIC = 365000 for the model that includes only gender, to AIC = 331000 for the model that includes gender, age, education and marital status). The Log-likelihood ratio test was significant in each subsequent model, showing that each further model was better than the previous one in predicting the outcome variable.

²³⁵ Both AIC and BIC are measures of fit that decrease as the fit of the model increase.

Table 32: Fit measures of 13 multinomial regression models

	Obs	Lsq	df	BIC	AIC
MODEL 1 (country)	219353	106261.0	46	314000.5	313506.2
MODEL 12 (three-way interaction)	219353	104342.0	38	315821.2	315409.2
MODEL 11 (genderXmigration, care)	219353	103611.5	34	316502.4	316131.7
MODEL 10 (careXmigration, gender)	219353	102809.5	30	317255.2	316925.7
MODEL 8 (genderXmigration)	219353	102669.5	30	317395.2	317065.7
MODEL 7 (careXmigration)	219353	101147.7	26	318867.8	318579.5
MODEL 9 (careXgender, migration)	219353	100322.3	30	319742.4	319412.8
MODEL 5 (all typologies)	219353	99781.6	26	320233.9	319945.5
MODEL 4 (migration typology)	219353	95724.8	18	324192.3	323986.3
MODEL 6 (careXgender)	219353	93110.5	24	326880.5	326612.7
MODEL 3 (gender typology)	219353	91914.7	16	327977.8	327792.4
MODEL 2 (care typology)	219353	91822.3	16	328070.2	327884.8
MODEL 0 (base)	219353	88637.6	12	331205.8	331061.6

As it emerges from the table, all models show a considerable improvement compared to the base model, which means that they all better predict the outcome variable than the latter. Annex 9 reports the coefficients, standard errors, and odds ratio of the 13 models listed in Table 32.

The best fitting model is Model 1 (which includes the individual country variable), according to either of the fit indices (BIC, AIC or L^2). Based on this result, we should conclude that the best way to predict whether a worker is a migrant working in the domestic sector is to consider the country she or he lives in; in other words, in Europe it is the country level that better accounts for the differences in the share of migrant workers in the domestic sector, hence pointing at cross-country differences in the welfare provisions, in the migration regulatory policies, and so on.

As sensible as this result is, it adds little to our understanding of the phenomenon under study: the cross-country differences as for the processes and mechanisms that influence the concentration of migrant workers in the domestic sector are obvious and well known, as the literature review in Chapter 2 shows. What would be more fruitful is to know whether these differences can be summarised by any set of typologies, and in particular those that were devised in Chapter 5, as alternatives to the already-existing ones described in Chapter 2. Indeed, since the aim here is to generalise (to the level of the three regimes), the idea is not to interpret variation at the level of each country, but rather to find a conceptual tool that allows both to generalise and at the same time to show a sufficiently strong explanatory power. In

this view, Model 1 would be best considered as a new baseline (thus substituting Model 0) for comparing the models without countries and with the care, gender and migration typologies. Model 12 (including interactions among the three regimes) shows the best fit, after Model 1 (BIC difference=1820; L^2 change=1919.0 with 4 degrees of freedom). In order to grasp the meaning of this result, two issues should be considered. On the one hand, this model tends to bring approximately the same level of information as Model 1, since the interaction between the three typologies gives 14 valid combinations (see the frequencies of the interactions at the end of Annex 9) against the 18 countries; therefore, it could be concluded that the two models show a rather close fit because Model 12 almost reproduces Model 1. On the other hand, and most interestingly, the fact that Model 12 is second only to Model 1 in terms of goodness of fit means that, should we use the three typologies in interaction between them, rather than the countries, we would come to explain the *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector about as well.

This represents a key finding for this study that is worth some discussion. Indeed, countries can be thought just as conventional proxy indicators for a host of factors: systems of welfare, migration, gender equality but also, and broadly speaking, culture, historical events, political arrangements and orientation, economic facts, support for different types of policies, and many other aspects of their lives that go unmentioned or unspecified. On the contrary, the clusters formed by the typologies developed in this study have a clear and evident meaning, as they group the European countries based on just three dimensions, that are clearly singled out both on the theoretical and the empirical level. The fact that these clusters do explain the variability shown by the data almost as well as the countries means that they constitute a useful and well-designed tool to understand the phenomena under study.

In other words, if it is true that statistically speaking going from 18 to 14 countries is a small improvement, what matters is that these 14 new groups are not arbitrary labels attached to the countries (as the names of the countries are), but they are the result of a careful representation of a three-dimensional discrete space. Indeed, the categories are not arbitrarily assigned, but are the result of processing (PCA) and clustering of the data. The fact that this novel regime-based coding is nearly as effective as country labels in predicting both the *ethnicisation* of domestic work and the ‘domesticisation’ of migrant workers is a solid validation of the whole process followed in this study, including the typologies identified in Chapter 5.

A second relevant consideration concerning Model 12 is that in this model the typologies are interacted with one another, so that the effect of either of them depends on that of the others. This goes exactly in the direction postulated by the theory of the three regimes, as Hypothesis 2 states: not only the three regimes do have an impact on migrant domestic work (thus

confirming Hypothesis 1), but their impact is greater when they are taken into consideration in mutual interdependence, rather than individually (as in Model 5), as Hypothesis 2 claims. Furthermore, and confirming the soundness of the previous finding, models from 6 to 11, including even only one two-way interaction, show a better fit than Model 5, in which the three typologies are considered independently from one another. Once more, this means that it is the interplay between the three regimes that matters for understanding the distribution of migrant workers over the sectors of activity, and in particular in the domestic sector.

As interesting as it is, Model 12 – as anticipated – is comparable to Model 1 because the number of valid combinations given by the three-way interaction (14 in total) is close to the number of countries included in the analysis. Hence, looking at models that show a slightly worse fit, but are more parsimonious than Model 12, can bring more light in the understanding of the phenomenon under study.

Among those including any two-way interaction, Model 11 features the interaction between the gender and the migration typologies, plus the care typology, and shows the next best fit after Model 12, with a difference from the latter in terms of BIC values of 681 and a L^2 change of 730.5 with 4 degrees of freedom²³⁶. Hence, were we to choose only one interaction of the possible three among the typologies, we should give preference to that between the gender and the migration typology. This result is in line with the characteristics of contemporary domestic work, as described in Chapter 1, the feminisation and *ethnicisation* of the sector being its two paramount features; and also with the descriptive analyses conducted in Chapter 4.

The next best fitting model is Model 10, which includes the interaction between the care and the migration typology, plus the gender typology, with a difference in fit from Model 12 of 753 points of BIC and a L^2 change of 802 with 4 degrees of freedom. Rather surprisingly, the still next best fitting model is not Model 9 (which includes the interaction between the care and gender typology, plus the migration clusters) but Model 8, which includes the interaction between the gender and migration typologies, but excludes the care typology altogether. When we compare this to Model 11 (including instead the latter), we find that the difference between the two is significant (BIC (9)-(12)=893, L^2 change=942, df=4), pointing at the fact that the care typology is relevant for predicting the probability of being a migrant domestic worker; nonetheless, it proves to be the weakest among the three, since the models that

²³⁶ It is to be noted that two cells of the interaction between the gender and the migration typologies are empty, namely the combination modern gender contract / new immigration and medium integration, and the combination modern gender contract / new immigration and low integration (see the frequencies of the interactions at the end of Annex 10).

include its interaction with any of the other two show a comparatively worse fit (Model 6, 7 and 9); in the same vein, Model 2 (that includes only the care typology) fits worse than Model 3 (including only the gender typology) and especially worse than Model 4 (including only the migration typology).

In sum, the examination of the fit indices shown in Table 32 points at the following conclusions. First, and not unexpectedly, the probability of being a migrant domestic worker is better accounted for when we consider the differences between countries. Second, the interplay between the three regimes is able to rival (albeit from a distance, statistically speaking) with the country level in this task (hence confirming Hypothesis 1), and gives a much better insight than considering the typologies independently from one another (thus confirming Hypothesis 2). Third, the interplay between the migration and the gender typologies is particularly relevant, while the care typology plays a lesser role in the shaping of the ethnic distribution of the domestic sector.

Given the limited interest that Model 1 has for the present study, and considering that Model 12 is close to the latter in terms of parsimony, my attention now turns to Model 11, whose parameters will be commented in the following section.

6.4.2 Model 11: interaction between gender and migration, plus care

Table 33 shows the coefficients, the odds ratio and the confidence intervals of the odds ratio of each independent variable of Model 11²³⁷. The table is divided into two blocks that correspond to the categories of the dependent variable (native domestic workers and migrants working in another sector) being compared to the reference category (migrant domestic workers).

Table 33: MODEL 11

	B	95% CI for odds ratio		
		Lower	Odds ratio	Upper
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	2.60			
Female	0.07	1.03	1.08	1.12
Age	0.02	1.01	1.02	1.02
Medium education	0.25	1.25	1.29	1.33
High education	-0.71	0.47	0.49	0.51
Separated/widow	-0.16	0.82	0.85	0.89
Single	0.66	1.87	1.94	2.01
Care 1 – De-familialisation	0.13	1.08	1.14	1.21
Care 3 – Familialisation without support	0.40	1.39	1.50	1.62
Gender 1 x Migration 1 (Modern gender contract x Old immigration & high integration)	-2.58	0.06	0.07	0.09
Gender 2 x Migration 1 (Gender contract in transition x Old immigration & high integration)	-2.95	0.04	0.05	0.06
Gender 3 x Migration 1 (Traditional gender contract x Old immigration & high integration)	-1.29	0.23	0.27	0.33
Gender 1 x Migration 2 (Modern gender contract x Old immigration & medium integration)	-1.74	0.15	0.17	0.21
Gender 2 x Migration 2 (Gender contract in transition x Old immigration & medium integration)	-2.27	0.09	0.10	0.12
Gender 3 x Migration 2 (Traditional gender contract x Old immigration & medium integration)	-2.87	0.05	0.06	0.07
Gender 2 x Migration 3 (Gender contract in transition x New immigration & medium	-2.60	0.06	0.07	0.09

²³⁷ The category ‘migrant domestic worker’ of the dependent variable was chosen as the reference category, in order to compare the other two categories against this one – which corresponds to the focus of the analysis. The reference categories of the control and independent variables are the following: male, low education, married, Care 2 (Familialisation with state support). As for the interactions between gender and migration typologies, the reference is the combination Gender 3 and Migration 4 (Traditional gender contract / New immigration and low integration). Two cells of the interaction do not have any occurrence, namely Gender 1 x Migration 3 (Modern gender contract / New immigration and medium integration) and Gender 1 x Migration 4 (Modern gender contract / New immigration and low integration). Hence, the interaction between gender and migration presents nine combinations.

integration)				
Gender 3 x Migration 3 (Traditional gender contract x New immigration & medium integration)	-3.44	0.03	0.03	0.04
Gender 2 x Migration 4 (Gender contract in transition x New immigration & low integration)	-2.34	0.07	0.10	0.13
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	4.17			
Female	-2.44	0.08	0.09	0.09
Age	-0.01	0.99	0.99	0.99
Medium education	0.44	1.50	1.55	1.61
High education	1.66	5.05	5.28	5.52
Separated/widow	-0.33	0.69	0.72	0.75
Single	-0.05	0.92	0.95	0.99
Care 1 – De-familialisation	-0.38	0.64	0.68	0.72
Care 3 – Familialisation without support	0.61	1.71	1.85	1.99
Gender 1 x Migration 1 (Modern gender contract x Old immigration & high integration)	-1.25	0.24	0.29	0.34
Gender 2 x Migration 1 (Gender contract in transition x Old immigration & high integration)	-0.75	0.39	0.47	0.57
Gender 3 x Migration 1 (Traditional gender contract x Old immigration & high integration)	0.03 (n.s.)	0.86	1.04	1.25
Gender 1 x Migration 2 (Modern gender contract x Old immigration & medium integration)	-0.69	0.41	0.50	0.61
Gender 2 x Migration 2 (Gender contract in transition x Old immigration & medium integration)	-0.79	0.38	0.45	0.54
Gender 3 x Migration 2 (Traditional gender contract x Old immigration & medium integration)	-0.73	0.40	0.48	0.57
Gender 2 x Migration 3 (Gender contract in transition x New immigration & medium integration)	-1.91	0.12	0.15	0.18
Gender 3 x Migration 3 (Traditional gender contract x New immigration & medium integration)	-1.67	0.16	0.19	0.22
Gender 2 x Migration 4 (Gender contract in transition x New immigration & low integration)	-0.77	0.35	0.46	0.61

All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.)

As it emerges from Table 33, all coefficients are significant, apart from the interaction between Gender 3 and Migration 1 (Traditional gender contract x Old immigration and high integration). However, there are important differences in the magnitude of the effects.

Figure 46 shows the graphical representation of the predicted probabilities of all the variables included in the model.

Figure 46: Predicted probabilities of Model 11




Figure 46: The predicted probabilities are shown in a scale from 0 to 1. All effects between 0 and 0.50 refer to negative effects, while from 0.50 to 1 refer to positive effects. Effects closer to 0 and to 1 are stronger, while effects closer to 0.50 are weaker. The figure is divided into the two categories of the dependent variable, which are tested against the reference category 'migrant domestic worker'.

6.4.2.1 The effect of the three regimes

Before discussing the interpretation of the results, it is important to mention that at this stage of the analysis the clusters of each typology, as well as the interactions between the clusters of the typologies, will be considered without any reference to the countries that belong to such clusters. This means that the number of countries and the countries that are actually part of each cluster and each interaction are not taken into account. The reason behind this choice is based on the theoretical framework of this study: because the ultimate goal of the research is to evaluate whether the three typologies can be used as a tool for investigating a social

phenomenon, from a theoretical point of view the membership of each country to one or another cluster is of no importance. Following the logic of the theory that is at the basis of this study, the clusters of each regime are defined by a series of features that refer to each of the three regimes and are expected to be constant over at least a certain amount of time. On the contrary, the membership of each country to a particular cluster is expected to be volatile, in that possible transformations at country level might entail the transition from one to another cluster.

The care regime

Let's first consider the effect of the care regime. A care regime characterised by familialisation without state support (Cluster 3), instead of familialisation with state support (Cluster 2), has a positive effect on the probability of being either a native worker in the domestic sector, or a migrant working in another sector, as compared to that of being a migrant domestic worker (respectively, with an odds ratio of 1.50 and 1.85). In other words, the probability to be a migrant domestic worker is higher in countries where the care regime is characterised by familialisation with state support. This confirms the preliminary descriptive analysis presented at the beginning of this chapter.

In the case of countries in which the state fosters a de-familialisation of care activities (Cluster 1), as compared to the reference category, the direction of the effect is different according to which contrast is considered: if we compare native and migrant workers in the domestic sector, a de-familialised care regime increases the probability to be native domestic workers against that of being migrant workers (odds ratio=1.14), while the opposite is true when we compare migrants working in other sectors to migrants in the domestic sector (odds ratio=0.68). Otherwise said, in this type of care regime, it is more likely to find natives rather than migrants in the domestic sector. However, a migrant worker is more likely to have a job in the domestic sector, rather than in others.

Figure 47 and Figure 48 provide a graphical representation that helps understanding the intensity of the effects.

Figure 47: Predicted probabilities of Care 1 (De-familialisation)




Figure 48: Predicted probabilities of Care 3 (Familialisation without state support)




Figure 47 and 48: The predicted probabilities are shown in a scale from 0 to 1. All effects between 0 and 0.50 refer to negative effects, while from 0.50 to 1 refer to positive effects. Effects closer to 0 and to 1 are stronger, while effects closer to 0.50 are weaker. 'Care 2' (Familialisation with state support) is the reference category for the typology of Care.

Although both Clusters 1 and 3 have a significant effect in predicting the outcomes (see Table 33), their effect is quite small. In particular, the effects of care regimes of both Clusters 1 and

3 on the probability to have native domestic workers rather than migrants are low (the predicted probabilities are located close to the value 0.50 in the figures). The effects of Clusters 1 and 3 on the probability to have migrants in other sectors rather than migrant domestic workers are stronger. As mentioned above, in Cluster 1 (De-familialisation) the probability to have migrant domestic workers rather than migrants in other sectors is higher, contrary to Cluster 3 (Familialisation without state support).

Interaction of Gender and Migration regimes

Let's now turn our attention to the interaction between gender and migration regimes. Still referring to Table 33, we can notice that the values of the odds ratios are all below 1, meaning that the probability to have migrant domestic workers, rather than native domestic workers or migrants in other sectors is everywhere higher compared to the interaction Gender 3 x Migration 4 (Traditional gender contract x New immigration and low integration), which is the reference category for the interactions²³⁸. However, as graphically visible in Figures 49-57, the intensity of the effect varies greatly among the different interactions.

Looking specifically at each interaction, what emerges is that the interaction between Gender 3 (Traditional gender contract) and Migration 3 (New immigration and medium integration) is the one with the strongest effect on the probability to have native domestic workers compared to migrants.

²³⁸ The only exception to this picture is the interaction between Gender 3 (Traditional gender contract) and Migration 1 (Old immigration and high integration), which is not significant.

Figure 49: Predicted probabilities of Gender 3 (Traditional gender contract) X Migration 3 (New immigration and medium integration)




Figure 49: The predicted probabilities are shown in a scale from 0 to 1. All effects between 0 and 0.50 refer to negative effects, while from 0.50 to 1 refer to positive effects. Effects closer to 0 and to 1 are stronger, while effects closer to 0.50 are weaker. 'Gender 3 x Migration 4' (Traditional gender contract / New immigration and low integration) is the reference category for the interactions Gender X Migration.

As shown in Figure 49, in this interaction the probability to have migrant domestic workers rather than native domestic workers is extremely high. However, also the probability that migrants work in the domestic sector, rather than in another sector is quite important. This suggests that in countries that belong to this combination of gender and migration regimes – traditional gender contract and new immigration/medium integration countries – the *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector is particularly pronounced, more than in any other combination.

However, it is not only in countries of new immigration and characterised by a traditional gender contract that the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector is high. If we consider, for instance, the combination Gender 3 x Migration 2 (Traditional gender contract / Old immigration and medium integration), it emerges that this combination has a similar strong effect on the probability to have migrant domestic workers, rather than native domestic workers. This suggests that the *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector is strong in countries characterised by a traditional gender contract, whether they have old or new immigration regimes.

Figure 50 shows the predicted probabilities of the interaction Gender 3 x Migration 2.

Figure 50: Predicted probabilities of Gender 3 x Migration 2 (Traditional gender contract / Old immigration and medium integration)




Figure 50: 'Gender 3 x Migration 4' (Traditional gender contract / New immigration and low integration) is the reference category for the interactions Gender X Migration.

As shown in Figure 50, the effect of this interaction on the probability to have migrants working in another sector, rather than migrant domestic workers, is significant, albeit considerably weaker compared to its effect on the probability to have migrant domestic workers vs. native domestic workers. Also, the effect is weaker, compared to the effect of the interaction Gender 3 x Migration 3. This suggests that while in both interactions – Gender 3 x Migration 3 and Gender 3 x Migration 2 – the *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector is very pronounced, in the first interaction there is also a high probability that migrants are concentrated in the domestic sector, which is not so strong in the second interaction.

Concerning the combination Gender 3 x Migration 1 (Traditional gender contract / Old immigration and high integration), the effect on the probability of having native domestic workers against migrant domestic workers is again statistically significant. This means that also in this combination between gender and migration regimes the probability to have migrant domestic workers, rather than natives, is higher, compared to the reference group (Traditional gender contract / New immigration and low integration). This suggests that also

in contexts characterised by less restrictive migration regimes, the *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector is important²³⁹.

Figure 51 shows the predicted probabilities of the interaction Gender 3 x Migration 1.

Figure 51: Predicted probabilities of Gender 3 x Migration 1 (Traditional gender contract / Old immigration and high integration)




Figure 51: ‘Gender 3 x Migration 4’ (Traditional gender contract / New immigration and low integration) is the reference category for the interactions Gender X Migration.

Concerning the interactions between Gender 2 (Gender contract in transition) and all the clusters of migration regimes, the effect on the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector is similar. Figures 52, 53, 54 and 55 show the predicted probabilities of these interactions.

²³⁹ The probability to have migrants working in another sector vs. Migrant domestic workers (blue point in Figure 50) is not commented, because the coefficient of the effect is not statistically significant (refer to Table 33).

Figure 52: Predicted probabilities of Gender 2 x Migration 1 (Gender contract in transition / Old immigration and high integration)




Figure 52: 'Gender 3 x Migration 4' (Traditional gender contract / New immigration and low integration) is the reference category for the interactions Gender X Migration.

Figure 53: Predicted probabilities of Gender 2 x Migration 2 (Gender contract in transition / Old immigration and medium integration)




Figure 53: 'Gender 3 x Migration 4' (Traditional gender contract / New immigration and low integration) is the reference category for the interactions Gender X Migration.

Figure 54: Predicted probabilities of Gender 2 x Migration 3 (Gender contract in transition / New immigration and medium integration)




Figure 54: 'Gender 3 x Migration 4' (Traditional gender contract / New immigration and low integration) is the reference category for the interactions Gender X Migration.

Figure 55: Predicted probabilities of Gender 2 x Migration 4 (Gender contract in transition / New immigration and low integration)




Figure 55: 'Gender 3 x Migration 4' (Traditional gender contract / New immigration and low integration) is the reference category for the interactions Gender X Migration.

As emerges from the above figures, the probability to have migrant domestic workers, rather than native domestic workers is strong in all interactions between Gender 2 (Gender contract in transition) and the four clusters of migration regimes, and even stronger for the interaction between gender contract in transition and less restrictive migration systems. Regarding the probability that migrants work as domestic workers rather than being employed in other sectors, the effect of the four interactions has the same directions, but the intensity of the effect varies considerably. In particular, it is in the interaction Gender 2 x Migration 3 (Gender contract in transition / New immigration and medium integration) that the effect is stronger, and in the interaction Gender 2 x Migration 1 (Gender contract in transition / Old immigration and high integration) that the effect is weaker. This means that migrants are more likely to be found in the domestic sector, rather than in other sectors in the first interaction.

Concerning the interactions between Cluster 1 of gender regimes and the clusters of migration regimes, only two combinations exist: Gender 1 x Migration 2 (Modern gender contract / Old immigration and medium integration) and Gender 1 x Migration 1 (Modern gender contract / Old immigration and high integration).

Figures 56 and 57 report the predicted probabilities of these two interactions.

Figure 56: Predicted probabilities of Gender 1 x Migration 1 (Modern gender contract / Old immigration and high integration)




Figure 56: 'Gender 3 x Migration 4' (Traditional gender contract / New immigration and low integration) is the reference category for the interactions Gender X Migration.

Figure 57: Predicted probabilities of Gender 1 x Migration 2 (Modern gender contract / Old immigration and medium integration)




Figure 57: 'Gender 3 x Migration 4' (Traditional gender contract / New immigration and low integration) is the reference category for the interactions Gender X Migration.

As visible from the comparison between the two figures, both the probability to have migrant domestic workers rather than native domestic workers and the probability to have migrants in the domestic sector rather than in other sectors are higher for the interaction Gender 1 x Migration 1 (Modern gender contract / Old immigration and high integration).

Overall, what emerges from the analysis of the effect of the interactions between gender and migration regimes is that the lowest *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector is found in the interaction between Cluster 3 of gender regimes (Traditional gender contract) and Cluster 4 of migration regimes (New immigration and low integration), while the higher *ethnicisation* is found in the interaction between Cluster 3 of gender regimes (Traditional gender contract) and Cluster 3 of migration regimes (New immigration and medium integration). However, the probability to have migrant domestic workers, rather than native domestic workers is also high in the interactions Gender 2 x Migration 1 (Gender contract in transition / Old immigration and high integration), Gender 2 x Migration 3 (Gender contract in transition / New immigration and medium integration) and Gender 3 x Migration 2 (Traditional gender contract / Old immigration and medium integration). On the contrary, the probability is weaker in the interactions Gender 1 x Migration 2 (Modern gender contract / Old immigration and medium integration), Gender 2 x Migration 2 (Gender contract in transition / Old

immigration and medium integration), Gender 2 x Migration 4 (Gender contract in transition / New immigration and low integration) and Gender 3 x Migration 1 (Traditional gender contract / Old immigration and high integration).

Concerning the probability of being a migrant working in another sector, compared to being a migrant domestic worker, the findings suggest that migrants are more likely to work in the domestic sector in contexts characterised by the interactions Gender 2 x Migration 3 (Gender contract in transition / New immigration and medium integration) and Gender 3 x Migration 3 (Traditional gender contract / New immigration and medium integration). In other words, in new immigration countries with a medium level of integration of migrants, be they characterised by a traditional gender contract or a gender contract in transition, there is a high probability to have migrant domestic workers, compared to migrants in other sectors. The situation is the opposite – namely, a higher probability to have migrants in other sectors rather than migrant domestic workers – in all the other combinations of gender and migration regimes.

6.5 Testing the hypotheses

Based on these results and on the hypotheses defined in section 6.1, we can state the following.

Hypothesis 1 (the three regimes – the care, the gender and the migration regimes – do have an effect on the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector) is confirmed. All the multinomial regression models that include the three regimes (the indicators or the typologies) confirm that the three regimes under study do have a statistically significant effect on migrant domestic work. In particular, they show that the three regimes have an effect on both the proportion of migrant domestic workers, compared to native domestic workers, and on the proportion of migrant domestic workers, compared to migrants working in another sector.

Hypothesis 2 (the three regimes have a highest explanatory power when they are taken into consideration simultaneously) is confirmed by the analysis. If we compare the models that include the typologies of the three regimes, what emerges is that the models where the three regimes are taken into consideration in their interactions have better parameters of fit. In particular, the model that includes the interaction between gender and migration regimes, plus the care regime considered as a separate factor (fixed effect), seems to have the strongest explanatory power. Overall, this finding is in line with the theory of scholar Helma Lutz, who

suggested that it is the intersection of the three regimes that explains the phenomenon of migrant domestic work in Europe.

Hypothesis 3 (the typologies of the three regimes are a better tool, compared to countries, to explain the degree of *ethnicisation* of the sector) can be generally confirmed. Although the multinomial regression model that includes the countries (Model 1) has the best parameters of fit, compared to all models, as it brings more detailed information, this model goes against the principle of parsimony. On the contrary, the typologies of the three regimes do bring a certain level of generalisation (which is one of the goals of using the three regimes as tools for investigating the phenomenon of migrant domestic work), while maintaining a strong explanatory power.

Concerning the specific effects of the three regimes on migrant domestic work (Hypothesis 4), the results point at the following considerations.

Hypothesis 4a, on gender regimes, is only partially confirmed. Cluster 3 of the gender regime (Traditional gender contract) has a positive effect on the *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector, but only when it is combined with the Clusters 2 and 3 of migration regimes, which correspond to old and new immigration countries with a medium level of integration. On the contrary, when the traditional gender contract is combined with the Cluster 1 (Old immigration and high integration) and Cluster 4 (New immigration and low integration) its effect on the *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector is weaker. In particular, in contexts characterised by a traditional gender contract and low levels of integration, the probability to have native domestic workers, rather than migrants, is very high. The Cluster 1 of gender regimes (Modern gender contract) shows a low degree of *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector – as predicted – only when it is combined with the Cluster 2 of migration regimes (Old immigration and medium integration). However, what is interesting to notice is that there is no clear pattern suggesting a higher *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector in the passage from Cluster 1 to Cluster 3 of gender regimes. In particular, both Clusters 2 and 3 of gender regimes can have either a low or a high degree of *ethnicisation*, depending on the type of migration regime they belong to.

Hypothesis 4b, on care regimes, is not confirmed by the analysis. According to the findings, both Cluster 1 (De-familialisation) and Cluster 3 (Familialisation without state support) increase the probability of having native domestic workers, compared to migrant domestic workers, compared to Cluster 2 (Familialisation with state support). In other words, the cluster of care regimes with the highest probability to have migrants in the domestic sector is Cluster 2 (Familialisation with state support), followed by Cluster 1 (De-familialisation).

This contradicts the main findings of literature, where the care regimes characterised by a weak public support (here Cluster 3) are generally thought to favour the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector.

Hypothesis 4c, on migration regimes, is only partially confirmed by the findings. According to the hypothesis, both Clusters 3 and 4 were expected to show the highest *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector. However, the findings show that only Cluster 3 (New immigration and medium integration) significantly increases the probability of having migrant domestic workers, compared to native domestic workers. Cluster 3 has a positive effect on the *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector in all cases, which is when it is combined to a traditional gender contract, or to a gender contract in transition. On the contrary, Cluster 4 (New immigration and low integration) is the cluster that has the least probability of having migrant domestic workers, rather than natives. This is always true, irrespectively of the cluster of gender regimes they belong to.

Concerning Clusters 1 (Old immigration and high integration) and 2 (Old immigration and medium integration), which were expected to have the least concentration of migrants in the domestic sector, the results are only partially confirmed. Concerning Cluster 1 (Old immigration and high integration), it increases the probabilities to have migrant domestic workers when it is combined with a gender contract in transition (Cluster 2 of gender regimes). However, it decreases the probabilities to have migrant domestic workers, rather than natives, when it is combined with a traditional gender contract. Concerning Cluster 2 (Old immigration and medium integration), it decreases the probability to have migrant domestic workers, rather than native domestic workers, when it is combined with a modern gender contract and a gender contract in transition. On the contrary, Cluster 2 increases the probability to have migrant domestic workers when it is combined with a traditional gender contract.

Overall, the hypotheses formulated in order to test the theory of the three regimes are generally confirmed. However, while the effect of the three regimes – especially when they are taken into consideration simultaneously – on migrant domestic work is confirmed by the analysis, the direction and the intensity of the effect do not confirm the predictions in all cases. The most innovative finding concerns the effect of care regimes on migrant domestic work. While the findings of the literature suggest that countries characterised by a weak state support have a stronger *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector, the analysis presented here suggests that the ‘familialisation without state support’ decreases the *ethnicisation* of the sector. Instead, it is in countries belonging to Clusters 1 (De-familialisation) and Cluster 2

(Familialisation with state support) that the probability to have migrants in the domestic sector is higher.

Conclusions

In this research, I have investigated the impact of the care, gender and migration regimes on migrant domestic work in Europe. Based on the findings of the literature on paid domestic work – which includes both housework and care work – it emerges that important common trends exist in Europe with respect to the main characteristics of the job. Among the most visible trends are the general increase of the sector, also due to the growing demand for care workers, the intensification of the feminisation and the growing *ethnicisation* of the sector. However, while differences exist in Europe with respect to all features of paid domestic work, including its regulation and the employment conditions, it is its *ethnicisation* that shows the greatest variations among European countries. While in some countries migrants have become the incontestable protagonists of this segment of the labour market, in other countries the proportion of migrant domestic workers remains at considerably lower levels.

In order to understand the reasons not only of the increased concentration of migrants in the paid domestic sector, but also of the significant differences between European countries, I have analysed three macro factors – the care, gender and migration regimes – which are known to have an impact on this phenomenon. In particular, the analyses conducted in this research draw from the theory elaborated by Helma Lutz, according to whom, in order to understand the phenomenon of migrant domestic work, the three regimes have to be taken into consideration simultaneously.

While part of the literature on domestic work has already given insights on the importance of these three macro factors on the domestic sector in Europe, the effects on these factors – taken individually or in combination – have not been empirically tested so far. This research aimed

to test this theory, while at the same time overcoming some of the main limitations of the literature that has developed around these themes, which can be summarised as follows.

First of all, while a vast corpus of studies exists on the three regimes (especially on care and migration, while less attention has been traditionally paid to the gender regime), they have often been studied separately and very seldom in their interaction. Although other structural factors, as well as individual choices, can surely account for playing a role in the growing *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector, and in other features of contemporary domestic work, a thorough analysis of the interaction between these three factors is necessary and can already shed light on the phenomenon.

Additionally, most literature on domestic work, but also on care, gender and migration regimes, tends to be confined to the theoretical level and/or to be carried out through qualitative methods of investigation. While this is understandable, due to the complexity of measuring concepts such as gender norms, preferences about care responsibilities and so on, it can nevertheless present some risks. These risks include issues of generalisation, especially in the case of multi-country comparisons, which can in turn prevent the use of these concepts as a basis for future studies and/or policy assessment.

In this research, which was carried out in three main steps, I have tried to overcome the above-mentioned limits, by i) taking into consideration the three regimes both separately and simultaneously, and ii) empirically testing this theory for the first time.

The overall objectives of the research were the following:

- To investigate whether and to what extent the three regimes have an impact on the main features of paid domestic work, and in the degree of *ethnicisation* in particular.
- To investigate whether the three regimes – in the form of typologies – can be a useful tool to explain the cross-national variation in the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector.

The following sections summarise the three sets of analyses that I have used to test the theory and focus on what can be considered the main contributions of this research.

First analysis: the features of contemporary paid domestic work

The first step was a descriptive analysis of contemporary paid domestic work in Europe. The objective of this first set of analyses was to confirm (or contradict) the findings of the literature and to highlight the similarities and differences that exist between European countries. Also, by highlighting how widely European countries differ in the size of the migrant population in the domestic sector, the objective was to underline the need for a

thorough understanding of such differences and set the framework of the second and third set of analyses.

This analysis focused on three elements, which were used to provide an overall description of the domestic sector: 1) The magnitude of the domestic sector, with a focus on the increase of the domestic sector over time and the analysis of the relative size of the domestic sector as a share of the total employment; 2) the workforce composition, with a focus on the concentration of women (feminisation) and the concentration of migrants (*ethnicisation*) of the domestic sector; and 3) some elements that can be used to define the working conditions in the domestic sector: the income level, the job stability (type of contract) and the unusual working hours (working on shifts, at night or at weekends).

The analyses were conducted using the EU-Labour Forces Survey data from 2015, which represent the most reliable and comprehensive source for a European comparison in the field of labour market participation. Despite the limitations of the data, which are highlighted in Chapter 3, this analysis proved to be relevant, as it allowed both to confirm some findings already attained by the literature and by the institutional sources, but also to reveal some unexpected findings.

The findings that mostly confirm the existing literature are the relative numerical importance of the domestic sector – and in particular of care activities – in the formal labour market in Europe, the incontestable feminisation of the domestic sector, as well as the poor working conditions that characterise this work, compared to similar types of work.

Concerning the size of the domestic sector, it is in Northern countries – and to a lesser extent in Central and Southern European countries – that domestic work represents the biggest share of the total employment. A net difference exists between Eastern European countries and the rest of Europe, with the former showing the smallest domestic sector. With this respect, it is important to notice that due to the high prevalence of undeclared work in the domestic sector, the analysis conducted on official institutional data (in this case, the EU-LFS database) can only partly grasp the extent of the phenomenon.

The analysis presented in section 4.2.2, which is based on the official available estimates on the irregular work in the domestic sector, is particularly interesting as it shows how the relative size of the domestic sector would change if we were to add the undeclared work. Unfortunately, not only estimates change greatly depending on the source, but they exist only on a reduced number of European countries. This stimulates two reflections. The first is that, due to the great incidence of undeclared work in the domestic sector, a full understanding of the scope of contemporary paid domestic work is possible only when irregular work is

accounted for. This leads to the second reflection, on the importance of the availability of reliable estimates on irregular work in Europe. The constant update of harmonised methods of calculation of estimates of the shadow economy should be coupled with the development of estimates disaggregated by professional and/or economic sector, which are currently unavailable.

Concerning the feminisation of the domestic sector, the analysis based on the EU-LFS 2015 data confirms that despite the slight cross-national differences, domestic work – also in the formal labour market – is in the great majority performed by women. In all European countries, the number of women in the domestic sector is higher than that of men and ranges from 77.7% in Denmark to 97.8% in Cyprus. Not surprisingly, and in line with previous studies, the countries with the lowest shares of women in domestic activities are those characterised by less traditional gender regimes and more egalitarian labour and welfare systems (Northern countries), while the most feminised domestic sectors are those of Mediterranean and Eastern European countries, which are associated with less egalitarian systems. The only remarkable exception is Italy, where the share of women in the domestic sector is similar to that of Northern countries. However, as already highlighted by the literature, this does not indicate a better repartition of domestic activities between men and women, but rather that more and more migrant men choose to temporarily enter this sector due to the strong demand.

Concerning the working conditions (income level, job stability and unusual working hours), the analyses confirm that domestic work is everywhere characterised by weaker labour standards, compared to similar occupations. The most surprising finding is that, apart from the income level, the poor quality of the jobs in the sector is not a prerogative of countries characterised by less regulated labour markets, high incidence of informal economy, or a weaker support by the welfare state. While the income of domestic workers in Northern countries (Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands, but also the UK) is similar or equal to that of other low-skilled workers, job instability and unusual working hours seem to be features common to all domestic sectors in Europe, including countries that enjoy the best welfare protection – such as the Scandinavian countries – and countries where this sector of the labour market is more regulated – such as France and Belgium, where a system of vouchers is in place.

Regarding the *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector, the analysis based on the EU-LFS data confirms that the situation in Europe is uneven. Indeed, the most striking element that emerges from the analysis of contemporary paid domestic work in Europe is the considerable

difference between European countries in the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector, which varies from less than 2% in some Eastern European countries, to more than 65% in Cyprus and almost 50% in Italy and other Mediterranean countries. This finding, as extreme as it is, confirms the need for a deeper investigation to uncover the reasons that determine such differences.

With this respect, it should be pointed out that the degree of *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector changes considerably depending on the definition of the migrant population. In particular, when second and/or third generations are added to first generation migrants, the *ethnicisation* of domestic workers is even more visible in certain countries. For instance, in countries of old immigration, such as France, Luxembourg and the UK (but also in some Eastern European countries, such as Latvia and Estonia), the presence of second generation migrants is considerable, while in Mediterranean countries the domestic sector is almost entirely populated by new migrants. The comparison between the degree of *ethnicisation* of the European countries for which data are available show that the national history of migration (namely, the age of the migration) can only partially explain the differences. Unfortunately, due to national restrictions, information on second generations – which is data allowing for identifying old immigration (i.e. country of birth of mother and father, etc.) – is not always disclosed, which prevents from making cross-national comparisons.

Second analysis: typologies of care, gender and migration regimes

The second step of this research was a thorough analysis of the care, gender and migration regimes. For this step, and with the purpose of investigating the impact of the three regimes on migrant domestic work, three typologies – each of them corresponding to one of the three regimes – were constructed. These three typologies were developed with the purpose of finding a valid empirical tool allowing for an empirical testing of the theory of the three regimes. In this sense, the three typologies are intended as instruments whose goal is twofold. First, they aim to operationalise each regime and classify countries according to the indicators that are selected to define these regimes. Second, they are used as instruments to test the impact of such regimes on migrant domestic work.

Concerning the care regime, the typology was created based on two dimensions, which are deemed to be crucial for the definition of care regimes: the ‘de-familialisation’ and the generosity of care regimes. For each dimension, one composite index was calculated, based on selected indicators from different international databases. If we take into consideration only the de-familialisation index, two main findings emerge. First, countries differ

considerably with respect to the degree of de-familialisation of their care regimes, the Northern countries being the greatest supporters of de-familialisation and Mediterranean countries promoting more familialistic policies. Second, great differences exist in the degree of de-familialisation depending on the policy area. While policies of de-familialisation are more common with respect to elderly care, all European countries show a certain degree of familialisation in the field of childcare. This confirms that, in line with the literature, a full de-familialisation of childcare is unlikely to be promoted. The only exceptions are Sweden and Belgium, which overall show a de-familialistic approach in both policy areas.

If we take into consideration only the generosity index, two main behaviours are visible in Europe. First, there is a group of countries that behave more or less coherently in terms of generosity towards children and the elderly. In Belgium, Ireland, Sweden, Luxembourg, Austria and Denmark both childcare and elderly care are well supported by the state, while in Eastern European countries, France, Italy and the UK, the state offers a less generous support for both children and seniors. Then, there is a group of countries that show a different level of generosity, depending on the field (childcare vs. elderly care). While the care regimes of Germany, Hungary, Slovenia, and Finland are very generous in supporting childcare, they are considerably less generous for the care of elderly people. The opposite behaviour is that of the Netherlands, Greece and Portugal, which offer better support to the care of elderly people and little support for childcare. This finding confirms that the financial support of welfare states is not unambiguous and that care policies strongly depend on which care responsibilities are considered a family or a public matter.

The typology that derives from the analysis of care regimes – which is the result of a cluster analysis based on the two indexes – suggests the existence of three main clusters of countries that behave similarly with respect to care regimes. The first cluster, which I have called ‘De-familialisation’, includes Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, France and Belgium; the second cluster, which I have called ‘Familialisation with state support’, includes mainly continental countries and the islands, but also Italy and Portugal; and the third cluster, which I have called ‘Familialisation without state support’, includes the remaining Mediterranean countries and Eastern European countries.

A few interesting findings emerge from the construction of this typology. First, only a minority of countries (Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands and France) show a de-familialistic approach in their care regime and these countries (Cluster 1) stand at a considerable distance from all the remaining European countries. Second, all the care regimes characterised by a de-familialistic approach provide a high level of generosity. This suggests

that, while familialisation is either pursued with or without the economic support of the state, de-familialisation always implies a certain amount of state support. Finally, the most unexpected finding in terms of clustering of countries is that Italy and Portugal, which are usually considered to be characterised by a weak state support, are instead found to be more similar to the countries characterised by a familistic approach supported by the state.

Concerning the gender regime, the typology was developed based on two dimensions: the gender equality and the 'gender contract'. While for the first dimension an existing synthetic index (the Gender Equality Index) was employed, for the second dimension I created a 'gender contract index', based on selected indicators from different sources. The typology of gender regimes derived from this analysis indicates the existence of three main clusters of countries: the first cluster, which I have called 'Modern gender contract', includes Scandinavian countries, plus the Netherlands; the second cluster, which I have called 'Gender contract in transition', includes continental countries and the islands, plus Spain and Estonia; and the third cluster, which I have called 'Traditional gender contract', includes Mediterranean countries and Eastern European countries, plus Austria.

What strongly emerges from the analysis of gender regimes is that, contrary to care and migration regimes, the classification of countries follows a coherent pattern and that a high level of gender equality outcomes in the different fields which are accounted for (employment, power, economic situation, education and so on) is always associated with less traditional views about gender roles and the gender division of labour. This means that countries clearly group themselves together in a scale that goes from low levels of gender equality and a traditional gender contract, to countries characterised by high levels of gender equality in all fields and a more equal vision of gender roles.

Concerning the migration regimes, the typology was developed so to cover both integration and immigration systems, but also some elements that can specifically influence the arrival and the concentration of migrants in the domestic sector. For the overall integration system, I have used an existing synthetic indicator (the Migrant Integration Policy Index), while for the other dimensions I have selected three indicators, from different sources. The choice of the three indicators was based on theoretical grounds and included the elements that are deemed to have an impact on the arrival of domestic workers in Europe: the existence of a large informal economy, the number of residence permits issued for employment reasons and the number of Eastern European migrants among intra-European ones.

The resulting typology indicates the existence of four main clusters of countries, if we exclude the case of Poland, which constitutes a unique case in Europe with respect to its migration regime. The first cluster – labelled ‘Old immigration and high integration’ – includes Scandinavian countries, Belgium and Portugal. This cluster corresponds to the least restrictive migration regime and is characterised by a high level of integration, a low presence of migrants from Eastern European countries and a medium level of informal economy. The second cluster – labelled ‘Old immigration and medium integration’ – includes mainly old immigration countries and is characterised by medium levels of integration, a low presence of migrants from new accession countries and a small informal economy. The third cluster – labelled ‘New immigration and medium integration’ – includes three Mediterranean countries, which share a similar large informal economy, a high percentage of migrants from new accession countries and a medium level of integration. The fourth cluster – labelled ‘New immigration and low integration’ – includes Eastern European countries, which are characterised by a very large informal economy, low levels of integration and a very high percentage of residence permits issued for employment reasons.

A few interesting points emerge from the construction of the three typologies.

First, the three typologies are found to group countries in a clear and meaningful way, and therefore maintain a strong link with the theory. The identification of a behaviour which is coherent with the theory with respect to the three regimes under study can be used as a construct validation of the three typologies (Carmines and Zeller, 1979). Indeed, although the choice of the indicators used for the analysis of each regime was based on theory, it could not be taken for granted that the results of the analyses be coherent with such theory.

Second, while in some cases the three typologies closely recall existing and well-known typologies developed by the literature, in other cases they move away from existing classifications. This is the case, for instance, of the typology of care regimes, where Italy and Portugal are found to have a closer similarity to continental countries (familialisation with state support) than to the other Mediterranean countries (included in the cluster of familialisation without state support). Similarly, in the typology of gender regimes, Spain moves away from Eastern and Mediterranean countries and scores considerably higher in terms of gender equality and perception of the gender contract.

This can be due to at least three reasons. First, countries may be grouped together differently from other classifications because of the indicators used to build each typology (the rationale for their choice and their possible limitations have been illustrated in Chapter 5). Second,

since the three regimes under study can evolve over time, recent changes occurred at national level can justify a different behaviour compared to previous classifications (when possible, the data used for the construction of these typologies are the most recent available data). Third, the choice of the countries included in the analysis can contribute to a different clustering of countries, compared to existing classifications.

Indeed, the inclusion in this analysis of (some) eastern European countries, which are generally excluded from cross-European comparisons, certainly contributes to redefining European typologies with respect to the three regimes under study and represents one of the most innovative contributions of this research. While Northern countries seem to remain a more or less stable cluster in all typologies, the inclusion of Eastern European countries brings about a reshuffling of the other European countries: in some cases, as in the typology of migration regimes, Eastern countries embody a distinct cluster, distant from the other configurations; in other cases, as in the typology of care and gender regimes, they mingle with other countries. Overall, they are nevertheless found to be more similar to Mediterranean countries, under many respects.

Third analysis: testing the impact of the three regimes on migrant domestic work

The last step of the research was the empirical test of the theory of the three regimes. For this step, I have conducted multivariate analyses (using multilevel logistic regression models), which allowed me to investigate the impact of the three regimes on migrant domestic work in Europe. The main findings can be summarised as follows.

First of all, according to the analyses and based on the available data, the three regimes under study are found to have an impact on migrant domestic work. The comparison between the different models presented in Chapter 6 shows not only that the impact of the three regimes is statistically significant, but that the three typologies used to measure the three regimes are powerful instruments for investigating migrant domestic work – almost at the level of countries.

This represents a key finding for this study that is worth some discussion. While countries can be thought just as conventional proxy indicators for a series of factors (welfare, migration, gender equality but also historical events, political orientation, economic activities, labour market regulations and so on), the clusters of the typologies developed in this study have a clear and evident meaning, as they group the European countries based on just three dimensions, that are clearly singled out both on the theoretical and the empirical level. In other words, the typologies derived from the analyses are not arbitrary labels attached to the

countries, but they are the result of a careful representation in a three-dimensional discrete space. The fact that these clusters do explain the variability shown by the data almost as well as the countries means that they constitute a useful and well-designed tool to understand the phenomena under study. This constitutes a solid validation of the whole process followed in this study.

A second important finding that can be derived from the analyses is that the three typologies – which correspond to the three regimes – are more powerful at predicting the outcome (in this case the probability to have migrant domestic workers, instead of native domestic workers and instead of migrants in other sectors) when their interactions are taken into consideration. Although also the models that tested the three typologies separately do have a significant effect on the outcome, the ‘best’ models – namely, those that have the best measures of fit – are those that include the interactions between the regimes. This goes exactly in the direction postulated by the theory of the three regimes: not only the three regimes do have an impact on migrant domestic work, but their impact is greater when they are taken into consideration in mutual interdependence, rather than individually, so that the effect of either of them depends on that of the others. This means that it is the interplay between the three regimes that matters for understanding the distribution of migrant workers over the sectors of activity, and in particular in the domestic sector.

A third important finding is that the interplay between the migration and the gender regimes proves to be particularly relevant, while the care regime plays a lesser role in the shaping of the ethnic distribution of the domestic sector. Indeed, the model that emerges as the best empirical test – because of its generalisation power and because of its explanatory power – is the model that analyses the interaction between gender and migration regimes, plus the care regime considered as a separate factor.

Concerning the effects of the three regimes on migrant domestic work the results point at different considerations. If we look at the interaction between the gender and the migration regime, the hypotheses that were formulated (see section 6.1) are only partially confirmed. Regarding gender regimes, no clear pattern suggests a higher *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector in the passage from Cluster 1 to Cluster 3 of gender regimes (that is from a modern to a traditional gender contract). For instance, both Clusters 2 and 3 of gender regimes can have either a low or a high degree of *ethnicisation*, depending on the type of migration regime they belong to. Regarding migration regimes, contrary to the hypothesis that Clusters 3 and 4 would show the highest *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector, the findings show that only Cluster 3 (New immigration and medium integration) significantly increases the probability

of having migrant domestic workers, compared to native domestic workers. Indeed, Cluster 3 has a positive effect on the *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector in all combinations with the gender regimes. On the contrary, Cluster 4 (New immigration and low integration) is the cluster that has the least probability of having migrant domestic workers, rather than natives. This is always true, irrespectively of the cluster of gender regimes they belong to. This suggests that it is not the distinction between old or new immigration countries that makes the difference in the *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector. The findings clearly suggest that new immigration countries characterised by low levels of integration are those more likely to have a high concentration of migrants in the domestic sector.

The most innovative finding concerns the effect of care regimes on migrant domestic work. If we look at the effects of the care regime, taken as a separate factor, what strongly emerges from the analysis is that the cluster of care regimes with the highest *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector is Cluster 2 (Familialisation with state support), followed by Cluster 1 (De-familialisation). While the findings of the literature suggest that countries characterised by a weak state support have a stronger *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector, the analysis presented here suggests that the ‘familialisation without state support’ decreases the *ethnicisation* of the sector. Instead, it is in countries belonging to Clusters 1 (De-familialisation) and Cluster 2 (Familialisation with state support) that the probability to have migrants in the domestic sector is higher.

To conclude, if we closely look at the effects of the three regimes on migrant domestic work, three elements seem to point at the peculiarity of care regimes. First, the analyses confirm the importance of taking into consideration the three regimes simultaneously. However, if we look at the ‘best’ model, the care regime proves to have a stronger effect if taken as a separate factor, rather than in combination. Second, although statistically significant, the effect of the care regime is weaker, compared to that of the gender and migration regimes. Third, the specific effects of the care regime are those that more than any other move away from the expected hypotheses. I believe that the distinct behaviour of the care regimes in this context is also due to the complexity of this regime and that supplementary in-depth analyses are necessary to shed light to these findings.

Future work

In the light of the findings of this research and the work presented in this dissertation, I would like to draw the attention on two issues, which can be interesting in the perspective of future research and policy assessment.

The first has to do with the indicators used to build the three regimes that have been measured. As highlighted in Chapter 3 on methodology, one of the main limitations of the construction of the three typologies was the lack of available harmonised data on specific indicators that, based on theory, should be part of the definition of each regime. This was the case, to mention one example for each regime, of an indicator that should assess the level of cash-for-care benefits for the elderly (care regime), an indicator assessing citizen's opinions about who is responsible for the care of elderly people (gender regime), or an indicator clearly assessing the number of regularisation programmes and the purpose of each of them (migration regime). Although the three typologies derived from the analyses can be reasonably considered a solid representation of each regime, the availability of data harmonised for all 28 European countries is of paramount importance for conducting comparative studies and the lack of such data (especially for certain European countries) should be taken seriously into consideration and be part of the European Union agenda in the future. Also, the EU should promote clear and uncontroversial guidelines for the collection and the use of data in each European country and abolish the restrictions that are in place in certain EU countries.

The second, and most important, issue regards the irregular work in the domestic sector. The test of the impact of the three typologies that correspond to the three regimes has been conducted on the available data (the EU-LFS 2015), which are ambiguously meant to include both formal and informal workers, but which presumably grasp only the formal segments of the labour market. The results of the analyses show that indeed the three typologies do have an impact on the *ethnicisation* of the domestic sector, especially in their interplay, but only of the formal domestic sector. Now, the fact that the strongest effects on the *ethnicisation* of domestic work is that of the interactions that present the strongest probability to have a large segment of irregular work (i.e. Traditional gender contract x New immigration and medium integration), at the point to become almost proxies of the irregular work, or that some findings seem to be counterintuitive (i.e. stronger *ethnicisation* of the Familialisation with state support care regimes), cannot be underestimated. Indeed, this seems to suggest that the portion of domestic work falling into the informal economy is crucial and that the inclusion of irregular domestic workers would bring useful insights to the interpretation of these results.

Therefore, I believe the next necessary step of this research would be to test the same typologies on data that include unambiguously formal and informal domestic work, which inevitably calls for a well-designed and reliable collection of data on irregular workers.

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
Annexes

ANNEX 1

Table 1: Disaggregated activities in the domestic sector in 24 EU member states (2015)


Country	Housework	Housework (%)	Childcare	Childcare (%)	Elderly care	Elderly care (%)
AT	3071	0.560	513	0.093	1903	0.347
BE	2256	0.617	575	0.157	824	0.225
CY	1500	0.861	148	0.085	95	0.055
CZ	380	0.486	60	0.077	342	0.437
DE	7051	0.712	776	0.078	2078	0.210
DK	1541	0.257	1974	0.329	2482	0.414
EE	286	0.492	107	0.184	188	0.324
ES	2370	0.614	283	0.073	1205	0.312
FI	316	0.273	271	0.234	569	0.492
FR	13785	0.614	4718	0.210	3943	0.176
GR	2254	0.830	172	0.063	291	0.107
HR	360	0.716	20	0.040	123	0.245
HU	2398	0.607	1004	0.254	546	0.138
IE	1381	0.236	1625	0.278	2843	0.486
IT	10002	0.590	440	0.026	6502	0.384
LT	775	0.637	190	0.156	252	0.207
LU	700	0.623	217	0.193	207	0.184
LV	413	0.470	194	0.221	271	0.309
NL	1039	0.338	692	0.225	1343	0.437
PT	3667	0.584	815	0.130	1794	0.286
RO	2014	0.616	174	0.053	1082	0.331
SE	2542	0.140	3068	0.169	12528	0.691
SK	933	0.422	202	0.091	1074	0.486
UK	787	0.230	1061	0.310	1579	0.461

Figure 1: Share of housework activities among domestic activities in 24 EU member states (2015)




Source: EU-LFS 2015

Figure 2: Share of childcare activities among domestic activities in 24 EU member states (2015)



Source: EU-LFS 2015

Figure 3: Share of elderly care activities among domestic activities in 24 EU member states (2015)



Source: EU-LFS 2015

ANNEX 2

Construction of the de-familialisation index

Correlation matrix:

	Effective maternity leave	Childcare usage under 3 years old	Full-time childcare usage under 3 years old	Residential care elderly	Home-based care elderly	Housework incentives
Effective maternity leave	1.00	0.36	0.22	0.25	-0.11	0.21
Childcare usage under 3 years old	0.36	1.00	0.80	0.76	0.56	0.43
Full-time childcare usage under 3 years old	0.22	0.80	1.00	0.47	0.50	0.29
Residential care elderly	0.25	0.76	0.47	1.00	0.70	0.49
Home-based care elderly	-0.11	0.56	0.50	0.70	1.00	0.08
Housework incentives	0.21	0.43	0.29	0.49	0.08	1.00

Principal Component Analysis:

Exploratory analysis (as many factors as variables):

```
Principal Components Analysis
Call: principal(r = matFAM, nfactors = 6, rotate = "none")
Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix
      PC1  PC2  PC3  PC4  PC5  PC6 h2  u2 com
Effective maternity leave 0.35 0.78 0.42 0.28 0.12 0.01 1 -2.2e-16 2.4
Childcare usage_under3 0.94 0.05 0.14 -0.13 -0.24 0.17 1 1.1e-15 1.3
FTChildcare usage_under3 0.80 -0.06 0.27 -0.51 0.10 -0.12 1 1.6e-15 2.1
Residential care_% 0.88 -0.08 -0.18 0.37 -0.15 -0.16 1 1.2e-15 1.6
Homebased care_% 0.70 -0.61 0.05 0.25 0.24 0.09 1 1.6e-15 2.5
Vouchers_HW 0.54 0.43 -0.69 -0.13 0.12 0.04 1 6.7e-16 2.8


      PC1  PC2  PC3  PC4  PC5  PC6
SS loadings 3.20 1.18 0.79 0.57 0.18 0.08
Proportion Var 0.53 0.20 0.13 0.10 0.03 0.01
Cumulative Var 0.53 0.73 0.86 0.96 0.99 1.00
Proportion Explained 0.53 0.20 0.13 0.10 0.03 0.01
Cumulative Proportion 0.53 0.73 0.86 0.96 0.99 1.00

Mean item complexity = 2.1
Test of the hypothesis that 6 components are sufficient.

The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0

Fit based upon off diagonal values = 1
```

Scree plot:



PCA with extraction of 1 component (without rotation):

Principal Components Analysis

Call: principal(r = matFAM, nfactors = 1, rotate = "none")

Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix

	PC1	h2	u2	com
Effective maternity leave	0.35	0.12	0.88	1
Childcare usage_under3	0.94	0.88	0.12	1
FTChildcare usage_under3	0.80	0.64	0.36	1
Residential care_%	0.88	0.77	0.23	1
Homebased care_%	0.70	0.50	0.50	1
Vouchers_HW	0.54	0.30	0.70	1

	PC1
SS loadings	3.20
Proportion Var	0.53

Mean item complexity = 1

Test of the hypothesis that 1 component is sufficient.

The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0.15

Fit based upon off diagonal values = 0.9

Reliability analysis – Cronbach's alpha:

Reliability analysis

Call: alpha(x = myfactor)

```
raw_alpha std.alpha G6(smc) average_r S/N ase mean sd
      0.8      0.8      0.88      0.4  4 0.066 6.2e-19 0.71
```

lower alpha upper 95% confidence boundaries
0.67 0.8 0.93

Reliability if an item is dropped:

```
raw_alpha std.alpha G6(smc) average_r S/N alpha se
Effective maternity leave      0.84      0.84      0.90      0.51 5.2      0.056
Childcare usage_under3        0.69      0.69      0.78      0.31 2.3      0.104
FTChildcare usage_under3      0.75      0.75      0.82      0.37 3.0      0.085
Residential care_%            0.72      0.72      0.78      0.33 2.5      0.095
Homebased care_%              0.79      0.79      0.82      0.43 3.7      0.071
Vouchers_HW                   0.80      0.80      0.88      0.45 4.1      0.067
```

Item statistics

```
n raw.r std.r r.cor r.drop mean sd
Effective maternity leave 22 0.45 0.45 0.31 0.24 2.1e-16 1
Childcare usage_under3 22 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.87 -3.7e-17 1
FTChildcare usage_under3 22 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.65 -2.1e-17 1
Residential care_% 22 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.78 -1.2e-16 1
Homebased care_% 22 0.64 0.64 0.62 0.47 -9.2e-17 1
Vouchers_HW 22 0.59 0.59 0.48 0.40 6.6e-17 1
```

Scores of the De-familialisation index

Country	Scores
AT	-0.204434914
BE	0.692274915
CZ	-1.140456688
DE	0.001231388
DK	2.864707217
EE	-0.428150835
ES	-0.063314878
FI	0.166964985
FR	1.189952016
GR	-1.086399018
HU	-0.896541446
IE	-0.396101984
IT	-0.429561369
LV	-0.832096912
LU	0.096992639
NL	0.930814849
PL	-1.395832071
PT	0.195270941
SE	1.658189194
SK	-0.837505389
SI	-0.096505004
UK	0.010502366

Construction of the generosity index

Correlation matrix:

	Effective parental leave	Child allowance 1 st child	Child allowance 2 nd child	Minimum social security	Net replacement rate	LTC expenditure
Effective parental leave	1.00	0.55	0.49	-0.31	-0.37	-0.03
Child allowance 1 st child	0.55	1.00	0.91	0.00	-0.11	0.28
Child allowance 2 nd child	0.49	0.91	1.00	0.02	-0.02	0.26
Minimum social security	-0.31	0.00	0.02	1.00	0.24	0.50
Net replacement rate	-0.37	-0.11	-0.02	0.24	1.00	-0.06
LTC expenditure	-0.03	0.28	0.26	0.50	-0.06	1.00

Principal Component Analysis:

Exploratory analysis (as many factors as variables):

Principal Components Analysis

Call: principal(r = matGEN, nfactors = 6, rotate = "none")

Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix

	PC1	PC2	PC3	PC4	PC5	PC6	h2	u2	com
Effective parental leave	0.75	-0.41	-0.08	0.38	0.33	-0.02	1	0.0e+00	2.6
Child allowance_1ch	0.93	0.14	0.19	-0.07	-0.14	0.22	1	2.7e-15	1.3
Child allowance_2ch	0.90	0.18	0.28	-0.11	-0.17	-0.20	1	1.2e-15	1.5
Min social security_%	-0.09	0.87	-0.14	0.42	-0.18	0.00	1	0.0e+00	1.6
Net replacement rate	-0.31	0.43	0.81	0.02	0.27	0.01	1	-1.1e-15	2.1
LTC expenditure_%GDP	0.31	0.73	-0.45	-0.26	0.32	-0.01	1	0.0e+00	2.8

	PC1	PC2	PC3	PC4	PC5	PC6
SS loadings	2.45	1.70	0.99	0.41	0.37	0.09
Proportion Var	0.41	0.28	0.17	0.07	0.06	0.01
Cumulative Var	0.41	0.69	0.86	0.92	0.99	1.00
Proportion Explained	0.41	0.28	0.17	0.07	0.06	0.01
Cumulative Proportion	0.41	0.69	0.86	0.92	0.99	1.00


Mean item complexity = 2

Test of the hypothesis that 6 components are sufficient.

The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0

Fit based upon off diagonal values = 1

Scree plot:



PCA with extraction of 3 components (without rotation):

```
Principal Components Analysis
Call: principal(r = matGEN, nfactors = 3, rotate = "none")
Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix
      PC1  PC2  PC3  h2  u2 com
Effective parental leave  0.75 -0.41 -0.08 0.74 0.258 1.6
Child allowance_1ch      0.93  0.14  0.19 0.93 0.071 1.1
Child allowance_2ch      0.90  0.18  0.28 0.92 0.081 1.3
Min social security_%    -0.09  0.87 -0.14 0.79 0.214 1.1
Net replacement rate     -0.31  0.43  0.81 0.93 0.072 1.9
LTC expenditure_%GDP     0.31  0.73 -0.45 0.83 0.170 2.1

      PC1  PC2  PC3
SS loadings  2.45 1.70 0.99
Proportion Var  0.41 0.28 0.17
Cumulative Var  0.41 0.69 0.86
Proportion Explained 0.48 0.33 0.19
Cumulative Proportion 0.48 0.81 1.00

Mean item complexity = 1.5
Test of the hypothesis that 3 components are sufficient.

The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0.07

Fit based upon off diagonal values = 0.96
> |
```

PCA with extraction of 2 components (oblique rotation):

```
Principal Components Analysis
Call: principal(r = matGEN, nfactors = 2, rotate = "oblimin")
Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix
          TC1  TC2  h2  u2 com
Effective parental leave  0.73 -0.46 0.74 0.26 1.7
Child allowance_1ch      0.94  0.08 0.89 0.11 1.0
Child allowance_2ch      0.91  0.12 0.84 0.16 1.0
Min social security_%    -0.04  0.87 0.77 0.23 1.0
Net replacement rate      -0.29  0.45 0.28 0.72 1.7
LTC expenditure_%GDP      0.35  0.71 0.63 0.37 1.5

          TC1  TC2
SS loadings      2.44 1.70
Proportion Var   0.41 0.28
Cumulative Var   0.41 0.69
Proportion Explained 0.59 0.41
Cumulative Proportion 0.59 1.00

With component correlations of
          TC1  TC2
TC1 1.00 0.01
TC2 0.01 1.00

Mean item complexity = 1.3
Test of the hypothesis that 2 components are sufficient.

The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0.13

Fit based upon off diagonal values = 0.89
```

Reliability analysis – Cronbach's alpha (1st component):

```
Reliability analysis
Call: alpha(x = child_gen)

raw_alpha std.alpha G6(smc) average_r S/N ase mean sd
0.85 0.85 0.85 0.65 5.5 0.061 -7.7e-17 0.88

lower alpha upper 95% confidence boundaries
0.73 0.85 0.97

Reliability if an item is dropped:
          raw_alpha std.alpha G6(smc) average_r S/N alpha se
Effective parental leave 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.91 19.4 0.021
Child allowance_1ch 0.66 0.66 0.49 0.49 1.9 0.147
Child allowance_2ch 0.71 0.71 0.55 0.55 2.5 0.123

Item statistics
          n raw.r std.r r.cor r.drop mean sd
Effective parental leave 22 0.78 0.78 0.56 0.53 -6.5e-17 1
Child allowance_1ch 22 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.85 -5.3e-17 1
Child allowance_2ch 22 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.79 -1.2e-16 1
```

Reliability analysis – Cronbach's alpha (2nd component):

Reliability analysis

Call: alpha(x = eld_gen)

```
raw_alpha std.alpha G6(smc) average_r S/N ase mean sd
      0.47      0.47      0.48      0.23 0.88 0.2 1e-16 0.7
```

```
lower alpha upper      95% confidence boundaries
0.08 0.47 0.86
```

Reliability if an item is dropped:

```
raw_alpha std.alpha G6(smc) average_r S/N alpha se
Min social security_% -0.14 -0.14 -0.065 -0.065 -0.12 0.49
Net replacement rate 0.67 0.67 0.503 0.503 2.03 0.14
LTC expenditure_%GDP 0.39 0.39 0.243 0.243 0.64 0.26
```

Item statistics

```
n raw.r std.r r.cor r.drop mean sd
Min social security_% 22 0.84 0.84 0.74 0.55 3.2e-16 1
Net replacement rate 22 0.56 0.56 0.20 0.10 -6.4e-17 1
LTC expenditure_%GDP 22 0.69 0.69 0.50 0.28 2.2e-17 1
```

> |

Scores of the generosity components

Country	Component 1 – Childcare	Component 2 – Elderly care
AT	0.1759207	0.70546799
BE	0.2504526	1.35802168
CZ	-0.1499288	-0.43025324
DE	2.0326994	-1.56503296
DK	1.1587283	1.68298402
EE	-0.1898703	-2.29892017
ES	-1.7263397	-0.38966254
FI	0.2653403	-0.41325725
FR	-0.6710803	-0.24190155
GR	-1.7536941	0.19399179
HU	1.9093109	-0.65304198
IE	0.3782104	1.21310260
IT	-0.2628085	-0.01951952
LV	-0.5828633	-0.85025428
LU	0.6759859	0.68180849
NL	-0.4983220	1.60943616
PL	-0.9598748	-0.68207226
PT	-1.1559234	0.29770403
SE	0.6625488	0.79612981
SK	-0.3021318	-0.71093417
SI	1.0160124	-0.33874342
UK	-0.2723726	0.05494676


ANNEX 3

Cluster analyses – Care regimes


Dissimilarity matrix:

	AT	BE	CZ	DE	DK	EE	ES	FI	FR	GR	HU	IE	IT	LV	LU	NL	PL	PT	SE	SK	SI	UK
BE	0.96760 11																					
CZ	1.18751 17	2.13458 64																				
DE	0.29170 22	0.89604 79	1.25616 41																			
DK	3.22185 51	2.25824 74	4.35530 46	3.09976 08																		
EE	1.69987 52	2.33500 50	1.19083 00	1.53932 73	4.23632 85																	
ES	1.50532 49	2.00968 84	1.32284 56	1.29344 59	3.83641 07	0.40969 26																
FI	0.63466 95	1.02331 72	1.32516 59	0.34957 60	3.08419 91	1.31304 42	1.01062 79															
FR	1.65808 82	1.35540 32	2.33634 19	1.37462 87	2.51579 75	1.79973 61	1.39014 12	1.09216 92														
GR	1.50585 26	2.38180 95	0.49273 44	1.48677 37	4.52264 89	0.80566 24	1.06022 10	1.43847 34	2.29920 33													
HU	0.71703 92	1.59854 61	0.95006 98	0.98054 55	3.84387 81	1.93022 21	1.88077 64	1.27435 49	2.35156 70	1.42072 8												
IE	0.40340 35	1.08841 07	1.31640 10	0.68812 73	3.32020 35	2.04030 35	1.88329 33	1.03598 97	2.02075 25	1.72009 72	0.52773 41											
IT	0.62389 19	1.46707 19	0.72632 73	0.57114 39	3.64583 50	1.10323 21	0.98728 25	0.60030 02	1.64992 57	0.91616 43	0.89993 92	0.93741 78										
LV	1.31650 84	2.15326 03	0.52627 04	1.26399 41	4.27023 46	0.66466 81	0.84119 48	1.18788 04	2.03870 48	0.26206 01	1.34623 66	1.57381 28	0.70222 08									
LU	0.38418 64	0.60833 47	1.57169 30	0.45524 96	2.86544 01	1.99369 74	1.74428 04	0.75610 04	1.57596 52	1.87839 36	0.99483 01	0.50672 98	0.97455 61	1.67645 60								
NL	1.14104 58	0.34459 12	2.23724 98	0.98368 27	2.11865 10	2.25535 28	1.89522 14	0.98982 65	1.04469 77	2.41918 72	1.82879 70	1.34846 43	1.52841 22	2.17396 80	0.84289 52							
PL	1.73529 05	2.64603 49	0.58911 19	1.75054 38	4.81435 31	1.05626 37	1.35343 42	1.73215 65	2.61134 58	0.31215 36	1.53271 17	1.90077 69	1.18144 83	0.57332 34	2.11616 11	2.70335 39						
PT	0.95724 80	1.32972 08	1.34294 25	0.69075 66	3.24780 91	1.02632 61	0.67997 87	0.35627 74	0.99505 79	1.32879 55	1.51980 90	1.36006 40	0.68798 85	1.06682 32	1.11235 69	1.22906 20	1.63864 76					
SE	1.88485 66	0.96881 37	2.97853 27	1.72946 10	1.39064 06	2.87201 02	2.48156 44	1.69382 32	1.27492 72	3.13215 90	2.55673 45	2.05536 13	2.26196 34	2.87960 87	1.56201 12	0.74784 60	3.42498 41	1.86604 77				
SK	1.13930 59	2.01453 37	0.37232 60	1.11875 89	4.17387 20	0.84380 79	0.95051 99	1.09365 51	2.02807 49	0.36966 32	1.13620 22	1.37496 71	0.54764 30	0.21009 54	1.50948 05	2.06276 31	0.64078 20	1.03567 43	2.78493 66			
SI	0.14854 32	0.91594 74	1.21865 95	0.14330 29	3.15277 36	1.61739 67	1.39702 99	0.48954 00	1.51234 79	1.49361 99	0.85080 46	0.54646 82	0.58406 60	1.28628 47	0.39143 33	1.04997 21	1.74153 43	0.82131 86	1.79766 57	1.12400 61		
UK	0.58995 46	1.13942 60	1.16516 30	0.34267 16	3.23821 97	1.21745 26	0.95215 39	0.16027 61	1.22965 48	1.28593 12	1.16861 99	0.99157 00	0.44125 86	1.03896 59	0.79234 48	1.13500 21	1.57641 74	0.36985 61	1.84856 79	0.93668 46	0.45996 77	


Agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis:




Explorative analysis of best cluster solutions:



K-means cluster analysis – 4 clusters solution:



PAM 3 clusters solution:



ANNEX 4

Gender contract index

Principal Component Analysis (PCA)

Correlation matrix:

	VAR1	VAR2	VAR3	VAR4	VAR5	VAR6	VAR7
VAR1	1.00	0.74	0.79	0.27	0.40	0.59	0.46
VAR2	0.74	1.00	0.84	0.52	0.68	0.77	0.68
VAR3	0.79	0.84	1.00	0.48	0.40	0.78	0.61
VAR4	0.27	0.52	0.48	1.00	0.59	0.58	0.67
VAR5	0.40	0.68	0.40	0.59	1.00	0.32	0.54
VAR6	0.59	0.77	0.78	0.58	0.32	1.00	0.84
VAR7	0.46	0.68	0.61	0.67	0.54	0.84	1.00

Exploratory analysis (as many factors as variables):

Principal Components Analysis

Call: principal(r = matrix_new, nfactors = 7, rotate = "none")

Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix

	PC1	PC2	PC3	PC4	PC5	PC6	PC7	h2	u2	com
VAR1	0.76	-0.50	0.26	0.11	0.30	0.07	0.00	1	0.000000000000000067	2.5
VAR2	0.93	-0.12	0.20	-0.11	-0.23	0.12	-0.10	1	0.0000000000000000377	1.4
VAR3	0.88	-0.35	-0.01	0.19	-0.16	-0.22	0.02	1	0.0000000000000000222	1.6
VAR4	0.71	0.56	-0.15	0.39	0.03	0.06	-0.02	1	0.0000000000000000244	2.7
VAR5	0.67	0.47	0.56	-0.14	0.00	-0.03	0.07	1	0.0000000000000000122	2.9
VAR6	0.87	-0.12	-0.42	-0.11	-0.06	0.13	0.10	1	0.0000000000000000211	1.6
VAR7	0.85	0.23	-0.31	-0.27	0.18	-0.12	-0.06	1	0.0000000000000000255	1.8

	PC1	PC2	PC3	PC4	PC5	PC6	PC7
SS loadings	4.64	0.99	0.71	0.32	0.21	0.10	0.03
Proportion Var	0.66	0.14	0.10	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.00
Cumulative Var	0.66	0.80	0.91	0.95	0.98	1.00	1.00
Proportion Explained	0.66	0.14	0.10	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.00
Cumulative Proportion	0.66	0.80	0.91	0.95	0.98	1.00	1.00


Mean item complexity = 2.1

Test of the hypothesis that 7 components are sufficient.

The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0

Fit based upon off diagonal values = 1

Scree plot :



PCA with extraction of 1 component (without rotation):

Principal Components Analysis

Call: `principal(r = matrix_new, nfactors = 1, rotate = "none")`

Standardized loadings (pattern matrix) based upon correlation matrix

	PC1	h2	u2	com
VAR1	0.76	0.57	0.43	1
VAR2	0.93	0.86	0.14	1
VAR3	0.88	0.77	0.23	1
VAR4	0.71	0.50	0.50	1
VAR5	0.67	0.45	0.55	1
VAR6	0.87	0.77	0.23	1
VAR7	0.85	0.72	0.28	1

	PC1
SS loadings	4.64
Proportion Var	0.66

Mean item complexity = 1

Test of the hypothesis that 1 component is sufficient.

The root mean square of the residuals (RMSR) is 0.13

Fit based upon off diagonal values = 0.96

Reliability analysis – Cronbach's alpha

Reliability analysis

Call: alpha(x = secfact)

raw_alpha	std.alpha	G6(smc)	average_r	S/N	ase	mean	sd
0.89	0.89	0.94	0.58	8.4	0.037	50	11

lower alpha upper 95% confidence boundaries
0.82 0.89 0.96

Reliability if an item is dropped:

	raw_alpha	std.alpha	G6(smc)	average_r	S/N	alpha	se
VAR1	0.87	0.88	0.93	0.59	7.3	0.044	
VAR2	0.83	0.84	0.88	0.52	5.4	0.057	
VAR5	0.90	0.90	0.91	0.64	8.7	0.030	
VAR6	0.87	0.87	0.91	0.57	6.7	0.045	
VAR3	0.85	0.86	0.91	0.55	6.0	0.050	
VAR4	0.89	0.90	0.92	0.63	8.5	0.040	

Item statistics

	n	raw.r	std.r	r.cor	r.drop	mean	sd
VAR1	21	0.79	0.78	0.74	0.70	31	12.4
VAR2	21	0.95	0.94	0.95	0.92	52	14.6
VAR5	21	0.71	0.70	0.67	0.55	57	16.4
VAR6	21	0.83	0.83	0.81	0.74	52	14.6
VAR3	21	0.89	0.89	0.88	0.82	39	14.7


ANNEX 5

Cluster analyses – Gender regimes


Dissimilarity matrix:

	AT	BE	CZ	DE	DK	EE	ES	FI	FR	GR	HU	IE	IT	LU	NL	PL	PT	SE	SI	SK
BE	1.427																			
CZ	0.555	1.797																		
DE	0.844	0.585	1.256																	
DK	3.326	1.904	3.691	2.482																
EE	0.561	1.001	0.799	0.502	2.892															
ES	0.730	0.703	1.109	0.156	2.607	0.346														
FI	2.996	1.622	3.413	2.166	0.549	2.622	2.306													
FR	1.755	0.492	2.019	0.970	1.723	1.240	1.038	1.583												
GR	1.049	2.013	0.538	1.558	3.835	1.056	1.402	3.626	2.115											
HU	1.029	2.429	0.691	1.858	4.333	1.455	1.726	4.021	2.693	0.959										
IE	0.886	0.569	1.327	0.106	2.446	0.596	0.253	2.111	0.994	1.650	1.910									
IT	0.822	2.096	0.301	1.557	3.986	1.096	1.410	3.714	2.304	0.503	0.476	1.627								
LU	1.263	0.267	1.580	0.467	2.111	0.782	0.537	1.865	0.505	1.761	2.233	0.502	1.875							
NL	2.292	0.980	2.733	1.477	1.165	1.954	1.625	0.719	1.107	2.989	3.320	1.413	3.034	1.243						
PL	0.702	2.087	0.373	1.519	3.991	1.113	1.385	3.684	2.351	0.780	0.343	1.574	0.290	1.890	2.986					
PT	1.084	2.040	0.571	1.589	3.857	1.087	1.433	3.652	2.136	0.035	0.974	1.681	0.525	1.788	3.017	0.805				
SE	3.508	2.100	3.896	2.667	0.286	3.098	2.800	0.565	1.963	4.065	4.525	2.623	4.194	2.322	1.270	4.184	4.088			
SI	1.137	0.301	1.540	0.293	2.189	0.761	0.431	1.875	0.746	1.808	2.151	0.268	1.841	0.293	1.195	1.811	1.837	2.374		
SK	1.185	2.258	0.633	1.781	4.093	1.283	1.626	3.876	2.374	0.263	0.830	1.868	0.459	2.011	3.230	0.747	0.248	4.321	2.041	
UK	1.372	0.056	1.747	0.529	1.958	0.952	0.650	1.670	0.534	1.971	2.376	0.513	2.046	0.242	1.019	2.034	1.998	2.152	0.245	2.214

Agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis:




Explorative analysis of best cluster solutions:




K-means cluster analysis – 3 clusters solution:

Cluster plot



PAM cluster analysis – 3 clusters solution:




ANNEX 6

Cluster analyses – Migration regimes


Dissimilarity matrix:

	AT	BE	CZ	DE	DK	EE	ES	FI	FR	GR	HU	IE	IT	LU	LV	NL	PL	PT	SE	SI	SK
BE	2.46																				
CZ	2.35	3.52																			
DE	1.19	1.37	2.64																		
DK	1.55	1.44	2.46	1.04																	
EE	3.62	3.14	2.51	3.25	2.86																
ES	2.17	1.77	1.92	1.50	1.34	1.98															
FI	2.06	1.64	2.56	1.30	1.04	3.16	1.30														
FR	1.95	1.39	3.46	1.53	1.36	3.33	2.29	2.24													
GR	2.67	3.14	2.25	2.55	2.93	2.31	2.10	3.19	3.22												
HU	2.61	2.67	1.81	2.37	2.23	1.15	1.40	2.62	2.71	1.35											
IE	0.85	2.28	1.65	1.14	1.18	2.93	1.45	1.58	2.06	2.30	1.98										
IT	2.69	2.95	2.00	2.30	2.71	2.67	1.62	2.45	3.50	1.52	1.90	2.13									
LU	2.40	2.02	3.62	2.15	1.41	3.73	2.65	2.14	1.35	4.12	3.32	2.38	4.11								
LV	3.40	3.89	2.10	3.50	3.28	1.51	2.60	3.75	3.66	1.90	1.28	2.84	2.78	4.18							
NL	1.68	1.53	3.10	1.28	0.74	3.52	2.05	1.44	1.14	3.51	2.90	1.66	3.35	0.91	3.90						
PL	5.50	4.82	4.68	5.26	4.35	3.25	4.32	4.79	4.63	5.37	4.04	4.93	5.61	4.20	4.01	4.65					
PT	3.07	1.18	3.49	2.01	1.72	3.04	1.68	1.37	2.34	3.56	2.86	2.63	2.98	2.38	4.07	2.00	4.47				
SE	2.80	1.08	3.85	1.73	1.74	3.84	2.19	1.40	2.14	3.88	3.41	2.62	3.29	2.20	4.65	1.69	5.25	1.03			
SI	3.89	3.95	2.04	3.75	3.21	1.44	2.42	3.34	4.07	3.01	1.92	3.09	2.97	4.09	1.83	3.89	3.18	3.59	4.38		
SK	2.38	3.51	1.17	2.80	2.32	2.35	2.21	2.82	3.08	2.63	1.81	1.80	2.87	3.11	1.83	2.86	3.91	3.60	3.98	1.97	
UK	1.01	2.12	2.04	1.06	0.91	3.25	1.58	1.17	1.99	2.85	2.43	0.63	2.47	2.03	3.36	1.27	4.95	2.36	2.23	3.35	2.16


Explorative analysis of best cluster solutions:




Dendrogram hierarchical cluster analysis:



K-means cluster analysis – 3 clusters solution:



K-means cluster analysis – 5 clusters solution:



ANNEX 7

Table 1: Domestic workers and all other workers in the 3 clusters of care regimes (EU-LFS, 2015)

Care typology	Domestic workers	Domestic workers (%)	Lower CI	Upper CI	Other workers	Other workers (%)
1	53310	10.86	10.77	10.94	437669	89.14
2	54116	6.49	6.44	6.55	779321	93.51
3	10147	5.59	5.49	5.70	171234	94.41

Table 2: Domestic workers and all other workers in the 3 clusters of gender regimes (EU-LFS, 2015)

Gender typology	Domestic workers	Domestic workers (%)	Lower CI	Upper CI	Other workers	Other workers (%)
1	28365	10.70	10.59	10.82	236635	89.30
2	50845	7.74	7.68	7.81	605697	92.26
3	38363	6.57	6.50	6.63	545892	93.43

Table 3: Domestic workers and all other workers in the 4 clusters of migration regimes (EU-LFS 2015)

Migration typology	Domestic workers	Domestic workers (%)	Lower CI	Upper CI	Other workers	Other workers (%)
1	29225	10.64	10.53	10.76	245373	89.36
2	57309	7.63	7.57	7.69	693719	92.37
3	23519	7.45	7.56	7.54	292312	92.55
4	7520	4.58	4.48	4.68	156820	95.42

Table 4: Proportion of women in the domestic sector in the 3 clusters of care regime (EU-LFS 2015)

Care typology	Men	Men (%)	Women	Women (%)	Lower CI	Upper CI
1	8053	15.11	45257	84.89	84.59	85.20
2	6168	11.40	47948	88.60	88.33	88.87
3	755	7.44	9392	92.56	92.03	93.06

Table 5: Proportion of women in the domestic sector in the 3 clusters of gender regimes (EU-LFS 2015)

Gender typology	Men	Men (%)	Women	Women (%)	Lower CI	Upper CI
1	5164	18.20	23201	81.79	81.34	82.24
2	5595	11.00	45250	88.99	88.72	89.27

3	4217	10.99	34146	89.01	88.69	89.32
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Table 6: Proportion of women in the domestic sector in the 4 clusters of migration regimes (EU-LFS 2015)

Migration typology	Men	Men (%)	Women	Women (%)	Lower CI	Upper CI
1	4032	13.80	25193	86.20	85.80	86.60
2	7163	12.50	50146	87.50	87.23	87.77
3	3176	13.50	20343	86.50	86.05	86.93
4	605	8.04	6915	91.95	91.32	92.56

Table 7: Proportion of migrants in the domestic sector in the 3 clusters of care regimes (EU-LFS 2015)

Care typology	Migrant	Migrant (%)	Lower CI	Upper CI	Native	Native (%)
1	10575	19.86	19.50	20.18	42679	80.14
2	12914	29.31	28.79	29.64	31143	70.69
3	2015	19.86	19.09	20.65	8130	80.14

Table 8: Proportion of migrants in the domestic sector in the 3 clusters of gender regimes (EU-LFS 2015)

Gender typology	Migrants	Migrants (%)	lwr.ci	upr.ci	Natives	Natives (%)
1	5689	20.09	19.59	20.53	22628	79.91
2	8571	21.02	20.54	21.33	32207	78.98
3	11244	29.31	28.85	29.77	27117	70.69

Table 9: Proportion of migrants in the domestic sector in the 4 clusters of migration regimes (EU-LFS 2015)

Migration typology	Migrants	Migrants (%)	Lower CI	Upper CI	Natives	Natives (%)
1	6231	21.34	20.85	21.79	22966	78.66
2	9530	20.18	19.74	20.47	37692	79.82
3	9498	40.39	39.76	41.01	14019	59.61
4	245	3.26	2.87	3.68	7275	96.74

Table 10: Proportion of domestic workers doing shift work in the 3 clusters of care regimes (EU-LFS 2015)

Care typology	Shift work	Normal hours	Shift work (%)	Lower CI	Upper CI	Normal hours (%)
1	22925	30095	43.24	43.13	43.97	56.76
2	27513	26179	51.24	51.20	52.05	48.76
3	5583	4353	56.19	56.13	58.07	43.81

Table 11: Proportion of domestic workers doing shift work in the 3 clusters of gender regimes (EU-LFS 2015)

Gender typology	Shift work	Shift work (%)	Lower CI	Upper CI	Normal hours	Normal hours (%)
1	17896	63.12	62.57	63.69	10458	36.89
2	17976	36.00	36.73	37.57	31958	64.00
3	20149	52.53	52.03	53.03	18211	47.47

Table 12: Proportion of domestic workers doing shift work in the 4 clusters of migration regimes (EU-LFS 2015)

Migration typology	Shift work	Shift work (%)	Lower CI	Upper CI	Normal hours	Normal hours (%)
1	16479	56.41	55.86	57.00	12733	43.59
2	22922	40.49	40.82	41.62	33686	59.51
3	13213	56.68	56.43	57.70	10098	43.32
4	3407	45.32	44.22	46.50	4110	54.68

Table 13: Temporary and permanent work in the domestic sector in the 3 clusters of care regimes (EU-LFS 2015)

Care typology	Temporary work	Temporary work (%)	Lower CI	Upper CI	Permanent work	Permanent work (%)
1	11937	22.72	22.36	23.08	40603	77.28
2	7295	14.04	13.74	14.34	44658	85.96
3	2140	23.05	22.20	23.92	7144	76.95

Table 14: Temporary and permanent work in the domestic sector in the 3 clusters of gender regimes (EU-LFS 2015)

Gender typology	Temporary work	Temporary work (%)	Lower CI	Upper CI	Permanent work	Permanent work (%)
1	6664	24.09	23.59	24.60	20994	75.91
2	9017	18.22	17.88	18.56	40469	81.78
3	5691	15.53	15.16	15.91	30942	84.46

Table 15: Temporary and permanent work in the domestic sector in the 4 clusters of migration regimes (EU-LFS 2015)

Migration typology	Temporary work	Temporary work (%)	Lower CI	Upper CI	Permanent work	Permanent work (%)
1	7137	24.81	24.31	25.31	21632	75.19
2	9254	16.67	16.36	16.98	46253	83.33
3	3582	15.82	15.34	16.30	19066	84.18
4	1399	20.41	19.46	21.39	5454	79.59

ANNEX 8

Log-linear models (the number of the tables refers to the tables of Annex 7)

Table 1

Care typology	%		Standardized residuals	
	Domestic workers	N	Domestic workers	Other workers
Cluster 1	10,9	53310	77,5	-26,6
Cluster 2	6,5	54116	-43,9	17,9
Cluster 3	5,6	10147	-33,9	10,4
Total	7,8	117573		
L ² =	9.184,0	df =	2	

Table 2

Gender typology	%		Standardized residuals	
	Domestic workers	N	Domestic workers	Other workers
Cluster 1	10,7	28365	53,7	-17,0
Cluster 2	7,7	50845	-1,9	0,7
Cluster 3	6,6	38363	-34,5	12,3
Total	7,8	117573		
L ² =	4.112,9	df =	2	

Table 3

Migration typology	%		Standardized residuals	
	Domestic workers	N	Domestic workers	Other workers
Cluster 1	10,6	29225	53,5	-17,0
Cluster 2	7,6	57309	-5,6	2,2
Cluster 3	7,4	23519	-7,3	2,4
Cluster 4	4,6	7520	-47,1	14,4
Total	8,2	110053		
L ² =	5.639,1	df =	3	

Table 4

Care typology	%		Standardized residuals	
	Women	N	Men	Women
Cluster 1	84,9	45257	15,8	-7,5
Cluster 2	88,6	47948	-9,0	4,3
Cluster 3	92,6	9392	-15,0	5,9
Total	87,3	102597		
L ² =	641,4	df =	2	

Table 5

Gender typology	%		Standardized residuals	
	Women	N	Men	Women
Cluster 1	81,8	23201	26,2	-11,1
Cluster 2	89,0	45250	-11,3	5,3
Cluster 3	89,0	34146	-9,8	4,3
Total	87,3	102597		
L ² =	938,9	df =	2	

Table 6

Migration typology	%		Standardized residuals	
	Women	N	Men	Women
Cluster 1	86,2	25193	5,2	-2,2
Cluster 2	87,5	50146	-1,7	0,8
Cluster 3	86,5	20343	3,3	-1,4
Cluster 4	92,0	6915	-11,4	4,5
Total	86,9	95682		
L ² =	212,4	df =	3	

Table 7

Care typology	%		Standardized residuals	
	Migrant	N	Migrant	Native
Cluster 1	19,9	10575	-19,5	13,0
Cluster 2	29,3	12914	25,3	-16,2
Cluster 3	19,9	2015	-8,1	4,6
Total	23,7	25504		
L ² =	1.269,1	df =	2	

Table 8

Gender typology	%		Standardized residuals	
	Migrant	N	Migrant	Native
Cluster 1	20,1	5689	-13,0	7,9
Cluster 2	21,0	8571	-11,8	7,4
Cluster 3	29,3	11244	23,4	-14,7
Total	23,7	25504		
L ² =	1.014,3	df =	2	

Table 9

Migration typology	%		Standardized residuals	
	Migrant	N	Migrant	Native
Cluster 1	21,3	6231	-8,7	5,3
Cluster 2	20,2	9530	-16,7	10,8
Cluster 3	40,4	9498	53,8	-32,0
Cluster 4	3,3	245	-36,8	20,9
Total	25,3	25259		
L ² =	6.114,5	df =	3	

Table 10

Care typology	%		Standardized residuals	
	Doing shifts	N	Doing shifts	Normal hours
Cluster 1	43,2	22925	-18,0	17,5
Cluster 2	51,2	27513	12,2	-11,9
Cluster 3	56,2	5583	12,0	-11,5
Total	48,0	56021		
L ² =	976,5	df =	2	

Table 11

Gender typology	%		Standardized residuals	
	Doing shifts	N	Doing shifts	Normal hours
Cluster 1	63,1	17896	39,0	-37,7
Cluster 2	36,0	17976	-43,5	42,3
Cluster 3	52,5	20149	13,9	-13,4
Total	48,0	56021		
L ² =	5.858,2	df =	2	

Table 12

Migration typology	%		Standardized residuals	
	Doing shifts	N	Doing shifts	Normal hours
Cluster 1	56,4	16479	22,1	-21,3
Cluster 2	40,5	22922	-29,5	28,8
Cluster 3	56,7	13213	20,1	-19,4
Cluster 4	45,3	3407	-3,4	3,3
Total	48,2	52614		
L ² =	2.842,4	df =	3	

Table 13

Care typology	%		Standardized residuals	
	Temporary work	N	Temporary work	Permanent work
Cluster 1	22,7	11937	21,8	-12,7
Cluster 2	14,0	7295	-26,1	15,1
Cluster 3	23,1	2140	9,6	-4,7
Total	18,8	21372		
L ² =	1.436,1	df =	2	

Table 14

Gender typology	%		Standardized residuals	
	Temporary work	N	Temporary work	Permanent work
Cluster 1	24,1	6664	20,9	-10,9
Cluster 2	18,2	9017	-3,0	1,7
Cluster 3	15,5	5691	-14,8	8,0
Total	18,8	21372		
L ² =	755,2	df =	2	

Table 15

Migration typology	%		Standardized residuals	
	Temporary work	N	Temporary work	Permanent work
Cluster 1	24,8	7137	24,2	-12,7
Cluster 2	16,7	9254	-12,0	7,1
Cluster 3	15,8	3582	-10,5	5,4
Cluster 4	20,4	1399	3,1	-1,5
Total	18,7	19973		
L ² =	951,8	df =	3	

ANNEX 9

Multinomial logistic regression models

MODEL 0 – base model

MODEL 0				
	B (SE)	95% CI for odds ratio		
		Lower	Odds ratio	Upper
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	-0.05 (0.04)			
Female	0.17 (0.02)	1.13	1.18	1.23
Age	0.02 (0.00)	1.02	1.02	1.02
Medium education	0.36 (0.02)	1.38	1.43	1.47
High education	-0.55 (0.02)	0.55	0.57	0.60
Separated/widow	-0.15 (0.02)	0.82	0.86	0.89
Single	0.69 (0.02)	1.91	1.99	2.06
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	2.94 (0.04)			
Female	-2.35 (0.02)	0.09	0.09	0.10
Age	-0.01 (0.00)	0.99	0.99	0.99
Medium education	0.46 (0.02)	1.52	1.58	1.64
High education	1.72 (0.02)	5.38	5.61	5.85
Separated/widow	-0.34 (0.02)	0.68	0.71	0.74
Single	-0.10 (0.02)	0.87	0.90	0.94

All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.)

MODEL 1 – countries

MODEL 1				
	B (SE)	95% CI for odds ratio		
		Lower	Odds ratio	Upper
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	-0.24 (0.05)			
Female	0.07 (0.02)	1.03	1.07	1.12
Age	0.02 (0.00)	1.01	1.02	1.02
Medium education	0.24 (0.02)	1.23	1.27	1.31
High education	-0.72 (0.02)	0.46	0.49	0.51
Separated/widow	-0.16 (0.02)	0.81	0.85	0.89
Single	0.66 (0.02)	1.85	1.93	2.00
Belgium	0.06 (0.05) (n.s.)	0.97	1.06	1.16
Czech Republic	2.33 (0.18)	7.22	10.24	14.51
Denmark	1.19 (0.05)	2.98	3.28	3.62
Estonia	0.95 (0.12)	2.03	2.57	3.26

Spain	0.67 (0.05)	1.78	1.96	2.16
Finland	1.81 (0.12)	4.82	6.09	7.71
France	0.80 (0.03)	2.07	2.22	2.37
Greece	-0.25 (0.05)	0.71	0.78	0.86
Hungary	2.96 (0.11)	15.69	19.35	23.88
Ireland	0.57 (0.04)	1.62	1.77	1.93
Italy	-0.55 (0.03)	0.54	0.58	0.61
Luxembourg	-1.18 (0.08)	0.26	0.31	0.36
Netherlands	1.42 (0.07)	3.65	4.15	4.73
Portugal	1.58 (0.05)	4.38	4.85	5.38
Sweden	0.36 (0.03)	1.34	1.43	1.53
Slovakia	3.62 (0.20)	25.40	37.29	34.62
UK	0.82 (0.05)	2.04	2.26	2.51
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	3.45 (0.05)			
Female	-2.45 (0.02)	0.08	0.09	0.09
Age	-0.01 (0.00)	0.99	0.99	0.99
Medium education	0.45 (0.02)	1.51	1.57	1.62
High education	1.68 (0.02)	5.15	5.38	5.63
Separated/widow	-0.32 (0.02)	0.69	0.72	0.76
Single	-0.04 (0.02)	0.92	0.96	1.00
Belgium	-0.40 (0.04)	0.61	0.67	0.73
Czech Republic	0.93 (0.18)	1.77	2.54	3.64
Denmark	-0.65 (0.05)	0.47	0.52	0.58
Estonia	0.57 (0.12)	1.40	1.77	2.23
Spain	-0.57 (0.05)	0.51	0.56	0.62
Finland	-0.26 (0.13)	0.60	0.77	1.00
France	-0.44 (0.03)	0.60	0.64	0.69
Greece	-0.24 (0.05)	0.72	0.79	0.86
Hungary	1.06 (0.11)	2.31	2.87	3.57
Ireland	-0.12 (0.04)	0.81	0.89	0.96
Italy	-0.96 (0.03)	0.36	0.38	0.41
Luxembourg	0.13 (0.06)	1.01	1.14	1.28
Netherlands	0.21 (0.07)	1.07	1.23	1.40
Portugal	0.77 (0.05)	1.94	2.15	2.39
Sweden	-0.90 (0.03)	0.38	0.40	0.43
Slovakia	0.43 (0.21)	1.02	1.54	2.31
UK	-0.16 (0.05)	0.77	0.85	0.94

All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.)

MODEL 2 (care typology)

MODEL 2				
	B (SE)	95% CI for odds ratio		
		Lower	Odds ratio	Upper
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers				

Intercept	-0.22 (0.04)			
Female	0.18 (0.02)	1.14	1.19	1.24
Age	0.02 (0.00)	1.02	1.02	1.02
Medium education	0.32 (0.02)	1.333	1.38	1.42
High education	-0.59 (0.02)	0.53	0.55	0.58
Separated/widow	-0.15 (0.02)	0.83	0.86	0.90
Single	0.64 (0.02)	1.83	1.90	1.98
Care 1 – De-familialisation	0.44(0.01)	1.51	1.55	1.60
Care 3 – Familialisation with support	0.49(0.03)	1.55	1.63	1.72
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	2.98 (0.04)			
Female	-2.36 (0.02)	0.09	0.09	0.10
Age	-0.01 (0.00)	0.99	0.99	0.99
Medium education	0.47 (0.02)	1.54	1.60	1.65
High education	1.75 (0.02)	5.50	5.74	5.99
Separated/widow	-0.34 (0.02)	0.68	0.71	0.74
Single	-0.08 (0.02)	0.89	0.93	0.96
Care 1 – De-familialisation	-0.21(0.02)	0.78	0.81	0.83
Care 3 – Familialisation with support	0.15(0.03)	1.10	1.16	1.22

All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.)

MODEL 3 (gender typology)

MODEL 3				
	B (SE)	95% CI for odds ratio		
		Lower	Odds ratio	Upper
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	0.23 (0.04)			
Female	0.18 (0.02)	1.15	1.20	1.25
Age	0.02 (0.00)	1.02	1.02	1.02
Medium education	0.30 (0.02)	1.30	1.34	1.38
High education	-0.68 (0.02)	0.48	0.51	0.53
Separated/widow	-0.14 (0.02)	0.83	0.87	0.90
Single	0.62 (0.02)	1.79	1.86	1.93
Gender 1 – Modern gender contract	0.01(0.02) (n.s.)	0.97	1.01	1.05
Gender 3 – Traditional gender contract	-0.47(0.02)	0.60	0.62	0.64

Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	3.11 (0.04)			
Female	-2.36 (0.02)	0.09	0.09	0.10
Age	-0.01 (0.00)	0.99	0.99	0.99
Medium education	0.47 (0.02)	1.55	1.60	1.66
High education	1.75 (0.02)	5.49	5.74	5.99
Separated/widow	-0.33 (0.02)	0.69	0.72	0.75
Single	-0.09 (0.02)	0.88	0.91	0.95
Gender 1 – Modern gender contract	-0.46(0.02)	0.61	0.63	0.66
Gender 3 – Traditional gender contract	-0.13(0.02)	0.85	0.88	0.91

All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.)

MODEL 4 (migration typology)

MODEL 4				
	B (SE)	95% CI for odds ratio		
		Lower	Odds ratio	Upper
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	2.43 (0.08)			
Female	0.11 (0.02)	1.06	1.11	1.16
Age	0.02 (0.00)	1.01	1.02	1.02
Medium education	0.16 (0.02)	1.14	1.17	1.21
High education	-0.79 (0.02)	0.43	0.45	0.47
Separated/widow	-0.17 (0.02)	0.81	0.84	0.88
Single	0.66 (0.02)	1.86	1.93	2.00
Migration 1 – Less restrictive	-2.10 (0.07)	0.11	0.12	0.14
Migration 2 – Old immigration	-1.96(0.07)	0.12	0.14	0.16
Migration 3 – New immigration	-3.01 (0.07)	0.04	0.05	0.06
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	4.38 (0.08)			
Female	-2.38 (0.02)	0.09	0.09	0.10
Age	-0.01 (0.00)	0.99	0.99	0.99
Medium education	0.36 (0.02)	1.38	1.43	1.48
High education	1.59 (0.02)	4.68	4.89	5.11
Separated/widow	-0.33 (0.02)	0.68	0.71	0.75
Single	-0.12 (0.02)	0.85	0.89	0.92
Migration 1 – Less restrictive	-1.37(0.07)	0.22	0.25	0.29
Migration 2 – Old	-1.09 (0.07)	0.29	0.34	0.38

immigration				
Migration 3 – New immigration	-1.69 (0.07)	0.16	0.18	0.21

All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.)

MODEL 5 (three typologies)

MODEL 5				
	B (SE)	95% CI for odds ratio		
		Lower	Odds ratio	Upper
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	2.17 (0.08)			
Female	0.10 (0.02)	1.06	1.10	1.15
Age	0.02 (0.00)	1.01	1.02	1.02
Medium education	0.15 (0.02)	1.13	1.17	1.21
High education	-0.81 (0.02)	0.42	0.44	0.47
Separated/widow	-0.16 (0.02)	0.82	0.85	0.89
Single	0.66 (0.02)	1.86	1.93	2.00
Care 1 – De-familialisation	-0.02 (0.03) (n.s.)	0.93	0.98	1.03
Care 3 – Familialisation with support	0.68 (0.03)	1.84	1.97	2.10
Gender 1 – Modern gender contract	0.11 (0.02)	1.06	1.11	1.17
Gender 3 – Traditional gender contract	-0.03 (0.03) (n.s.)	0.92	0.97	1.03
Migration 1 – Less restrictive	-1.89 (0.07)	0.13	0.15	0.17
Migration 2 – Old immigration	-1.72(0.07)	0.16	0.18	0.20
Migration 3 – New immigration	-2.91 (0.07)	0.04	0.05	0.06
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	3.80 (0.09)			
Female	-2.43 (0.02)	0.09	0.09	0.10
Age	-0.01 (0.00)	0.99	0.99	0.99
Medium education	0.41 (0.02)	1.46	1.51	1.57
High education	1.64 (0.02)	4.92	5.14	5.38
Separated/widow	-0.32 (0.02)	0.69	0.72	0.75
Single	-0.06 (0.02)	0.91	0.94	0.98
Care 1 – De-familialisation	-0.40 (0.03)	0.64	0.67	0.71
Care 3 – Familialisation	0.70 (0.03)	1.89	2.02	2.16

with support				
Gender 1 – Modern gender contract	-0.30 (0.03)	0.70	0.74	0.78
Gender 3 – Traditional gender contract	0.27 (0.03)	1.23	1.30	1.38
Migration 1 – Less restrictive	-0.42 (0.07)	0.57	0.65	0.75
Migration 2 – Old immigration	-0.36 (0.07)	0.60	0.70	0.80
Migration 3 – New immigration	-1.57 (0.07)	0.18	0.21	0.24

All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.)

MODEL 6 (interaction Care X Gender)

MODEL 6				
		95% CI for odds ratio		
	B (SE)	Lower	Odds ratio	Upper
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	0.28 (0.05)			
Female	0.18 (0.02)	1.14	1.19	1.24
Age	0.02 (0.00)	1.02	1.02	1.02
Medium education	0.28 (0.02)	1.29	1.33	1.37
High education	-0.66 (0.02)	0.49	0.51	0.54
Separated/widow	-0.14 (0.02)	0.83	0.87	0.90
Single	0.63 (0.02)	1.81	1.88	1.95
Care 2 x Gender 2	-0.19 (0.04)	0.76	0.82	0.89
Care 1 x Gender 2	0.00 (0.04) (n.s.)	0.93	1.00	1.08
Care 3 x Gender 2	0.03 (0.05) (n.s.)	0.93	1.03	1.14
Care 2 x Gender 1	1.13 (0.12)	2.44	3.09	3.92
Care 1 x Gender 1	-0.06 (0.04)	0.87	0.94	1.01
Care 2 x Gender 3	-0.59(0.03)	0.52	0.55	0.59
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	3.24 (0.05)			
Female	-2.36 (0.02)	0.09	0.09	0.10
Age	-0.01 (0.00)	0.99	0.99	0.99
Medium education	0.45 (0.02)	1.52	1.57	1.62
High education	1.71 (0.02)	5.27	5.51	5.76
Separated/widow	-0.33 (0.02)	0.69	0.72	0.75
Single	-0.08 (0.02)	0.89	0.92	0.96
Care 2 x Gender 2	0.05 (0.04) (n.s.)	0.97	1.05	1.14
Care 1 x Gender 2	-0.27 (0.04)	0.70	0.76	0.82
Care 3 x Gender 2	-0.22 (0.05)	0.72	0.80	0.89
Care 2 x Gender 1	-0.11 (0.13) (n.s.)	0.69	0.89	1.15
Care 1 x Gender 1	-0.62 (0.04)	0.50	0.54	0.58

Care 2 x Gender 3	-0.32 (0.04)	0.67	0.72	0.78
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All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.)

MODEL 7 (interaction Care X Migration)

MODEL 7				
	B (SE)	95% CI for odds ratio		
		Lower	Odds ratio	Upper
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	0.00 (0.05)			
Female	0.106(0.02)	1.02	1.07	1.11
Age	0.02 (0.00)	1.01	1.02	1.02
Medium education	0.27 (0.02)	1.26	1.31	1.35
High education	-0.65 (0.02)	0.50	0.52	0.55
Separated/widow	-0.16 (0.02)	0.81	0.85	0.88
Single	0.68 (0.02)	1.90	1.98	2.05
Care 2 x Migration 4	2.72 (0.11)	12.26	15.12	18.65
Care 3 x Migration 4	2.11 (0.09)	6.95	8.27	9.83
Care 2 x Migration 1	1.37 (0.05)	3.58	3.94	4.34
Care 1 x Migration 1	0.05 (0.03) (n.s.)	0.98	1.05	1.12
Care 2 x Migration 2	0.04 (0.03) (n.s.)	0.97	1.04	1.11
Care 1 x Migration 2	0.66(0.03)	1.82	1.94	2.07
Care 2 x Migration 3	-0.79 (0.03)	0.42	0.45	0.48
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	3.07 (0.05)			
Female	-2.44 (0.02)	0.08	0.09	0.09
Age	-0.01 (0.00)	0.99	0.99	0.99
Medium education	0.43 (0.02)	1.48	1.53	1.59
High education	1.64 (0.02)	4.94	5.17	5.40
Separated/widow	-0.33 (0.02)	0.69	0.72	0.75
Single	-0.06 (0.02)	0.91	0.94	0.98
Care 2 x Migration 4	1.43 (0.11)	3.38	4.20	5.21
Care 3 x Migration 4	1.07 (0.09)	2.44	2.92	3.49
Care 2 x Migration 1	1.03 (0.05)	2.52	2.79	3.08
Care 1 x Migration 1	-0.41 (0.03)	0.62	0.66	0.71
Care 2 x Migration	0.31 (0.04)	1.28	1.36	1.46

2				
Care 1 x Migration 2	-0.05 (0.03) (n.s.)	0.89	0.95	1.02
Care 2 x Migration 3	-0.59 (0.03)	0.52	0.55	0.59

All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.)

MODEL 8 (interaction Gender X Migration)

MODEL 8				
		95% CI for odds ratio		
	B (SE)	Lower	Odds ratio	Upper
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	0.77 (0.04)			
Female	0.07 (0.02)	1.03	1.08	1.13
Age	0.02 (0.00)	1.01	1.02	1.02
Medium education	0.24 (0.02)	1.24	1.28	1.32
High education	-0.74 (0.02)	0.46	0.48	0.50
Separated/widow	-0.16 (0.02)	0.81	0.85	0.88
Single	0.65 (0.02)	1.85	1.92	2.00
Gender 2 x Migration 4	1.45 (0.12)	3.38	4.26	5.37
Gender 3 x Migration 4	3.52 (0.08)	28.81	33.85	39.77
Gender 2 x Migration 1	0.57 (0.04)	1.63	1.76	1.90
Gender 1 x Migration 1	0.92 (0.02)	2.41	2.52	2.64
Gender 3 x Migration 1	2.09 (0.04)	7.38	8.07	8.83
Gender 2 x Migration 2	1.21(0.02)	3.33	3.35	3.49
Gender 1 x Migration 2	1.77 (0.04)	5.49	5.89	6.33
Gender 3 x Migration 2	0.51 (0.03)	1.56	1.66	1.77
Gender 2 x Migration 3	1.18 (0.04)	3.00	3.26	3.55
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	2.66 (0.04)			
Female	-2.44 (0.02)	0.08	0.09	0.09
Age	-0.01 (0.00)	0.99	0.99	0.99
Medium education	0.45 (0.02)	1.51	1.57	1.62
High education	1.70 (0.02)	5.24	5.48	5.73
Separated/widow	-0.33 (0.02)	0.68	0.72	0.75
Single	-0.07 (0.02)	0.90	0.93	0.97

Gender 2 x Migration 4	1.41 (0.12)	3.27	4.10	5.15
Gender 3 x Migration 4	1.79 (0.08)	5.05	5.97	7.06
Gender 2 x Migration 1	0.43 (0.04)	1.43	1.54	1.66
Gender 1 x Migration 1	-0.05 (0.02)	0.91	0.95	1.00
Gender 3 x Migration 1	1.60 (0.05)	4.54	4.98	5.46
Gender 2 x Migration 2	0.56 (0.02)	1.68	1.75	1.83
Gender 1 x Migration 2	0.48 (0.04)	0.51	1.62	0.75
Gender 3 x Migration 2	0.83 (0.03)	2.17	2.31	2.45
Gender 2 x Migration 3	0.26 (0.05)	1.19	1.30	1.42

All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.)

MODEL 9 (interaction Care X Gender, Migration)

MODEL 9				
		95% CI for odds ratio		
	B (SE)	Lower	Odds ratio	Upper
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	2.67 (0.08)			
Female	0.09 (0.02)	1.05	1.10	1.14
Age	0.02 (0.00)	1.01	1.02	1.02
Medium education	0.16 (0.02)	1.14	1.17	1.21
High education	-0.78 (0.02)	0.43	0.46	0.48
Separated/widow	-0.16 (0.02)	0.82	0.85	0.88
Single	0.66 (0.02)	1.86	1.93	2.00
Migration 1 – Less restrictive	-1.88 (0.07)	0.13	0.15	0.17
Migration 2 – Old immigration	-1.64 (0.07)	0.17	0.19	0.22
Migration 3 – New immigration	-2.95 (0.07)	0.05	0.05	0.06
Care 2 x Gender 2	-0.75 (0.05)	0.43	0.47	0.52
Care 1 x Gender 2	-0.53 (0.05)	0.53	0.59	0.65
Care 3 x Gender 2	0.45(0.05)	1.42	1.57	1.75
Care 2 x Gender 1	0.82 (0.13)	1.78	2.28	2.92
Care 1 x Gender 1	-0.46 (0.05)	0.57	0.63	0.69
Care 2 x Gender 3	-0.47 (0.04)	0.58	0.63	0.68
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers				

Intercept	4.68 (0.08)			
Female	-2.44 (0.02)	0.08	0.09	0.09
Age	-0.01 (0.00)	0.99	0.99	0.99
Medium education	0.42 (0.02)	1.47	1.52	1.57
High education	1.65 (0.02)	4.97	5.19	5.43
Separated/widow	-0.33 (0.02)	0.69	0.72	0.75
Single	-0.06 (0.02)	0.91	0.94	0.98
Migration 1 – Less restrictive	-0.41 (0.07)	0.58	0.67	0.77
Migration 2 – Old immigration	-0.32 (0.07)	0.63	0.73	0.84
Migration 3 – New immigration	-1.60 (0.07)	0.18	0.20	0.23
Care 2 x Gender 2	-0.99 (0.05)	0.34	0.37	0.41
Care 1 x Gender 2	-1.31 (0.05)	0.24	0.27	0.30
Care 3 x Gender 2	-0.03 (0.05) (n.s.)	0.87	0.97	1.08
Care 2 x Gender 1	-1.06 (0.13)	0.27	0.35	0.45
Care 1 x Gender 1	-1.60 (0.05)	0.18	0.20	0.22
Care 2 x Gender 3	-0.59 (0.04)	0.52	0.56	0.60

All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.)

MODEL 10 (interaction Care X Migration, Gender)

MODEL 10				
	B (SE)	95% CI for odds ratio		
		Lower	Odds ratio	Upper
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	0.22 (0.05)			
Female	0.07 (0.02)	1.03	1.08	1.12
Age	0.02 (0.00)	1.01	1.02	1.02
Medium education	0.25 (0.02)	1.24	1.28	1.32
High education	-0.71 (0.02)	0.47	0.49	0.52
Separated/widow	-0.16 (0.02)	0.81	0.85	0.88
Single	0.66 (0.02)	1.87	1.94	2.01
Gender 1 – Modern gender contract	0.33 (0.03)	1.32	1.39	1.46
Gender 3 – Traditional gender contract	-0.43 (0.03)	0.61	0.65	0.69
Care 2 x migration 4	2.94 (0.11)	15.27	18.88	23.33
Care 3 x migration 4	2.23 (0.09)	7.85	9.35	11.13
Care 2 x migration 1	1.53 (0.05)	4.09	4.51	4.99

Care 1 x migration 1	-0.42 (0.04)	0.61	0.66	0.71
Care 2 x migration 2	0.01 (0.03) (<i>n.s.</i>)	0.94	1.01	1.07
Care 1 x migration 2	0.37 (0.04)	1.35	1.45	1.55
Care 2 x migration 3	-0.57 (0.03)	0.52	0.56	0.60
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	3.02 (0.05)			
Female	-2.44 (0.02)	0.08	0.09	0.09
Age	-0.01 (0.00)	0.99	0.99	0.99
Medium education	0.44 (0.02)	1.50	1.55	1.60
High education	1.67 (0.02)	5.07	5.30	5.54
Separated/widow	-0.32 (0.02)	0.69	0.72	0.75
Single	-0.05 (0.02)	0.91	0.95	0.98
Gender 1 – Modern gender contract	-0.22 (0.03)	0.76	0.80	0.85
Gender 3 – Traditional gender contract	0.11 (0.03)	1.05	1.12	1.18
Care 2 x migration 4	1.38 (0.11)	3.21	3.99	4.97
Care 3 x migration 4	1.09 (0.09)	2.48	2.97	3.56
Care 2 x migration 1	1.03 (0.05)	2.52	2.79	3.09
Care 1 x migration 1	-0.18 (0.04)	0.77	0.84	0.91
Care 2 x migration 2	0.34 (0.03)	1.31	1.40	1.50
Care 1 x migration 2	0.08 (0.04)	1.01	1.08	1.16
Care 2 x migration 3	-0.63 (0.03)	0.49	0.53	0.57

All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.)

MODEL 11 (interaction Gender X Migration, Care)

MODEL 11				
		95% CI for odds ratio		
	B (SE)	Lower	Odds ratio	Upper
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	2.60 (0.09)			
Female	0.07 (0.02)	1.03	1.08	1.12

Age	0.02 (0.00)	1.01	1.02	1.02
Medium education	0.25 (0.02)	1.25	1.29	1.33
High education	-0.71 (0.02)	0.47	0.49	0.51
Separated/widow	-0.16 (0.02)	0.82	0.85	0.89
Single	0.66 (0.02)	1.87	1.94	2.01
Care 1 – De-familialisation	0.13 (0.03)	1.08	1.14	1.21
Care 3 – Familialisation without support	0.40 (0.04)	1.39	1.50	1.62
Gender 1 x migration 1	-2.58 (0.09)	0.06	0.07	0.09
Gender 2 x migration 1	-2.95 (0.09)	0.04	0.05	0.06
Gender 3 x migration 1	-1.29 (0.09)	0.23	0.27	0.33
Gender 1 x migration 2	-1.74 (0.09)	0.15	0.17	0.21
Gender 2 x migration 2	-2.27 (0.08)	0.09	0.10	0.12
Gender 3 x migration 2	-2.87 (0.09)	0.05	0.06	0.07
Gender 2 x migration 3	-2.60 (0.05)	0.06	0.07	0.09
Gender 3 x migration 3	-3.44 (0.08)	0.03	0.03	0.04
Gender 2 x migration 4	-2.34 (0.14)	0.07	0.10	0.13
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	4.17 (0.09)			
Female	-2.44 (0.02)	0.08	0.09	0.09
Age	-0.01 (0.00)	0.99	0.99	0.99
Medium education	0.44 (0.02)	1.50	1.55	1.61
High education	1.66 (0.02)	5.05	5.28	5.52
Separated/widow	-0.33 (0.02)	0.69	0.72	0.75
Single	-0.05 (0.02)	0.92	0.95	0.99
Care 1 – De-familialisation	-0.38 (0.03)	0.64	0.68	0.72
Care 3 – Familialisation without support	0.61 (0.04)	1.71	1.85	1.99
Gender 1 x migration 1	-1.25 (0.09)	0.24	0.29	0.34
Gender 2 x migration 1	-0.75 (0.10)	0.39	0.47	0.57
Gender 3 x migration 1	0.03 (0.10) (<i>n.s.</i>)	0.86	1.04	1.25
Gender 1 x	-0.69 (0.10)	0.41	0.50	0.61

migration 2				
Gender 2 x migration 2	-0.79 (0.09)	0.38	0.45	0.54
Gender 3 x migration 2	-0.73 (0.09)	0.40	0.48	0.57
Gender 2 x migration 3	-1.91 (0.10)	0.12	0.15	0.18
Gender 3 x migration 3	-1.67 (0.08)	0.16	0.19	0.22
Gender 2 x migration 4	-0.77 (0.14)	0.35	0.46	0.61

All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.)

MODEL 12 (interaction Care X Gender X Migration)

MODEL 12				
	B (SE)	95% CI for odds ratio		
		Lower	Odds ratio	Upper
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	-0.50 (0.05)			
Female	0.07 (0.02)	1.02	1.07	1.12
Age	0.02 (0.00)	1.01	1.02	1.02
Medium education	0.25 (0.02)	1.24	1.28	1.33
High education	-0.70 (0.02)	0.47	0.50	0.52
Separated/widow	-0.16 (0.02)	0.82	0.85	0.89
Single	0.66 (0.02)	1.87	1.94	2.02
Care 3 x Gender 2 x Migration 4	1.18 (0.12)	2.57	3.28	4.17
Care 2 x Gender 3 x Migration 4	3.21 (0.11)	19.92	24.76	30.76
Care 3 x Gender 3 x Migration 4	3.34 (0.14)	21.57	28.14	36.70
Care 1 x Gender 2 x Migration 1	0.30 (0.05)	1.22	1.36	1.51
Care 2 x Gender 1 x Migration 1	2.05 (0.12)	6.10	7.77	9.89
Care 1 x Gender 1 x Migration 1	0.60 (0.04)	1.68	1.83	1.99
Care 2 x Gender 3 x Migration 1	1.83 (0.06)	5.56	6.24	7.00
Care 2 x Gender 2 x Migration 2	0.73 (0.05)	1.89	2.07	2.27
Care 1 x Gender 2 x Migration 2	1.04 (0.04)	2.60	2.84	3.09
Care 1 x Gender 1 x Migration 2	1.51 (0.05)	4.08	4.52	5.00

Care 2 x Gender 3 x Migration 2	0.25 (0.05)	1.16	1.28	1.41
Care 3 x Gender 2 x Migration 3	0.92 (0.06)	2.25	2.51	2.81
Care 2 x Gender 3 x Migration 3	-0.30 (0.04)	0.68	0.74	0.80
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	3.20 (0.05)			
Female	-2.44 (0.02)	0.08	0.09	0.09
Age	-0.01 (0.00)	0.99	0.99	0.99
Medium education	0.44 (0.02)	1.50	1.55	1.61
High education	1.67 (0.02)	5.08	5.31	5.56
Separated/widow	-0.33 (0.02)	0.69	0.72	0.75
Single	-0.05 (0.02)	0.92	0.95	0.99
Care 3 x Gender 2 x Migration 4	0.81 (0.12)	1.77	2.25	2.85
Care 2 x Gender 3 x Migration 4	1.30 (0.11)	2.94	3.67	4.58
Care 3 x Gender 3 x Migration 4	1.001 (0.14)	2.08	2.74	3.61
Care 1 x Gender 2 x Migration 1	-0.16 (0.05)	0.77	0.85	0.94
Care 2 x Gender 1 x Migration 1	-0.01 (0.13) (n.s.)	0.76	0.99	1.28
Care 1 x Gender 1 x Migration 1	-0.66 (0.04)	0.48	0.52	0.56
Care 2 x Gender 3 x Migration 1	1.01 (0.06)	2.44	2.73	3.06
Care 2 x Gender 2 x Migration 2	0.15 (0.04)	1.06	1.60	1.26
Care 1 x Gender 2 x Migration 2	-0.20 (0.04)	0.75	0.82	0.89
Care 1 x Gender 1 x Migration 2	-0.10 (0.05)	1.81	0.90	1.00
Care 2 x Gender 3 x Migration 2	0.24 (0.05)	1.16	1.27	1.39
Care 3 x Gender 2 x Migration 3	-0.33 (0.06)	0.64	0.72	0.80
Care 2 x Gender 3 x Migration 3	-0.72 (0.04)	0.45	0.49	0.53

All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.)

Comparison between 4 models:

	MODEL 0	MODEL 1	MODEL 5	MODEL 11
	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)	B (SE)
Native domestic workers vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.24 (0.05)	2.17 (0.08)	2.60 (0.09)
Female	0.17 (0.02)	0.07 (0.02)	0.10 (0.02)	0.07 (0.02)
Age	0.02 (0.00)	0.02 (0.00)	0.02 (0.00)	0.02 (0.00)
Medium education	0.36 (0.02)	0.24 (0.02)	0.15 (0.02)	0.25 (0.02)
High education	-0.55 (0.02)	-0.72 (0.02)	-0.81 (0.02)	-0.71 (0.02)
Separated/widow	-0.15 (0.02)	-0.16 (0.02)	-0.16 (0.02)	-0.16 (0.02)
Single	0.69 (0.02)	0.66 (0.02)	0.66 (0.02)	0.66 (0.02)
Belgium		0.06 (0.05) (<i>n.s.</i>)		
Czech Republic		2.33 (0.18)		
Denmark		1.19 (0.05)		
Estonia		0.95 (0.12)		
Spain		0.67 (0.05)		
Finland		1.81 (0.12)		
France		0.80 (0.03)		
Greece		-0.25 (0.05)		
Hungary		2.96 (0.11)		
Ireland		0.57 (0.04)		
Italy		-0.55 (0.03)		
Luxembourg		-1.18 (0.08)		
Netherlands		1.42 (0.07)		
Portugal		1.58 (0.05)		
Sweden		0.36 (0.03)		
Slovakia		3.62 (0.20)		
UK		0.82 (0.05)		
Care 1			-0.02 (0.03) (<i>n.s.</i>)	
Care 3			0.68 (0.03)	
Gender 1			0.11 (0.02)	
Gender 3			-0.03 (0.03) (<i>n.s.</i>)	
Migration 1			-1.89 (0.07)	
Migration 2			-1.72(0.07)	
Migration 3			-2.91 (0.07)	
Care 1 – De-familialisation				0.13 (0.03)
Care 3 – Familialisation without support				0.40 (0.04)
Gender 1 x Migration 1				-2.58 (0.09)
Gender 2 x Migration 1				-2.95 (0.09)
Gender 3 x Migration 1				-1.29 (0.09)
Gender 1 x Migration 2				-1.74 (0.09)

Gender 2 x Migration 2				-2.27 (0.08)
Gender 3 x Migration 2				-2.87 (0.09)
Gender 2 x Migration 3				-2.60 (0.05)
Gender 3 x Migration 3				-3.44 (0.08)
Gender 2 x Migration 4				-2.34 (0.14)
Migrants in other sectors vs. migrant domestic workers				
Intercept	2.94 (0.04)	3.45 (0.05)	3.80 (0.09)	4.17 (0.09)
Female	-2.35 (0.02)	-2.45 (0.02)	-2.43 (0.02)	-2.44 (0.02)
Age	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)
Medium education	0.46 (0.02)	0.45 (0.02)	0.41 (0.02)	0.44 (0.02)
High education	1.72 (0.02)	1.68 (0.02)	1.64 (0.02)	1.66 (0.02)
Separated/widow	-0.34 (0.02)	-0.32 (0.02)	-0.32 (0.02)	-0.33 (0.02)
Single	-0.10 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.06 (0.02)	-0.05 (0.02)
Belgium		-0.40 (0.04)		
Czech Republic		0.93 (0.18)		
Denmark		-0.65 (0.05)		
Estonia		0.57 (0.12)		
Spain		-0.57 (0.05)		
Finland		-0.26 (0.13)		
France		-0.44 (0.03)		
Greece		-0.24 (0.05)		
Hungary		1.06 (0.11)		
Ireland		-0.12 (0.04)		
Italy		-0.96 (0.03)		
Luxembourg		0.13 (0.06)		
Netherlands		0.21 (0.07)		
Portugal		0.77 (0.05)		
Sweden		-0.90 (0.03)		
Slovakia		0.43 (0.21)		
UK		-0.16 (0.05)		
Care 1			-0.40 (0.03)	
Care 3			0.70 (0.03)	
Gender 1			-0.30 (0.03)	
Gender 3			0.27 (0.03)	
Migration 1			-0.42 (0.07)	
Migration 2			-0.36 (0.07)	
Migration 3			-1.57 (0.07)	
Care 1 – De-familialisation				-0.38 (0.03)
Care 3 – Familialisation without support				0.61 (0.04)
Gender 1 x Migration 1				-1.25 (0.09)
Gender 2 x				-0.75 (0.10)

Migration 1				
Gender 3 x Migration 1				0.03 (0.10) (n.s.)
Gender 1 x Migration 2				-0.69 (0.10)
Gender 2 x Migration 2				-0.79 (0.09)
Gender 3 x Migration 2				-0.73 (0.09)
Gender 2 x Migration 3				-1.91 (0.10)
Gender 3 x Migration 3				-1.67 (0.08)
Gender 2 x Migration 4				-0.77 (0.14)

All coefficients are significant at 95%, apart from those indicated with (n.s.)

Frequencies of interactions (Care x Gender, Care x Migration, Gender x Migration):

-> tabulation of interaction

group (care gender migration)	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1 1 1	151,791	12.10	12.10
1 1 2	96,846	7.72	19.82
1 2 1	40,058	3.19	23.01
1 2 2	197,223	15.72	38.73
2 1 1	11,835	0.94	39.67
2 2 2	122,121	9.73	49.41
2 3 1	69,813	5.56	54.97
2 3 2	85,247	6.79	61.76
2 3 3	202,719	16.16	77.92
2 3 4	95,771	7.63	85.55
3 2 3	39,798	3.17	88.73
3 2 4	11,727	0.93	89.66
3 3 3	72,904	5.81	95.47
3 3 4	56,808	4.53	100.00

Total	1,254,661	100.00	

-> tabulation of careXgender

group (care gender)	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1 1	248,637	19.82	19.82
1 2	237,281	18.91	38.73
2 1	11,835	0.94	39.67
2 2	122,121	9.73	49.41
2 3	453,550	36.15	85.55
3 2	51,525	4.11	89.66
3 3	129,712	10.34	100.00

Total	1,254,661	100.00	

-> tabulation of careXmigration

group(care migration)	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1 1	191,849	15.29	15.29
1 2	294,069	23.44	38.73
2 1	81,648	6.51	45.24
2 2	207,368	16.53	61.76
2 3	202,719	16.16	77.92
2 4	95,771	7.63	85.55
3 3	112,702	8.98	94.54
3 4	68,535	5.46	100.00
Total	1,254,661	100.00	

-> tabulation of genderXmigration

group(gender migration)	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
1 1	163,626	13.04	13.04
1 2	96,846	7.72	20.76
2 1	40,058	3.19	23.95
2 2	319,344	25.45	49.41
2 3	39,798	3.17	52.58
2 4	11,727	0.93	53.51
3 1	69,813	5.56	59.08
3 2	85,247	6.79	65.87
3 3	275,623	21.97	87.84
3 4	152,579	12.16	100.00
Total	1,254,661	100.00	