UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI MILANO
DIPARTIMENTO DI
SCIENZE SOCIALI E POLITICHE

UNIVERSITÀ
CATTOLICA
del Sacro Cuore

Ph.D. Program in Political Studies

POLITICAL PARTIES AS COMBINERS

TRANSITIONS IN TUNISIA AND EGYPT BETWEEN DEMOCRATIZATION AND AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE

Supervisor:
Prof. Fabio Franchino

PhD Director:
Prof. Francesco Zucchini

Candidate:
Valeria Resta

Matr: R10635 – R40

ABSTRACT

In marking an historical change in large parts of the Arab region, the Arab uprisings have also triggered a process of soul searching in the scholarship of Arab politics. The events unfolding in the region since 2011 prove indeed that the two paradigms dividing the academic community, that of authoritarian resilience (also known as the post-democratization paradigm) and that of democratization, are alone insufficient in accounting for the political developments of the area.

In this regard, extant contributions explaining the different paths undertook by Tunisia and Egypt between 2011 and 2013 enlighten the point in case. On the one hand, democratization studies pinpoint to the different choices taken by transitional actors but remain only partial in that don't go further than the observed behavior. On the other hand, post-democratization studies focus on the structures and the mechanisms underpinning the previous authoritarian regimes but fall short in providing the causal link between them and the observed outcome.

In line with the transitology approach, this research moves from the acknowledgment that the failure or the success of the transitions in Egypt and Tunisia is to be attributed to political parties' choice about whether to cooperate or not with the other ones within the phase of installation. Yet, unlike any other kind of transitional actor, parties' strategy profiles result from the interplay among: i) extant social divisions; ii) power resources and iii) ideological polarization. By breaking down the concept of agency in this way, the different structures of competition underneath the previous authoritarian rule in Tunisia and Egypt account for much of the variation across the two countries. First, they are responsible for the uneven distribution of seats' share inside the transitional national assemblies encouraging stronger parties to defect from cooperation in order to institutionalize their power advantage. Second, they are responsible for the different degrees of ideological polarization which is deemed to reduce the common ground available for the constitutional bargaining.

While offering new insights accounting for the political developments in Tunisia and Egypt following the ousting of the previous dictators, this work combines the two contending paradigms into a unified reading fulfilling their respective shortcomings. On the one hand, the concept of agency so formulated allows democratization studies to go deeper than 'what ought to be'. On the other hand, it provides post-democratization studies a causal link, i.e. parties' agency, connecting previous regimes' structures with the outcome of transition.

CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When meeting Michael Driessen during my first year, he told me that the PhD is a "solitary journey".

These worlds have always hummed in my head, and day by day I realized there was lot truth in them. Nonetheless, I occasionally had the luck of enjoying a good company. Both inside and outside the university, I've been surrounded by persons I could count in for whatsoever reason, and that contributed in many ways to this PhD thesis.

First of all, I want to thank Vittorio Emanuele Parsi, who first believed in me and in my research project, Fabio Franchino, for his intellectual vitality and his supervision, and Francesco Zucchini, who followed me and my NASP fellows. Also, I wish to thank Luigi Curini, who tough me to familiarize with quantitative methods and clarified many of my doubts, Francesca Pasquali, for her support, and Licia Claudia Papavero, who gave the opportunity to be a TA in course of Political Science. A special thanks goes also to Lise Storm who hosted me in her department. She made me feel part of a worthy academic enterprise and she furnished me the coordinates I needed to pursue it at best. In the same line, a special thanks goes to Leonardo Morlino and Rosita Di Peri who reviewed this work furnishing insightful comments and suggestions.

Moreover, if leaving home in the morning to go to work has never been so stressing, it has been for the fabulous Sopralzos: Beatrice, Sabrina, Federico, Ferruccio, Simone, Silvia and Stefano – thanks for your smiles, your encouragements, and your care. Thank also to my fellows Francesco, Venera, Massimo and Serena for enduring my disorder and my changes of mood. And thanks to Elisa, Tullia, Andrea, Alessandro, Camilla M. and Camilla G., for show me there's life in the post-Doc and for never give up. A truly thanks goes to those passionate and gifted researchers met in conferences or summer schools, source of inspiration and insightful debates. And, of course, thanks to Ric and the "altrimenti mi arrabbio" crew, for being always there, despite the distance and the different paths our lives have taken.

A not ironic thanks goes also to my family. To my mother, "quando ti trovi un lavoro vero?". To Nicola, "ma se ti sei laureata cinque anni fa, perché sei ancora all'università?" and Matteo "tu e tutti quella della tua categoria..parassiti sociali". Thank you, you made me feel like being in an ivory tower (been paid for doing what I like) and this pushed me to work hard to maintain this privilege.

To conclude, I wish to thank Filippo. For uncountable reasons.

"Democracy is almost always the fruit of popular struggle, and this must never be forgotten, but the design of formal democratic institutions is, out of necessity, the work of a political elite".

Nancy Bermeo, 1992

INTRODUCTION

On March 2015, Morten Valbjørn published an article on *Democratization* entitled "Reflections on self-reflections – On framing the analytical implications of the Arab uprisings for the study of Arab politics" which perfectly reflects the process of 'soul searching' (Jung 2011) the discipline is undergoing. The Arab uprisings have marked indeed an historical change in the Arab region, but also on the scholarship of Arab politics. Even though the effects of these mass protests have varied from country to country, these have irreparably altered the structures of the authoritarian regimes that up to that moment scholars thought unchallengeable.

In the last two decades, studies aimed at accounting why and how the Arab region appeared immune to democracy, despite some room for economic liberalization and multiparty politics, gave rise to the paradigm of the authoritarian resilience (also known as that of post-democratization), which replaced the more optimistic one of democratization through which students have read the Arab politics from the 1970s. In this way, hopeful expectations for a 'fourth wave' of democracy left the floor to hybrid regime theorizing. The eruption of the 2011 uprisings putted then an entire scholarly tradition under question but wasn't sufficient to fully rehabilitate the democratization paradigm. Despite a promising start, only in one case these have been conducive to democracy.

Competing explanations drawing from one paradigm or another have been put forth to account for why the uprisings were not always successful in toppling the regime (as happened in Yemen), or why regime breakdowns did not always produce a transition (as was the case for Libya) or, again, why eventual transitions were not always conducive to the rise of new democratic regimes. As far as the inter-paradigm debate is concerned, this latter question is by far the more intriguing. Following Ben Ali's ousting, Tunisia managed to achieve a democratic installation and is currently on its way to democratic consolidation. By contrast, in Egypt the transitional experience ran out into a military coup. To account for these diverging outcomes, explanations within and between the two paradigms have been offered.

For democratization studies both processes were indeed transitions from the authoritarian rule. Out of this assumption, the Egyptian breakdown is explained in terms of lack of

preconditions to democracy or by looking to more contingent factors. In this respect, explanations revolving on actors' 'bad choices' or to the fuzziness of the transitional roadmap enjoy great appeal. By contrast, scholars subscribing to the authoritarian resilience paradigm are much less inclined in framing 2011-2013 Egypt as an instance of transition because of the continuity with the past in terms of the structures of power and the patterns of interaction among the relevant political elite.

Both lines of inquiry offer a copious and insightful corpus of literature that has contributed to our understanding of the Arab politics in the aftermath of the uprisings. Yet, because of the normative and theoretical rigidity characterizing each of the paradigms underneath them, these two streams of research proceed along parallel binaries. Nonetheless, the two are indeed much more complementary than thought. While democratization studies offer a precious theoretical framework to appraise the 2011-2013 events in the region but are deemed to be too much concerned on what 'ought to be', post-democratization studies are really useful in enlightening 'what actually is' but fall nonetheless short in locating the causal factors in time and space. What is actually missing is a hinge between the two. This lack is filled by the present work through a focus on political parties' behavior. Normally, the literature on party politics conceives them as combiners of institutional and social constraints. Yet, by reappraising the concept of agency proposed by transitologists to suit the unique nature of political parties as intermediate institutions, this work puts forward that political parties offer themselves as combiners of the paradigms of democratization and authoritarian resilience by enlightening how they transform structural inputs into their transitional agency thus providing new and insightful points.

This thesis proceeds as follow. The first chapter is dedicated at charting the different transitions by recounting the mere events happening in the two countries from the downfall of the previous dictators to the adoption of a democratic constitution in Tunisia and the military coup in Egypt. Yet, one thing is to report events, quite different things is to account for them. The second chapter will review the broad variety explanations offered to discriminate the Tunisian experience from the Egyptian one moving from the two different paradigms, following different approaches and having different units of analysis. In line with some of them, the Egyptian military coup is here conceived as the

result of political parties' inability to successfully manage the process of democratic installation.

Chapter three will therefore justify such choice and provide a theoretical framework for analyzing the role of political parties in determining the success or the failure of transitional experiences. Accounts aimed at explaining actors' behavior during processes of installation conceive their ideology and their resource distribution as determining the prospects to find a compromise on the new rules of the game. Yet, being political parties intermediate institutions, i.e. part of the mobilized public and the relevant political elite at the same time, their governing agency is influenced by their representative agency. Simply put, parties' payoffs from cooperation with others, within installation processes are the result of the interplay between i) the extant social divisions; ii) the power resources they have at disposal and iii) by their ideological polarization.

Sectioning parties' agency in this way allows to pinpoint how the structures of the authoritarian regime have a role in accounting for transitions' failure or success by creating deep social divisions, providing parties with balanced power resources distribution, or fostering political polarization. The more the extent of social divisions, uneven distribution of power among parties, and polarization, the lesser the chances political parties will arrive to find an agreement. Accordingly, each of the following chapter will then deal with the analysis of each of these aspects.

Chapter four investigates the nature and depth of social divisions at the time of the founding elections. Drawing from the political sociology approach, according to which political parties represent pre-existent social divides, this section seeks whether, and in what degree, these can be held accountable for the success in finding a compromise in Tunisia and for the concomitant dialogue of the deaf occurred in the Egyptian parliament. In so doing, I will recur to a multinomial choice modeling on Arab Barometer data aimed at detecting the determinants of the vote choice in the 2011 elections.

Chapter five is not directly aimed at detecting the extent of uneven power distribution among constituent parties, this can be easily get by looking at parties' share of seats inside the elected parliaments. Rather, it intends to investigate what is at the base of the observed distribution of power through the analysis of the effects of the electoral system used by the two countries in occasion of the 2011 founding elections, but also by looking at the

opportunity structures provided by the previous authoritarian regime allowing political parties to reach, or not, those who would eventually become voters in 2011.
Finally, chapter six measures and explains the political polarization within the two party systems at the time of the founding elections. The assumption at the base of this kind of investigation is that parties' positioning on a political space is a signaling game whereby political entrepreneurs cast out different kinds of representation with their voters (e.g. moderating trusteeship or polarizing ones) on the base of previous political learning. In this guise, the way in which previous regime structured the political conflict, e.g. by exploiting the religious divide to prevent the unification of leftist and Islamist oppositions, proves to have a great impact on the stemming degree of polarization during the transition.

The findings of the present work show that the different outcome of the transition in Tunisia and Egypt largely relies on the different distribution of power among parties involved in the phase of installation and to the resolution of their commitment problems. In Egypt Islamist parties monopolized the parliament by mean of their electoral strength which had no equal in Tunisia. Moreover, no Egyptian party exerted itself in bringing forth a consensual transition like that occurred in Tunisia. In the absence of any remarkable distinction in the degree of divisiveness or 'Islamization' of the society across the two countries, or even of stark ideological distance among transitional parties, both aspects are attributable to the way party competition has been structured during the authoritarian regime. The way and the effectiveness whereby the transitional parties have been previously manipulated in contexts of 'liberalized autocracy' like those of Tunisia and Egypt before the eruption of the 2011 uprisings vary across the two countries. In Egypt, the Islamists benefited from more organizational advantages than other parties in that they controlled the opposition front while nonetheless filing independent candidates at the elections. By contrast, in Tunisia Islamist and leftist oppositions were equally repressed by the regime and joined force to challenge it. These diverse previous experiences are reflected both in the different compositions of transitional parliaments and in parties' behavior. While the Egyptian parliament was monopolized by Islamists and characterized by mistrust among parties, in Tunisia no formation controlled the absolute majority of seats and each party could count on a tradition of dialogue with

others. Endeavored as an explorative study on the role of political parties within political transitions, this work advocates with new empirical findings the long-standing notion that transitions are ultimately decided by political parties' moves, yet these latter very much reflect –and replicate – the uneven patterns of competition within which they socialized.

1 CHARTING DIFFERENT TRANSITIONS: TUNISIA AND EGYPT COMPARED

The wave of protests that the shacked the regimes of the Arab region produced extremely different results ranging from civil war, government reshuffle or the ousting of the incumbent dictators. Tunisia and Egypt are instances of this latter case. In both countries the departure of the ruler inaugurated a transition process intended to be toward democracy. Yet, despite some similarities, namely the initial attempt of the deep state at controlling the transition and the election of a Parliament charged – directly or indirectly - with writing a democratic constitution, the development of the transition in the two countries diverges significantly. Tunisia has experienced a somewhat linear transition process controlled by partisan entities inside representative institutions who managed to contain the political conflict within the circuit of party politics. In Egypt, by contrast, contentions among the different parties sitting inside the Parliament resulted in a conflict among the different institutions of the state and was intertwined with it, making the transition much more muddled than the Tunisian one. In light of similar premises across Tunisia and Egypt, it then emerges how the role of the Egyptian military, and perhaps also the less emphasized role of the judiciary, is more contingent than hypothesized thus far. The following pages will chart these two different trajectories thus offering empirical evidences for the formulation of hypothesis about the reasons of such different outcomes.

1.1 TUNISIA

Tunisia represents by far the best outcome following the so-called Arab Spring. The protests initiated in December 2010 with the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi provoked the ousting of the incumbent dictator, as happened in Libya and Egypt. Yet, contrary to those countries, in Tunisia this led to the installation of democracy with the adoption of an agreed Constitution in January 2014.

Despite the initial attempt of Ben Ali's entourage at controlling the transition, civilians managed to take over. The creation of the Higher Reform Political Commission, better known as "Ben Achour commission" after its president, and made by civilians, became

the main decision-making body, and turned to be the place of negotiations and consensus-building among the different components of the Tunisia society. This commission crafted the transitional roadmap by providing for the elections of a parliament directly charged to write a constitution, form a government and nominate an interim president of the republic.

In light of this, already in 2012, Stepan looked at the Tunisian experience with great optimism for it displayed all the features identified as crucial in neutralizing the authoritarian resilience, namely: a sufficient agreement on the procedures to produce and elected government; the presence of a government as direct result of popular vote; the effectiveness of the government and the absence of power sharing with other bodies de jure upon the legislative, the executive and the judicial powers (Linz and Stepan 1996; Stepan 2012). Yet, the hardest moment of the Tunisian transition arrived in the summer 2013 when the contested legitimacy of the governing power led to the suspension of the National Constituent Assembly. In those days, and for similar reasons, Egypt was abandoning its path toward democracy. Probably because of this negative example, the major competing parties, led by Ennadha and Nidaa, managed to solve the crisis and found an agreed compromise. Even though some observers referred to such agreement as a radical departure from the realization of the revolutionary claims (Achcar 2013; Boubekeur 2016; Merone 2015), this allowed Tunisia to be, thus far, the only Arab and Islamic country enjoying a democratic installation.

1.1.1 The 'Deep State' tries to control the transition

Following the departure of Ben Ali on 14th January 2011, its clique constituting the old regime attempted to appease the protesters while trying to preserve the extant apparatus. At the beginning, doubts were casted upon the irreversibility of Ben Ali's leave. Convinced that this would be only temporary, its Prime Minister, Mohamed Ghannouchi, according to article 56 of the 1959 Constitution, advocated to himself presidential powers waiting for the President to come back. Yet, the Constitutional Council was indeed of the advice that such leave would rather be permanent and, as provided by article 57 of the Consitution, vested the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Fouad Mebazaa, with the functions of interim president of the Republic. A new government saw the light on January 17th with the aim of soothing protesters while making only cosmetic changes.

Three members of the country's formal opposition and one activist were included in the new cabinet. Yet, they were reserved only ancillary positions: Ahmad Najib al-Chebbi of the Progressive Democratic Party (hereafter PDP) was appointed minister of development; Mustafa Ben Jaar, from the Union of Freedom and Labor, obtained the ministry of health; Ahmad Ibrahim, of Ettajdid, received the ministry of higher education, while Slim Amamou, the young activist who had been jailed during the uprisings against Ben Ali, had the ministry of youth and sport[1]. The hard-core of the authoritarian era was still sound and well.

Confronting with this continuity, and supported by authoritative opposition voices, such as those of Rachid Gannouchi and Moncef Marzouki, a new wave of street protests arose. From the inner and poorer areas of Kasserine, Thala, Regueb and Sidi Bouzid, hundreds of peoples marched towards Tunis in the "liberation caravan"[2] to demand the resignation of Gannouchi's government. During the same days the "14th January Front" saw the light under the impulse of radical leftist parties, in particular the Tunisian Workers' Party (PCOT, form its French acronym). This Front asked for the dismissal of Gannouchi's government, the dissolution of the RCD and of all institutions representing the previous regime – first of all the parliament and the political police-, along with the inception of a veritable process of transitional justice and the improvement of Tunisians' living conditions[3]. The "liberation caravan" arrived in the Qasbah square of Tunis, residence of the government, on 23th January. Together with the "14th January Front" and other oppositions, they organized a sit-in asking the immediate dissolution of the government, of the RCD and of the political police. On January 27th, Gannnouchi responded to the square with another government reshuffle only involving the ministry of National Defense and that of Foreign Affairs. Nonetheless, the civil society continued to autonomously organize itself, a National Council for the Protection of the Revolution (NCPR) was created including the "14th January Front", the Tunisian General Labour

[1] See: "Tunisia's Mohammed Ghannouchi defends new government" on the BBC website. Available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12213284 (last access: 1st March 2017)

[2] See: "'Liberation caravan' reaches Tunis" on al Jazeera. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/2011123124352723753.html (last access: 1st March 2017)

[3] See: "Communiqué de fondation du Front du 14 janvier", 20th January 2011. Available at: http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article26968 (last access: 1st March 2017)

Union (UGTT), the Islamist party Ennadha and other political and civic associations (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015; Zemni 2014). The goal of this new-born National Council was that of being "the sole depository of popular sovereignty and it asked to be recognized by presidential decree so that it could monitor the work of the transitional government" (Zemni 2014, 5). This led to the creation of the Higher Committee for Political Reform within the government and exponents of the NCPR where invited to join in. The Higher Committee and the National council eventually managed to merge in the High Authority for the Achievement of the Revolution Objectives, Political Reform and Democratic Transition, established by Decree-law n° 2011-6 dated 18 February 2011[4] with the task of "studying the legislative texts having link with the political organization and proposing the reforms likely to concretize the revolution objectives relating to the democratic process", and to advise the government (art. 2). However, Gannouchi's perseverance to control the transition caused another sit-in on 20th February. Qasbah 2 "called for the prime minister's resignation, the excision of all remnants of Ben Ali's regime from the country's government, and the election of a constituent assembly to write a new constitution" (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 128). This new wave of protests was partially successful and Gannouchi stepped aside on February 27th. His successor, Béji Caïd Essebsi, a former Bourguiba's minister and speaker of the parliament under Ben Ali, inaugurated a new course of management of the transition in the direction of empowering the oppositions while dismantling the remnants of the old regime.

1.1.2 The 'tabula rasa'

Decree-law n° 2011-14 dated 23 March 2011, related to the provisional organization of the public authorities, dissolved the Parliament and suspended the 1959 Constitution. Formally, the provisional legislative and executive powers were entrusted to the interim President of the Republic and the interim government, with extremely little prerogatives. Actually, the bulk of the decision making became the High Authority composed by an

[4] Full English text available at http://www.legislation.tn/sites/default/files/journal-officiel/2011/2011G/Jg0132011.pdf (last access: 1st March, 2017)

expert committee of specialists and of a council of "national political personalities, representatives of the different political parties, authorities, organizations, associations and components of the civil society concerned by the national affairs in the capital and regions, among those who took part in the revolution or supported it and which will be appointed by order of the Prime Minister on proposal from the concerned organizations" (art.2). This broad composition served the purpose of legitimating the process of "formulating the orientations likely to adapt the legislations relating to the political life so that they meet the requirements of the realization of the democratic transition" (art. 3) with the broader aim of changing the balance of the control of the transition in favor of the civil society. Following the request of protesters, two different commissions were created to investigate on corruption and on the abuses perpetrated during the uprisings[5]. In addition, it was provided for the dissolution of the political police[6] and of the RCD[7] whose members were banned from participating in politics for ten years. Finally, the Higher Independent Electoral Commission (ISIE, from its French acronym) was created in order to ensure democratic, pluralist, fair and transparent elections[8]. Its members, chosen by the High Authority among specialized and representative sectors of the society were entitled to supervise the entire electoral process, i.e. proposing the division of the electoral constituencies, preparing the electoral calendar, fixing the list electors, receiving the applications of candidacies, publishing the results of elections and deciding on possible controversies.

As first step, the ISIE decided to postpone the elections (originally scheduled for July 24 2011) in order to "meet the administrative, financial, and technical requirements of organizing a free and fair election" (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 133). This decision created, unsurprisingly, divisions between the bigger and the smaller parties. The first ones, such as Ennadha, the Congress for Republic (CPR), or the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), were afraid of losing their competitive advantage and appealed to the urgent need of giving the county a Constituent Assembly. The second ones, such

[5] See: Decree-law n° 2011-7 dated 18 February 2011 and Decree-law n° 2011-8 dated 18 February 2011.
[6] See: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12669461 (last access: March 2, 2017)
[7] See: Decree-law n° 2011-35 dated 10 May 2011.
[8] See: Decree-law n° 2011-27 dated 18 April 2011

as the Democratic Reform Meeting Movement and the PCOT, agreed with this decision seeing in it the opportunity to better organize in facing the ballot box.

Another point of disagreement among the competing factions of the society around the transitional road map was related to the mandate of the elected assembly. Some parties, as Ennadha and others rallied around the "October 23rd coalition", envisaged a Constituent Assembly with extended prerogatives (as originally stated by the decree law 2011-14). Others, as the PDP and others fifty parties, called for the elections of an Assembly with the sole scope of writing a constitution within a six months and, eventually, to supervise for other six months the elected bodies. As Brownlee et al. note, "[t]his disagreement was not merely technical. According to many observers, some non-Islamists feared that Ennadha was poised to capture a majority in the assembly, and therefore these non-Islamists wanted to limit both the assembly's term and its mandate, lest it prove the gateway to Islamist dominion" (2015, 136). In the wake of reciprocal suspicions, an agreement between these two factions was finally casted on September 15 2011 with the transitional Pact providing the election of a 1-year Constituent Assembly settling also the new structure of the public authority and electing an interim president. In line with the desire of guaranteeing the widest representation, and to safeguard the smaller parties from the threat of an overwhelming power handled by one party, in the case Ennadha (Lieckefett 2012), the ISIE predisposed that the election of the ANC were to be held according to a system of closed list proportional representation, that assured also equal representation between men and women. Seats were to be attributed with the largest remainders formula with no national threshold[9]. This encouraged the registration of some hundreds parties, some of which being offshoots of the RCD despite the ban. The registration of voters, however, didn't reflect the enthusiasm of candidates and the procedures took longer than preview for the low affluence to the registration offices[10].

[9] See: Decree-law 35-2011 dated 10 May 2011.

[10] See: https://www.tunisienumerique.com/prorogation-jusquau-14-aout-2011-des-delais-dinscription-sur-les-listes-electorales/62093

1.1.3 Establishing the 'rules of the game' from the ANC to the National Dialogue

On October 23, 2011, Tunisian citizens went to the pool to express their political will. As table 1.1 shows, the Islamic party Ennadha won 89 of 217 seats, followed by the secular parties, namely the Congress for the Republic, hereafter CPR (29 seats), al-Aridha coalition (26 seats) and the Ettakatol party (20).

Table 1.1. Results of Tunisian Constituency Assembly, 23 October 2011

	Votes	%*	Seats	%
Mouvement Ennadha	1498905	34,81	89	41,01
Congress for Republic (CPR)	352825	8,19	29	13,36
Democratic forum for labour and liberties (Ettkatol)	285530	6,63	20	9,22
Popular petition (al-Aridha) [1]	280382	6,51	26	11,98
Progressive Democratic Party (PDP)	160692	3,73	16	7,37
Al-Moubadara	129215	3	5	2,30
Democratic Modernist Pole (PDM)[2]	113094	2,63	5	2,30
Tunisian Horizon Party (Afek Tounis)	76643	1,78	4	1,84
Tunisian Workers' Party (PCOT)	60620	1,41	3	1,38
Free Patriotic Union	51594	1,2	1	0,46
Mouvement of Democratic Patriots	32306	0,75	1	0,46
Popular Mouvement	31793	0,74	2	0,92
Movement of Social Democrats (MDS)	22842	0,53	2	0,92
Sowat al mostakbal[1]	17340	0,4	1	0,46
Social Democratic Nation Party	15572	0,36	1	0,46
Neo-Destour Party	15459	0,36	1	0,46
Maghribi Liberal Party	13053	0,3	1	0,46
Almostakel[1]	12172	0,28	1	0,46
al-Wafa[1]	11578	0,27	1	0,46
al-Amal[1]	10681	0,25	1	0,46
For a National Tunisian Front [1]	9923	0,23	1	0,46
Progressive Struggle Party	9329	0,22	1	0,46
Equity [1]	9221	0,21	1	0,46
Euqality and Equity Party	7619	0,18	1	0,46
Social Struggle[1]	6680	0,16	1	0,46
Party of the Cultural Unionist Nation	5581	0,13	1	0,46
Martyrs' wafa	3869	0,09	1	0,46
Total	**3244518**	**75,35**	**217**	

* percentage of votes by registered voters

[1] independent lists

[2] coalition list

Source: ISIE, *Rapport relative au déroulement des élections de L'Assemblée Nationale Constituante*, February 2012.

As hoped, no party gained the majority of seats that would allow a lone government. Ennadha, the CPR and Ettakatol (forming what will be known as the Troika) came to a power sharing agreement. Out of it, a coalition government among the three was guided by Hamada Jebali, a Ennadha's MP; CPR's leader, Moncef Marzouki was elected interim President of the Republic and Ettakatol's Mustapha Ben Jaafar was elected as Speaker of the Parliament. Meanwhile, the elected Parliament began to draft the Constitution. The works began on February 2012 with the creation of six commissions, each reflecting the distribution of power inside the ANC, in charge of dealing with specific aspects of the constitution[11]. This phase of institution building has been characterized by profound disagreement around both procedural aspects and substantive issues concerning the outlook of the future regime. Both confrontations manifest the power struggle between the competing political forces, inside and outside the Parliament, over the control of the transition process to secure a stake in the upcoming regime. Already before the election of the ANC, the 23rd October coalition, gathering Ennadha, the CPR and other parties clashed against other political parties over the extent of the Constituent Assembly's prerogatives. Despite what sanctioned by the declaration of the transitional pact, "in December 2011, Ennadha and its coalition partners rejected an attempt within the assembly to impose a timeline on the body or otherwise restrict its powers" (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 141). Worried about the absence of effective balances to the Troika's power and lamenting its autonomous management of the government and the constitution-making process alike, PDP, the Tunisia Horizon party and the Republican party gathered to form the Republican party with the aim of contrasting Ennadha and the Troika. This parliamentary initiative was followed by an extra-parliamentary one. On July 2012 a new party arose with no other aim, at least in the beginning, of "contrasting Ennadha"[12]. Later on, the Popular Front saw the light on October 7th 2012 by the convergence of a dozens of leftist parties including the Movement of Social Democrats (MDS after its French acronym), the People's Movement, the Workers' Party, the Green Party and the Ba'athist Movement of Tunisia. The rationale underneath the creation of

[11] See: http://majles.marsad.tn/assemblee/commissions (last access: 2nd March 2017)
[12] Personal interview with Hafed Caïd Essebsi, July 2012.

this Front was that the more united the oppositions, the greater their bargaining power via-à-vis Ennadha.

Coming to the substance, the major disagreements regarded the form of government and the role of Islam within the new regime. Ennadha was the sole party claiming for a parliamentary system, while all the other parties preferred a presidential one or some mixture of the two. Further, lot of politicians and observers were scared about Ennadha's intention to introduce the Shari'a among the sources of law. Indeed, such question has never been on the party's agenda[13]. Rather, it was the coming back of a traditional and Islamic view of society that preoccupied the constitution makers and Tunisians altogether (McCarthy 2015). Indeed, from two draft articles proposed by Ennadha it emerged the distinction, if not subordination, of the role of the woman within the family and the society. In this regard, this period has been referred to as the "reappearance of identity politics" or the struggle of "competing ways of life" (Zeghal 2013) thus underlying the challenge of accommodating different worldviews that Tunisia had to overcome in order to achieve the transition (Stepan and Linz 2013). Yet, such reading cannot obscure the broader battle-ground of the transition process that is the question of the legitimation of its governance. Attacks to Ennadha and Troika came from both inside and outside the state institutions.

The new parties inside the ANC, namely the Republican Party and the Social Democratic Path joined with the extra parliamentary party Nidaa Tounes of Caïd Essebsi to form the Union for the Sake of Tunisia[14].

On February 6 2013, one of the leader of the leftist opposition, Chockri Belaïd was assassinated in an ambush that nobody never claimed. This episode of violence was not alone. Already in October an activist of Nidaa Tounes was killed in a clash with the National League for the Protection of the Revolution reported to have hidden ties with Ennadha and during the summer 2012 a cinema and an exposition have been targeted by the violence of radical Islamic groups. Confronting with these mounting violence, protesters called for the government resignation and blamed in particular the interior

[13] Personal interview with Ajmi Lourimi, Ennadha's MP and member of its Shura Council, the decisional body of the party, and Imen Ben Mohammed, Ennadha's MP. July 2012.

[14] See: "Union for Tunisia - Jebali's Initiative 'Step Forward On Right Path'", 12 February 2013. Tunis Afrique Press (TAP).

ministry accused to have been soft-handed in dealing with these episodes. PM Hamadi Jebali, from Ennadha, tried then to form a technocratic government in line with the requests of demonstrators, but his effort proved in vain following the reluctance of his own party to step back. In disagreement with Ennadha's position, Jebali eventually resigned and was replaced precisely by the former minister of interior, Ali Laarayedh. Within the new cabinet, the presence of Ennadha's members was drastically reduced and key ministries were assigned to independent personalities. That spring was also the season of great discontent following the release of the draft constitution alleged to threaten some basic rights and to impose an Islamic view of society[15]. Mass protests lead Moncef Marzouki to call for a National Dialogue, but this was boycotted by the UGTT, the Popular Front and Nidaa Tounes.

New severe tensions arose after the murder of Mohamed Brahmi, the former leader of People's movement on July 25. The following day, the coalitions Union for Tunisia and Popular Front joined to give way to the National Salvation Front. This urged the government, indicated as the responsible for the widespread violence, to be replaced by a government of independent technocrats and asked for the dissolution of the ANC and its replacement by a Commission of National Salvation, composed by politicians, exponents of the civil society and experts in constitutional law, in charge of writing the Constitution within 2 months to subsequently submit it to popular referendum. In so doing, the National Salvation Front also incited civil disobedience and made itself promoters of a series of general strikes, manifestations and sit-ins[16]. Bardo's square (the ANC's headquarters) was besieged by protesters and MPs belonging to the National Front who refused any further discussion inside the ANC to achieve the writing of Constitution nor any kind of discussion with Ennadha until a new independent government was elected. Social and political agitation never reached a peak so high within the constitution-making process as in those months. Given this political impasse, on August 6, Ben Jaafar, the President of the Parliament, suspended the works of the ANC until a dialogue between the government and opposition was set up[17]. The transition appeared so as risk that some

[15] See: "Tunisia's Theocratic Temptation", 3 May 2013. The New York Times.
[16] See: http://front-populaire.org/?p=2414 (last access: March 2, 2017). Moreover, personal interview with Hamma Hammami. Tunis, August 2013.
[17] See: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-23596640 (last access: March 2, 2017).

observers also wondered if Ennadha would have followed the fate of the Muslim Brotherhood and Tunisia that of Egypt [18].

Following the idea of Moncef Marzouki, the General Union of the Tunisian workers (UGTT), the Tunisian Union for the Industry, Commerce and Craftsmanship (UTICA), the Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights (LTDH) and the National order of lawyers, constituted themselves as brokers of the National Dialogue to overcome the political impasse. Such "Quartet", heard the different positions of the political actors involved, more remarkably the governing forces headed by Ennadha and the oppositions led by Nidaa, and drafted the roadmap of the transition. Out of this roadmap, the oppositions engaged in collaborating for the adoption of the Constitution, the creation a new ISIE and the promulgation of the electoral law. After the achievement of these objectives, the Troika government would resign. Both the opposition and the government abided by the road map of the National Dialogue and the transition continued, despite slowdowns such as the nomination of ISIE's commissioner. In that occasion, political parties disagreed on the procedure of nomination and the Administrative Court was called to pronounce on this twice. Once again its seemed a deadlock "à la Egyptienne". Yet, through negotiations within the ANC a political solution was found to bypass the legal obstacle[19]. The Constitution was finally adopted on January 26 2014 along with the institutions and laws to regulate new elections. The government of technocrats replaced the Troika government and between October and December 2014 new democratic elections were held to elect a new parliament and the new president of the Tunisian Republic.

[18] See: http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2013/07/27/Islamists-fall-from-grace-Will-Tunisia-s-Ennahda-follow-the-Brotherhood.html (last access: March 2, 2017).

[19] Personal interview with Oussama Al Saghir, Ennhdha's MP and member of the commission for the elections. Tunis, October 2013.

1.2 EGYPT

The Egyptian transition, intending for it the eighteen months that go from Mubrak's ousting to Morsi's deposition, didn't follow a more or less linear trajectory as the Tunisian one. If reasoning in terms of path dependence, the Egyptian experience is indeed characterized by the continuing emergence and shift of conflicts of power from one electoral consultation to another molding the transition as a muddled succession of 'bad choices' and 'bad behaviors' that made the democratic breakdown almost inevitable, as Brown rightly notices (2013b). In this regard, the inability of the elected Parliament to find a political solution upon a pure political matter had the twofold effect of allowing exponents of the deep state, namely the judiciary and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, to hijacked the transition and of putting the legitimate elected President in the condition of wrestling with them over the control of the transition. This power struggle was characterized by extreme uncertainty. Przeworski clearly shows how incomplete information between incumbents (in our case the remnants of the deep state) and oppositions (here the Islamists and left/secular parties) is a key ingredient in fostering a successful democratic transition (Przeworski 1991). Yet, in the Egyptian case, uncertainty and suspicion marked the mutual relations of the latter front that was nonetheless willing to break with the past. However, fearing the concentration of power in the hand of Mohamed Morsi, which was instrumental to contrast the SCAF and Mubarak's judiciary, the left, the secular and even some Islamist oppositions turned in cherishing the SCAF's intervention to depose him. Eventually, such a request was satisfied through the July 3 2013 military coup that, up to now, has extinguished any democratic ambition for the country.

1.2.1 The SCAF controls the transition

Much like what occurred during the first weeks of the Tunisian transition, Mubarak's resignation of February 11, was followed by the attempts of controlling the transition from the remnants of the deep state. Yet, contrary to the Tunisian case, the deep state, represented by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), succeed in

maintaining the control of the transition. Ousted Mubarak, "power in Egypt was assumed, not by the Speaker of the People's Assembly (as called for by article 84 of the country's constitution), nor by an interim government of national salvation (as called for by many of the protesters), but by the [SCAF], a conclave of twenty senior military officers led by the minister of defense, Muhammad Ḥussayn al-Ṭanṭāwī" (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 104). At first, this move drew little attention from Egyptians and observers alike. On the one hand, the military has always enjoyed the trust of the populace, and its denial of shooting on protesters during the uprising increased this sentiment of confidence articulated in the slogan "The army and the people are one hand" (Ketchley 2013). On the other hand, as Brown simply puts it, "no one else could come up with a timely alternative" (Brown 2013b, 54). As first step, on February 13, the SCAF dissolved the parliament and suspended the constitution with the declared aim of creating a favorable environment allowing the building of the new political regime[20]. The timetable presented by the regent authority provided for a 6-months term wherein to draft constitutional amendments, submit them to a referendum and elect a new government. Such process, according to the declared plans, would have been followed by SCAF's return to the barracks.

While leaving in place Shafiq's government put in place by Mubarak on January 29 (Awad 2013), field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, the defence minister acting as chief of state, in accordance with the roadmap, created an 8-member committee to amend the 1971 constitution to render it well suited to the transition. Unlike the Tunisian High Authority, which broadly represented all the components of the civil society, this constitutional review committee was very much the expression of the old establishment. It was formed by three members of the Supreme Constitutional Court, three law professors, one member of the Muslim Brotherhood' Freedom and Justice Party (the sole party represented) and one former member of the Council of State with Islamic leanings[21]. The amendments presented on February 16, while diminishing the duration of the

[20] Mai Shams El-Din, "Armed Forces suspend constitution, dissolve parliament", 13 February 2011, Daily News Egypt. Available at http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2011/02/13/armed-forces-suspends-constitution-dissolves-parliament/. Last access: 9 March 2017.

[21] See: "In Egypt, a Panel of Jurists Is Given the Task of Revising the Country's Constitution", 15 February 2011, The New York Times.

mandate from six to four years and allowing just for one renewal, broadened the possibility for individuals to run for the Presidency of the Republic, thus filling the gap created with the 2005 constitutional revision (art. 76 and 77), even though preventing expats to apply (art. 75); established complete judicial supervision over all elections and referenda (art. 88); entrusted the Supreme Constitutional Court of deciding about the validity of membership of the People's Assembly MPs (art. 93); provided the appointment of a vice-president by the President for the Republic in order to prevent what elsewhere has been referred to as "the dauphin syndrome" (art. 139); strongly limited the applicability of the state of emergency while protecting human rights in any case (art. 148 and 179); added provisions and established the procedures for the adoption of a new constitution thus coming right to the bulk of the transition process. Amended article 189 entrusts the President of the Republic, after approval of the cabinet, and half of the People's Assembly and the Shura council, with the power to ask for issuing a new constitution. Such constitution would be redacted by a 100 members Constituent assembly mostly elected by the two houses of parliament and submitted to popular referendum.

To popular referendum have been subjected also the constitutional amendments on March 19, 2011. They were approved by 77% of voters although the turnout was as low as 41%. Despite the fact that SCAF ousted Shafiq and dissolved the State Security Agency[22], as asked by many oppositions, and remarkably by the Revolutionary Youth Coalition -a coalition formed in February 2011 to be the stakeholder of the young revolutionaries including the 6 April Youth movement, Justice and Freedom, Muslim Brotherhood youth, ElBaradei's campaign, The Popular Democratic Movement for Change (HASHD), the Democratic Front and the administrators of the renown Khaled Saeed Facebook group[23]- dissatisfaction toward the management of the transition was high. Many within the youth organizations and non-Islamist political parties still looked at the total dismantling of the old regime as precondition for the founding elections and feared the subsequent Islamist

[22] "Egypt dissolves notorious internal security agency", 15 March 2011, BBC News. Available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12751234. Last access: 9 March 2017.

[23] See: "Egypt revolution youth form national coalition", 9 February 2011, Ahram on line available at http://english.ahram.org.eg/~/NewsContent/1/64/5257/Egypt/Politics-/Coalition-of-The-Revolutions-Youth-assembled.aspx. Last access: 3 March 2017.

dominion at the ballot box. By contrast, the two major factions of the country, namely the Muslim Brotherhood and Moubarak's National Democratic Party, supported the amendments. The first saw in them the highway to parliamentary control, the second was at ease with the mild transition profiled by the military forces.

However, what followed the popular consultation was not the reinstitution of the 1971 Constitution as modified by the referendum, but a new Constitutional declaration unilaterally adopted on March 30 by the SCAF. This document was intended to be a fundamental law providing guidance towards civilian rule: it guaranteed democratic rights (art. 3 – 23) while indicating the timing and procedures of the transition (art. 24-62). Controversially, in envisaging the developments of the transition, the SCAF arrogated to itself legislative and executive powers to "deal[..] with the administration of the affairs of the country" (art. 56) "until a time at which the People's Assembly and the Shura Council assume their responsibilities and the president of the republic is elected and assumes his/her position" (art. 61). To counterbalance such maneuver, the SCAF convened a National Accord Conference with representatives of all political parties to reach a non-binding accord over the basic outlines of a new constitution. Yet, neither the Muslim Brotherhood's new-born Freedom and Justice party (FJP), nor the youth revolutionary groups joined the conference in sign of protest toward SCAF's ambivalent behavior[24]. At first, the National Accord Conference opted for drafting a constitution before parliamentary and presidential elections[25]. However, the two major opposing groups, the FJP and the revolutionary youths, strongly rejected this proposal and elections were finally scheduled for November[26].

Amidst suspicions, each faction approached the elections trying to safeguards its prerogatives by undermining its rivals. At that time, two trends common to almost all political parties emerged. On the one hand, they cherished SCAF's benevolence in order to count on a strong ally (De Smet 2014). On the other hand, political parties started to organize in broad electoral coalitions against what they saw as their worthiest rival. The FJP gathered with other parties such as the Dignity Party and Tomorrow Revolution to

[24] See: "Deputy PM alleges attempts to spoil accord on constitution", 26 May 2011, Egypt Independent.
[25] See: "National Accord Conference calls for constitution before elections", 21 June 2011, Egypt Independent.
[26] See: "Egyptian Parliamentary Election Date Set for November", 25 July 2011, IHS Global Insight.

prevent the return of Mubrark's clique. By contrast, the Egyptian Bloc gathered left and secular parties, such as the Social Democratic Party, the Free Egyptians Party and the National Progressive Union Party (NPUP, also known as Tagammu), to counterbalance the power of Islamists parties, in particular that of the FJP. And finally, also Salafist parties, under Nour's aegis united in the Islamist bloc to survive the plethora of secular parties.

Sharing anti-Islamists parties' preoccupations, SCAF's cabinet declared its intention to settle super-constitutional principles in order to bind Islamists' prerogatives within the constitution-making process. Again, opposition against this measure was vibrant and culminated with a meeting on September 19, between the SCAF and representatives of 36 Egyptian political parties and movements to agree upon a new road-map. The new agreement was formalized in SCAF's decree of 27 September calling for the national elections. Nonetheless, a new attempt at controlling the work of the Constituent Assembly arrived on November 1st with the Draft Declaration of the Fundamental Principles for the New Egyptian State, also known as the "Al-Salmi's bill"[27]. This document was another attempt at guiding the transition process by settling super constitutional principles as well as the criteria for the election of the Constituent Assembly. Yet, this time more attention was devoted at securing the interests of all the factions involved in the transition. Secular factions would be reassured from religious attempts at establishing an Islamic state by the first fundamental principle reporting that "The Arab Republic of Egypt is a democratic civil state which is based on citizenship and on the rule of law" (art. 1). By contrast, Islamists would be appeased by the acknowledgment that "Islam is the religion of state, and the Arab language is the official language of state. Islamic jurisprudence (shari'a) is the principle source of legislation" (art. 2). How these two principles would be reconciled in practice is difficult to guess. Also, the SCAF tried to secure itself from civilian interference with the provision that "the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces is solely responsible for all matters concerning the armed forces, and for discussing its budget, which should be incorporated as a single figure in the annual state budget. The Supreme

[27] Full text available at: http://www.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/2011.11_-_constitutional_principles_document_english_0.pdf. Ali al-Salmi, Sharaf's deputy PM, was appointed by the SCAF to the interim government as "minister of democratic transition", see: Mona el-Ghobashy, "Egyptian Politics Upended", MERIP, 20 August 2012.

Council for the Armed Forces is also exclusively competent to approve all bills relating to the armed forces before they come into effect" (art. 9). Finally, the SCAF, here indicated as the defender of the "constitutional legitimacy", tried to disempower the elected Parliament by envisaging a 100 members of Constituent Assembly composed by "eighty members, who are not members of the People's Assembly and of the Shura Council, and who represent all segments of Egyptian society including political forces, political parties, trade unions, professional and religious groups" and "the remaining members will be chosen from among the representatives of parties and independents, according to the proportion represented by the People's Assembly and Shura Council" (art. 1 of the Criteria for the formation of the Constituent Assembly to develop a new constitution for the country). Unsurprisingly, this document encountered the massive opposition of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Young Revolutionary Coalition. The first blamed the imposition of super-constitutional principles at the eve of their certain victory at the elections. The second saw in the document another attempt at hijacking the transition they provoked. Either because "the military preferred no supra-constitutional principles to a document that would consolidate liberal principles and ultimately sanction the supremacy of civilians in the political system" (Awad 2013) or because the SCAF didn't want to confront with the mobilizing potential of both the Brotherhood and the young (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015), the document was withdrawn and a new government, without al-Salmi, saw the light.

1.2.2 Writing the Constitution: Parliament's dialogue of the deaf

By modifying some provisions of Law No. 38 of 1972 on the People's Assembly, and Law No. 120 of 1980 on the Shura Council, SCAF's decree 199 of September 27, constitutes, along with other decrees recalled by it and two subsequent decrees[28], the legal framework of the voting procedures for the elections of the two chambers of the

[28] Susequent decrees are Decree 123 dated 3 October 2011 (modifying disposition of Decree 120 dated 26 September 2011, thus finally allowing political party members to contest individual candidacy seats) and Decree 130 dated 19 November 2011 (rules for voting abroad)

Parliament. Members of the People's Assembly –now of 498 members (art.1)- would be elected on 3 stages, with the first stage starting on 28 November 2011 and the run-off for the third stage ending in 10 January 2012 while members of the Shura Council would have been voted in other three stages from 29 January to 11 March 2011 (article 6). In continuity with the Nasserist tradition, the electoral framework provided that half seats in Parliament were to be reserved to workers and farmers (art. 2). The voting system envisaged was a mixed one: two thirds of the members of each chamber would be elected through a closed party list system with national threshold of 0.5%, and the remnants third through the individual-candidate voting system (art. 2 and 3).

The results of the elections confirmed the fears of the secular front but nonetheless surprised for the magnitude of the victories reported by the Islamists factions. As shown in table 1.2, Freedom and Justice party, leader of the Democratic Alliance rallying other minor parties like the Dignity Party, al-Hadara and affiliated independents, gained 218 out of the 498 elected seats at the People's Assembly and 105 out of the 180 elected seats in the Shura Council. Further, the salafist Nour party, head of the electoral coalition "Islamist Alliance" gained 108 seats within the lower chamber and 45 in the upper one. Facing this stunning performance, secular formation performed poorly. The New Wafd Party reported 42 seats in the People's Assembly and 14 in the Shura Council.

The electoral alliance born in august 2011 to counterbalance the Muslim Brotherhood, namely the "Egyptian Bloc" gained 33 and 8 seats respectively. Among its founding parties, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, founded by Mohamed Abou El-Ghar, gained 15 seats at the People's Assembly. The same poor figure applies also for the Free Egyptians Party established by the magnate of telecommunications Naguib Sawiris, while the oldest leftist opposition party of Egyptian history, namely the National Progressive Unionist Party gained only 3 seats inside the People's Assembly. NDP's offshoots, that reorganized despite the ban, contested elections divided in seven different parties achieving poor gains: the National Party of Egypt, born under NDP's chairman, Talaat Sadat's efforts to reorganize the party secured only 5 seats while the Union Party secured only 3 seats inside the People's Assembly. Overall, NDP's affiliated presence inside the People Assembly does not exceed the two dozen, while inside the Shura Council only the Freedom Party managed to elect 3 of its representatives.

Table 1. 2: Results of Egyptian Parliamentary Elections, 28 November 2011 – 11 January 2012

	Votes*	%*	Seats	%
Democratic Alliance	10138134	37,5	235	46,2
Freedom and Justice Party			213	41,9
Dignity Party (al-Karama)			6	
Tomorrow Revolution (Ghad al-Thawra)			2	
Civilization Party			2	
Islamic Labor Party			1	
Egyptian Arab Socialist			1	
Egyptian Reform			1	
Affiliated Independents			9	
Islamic Alliance	7534266	27,8	123	24,2
Al Nour			107	21,1
Building and Development Party			13	
Authenticity Party			1	
Egyptian Bloc	2402238	8,9	35	6,9
Socialist Democratic Party			16	
Free Egyptians			15	
Progressive Unionists (MPUP)			4	
New Wafd Party	2480391	9,2	38	7,5
al-Wasat	989003	3,7	10	2,0
Reform and Development	604415	2,2	9	1,8
Revolution Continues	754863	2,8	7	1,4
National Party of Egypt	425021	1,6	5	1,0
Freedom Party	514029	1,9	4	0,8
Egyptian Citizen Party	235359	0,9	4	0,8
Union Party	141382	0,5	2	0,4
Conservative Party	272910	1,0	1	0,2
Demcratic Peace Party	248281	0,9	1	0,2
Justice Party	184553	0,7	1	0,2
Arab Egyptian Unity Party	149253	0,6	1	0,2
Independents			21	4,1
Total	**27065134**			

* PR votes
Source: Masoud 2014

As stated by the modified Law No. 38 of 1972, the People's Assembly convened on March 17 2012 while the Shura Council on March 24 2012. Yet, instead of being the bulk of and agreed compromise to give the country a democratic constitution, the Parliament soon turned to be the arena of an unleashed conflict among the different political currents. Following the withdrawal of the Draft Declaration of the Fundamental Principles for the New Egyptian State, MPs were left with no guidance in determining the composition of

the Constituent Assembly. This provoked profound disagreement between Islamists and Secular. To the former, the composition of the assembly had to reflect the balance of power inside the elected Parliament. To the latter, the Constituent Assembly had to be the expression of the different political souls present in the country.

During the first session of the People's Assembly, parties agreed that the Constituent Assembly would be made by 50 MPs and 50 members from outside the Parliament[29]. Despite the fact such decision was voted by the Parliament, lawyers and activists appealed the administrative court alleging that the parliament-appointed panel did not reflected the diversity of Egyptian society and that such composition also violated article 60 of the March Constitutional Declaration related to the procedures for selecting the Constituent Assembly[30].

On March 22, amidst street protests contesting the criteria for selecting the constitution-makers[31], political parties and MPs announced their nominations for the Constituent Assembly that were finally voted by the parliament two days later. The Constituent Assembly would then be made up of 25 FJP's MPs, 11 Nour's MPs and other 14 MPs expression of the secular and leftist independents as far as the MPs' quota was concerned (35 of them from thee People's Assembly and 15 from the Shura Council), the remaining part of non-MPs was made up by 25 exponents of syndicate and unions and an equal amount of public Egyptian figures. In light of the overwhelming presence of Islamists inside the Constituent Assembly (even though according to some they contributed 58 members inside it), the left and secular parties led by the Egyptian bloc decided to withdraw from it[32]. Such act of demonstration was not necessary to block the proceedings, however. On April 10, the Supreme Administrative Court declared the panel of constitution-makers unconstitutional on the ground that this was composed also by self-appointed parliamentarians[33] and the Constituent Assembly was finally dissolved. After confrontations among all parties and the SCAF[34], a new one finally saw the light on June

[29] See: "Egypt Parliament opens nominations for constituent assembly", 18 march 2012, Al-Ahram online.
[30] "Legal experts challenge decision to stock constituent assembly with sitting MPs", 19 march 2012, Al-Ahram.
[31] "Protesters rally against Islamists dominating Constituent Assembly", 23 march 2012, Daily News Egypt.
[32] "Egyptian secular parties withdraw from Constituent Assembly", 27 March 2012, Xinhua General News Service.
[33] "Egyptian Court Suspends Constitutional Assembly", 10 April 2012, RTT News.
[34] "SCAF, political parties agree to 6 criteria for forming constituent assembly", 28 April 2012, Al-Ahram.

12[35], and again its composition was challenged to the court. However, this time the Supreme Constitutional Court disbanded the elected Parliament for unconstitutionality of the electoral law. According to the SCC, the electoral system used for the founding elections discriminated between independent candidates and party members insofar as the former were granted access only to one third of seats allocated through the first-past-the-post electoral formula while the latter had instead access to both the individual candidature and the closed party list seats thus enjoying a much greater advantage.
While it has been argued that SCC, entirely formed by judges appointed by Mubarak, with this decision has probably gone beyond its prerogatives (even though this is not an isolated episodes) (Brown 2013a), its intervention is surely indicative of "the persistent resort to adjudication to decide on essentially political conflicts" (Awad 2013, 287) due to the dialogue of the deaf brought about by political parties inside the Parliament.

1.2.3 From the intra-parliamentary to the inter-institutional conflict

The decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court arrived at an extremely delicate moment of the Egyptian transition, namely at the eve of the Presidential elections that took place between 23/24 May (first round) and 16/17 June (runoff). In this regard, the many interventions of Mubarak's courts had direct and indirect results on both the electoral race and the political prerogatives of the highest office. On the one hand, already in April the High Judicial Election Commission disqualified MB's first candidate al-Shatir form the presidential race. In absolute legal continuity with the Mubarak era, as Brownlee et al. note, the electoral commission argued that al-Shatir could not yet enjoy its political rights following the 2008 penalty issued by a military court for membership of a banned organization (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 117). On the other hand, SCC's decision to outlaw the Parliament had the, more or less unintentional, consequence of putting the elected president in open confrontation with the SCAF for the governing power and the control of the transition.

[35] "Official: The 100 members of Egypt's revamped Constituent Assembly", 12 June 2012, Al-Ahram.

Following the Parliament's disband by the SCC, the SCAF issued another constitutional declaration in the exact day of the runoff between MB's candidate, Mohamed Morsi, and Ahmad Shafiq, an exponent of Mubarak's clique. SCAF's constitutional declaration of June 17 overcame the legal void following SCC's rule by awarding the military council with the legislative power "until a new parliament is elected" (art. 56 B). Further, it empowered the SCAF with the prerogatives of forming a new constituent assembly "if the constituent assembly encounters an obstacle that would prevent it from completing its work" (art. 60 B) and of intervening in the process of constitution making if "the new constitution contains an article or more which conflict with the revolution's goals and its main principles or which conflict with any principle agreed upon in all of Egypt's former constitutions" (art. 60 B1). Finally, the SCAF secured its autonomy from civilian oversight (art. 53) and established its veto power over presidential decisions on national security (articles 53/1 and 53/2).

Therefore, when Morsi won the Presidential race, he found himself in a battle on two fronts. On the one hand he had to confront with the fact that "the coalition undergirding the Mubarak regime had begun to regroup" (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 118), as emerged from its modest advantage (51.7%) toward Ahmed Shafik in the run off. On the other hand, following SCAF's constitutional declaration of June 17, Morsi (who found himself with tied hands vis-à-vis the SCAF, unelected body), entered in competition with it for the governing power of the transition confident of its popular legitimacy.

In order to confront with the challenges coming from both fronts, Morsi tried to gather the support from the left and secular field by "inviting dozens of national leaders from across Egypt's political spectrum to a June 21 summit at Cairo's Fairmont hotel, to 'discuss developments and changes in the political scene and the steps to be taken in the face of current challenges'" (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 119). Eventually, the "Fairmont Accord" succeeded in securing oppositions' allegiance with Morsi's promises to form a government of national salvation led by and independent figure and to balance the composition of the Constituent Assembly in order to make it more representative of the different political souls present in the country (ibidem). Yet, the developments of Morsi's attempt at wrestling power from the hands of the military and Mubarak's clique led him to disregard such promises.

As first step as President of the Republic of Egypt, Mohamed Morsi tried to reinstate the Parliament elected in 2011/2012 and to convene new parliamentary elections two months after the approval by referendum of the country's new constitution and the adoption of a new law regulating the parliament[36]. Unsurprisingly enough, such motion not only alarmed the judiciary and the military, who held meetings to figure out their next moves[37], but also provoked harsh reactions from the political oppositions. Rifat al-Said, leader of the NPUP blamed such decision asserting that "in any decent and democratic country, a president cannot disrespect the judiciary" [38] and called for both the boycott of the parliamentary session and street protests. In addition, al-Baradei tweeted that "the executive decision to overrule the Constitutional Court is turning Egypt from a government of law into a government of men"[39]. Eventually the Supreme Constitutional Court overturned Morsi's decree, and in a move he found himself politically isolated. To overcome his isolation, the newly elected President formed a cabinet of technocrats and left the ministries of defence, foreign affairs, and the interior, in the hands of the professional bureaucracies that had controlled them in the Mubarak era (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 120). However, the composition of the Morsi's government is not the expression of his decision to acquiesce with the status quo. It was just the last tribute to political cohesion before the launch of a series of attacks aimed at dismantling the deep state, or at least to subtract it the control of the transition.

With the pretext of Sinai's disorders[40], Morsi started to openly challenge the military rule. First, he removed of two prominent figures of the SCAF, namely those of Field Marshall Tantawi, replaced by al-Sisi, and of the army chief Sami Annan, replced by Sidki Sobhi. Further, and most importantly, he cancelled SCAF's constitutional amendments of June 17 and amended the constitutional declaration issued by SCAF on March 30, 2011. By so doing he granted himself with all the powers, including full executive and legislative

[36] "Egypt's reinstated parliament to convene Tuesday", 9 July 2012, Agence France Presse.
[37] "Egypt's ruling generals warn Morsi to respect the constitution", 9 July 2012, The Guardian.
[38] "Egypt's reinstated parliament to convene Tuesday", 9 July 2012, Agence France Presse.
[39] "Morsi orders Parliament to return", 7 July 2012, St. Paul Pioneer Press (Minnesota).
[40] "Egypt says 7 suspected militants killed in Sinai", 12 August 2012, Associated Press.

authority, and the prerogative to decide on all public policies in Egypt and to sign international treaties[41].

In the absence of SCAF's retaliation, Morsi then could turn to Mubarak's judicial apparatus. He named Mahmud Makki, a former judge of the Court of Cassation and activist for judicial independence under Mubarak, as his vice president. Moved by the twofold aim of cherishing again the support of the political opposition and to shake the judiciary, Morsi attempted to remove the general attorney, Abdel Meguid Mahmoud, accused of being too mild with the prosecution of those responsible of a violent episode occurred on February 2, during the Egyptian uprisings, by naming him ambassador to the Vatican[42]. Yet, Mahmoud refused to be reallocated and Morsi was obliged to rescind his decree by the Supreme Judicial Commission, the state body responsible for judicial appointments and promotion.

Confronting with the obstructiveness of Mubarak's judiciary and found himself almost isolated, Morsi shifted from a firm-handed to a "heavy handed" approach (Moustafa 2012). On November 22, he issued a new Constitutional Declaration aimed at seizing power from SCAF's hands while securing it from judicial interferences by stating that "previous constitutional declarations, laws, and decrees made by the president since he took office on 30 June 2012, until the constitution is approved and a new People's Assembly is elected, are final and binding and cannot be appealed by any way or to any entity. Nor shall they be suspended or canceled and all lawsuits related to them and brought before any judicial body against these decisions are annulled" (art. 2) and by extending such 'untouchability' also to the Shura Council preventing its dissolution from courts' rulings as happened with the People's Assembly (art. 5). Moreover, Morsi extended Constituent Assembly's time limits and attempted to control the judiciary by appointing the prosecutor-general (art. 3). Finally, the declaration provided the president with the power of taking "the necessary actions and measures to protect the country and the goals of the revolution" (art. 6).

---

[41] "Egypt's President Morsi cancels SCAF's constitutional amendments", 13 August 2012, Intellinews - MENA Today.

[42] "Egypt prosecutor-general to remain in office", 13 October 2012, Al-Jazeera. Available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/10/201210131356263711 29.html. Last access, 8 March 2017.

Even though such move was intended to bring the power back from the deep state against which many revolted to the newly elected bodies, "the effect was to further heighten opposition to the president, providing a focal point around which previously scattered liberals, leftists, and Mubarak supporters could coalesce" (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 122). The first signal of Morsi's ability at unifying its enemies arrived two days after the Constitutional Declaration with the creation of the National Salvation Front. This was a coalition among a wide range of liberal, secular and leftist groups, such as the Egyptian Popular Current, the Constitution Party (al-Dustour), the NPUP, the Free Egyptians, the New Wafd, the Democratic Front, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, Nasserist Democratic Party and the Conference Party[43]. Together, they were lead by prominent political figures with extremely different, if not opposite, backgrounds such as diplomat Nobel laureate ElBaradei; Amr Moussa, who served as minister of Foreign affairs with Mubarak and was president of the Arab League, and Hamdeen Sabahi, eminent figure of opposition to the authoritarian rule since the 1970s, founder of the Dignity Party and candidate in the 2011 Presidential race as exponent of the left[44]. The so formed National Salvation Front asked Morsi to rescind the Constitutional Declaration, to form a new and more plural Constituent Assembly, to carry through the measures of transitional justice and to form a new government of national salvation in line with the Fairmont Accord. Confronting with this organized protest, Morsi tried the way of the national dialogue to appease the tensions and to ensure the referendum approval of the Islamist-led constituent assembly's draft constitution, but in vain. On December 8, he withdrew the controversial decree but confirmed the constitutional referendum to be held on 15th December[45]. This was only a partial concession to the requests of the National Salvation Front, and protests continued while pursuing a harsh campaign against the approval of the Constitution. Eventually the draft constitution was approved in a two steps

[43] "Profile: Egypt's National Salvation Front", 10 December 2012, BBC News.
[44] "Egypt's opposition coalition: the key players", 6 December 2012, The Guardian.
[45] Matt Bradley, "Egypt's Morsi Partially Annuls Decree Expanding His Powers", 8 December 2012, The Wall Street Journal.

election at a rate of 64%, but the effect of the oppositions was evident in the participation whose turnout was as low as 33%[46].

In line with the transitional roadmap, the approval of the Constitution was followed by the attempts to organize a new Parliament that would have put Egypt on the rails of democratic stability, namely the draft, and the approval, of the Parliamentary law and of the electoral law. Yet, considerable uneasiness over unchecked presidential powers was stirring. In April, Tamarrod, a new grassroots movement protest saw the light and launched a petition campaign to ask Morsi to step down and allow for presidential elections to be held. Here, again, the initiative enjoyed the support of many and diverse social organizations and political parties such as the Kefaya Movement, the April 6 Youth Movement and Shayfeencom (three civil society organizations established in mid-2000s to protest against the authoritarian nature of the Mubarak regime), the National Salvation Front, but also of former members of Mubarak's ruling party and religious groups ranging from the Jihadists to the moderates' Strong Egypt Party. Maybe with the help of the Interior Ministry[47], Tamarrod's organizers announced that the petition reached 22 million signatures by the end of June[48] and the mass demonstrations they organized for June 30 proved to be a massive showdown. Millions of people took the streets of the major cities demanding Morsi's step down and, in case, the intervention of the military to depose him[49]. Not waiting much, on 1st July Defense Minister General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi launched an ultimatum to the incumbent president by giving him forty-eight hours to "respond people's demands" or encounter SCAF's intervention "due to its national and historic duties, out of respect for the demands of the great Egyptian people, to announce a roadmap and measures for the future"[50]. The following day on a televised speech Morsi rejected the ultimatum by insisting that "legitimacy is the only way to protect [the]

---

[46] "Egypt votes in second phase of constitution referendum", 22 December 2012. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/22/egypt-votes-second-constitution-referendum (Last access on 22 April 2017)

[47] Asma Alsharif and Yasmine Saleh, "Special Report - The real force behind Egypt's 'revolution of the state'", 10 October 2013, Reuters.

[48] "Profile: Egypt's Tamarod protest movement", 1 July 2012, BBC News.

[49] David D. Kirkpatrick, Kareem Fahim and Ben Hubbard, "By the Millions, Egyptians Seek Morsi's Ouster", 30 June 2012, The New York Times.

[50] Full text of SCAF's ultimatum pronounced by al-Sisi available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2013/jul/01/egypt-stanoff-millions-protest#block-51d1e142e4b042dd8f04a137, last access 9 March 2017.

country and prevent bloodshed, to move to a new phase"[51] well aware that this position would have probably cost him his life. In the meantime, the pro-Morsi National Alliance to Support Legitimacy called its supporters "to rally in defense of legitimacy and reject any attempt to overturn it"[52]. On July 3rd al-Sisi announced the deposition of the elected president, suspended the Constitution and appointed an interim government presided over by a senior jurist[53]. The two bastions of the authoritarian deep state, i.e. the military and the judges, finally came 'back on horseback', thus tuning off any hope of transition *to* democracy.

[51] David D. Kirkpatrick, Kareem Fahim and Ben Hubbard, "Morsi Defies Egypt Army's Ultimatum to Bend to Protest", 2 June 2012, The New York Times.

[52] "Egypt protests: Muslim Brotherhood reject army ultimatum; The Brotherhood and its Islamist allies in government reject an army ultimatum for President Morsi to negotiate with protesters, as demonstrations continue in Cairo's Tahrir Square and across the country", 2 July 2012, The Telegraph.

[53] David D. Kirkpatrick, "Army Ousts Egypt's President; Morsi Is Taken Into Military Custody" 3 July 2012, The New York Times.

2 DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESSES OR AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE?

One thing is to report different transitional paths; quite different thing is to account for them. Different readings have been offered to both categorize and explain these events. The preliminary question at stake is whether to label the Egyptian transition as a democratic breakdown, a failed transition or only an attempted transition. Out of this latter understanding, the events unfolding from 2011 to 2013 as only apparent changes in that the power remained in the hand of the SCAF. The first definition conceives the 2013 military coup as subsequent to the completion of the democratic transition. The second, by contrast, locates it within the unfolding of the transition. Mubarak's chute, followed by free and democratic elections of the Parliament entitled to elect a Constituent Assembly with the task of giving Egypt a democratic constitution makes the point for referring to the events between 2011 and 2013 as a transition. But was it complete when General Sisi deposed president Mursi? According to the mainstream definition:

> "[a] democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce and elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure" (Linz and Stepan 1996, 3)

Out of this understanding the centrality of the military, either as legislative and executive power, or as the "men on horseback" behind the scenes lead some to deny any completion (Hinnebusch 2015c; Stacher 2015), while others see this completion, even if "in only the thinnest, most formalistic of senses" (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 170) in Mursi's presidential decree entrusting himself, as elected body, all the executive and legislative powers.

Both accounts fall nonetheless under the notion of democratization failure, yet, in line with the mainstream position, speaking of failed transition is more appropriate in that it better grasp the bulk of the question which is not much the centrality of non-elected bodies, but rather, as well be explained, the lack of any kind of agreement about some

sort of rules aimed at inaugurating a new course of politics. True enough, at some point Morsi succeeded in side lining the SCAF from the exercise of the governing power, but if *terminus ad quem* of any transition is the installation of another regime (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986), this ending point was simply missing. No elected or governing body was created according to the 2012 constitution, nor such constitution can be defined as an agreed compromise, as the 33% of turnout for its popular approval suggests.

The analytical consequence of this definition is to delimit the search of possible explanations to the field of 'transition maintenance', namely the "persistence of [democratically elected] regimes in the face of challenges" (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 171). In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, only Tunisia and Egypt managed to inaugurate a transition following the ousting of the previous dictator through founding elections with the aim of democratically selecting the representative bodies entitled to draft democratic constitutions thus inaugurating a new, and democratic, course of politics. As saw, this project succeeded in Tunisia but failed in Egypt. The proposed explanations to account for the different outcomes displayed by the two countries are all theoretically and methodologically influenced by the two contending paradigms underlying the study of the Arab Politics in the last decades, namely that of democratization studies and that of post-democratization ones, whose fortunes have been subjected to the ups and downs of political developments in the region. The paradigm of democratization studies has guided the research agenda from the discovery of the Arab Region at the end of World War II to the late 1990s, when the processes of national independence and the following processes of liberalization started in the 1970s were deemed to be conducive to democracy. The paradigm of post-democratization studies, that focuses on the causes of the authoritarian resilience, imposed itself since the early 2000s following the entrenchment of Arab countries into the 'grey zone' of liberalized authoritarianism.

In light of these two opposite orientations, the broader phenomenon of the Arab Spring is either appraised as process of democratization or as a process of authoritarian upgrading. Accordingly, the explanations accounting for the observed variations go from the analysis of the conditions fostering democracy to the structures and mechanisms allowing authoritarian regimes to survive. In the following all kind of explanations will be reported with an emphasis on the units of analysis, otherwise said the 'arenas of democracy' or

'democratic dimensions' (Linz and Stepan 1996; Morlino 2011), enlightened by the different contributions.

2.1 THE PARADIGM OF DEMOCRATIZATION STUDIES

As Anderson (2006) remembers, contemporary political science discovered the Arab region at the end of the World War II. At that time, the Arab countries were newly independent and developing states still entrenched in the traditional structures of the pre-modern state. At the same time, in the North of the world – remarkably US and Europe, the theory of modernization, which conceives democracy as endogenous to specific sets of conditions stemming from human development, was imposing itself in accounting for the rise of democracy in western states (Huntington 1968; Lipset 1959). It then followed that the attention of students of Arab politics was devoted to the search of those 'social requisites' for democracy to come about. Yet, interestingly enough, the appearance of *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa*, which represents the first and most comprehensive effort of to deal with the Arab Politics "by concentrating on the comparative analysis of changing internal politics" with the declared aim of grasping signals "not of Westernization, but of locally-rooted modernization" (Halpern 1963), coincided with the building of the authoritarian system of rule which, at least until the Arab Spring, has characterized the political outlook of the MENA region with few exceptions, namely Israel and – to some extent – Turkey (Hinnebusch 2015a). During the late 1950s and 1960s, Arab incumbents scarified the subversive exigencies of democratization to those of state and nation building processes deemed to lead to economic development, and in turn to democracy. Because the central power at the core of newly independent states had to compete with other and alternative forces (Migdal 1988), pluralism was regarded as a major threat. In 1952 Egypt, all political parties were disbanded and nearly three decades later the Parliament was dissolved for irresponsible oppositions. Since 1957, Jordan's government was appointed by the King and the parliament lost any significance. In 1963, Tunisia inaugurated itself as a single party-system and opposition parties started to be repressed. The following year, Algeria

witnessed the passage from and hegemonic party system to a single-party one wherein the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) was the only legal political party. From 1965, also the Moroccan monarchy aborted any pretension of being bounded by democratic constitutional limits. Gaddafi took over Libya through a military coup in 1969. Such regimes were nonetheless legitimated by a "populist social contract" whereby "the state was to effect development, ensure social justice, satisfy the basic needs of citizens, consolidate political independence, and achieve national aspirations (e.g. the Arab unity, the liberation of Palestine). In return, citizens were to forgo, at least for a while, the quest for liberal participatory politics" (Ibrahim 1995, 36). As far as the academic research was concerned, it seemed that the "developmentalist ethos", i.e. Arabs' internalization of the principles behind the authoritarian drive (Gelvin 2004), was spreading also among political scientists. Their shallow enthusiasm for the processes of national independence in the MENA region gave way to a silent waiting for development to come about as precondition for polyarchic institutions.

The search of democracy in the area regained a new momentum at the end of the 1980s until the early 2000's because of regional and international developments. Regionally, since 1967, the defeat of populist regimes at the hand of Israel, along with the evident inefficacy of socialist developmental plans, discredited the populist social contract underneath Arab incumbents' legitimacy. This political and economic crisis lead to the introduction of measures of economic liberalization across the region inaugurated in 1974 with the Egyptian's *infitah*, that is the overture of the socialist planned economy to some measures of free market economy. Internationally, during the same years, the world was assisting to the reversal of autocracies across Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe initiated with the Portuguese revolution of 1974. Such Third Wave of democratization (Huntington 1991) had a double effect. On the one hand, for its geographical spread, it instilled the wishful thinking that the world was irreversibly moving to democracy (Fukuyama 1989). On the other hand, the insights stemming from such events lead to the emergency of a new approach in the field of democratization studies, namely the one agency-based of transitology. Under this new understanding, democracy is conceived as the outcome stemming from actors' strategic interactions, rather than something inevitable given a set of certain conditions and appeared thus more

easily applicable also in the MENA region (Anderson 1991) where such preconditions were scarce.

The two resulting approaches grounding the study of democratization processes, namely the structuralist one at the base of the modernization theory and the agency-based one informing transitology never entered into conflict. Rather, because of their complementarity they inform a multifaceted and multidimensional theory of democratization (Linz and Stepan 1996; Morlino 2011; Welzel 2009). Hence, together they guide also the research agenda of democratization studies' proponents in accounting for the different outcomes observed in Tunisia and Egypt following the Arab Spring.

2.1.1 Processes

The undisputed lesson drawn from transition studies is that processes of transition are characterized by uncertainty (Higley and Burton 1989; North and Weingast 1989; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991; Weingast 1997). This comes from very definition of transition, that is "the interval between one regime and another" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 5). During it "the rules of the political game are not defined. Not only are they in constant flux, but they are usually arduously contested; actors struggle not only to satisfy their immediate interests and/or the interests of those whom they purport to represent, but also to define rules and procedures whose configuration will determine likely winners and losers in the future" (ibid.). Out of it, if follows that the process of transition itself, intended as the set of procedural decisions concerning its development and the way whereby such decisions are token, is essential in determining its outcome (Morlino 2011). Not only democracy is more likely to occur when the transitional roadmap is clearly defined, but also when those rules are considered as legitimate by mean of the process leading to their formulation (Szmolka 2015).

Earlier contributions aimed at explaining the divergences in outcome between Tunisia and Egypt have focused precisely on this aspect taking into account both the broader institutional design aimed at ruling the transition and on the different electoral system chosen to form, directly or indirectly, the Constituent Assembly. For many scholars,

differences in the transitional outcome across Tunisia and Egypt are due to stark differences in such procedural aspects.

2.1.1.1 The making of Transitional roadmaps

From the previous chapter, it immediately comes out how the Tunisian transition followed an overall liner trajectory fulfilling the roadmap established already in early 2011, despite the eventual delay in the adoption of the Constitution, while the Egyptian transition followed an irregular trajectory punctuated by twists and reversals. Therefore, if some scholars praise Tunisia's transitional design for its inclusionary and consensual character following the establishment of Ben Achour's commission (Driessen 2014; Stepan 2012; Szmolka 2015), others regard Egypt as "a case study in how not to initiate a constitution-writing process" (Moustafa 2012). The original sin, according to Brown, is that "Egypt's transition was not badly designed; was not designed at all. Its original failing lay in a series of shortsighted decisions made by generally well-meaning but myopic actors who found themselves thrust into positions of limited authority in February and March 2011" (2013b, 53). In his view, SCAF's control over the transition for no other reason that was the only power in the position to do so and nobody challenged it, and its subsequent decision to charge a tiny committee to amend the 1971 constitution, generated a twofold lack of inclusion and accountability. Given SCAF's centrality, the other actors involved, remarkably divided between Islamists and secular, resolved their rivalries "by pressuring, nagging and bargains with the generals" instead of trying to coalesce for guarantee the civilian control over the transition (ibid.). "Had a process of broad and careful consultation been used to adjust the basic law, the results might have been made palatable. But the generals were predictably bad at consultation, and later the first freely elected president turned out to be even worse. So Egypt's rulers took turns decreeing unilateral changes with ultimately disastrous results" (Brown 2013b, 54).

Intimately related with the different degrees of inclusion in the establishment of the transitional roadmap is the content of the decisions taken at that time. Differences across the two countries concerning the rules for the elections of parliaments, the prerogatives assigned to each of them, the composition of the constituent assembly and the provisions

for finally adopting the stemming constitutions replicate patterns of exclusionary or consensual politics already triggered at this earlier phase thus further enhancing or undermining the overall process of transition.

2.1.1.2 The choice of the electoral systems

Already in 1954, Duverger showed how different political system impact on the party system by mean of two mechanisms. On the one hand, the degree of proportionality of the overall electoral system influences the number of parties finally embarking on the electoral race (strategic effect). The more the proportionality the higher the number of parties contesting the election moved by the expectation of entering into the parliament (strategic entry) and higher the probability that voters will vote for their preferred choice instead of voting the one with the greatest possibility of success (strategic vote). On the other hand, the electoral systems directly impact on the number of parties represented inside the elected body (mechanic effect). The more majoritarian the electoral system, the lesser the parties entering inside the representative institutions (Duverger 1954). This understanding, which remains basically unchallenged, grounds also several accounts aimed at explaining how the vote choice in Tunisia and Egypt has affected the overall transitional processes. Indeed, this is the case because the electoral system determines, first and foremost, the composition of the elected parliaments entrusted with constitution-making prerogatives and the kind of relationship between MPs and their voters. Variations in these two dimensions have profoundly different implications for the constitution-making processes.

The proportional closed-list electoral system associated with Hare's quota formula with highest remainders (HQLR) chosen in Tunisia strongly concurred, according to some, at guaranteeing the installation of democracy acting on two levels. First, the closed-list electoral system encouraged parties' discipline and organization in filing candidates in all the 33 Tunisian districts (Carey 2013). Second, inside the elected parliament the HQLR electoral formula encouraged the search for compromise and collaboration inasmuch as it drained seats bonuses from Ennadha, who managed to capture 'only' 41% of seats, to the smaller parties (Carey 2014). In simulating seats allocations out of the vote casted by

the Tunisian voters at the 2011 elections under different electoral formulas, Carey notices that the one chosen by the Higher Commission proved to be the more suitable for the founding elections for it magnified the political pluralism resulting from the ballot box while denying the first party the absolute majority inside the parliament, that other proportional formulas (such as the D'Hont) would have otherwise conceded (Carey 2014).

In Egypt, by contrast, the fuzziness surrounding the design of the transitional roadmap was reflected in a jumbled voting procedure. The military, as we saw, opted for a mixed electoral system: two thirds of each house were to be elected by closed-party lists, while the remaining third through individual candidacies. Districts differed from one system to the other and consultations were conducted in six rounds. As far as the strategical effects of this electoral system are concerned, the combinations of two symmetrically systems for the election of the same body "pulled [parties] in two different directions. On the one hand, individual districts incentivize parties to pool resources, negotiate certain districts, and come together on the basis of ideological affinity. [On the other hand], high district magnitudes in list districts encourage party proliferation and provide disincentives to coordination" (D. Tavana 2011, 563–64). Hence, the author rightly forecasted the emergence of three distinct ideological groups (the religious, the right/liberal and the leftist champ) with poor party discipline. Yet, parties' off-shores in the aftermath of the founding elections is a phenomenon that also happened inside the Tunisian ANC. More likely is the possibility that individual districts penalized partisan mechanisms, such as ideological and issue affinity at the expense of mechanisms typical of Mubarak's liberalized autocracy, namely networks of kinship, clintelism and so on (Masoud 2014), thus perverting the very nature of representation in occasion of the founding elections charged with electing the body that will, directly or indirectly, write the new constitution. Further, coming to the analysis of the mechanic effects, the Egyptian electoral formula has benefited major parties at the expenses of the smaller one thus magnifying the unbalance of power between the Islamists and their oppositions (Carey 2014).

In light of these findings, it is evident that the electoral systems adopted by the two countries can accounts for the different outcomes observed (Morlino 2012). Nonetheless, it also evident that the strength of the Islamists in Egypt, i.e. the FJP and the Salafists, cannot be compared to that of the Tunisian ones, represented by the sole Ennadha which

proposes a moderate political Islam, nor can it be entirely attributed to the different electoral systems used by the two countries, as chapter five will show. Moreover, it may also be the case that the different methods to design the constituent assemblies have also played a role by providing the constitution-making with varying degree of legitimation.

2.1.1.3 Elected bodies' prerogatives

Not only the choice of the electoral system to form the parliaments, but also choices regarding their prerogatives have been taken into account by scholars. In Tunisia, parliamentary elections nominated a 217 Constituent Assembly entrusted with legislative powers and in charge of writing a constitution, expressing a government and appointing an interim president. That guaranteed, according to prominent observers, the fulfilment of the democratic transition inasmuch as this provided full legitimacy to the decision-making process (Stepan 2012; Stepan and Linz 2013). In Egypt, by contrast, SCAF's decision of detaining the executive power hampered the prospects of democratic installation. Not only the parliament couldn't express a government or enjoying full legislative powers, it was neither directly entitled to write the constitution. The choice of nominating a 100-members constituent assembly, according to Brown, "offered no guarantee that everyone would have a voice" (2013b, 55). Moreover, the choice of submitting the stemming constitution to popular referendum has been conceived as a further move away from procedural consensus because Islamists' confidence on their electoral capabilities didn't encourage them to compromise with the oppositions in the constitution-making process (ibid.). How actors behaved within the two transitions, and how their behavior accounts for the different outcomes observed will be debated in the following.

2.1.2 Actors

As happened with the process, also actors found room in accounting for the emergence of democracy. This is an analytical implication of the transitologist approach for it models

democratic transitions as a set of political elites' strategic interactions. Under the widely shared cooperative reading, democracy is deemed to be more likely when actors' strategic interactions assume the form of pact-making (Higley and Burton 1989; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991; Weingast 1997). Under a non-cooperative one, democracy is more likely to be the imposition of committed democrats enjoying power advantage (McFaul 2002). In either cases, actors are deemed to be the key in order to understand the course of the transition because their ideology, their position within the polity, their interests, beliefs and so on concur the formation to their preferences underneath their moves, if the transition is framed in cooperative terms, or enlighten the prospects of a democratic imposition, if moving from a non-cooperative understanding.
Drawing from these two lines of inquiry, the role of the military and the behavior of political party leaders "are two powerful, agent-centric, narratives advanced for Tunisia's democratic continuity and Egypt's military coup" (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 186). On the one hand, the difference of power advantage between the two national armies is deemed to account for the different outcomes. On the other hand, these two different outcomes observed are attributed to the different attitudes and results of political parties' pact-making. In the first case, given the SCAF's dominant position, much of efforts revolve around the investigation of the reasons why it should prefer autocracy over democracy. In the second case, scholarly attention is devoted to parse cross-countries differences in both religious parties' democratic commitment and in party systems' polarization, both crucial in enlightening the different conditions of pact-making in the two countries.

2.1.2.1 The military

Despite the fact that during the revolts the position of the military has been categorized both in Tunisia and Egypt as a stance of siding with protesters (Barany 2011), the role of the two armed forces greatly differs following the downfall of the incumbent dictator. In the Tunisian case the armed forces came back to the barracks while in the Egyptian one they controlled the transition. According to some, the simple difference in militaries' positioning in the two processes of transition is sufficient to account for why Tunisia is

still on the road of democratization while Egypt abandoned it. For Said (2012) the fact that the SCAF controlled a political transition intended to be democratic has been seen as a twofold paradox and the main drawback of the Egyptian experience. On the one hand, "the army leaders can be seen as part of the ruling regime that the revolution was aimed at replacing" (ibid., 396). On the other hand, "an institution such as the military, which is based on hierarchy, strict regulation, and obedience" (ibid.) – because "officers are socialized as military men, not as politicians" (Albrecht and Bishara 2011, 21)- is seen as intrinsically incompatible with the task of leading a transition to democracy. As a matter of fact, this argument suggesting a sure failure of military-controlled transitions from authoritarian rule is not entirely true. Records of democratization processes proved that this might apply in some cases but not in others, as the cases of 1985 Brazil and 1999 Indonesia illustrate. To be sure, it is not much the centrality *per se* of armies during the transitions that determines their final outcome. Rather, whether they have incentives and opportunities to determine it (Bou Nassif 2017).

A vast literature has explained why the armed forces defect from the ruling elite to support a regime change, as initially happened in Tunisia and Egypt. Internal splits within the ruling elite or the military itself and the preservation of strategic interests, be them of economic or institutional nature, are deemed to account for the armed forces' choice to side with protesters of stand with the status quo (Geddes 1999; Haggard and Kaufinan 1997; Lee 2009; Makara 2013; Taylor 2014). Drawing from this corpus, scholars have tried to enlighten the reasons of the different armies' behavior in Tunisia and Egypt, with a particular focus on SCAF's behavior within the 18 months of the Egyptian transitions.

At the very beginning, it was thought that SCAF's centrality, following its solidarity with protesters, was only a temporary measure justified by the fact that it was the sole organized and neutral body able to establish the transitional roadmap (Brown 2013b). At that time, only few questioned its commitment to democracy (as a remarkable execption see Albrecht and Bishara 2011). Out of this understanding, Salmi's document was conceived as one of the many instances of transitional pact-making whereby deep-state actors try to "protect select interests of the outgoing regime in order to facilitate the transition to a new political order" (Moustafa 2012, 10). The SCAF "simply" asked for independence from civilian control as counterpart of a peaceful transition (ibid.). In the same line, SCAF's moves exerting noxious effects – such as the decision to unilaterally

issue a constitutional declaration disregarding the verdict of the referendum in March 2011, or to opt for the election of a National Assembly with limited powers – have been innocently referred to as "bad choices" (Brown 2013b). According to this reading, the SCAF was simply unprepared to occupy a central political position but was forced to because no other body could guarantee an orderly regime change in 2011. Its following decisions harming the transition were just the fruit of SCAF's inexperience to run politics. Other accounts complement this reading by addressing more explicitly the dimension of strategic interests. Maintaining that SCAF's control over the transition "happened at a moment of opportunity, despite a low degree of disposition on the side of the armed forces" (Albrecht and Bishara 2011, 17), some see it driven not by chance – or at least not entirely – but by the need to preserve its interests, "namely an early exit from direct political engagement, organizational cohesion, and the preservation of its economic privileges" (ibid., 22). In particular, the SCAF was deemed to return behind the scenes from where continuing to exert its political influence while avoiding internal ideological divisiveness and, of course, preserving its huge economic interests. The passage from SCAF's "direct management" of country's political affairs to its "institutionalization", with the 30 March Constitutional Declaration, is thus seen as a function of such predefined priorities matching the absence of other viable alternatives to preserve them from behind the scenes (ibid.). Not only the SCAF was deemed to act out of mere corporate interests, according to some it did so on ideational grounds. Since the Free Officers' Coup of 1952, the Egyptian army has been awarded with prestige and accountability, for which its intervention in national politics are welcomed – or at least not regarded as inappropriate. For some scholars, this historical and cultural heritage is self-evident in accounting for SCAF's intervention (Hinnebusch 2015d; De Smet 2014). A recent study further shows how this has affected senior officers' perceptions in the aftermath of Mubarak's ousting. While conceiving the military as the only guarantor of national security, the great majority of interviewed officials perceive the MB as not loyal to Egypt, due to their appeal to the entire Islamic *'umma* and their relations with other Islamic organizations such as Hamas, and therefore as a threat to national security. Moreover, both the Islamic front and the secular oppositions are perceived as subject to foreign manipulation, but the latter are also seen as only concerned with narrow interests and not suitable to serve the national ones (Bou Nassif 2017). Therefore, SCAF's

intervention responded to a twofold aim: that of preserving corporate interests and that of safeguarding the national security. By contrast, other readings conceive SCAF's power institutionalization as a strategic interest itself and therefore appreciate its engagement in politics as a deliberate move to restore its lost standing within the polity, rather something SCAF forcefully underwent pushed by the events. Being the center of power following the 1952 coup that led to the establishment of the republic of Egypt, under Sadat military's influence started to decline insofar as he started to distance the SCAF from direct involvement in politics (Stacher 2012b). Under Mubarak, and following a regional trend, the expansion of internal security forces (*al-Mukhabarat*) further threatened the position of prestige and the influence the military was used to occupy. Mubarak's ousting then, furnished SCAF the occasion to restore, if not expand, its power within the political relevant elite (Kandil 2012a; Roll 2016; Stacher 2011, 2012a).

In light of all these accounts, it emerges that the Egyptian army, despite its initial support for a regime change, found it hard to safeguard its corporate interests under the new political course. In particular, it couldn't accept the 'untrustworthy' civilian oversight on the armed forces democracy implies and eventually opted for its sabotage. Yet, it is not clear whether this awareness matured on the eve on the military coup, when its intervention was also encouraged by the masses (Bou Nassif 2017; Taylor 2014) or even before (Albrecht and Bishara 2011; Roll 2016).

The totally different historical background of the Tunisian army, which played no significant role in the anti-colonial struggle –the UGTT did (Ayubi 1995; Perkins 2004)- has always been marginal to the national polity and its lack of economic assets of the sort of the Egyptian one, deprived it of any ambition as far as involvement in transitional politics is concerned. In this regard, its opting-out (which was not really a decision in that the option to opt-in was never offered to it) reflects the fact that the Tunisian army had nothing to gain and anything to lose from any institutional change of the sort. Yet, even though a focus on the military in Tunisia and Egypt enlightens how differences in historical traditions, political engagement and economic resources drove the different appraisals of the transition by the two armies and why they should have preferences for one outcome another, it still leaves unexplored why the Egyptian army was offered the opportunity to take-over the transition even after national parliaments were freely elected.

The only two successful military coups occurred within the 'third wave', namely those of

Nigeria and Sudan were triggered by the failure of the democratic institutions in producing a new and effective 'rule of the game' (Huntington 1991). This reading is also in line with the exploration of the *possibilities* leading the military intervention in Egypt, that are attributed to the failure of the political parties-led transitional politics (Bou Nassif 2017; Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015). The next section will deal precisely at verifying this hypothesis by looking at the behavior of the democratically elected political elites enlightening cross-countries differences in the opportunity structures offered to military intervention.

2.1.2.2 Political Parties

Despite a somehow shared conviction about the irrelevance of political parties within the transitional set ups in Tunisia and Egypt (Collombier 2013; Eyadat 2015), the investigation of the role played by political parties' elites in the two cases departs from the assumption that SCAF's intervention in Egypt would have been far less likely had the political parties inside the elected parliament found a compromised agreement on the issues they were in charge to deal with for drafting a new social and political organization, as happened in Tunisia (Bou Nassif 2017; Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015). Beyond this, the case for focusing on political parties is also theoretically grounded. Democratization studies maintain that 'political parties matter' during such process, even if they might not have played any role in producing the transition - as is the case for Tunisia and Egypt (Cavatorta 2012; Collombier 2013; Storm and Cavatorta 2018) -, because they are deemed to channel the revolutionary claims into the governing action inside representative institutions (Merkel 1998; Morlino 2011). In so doing, while satisfying the various demands of their electorate, they guarantee the proper working of democratic institutions (Huntington 1991; Morlino 2005; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Schmitter 2010). More particularly, the role of political parties within transitions is conceived as being extremely crucial for the installation of democracy if, as is the case for Tunisia and Egypt, founding elections are held to create parliaments directly or indirectly charged with writing a new constitution (Elkins 2010; Elster 1995). In this case,

the more the ability of parties to reach a consensual compromise, the more the prospects for democracy (Cross and Sorens 2016; Elster 1995; Higley and Burton 1989; Linz and Stepan 1996; Przeworski 2006).

Out of this, some scholars focus on the role played by political parties in transitional settings, and more in particular, on the reasons that hampered or encouraged the dialogue among parliamentary political parties across Tunisia and Egypt.

Central to such debate is the role of religious parties, who registered overwhelming electoral victories in both cases, and how they contribute to democratization. The analytical implications of this phenomenon are twofold. First, it reopens the debate about the compatibility of religion and democratization. Second, inasmuch as the resurgence of Islamist parties is accompanied with strong secular oppositions, it is deemed to reveal the presence of a strong identity cleavage that undermines Rustow's background condition of national unity for democratic transitions to succeed (Rustow 1970). In light of this multifaceted implications, the approaches and methods to assess the role of political parties in Tunisia and Egpyt are varying. From culturalist to political approaches, the unit of analysis of these researches shifts from the study of single parties (i.e. the Islamists) to the analysis of the overall party system. On the one hand, lot of attention has been devoted to unveil differences in the commitment of democracy between Ennadha and the FJP by looking at their party's structure and nature. On the other hand, the interactive nature of the constitution-making process induced scholars to focus on the differences in the party system as represented inside the elected parliaments.

2.1.2.2.1 Credible commitment of religious parties

The incredible success achieved by Islamists parties at the founding elections soon damped the early enthusiasms inflamed by the Arab Spring both within internal oppositions and within the international community of observers and scholars. The reasons for this disenchantment are rooted in the alleged difficulties in conciliating the political agenda of Islamist parties with the needs of democratization. To be sure this issue is not new at all but derives from the debate over the compatibility between religion, and particularly Islam, and democracy. This is so articulated and lively that an accurate account of it transcends the scope of this work. Nonetheless, according to a mere political

approach, the religious reference of Ennadha and the FJP (but also of other Salafists parties involved in politics), is deemed to be detrimental to democracy unless such parties are not able to display a credible commitment to it (L. Blaydes and Lo 2012; Kalyvas 2000; A. Stepan and Linz 2013), either following a process of gradual secularization (Bokhari and Senzai 2013; Roy 1994) or out of a process of religiously-friendly democratization (Driessen 2014; Stepan 2000), or both.

This tenet relies on both normative and empirical ground. On the one hand, the contradictory and conflictual relationship between democracy and this kind of parties is to be traced on their alleged structural incompatibility in that religious parties are conceived as bearer of an unchallenged divine truth based on a vertical relation between God and its believers who distinguish themselves from others, while democracy is based on a horizontal relationship between equal citizens, without distinctions of creed, race and the like, and their inclination to dialogue and compromise (Rawls 1993; Rosenblum 2003; Strauss 1938). On the other hand, considering the historical records of Ennadha and the FJP it is actually hard to see how their recent political programs would forecast a democratic set up.

Even though both parties trace their origins in late 1920s and 1930s with the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and its subsequent exportation across all the Muslim world, their political engagement dates back to the 1970s. In those year, the entire Arab and Islamic region witnessed the rise of political Islam, that is the emergence of "movements drawing on Islamic referents – terms, symbols and events taken from the Muslim religious tradition – in order to articulate a distinct political agenda" (Bokhari and Senzai 2013, 18) aimed at "establish[ing] some kind of an Islamic order — a religious state, Sharia law and moral codes in Muslim societies and communities" (Bayat 2013, 592). Initially, both movements – engaged in politics, but prevented to form as parties – advocated for the full implementation of the Islamic law while overtly rejecting pluralism and liberal democracy altogether. In Egypt, despite the political confrontation, and sometimes collaboration with other political forces against the regime over the years (Shehata 2010), "during the 1980s, the Brotherhood continued to push for the application of Shari'a" (Wickham 2015, 52). Even further steps toward the acceptance of pluralism during the mid-1990s, seemed to be narrower and limited than that recognized by liberal democracy "insofar as it presupposed a social consensus on the primacy of Shariʿa law"

(Wickham 2015, 69). In the same line is the evolution of Ennahda in Tunisia, which constituted as party in 1989 as the political branch of the Islamic Tunisian Movement (MTI, after its French acronym). Initially, it called for the implementation of Shari'a and rejected woman's empowerment sanctioned in Bourguiba's personal status code (Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh 1994). Despite Ennahda's journey to democratic values (Tamimi 2001), in the aftermath of Ben Ali's ousting, one of its deputy, Souad Abderrahim, affirmed that "single mothers are a shame for Tunisia"[54] and Gannouchi is still firmly convicted that there's no need for secularism[55].

Even tough through the years both parties have nominally acknowledged the "necessity" of democracy and the values of pluralism, the question of how deeply and sincerely they endorse these values is deemed to be crucial for the aims of democratization in Muslim-majority countries (Landolt and Kubicek 2014; Schwedler 2013a). This can be conceived as a religious declination of the commitment problem raised by rational choice theorists in the 1980s that poses that the survival of democratic institutions relies on the resolution of actors' coordination problems and on the capability of new-born norms and institutions to trigger the 'credible commitment' of the actors involved - either by mean of "self-enforcing pacts" or through the settlement of rules and institutions "that do not permit leeway for violating commitment" (North and Weingast 1989; Przeworski 1991, 2006; Przeworski et al. 2000; Weingast 1997). The question of credible commitment in democratization processes where religious parties are involved has been framed in Kalyvas' seminal article as follow:

> "Democracy opens the political process to actors who are opposed to it. When powerful religious parties are set to win critical elections in emerging democracies, the future of new and fragile secular and liberal democratic institutions is put in question. These parties either intend to impose theocratic authoritarian institutions or are willing to forego their objectives and subject themselves to democratic control. In the first case the outcome is certain:

[54] See: « Souad Abderrahim : les mères célibataires sont une infamie pour la société tunisienne", Tuniscope, 9 November 2011. Available at http://www.tuniscope.com/index.php/article/10155/actualites/tunisie/souad-184612#.UFIDFY3N9cQ, last access, 17 March 2017.

[55] Rachid Gannouchi, "Lecture on Secularism", CSID, Tunis, 2 March 2012.

> democratization fails, either through the full implementation of the religious party's program or through pre-emptive or reactive military action by its opponents. In the second case the outcome is uncertain: democratization may fail, but it may also succeed" (2000, 379).

According to Kalyvas, in this latter case, following Przeworski's modelling, in order to convince incumbents to open, challenging religious parties shall "signal that, once in power, they will behave moderately and will even guarantee the incumbents' material interests (property rights, rents)" (2000, 380). Nonetheless, departing from Przeworski's original modelling, the issue arising when religious parties are at stake is that "challengers' credibility is *further* undermined by their reputation for 'pious passions, strong beliefs, and inflexible values' and their ideological principles, which include (or are plausibly seen to include) the rejection of liberal democracy as a principle. Yet for democratization to proceed it is necessary (though not sufficient) for religious challengers to solve their commitment problem" (2000, 380, emphasis is the author's), as Ozzano implicitly parallels in his typology of religiously oriented parties (Ozzano 2013)

Out of it, it is widely hold that Ennadha's alleged attachment to democracy has favored the transition to democracy in Tunisia, while FJP ambiguity towards democratic principles has been detrimental for Egypt to overcome the authoritarian status quo (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015; Stepan and Linz 2013). Yet, different positions arise in identifying the causes of such attachment (or not) to democracy and its values. This debate is intimately related to the stream of studies falling under the research agenda of the 'inclusion-moderation hypothesis', from which it largely draws. Arose in the mid-2000s, the inclusion-moderation hypothesis holds that Islamist parties moderate their political agenda, thus moving from preference over a theocratic state to call for liberal democracy, whenever they are included into the political arena (Schwedler 2001, 2013b; Somer 2014; Tepe 2013). Yet, scholars contributing to this literature differ when coming to pinpoint the causal mechanism driving such moderation. Some look at the strategical moderation which eventually alters the inner nature of Islamist parties leading them to espouse the values of liberal democracy (Ly Netterstrøm 2015; Wickham 2004). Other, by contrast point to ideological revision, resulting from a process of political learning (Clark 2006; Schwedler 2011; Turam 2007), as the driving force of moderation. Accordingly, differences in the commitment to democracy between Ennadha and the FJP

are explained by recurring to either their organizational structure, that is whether this suits strategical adaptation or not, or their ideology. Such distinction, as noted by others (Tezcur 2010; Wickham 2015), is rather fictional and the burdens between strategy and ideology at some point are blurred also in light of a third line of research that highlights how strategy and ideology are indeed entangled and highly context-dependent.

For some observers, religious parties' commitment to democratic values cannot be credible unless a profound ideological revision has occurred. Following this reading, Tunisia succeeded to achieve a democratic transition because Ennahda has eventually integrated democratic values in its ideology, while Egypt's democratic breakdown is to be attributed to the inexistent ideological attachment to the values of pluralism and democracy from the part of the main religious parties, namely the FJP and Nour. This is what emerges for instance in Blaydes and Lo (2012). The authors develop Przeworki's classic model of transition by introducing civil society's preference for either democracy or theocracy. In their account, civil society's preferences for a theocratic state, embodied in religious parties' political agenda, might induce incumbents to not cede power to elected institutions in order to prevent the possible installation of a theocratic state, thus aborting the transition. Even though such account, by framing Muslim public's orientation in either/or terms, disregards the real content of regional public preferences over the type of regime which are indeed more nuanced and complex but overall supportive for both democracy and the social recognition of the importance of Islam (Jamal and Tessler 2008; M. Tessler 2003, 2010), it nonetheless centers the problem of credible commitment of religious parties by framing it in ideological terms. This view is also shared by Schwedler who points out how democratization entails not a moderation in "relative terms", but rather understood as "a substantive set of norms as well as procedures" (Schwedler 2013a, 15). Out of this reading, it can be affirmed that the Egyptian FJP had poorer credentials than the Tunisian Ennahda for it was still entrenched in old-fashioned programmatic positions hardly compatible with democracy. In this line, Bayat observes that the MB guiding the FJP is simply not in step with the times. In his account, the Arab Spring has unfolded the existence of religious movements and parties conceivable as bearers of post-Islamism, defined as "a critique of Islamism from within and without" that "hopes to mix religiosity and rights, faith and freedom (with varied

degrees), Islam and democracy" (2013, 592), with the exception of the Muslim Brothers. In his words,

> "[t]he Muslim Brothers (MB) are in the throes of a transformation, and remain in an ideological quandary. While the old guard still utters the language of Islamism and the Sharia — with some even subscribing to the ideas of the radical Sayyid Qutb — their political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, is officially committed to a civil state, and many of their youths embrace post-Islamism of the AKP type" (2013, 593).

This 'ideological quandary', which generates ideological divisions inside the MB, is deemed to be particularly salient also in the functioning of its political party, the FJP, and to the overall process of transition (Wickham 2011). That is, "the Brotherhood's efforts to carve out a new role for itself in the post-Mubarak era are complicated by the conflicting interests and priorities of its individual members and factions" (2011, 217). Within the Egyptian Islamists, internal divisions arose already from the 1980s to reach its apex in 2011 when Mubarak's ousting dramatically altered the political context offering new and varied opportunities of political engagement. In particular, according to the author, three factions contend for the control of the movement: the "da'wa faction", which is made up of elderly members with conservative ideological position but well represented at the top level of the movement; the "pragmatic conservatives", which mixed some vague notions of democracy and pluralism with the tenets of Islam; and the faction of "reformers" for whom Islam is just a normative reference and who call for the full implementation of democracy and pluralism both in the country and inside the Brotherhood itself. Even though the FJP is mainly made up of reformers and pragmatic conservatives, its close relationship with the movement – despite its declared independence- reflects such divisions on its functioning and on the public perceptions of it. On the one hand party members lack a common vision on the nature and mission of the party itself, which prevented the FJP to have a clear agenda thus making its moves in post-2011 Egypt extremely confused and incoherent. On the other hand, the public is not able to guess FJP's program or essence, that is whether it envisages the implementation

of huddud, as in Ezzat's[56] words, or rather struggle to "build up an entire society", as in Beltagui's[57] ones (Wickham 2011, 2015).

Wickham's reference to the consequences of ideological divisions on the internal structure of the MB, and, out of it, on the credibility of FJP's democratic commitment, introduces the structural explanations accounting for the different moderation, and hence credible commitment, of the Islamists parties across Tunisia and Egypt. For Kalyvas, the resolution of commitment problems depends on the structure of the religious institutions. Centralized religious institutions, such as the Catholic Church, are more suitable to help the party overcoming its commitment problems because, if deciding to recognize and embrace democracy, they furnish an official and authoritative line that won't be challenged or put into question, as happened in late 1870s Belgium (Kalyvas 1996). By contrast, in religions lacking a centralized and supreme authority, religious parties encounter more difficulties in proving their commitment to democratic values, for they might be challenged both inside and outside by self-proclaimed religious leaders (Kalyvas 2000). Paralleling this reading, the capability of Ennadha to present itself as somewhat moderate and FJP's inability to overcome its commitment problems is deemed to be a function of their internal structures (Ly Netterstrøm 2015; Wickham 2011). By contrast, through the analysis of the Tunisian constitution-making, which has been possible through Ennahda's concessions to oppositions on the field of the 'civil state', on the form of government and other religiously sensible issues such as gender equality and the sin of apostasy, Ly Netterstrøm cautions from reading such "Islamist compromise" as the result of Ennadha's ideological evolution and conceives it as rather the result of strategical calculations made possible because of Ennadha's internal structure (2015). In his account, party leaders were just interested to maintain political power thus preventing the return of persecutions toward their party and their sympathizers. The acceptance of pluralism, the call for the 'civic state' and the rejection of Shari'a resulting in the new constitution were just the price to not be ousted like the FJP in Egypt. Despite some Ennadha's grassroots members and MPs opposed such compromise, the leadership succeeded in make them digest it because of its internal organization. Far from ideological revision and

[56] Leader of the MB from August 2013
[57] FJP's General Secretary

political moderation, key and causal factors of the "Islamist compromise" were Ennahda's hierarchical structure and strong discipline stemming from decades operating underground (even though with the 2016 Party Congress structural changes occurred to make the party more open) combined with the presence of a leader, Rachid Gannouchi, who is at the same time a religious authority and a political leader. Confronting with this configuration, Ly Netterstrøm concludes that "in Tunisia, Islamists did not learn a new point of view; rather, their leaders decided to adopt a new view, and pressured members to do the same" (2015, 120). Such way was simply precluded in the case of the MB's FJP which was divided along ideological leanings. Hence, much like appended in 1991 Algeria, in 2011 Egypt there were simply too many voices from the FJP speaking in the name of the 'true' political and this prevented it to prove (or at least to simulate) its commitment to democracy. While the findings of this work will confirm the saliency of the different resolution of the commitment problems across Tunisia and Egypt, they also put forward that it has little to do with the parties' internal structures. Hence, it might be the case for focusing on a more relational understanding of Islamists parties' moderation that focus on the features of the whole party system.

2.1.2.2.2 Polarization of the party system

Debates and revisions of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis agree on the contextual nature of religious parties' moderation and maintain that the overall political system influences both parties' strategy and ideology, those latter being in a continuous interplay (Driessen 2014; Schwedler 2013a; Somer 2011). In particular, recent contributions underline the saliency of political institutions and the broader political context (Pahwa 2017; Schwedler 2013a; Somer 2014; Tepe 2013). When coming to transition processes, characterized by institutional flux, Schwedler notes that "[t]he overall logic of moderation may prevail during elections and in the immediate moths that follow, when winning large blocks may require appealing to a wider constituency. But between elections, when debates over the role of the judiciary, the substance of the constitution, the independence of oversight institutions and so on are in full force, incentives for cooperation with other actors may be less than the inclusion-moderation hypothesis would imagine" (Schwedler 2013a). In her reading, then, moderation does not necessary equate with democratization

unless this latter entail religious parties' ideological revision leading to a genuine and deep commitment to democracy. Departing from such deterministic view, Driessen argues that democratization "in relatively homogeneous religious societies where opposition to liberal democracy has been casted in religious terms" (2014, 62) is more likely to occur at the presence of i) religiously friendly institutions – that is that favour religion, and ii) multiparty electoral politics. The former triggers religious elites' support for democracy and incentivizes religious individuals to participate in elections. The second predicts the moderation of religious parties as theorized by the inclusion-moderation hypothesis (ibid.). Driessen's account recasts the inclusion-moderation hypothesis by identifying the institutional incentives outlined by the such stream of studies in Stepan's "twin tolerations", defined as "the minimal boundaries of freedom of action that must somehow be crafted for political institutions vis-à-vis religious authorities, and for religious individuals and groups vis-à-vis political institutions" (2000, 37). Yet, for an agreement to occur upon such "minimal boundaries" or the aforementioned "religiously-friendly institutions", that can be conceived as a preliminary and integral part of the constitutional agreement, a process of approaching between the parties involved – that is Schwedler's understanding of moderation or Linz and Stepan's notion of "common ground" (2013) – is necessary inasmuch as ideological distance between them hampers any kind of agreed compromise (North and Weingast 1989; Tsebelis 2002).

Out of this reading, instead of focusing on the varying resolutions of religious parties' commitments problems, some scholars look instead on the differences in the polarization of the party systems, that is the ideological distance between the political parties (Sartori 1976), in Tunisia and Egypt seeing in it the main causal explanations for the difference in the transition outcome. Even though political polarization might be rightly conceived as resulting from the absence of religious parties' moderation (Tepe 2013), the focus of these analyses does not revolves on the investigation of religious parties' adhesion to liberal democracy but rather on the ideological distance among parties concurring to the formation of national party systems and on the implications it has on the processes of transition.

By examining the transitions in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, Lesch observes that the major difference between the three cases accounting for different transitions path is the degree

of inclusiveness of the new government, which is conceived as the consequences of the degree of polarization among the political parties involved. Increasing levels of polarization are deemed to foster lower levels of transitional government inclusivity which pose a serious threat for its legitimacy and the prospects for democratization (Lesch 2014). In her reading then, the presence of a coalition government in Tunisia is a signal of low ideological polarization and enhances the success of a transition to democracy. By contrast, Morsi's heavy-handed government, entirely made up of Muslim Brothers, paved the way for popular discontent leading "Egypt [to veer] to the opposite extreme" (Lesch 2014, 72), namely to the exclusion and the harsh of the Brotherhood, following the military coup, which nonetheless represents an important and consistent segment of the Egyptian society. Paralleling this argument, but transposing it within the constitution-making process, Cross and Sorens (2016) conceive polarization as a predictor of constitution's making style and content. In particular, the authors examine the level of inclusion within the drafting of the constitution and the constitutional provisions to limit (or not) the executive power. Both aspects are particularly telling about the prospects of democracy in transitional setting. Inclusion in the constitution making is deemed to predict the durability of the constitution itself, as constitutional provisions empowering or constraining the government affect the durability of the new democratic polity (Linz 1990). Cross and Sorens' study reveals that political polarization, measured in terms of presence of "extreme Islamist party of nontrivial size" (2016, 1297), is higher in Egypt than in Tunisia and such difference is at the heart of the different transitional outcomes observed. As a matter of fact, Tunisia was found to have the least ideological polarization and this fostered an inclusive constitution making whereby constitutional provisions related to the exercise of the governing authority pose limits on it. In Egypt, by contrast, high polarization due to the presence of the "more radical Muslim Brotherhood join[ing] with extreme Salafists" (Cross and Sorens 2016, 1302), is at the heart of an exclusive process of constitution making and of constitutional provisions imposed by such factions aimed empowering the government "to defend themselves against present and future political opponents" (2016, 1295).

Differences in levels of political polarization between the two countries have been considered as salient also in Linz and Stepan's account (2013). Yet, contrary to Cross and Sorens, in their account polarization is not much the result of the presence or absence of

the Salafist parties inside elected representative institutions, but rather, partially recalling Schwedler's contributions, it is the result of the absence of dialogue between the FJP and its secular counterparts on the kind of those occurring among Ennadha and the other left/secular oppositions in the years preceding the Arab Spring. Instances of such common ground between Islamists and Secularists in Tunisia are the 2003 "Call for Tunis" and "2005 18 October Coalition for Right and Freedom" (Resta 2013; Stepan and Linz 2013). As this work will show, while having no clear effects on the party system's polarization, these experiences proved incredibly precious in determining the success of the Tunisian transition. Why then, oppositions forces under Ben Ali managed to dialogue already before the transition, while this didn't occur in Mubarak's Egypt? Some answers to this question are provided below by introducing another stream of explanations that approach democratic transitions from a structuralist approach and will be further developed in the last chapter.

2.1.3 Socio-economic determinants

Modernization theory, which grounded the scholarly agenda of democratization studies before the advent of transitology, has also played a role in accounting for the transitional outcomes following the Arab Uprisings of 2011. Out of this reading, democracy is conceived not much as the accidental result of actors' strategic interactions, but rather as an endogenous outcome to specific sets of conditions stemming from human development, i.e. modernization. In this reading, "economic development, involving industrialization, urbanization, high educational standards, and a steady increase in the overall wealth of society, is a basic condition sustaining democracy" (Lipset 1959, 86). As another scholarship has helped to acknowledge, the causal link between economic development and democracy is mediated by changes produced within the fabric of society and its relationship with the state. These changes, measured through the structure of the economic system (North and Weingast 1989), the level of inequality (Kuznets 1995), the formation of a middle class (Lipset 1959), the level of education (Glaeser, Porta, and Shleifer 2004), the presence of intermediary organizations and institutions (Lipset 1959; Putnam 1993), the rise of a democratic culture (Putnam 1993) or as the sum of all these

(Cutright 1963; Przeworski et al. 2000), alters individual values and beliefs "which in turn lead to the growing public demands for civil and political liberties, gender equality, and responsive government, helping to establish and sustain the institutions best suited to maximize human choice – in a word, democracy" (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

In line with this understanding, some authors argue that the different transitions in Tunisia and Egypt are to be attributed to the different socio-economic structures present in those countries. Is do doing, each of such contributions focus on the "crucial intervening variables" that, when altered favorably by economic development, are deemed to "produce or facilitate democracy", namely political culture, civil society class structure and state-society relations (L. Diamond 1992, 487).

The varying effects of different levels of socio-economic development across the two countries on civil society and, as consequence, on the political system, are shown by Brownlee and others (2015). In their reading, the Egyptian democratic breakdown is not to be attributed to the "military centrality" - which in their account "is less an explanation for the coup of 2013 than (at best) an intermediate variable in a longer causal chain" (2015, 194). Rather, differences in transitions' outcomes are to be attributed different levels of economic development. In particular, "urbanization and industrialization" are deemed to trigger the development of "associational infrastructures on which leftist parties are based" thus leading to a more articulated and pluralistic civil society which in turn expresses a seemingly plural political society (ibid.). The hypothesis presented relies in the attribution of different democracy-prone political orientations across the two countries, measured by the level of support for the enactment of the Islamic law, to different level of underdevelopment, measured as the percentage of population living in urban areas (ibid., 207-209). This argumentation expands the findings of a previous work of one of the authors, Masoud, who explained the Islamists dominion in post-2011 Egypt as a function of organizational advantages offered to them by underdevelopment (2014). This latter is conducive to the "Islamist dominion" trough two different but deeply entangled mechanisms. On the one hand, underdevelopment limits the ability of voters to choose by making them susceptible to vote buying, clientelism and patronage. On the one hand, underdevelopment, characterized by the "strong presence of agrarian workforce and informal sector" is also responsible for the fact "the associational landscape confronting Egyptian political parties at the end of Mubarak's rule was one dominated by

traditional forms of collective life, rooted in the family and in the faith" (Masoud 2014, 167). The stemming unbalance between Islamists and their opponents resulting in the transitional party system is the result of unbalanced organizational opportunities which made Islamists, who easily embedded in the pre-existent associational life described above, able to approach citizens in ways other parties couldn't thus altering individuals' perceptions about parties' positioning on the real salient issue, that is the economic one. Therefore, even though Egyptian voters, as others with Masoud have shown (Çarkoğlu, Krouwel, and Yıldırım 2013; M. Tessler 2011), are supportive for redistributive measures of the kind prompted by leftist parties but not by Islamists, they nonetheless voted for this latter for no other reason that these latter were able to reach them in way the left couldn't, thus impairing the stemming party system by depriving it of genuine pluralism.

As far as society's class structure is concerned, economic development is deemed to bring to the fore two important democratizing social classes: the middle and the working class, even though there's no agreement upon which of the two is the primary driver to democracy. For mainstream modernization theorists, the middle class is deemed to be crucial for democratization inasmuch as it is well-educated thus bearing democracy-prone attitudes and beliefs (Huntington 1991; Moore 1965). For other, it matters only inasmuch as it possesses a credible exit threat when incumbent's survival derives from part of their revenues, of course in the form of taxation (North and Weingast 1989). Coming to the case of Tunisia and Egypt, middle classes are deemed to account for the crisis of the previous authoritarian regime (Diwan 2013; Hinnebusch 2015d; Kandil 2012b), yet little contributions are present in explaining how they matter in explaining the different outcomes of the transitions. If Anderson (2011) argued that Tunisia enjoyed a larger middle class than other countries from which the transition would have benefit, no account on how this happened was rather furnished. Merone (2015) addresses the salience of the middle class in bargain a new institutional change in Tunisia, but he sees it as a depart revolutionary claims. In line with Achcar (2013), in his reading, the compromise between Ennadha and its rivals was a way to include the Islamic middle-class within the ruling power that that nonetheless hijacked a proper democratization in that the lower classes that provoked the transition, were still left on the margins. Nonetheless, if the Tunisia transition succeeded, this was due to the ability of middle class to sideline the real bulk of change incarnated by the revolutionary youth and workers.

Quite on the opposite, Allinson (2015) explains the different outcomes across Tunisia and Egypt in terms of trade union's strength inside each specific country during the entire process of transition. Drawing from Rueschemeyer et. al, according to which the working class is the more consistent force pushing for democracy for its social embedment and its organizational capacities make it the guarantor of inclusion within the poliarchy (1992), he investigates whether different balance of power between the working class and others can account for different transition paths in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria. By so doing, he attributes the success of the Tunisian transition to the centrality of the working class and the failure of the Egyptian one to the relative weakness of organized labor movements vis-à-vis other forces. Such difference of power relies in the different economies of the two countries. While in Tunisia the UGTT was high in membership and widespread because socialism was followed by the "circuit of European Capital" (Allinson 2015, 301), in Egypt the labor unions were ore marginal because "Egypt's formally employed and organized working class is still a minority compared to the informal sector and those in vulnerable employment" (ibid. 305). Hence, while the Egyptian organized labor was mashed between the remnants of the deep-state and the Islamists, UGTT's social significance allowed it to mobilize protesters, purge the ruling party, call for the elections of the National Constituent Assembly, represents the interests of revolutionaries and broke the National Dialogue thus ensuring the success of the transition.

Taken together, all these contributions seem to agree to modernization theory's pillar that "the simple—and perhaps, discouraging—fact is that if one had wished at the Arab Spring's outset to predict which of our […] cases of regime breakdown would become a democracy, mere reference to gross developmental indicators (such as per capita income) would probably have been sufficient" (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 210). True enough, Tunisia enjoyed a better socio-economic environment than Egypt. Yet, luckily for richness of democratization studies, things are not always so deterministic in that democracy succeeded to be the only game in town also in cases modernization studies wouldn't concede it. Countries like India, Benin, Costa Rica and partially also Muslim-majority Indonesia, are examples of successful democratization despite poor showing in all relevant indicators, in some cases even poorer than Egypt. Then, not only the level of development cannot predict the feasibility of democracy, as already shown elsewhere (Beblawi 1987; L. Diamond 1992; Luciani 1995; Ross 1999), but there are also good

reasons to doubt the forecasting power of the democracy-'favorable' changes economic development is deemed to provoke. First, empirical studies have downsized the role of political culture in fostering democracy by showing that what scholars refer to as 'civic culture', intending for it a set of individual attitudes and beliefs conducive to democracy, indeed doesn't exists, nor there is a univocal relationship between a democratic-prone political culture and democracy in that the former seems to be a consequence of the latter. Second, the so-called democratizing social classes have been put in question by Bellin who proved how "the capital and the labor are *contingent* democrats" (Bellin 2000, 178) intending that both the labor unions and the bourgeoisie support democracy only if they see in it a preservation of their interests. In this sense, it is not really determinant the level of economic development, but rather by whom, how, and in favor of whom this is managed.

Only by enlightening these aspects will capital and labor's interests be assessed. Economic and capitalist development in the Arab region, with no exception for Tunisia and Egypt, was driven – paraphrasing Smith – by the very visible hand of the incumbent dictators and used to reward some segments of the society while punishing others with the ultimate aim of preserve and consolidate their power. So, while economic development may have modified the fabric of the involved societies, as modernization theory holds, such changes won't necessarily be those described by modernization theory, nor go in the direction it predicts (Allinson 2015; Angrist 2013; Cavatorta and Haugbølle 2012; Hibou 2011; Kandil 2012b; Penner Angrist 1999). In particular, the economic liberalization started at the end of the 1970s has not been genuinely "paralleled by the expansion of civil society" (Bill and Springborg 1994, 450) tout court. Rather, it was coupled with the expansions of only those segments serving the maintenance of a changed ruling coalition by mean of a new 'social pact'. While this aspect centers one of the crucial intervening variables identified by Diamond (1992), namely that of state-society relations, studies on this direction depart from the paradigm of democratization and constitute the bulk of a diametrically different understanding, namely the paradigm of the authoritarian resilience or, otherwise called, that of post-democratization.

2.2 THE PARADIGM OF POST-DEMOCRATIZATION STUDIES

As it happens with scientific revolutions, the paradigm of post-democratization studies was born out of the accumulations of explanations to the 'Arab exceptionalism' in resisting democracy despite the apparent introduction of political and economic liberalization. In spite of searching for what ought to be, as proponents of democratization studies did, these scholars rather accounted for what 'in fact is' (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004).

Truly enough, from the late 1970s and with new vigor in mid 1980s, the regimes of the MENA region underwent a series of structural adjustments that entailed an increase in the levels of inclusion and competition. Constitutional changes, new laws and organs were put in place with the declared aim of safeguarding democratic and liberal prerogatives. Remarkable in those years was the creation of Constitutional courts, the expansion of civil society and the call of regular and pluralistic elections. Yet such overtures entailed nonetheless a "net loss of liberties" (Allal 2009; Bianchi 1989; Maghraoui 2002; Perkins 2004; L. Sadiki 2002; Salloukh et al. 2015) and were in no case conducive to some kind of poliarchy. Constitutional guarantees were actually empty shells, manipulated from above or disbanded (Kienle 2000). The growth of civil society was maneuvered from above as part of a "new tactic of control" whereby incumbents "could reassert power and slake dissension by granting concession too mild to produce systemic change, but hefty enough to merit symbolic applause at home and abroad" (Yom 2005, 23). Finally, on the same line is the introduction of plural elections. Through the "menu of manipulation" aimed at breaking the chain of democratic choice (Schedler 2002), the appointment at the ballot box served to co-opt oppositions, provide information about the relative strength of the ruling party, and guarantee external legitimacy. On the one hand, party laws were majorly directed at excluding from competition the major opposition by denying them the right to constitute as a political party (Kienle 2000; Lust-Okar 2005; Schedler 2002). On the other hand, "creative elections" were engineered to grant incumbents easy victories through gerrymandering, malapportionment, by enhancing the competitive advantages of the ruling party, and by recurring to corruption and violence at the ballot box means (Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta 2010; Lust-Okar 2005; Posusney 2002; Schedler 2002, 2006; Shehata 2010). As last resort, in the case the

electoral engineering would not produce the expected outcome, electoral results were manipulated (Herb 2004; Schedler 2002), or the elected bodies overthrown as happened in 1989 Algeria.

In light of these new findings, which were off the light of democratization studies, contrary to the "democracy-spotters" (Valbjørn 2012) post-democratization scholars don't conceive this liberalization as intermediate step toward democracy. Rather they see it as part of the authoritarian upgrading to "respond aggressively to the triple threat of globalization, markets and democratization" (Heydemann 2007, 3). Out of this new understanding, the outcome of this upgrading has been called in several ways, such as upgraded authoritarianism (ibid.), competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2002) or electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2006). As those definitions suggest, instead of apprehending the regimes in the "grey zone" (Carothers 2002) as defective democracies, such students emphasize their continuity with the authoritarian regimes defined by Linz as a "political systems with limited, not responsible political pluralism […] without intensive nor extensive political mobilization […] and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones" (1964: 297 in Bronwlee 2007: 26). The reason of this continuity is due to the fact that "Arab regimes, simply changed their co-optative strategies: they shifted from allocative to inclusionary co-optation […] with the aim of either widening a regime's power base or directly controlling society" (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004, 383). Indeed, like full autocracies, these grey-zone regimes still rely on a sophisticated mix of "distributive-driven" legitimation and repression. Yet, differently from full autocracies, such hybrid regimes serve themselves of liberal institutions to pursue their survival in order to appease internal oppositional and please international oobservers.

According to this understanding, the results produced by the Arab Spring – which only in Tunisia was conducive to democracy – have been understood in terms of regime's capacities to resist the quest for democracy, by pointing to either the structural configuration or to the mechanisms underneath them. To be sure, such research interest is not that alien to democratization studies. Already some twenty years ago, Linz and Stepan noted that "the characteristics of the previous regimes have profound implications for the transition *paths* available and the *tasks* different countries face when they begin their struggle to develop consolidated democracies" (1996, emphasis in original). While

it is still too early to deal with how structures affect the consolidation in Tunisia, drawing from this lesson, and imbuing it with more historical institutionalism, exponents of post-democratization studies agree that the characteristics of the previous regimes account for much of the variation of the transitional paths in the region by means of mechanisms of path dependency and social reproduction of previous norms. Out of such understanding, the centrality of the military, the capabilities of political parties to reach a compromised agreement over the rules of the game, are all functions –influencing each other- of the previous authoritarian regime's structures. More precisely, the different role played by the military or political parties in Tunisia and Egypt accounted for as independent causal variables by proponents of democratization studies, is here presented as an intermediate variable within a longer causal chain. Yet explanations diverge depending on whether the focus of analysis falls on the structures or the mechanisms of the previous authoritarian regime and whether their effects are deemed to be direct or mediated by other factors.

2.2.1 Degree and form of stateness

More obviously, differences in the structures of the previous authoritarian regime, drawn from the paradigm of authoritarian resilience, have been more often invoked to explain differences of revolutionary outcomes. Facing the Arab Uprising, it was found that monarchies and/or rentier state were better positioned than the republics to survive. But how structures can account for the diverging path of the transitional republics?

From mere configurational accounts, the answers to this question vary depending on wehther the focus is on the form or the degree of previous regimes' stateness. The first aspect refers to the organization of regime's structures; the second relates to their complexity, their expansion and their embeddedness within the state and the society (Brownlee 2007; Heydemann 2016; Migdal 1988; Schlumberger 2007).

Taking in consideration the form of the previous regimes' structures, Stacher (2011, 2012a, 2015) furnishes an account of the role of the military that departs from an agency-based approach and falls under an institutionalist one. In so doing, he ascribes SCAF' intervention to institutional continuity made possible by the structural configuration of the Egyptian regime before 2011. In his reading, SCAF's intervention was aimed at

"gaining veto power over the transition to ensure that no substantive change to Egypt's system occurs" (2011). Hence, through Suleiman's announcement of Mubarak's deposition, far from initiating a process of democratic transition, "the military salvaged the regime" (Stacher 2012a, 158). If this could be the case, it was because the centralized lines of the executive authority constituting the governing power allowed changes in the ruling coalition thus producing "a structural change to the regime rather than a regime change" (Stacher 2012a, 160), which now relies on state violence more than ever (Stacher 2015) in perfect line with what predicted by the scholarly tradition of authoritarian resilience. As a matter of fact, this argumentation adapts Brownlee's (2002, 2007) findings accounting for the authoritarian persistence in the MENA region. Writing before the Arab Spring, he noticed that the structures supporting single-party regimes allowed the management of internal elite-conflicts and were able to absorb newcomers, thus securing regime's survival. However, both Tunisia and Egypt were single-party regimes governed through a highly centralized executive authority, so this explanation cannot account for the variations observed in 2013. Nonetheless, Stacher's finding is certainly true, yet is was not the centralization of power per se that allowed the SCAF to control the transition, but rather Egypt's high level of bureaucratization. This is the suggestion stemming from studies concerned with the degree of stateness.

If the aforementioned contributions conceive the military as an institution itself concurring to the regime set-up as whole, other accounts see it as a transitional actor whose strategies are influenced by its power position within the previous regime, which is an ultimate function of different levels of structural development. For Heydemann (2016), the SCAF in Egypt was one of the political elites engaged in a power struggle for the control of the state and the power itself, the same kind of conflict occurring in Tunisia. Following this premise, he argues that the political elite in Tunisia managed to compromise because "no single element of the PRE [political relevant elite] possessed the coercive or bureaucratic resources to govern on its own. All elements of the PRE preferred compromise that preserved the state and the potential for further democratization instead of defection, conflict and potential state collapse" (Heydemann 2016, 198), while in Egypt, this possibility was precluded because the military, strong of its command over the "coercive and bureaucratic resources" (ibid.), preferred to defect from a ruling coalition with others political forces and impose the rules of the game by

itself (Kandil 2012b). Yet, SCAF's power advantage deriving from its control over the coercive and bureaucratic resources would be insufficient for the control of the transition, if these were few. Indeed, it has also been argued that the regime survival is more likely where personal authority of the ousted dictator is relatively lower than regime's bureaucratic capabilities (Andersen et al. 2014). In this regard Egypt outperforms Tunisia. In the former country the state apparatus, included the armed forces, was far more developed than in the latter. With particular regard to the armed forces, some link the saliency of the Egyptian military, both in terms of economic resources and popular prestige, to the process of state formation. Hinnebusch (2015b), for instance, goes back to the process of independence from the colonial rule. Even though both countries instantiated cases of national independence by revolution (Gelvin 2004), while the Free Officers' revolutions of 1952 rendered the military a central player in the Egyptian polity and proposed it in common imaginary as an agent of change, the smoothed process of Tunisian independence led by Bourguiba left the army apart from the heroic national narrative and therefore more marginal to following polity. Therefore, following the departure of the previous dictators, the Egyptian army could count on an historical, popular and even economic prestige to – in case- propose itself as the guardian against the turmoil that lacked to the Tunisian one. It is indeed a shared conviction that the degree of elite conflicts, coupled with mass mobilization protests, was as high in Egypt as in Tunisia in the summer 2013. Yet, the presence of an army people and political elite can "count on" precipitated the things in Egypt, while its absence in Tunisia pushed the political elite to dialogue under the aegis of the UGTT that some, for its centrality, compared to the Egyptian army (Hinnebusch 2015a; De Smet 2014). In Hinnebusch words, "in Egypt the split between secular and Islamist civil/political society restored a certain capacity for the army-led 'deep state' to balance between them and position itself as the guardian of order appealing to a population tired of constant turmoil" (Hinnebusch 2015a), while "the unpoliticised Tunisian military lacked the ambition to use the crises to assert dominance" (ibid.).

Out of these findings, two considerations emerge. First, departing from a regime survival approach – which Heydemann and Hinnebusch himself contributed to affirm in the past (Heydemann 2007; Hinnebusch 2005) – in this kind of accounts a regime change is assumed. Therefore, the effects of structures are not as straightforward as Stacher and

other assume, but are rather indirect inasmuch as they influence actors' strategic behavior in the aftermath of regime collapse, more in line with the transitology approach. Second, Hinnebusch's contribution suggests that one thing is to speak about the presence or absence of the remnants of the deep state such as the military or the previous dictator-friendly courts, for which these contributions account. Pretty different thing is investigating the reasons why transitional actors should activate them or giving them the chances to restore their role as arbiters or guardians of the political and public order, as happened Egypt in 2012, when PMs remitted to the court a political problem, or with the 2013 military coup. To answer this question, attention should shift from the structures to the mechanisms underpinning the previous authoritarian regimes.

2.2.2 Mechanisms underneath previous authoritarianisms

In line with the aforementioned accounts, also for Brumberg (2013) the different outcomes observed in Tunisia are attributed to different degree of presence of the remnants of the authoritarian regime within the transition. Yet, these are here conceived as intervenient variables at the service of transitional actors' tendency of reproducing, through their behavior, the mechanisms providing for the protection racket-politics on which all Arab regimes rely. This kind of politics consists in the deliberate use of state violence, political and economic exclusion, or the threat to, toward some groups of the civil society, while protecting others, to consolidate the authoritarian rule (Tilly 1985; Wilson 2015). Following the ousting of the incumbent dictator, transitional actors – be them elected party elites or minority groups – are more concerned to secure their protection, that means inclusion into the new political system, than establishing a democratic rule. This trend was more evident in the Egyptian case but was nonetheless observable in the Tunisian one. In the former, some scholars see it at work following the downfall of Mubarak, in the efforts of the varying political forces, MB and young revolutionaries included, to cherish a deal with the army whenever their political positioning or their vey prerogatives were not granted (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015; De Smet 2014). In the latter, some see an instance of this replicative trend in the final agreement between Ennahda and Nidaa at conclusion of the 2013 National Dialogue.

Contrary to the wishful thinking surrounding the Tunisian experience, this "bargained competition" (Boubekeur 2016) was not aimed at giving the country a democratic governance but rather to secure the major competing forces, i.e. the Islamists and the remnants of the old ruling group represented by Nidaa, their mutual integration in the new political system. On the one hand, political rivalry was activated within electoral campaign to secure institutional integration. On the other hand, it "was downplayed in the name of consensus when it became a risk to inclusion" (ibid. 119). Even if doubts might arise upon the sufficiency of such kind of pacts for the sake of democracy (Achcar 2013), it is nonetheless true that Tunisia is at least in possession of one necessary condition for the survival of democracy, while Egypt doesn't.

What accounts for the ability of Tunisian opposition forces to join forces to cast a compromised agreement on both a roadmap and on a democratic constitution, and the unwillingness of Egyptian opposing forces to the same? In Brumberg's reading, the structural legacies of the authoritarian regime account as *external incentives* at compromise-making. As in other readings, in his account, deep-state exponents' control over the transition in Egypt is deemed to be the consequence of the failure of previous opposing factions to compromise, due to the entrenchment of the previous racket-politics expressed by the extension and the complexity of the security system (Brownlee et al. 2013; Brumberg 2013; Hinnebusch 2015a; Stepan and Linz 2013). Out of tautology, the more and more complex the security system of the 'deep state', the lesser the inclination of the political elite at staking a compromise to challenge it.

So, what about the *inner proneness* of the transitional political elite to compromise? After all, the greater the proneness of transitional actors at compromise, the little the influence of external incentives. Even though the causal relationship pinpointed by Brumberg's is not entirely satisfying, he nonetheless unfolds a central aspect that others overlook and that will be developed in this thesis, namely that the mechanisms through which the previous regimes secured their survival continue to exert their influence within transitional settings by means of political elite's behavior. To better enlighten this facet, the theoretical framework proposed by Lust (2005) is particularly useful. In her account different patterns of government-oppositions relations not only affect the relationship between these two factions, but have also important consequences for the relationships between the various opposition groups. Interestingly enough, thus far no contribution

aimed at grasping the different outcomes of the Arab Spring draw from such theoretical framework to advance hypotheses or proposing possible explanations. This contribution tries to fulfill this gap by showing how different patterns of government-opposition relations determine the proneness of previous opposition groups at compromising in transitions from authoritarian rule thus influencing the prospects for democracy.

2.3 BEYOND THE INTER-PARADIGM DEBATE

With the aim of enlightening one particular aspect of the transitions in Tunisia and Egypt thus far overlooked, this research mixes two scholarly traditions deemed to be incompatible before 2011, but which are now gradually approaching. To be sure, the Arab Spring has initiated a process of 'soul searching' among the whole academic community because neither the at-that-time-silenced defenders of the democratization approach, nor the proponents of post-democratization studies predicted this event or reported signs of imminent change in the area. Yet, this is not a sufficient reason to get rid of both paradigms altogether, as some invite to do. Indeed, if many scholars propose a shallow mix between these extreme positions, others opt for a return to the year zero in the study of Arab politics. In this regard Valbjørn understands current developments in the region as a multi- dimensional re-politicization of Arab politics. In his opinion, the (re)emergence of political structures of mobilization, participation and representation, along with (re)emerging problems of statehood and nationhood should lead scholars to rediscover the classic debate and to reopen 'old toolboxes' in order to (re)investigate these grand themes of classical political science (Valbjørn 2015). Rightly enough, Valbjørn sees in the Arab uprisings an opportunity not only to synthetize and upgrade the two contending literatures, but also to exit the particularism of Arab studies, and in particular of post-democratization studies, by placing them into a "genuine science of politics" (Valbjørn 2015, 219). Yet, there is little reason to believe that this is achieved by coming back to the 'basic questions' of political science while dismissing the literature 'reduced mainly to topics of democratization and authoritarian resilience' (*ibidem*). Indeed, both approaches rely on such 'basic questions' and long-standing and consolidated traditions

of the ‘genuine’ (sic) political science. On the one hand, post-democratization studies deal with changes in the amount and dispersion of power to deal with political change in traditional polities. On the other hand, democratization studies deal with problems of political coordination and institutions-making. So the ‘basic questions’ are already there. In light of the precious and inalienable corpus of literature, the research agenda here proposed undertakes the “challenge of synthesis” (Brynen et al. 2012) invoked by most scholars of Arab politics.

3 DEMAND OF REPRESENTATION, POWER RESOURCES AND PARTIES' AGENCY: POLITICAL PARTIES IN TRANSITION PROCESSES

Despite the different patterns undertook by the transitional experiences in Tunisia and Egypt, it is unquestionable that the process of installation constitutes itself as a crossroad. This latter has been defined as the "devolution of power from a group of people to a set or rule" and represent the decisive step for democracy to come about. Its analytical discovery as an independent transitional sub-process is quite new but provides a useful starting point for the research of the factors accounting for the variations across the two countries. Within this phase, political parties appear as crucial actors but the concept of agency informing actor-centric explanations must be reappraised in order to fully account for their nature as 'intermediate institutions' between the governing apparatus and citizens. Political parties are at once the decision makers on the more salient issues regulating the exercise of power and the life of people, but they are also the incubators of political demands stemming from the civil society. In this regard, their functions are usually divided between the governing and the representative ones and the two are mutually influencing. Within transitions, when analyzing parties' agency in the fulfillment of their governing functions, their representative agency should be accounted for as informing it. Simply put, the way political parties structure the political space, by politicizing pre-existent social divisions, highly determines what they can or cannot do once elected. From this reading, parties' choice to cooperate or not with others to find an 'agreed compromised' within the phase of installation is the result of the interplay among i) pre-existent social divisions; ii) their power resources and iii) their ideological positioning.

Out of this acknowledgement, the structures and mechanisms underneath previous authoritarian regimes, enlightened by post-democratization studies, are extremely relevant for at least two reasons. On the one hand, they represent the context whereby the political learning of parties active in 2011-2013 occurred, which is at the base of their ideological positioning. On the other hand, they constituted the opportunity structures available to parties which are determinant for their power resources. This is not to say

that previous regimes do not have any role in casting the social divisions parties have to do with once they collapse. Quite on the contrary. Yet, for the shake of regime transitions, what ultimately counts is how these are politicized at the time of the founding elections, which is a function of parties' signaling game on the base of their political learning.
This formulation has a twofold advantage. First, it provides a consistent explanation to the research question of why transitions in Tunisia and Egypt followed different paths. Second, and more importantly, it combines the synergies stemming from the two competing paradigms of democratization and post-democratization studies into a unique account.

3.1 TRANSITIONS AT CROSSROADS: DEFINING INSTALLATIONS

3.1.1 The necessity of installations

As illustrated in the previous chapter, scholars explain the different outcomes of the transition from authoritarian rule in Tunisia and Egypt by alternatively pinpointing to actor-centric or structural factors. Nonetheless, as saw, independently from the kind of explanations, it is a fact that transitional patterns in Tunisia and Egypt took different directions during the 'constitutive' phase. In the first case, the elected political elite managed to find an agreed compromise. In the second case the 'democratic maintenance' has aborted under the inability of the elected representatives to find an agreed compromise upon the rules game. Without falling into the teleological determinism blamed on democratization studies (Anderson 2006), a review of recurring patterns and recurring mechanisms informing this specific sub process of the transition where Tunisia succeeded and Egypt failed, that is the installation phase, may unfold key analytical aspects allowing to strike a balance between competing explanations.
In the mainstream scholarly understanding, the broad process of democratization is treated as the result of three distinct processes having different scopes and responding to diverse underlying mechanisms: transition, installation and consolidation. The first refers

to the interval between one political regime and another, the second denotes the introduction of democratic institutions and procedures, and the third is the process by which these are internalized and unchallenged. According to this conceptualization, installation only refers to the turning-point moment between the two other phases. The rare appearance of this term in the main treaties of democratization, where scholars prefers to speak of 'regime completion', 'democratization' or 'constitution' instead (Linz and Stepan 1996; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991), testifies the reported lack of analytical distinctiveness and autonomy imputed to installation. This understanding was the result of a (really successful) attempt of theory-building stemming from the empirics of transitions from authoritarian rule in Southern Europe and Latin America, where "installation [was] short ad very difficult to distinguish form transition" (Morlino 2015, 18). Even following findings stemming from democratization in Eastern Europe, wherein the sub process of installation was more articulated and the constitution-making caught the attention of prominent scholars (Elster 1995; Geddes 1998; Reynolds 2002), didn't alter this theorization. By contrast, the different reappraising of the notion of installation is one of the major analytical implications stemming from the more recent processes of transitions in the Arab World.

Already in 2010, Capoccia and Zimblatt expressed the need "to systematically analyze *the historical episodes in which democratic institutions were created or substantially reshaped*" (2010, 934; emphasis is in original). In their work, the lexicon of historical institutionalism – e.g. path dependence, sequencing and critical juncture – enters in the study of democratization. The stemming methodology, informed by Arab transitions' empirics, is more attentive to the unfolding of the different sub-processes and their direction of causality requiring students to analyze episodes of institutional change in different arenas and shaped by historical legacies (Ahmed and Capoccia 2014). In the same lime, Morlino has recently proposed to conceive installations as "different, alternative or possibly subsequent process with respect to liberalization", i.e. the initial moment of transition (Morlino 2011, 86). If the very definition of transition temporally and analytically expands from the fall of the previous regime, thus departing from its crises, to the settlement of another, the installation phase only refers to its sub process concerned with the building of new regimes' structures, therefore relying on different actors and mechanisms from the other phases of democratization (Morlino 2011, 2015;

Przeworski 1991). More precisely, for Morlino it "involves the complete expansion and genuine recognition of civil and political rights; where necessary, the full civilianizing of society; the emergence of a number of parties and a party system, but also of collective interests' groups such as unions and other organizations; and the drawing up and adoption of the principal democratic procedure and institutions that will characterize the regime" (2011, 86). However, for others installation only coincides with the constitution-making process, or some sort of institutional arrangement of the kind, out of the acknowledgment that the establishment of structures and institutions characterizing the new regime has been often arranged among a small, and in some case non-elected, political elite while nonetheless bringing to successful democratizations, as the American case shows (Elster 1995; Landau 2012; Merkel 1998). Indeed, while the complete expansion of full-fledged political and civil liberties, the organization of collective interests and the emergence of parties and party systems can be attained also within the subsequent phase of democratic consolidation, as many studies showed (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Merkel 1998), the establishment of the 'rules of the game', trough the drawing up and adoption of the principal democratic procedures and institutions that will characterize the new regime, is a *sine qua non* condition for installation to be achieved and a new regime to come about (Linz and Stepan 1996; Merkel 1998; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991) - even if there is no doubt that the concomitant restructuring of the civil and the political society is relevant in accounting for the contextual factors within which the institutional settlement occurs, or the quality of the transitional process overall (Herbert Kitschelt et al. 1999; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Rustow 1970). Out of this understanding, it then emerges not only that of installations shall regarded as *processes*, but also that their accomplishment is *necessary* (even though not sufficient) for a new (and hopefully democratic) regime to come about.

Such processes, defined as "the devolution of power from a group of people to a set of rules" (Przeworski 1991, 14), can occur in a variety of ways. They can be the result of trial and errors over a long span of time seeing the involvement of the military, as happened in 1975-1982 Portugal, they can stem from a rapid process of bargain among a restricted political elite as happened in Spain, or they can coincide with the making of new constitution followed by elections, as happened in Eastern Europe and Tunisia. In this regard Morlino has pointed out several dimensions wherein installations can vary

(2011, 85–91). Despite the different configurations installations processes can display, political elites' negotiations emerge as the ultimate constant and distinctive features of these processes. In all cases of regimes changes, or attempted ones, the introduction of new institutions stems from the arrangements of at-that-moment political relevant elite (Perthes 2004). Both the relevant political elite and the resulting institutional arrangements might vary depending on cases, as the variety of transitions from authoritarian rule and democracies testifies. Yet, the very content of pacts leading to democratic installation is invariably related to the settlement of institutions *i)* providing individuals with equal rights and freedoms *ii)* perceived by the majority of people as legitimate (Morlino 2011; Przeworski 1991; Weingast 1997). The first aspect comes from the very definition of democracy (Dahl 1971; Morlino 2011; Sartori 1987), the second relates to its stability (Przeworski 1991, 2006). For such outcome, the institutions arranged during the installation shall display two features. On the one hand, they need to pose limit on the governing power; only in this way individuals are granted their freedoms and rights (Morlino 2011; Weingast 1997). On the other hand, in order to endure and become the veritable 'game in town', the agreed-upon institutions must be self-enforcing, in the sense that compliance with the institutional framework so defined shall "constitute the equilibrium of the decentralized strategies of all the relevant political forces" (Przeworski 1991, 26). These two features are deemed to follow the resolution of coordination problems among both the political elite and the citizenry, in that the settled institutions represent focal points able to trigger citizens and elite reactions vis-à-vis possible violations of individual and collective rights and freedom by whoever has the power to govern (Weingast 1997).

Institutions so defined require that *i)* the political elites involved in the installation bargain arrive at an agreement among the aforementioned limits through pacts, defined "as […] explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement[s] among a select set of actors which seek to define (or better, redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the 'vital interests' of those entering into it" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 42) and that *ii)* these pacts find mass support through a process of attitudinal adaptation (Linz and Stepan 1996; Merkel 1998). While this latter aspect relates to the consolidation of democracy, the first constitutes precisely the bulk of the installation process. Here the relevant political elite is required to arrive to a shared

consensus about the rules and codes of political conduct (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991; Rustow 1970). Historically this can be the result of adaptation whereby anti-system factions gradually abandon their ideological stances in order to compete for office following the rules established by ruling factions, or can be the result of 'elite settlement' following traumatic events such as the ousting of dictators occurred in Tunisia and Egypt (Higley and Burton 1989). In this latter case, "warring elite factions suddenly and deliberately reorganize[e] their relations by negotiating compromises on their most basic disagreements, thereby achieving consensual unity and laying the basis for a stable democratic regime" (Higley and Burton 1989, 21). The experiences of transition from authoritarian rule in Tunisia and Egypt differ precisely because the Tunisian experience instantiates a case of 'elite settlement', while in the Egyptian case the warring factions fell short in finding a shared set of rules and institutions to regulate the exercise of the governing power under a new course of politics. Because of the centrality of the actors within installation processes, the focus on them prompted by agency-based approaches appears as particularly suitable to understand the varying success of democratic installations.

3.1.2 Determinants of installations

Elite settlement within installation processes can be thought in once as substitute for violent revolutions, as catalyst for social integration and as incubators for the management of the reform agenda (Yeh and Chang 2009). In this regard then, because the stemming institutions influence the "distribution of economic, political and ideological resources" (Przeworski 1991, 81), they are reflective of actors' power relationships (real or perceived), and their ideology at the moment of installation. Przeworski (1991) has been one of the first directly concerned with how power-relationships among actors affect the phase of installation. In his account, there is no power distribution among actors really conducive to democracy in situations of complete information. In cases of uneven distribution of power, the dominant faction will surely profit the installation to consolidate the power advantage thus falling short in bringing about a legitimate and self-enforcing democratic set-up. Alternatively, if the distribution

of power is balanced, 'anything can happen' because all the factions involved won't neither have particular incentives in negotiating their priorities with the other, nor to do the contrary. For the author, the only installation process conducive to democracy is that wherein all the actors involved do not actually known their relative power resources. Only in such way, he notices, the actors will convene on the establishment checks and balances. They do so by "counteract[ing] increasing return to power [while] provid[ing] insurances to the eventual losers" (ibid., 88). This hypothesis perfectly suits the understanding of democracy as a limited form of government, or 'institutionalized uncertainty'. Yet, it nonetheless leaves unexplained a wide range of cases wherein knowledge over power distribution didn't prevent actors to reach and enduring and democratic agreement.

In this regard, many scholars tend to rather focus on the role of actors' normative orientations to explain both the prospects and the outcome of installational bargaining processes (Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount 2009; Landau 2012; Negretto 1999). Consider for instance the cases of known and even relation of forces. As Przeworski notes, this is a typical case of coordination problem, that can nonetheless be solved recurring to focal points, i.e. "solutions that are readily available and are not seen as self-serving" (1991, 85) furnished not only by traditions of foreign examples, as the author reports, but also by political learning. Further, not only the content of "motivations and motivational assumptions" (Elster 1995) matters in cases of known and even power relationships among the actors involved by serving as focal points, but also their configuration among the deciding political elite. In such cases, as long as probable political cleavages do not concentrate along the same dimension across all issues, the actors can coordinate on cooperative outcomes though bargain processes (Colomer 1995; Raiffa 1982). Departing from a cooperative understanding of installation processes, democracy in situations of uneven balance of power become a viable and stable solution if the dominant faction is normatively "committed to the democratic project" (McFaul 2002, 225).

Drawing from this actors-centric understanding of processes of installations, it then emerges that the actors' strategies are influenced by both their power resources and their normative orientation. In game theoretic terms it can simply be expresses by the following model:

Table 3.1: The installlation game

		Player B	
		Cooperate	**Defect**
Player A	**Cooperate**	i-p; i-p	i-p; p-i
	Defect	p-i; i-p	p-i; p-i

In this game, the utility of both actors is represented by *i*, that is the incentives of cooperation conceived as the benefices expected by collaboration and *p*, that is power maintenance, that stands for the expected gains deriving from a unilateral imposition. The first argument represents, for instance, the gains deriving from the avoidance of protracted conflict that can be detrimental for players' survival, or the acknowledgment that collaborating is per se a value in that it entrusts the installation process with the required legitimacy. This can be conceived as a function of a given actor's perceived ideological distance from the other player in that the more different the normative orientation or the policy preferences of actors, the lesser the gains from cooperation in terms of outcome (Lust-Okar 2005; Tsebelis 2002). The second argument, by contrast, represents the loss of power in terms of failed institutionalization of one's power advantage. This latter can instead be conceived as function of actors' power position in that the greater its power advantage, the greater the expected payoff from defection strategies (Przeworski 1991). Each and every player's profile depends on the combination of *i* and *p*. Nonetheless, from the game it emerges that whenever *i* outweighs *p* the dominant strategy for both players is to cooperate. In line with the different contributions outlined above, this entails that either both actors share a common understanding about the nature of the future state (or are equally frightened by the prospect of a protracted stalemate), or that no party have huge positional advantages within the bargain process. Recent contributions aimed at grasping the differences between Tunisia and Egypt saw in the previous chapter are consistent with this understanding in that they explain the different outcomes by alternatively pinpointing to different degrees of polarization (Cross and Sorens 2016; Lesch 2014) and the different power relationship across the two party systems (Brownlee,

Masoud, and Reynolds 2015; Carey 2014; Tavana 2012). Yet, when the actor involved in the bargain process are political parties, such strategy profiles are to be reappraised in order to account of their unique nature as intermediate institutions.

3.2 A MODEL FOR PARTIES' AGENCY WITHIN INSTALLATIONS

The actors involved in the installation phase might vary. These can be non-elected exponents of the civil society and the ruling elite, or can be technocrats appointed by select commissions (Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount 2009). Nonetheless, when founding elections are held to express a constituent assembly, political parties become the key players of this sub process. Interestingly enough, the role of political parties in democratization studies has only been appreciated, receiving a great deal of attention indeed, only within the subsequent process of democratic consolidation, when the rules are already established (for a remarkable exception see Bermeo 1990). In this regard, the functioning of democracy is deemed to be enhanced at the pace of party systems' institutionalization. Democracy, as we know it, is representative democracy wherein parties fulfil a set of vital functions for its working. They provide interests articulation and aggregation; they drop citizens' costs of information, allowing them to take part in the public discourse; they guarantee popular control of the government trough the recruitment and selection of candidates; finally, they fulfil the task of organizing parliaments and governments. Out of this, the interest of extant researches is actually oriented toward the *institutionalization* of party systems, understood as sets of patterned interactions in the competition among parties, for only such an entrenchment within the polity enables democracy to consolidate and function (Huntington 1968, 397-461; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Morlino 1995; Randall and Svasand 2002; Randall and Svåsand 2002; Randall 2001; Yardimci-Geyikci 2015). By contrast, the role of parties in contributing to the installations of the democratic rules has been often overlooked. The reasons for this gap is twofold. On the one hand, this gap is attributable to the aforementioned bias that has entrenched the

theoretical framework, and therefore the research agenda, on the experience of Latin countries where transition and installation were perceived as a unique process. On the other hand, this is due to the 'tabula rasa' understanding according to which political parties are understood as a result of political liberalization (Dahl 1971; Mainwaring 1998; Morlino 1995): how can they form and organize when there is no freedom of speech or association, as it is the case in authoritarian regimes? In principle this claim is certainly true. However, transitions do not occur in-between perfectly typified and binary categories of authoritarianism and democracy. Indeed, the empirical reality has shown us a great variety of hybrid regimes where elections – sham elections, to be sure - are not rare, for they serve a variety of goals, all attributable to regime survival, even in the context of authoritarian rule (Diamond 2002; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Geddes 2006; Schedler 2002b). As consequence, political parties, even though extremely weak and poorly organized, might be already present when undemocratic regimes collapse and/or organize in view of the founding elections.

This is precisely what happened in Tunisia and Egypt. Here, the political parties active and well-known even before the downfall of the authoritarian regime parties played the lion share within the process of installation (Hamid 2014; Storm 2014). Hence, understanding how they might have contributed to the different outcome observed is of paramount importance in light of their centrality in the process. Yet, the actor-centric model elaborated before fall short in accounting for the unique nature and functions of political parties. Differently from any other kind of actors, political parties are "central intermediate and intermediary structure[s] between society and the government" (Sartori 1976, ix). Paralleling this view, in democratization processes, political parties are deemed to be 'anchors of democracy' in that they hook and bind the society to governmental institutions being at once part of the mobilized public and political relevant elite (Asseburg and Wimmen 2016; Morlino 2011; Perthes 2004). According to their dual nature, parties' functions are commonly distinguished between governing and representative functions (Mair 2002). The first set refers to actions and decisions performed by political parties in their institutional capacities, such as organizing parliament and governments, or – as in the cases under investigation- deciding on "ground rules within which day-to-day legislation and government are to be conducted" (Elster, Offe, and Preuss 1998, 64). The second, by contrast, refers to all those functions fulfilled

by parties in organizing the political participation of citizens (Huntington 1968) such as aggregating dispersed interests and formulating policy options. Consolidated democracies display a great interplay between the two agencies meaning that the governing activity of political parties determines the dividing lines of the electoral competition and vice versa (Deegan-Krause and Enyedi 2010). By contrast, in the aftermath of founding elections in emerging democracies - lacking any previous parties' governmental commitment - it might be plausible to think the governing agency as a function of the representative one. This means that parties' strategies in the exercise of their institutional functions, that in the case of democratic installations are cooperation or defection with their counterparts in searching an agreed compromise, are the result of (i) pre-existent social divides; (ii) the decision parties take when aggregating them in their electoral offer; and, of course (iii) their power position in term of seats within the representative institutions. Thus, specifying the actor-centric model above mentioned to account for the nature of political parties, party's governing agency -so as influenced by their representative agency- within processes of installations appears as follow:

Table 3.2: Political parties' installation game

		Party B	
		Cooperate	**Defect**
Party A	**Cooperate**	(PI-SD)-P; (PI-SD)-P	(PI -SD)-P; P-(PI -SD)
	Defect	P-(SD-PI); (PI-SD)-P	P-(PI -SD); P-(PI -SD)

Very much like the previous model, also in this case the actors involved are confronted with incentives and costs of cooperation stemming from their power positions, *P*, and normative orientation. Yet, unlike the previous case, political parties normative orientation is the compounded result of given social divisions, *SD*, which is the 'raw material political entrepreneurs work with" (Enyedi 2005, 700) and the decisions taken

by political entrepreneurs when formulating their political offer, *PD*. The former increases at pace of the number and/or depth of pre-existent social divisions. The latter can also be expressed as $1/(|P_A - P_B|)$ where P_A and P_B represent the positioning of parties A and B within the political space. *PD*, which is clearly the inverse of political polarization, can therefore be thought of as an index of centripetal drives present within the party system.

Clearly, these three factors are not independently given. More than often, they are deeply correlated. For instance, deeply divided societies induce ideological polarization. It is so because, the parameters here considered are deeply entangled and mutually influencing, as the literature shows. Yet, attesting the primacy to one or the others in the determination of party systems' outlook is an open debate. Nonetheless, in purely formal terms, the resolution of the present game allows for different Nash equilibria but suggests that cooperation is the dominant strategy under three different scenarios, each emphasizing one of the features alternatively pinpointed by scholars as responsible for party systems' configuration, and – in turn – for the institutional decision-making outcomes.

3.2.1 Pre-existent social divisions

One possible formulation for solving the transition game ($SD < PD - P$) poses that cooperation is the dominant strategy when societal divisions are not so pronounced, so as parties' power advantage, and easily outweighed by the incentives parties have in cooperation. In this case, the attention falls on the attributes society presents to which many scholars have devoted their works. Drawing from the political sociology tradition, according to which party systems reflect and 'freeze' pre-existent social cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), many scholars attribute the quality of parties' governing process – and in particular the feasibility of the bargaining process – to the characteristics of the society underneath. Even though in consolidated democracies the paradigm of cleavage politics appears to be under revision (Franklin 1992), in emerging democracies, where "democratic elections create feedback loops of accountability and responsiveness that foster a certain convergence between the preferences of constituencies, as democratic principals, and their representatives, as legislative agents, and reward or punish the latter

for their contribution to the governance of the polity" (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 77), this aspect is deemed to be all the more relevant. New-born or reorganized parties tend indeed to secure their survival by acting as 'satisficers' to the demands of their constituencies (Frye 2010). Out of this, the presence of intense social divisions in transitional setting is regarded as a threat to the consensual politics needed to set new democratic institutions. This concern was already expressed by Rustow when he posed national unity as the background condition to democratic transition meaning for it that "the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to" (1970, 350). In this respect, the presence of identitarian or religious cleavages characterizing dividing societies makes the feasibility of democracy quite uncertain (Horowitz 1993). Transitions from the authoritarian rule in the MENA region display both kind of social divisions. Yet, while there is a widely shared agreement that tribal divisions are at the heart of the Libyan failure (Heydemann 2016; Shehata 2014), it is not clear how the religious divide emerged from the ashes of the previous regime can account for the Egyptian breakdown (Zartman 2015).

3.2.2 Institutional incentives

Yet, transitional societies are always divided along different and multiple fractures but such divisions are not always conducive to a polarized party system. What matters in this regard is how they are translated into the governing party systems. In this regard, the specific format and degree of polarization displayed by a given party system has been explained by pinpointing the role of state institutions in converting societal divisions in political divisions. The second asset conducive to cooperation *(P < PD – SD)*, is when no party, in the absence of problems of related to excessive polarization of the party system, enjoys great power advantage. In this case, as a number of scholars have noticed, the predominance of one faction over the its rivals contribute to explain why certain transitions fail while others succeed. Central to these considerations is the role of the electoral systems in emphasizing or smoothing parties' electoral strength inside the representative institutions (Carey 2014; Masoud 2014) and the consequences electoral system have on both the format (Duverger 1954) and the polarization (Sartori 1976) of

party systems and the decision-making process overall. Yet, as it will be showed, also the opportunity structures characterizing previous regimes account for explaining the distribution of power resources among the parties of a given party system.

3.2.3 Choices parties define

A third case scenario occurs when the incentives toward moderation outweigh the parties' power advantage and the degree of societal division ($PD > P + SD$). This exactly the case wherein political parties successfully manage to act as "countervailing mechanisms" to social polarization described by the inclusion moderation hypothesis (Driessen 2014; Tepe 2013) and whenever problems of credible commitment are settled (Kalyvas 2000; Ly Netterstrøm 2015). Indeed, sociological and institutional accounts alone cannot fully account for the cleavages structure and the degree of polarization of a party system. On the one hand, political sociology falls short in explaining the sinusoidal relevance for the vote choice of certain divides that don't reflect the actual socio/demographic composition of society, such as for instance the relevance of religion in modernized and secularized societies (Elff 2009; G. Evans and De Graaf 2013; Thomassen 2005). On the other hand, while the institutional asset, such as the electoral system and the form of government can account for the format of the party system, it cannot predict the dividing lines or the degree polarization of the emerging party system. Integrating these contributions with the role of parties' agency represents indeed a fruitful research agenda. In this regard, the concept of agency refers to "significant elite actions in which the actors face a relatively high degree of choice" (Deegan-Krause and Enyedi 2010, 695). Such field of studies focuses indeed on political entrepreneurs' choices when aggregating and articulating social demands for the formulation public policy options. When doing so, political parties' elites actually decide to what issues devote their attention, thus emphasizing issues' salience; how to positioning with regard these issues; and how to combine them on programmatic platforms. This is part of the wider representative agency functions described by Mair (2002). Out of this understanding, the presence or absence of political polarization is in large part attributable to political entrepreneurs' choices concerning the salience and their party's positioning vis-à-vis some issues. Nonetheless, more attention should be devoted at investigating how such decisions are taken.

3.3 THE INVISIBLE HAND OF UPGRADED AUTOCRACIES ON PARTIES' STRATEGIES

Out of the above model, parties' decisions to cooperate in establishing the rules of game are the result of pre-existent social divisions, their agency, and their power position inside the elected body. Because the parties entitled to take crucial decisions within the installation process are the same operating also under authoritarian rule, it might be the case that the structuring of competition under non-democratic rules determines parties' strategies conducive to either democracy or failed transition.

Numerous contributions by proponents of post-democratization studies rightly pinpoint to the role of structures. Yet, while being extremely enlightening, such accounts largely fail to contextualize the role of structures within the transition, which is the result of their 'normativity and theoretical rigidity'. By refusing to acknowledge the occurrence of the transition process – or by rejecting its analytical framing, these accounts fall short in explaining when and how such structures might have come into play. After all, both countries experienced the same kind of transition from authoritarian rule up to the moment elected political parties took step in the decision-making process. In light of this, the crucial question is how authoritarian structures can account for parties' behavior.

Scholars engaged to comprehend why Arab authoritarianisms appeared so resilient before the uprisings of 2011 – and also after, considering the "modest harvest" of the Arab Spring – showed that this was in large part to be attributed to the deliberate at-that-time incumbents' strategies aimed at undermining seemingly pattern of democratization following the partial and fake overture of those regimes to democratic procedures. From the mid-1970s, Arab autocracies underwent a process of economic liberalization led by the IMF and the World Bank to recover from the failures of their socialist economic plans. To align with the democratic standard, as praised by the international community, these economic overtures were also accompanied by the introduction of measures of political liberalization. These novelties comported a major adjustment of the strategies and the structures providing for incumbents' power maintenance shifting from allocative to inclusionary co-optation (Albrecht 2005; Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004). Besides the introduction of nominal democratic procedures, such as the reopening of national parliament and the calling of elections, incumbent dictators, relied on a complex mix of formal and informal tools to secure their power. On the one hand, as Lust showed, they

created uneven structures of competition allowing some oppositions to compete for elections while banning others (Lust-Okar 2005). On the other hand, they arbitrarily recurred to more implicit forms of co-optation frauds, and to repressive means which often entailed a certain degree of violence. In this way, the dictators of the region could manipulate at their please the political space by directly intervening on inclusion and competition.

All the political entrepreneurs involved in the process of transition developed their political learning in such context and almost all the relevant political parties, like Ennadha, the FJP, Ettakatol, Wasat and CPR, which handled power after the downfall of the previous regimes and were called to give their country a democratic constitution, started their process of institutionalization within this uneven structural set up. Therefore, it is plausible to think that while these structures served their purpose in that they altered the development of genuine patterns of competition and participation, they nonetheless are at the base of differences in parties' power positioning and ideological polarization of the transitional party system once the dictator is gone.

3.3.1 Previous opportunity structures and transitional party advantage

Divisions characterizing upgraded authoritarianism between legal and illegal oppositions created different opportunities structures for partisan factions active during the autocratic era with seemingly consequences as far as the installation phase is concerned. Before the uprisings, legalized oppositions, who could run for elections and eventually joined the ruling party inside representative institutions, with the passing of the time ended up to collude with the authoritarian regime.

Illegal opposition were equally prevented to join the electoral race, but the channels of mobilization available to them varied. Across the Arab region, the illegal oppositions comprehend both previously important leftist parties and Islamists movements. However, authoritarian repression didn't damage them equally for reasons that relate to both dictator's strategic calculation and movements' organization. The harsh repression against leftist formations started in the late 1970s as a consequences of the incredible popular support they enjoyed in denouncing regime's democratic and economic

deficiencies. This was indeed an easy task for the dictators because these formations relied all on well-known and traditional channels of leftist mobilization, such as workers and students' associations or networks inside factories and poorer areas, which the state apparatus eventually infiltrated or crushed (Bianchi 1989; Hinnebusch 1981, 2005; Perkins 2004). In so doing, the regime propagandistically recurred to arguments related to the preservation of the national unity and stability needed to achieve economic and social development, but also to those of the defense of the values of religion from atheism. By contrast, when dealing with the repression of Islamic movements in mid-1980s, the regime used a double standard. On the one hand, as for leftist formations, political formations inspired to Islam were repressed whenever proved to be too strong to be cooptated. On the other hand, because such regime were nonetheless secular, they tolerated the presence and the proliferation of Islamic associations fearing to be regarded as offenders of religion and out of the conviction that these were easily controllable and innocuous (Bianchi 1989; Lust 2011; Wickham 2002).

Out of this, with the advent of the first free, fair and democratic elections in 2011 and 2012, some parties already enjoyed a mobilization advantage. As far as the front of previous legal oppositions, these, as expected, achieved only poor showings in that they were perceived as part of the previous authoritarian regimes, but also because by relying for their survival on regime's benevolence they dismissed any kind of partisan infrastructure. Compared to the front of previous illegal oppositions, which are expected to be welcomed by the electorate for their real opposition to the previous regime, leftist parties found themselves without any kind of linkage with their possible constituencies for the regime had accurately dismantled them, while Islamist formations could rely instead on the extant religious networks which they exploited also during the authoritarian rule (Masoud 2014). It then follows that the *P* parameter in our model, which measures a given party's power position through the number of party's seats inside the elected parliament, is indeed much more influenced by previous patterns of uneven competition than thinking of it as a parameter of the effect of the electoral system, or as an index of parties' real support, would allow. Possibly the Islamist dominion at the ballot box far from proving that Arab citizens want an Islamist rule, simply confirms that regime's structures continues to exert their influence also when the regime itself collapse, and that,

for this reason, the development of a genuine party system takes time (Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010; Herbert Kitschelt 1992; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Pierson 2004).

3.3.2 Political learning and transitional party systems' polarization

The way dictators shape competition in the Arab region does not only affect, as it was easy to expect, parties' power resources once they have been ousted. Equally importantly, they shape the nature and the degree of the ideological polarization emerging in the following process of transition. It is so because the promotion of particular discursive structures is a "signaling game" among the competing parties whereby past experiences of political learning determine the salience parties' entrepreneurs will accord to certain issues and their positioning on them (Kitschelt 1995, 456). Hence, the way political competition and political participation were structured might account also in this case, but under a different light.

Writing before the Arab Spring, Lust noticed that prolonged economic crises hitting the Arab countries was not conducive to the rise of popular protests or political reforms, as students of democratization expected, because the structures of competition settled by those regimes prevented the emergence of coalitions among all oppositions (Huntington 1991; Lust-Okar 2005). While she missed to account for the incredible power of spontaneous mobilization led by the youth that eventually succeed to topple the regimes, her analyses upon the prospects for the organization of oppositions – who indeed never organized in a unique front against their regimes – offer punctual explanations to account for the nature and depth of political polarization emerged from the downfall of the previous regime by showing how divided structures of competition end up to magnify the differences and the political positioning between legal and illegal oppositions by altering actors' cost of cooperation. Under these institutional assets and given founded reasons to voice against the status quo, excluded group would necessarily face higher cost in case of failure such as harsh repression, imprisonment and the like, and will tend to exploit possible mobilization initiatives prompted by legal oppositions. Yet, at the same time, legal opposition are discouraged from undergoing a confrontation with the regime in that they face not only the cost of possible repression, but also those of losing the privileges

acquired. Therefore, the status quo is hardly challenged. The interesting consequence of this kind of institutional arrangement is its tendency to polarize the oppositions: the excluded one continue to capitalize on popular discontent by increasing the saliency of critical issues thus expanding their mass support; the included will perceive those latter as a threat to their power position and will tend to align with the regime in opposing them. When the division between included and excluded groups overlaps with the division between secularists and Islamists opposition, and when the authoritarian regimes are secular in its institutional foundations and ideology, then the ideological evolution of those groups is subject to centrifugal pushes around the religious divide. Islamists illegal oppositions tend to radicalize their claims sometimes recurring to violence, while legal secularist oppositions, uncertain over the real strength of the illegal opposition and their true intentions, will tend to adopt an anti-Islamic propaganda in order to preserve their acquired privileges for they see them at risk in case of Islamists' success (Lust 2011). By contrast, if Islamists oppositions are included into the electoral competition, then the ideological alignment of both groups is subject to centripetal pushes following what predicted by Somer' inclusion-moderation hypothesis (2014). On the one hand, the electoral competition will force Islamists parties to reduce the salience and moderate their positioning about religious issues - gradually renouncing to the implementation of the shari'a, diminishing the reference to the jihad, recognizing the rights of religious minorities and acknowledging women's rights – to maximize their votes for entering state institutions (Kurzman and Naqvi 2010). On the other hand, secular opposition parties, facing such moderation, will mild their anti-Islamist propaganda and tend to compete with religious formations on other issues such as the economic ones.

Tunisia and Egypt, since late 1970s, are both regarded as instances of secular regimes characterized by divided structures of competition overlapping the cleavage between secular, included in the political competition, and Islamists who are instead excluded (Lust 2011). At first glance this distinction approximates the real state of affairs, yet some precisions are needed. First, in both cases excluded groups comprehended also left/secular parties that had proved to be strong in the mid-1970s. Second, while in Tunisia the Islamists formations were excluded from political competition and occasionally repressed as associations, in Egypt they were tolerated as associational organization and, even though formally excluded from political competition, were allowed to field

independent candidates in parliamentary elections. Beside the effects of the formal structures of competition, is also plausible to think that the way dictators informally intervened in the party system has observable repercussions as well on its polarization at the time of the installation.

Drawing from such background, it is plausible to expect that parties' elite agency, our model parameter *PD*, will reflect different patterns of political learning due to different formal structures of competition and informal means of manipulation more or less conducive to political polarization.

4 HOMOGENEOUS VS. DIVIDED SOCIETIES? ANALYZING THE DEMAND OF REPRESENTATION

From the model sketched in the previous chapter, one of the component determining political parties' strategies is the degree of social divisions constituting the demand of representation for which they are deemed to account for. According to the literature, social divisions are particularly relevant as far their nature and depth are considered. This chapter is aimed at exploring both these dimensions by recurring to discrete choice modelling on the data furnished by the Arab Barometer project. By so doing, this analysis will unfold the determinants of vote choice for Islamist parties and their major secular competitors on the socio/economic, the organizational and the normative dimensions concurring to the formation of a cleavage. This proceeding allows to reveal which issues divide voting citizens at each level and whether there the conflicting lines overlap thus forming a 'closure of social relationships' which is deemed to be particularly detrimental for installation processes regardless the nature of such divisions.

4.1 2011-2012 FOUNDING ELECTIONS: TRANSITIONAL CHALLENGES STEMMING FROM THE EMERGENCE OF TWO IMAGINED COMMUNITIES

4.1.1 Islamists vs. Secularists and the need of a pre-constitutional consensus

In 2009 Nader Hashemi wrote that "in societies where religion is a marker of identity, the road to liberal democracy , whatever other twists and turns it makes, cannot avoid passing through the gates of religious politics" (2009, 9). Hindsight, and quite surprisingly given the premises, such words sound like a prophecy. In the two cases where the mass protests of 2010 - led by young, leftist and secularized people -, ended up in the chute of the authoritarian regimes which gave way to free, fair and competitive elections, the Islamist parties appeared in both case as the initial leading political force contrasted by secular

parties. In Tunisia, at the occasion of the 2011 parliamentary elections, the Islamist party Ennadha, which alone monopolized all the representation of the political Islam, gained the 37% of expressed preferences thus securing 89 seats of 217. The other secular parties, namely the Congress for the Republic, al-Aridha, Ettakatol and the Democratic and Progressive Party were left far behind gaining respectively 8.71% (29 seats), 6.74 (26 seats), 7.03% (20 seats) and 3.94% (16 seats) of expressed preferences. A broader victory for the Islamist faction had been registered also in Egypt at the election of the People's assembly that took place in three rounds between late November 2011 and January 2011. Here, the political offer embodying the political Islam was fragmented into seventeen parties. Some of them are ascribable to the Muslim Brotherood, as the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and Wasat. Others are expression of more radical religious readings, such as Nour and the Virtue party, of Salafist inspirations, or the Building and Development party, which traces its origin in the militant organization of the Islamic Group. Nonetheless, the FJP gained 36.6% of expressed preferences and 213 seats while the Islamist bloc, a coalition formed by more radical Islamist parties led by Nour that alone gained 107 seats, secured 27.8% of voted and 123 seats. Wafd, born from the split with the MB to express a secular and progressive religiously inspired party, positioned as the third party with 9.2% of votes and 41 seats. The remaining parties did not manage to secure more than 20 seats.

These results not only seemed to reinvigorate the conventional wisdom according to which Muslim populations are inherently imbued with religion, they also portrait two polarized publics which are potentially dangerous for the processes of installation. This kind of processes, which largely coincide with the constitution-making, can be conceived at once as having an institutional and a foundational, or expressive, role. As saw in the previous chapter, the first refers to the establishment of the rules of the game underneath the functioning of the polity. The second refers to the definition of the political community such process entails, and in this respect the presence of two 'imagined communities' might represent a major obstacle for a compromise to see the light. It is a fact that constitutions always "identify and formalize the most fundamental beliefs, norms, values and aspirations of the political collectivity" (Lerner 2011, 26). This entails "the need for pre-constitutional societal consensus regarding shared norms and values that underpin the state" (ibid., 27). In literature, this has been referred to as alternatively

the national unity (Rustow 1970), some set of shared beliefs (Elster 1995; Higley and Burton 1989), or a shared political culture (Lipset 1959; Weingast 1997). In this regard, the fact that in Tunisia and Egypt the public appeared divided as far both identity and preferred political regime are concerned, poses some questions for the existence of such pre-constitutional consensus.

4.1.2 Why does the religious divide matter? Substance vs. Form

While the stemmed religious divide has unanimously considered as a threat for the feasibility of a democratic consensus, the focus of explanations has alternatively shifted from substance to form-related accounts. The first kind of explanations all pinpoint to the fact that the religious divide is particularly puzzling for the installation of a democratic polity (Bâli and Lerner 2017; Driessen 2014; Stepan 2000) in that religion is at once an "infungible identity" (Hashemi 2009) and a system of rules whose obedience often contrasts with the respect of rules underneath the democratic polity (Stepan 2000; Strauss 1938). The second order of explanations consider the religious divide like any other kind of social division. In this regard, what matters is not the content of the divide but rather its capability of provoking the emergence of two divided societies, i.e. those societies characterized by "intense internal disagreements over the vision of the state" (Lerner 2011, 29). Regardless the pretext, the emergence of some forms of "closure of social relationships", that prevent the possibilities for cross-cutting alliances, represents a problem for the democratic installation because it hampers the feasibility for a democratic compromise (Driessen 2014; Landau 2012; Negretto 1999) leading to a zero-sum bargaining process thus undermining the legitimation of the stemming regime (Gunther and Mughan 1993; Negretto 1999). Out this understanding the focus shifts from the nature to the depth and the compositions of the observed divide (Chandra 2005; Chandra and Boulet 2003; Gunther and Mughan 1993; Horowitz 1993). While some scholars have recently accounted for the outcomes observed in Tunisia and Egypt by pinpointing to the need of a qualitatively different process of democratization from those known thus far because of the prominent role of disagreement over the role of religions (Blaydes and Lo 2012; Brown 2017; Driessen 2014; Parolin 2013; Stepan and Linz 2013), other students

account for different patterns of transition in the two countries by investigating the depth and the composition of the religious divide. Yet, explanations of these latter kind largely differ in their results. For some, the religious divide is confined to identity politics and is more likely to be circumscribed within the middle class (Cavatorta and Wegner 2016; Merone 2015; Pellicer and Wegner 2014). For others, by contrast, the religious divide expresses a socio/economic differentiation between wealthier people included into the social and economic system – voting for secular parties – and the deprived strata of the society – voting for Islamist parties instead (Elsayyad and Hanafy 2014; Van Hamme, Gana, and Maher 2014). Marginalized people, are reported to vote for Islamist parties on the base of either their perceived priorities expressed through defined policy preferences (Berman and Nugent 2015; Garcia-Rivero and Kotze 2007) or because of the material benefits stemming from such kind of vote choice (Lisa Blaydes 2010; Clark 2004a, 2004b; Ellen Lust 2009). Finally, another reading conceives the religious divide as a function of the channels of socialization available to citizens, and explains the Islamists dominion in terms of greater opportunities these enjoy to get in touch with potential voters (Masoud 2014).

All these accounts, while shedding lights on the determinants of voting behaviour for Islamists parties, do not allow for a comprehensive understanding of the nature and the depth of the religious divide that characterized 2011-2012 elections in Tunisia and Egypt. Lot of these accounts are based on district levels data, others are only interested in grasping the determinants of the vote choice for Islamist parties (for a remarkable exception see: Wegner and Cavatorta 2016). In what do the constituencies of the major competing parties differentiate? Is it religious commitment relevant for the vote choice? Does it overlap with other socio-economic features? Is it really driven by different organizational opportunities? Does the 'religious vote' express anti-democratic posture per se, or it is rather the depth of the cleavage beneath it which undermines the feasibility for cross-cutting bargaining alliances? Such kind of answers can be better answered by means of vote choice modelling relying on the political sociology approach. On the one hand, the employment of vote choice modelling on the base of surveys' answers allows to enlighten the characteristics of the voters of a specific party, thus entrusting with more precision the eventual findings. On the other hand, structuring such models on the

political sociology approach, which is centred on the concept of cleavage, enables to assess the depth of the observed divide.

4.2 HYPOTHESIZING THE ORIGINS OF THE ISLAMIST/SECULAR DIVIDE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTALLATIONS

4.2.1 The political sociology approach

As saw, the political sociological approach revolves around the idea that critical junctures shaping the history of nations produce several divisions within society that are subsequently politicized by political parties. This lead to the generation of political cleavages that structure the party system and the political competition altogether. Despite the fact that the majority of students referred to the apparent polarization along the Islamist/Secular axis with the term of *cleavage*, Bartolini and Mair's well-known definition makes clear that a cleavage is not simply a division at the ideological *or* social level. Indeed, a cleavage encompasses the two of them passing through a set of values and beliefs that provides individuals with a sense of belonging to their social group and drives their political choices. For analytical purposes,

> "the concept of cleavage can be seen to incorporate three levels: an empirical element, which identifies the empirical referent of the concept, and which we can define in social-structural terms; a normative element, that is the set of values and beliefs which yields a sense of identity and role to the empirical element, and which reflects the self-consciousness of the social group(s) involved; and an organizational/behavioural element, that is the set of individual interactions, institutions, and organizations, such as political parties, which develop as part of the cleavage." (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 215).

Hence, either the three elements overlap, or it should be better to speak of divisions or differences instead (Deegan-Krause 2006). In Withefiled's words, to properly refer to a cleavage "it is necessary to show that social differentiation exists, that it has intelligible consequences for citizens' ideological perspectives, and that these consequences are

important in shaping vote choice" (2002, 186)[58]. This precision is required not only for the sake of theoretical precision but, more importantly, for the consequences that such competing "form[s] of closure of social relationships" (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 216) have on the constitution making process.

According to the approach founded by Lipset and Rokkan, the divisions within society that will subsequently be politicized to form a cleavage derive from critical junctures, defined as moments in which the placement of "institutional arrangements on paths or trajectories, which are then very difficult to alter" occurs (Pierson 2004). In their model, the processes of creation of Nation States and the subsequent Industrial Revolution created dividing lines within the European society that were politicized with the advent of universal suffrage and democratization and that were eventually frozen in the structure of the party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

4.2.2 Post-independence state building strategies and national fractures

Lipset and Rokkan's reconstruction is based upon the experiences of Western European countries and is extremely specific to this reality. Hence, applications of this model outside its cradle might be problematic. Yet, as Randall points out, it still represents a useful analytical framework to investigate how divisions within society translate, or nor, into the party systems allowing also for cross-countries comparisons (Vicky Randall 2001). In her seminal article, the author warns that the nature and the sequence of the occurrence of the critical junctures across Third World countries won't necessarily fall under the predictions of the model and raises the question of the influence played by colonial experiences in fashioning political cleavages. The fight for independence, which availed itself of the nationalist ideology, prevented indeed the politicization of other social divisions (ibid.). However, new cleavages, be them identitarian or functional, might appear as consequences of post-independent strategies aimed at the formation and the consolidation of the new formed states. As Migdal illustrates, states' ability to survive

[58] For a different conceptualization of cleavage, see: Bornschier 2009.

largely relies on a series of factors among which mobilization emerges as the most important. Yet, at its origins, the state is just an organization among many others, sometimes in competition with them. To gain compliance, if not legitimation, state leaders must offer individuals a series of incentives that should result attractive.

> "Such packaging rests, of course, on the bedrock of material needs, but it also lends meaning to people's behaviour as they meet those needs. A consciousness about social behaviour aims to tie actions together in some meaningful or purposeful way, to transcend trough action the specific act itself. These systems of meaning or symbolic configurations, whether ideology or beliefs or anything else, make manageable a universe, which could otherwise seem overwhelmingly threatening and impenetrable." (ibid. 26).

Post-independence Tunisia and Egypt exemplify this dynamic. Following the enfranchisement from foreign domination – which in Tunisia was embodied in the French protectorate while in Egypt in the influence exerted by the English crown through the Egyptian royal family even after the official end of the colony -, Habib Bourguiba, like Gamal Abdel Nasser, confronted themselves with the construction of a "viable, prosperous and modern state" (Perkins 2004, 130). The economic and social reforms put in place since the mid-50s constitute the policy packages to substantiate the newly acquired independence to attract the allegiance of their people while creating a unified nation, inexistent up to that moment (Gelvin 2004). On the one hand, a series of state-driven economic plans of socialist inspiration were put in place to fight against underdevelopment. On the other hand, the transformation of the civil society was pursued through a series of policies aimed at undermining of the role Islam in the public sphere, supposed to hinder the new, and modern, esprit of those countries. It can thus be argued that Tunisia and Egypt, like many others third world countries and differently from western experiences, have only had one critical juncture – that is the national independence – that has created two fractures: an identitarian and a functional one. The first opposes those embracing secular and modern values against the nostalgic of the Islamic roots of the Tunisian and Egyptian cultures. The second has created a division between those who benefited from state economic policies (in terms of e.g. infrastructures and work opportunities) and those marginalized, if not exploited, by them.

As saw in the previous paragraph, these two lines of divisions may provide for the individuation of two different publics at both the empirical and the normative level of a cleavage. If there is covariance between them and the organizational level, then the Islamist/Secular divide can properly be defined as a cleavage. Yet, as Wegner and Cavatorta (2016) puts, it might by the case that only the normative level accounts for the vote choice. Alternatively, as Masoud (2014) argues, it can be the case that the divide stemming from the 2011-2012 ballot box has only to do with the organizational structures individuals are involved into, which are part of what students of electoral behaviour define "political intermediation", namely "the varying channels and processes through which voters receive information about partisan politics" (Gunther et al. 2016, 2). These different readings lead to the formulation of competing hypotheses:

Hypothesis of organizational intermediation: the vote choice for Islamists and seculars at the 2011-2012 elections is driven by respectively mosque attendance and trade union membership.

Hypothesis of identity politics: the vote choice for Islamists or seculars at the 2011-2012 elections is only driven by identity issues, such as the role of religion in politics and the role of women within society.

Hypothesis of cleavage politics: the vote choice for Islamists or seculars at the 2011-2012 elections relies on the refusal or the acceptance of the entire 'policy packaging' on which autocrats were used to base their legitimacy. Out of it, personal piety, policy preferences for more room of religion in politics and poor socio/economic conditions drive the vote choice toward Islamist parties while wealthier people bearing secular worldviews vote for Secular parties.

4.3 DATA COLLECTION, MEASURES AND METHODOLOGY

The analysis conducted to test the aforementioned hypotheses avails itself of the data collected by the Arab Barometer project (hereafter AB). This is a survey dataset that gather individuals' positioning on a series of social cultural and religious topics, opinions about institutions and political attitudes along with demographic information that fulfil the lack of data at the individual level in the MENA region. At the time of writing (March

2017), AB has conducted three waves of surveys thus progressively increasing the number of countries covered, and tracking the change of citizens' attitudes and beliefs over time. For the purposes of the present research, only the Second Wave will be used (hereinafter ABII). This Wave has been conducted during the years 2010 and 2011. In Egypt face-to-face interviews have been conducted from June 16th to July 3rd, while in Tunisia from September 30th to October 15th 2011. This make these data more reliable as far as the questions on the vote intention are concerned for the Tunisian elections, which took place on October 23th, but a bit less for the Egyptian case, where elections started on November 28th and concluded on January 11th. The dataset counts as many as 1219 observations in Egypt and 1196 in Tunisia. This latter has been subsequently self-weighted for the probability of selection, moreover, post-stratification weights have been used in the present analysis to correct imbalances based on age and gender.

In ascertaining the presence of a cleavages underneath the results of 2011 elections, I will recur to multinomial logistic models aimed at detecting possible correlation between the attributes of individuals and the vote choice. The dependent variable is the declared intention of vote here defined as a nominal variable with three categories: vote for Islamists, vote for their secular counterpart and vote for other parties. By so doing, it will be possible to grasp the differences in the determinants of vote choice between the two major electoral blocs emerging from the electoral consultations holding respondents that voted for other parties as the reference category. However, as table 4.1 shows, the stemming sample is really small for the low rate of respondents declaring to vote for a political party, 446 and 129 in Tunisia and Egypt respectively, due to indecisiveness (as is the case for Tunisia) or preference for an independent candidate (as is the case or Egypt).

Table 4.1: Declared vote intention for the elections of the Constituent Assembly/Parliament

	Tunisia	**Egypt**
Political party	466	129
Independent candidates	102	822
Don't know	585	189
Declined to answer	42	1
Do not participate/will see	1	78
	1196	1219

Source: ABII questions EG307 and T307.

Moreover, except for the case of Ennadha, gathering single parties into broader factions has been necessary to overcome problems of excessive disproportion among categories due to too small cells size. Table 4.2 reports the coding procedure. In Tunisia Ennadha party has been contrasted with other leftist secular parties, namely PDP, Ettakatol, CPR, PTT, Ettajdid, PS and PCOT. Hence, the dependent variable assumes value 1 if the vote choice is for Ennadha, 2 it the vote choice falls on one of the aforementioned leftist parties and 0 if respondents declared to vote for other parties. In Egypt, FJP party, Nour, Virtue Party, Building and Development Party and Wasat have been together considered as Islamist parties, with value 1 in the dependent variable, and contrasted against the Right/Secular front made up of the Free Egyptians, Wafd party and the Democratic front, for which the dependent variable assumes the value of 2. Also in this case, when respondents declare to vote for other parties than the above-enlisted, the dependent variable assumes the value of 0. In light of the small size of the present sample, due to the determination of the dependent variable, tests of representativeness will be presented at the end of the chapter to complement, and add further insights, the analysis of the multinomial models.

Table 4.2: Dependent variable coding

	Vote Islamist parties	**Vote Liberal/Secular**	**Vote other parties**
Tunisia	**240**	**75**	**151**
Parties included	*Ennadha (240)*	*PDP (30)* *Ettakatol (15)* *CPR (18)* *PTT (2)* *Ettajdid (2)* *PS (1)* *PCOT (7)*	
Egypt	**40**	**37**	**52**
Parties included	*FJP (33)* *Nour (3)* *Virtue Party (1)* *BD (1)* *Wasat (2)*	*Free Egyptians (26)* *Wafd (10)* *Democratic Front (1)*	
Coding	**1**	**2**	**0**

Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the amount of respondents declaring to vote for that specific party

The independent variables are designed to account for each level of the cleavage. As far as socio-economic characteristics of individuals are concerned, these are here expressed

as self-reported house income, schooling years and area of residence aimed at capturing patterns of exclusion both at the national and at the regional level to test whether 'material explanations' hold. The first is an ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 4 where higher values indicate higher levels of respondents' perceived wealth. Education is as well an ordinal variable constructed in accordance with UNESCO's parameters[59]. Following them, each level of completed cycle of studies is here indicated in terms of schooling years, the minimum values is 0 denoting illiteracy while the maximum is 18 thus indicating at least the achievement of the MA degree. The others, urban/rural and area of residence, are dummy variables assuming value 1 for either rural or marginalized areas according to the regional pro capita consumption and unemployment rate of respondents' governorate (Boughzala and Hamdi 2014). In order to have a measure of deprivation[60] (Berman and Nugent 2015), a new variable has been created: it assumes value 1 if respondents simultaneously live in rural and marginalized areas, 0 in all the other cases, i.e. for all urban residents and rural residents in favoured areas. The normative level dimension is differentiated here among values and beliefs regarding identity and political attitudes towards policy issues that emerged during the transition. As far as identity issues are concerned, these are measured through self-definition of religiosity and cultural conservativism. The first is categorical variable assuming three values: not religious (1), somewhat religious (2) and religious (3). The other identity variable, cultural conservativism, is measured through an index reporting individuals' positioning on gender issues. As saw in chapter two, some exponents and adherent of religious parties question gender equality by pinpointing to a conservative reading of the religious predicaments thus invoking the return to a traditional and patriarchal society, hence it might be probable that individual positioning on such issues will discriminate between Islamists and seculars voters (Zeghal 2013). Because the items included are ordinal categorical variables, this index has been constructed through an exploratory factor analysis on the polychoric correlation matrix of the items included (Choi, Peters, and

[59] http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/DOcuments/isced-2011-en.pdf

[60] Theoretically speaking the presence of the variable 'deprived areas' would require a multilevel multinomial model in that it is not an individual-level variable for it reports context-level information. However, being it a dummy variable, it does not meet the formal criteria to proceed with multilevel modeling (Gelman 2005).

Mueller 2010; Vermunt and Magidson 2005). This procedure is particularly useful in that it allows for the identification of a latent variables also when working with ordinal variables by assuming these are obtained by categorizing a normally distributed unobserved variables and estimating the maximum-likelihood of their product moment correlation. In line with Kostenko et al. (2016) two latent factors emerge: one attributable to the public sphere and the other to the private one. Nonetheless, both need to be considered; therefore, a simple composite index has been created taking into account both spheres. The Cronbach's alpha coefficient for a test scale based on the aforementioned items is 0.775 for Egypt and 0.804 for Tunisia, meaning that the resulting indexes have internal consistency and can be considered reliable measures of individuals' standing toward gender issues, both in the public and in the private sphere. The variable so derived is a continuous one assuming values from 1 to 4, where higher values denote increasing oppositions to women's empowerment in society. Individuals' regime preferences have been operationalized as perceived suitability of democracy, preferred kind of regime, preferred source of law and trust towards the 'deep state' institutions. The first is a continuous limited variable ranging from 0 to 10, the higher the more suitable democracy appears to the respondent for its country. State preference is dummy variable indicating either support or a religious or a civil state. Two ordinal variables (ranging from 1 to 4) are indeed required for the preferred source of law, indicating increasing support for either the enforcement of laws according to Shari's or according to the popular will. While most studies approach the religious divide in terms of preferences for more religious people in public offices (Garcia-Rivero and Kotze 2007), or just preferences over the Shari'a (Berman and Nugent 2015), in this analysis both variables concerning the preferred source of law are included because these are weekly correlated (0.19) meaning that for most people Shari'a and popular will are not mutually exclusive as previously though (Jamal and Tessler 2008; Tessler 2015; Tessler and Gao 2005). Keeping both of them is then aimed to account for pro or anti-democratic attitudes behind the vote choice that otherwise will be left overlooked. Trust toward deep state institution is also taken into account because many contributions suggest that the vote toward Islamist parties is largely attributable to the desire of a radical change with the past (Garcia-Rivero and Kotze 2007; Hashemi 2009). For the case of Egypt, an additive index has been created to account for trust toward the military and the judiciary while for the case of Tunisia, the

index grasp confidence towards the police and the judiciary. Finally, mosque attendance and trade unions membership are included to describe whether the link between possible social groups and their normative orientation is mediated by some sort of organizational/environmental component thus creating a veritable cleavage. Some authors also argue for the importance of this dimension by suggesting that in some case it is self-sufficient to explain individuals' vote choice (Gunther et al. 2016; Masoud 2014). For instance, Pellicer and Wegner found that "in countries with large Islamist networks it is clear that Islamists do not differ demographically from voters of other parties" (Pellicer and Wegner 2015, 5). Given the law rate of respondents declaring to belong to a charitable association, only mosque attendance is here considered because of the associational networks orbiting around mosques that transcend worship functions (Masoud 2014). All these variables are controlled for (mean centred) age and sex. On the one hand, many studies suggest that older constituencies are less inclined to vote for an Islamist party than are the younger ones (Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu, and Şenatalar 2005; Elsayyad and Hanafy 2014). On the other hand, women are reportedly less inclined to vote for an Islamist party because of their opposition to gender equality (Cavatorta and Wagner 2017).

4.4 How much divided?

In order to reconstruct the presence of a cleavage underneath voting behaviour, I first analyse each level separately though different multinomial models. This procedure allows to detect which factors are statistically significant within each level thus avoiding the risk of multicollinearity, that is the association between two (or more) explanatory variables. When this happen, only one of the involved variable appears as impacting significantly on the outcome variable. In our case, it might be possible that only normative variables appear to have a significant effect on the vote choice, even though individual political orientation might stem from predefined socio-economic conditions or organizational intermediaries. This circumstance is also to be expected because, out of Withefiled's definition of cleavage, ideological perspectives might be thought as an intervening variable between social-differentiation and vote choice.

4.4.1 Egypt

By contrasting the different categories of the dependent nominal variable within each level of the cleavage alone considered, few statistically significant differences between those voting for Islamist parties and those voting for their major competing faction emerge. As shown in table 4.3, on the empirical level only house income emerges as significantly associated with one category of the other of the dependent variable. This is positively correlated with the vote choice for an Islamist party and its log odds coefficient of 0.81 indicates that for a unit increase in individuals' perceived wealth the probabilities to vote for an Islamist party than to vote for the residual parties enlisted in the reference category increase of 68%. However, the coefficients of the house income variable are not significantly different when contrasting the probabilities of voting for an Islamist party rather than one in the reference category against those of voting a Right/Secular parties rather than those in the base outcome. This means that while house income significantly discriminates Islamist voters against those voting parties in the reference category, it does not discriminate between Islamist and Right/Secular voters. The same applies to the variables age, deprived areas and schooling years. Even though they don't emerge as statistically correlated with Islamist or Right/Secular voters against the base outcome, the direction of their impact differs across the two categories of the dependent variable here considered. Yet, in no case the coefficients of such variables associated with Islamist or secular voters differ. On the normative level (see the second column in table 4.3), as expected cultural conservativism is significantly positively correlated with the electoral preference for Islamist parties rather than those in the reference category in that a unitary increase in the index of cultural conservatism more than doubles (+245%) probabilities to vote them rather than others. However, the impact of this variable in determining this choice does not statistically differ form that behind the vote choice for secular parties (whose log odds coefficient is of 0.407). Similarly, the belief that popular will should be at the base of the legislation is negatively correlated with the religious vote. Yet, its coefficients (-0.494 and -0.225) are not statistically different across religious and secular voters vis-à-vis the other ones. On the same token, a unit increase in the agreement with the statement that the Shari'a should be enlisted among the sources of law more than doubles the relative probability of voting an Islamist party instead of one of those in the reference category and diminishes of 23% the probabilities of voting a right/secular

parties instead of one in the reference category. Moreover, as expected the two coefficients are statistically different across the two groups. Not really surprisingly (and cautioning from referring to political Islam and democracy in either/or terms), the belief that democracy is suitable for Egypt is significantly and positively correlated with both the vote choice for Islamist and Right/Secular parties rather than others. Both kinds of voters indeed, share the belief democracy is suitable for Egypt and, in so doing, they distinguish themselves from the voters of parties in the reference category. In total contradiction with other studies (Garcia-Rivero and Kotze 2007), trust towards institutions is significantly and positively correlated with religious vote but negatively (even though not significantly) correlated with the Right/Secular vote, and such difference is statistically relevant. In this sense, there seems that the religious vote stands not for a protest vote, nor for a pious vote in that religiosity doesn't have a meaningful impact in determining the vote choice or in distinguishing Islamic parties' voters from all the others. From the analysis of the organizational level (see the third column in table 4.3), both trade union membership and mosque attendance behave as expected. The first is positively correlated with the secular vote but negatively associated with the vote for Islamist parties. The second, by contrast, is positively related with the religious vote but has a negative relationship with the secular one. Yet, no one of the coefficients associated with these variable is significant in discriminating these choices from the base outcome, nor are they statistically different across the two groups of interest.

When considering all the aforementioned variables (and therefore the three dimensions) into a unique model, the normative level emerges over the other dimensions previously analysed. As shown in table 4.4, while some variables account for the vote choice of Islamist parties or Right/Secular against the reference category, such as schooling years, house income, popular will, trade union membership and Islamic law, only this latter is also statistically significant in distinguishing religious against secular voters. Indeed, only in this case the coefficient associated with the vote choice for an Islamist party rather those in the reference category is different from that distinguishing the vote choice for a Right/Secular parties from the base outcome. In front of all these findings, the divide between Islamists and Seculars emerged in the occasion of the 2011-2012 elections is not a veritable cleavage. On the one hand, the three dimensions do not overlap. On the other hand, the empirical referent is totally missing in that there is not socio/economic

differentiation between the two groups of voters and there is not a veritable differentiation in the organizational intermediaries. What seems to emerge in Egypt is not even an identity divide as suggested elsewhere (Pellicer and Wegner 2014, 2015; Wegner and Cavatorta 2016), in that personal issues related to identity and to the definition of the society (exemplified by the variables religiosity and cultural conservativism) are not relevant in discriminating the voters of the two factions opposing each other during the transition. Rather, there appears to be a divide on the 'rules of the game' opposing those who want more room for religion into the bases of legislation against those opting for a secular law-making.

Table 4.3: Cleavage-dimensions-related multinomial models for vote choice in Egypt

	Socio/Economic Level		**Normative Level**		**Organizational Level**	
	Islamists	**Right/Secular**	**Islamist**	**Right/Secular**	**Islamist**	**Right/Secular**
Age	0.00563	-0.0107				
	(0.0159)	(0.0176)				
Female	-0.238	-0.349				
	(0.481)	(0.495)				
Deprived areas	-0.290	0.0925				
	(0.478)	(0.489)				
School years	-0.00145	0.0512				
	(0.0404)	(0.0444)				
House income	0.484*	0.289				
	(0.261)	(0.271)				
Religiosity			0.354	-0.163		
			(0.461)	(0.426)		
Cultural conservativism			1.181**	0.407		
			(0.590)	(0.472)		
Shari'a			0.804**	-0.228		
			(0.404)	(0.290)		
Popular will			-0.494*	-0.255		
			(0.276)	(0.258)		
Suitability of democracy			0.226**	0.196*		
			(0.113)	(0.106)		
Religious state			0.796	0.0558		
			(0.682)	(0.749)		
Trust in institutions			0.717*	-0.132		
			(0.399)	(0.298)		
Trade union membership					-0.561	0.235
					(0.654)	(0.572)
Mosque attendance					0.221	-0.126
					(0.212)	(0.184)
Constant	-1.017	-1.423*	-9.397***	-0.229	-0.908	0.0464
	(0.786)	(0.844)	(3.010)	(2.170)	(0.787)	(0.654)
Observations	126	126	120	120	127	127
Pseudo R^2	0.0348		0.1326		0.0153	
Prob > chi2	0.4794		0.0016		0.3737	

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Model coefficients are referred to the reference group constituted by those voting for other parties than those analyzed

Table 4.4: Vote determinants in Egypt

	Islamists	Right/Secular
Age	0.00702	0.00588
	(0.0217)	(0.0215)
Female	-0.276	-1.028
	(0.795)	(0.784)
Deprived	-0.345	0.137
	(0.629)	(0.571)
School years	0.0287	0.0857*
	(0.0507)	(0.0521)
House income	0.708**	0.120
	(0.356)	(0.310)
Religiosity	0.0266	0.0131
	(0.561)	(0.495)
Traditional index	1.009	0.295
	(0.665)	(0.535)
Islamic law	0.933**	-0.249
	(0.450)	(0.326)
Popular will	-0.609**	-0.230
	(0.306)	(0.289)
Suitability of democracy	0.119	0.249**
	(0.124)	(0.125)
Religious State	0.945	-0.314
	(0.786)	(0.887)
Trust in institutions	0.631	-0.176
	(0.470)	(0.331)
Mosque attendance	0.104	-0.395
	(0.329)	(0.302)
Trade unions membership	-1.839*	-1.092
	(0.956)	(0.810)
Constant	-9.004***	0.0169
	(3.452)	(2.855)
Observations	116	116
Pseudo R^2 0.1845		
Prob>chi2 0.0146		

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Model coefficients are referred to the reference group constituted by those voting for other parties than those analyzed

4.4.2 Tunisia

Also in the case of Tunisia, the analysis will proceed stepwise. First, each component of cleavage politics is separately considered, then the focus will fall on the fully specified model. As far as the empirical level is concerned, socio-economic differences emerge in both countries. While age, gender and regional marginalization do not have an impact on the vote choice for one faction or the other, house income and education significantly impact on the final decision at the ballot box. As table 4.5 shows, the variable schooling years positively impacts on the vote choice for Left/Secular parties with respect to the reference category. In particular, the effect of one additional year of education is associated with a 0.25 increase in the relative log odds of being in vocation program vs. academic program, meaning that for each additional schooling years the probabilities to vote for Left/Secular parties increase of 11%. At the same time, this variable seems to not have any statistically significant impact on the vote choice for Ennadha with respect to the reference category, even though a negative impact is suggested (a decrease of 2% for each additional schooling year). Such different effect education has on the categories of interest, Ennadha and Left/Secular voters, is also statistically significant for we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients associated with education are equal for the two categories via-à-vis the one of reference with a confidence of 99%. The same trend appears to be followed also by the variable house income. An increase in the perceived wealth increases of 29% the probabilities of vote for a Left/Secular party and decreases of 5% those for Ennadha. Even though this effect is not statistically significant in discriminating from the base outcome 'vote for others', it is significantly different when comparing the effect house income has in determining a Left/secular vote vs. the base outcome with that played in determining a vote for Ennadha vs. the base outcome. However, this does not imply that more educated and wealthier people have more probabilities to vote for a Left/Secular party instead of Ennadha. As a matter of fact, those with the highest slef-reported income have a probability as high as 41% of being Ennadha voters and 28% of being Left/Secular voters. On the same token, those in possess of a master degree or more have 37 and 33 percent of probabilities to vote for Ennadha or Left/Secular respectively. Coming to the normative level, religiosity, cultural conservativism, support for the Islamic law and preference for a religious state appear to discriminate the vote choice among the different groups of voters. Unsurprisingly,

increases in the self-definition of piety are correlated with an increase of 55 percent of the probabilities to vote for Ennadha and a decrease of the 27% of probabilities to vote for Let/Secular parties. Yet, even when people define themselves as 'not religious' there is a statistical significance in voting for one faction (39% of probabilities to vote Ennadha) or the other (23% to vote Left/Secular) vis-à-vis the reference group, meaning that religiosity impacts on the magnitude but not on the figure that Ennadha is the most voted party. In the same line, a unit increment in the agreement that the laws should be enacted in accordance with the Islamic law significantly increases of 68% of probabilities of a vote choice for a Ennadha while significantly decreases of 35% those for Left/Secular factions with respect to the reference category. Paralleling this figure, the probability of voting Ennadha are more than double (236%) for those preferring a religious state instead of a civic state. Finally, and quite surprisingly, support for gender equality while statistically increasing (of 78% for unit) the probability of vote for a Left/Secular party, has no relevance the propensity to vote for Ennadha vis-à-vis the reference category. Contrary to the expectations of finding a positive correlation between cultural conservativism (measured trough attitudes toward gender equality) and voting Ennadha, it has emerged that a unitary increase on this index is associated with a little, even though not having statistically significance, decrease (4%) in the vote choice for Ennadha. The remaining variables, trust towards 'deep state institutions' and suitability of democracy do not have any statistically relevant effect in discriminating the vote choice for Ennadha or Left/Secular factions with respect to the reference category and even if they have different effects on the different categories of the dependent variable, such differences are not statistically significant, thus suggesting they are not helpful to discriminate the final vote choice. On the organizational level, the two selected variables mosques attendance and trade union membership have both a role in determining the vote choice. Mosque attendance is significantly correlated with voting Ennadha and Left/Secular parties but, as expected, the direction of this correlation is positive in the first case and negative in the second one. Trade union membership increases of 48% the vote choice for Left/Secular parties with respect to the reference category. Interestingly, even if not meaningful, this variable is positively associated also with the vote choice for Ennadha, partially confirming Waltz (19878) and Wickham's (2004) findings that that Islamists are particularly successful in penetrating trade unions and professional syndicates – despite

the statistically difference between the effect trade union membership has in discriminating the two categories of interest (Ennadha and Left/Secular voter) against the base outcome.

Table 4.5: Cleavage-dimensions-related multinomial models for vote choice in Tunisia

	Socio/Economic Level		Normative Level		Organizational Level	
	Nahdha	**Left/Secular**	**Nahdha**	**Left/Secular**	**Nahdha**	**Left/Secular**
Age	0.00785	0.0107				
	(0.00807)	(0.0114)				
Female	0.0976	0.436				
	(0.214)	(0.295)				
Deprived areas	0.0543	0.0364				
	(0.299)	(0.461)				
School years	-0.0153	0.104***				
	(0.0217)	(0.0325)				
House income	-0.0468	0.255				
	(0.116)	(0.159)				
Religiosity			0.441**	-0.311		
			(0.210)	(0.284)		
Cultural conservativism			-0.0367	-1.249***		
			(0.278)	(0.386)		
Shari'a			0.519***	-0.417*		
			(0.186)	(0.227)		
Popular will			0.0667	0.259		
			(0.179)	(0.225)		
Suitability of democracy			0.0601	-0.0597		
			(0.0542)	(0.0714)		
Religious state			0.860***	-0.375		
			(0.314)	(0.524)		
Trust in institutions			-0.229	0.00238		
			(0.145)	(0.194)		
Trade union membership					1.123	2.254***
					(0.800)	(0.856)
Mosque attendance					0.152**	-0.196**
					(0.0656)	(0.0951)
Constant	0.685**	-2.592***	-2.103*	2.890**	0.0329	-0.289
	(0.310)	(0.510)	(1.095)	(1.384)	(0.216)	(0.271)
Observations	464	464	355	355	457	457
Pseudo R^2	0.0376		0.1233		0.0279	
Prob>Chi2	0.0001		0.0000		0.0000	

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Model coefficients are referred to the reference group constituted by those voting for other parties than those analyzed

When considering the full model integrating all three dimensions, much of what previously found still applies. As shown in table 4.6, education, house income, willingness to enlist the Shari'a among the sources of law and preference for a religious state appear statistically significant in discriminating the vote choice in the direction seen above, even with slightly different magnitude. For each additional year of schooling, the

probability of a Left/Secular vote increases of only the 7%, while unitary increments in the perceived wealth raise it to 54%. Preference for the Islamic Law ceases to be significantly correlated with a drop in the probabilities to vote for secular parties but remains highly significant in determining a rise (of 78% for each unit increase) in the probabilities to opt for Ennadha. Similarly, other things being equal, the relative probability of voting for Ennadha rather than parties in the reference category is more than double (+221%) for those preferring to live in a religious state. Even if those variables are statistically significant only when contrasting one of category of interest of the dependent variable with the base outcome (education and house income are statistically significant only for Left/Secular outcomes while preferred source of law and preference for a religious state are significant only when considering Ennadha voters), the trends these display are significantly different across Left/Secular and Ennadha voters. Nonetheless, the full model provides also for dissimilarities with the models examined before. First, cultural conservativism ceases to be significant for the Left/Secular outcome and its coefficient associated with Left/Secular and Ennadha voters are not statistically different. Second, the effects of the organizational predictors disappear. While the coefficients of mosque attendance still differ across the Ennadha and Left/Secular voters, this variable is no more significant in discriminating Ennadha voters from the base outcome. Moreover, trade union membership loses both statistically significance in discriminating the base category from the others considered and ceases to differ across Ennadha and Left/Secular voters. Compared to the case of Egypt, at first glance the Tunisian public seems more deeply divided in that the division around the role Shari'a should have within the new regime is accompanied by a divide in the socio/economic conditions due to the statistical difference of the coefficient related to education and house income. The next section will provide a series of robustness checks to attest the reliability of such findings.

Table 4.6: Vote determinants in Tunisia

	Nahdha	Left/Secular
Age	-0.00998	0.00976
	(0.0107)	(0.0146)
Female	0.203	0.378
	(0.326)	(0.416)
Deprived	0.518	-0.0589
	(0.420)	(0.627)
School years	-0.0158	0.0722*
	(0.0291)	(0.0429)
House income	-0.0305	0.435**
	(0.148)	(0.205)
Religiosity	0.346	-0.415
	(0.225)	(0.310)
Traditional index	-0.132	-0.580
	(0.319)	(0.479)
Islamic law	0.582***	-0.315
	(0.193)	(0.240)
Popular will	0.0795	0.396
	(0.187)	(0.244)
Suitability of democracy	0.0493	-0.0306
	(0.0561)	(0.0776)
Religious State	0.795**	-0.177
	(0.325)	(0.551)
Trust in institutions	-0.224	-0.0250
	(0.152)	(0.208)
Mosque attendance	1.354	1.569
	(0.850)	(0.991)
Trade unions membership	0.162	-0.221
	(0.0990)	(0.141)
Constant	-2.335*	-0.547
	(1.344)	(1.851)
Observations	349	349
Pseudo R2 0.1663		
Prob>Chi2 0.0000		

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: Model coefficients are referred to the reference group constituted by those voting for other parties than those analyzed

4.5 THE IMPORTANCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL INTERMEDIARIES

In order to assess the degree of reliability of the present findings, tests of robustness and representativeness are here conducted. The first kind of tests serves the purpose to ascertain whether the models used were suited to account for the vote choice in Tunisia and Egypt. The second ones are needed to assess whether the stemming findings account

for the entire population by controlling for possible selection bias due to the small size of the samples used.

Above all we might want to know the overall meaingfulness of the predictors included in the models by looking at their variance across the different categories of the dependent variable. This can be done recurring to a Wald test for independent variables which verifies whether all the coefficients associated with the independent variables are statistically different form zero, which constitute the null hypothesis. The results of this test, reported in table 4.7, show that for most of the independent variables included in our models, this null hypothesis cannot be rejected – meaning that, from a formal point of view, those variables can be removed from the model for they add nothing to its goodness of fit. In Tunisia only religiosity, preference for Shari'a and an Islamic state and mosque attendance have non trivial effects on the dependent variable. In Egypt the same can be said only for the Islamic law variable.

Table 4.7: Wald test for independent variables

	Tunisia			Egypt		
Vote choice	**Chi2**	**Df**	**P>chi2**	**Chi2**	**Df**	**P>chi2**
Age	2.031	2	0.362	0.569	2	0.752
Female	0.917	2	0.632	2.335	2	0.311
Deprived	1.861	2	0.394	0.495	2	0.781
School years	4.244	2	0.120	3.397	2	0.183
House income	5.662	2	0.059	5.160	2	0.076
Religiosity	6.354	2	0.042	0.109	2	0.947
Traditional index	1.467	2	20.480	2.237	2	20.327
Islamic law	15.313	2	0.000	6.954	2	0.031
Popular will	2.653	2	0.265	3.546	2	0.170
Suitability of democracy	1.352	2	0.509	4.614	2	0.100
State preference	7.792	2	0.020	2.491	2	0.288
Trust in institutions	2.374	2	0.305	2.522	2	0.283
Trade union membership	3.033	2	0.219	5.581	2	0.061
Mosque attendance	7.966	2	0.019	1.989	2	0.370
Constant	3.115	2	0.211	7.043	2	0.030

Note: The H_0 hypothesis tested is that all coefficients associated with given variables are 0

A similar test is also conducted on the dependent variables. In this case we want to know whether, in light of the predictors included into the model, different categories of the dependent variable can be combined. Indeed, if, as shown in table 4.7, only few variables affect the odds of the different outcomes of the dependent variable, it might be the case that the different categories of the dependent variable are indistinguishable with respect to the variable in the model. To ascertain whether this is the case another Wald test has

been conducted to test the null hypothesis that all coefficients except the intercepts associated with a given pair of alternatives are equal to 0. In Tunisia, no one of the categories identified should be collapsed, as table 4.8 shows. In Egypt, by contrast, all pairs of alternative can be collapsed into a unique one (see table 4.9), meaning that, there are not meaningful distinctions across the different groups of voters on the base of the independent variables identified.

Table 4.8: Wald test for combining outcome categories (Tunisia)

	Chi2	df	P>chi2
Others vs. Ennadha	39.575	14	0.000
Others vs. Left/Secular	30.200	14	0.007
Ennadha vs. Left/Secular	60.025	14	0.000

Table 4.9: Wald test for combining outcome categories (Egypt)

	Chi2	df	P>chi2
Others vs. Islamists	23.104	14	0.059
Others vs. Right/Secular	11.363	14	0.657
Islamists vs. Right/Secular	17.668	14	0.222

It then emerges that the fully specified model works quite good for Tunisia, but not for Egypt. What about the step-wise modeling then? The same figure emerges also in this case, with the exception that, as expected, the normative model in the Egyptian case shows a significant distinction between Islamist voters and those opting for a party included in the reference category. Nonetheless, by making a comparison of the goodness of fit between the model with only the socio-economic determinants and the model with only the organizational factors, it emerges that the variables related to individuals' associational life better account for the vote choice than the socio-economic ones. This is what emerges by looking at two particular measures of goodness of fit, namely the AIC (Akaike information criterion) and BIC (Bayesian information criterion). Both measures provide information about the fit of the estimated model with the observed data by

weighing model's likelihood functions for its parameters (and in the case of BIC, also the sample size is taken into account). The recourse to these measures is particularly suited to compare competing theories expressed by different models, and the one with lower scores on both AIC and BIC is to be preferred (Burnham and Anderson 2004). As table 4.10 shows, in both Tunisia and Egypt, the organizational model outperforms the socio/economic one in both measure, thus corroborating network theories for vote choice.

Table 4.10: Measures of fit for multivariate models

	Tunisia			**Egypt**		
	Organizational model	Socio/Economic Model	Difference	Organizational model	Socio/Economic Model	Difference
N:	457	464	-7	127	126	1
LR:	25.331(4)	38.487(12)	-13.156 (-8)	4.247(4)	9.566(10)	-5.319 (-6)
Prob>LR:	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.374	0.479	-0.106
McFaden 's Adj R2:	0.008	-0.004	0.012	-0.050	-0.096	0.046
AIC:	1.972	2.006	-0.034	2.287	2.391	-0.104
BIC:	-1860.673	-1831.179	-14.725	-299.166	-257.066	-42.100

Negative differences between the organizational and the socio/economic model in both AIC and BIC suggest that the first of the two model is to be preferred for it better fits the observed data controlling for the number of the parameters included. Nonetheless, the difference of -14.725 observed in the BIC values for Tunisia suggests that the organizational model is far better than the other one in accounting for the vote choice. The same goes for Egypt, even though none of the two models is deemed to be reliable for we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is in fact no effect of the independent variables, taken together, on the dependent variable (Prob>LR is greater than 0.05). Yet, the organizational model seems the less evil.

As far as the representativeness of these findings is concerned, a test has been conducted by comparing the means of the independent variables between the sample constituted by those voting for a political party and all other respondents. By looking at the results in tables 4.11 and 4.12, it emerges that while the variables accounting for individual beliefs and political preferences do not vary across the two groups, much of variation is at stake as far as the socio/economic and organizational variables are concerned. It is to because

the probability that the means of those variable differ across the two groups is higher than 95%.

Table 4.11: T-test results on two independent samples, Egypt

Variable	Party voters	Others	Pr(|T| > |t|)
age (mean)	37.42636	39.75413	0.0735
female (mean)	.3100775	.5183486	0.0000
deprived (mean)	.4418605	.5798165	0.0028
schooling years (mean)	10.33333	8.623853	0.0037
house income (mean)	2.206349	1.836111	0.0000
self-reported religiosity (mean)	2.338583	2.363383	0.6106
traditional index (mean)	2.54080	2.608265	0.2254
mosque attendance (mean)	3.425197	3.127679	0.0101
trade union member (mean)	.1472868	.093578	0.0538
preference for Shari'a (mean)	3.232558	3.232537	0.9998
Suitability democracy (mean)	6.897638	6.819139	0.7146

Table 4.12: T-test results on two independent samples, Tunisia

Variable	Party voters	Others	Pr(|T| > |t|)
age (mean)	37.42918	41.81096	0.0000
female (mean)	0.4270386	0.5410959	0.0001
deprived (mean)	.1523605	.2589041	0.0000
schooling years (mean)	9,381974	7.224658	0.0000
house income (mean)	2.172414	1.859944	0.0000
self-reported religiosity (mean)	1.995633	1.956764	0.3108
mosque attendance (mean)	2.886214	2.443515	0.0000
trade union member (mean)	.0429185	.0219178	0.0382
preference for Shari'a (mean)	2.770642	2.717822	0.2627
Suitability democracy (mean)	5.926606	6.043831	0.4415

In particular, in both countries respondents declaring to vote for a political parties tend to be younger, male and are socially and economically well integrated. They are indeed more affluent than the rest of the sample, more educated, do not reside in deprived areas and are more probably than others trade union members or mosque attendants. This picture enlightens that while individuals' political preferences are equally distributed across the party voters and the rest of the sample, individuals' reaction to elections, e.g. deciding

whether to participate or not, vote for an independent candidate or a party, or being undecided, relies on their socio/economic background and their organizational newtorks. In light of this, while political preferences regarding the role of religion in politics – i.e. Shair'a as source of law and preference for a religious state - are the primary drivers accounting for the electoral preference between Islamist and their secular counterparts, socio/economic and organizational variables are relevant in accounting for how this preference is expressed and the degree of political conscience underneath.

The present findings reveal that indeed no remarkable differences emerge in the two national patterns of vote choice. In both cases, the divide appears to be confined to the role of religion in politics as the result of individuals' proximity to particular networks. Yet, while these findings are sufficient to dismiss the hypothesis that deep and stratified social divisions have played a role in the two processes of transitions, it is not sufficient to dismiss the hypothesis that the religious divide alone can be perceived as a threat to the achievement of any kind of compromised agreement upon the future of the *constituendum* political regime and its nation. In both cases, preferences for more religion in politics predict the vote for religious parties while its rejection is positively correlated to the electoral preference for their competitors. But was Islam the real and major concern of North African people? The next chapter will answer this question thus enlightening why Islamists dominated the ballot boxes.

5 UNFAIR PATTERNS OF COMPETITION AND TRANSITIONAL PARTIES' POWER RESOURCES

Intriguingly, the emergence of a religious cleavage limited to the normative sphere, occurs shortly after mass protests articulated by claims historically prompted by leftist parties, which were dominant in the 1970s but performed incredibly poor in the subsequent decades and in the 2011-2012 elections as well. According to Hinnebusch (1981), the causes of the emergence of some parties and the rollback of others are to be attributed either to the social environment or to the structures of the state, or both. After ascertaining that society seem particularly receptive to Leftists' messages, this part is dedicated to the investigation of the institutional determinants behind different parties' power resources which, accordingly to the model exposed in chapter three, contribute to the formation of parties' strategy profile within processes of democratic installation. This disproportion of power, expressed in terms of parties' share of seats inside the elected assemblies, discourages cooperative strategies from the part of bigger parties thus undermining the prospects of a democratic installation. While in Tunisia the strength of Ennadha was rather contained, that was not the case for the Islamist faction in Egypt. While it is certainly true that the different electoral systems for the founding elections in Tunisia and Egypt contribute to explain for eventual misrepresentations and the possible creation of governing coalitions, it appears that the disproportion between the great victories of Islamist formations and the poor records displayed by the leftist ones has deeper roots. In line with a regional trend, in both Tunisia and Egypt, the cooptation, manipulation and repression of oppositions within the previous authoritarian regimes have contributed to the electoral successes of the Islamists parties while determining the irrelevance of the leftist ones, thus undermining the prospect for a democratic installation.

5.1 FROM LEFTIST PROTESTS TO THE ISLAMIST DOMINION: THE GAP OF THE FOUNDING ELECTIONS

The uprisings of 2010-2011 are often accounted for as unorganized spontaneous movements of protests led by young people and a-political in their contents (Cavatorta 2012). It is so because "no party, no union, no politician gave the impetus for this popular uprising nor were they in any way involved" (Ben Yahmed 2011). The upheavals occurred "outside the expected parameters of civil activism" (Cavatorta 2012, 78). They didn't have any recognizable leaders, nor they were imbued with clearly recognizable ideologies. Moreover, long standing opposition groups, such as the Islamists and the lefts were caught by surprise by these uprisings in the same way of the incumbent dictators and foreign observers. Remarkably enough, in 2011 the protesters rejected any partisan affiliations, nor were they known for previous political or trade unionist engagement. Out of this, much of ink has flowed to account for the role of the social media as substitutes for coordination functions, which are usually ascribed to political parties and to the formal structures of social activism, "in spreading protest messages, driving coverage by mainstream broadcasters, connecting frustrated citizens with one another, and helping them to realize that they could take shared action regarding shared grievances" (Howard and Hussain 2011, 41), too often overlooking the real content of these grievances. Contrasting this narrative recounting the deeds of 'the people' as a revolutionary actor triggered by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, the young man who set himself on fire on December 17th 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, some scholars locate these uprisings in a broader contest of class struggle. Writing before the popular uprisings of 2010-2011, Allal (2009, 2010) and Al-Mahdi (2011) account for a sustained activity of contentious politics brought about by the workers in Tunisia and Egypt respectively since the mid-2000s. In both cases, the working class, which was the hardcore constituency of post-independence populist regimes, started to organize itself beyond the established corporative structures to protest against the erosion of the social pact underpinning those regimes before the introduction of neo-liberal measures of political economy. In line with these contributions, for Zemni et al., the Arab Spring is a step toward "political and social emancipation of the masses from domination and exploitation" (Zemni, De Smet, and Bogaert 2013, 18) brought about by the capitalist economy. In their reading, the

organization of the labor movement had spillover effects on the entire civil society. Drawing from Luxemburg, according to which "the economic struggle is the transmitter from one political center to another; the political struggle is the periodic fertilization of the soil for the economic struggle. Cause and effect here continually change places ... " (1906, 145 cited in Zemni et al. 2013), the economic grievances naturally arrived to question the very political choices of incumbents and the nature of their regimes. In this way, those not falling into the categories of workers, but belonging instead to the educated middle classes of favored areas translated such economic claims into political grievances. In a very similar way, Achcar conceives the Arab Spring as a "as a protracted or long-term revolutionary process" (Achcar 2013, 17) not really against neo-liberalism tout court, but rather against its specific regional variant imbued with rentierism and/or patrimonialism.

While it is not the scope of this chapter to investigate whether the Arab Spring was actually a revolution against neo-capitalistic liberal regimes led by leftist-inspired forces, it is nonetheless true that the uprisings across the region, and particularly in Tunisia and Egypt, spoke a leftist jargon resumed in the revolutionary claims "change, freedom and social justice" or "bread, jobs and dignity" (Chomiak and Entelis 2011). In this regard, the recourse to the ABII data allows to capture personal orientations regarding some values that correspond to the tenets of the Left, namely the need for pluralism, secularism, women rights, and economic redistribution (for the construction of variables see the annex). The data show that when the previous regime was toppled and a new one was yet to build, north African citizens of Tunisia and Egypt were majorly concerned by the economic environment.

As figure 5.1 shows, precisely 69.34% and 82,79% of Tunisians and Egyptians respectively perceived unemployment and poverty as the major challenges of their country despite the precarious institutional and political conditions. Indeed, concerns over regime stability and internal security are regarded as the major challenge only by 7,36% of Tunisians and 6,97% of Egyptians, coming after the desire to fight administrative and financial corruption.

Figure 5.1: Perceived priorities in Tunisia and Egypt, 2011



Source: Arab Barometer, Wave II

Finally, and from a broader perspective, in the immediate aftermath of the regimes' downfall and right before the call for the elections, the majority of surveyed people believed that a parliamentary system, wherein all parties can compete in elections, would be appropriate for their country. Even though this is not a uniquely leftist claim, leftist parties have nonetheless championed the introduction of a genuine parliamentary system and political pluralism (see figure 5.2). At the same time, the majority of respondents believed that religion should be disentangled from social and the political life (see figure 5.3), and that women should have the same opportunities and rights as men (see figure 5.4). The variables used to grasp these personal orientations toward these issues are all ordinal categorical variables ranging from 1 (total detachment) to 4 (complete attachment). Interestingly, in no cases such political values are put under discussion in that the means in both countries are always beyond the 2 score threshold. Moreover, these figures are in line with a regional trend whereby Arab public's social and political

orientations are gradually shifting toward more modern, pluralist and secular stances (Resta 2018).

Figure 5.2: Suitabiltity of a Parliamentary system wherein all parties can contest elections, 2011



Source: Arab Barometer, Wave II.

Figure 5. 3: Index of secularism, 2011



Source: Arab Barometer, Wave II.

Figure 5. 4: Support for gender equality



Source: Arab Barometer, Wave II.

Yet, these findings sound like a paradox in that the rise (or the discovery) of a society supportive of redistributive measures and progressive values corresponds to the

resurgence of Islamist parties both in terms of mass support and parliamentary representation within transitional regimes. As a matter of fact, the revolutionary claims and the normative orientations of surveyed respondents would have predicted a massive Left vote in both Tunisia and Egypt instead of an 'Islamist dominion'. The reasons of this electoral gap, expressed through the lack of political representation of this new Arab public (Achcar 2013), have been framed in terms of 'bad choices' as far as the transitional electoral systems are concerned. Yet, it might be the case to also consider to frame them in terms of uneven patterns competition resulting in an unbalanced power resources among the competing parties to the benefit of the Islamists one. In the following the validity of each account will be considered.

5.2 BLAME ON THE FOUNDING ELECTORAL SYSTEMS?

The electoral systems used for the founding elections are naturally the prime suspects regarded as accountable for the gap observed between people's orientations and the results produced by the ballot boxes. The impact of the electoral systems on the political life of a given country has been a majorly debated theme in political science but their effect are all the more salient at the time of founding elections in cases where the transition from non-democracy is rapid and dramatic (Carey 2014).

Depending on the decisions around the three constitutive elements of an electoral system, namely the electoral formula, the structure of the vote and the dimension of electoral districts, it is possible to arrive to different kinds of electoral systems depending on their simplicity, their effects on inclusiveness, distortion, incentives in building coalitions and individual accountability – aspects electoral reformers in founding elections are deemed to purse as goals (Carey and Reynolds 2011). In this perspective, as has been reported by many, different kinds of electoral systems can favor or hinder a democratic transition by determining the relative power positioning of competing parties and by conceding room to manipulations and frauds. Out these considerations, the Tunisian electoral system has been often presented as the poster case for its positive impact on the Constituent Assembly, while the Egyptian one has been repeatedly pointed to as one of the principal

causes of the failed transition. Yet, as the remaining part of this section will show, while the electoral systems can account for relative differences in single parties' representation, displaying more or less distortive effects, they fall short in accounting for the regional (beyond Tunisia and Egypt) success of Islamic formations and the concomitant rollback of leftist parties which, from the above survey data, appear as the natural vehicles for the realization of north African people's political ambitions.

5.2.1 The Tunisian electoral system

The electoral system choice made by Ben Ashour's commission has deemed to be particularly fortunate by many observers (Carey and Reynolds 2011; Carey 2013; Stepan and Linz 2013). It is so because the provisions around its constitutive element assured "high scores on almost all key markers" (Carey and Reynolds 2011, 40) mentioned above. As far as the structure of vote is concerned, the closed-list vote providing for the gender quota has had good effects on inclusiveness but noxious effects on individual accountability. On the one hand, the provision of lists with alternated representation of men and women had the undoubtable effect of including in the circuit of passive electorate also women otherwise possibly left at the margins. On the other hand, this has deprived citizens with the possibility of choosing their own candidates – whereas party did – thus reducing MPs' accountability in front of their electorates. This effect appears in all its evidence by looking at the parties' outflows inside the ANC in the months following the elections. Coming further to the most substantive features, the recourse to the Hare electoral formula with largest remainders (HQLR), which is the most proportional electoral system among those available, was enhanced by the district magnitude. Indeed, at the time of elections, the 33 electoral districts were to elect the members of the constituent assembly (for a total of 217) in proportion to their population. Out of this, districts' magnitude ranged from 1 to 10, but often districts were entrusted with the election of 5 or 7 MPs. In the absence of a legal threshold, this moderate magnitude allowed the representation of also small parties. It is so because under the HQLR formula, seats are allocated by dividing the total number of casted votes in each district for the seats assigned by it. This is the electoral quota, alternatively known as the

price parties pay to automatically receive one seat. The more the seats at stake in a given constituency the lesser the number of votes needed to gain a seat. Moreover, possible remaining seats are further assigned to those parties with the largest remainders. The combined effect of the HQLR with the size of the district allowed even smaller parties to compete for votes with the concrete hope of acceding to the parliament (Duverger 1954). In this way, as Carey notes,

> "the HQLR method awarded Ennahda 41% of the seats in the Assembly, or 4% above its vote share. It is noteworthy that, despite dominating the field of parties, Ennahda's seat bonus was not the largest. The bonuses of much smaller alliances were as large – and in one case, even larger – than Ennahda's in absolute terms, and many times larger in relative terms. Together, these seat bonuses for small alliances determined that Ennahda fell well short of a majority of the seats in the Constituent Assembly and, consequently, had to negotiate with other alliances in the process of drafting a constitution. By contrast, had Tunisia chosen differently – for example, had it chosen the other most common PR formula for converting votes to seats, the d'Hondt Divisor (DHD) method – Ennahda would have won 69% of the Assembly seats and been in a position to impose a new constitution unilaterally" (Carey 2014, 10).

5.2.2 The Egyptian Electoral System

As saw in the second chapter, the transitional roadmap settled in Egypt to oversee the passage from SCAF's control to a civilian rule has been reported as an example of how to not conduct a transition. In the same line, the electoral system adopted for the founding elections has been described as "headed for failure" (Carey and Reynolds 2011, 39) for the purposes of democratic transition.

The SCAF envisaged for the founding elections a complex electoral system whereby one third of the Parliament would have been elected trough individual candidacies, while the remaining two third according to a closed-list system. As far as the elections of individuals was concerned, for the People Assembly and the Shura Council, the law

provided the disposition of respectively 83 and 30 two-member districts. Coming to the closed-list part, 46 districts were to elect 332 members of the People Assembly, while 30 districts were designed to assign a total of 120 seats. The electoral formula to convert votes in seats for closed-list districts was, as in Tunisia, the HQLR, and a legal threshold was also provided as low as 0,5% of the nationwide vote. To make things more complex, each branch of the parliament was elected in six separate rounds across three distinct regions for a total of twelve election days. The rationale behind this decision was that of overcoming the lack of personnel to supervise the correct conduct of elections. Yet, this has open the room to frauds, manipulation of the electoral results and strategic vote following the announcement of previous results.

Individual candidacies are deemed to assure the accountability between principals (electors) and agents (elected). Yet, this structure of vote recalls the electoral system adopted in the same Egypt before 1984 and 1990 that "increased the importance of money in elections" (Carey and Shugart 1995; Masoud 2014, 68) and paved the way for the reassertion of patronage practices, networks of kinship and vote-buying over policy programs. Masoud (2014) indeed, described that system as a 'death knell' for parties other than the ruling RCD and the Islamists.

Besides the effects of a spaced out vote, it is indeed quite difficult to assess the overall impact of such complex system, wherein two symmetrically different kind of vote (majoritarian and proportional) coexists, on the phase of installation. On the one hand, Masoud (2014) welcomed this system because, in his opinion, the combined effect of large district size for the majoritarian vote and the PR part, would have brought politics back in allowing even smaller parties to compete on the base of their political platforms. On the other hand, other scholars, emphasized the distortive effects of the majoritarian vote and point to the fact that lot of proportional districts are "too small to offer voice to fledging parties outside the dominant players" (Carey and Reynolds 2011, 38). In the same line, but emphasizing the fuzziness of the entire electoral system, and the fact that it proceeded along separate steps, others downplayed the fairness of elections, seeing them too prone to manipulation and conducive to excessive distortions (Morlino 2012). Tavana (2011), by contrast, is more cautious in praising or condemning the Egyptian electoral system in that he highlights two opposite effects it eventually produced. On the one hand, the individual candidacies in large districts pushed parties to band together to

increase their probability of success. On the other hand, the high magnitude of the proportional districts encouraged parties' proliferation, because the threshold for acceding Parliament was really low. Overall, as he noticed, "although parties will coalesce into three distinct ideological groups, they will be both weak and loosely organized" (D. Tavana 2011, 564).

5.2.3 Comparing the effects of the electoral systems

By comparing the number of list registered and contesting the elections, it emerges that the Tunisian electoral system incentivized parties' competition and inclusion more than the Egyptian one. As a matter of fact, in Tunisia around 560 lists were registered, 154 of those presented themselves in at least one district and 4 of them run in all the districts. By contrast, in Egypt, something like 40 lists applied to contest elections, 29 of them in at least one district but only one presented in all of them. However, the degree of inclusion of a given electoral system is not to confound with its degree of distortion. If Tunisia's electoral system choice has been praised for its suitability to the exigencies of democratic installations, the same cannot be said for the Egyptian one by mean of the majoritarian vote and by mean of how the voting procedures took place.

In this sense, the electoral system – as expected- is for sure responsible for the creation of an unbalanced power distribution allowing the Egyptian Islamists to rule all alone thus nullifying the incentives to seek for bargain and compromise, as was forced to do Ennadha. But, going backward, why did Islamists arrived at gaining so much vote nonetheless? Why did they perform so well both under the proportional rule, which emphasizes 'politics', and under the majorities one, which stresses on the importance of candidates' popularity? And why this was the case in both the countries here considered, but also in other?

5.3 THE DOUBLE STANDARD: PATTERNS OF COMPETITION BETWEEN LEFTISTS AND ISLAMISTS BEFORE THE ARAB SPRING

As already mentioned, the power advantage of Islamists parties, enlightened by the results of the ballot boxes, appears like a paradox (Cavatorta and Storm forthcoming) and having deep roots in both countries. Dominant oppositions forces in the 1970s, leftist parties have consistently lost appeal across the Arab world while political Islam has imposed itself as a major political force. More intriguingly, the Arab Spring seemingly unveiled the existence of a rather progressive society in line with the values and policies of the Left. Yet, in post-uprising democratic elections in Tunisia and Egypt, Left parties have been largely marginalized by the success of their competitors: the Islamist parties. Drawing from Hinnebusch, political parties in the Middle East, as their counterparts in western consolidated democracies, can be considered as barometers of "the nature and the development of politics in the region" (Hinnebusch 2005, 335). In particular, parties are deemed to: i) reflect the inherited societal tradition, and with it the power of sub-national and trans-national identities; ii) reflect societal change, in terms of composition, ideologies, and organizational capacit[ies]; and to iii) reflect and affect the process of state formation (ibid., italics in original). Out of this theoretical framework, the very reasons for the decline of Leftist parties and the concomitant resurgence of the Islamists are to be found within the society, intended as its inner characteristics and its perception of political changes, and within the national polities. It might then be the case that either leftism did not chime any longer with mass aspirations, while Islamism did, or that the evolution of the North African regimes here considered has been detrimental to leftist parties but not to Islamists. Indeed, each of the explanations attributed to the decline of Leftist parties falls within one of these two referent environments, namely the social and the institutional. As for the former, some have argued that the importance of trans-national identities the Left embodied, namely Communism, Socialism and Nasserism, lost their attractiveness because of the failure of the URSS and of the Nasserist socio-economic and political experiments (Hilal 2014; Graham 2004; Murphy and Ehteshami 1996). Others see in the organizational rigidity of leftist parties a problematic Soviet importation that undermined the capacity of the Arab Left to accommodate social dynamism (Yacoub 2014). By contrast, others point to the reliance of leftist parties in the charisma of their

leaders, thus reflecting the regional praxis of the personalization of politics (Shteiwi 2014). Along similar lines, the decline of Leftist parties has been attributed to their poor institutionalization (Hilal 2014; Storm 2014). This goes hand in hand with the claim that leftist parties were too elitist and too concerned with the intellectual work to develop any meaningful link with their societies (Guessoumi 2014). Although all these accounts enhance our comprehension of the phenomenon under investigation, a reappraisal is needed.

On the one hand, arguing that Leftism has lost appeal because its past failures might be misleading. Firstly, as Masoud puts brilliantly, "such arguments assume that the Egyptian peasant or the Yemeni tribesman (or the American political science professor) decide whom to vote for by weighting the historical records of alternative worldviews" (2014, 57). Indeed, Latin American countries prove that Leftist politics has not been buried under the ruins of the URSS. Secondly, these readings completely disregard the fact that many people in the Arab World self-place on the left side of the political spectrum (Tessler 2011; Masoud 2014) and that their personal orientations support Leftist agendas, as our data confirm. On the other hand, conceiving the decline of Leftist parties as a result of their organizational deficiencies that translate into their detachment from the public might be myopic. Considering the mobilization capacities these parties have enjoyed up to the late 1970s, such accounts confound the causes with the effects of other intervening variables. And this leads to the introduction of institutional explanations.

Both state gained their independence from foreign domination through revolutions inspired by leftist ideology, whose fight against the oppression of the capital was translated into a fight against the oppression of colonization. Since the 1960s all people and political elite gathered around the princes of those revolution, still galvanized by the common cause of independence and the big challenges ahead for the shake of nation and state building. Yet, from that moment, signals of uneasiness with the incumbent rule, namely power concentration and economic policies, started to surface finding political expression. As has been showed, when the single party rule seemed not being enough to secure the power of the incumbent rulers, authoritarian regimes started to actively manipulate the structures of competition giving this strategy a semblance of political liberalization (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004; Heydemann 2007). From this moment on, both Tunisia and Egypt's authoritarian regimes survived through a mix of repression

and cooptation that has, intentionally or not, advantages the Islamists parties. In both countries, while leftist and moderate conservative parties were fragmented between co-opted factions and illegal ones, the Islamists were invariably enlisted among illegal opposition forces. Yet, the repression targeting illegal groups was by far more efficient in destroying left parties, which relied on easily recognizable and traditional channels of mobilization, but for several reasons was quite ineffective in equally silencing the Islamist factions. The remaining part of this chapter will show how it did happen and what are the consequences of such uneven competition in terms of parties' power resources in the aftermath of the downfall of the authoritarian regimes of Mubarak and Ben Ali.

5.3.1 Leftist and Islamist oppositions in authoritarian Tunisia

The problem of oppositions' management arose in all its salience in Bourguiba's Tunisia only in the late '60s. From 1956 – years of independence – to that moment, "politics was dominated by the Neo-Destour's evolution from a mass-based nationalist movement into an authoritarian ruling party" (Alexander 2016, 34). Not that in this period political opposition was absent, but was rather confined within the Néo-Destour, the ruling party, and silenced through the personalization of politics. As observed, "part of Bourguiba's genius lay in his ability to play competing factions and personalities off against one another and to use promotions to pull people under his thumb" (ibid. 38). Wouldn't this suffice, individual expulsion (as happened to Ben Youssef and Ben Salah) or physical elimination (as happened to Ben Youssef) of opponents followed (Vandewalle 1980). The only opposition party present and active at that time was the Tunisian Communist Party (PCT). Present since the 1920s, it was then banned in 1963, the same year wherein the fusion between Buorguiba's party and state was sanctioned with the Bizerte Congress. Functional to the one-party regime was then the fusion of Bourguiba's party with the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT).

Political opposition outside the ruling party, from 1964 named Socialist Destourian Party (PSD, out of it French acronym) in the attempt to host the dissident voices from the left (Perkins 2004), emerged as the economic management of the country proved ruinous and the democratic overtures promised by Bourguiba, both inside the party and in the country,

remained unattained. Popular discontent found expressions in the mass protests of 1968, while discontent internal to the PSD paved the way for outflows. In that same year, Ahmed Mestiri, a minister of the state and a leading figure inside the party was expelled by the PSD after denouncing the failure of the economic plan engineered by Bourguiba and Ben Salah. He was then reintegrated two years later and expelled again 1972 for having expressed the desire of more internal democracy within the PSD. This time, the distancing from the ruling party was definitive and, along with other dissidents, Mestiri created the Mouvement of Socialist Demorats (MDS). The party, along with other political formations, remarkably the PCT and Salah's Popular Unity Movement (MUP) remained illegal until 1981.

The rise of other political voices from outside the PSD calling for democracy and social justice found fertile grounds. Bourguiba's reform of education produced a "unprecedented numbers of a young people [who] received secondary and university educations at home or in Europe" (Alexander 2016, 43) which was more politicized and inclined to protest as the distribution of wealth proceeded unbalanced and as the Bourguiba's grip on the country grew tighter culminating in the 1974 Congress of Monastir which designated him President for life. In 1978, mass protests spread around the country with unparalleled participation and violence. These events, pushed the Islamists, which up to that moment were only concerned in pure intellectual debate and preaching, to undertake political activity (Tamimi 2001). Because they were totally stranger to the facts and opposed the uprising of January 26th, the government initially perceived the Islamists as a potential ally to contrast the left (Allani 2009). While hardly repressing the left behind the protests, the central government closed an eye on Islamists which in turn profited from the crackdown on workers' unions to enlarge their following (Achcar 2013; Allani 2009; Tamimi 2001).

With so many political movements beyond the PSD dispersed in the society, and in need of restoring its lost ascendancy, Bourguiba accepted the popular demand for more democracy by calling the first contested elections in 1981. However, this doesn't mean that political parties other than PSD became legal. Indeed, this would have followed only if they would have obtained at least 5% of nationwide votes (Alexander 2016). Encouraged by this overture, the Islamists decided to go public by constituting in that same year the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) to participate in the political life of the

state. Nonetheless, frightened by the great following the Movement was displaying, the government organized mass arrests toward its members and the MTI was banned. By contrast, MDS, MUP and the PCT run for elections hoping this would be conducive to legal recognition. However, multiparty elections were not mean to give the way to more inclusion and competition, but only to calm the protests and have the pulse of oppositions' strength. Preoccupied by the possibility that those elections would be conducive to government alternation, Bourguiba intervened by "manipulate[ing] the voter rolls, intimidate[ing] oppositions observers at polling places and falsify[ing] the vote count" (Alexander 2016, 45). At the end, a plebiscitary victory was constructed for the PSD while the others didn't manage to reach the 5% of national vote. Tunisia then ended its pluralistic experiment and Bourguiba's power continue to rely on a single-party system. Out of this, those not absorbed by this structure were easily outlawed and repressed. In this latter regard, great efforts were devoted to annihilate both Islamists and leftists. On the hand, despite signs of overture toward the MTI in 1984 by the at-that-time prime Minister Muhammed Mzali (Allani 2009), a harsh repression hit the movement in 1987 after Islamists students' strikes (Boulby 1988). On the other hand, left parties continued to be banned and the fusion between the PSD and the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) engineered though the 1960s and 1970s, along with the suppression and the control of other independent trade unions and professional associations, closed them any possibility of mass mobilization making them the expression of upper class and intellectuals' frustrations (Gessoumi 2014).

Ben Ali's "medical coup" in 1987 seemed to inaugurate a new beginning characterized by democratic overtures both in terms of political competition and in terms of political and civil rights. This was at least what resulted from the 1987 Declaration and, more importantly, from the National Pact of the following year. While the Declaration, pronounced in the day of Ben Ali's takeover meant to sign a clear rupture with the hegemonic and paternalistic management of power[61], the National Pact wanted to be

[61] The most salient passage reads "Our people has reached a degree of responsibility and maturity where every individual and group is in a position to constructively contribute to the running of its affairs, in conformity with the republican idea which gives institutions their full scope and guarantees the conditions for a responsible democracy, fully respecting the sovereignty of the people as written into the Constitution. This Constitution needs urgent revision. The times in which we live can no longer admit of life presidency

programmatic document establishing government orientation within the four salient fields of national identity, the political regime, economic development, and foreign policy agreed upon also by the oppositions. The project provided for both the accommodation of Islam in society and the settlement of the democratic polity "Tunisians deserv[ed]" (Ben Ali's words from the National Pact). Indeed, sixteen among opposition parties and civil society organizations signed the 1988 Pact under the auspices this would have led to a relaxation of relations with the governing power and to a pluralistic society. As a matter of fact, beyond the pact there were good reasons to believe to this new beginning (Angrist 1999). In the days following Ben Ali's accession to power, men closed to Bourguiba were removed from key power positions and the party name changed into National Constitutional Rally (RCD) to mark the distance with the single-party regime. More than 5,000 political prisoners –including chiefs of the oppositions – were released from prison and exiles were invite to come back in their country. Further, the UN Convention against Torture was ratified to prevent the reiteration of common practices under Bourguiba. On the plan of the institutional reforms, on December 15 1987 a Constitutional Council was created – albeit with a merely consultative role - and life presidency came to an end[62]. On the plan of political liberties, political parties were allowed to form and operate enjoying new freedoms of expressions and association[63], which now seemed to dialogue with the power. The MTI, for instance, established a student union, the General Union of Tunisian Students (UGET) and was allowed to publish its journal (Allani 2009).

All the premises for a new beginning seemed to be there and the 1989 infused great expectations (Anderson 1991). However, the envisaged majoritarian electoral system "worked a tremendous hardship on small, new parties that did not have national organizations" (Alexander 2016, 53). Hence, Ben Ali proposed to the parties signing the National Pact to run jointly with the RCD and eventually divide the stemming spoils. This solution was certainly a win-win situation. On the one hand, it would allow the RCD to control the majority of parliamentary seats. On the other hand, given the electoral system,

---

or automatic succession, from which the people is excluded. Our people deserves an advanced and institutionalized political life, truly based on the plurality of parties and mass organizations"

[62] See Constitutional Law n. 88-88, 25th July 1988.

[63] See Organic Law 89-90, 2th August 1988 which modifies and completed law n. 59-154 of November 7th 1959.

it constituted the only way for opposition parties to enter representative institutions. However, this project collapsed after Mestiri's decision to run alone. Given his decision to detach its front from the ruling party, all other opposition parties understood that their credibility would have been really mined if they would have run with the RCD. Nonetheless, these latter were furious against Mestiri and all oppositions run under separate lists. Aborted Ben Ali's initiative, also the MTI, now named Ennadha decided to run alone. Still lacking the legal recognition, it had nonetheless obtained the permission to file its candidates as independents. Hence, those elections saw a unified Islamist camp and a disunified left competing against the ruling party. The disaster of the latter was sound, the MDS – the major competing party to the dominant RCD – gained only 4% of votes losing the right for legal recognition, while the success of the former was impressive. As a matter of fact, Ennadha candidates won the 14% of nationwide votes, reaching a peak of 30% in some urban areas (Alexander 2016). That was simply too much for the pluralism Ben Ali had in mind. A new wave of harsh repression hit again the Islamists. In this way the 1989 elections proved that the hegemony of the oppositions champ shifted from the left to Islamists and that Ben Ali's regime was not more inclined than the previous one in allowing genuine pluralism (Hibou 2011; Khiari and Lamloum 1999; Sadiki 2002).

From this moment on, the Islamists continued to operate underground until the 2011 revolution. Toward them, the regime alternated periods of tolerance with persecutions (as happened after the adoption of laws against terrorism following September 11, 2001), but they have been always prevented to contest elections, even as independents. By contrast, a bunch of leftist parties - namely MDS, Ettajdid, Unionist Democratic Union and the Party of People Unity, from the 1994 elections have been allowed to participate in the political and institutional life of the countries, but always within the boundaries established by the regime. By so doing, these parties moderated their oppositional stances and their electoral support, thus augmenting their dependency upon regime's benevolence for their survival. This journey to irrelevance is also the result of regime's success in closing to the left its natural channel of mass mobilization and electoral support. While trade unions were coopted or annihilated and professional associations easily infiltrated, the poor areas of the country, which would have support left's redistributive policy programs, relied on practices of vote-buying and electoral patronage (as the success of

the RCD in those areas prove). As consequences, leftist opposition from the 2000s found expression in a series of urban civil society's initiatives which nonetheless refused any kind of partisan and ideological affiliation. Instances of this trend are the Palestinian Youth Association for Leadership and Rights Activation and the Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH), already active since 1977 but which gained new momentum in those years.

5.3.2 Leftist and Islamist oppositions in authoritarian Egypt

Like Bourguiba in Tunisia, also Nasser, in the aftermath of the Free Officers' revolution in 1952, spent much of effort in creating a consensual environment suitable for the one-person rule. Like in Tunisia, the period going from 1952 to mid-1960s witnessed the creation of a single party-system - namely the Liberation Rally (LR) after named Arab Socialist Union (ASU) in 1962 - merged with state institutions (Brownlee 2007). This took place through the control, co-optation, repression of real or possible oppositions and the depoliticization of the polity. As Lust-Okar notes,

> "a new constitution, put to a referendum in 1956, created a presidency with vast powers. The 1956 "Law on the Exercise of Political Rights" established state control over all forms of political participation; the 1958 Law no. 162 confirmed the president's right to declare and terminate states of emergency; the 1960 Law no. 156 nationalized the media, effectively eliminating freedom of the press; a 1963 law stipulated that union leaders must be members of the ASU; and the 1964 law no. 32 allowed the government to prohibit organizations that threatened 'morality' and the 'interest of the republic'" (Lust-Okar 2005, 61).

Further, paralleling Bourguiba's co-optation and fusion of the UGTT with its party, Nasir in 1961 merged pre-existent trade unions (already under state control) into the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), falling under the direct control of the government (Posusney 1997). Together with the abolition of all pre-existent political parties, included the Communist Party, in 1953, the harsh repression against the Muslim Brotherhood

(MB), present in Egypt since 1928, and the Emergency Law active since 1967, all these measures seemed at first glance to have fulfill their scope and society appeared under control.

Much like would later happen with Ben Ali's takeover, Sadat's accession to power following Nasser's death in 1970 witnessed major changes. Sadat presented himself as the man of a new – and more open - political era. He adjusted Egypt's international position by approaching to the Western sphere of influence and in so doing he apparently opened the door to political liberalization. Major adjustments occurred both within the centers of power and in the overall polity to depart from the inherited set-up. On the one hand, to pursue its ambitious agenda, he reorganized the cabinet; appointed key governors; purged both the National Assembly and the security forces; reformed the ASU's top organization and established a committee to write a new constitution. On the other hand, he relaxed the grip of the regime on the political organization and participation of oppositions with a special eye on the Muslim Brotherhood. In his mind, the MB was an important ally to "counterweigh the combined opposition to his regime (mounted by Nasserite and leftist elements)" (Ibrahim 1982, 76). From this moment on, Islamists leaders "reemerged from prisons" (Brown 2012, 87) or made return from abroad to revive their organization under Sadat's tolerance, "if not outright blessing" (Ibrahim 1982, 76).

By 1976, times appeared then mature for the emergence of (limited) pluralism and multipartitism. In that year, the National Progressive Union Party (NPUP), also known as Tagammu, and the Liberal Socialist Union saw the light as ASU's outflows under the impulse of Sadat to introduce a semblance of political liberalization (Hinnebusch 1981) and the first multiparty elections were held. As expected, the ASU gained the overwhelming majority of seats, while its competitors achieved only modest gains (15 and 3 seats for the Liberal Socialist Union and Tagammu respectively) and independents, majorly composed by MB's exponents, gained 47 seats. This kind of results will constitute Sadat's regency till his death, but not without efforts to contain the left, represented by the NPUP, through repression and the by encouraging the expansion of the MB.

Because of the circumstance surrounding its creation, the NPUP –up to now the more long-lived in some moment also the more vibrant leftist opposition- was initially regarded with ambiguity. Soon after though, the party's involvement in 1977 bread riots signed a

clear rupture with the regime and its position as opposition party was reinforced. Thus, its following went far beyond an already politicized constituency and the party obtained the support of the wider working class, the middle class, progressive intellectuals and professionals. In particular, the NPUP seemed to have strongholds among the working class in the major districts of al Cairo and Alexandria. As Hendriks reports,

> "Of approximately one hundred eighty registered party members in one Cairo qism (district), thirty-one percent were workers, forty-one percent were muwazzafìn [clerks, rev], and the remaining twenty-eight percent were students. The official figures underestimate actual workers' support. In this district, one worker, who was a member of the local leadership group (lejnat el qism), collected membership fees from thirty-one colleagues, many of whom did not want to register officially. Given the risk of being known as a Tajammu'awi for people who feel more vulnerable vis-a-vis the authorities than do educated muwazzaf, it is probable that this underenumeration occurs elsewhere as well". (1983, 267)

In a relatively short period of time, the party had succeeded in developing a complex organizational structure and in penetrating trade unions - despite government interferences - the professional association of journalists, the bar and also made inroads the countryside (Hendriks 1983). This made the NPUP "(with the possible exception of the Ikhwan) […] the only political force in Egypt which possesse[d] cadres and basic units on a serious scale" (Hinnebusch 1981, 338). However, this increasing appeal drew Sadat's attention. In his mind, the party had simply crossed the fence. In September 1978 a wave of repression began against NPUP members and the party was virtually banned[64], while a tame leftist alternative to the NPUP, the Socialist Labor Party (SLP), was created. Finally, in 1980 the "law of Shame" stated that anyone trying to corrupt the youth by denying religious values or criticize state policy could be punished in the Court of Values. This law empowered Islamists appeal while undermining Nasserist elements and the

[64] In 1979, the Parliament was dissolved because of "irresponsible oppositions".

NPUP, for their secular ideology, portrayed as a "denial of divine laws", and for its oppositional stance, depicted as "disloyalty to the nation"[65].

At the same time, legitimized by regime's ideological revision on more pious stances, the Islamist organizational machine continued to grow despite, or thank to, the fact that it was still a formation lacking legal recognition. University activism shifted from leftist venues to Islamist ones without triggering regime's reaction (Wickham 2002). Islamists were also highly successful in penetrating civil society organizations, often having a "religious coloration" (Brown 2012, 88; Masoud 2014), establishing new ones (Wickham 2002) or entering into professional associations. In line with their mobilization strategies, characterized by incredible flexibility and opportunism, MB exponents also run the elections by filing independent candidates on the ranks of other lists, such as that of the Socialist Labor Party in 1979.

The advent of Mubarak to power in 1981 after Sadat's assassination by the hand of an extremist Islamic group, at first seemed to have rebalanced the organizational opportunities among the opposition factions. Initially, the new president eased, at least at first glance, the pressure upon the NPUP but, probably because of fear of following the sort his predecessor, didn't intervened much on the Islamists champ. As Albrecht and Wegner (2006) note, Mubarak adopted toward it a double standard. On the one hand, it used heavy-handed pressure toward the more radical groups such as Jihad and Jama'a Islamiyya. On the other hand, he left untouched moderates' prerogative to be a player in formal political institutions allowing them to participate in the elections of the parliament and professional syndicates as independent candidates. Following Sadat's politics, the relation between Mubarak and the Brotherhood during the 1980 has been described as a "political honeymoon". This environment had the effect of encouraging MB's political ambitions and resulted in the presentation of the Islamic Alliance list at the 1987 elections formed by the MB (still not a legal party) and other Islamist associations, the Liberal Socialist Party and the Socialist Labor party gaining as much as 60 seats.

On the other side of the opposition front, the left represented by the sole NPUP continued to decline irredeemably for significant obstacles concerning both the channels of mobilization available to it and access to parliament. On the hand, the electoral dynamics

[65] See Law 95/1980.

of the authoritarian regime under Mubarak were particularly detrimental to the NPUP despite changes in the electoral system. From 1984 to 1987, Egypt used a proportional system with closed list. Even though priority was given to parties, the NPUP was badly defeated, gaining no seats in both elections due to its inability to compete with the ruling party in terms of both political and economic resources. The situation worsened for the NPUP when, from 1990, Egypt returned to a majoritarian system that for opposition parties was "something close to a death knell" (Masoud 2014, 68). The influence of political parties declined due to the influx of local notables and businessman who had more economic resources to meet the demands of voters. In addition, as in the past, there was a resurgence of networks of patronage and kinship – networks that were also detrimental to the NPUP's hope of expanding beyond its cradle-districts (Masoud 2014). On the other hand, the left's natural channels of mobilization, such as trade unions, professional syndicates and deprived areas were distributed beetween the Islamists and the regime. This latter in particular managed to secure the allegiance of the poor people through vote-buying and patronage practices and completely colonized the trade unions (Posusney 1997). Serving as channel of mobilization under Nasser, these became, under Sadat and Mubarak, channels of demobilization to control the working class. This strategy of demobilization reached its apex in 1995 with the trade union law, which prevented workers employed on temporary contracts to vote in union elections thereby easing the re-election of incumbent union leaders (Kienle 2001; Posusney 1997; Shehata 2010).

Meanwhile, since the early 1990s, the regime was not even so well disposed neither towards the MB. The escalation of violence in the first years of the 1990s by the hand of radical and armed Islamists groups generated mistrust toward the MB, accused to be the "front organization for armed Islamist groups" (Kienle 1998, 229). With the pretext of fighting violence, but with the deliberate purpose of silence mass protest following the economic crisis of the mid-80s and the failure of market-oriented reforms, Mubarak put in place a series of measures conducive to a 'net loss of positive and negative liberties' (Kienle 2000). In 2005, however, things appeared to have changed, elections occurred in 'an unprecedented international spotlight" (Brown 2012, 92) after the pressures for moving toward a genuine liberalization and to pose an end to the persecutions under the ban of the 'war on terror' that knew new vigor after the 9-11. In that occasion, the left, represented by the NPUP only gained 2 seats signaling its impossibility of reaching the

masses. By contrast, the MB –who also in that occasion run filing independent candidates – gained as many as 88 seats. As happened in 1989 Tunisia, MB's strength test alerted the regime who responded with violence and forced the group to operate underground until the uprisings. Yet, the party nonetheless managed to equally develop at the margins of the state control. During the same years, also the partisan left further demobilized. This opened the space for the creation of acephalous issued- based movements that while promoting leftist claims and fighting leftist battles always rejected any explicit political affiliation of formal organization. In light of past experiences showing the costs of so doing, they simply conceived such already experienced form of participation as counterproductive.

5.4 ISLAMISTS' SUPREMACY AFTER THE ARAB SPRING: ORGANIZATIONAL ADVANTAGES AND REPUTATION

The political developments of Tunisia and Egypt from independence to the Arab Spring follows a similar dynamic that is crucial for understanding parties' power resources at the time of the founding elections, which – as emerged from the above investigation of people's beliefs and political convictions – is in no way reflective of Tunisians and Egyptians' policy preferences and political aspirations. In both countries, the growth of the political attractiveness of Islamism parallels the rollback of Left parties, which in the 1960s and 1970s were really strong both in terms of mass support and ideological appeal and thus constituted the major opposition force. By the beginning of the new millennium, in both countries the Left displayed all the symptoms Tarrow (1998) attributes to decline of the collective actions, namely withdrawal, fractionalization and institutionalization. By contrast, the Islamist champ was sound and well.

Out of the analysis on the evolution of the political systems in both countries, and in line with other contributions (Heydemann 2007; Lust-Okar 2005; Masoud 2014), it is here argued that such disparity -which is also at the heart of the electoral results of the founding elections- is to be attributed to the mix of co-optation and repression with which previous dictators structured the political conflict for the sake of power maintenance. On the one

hand, divided structures of competition created by discriminating oppositions between legal and illegal groups has harmed the once legal oppositions, mainly of the Left, while awarding the illegal ones, notably the Islamists, with reputation in that they were considered as really independent and alternative to the regime. On the other hand, the recourse to repression has weakened differently the organizational resources of the oppositions both because it was directed toward different groups with different resolve and because it was differently effective depending on the organizational structures the targeted oppositions relied. These two effects are in turn responsible for *i)* the inconsistency of the electoral offer and *ii)* individuals' misperception of the electoral offer leading to the representativeness gap emerged in occasion of the 2011 founding elections.

5.4.1 Authoritarian repression and transitional parties' organizational advantages

With the term 'repression' it is here intended not only the recourse of violent and other undemocratic means to silence opposition, but also the control and the cooptation of potential mobilization channels engineered to jeopardize any political initiative beyond the perimeter of rulers' will. Differently from the inclusion of some parties into the institutional sphere of a given regime, which falls under the uncontested notion of co-optation as well, these kind of measures, like other forms of repression, act at grassroots level exerting their effects on the organization capabilities of the various groups operating under upgraded authoritarianisms (Heydemann 2007). In both countries, patterns of state formations and power maintenance have undermined Leftist formations more than the Islamist ones by depriving them the access to its key constituencies, especially the labor classes and the poor living deprived areas, because Leftists' organizational structures overlapped in many instances with those the regime occupied to sustain its power, and also because these were more easily identifiable than those of Islamists.

In Tunisia and Egypt, one of the first measures in the construction of the single-party regime, lasting until the 1970s, has been that of repressing the left opposition which had nonetheless partake and fought for the cause of national independence. This was the sort of the Communist parties, present since the 1920s, but also of prominent figures initially closed to Bourguiba and Nasser, who were eventually expelled from the party. Beside

this, in both countries the rulers secured their grip on critical social sections by blending their party with the established trade unions. This development is actually in line with the regional trend pushing scholars to speak of these regimes as authoritarian populist (and after post-populist) corporatism (Ayubi 1995; Hinnebusch 2005, 2010). Initially, trade unions were subordinated to the state which sought to include the different social forces and make class conflict irrelevant for the sake of state-building and regime stability (Ehteshami and Murphy 1996; Hinnebusch 2010; Murphy 1999). In this regard, the ruling party functioned as the intermediary between the state and corporate groups by co-opting all other intermediary associations (Murphy 1999). Further, following the introduction of measures of economic liberalization, trade unions, and all other intermediate associations were allowed to function to accommodate growing demands of representation, thus serving as means of demobilization and social control (Heydemann 2007; Hinnebusch 2010; Posusney 1997). This was for instance the case of the creation of leftist parties like the NPUP in Egypt or MDS's participation at the 1981 elections in Tunisia and the reorganization of state labor-relations in both countries. As saw, from the 1980s, the "formalistic interpenetration of state, party and union" (Feltrin 2016, 13) was in varying degrees substituted with less visible means of co-optations through legal restrictions on the civils and political liberties, clientelistic relations and, as ultimate ratio, repression.

From national independence to the Arab Spring then, important sectors of the workforce were under the direct, even though unveiled or not, control of the ruling elite. Trade unions leaders were indeed selected by top cadres of the state apparatus and the base knew important restrictions on its freedom of self-organization and demonstration, even though in some cases it found its way to denounce this system, as the 2008 Gafsa protests in Tunisia prove. Given this set-up, Leftist parties, when legalized, faced insurmountable obstacles to penetrate this key constituency like the NPUP succeeded to do in late 1970s before being harshly repressed. Another important key constituency represented by the poor, who would naturally favored Leftists' claims for redistribution and social justice, was by contrast controlled by the ruling party through patronage and clientelistic practices (Schedler 2002, 2006). In this respect, the Left couldn't compete with regimes' economic resources needed to secure the vote of this constituency (Hinnebusch 1981; Masoud 2014).

By contrast, a totally different history regards the mobilization opportunities of Islamist formations. From being simple communities of pray and theological debates, these groups grew by creeping in the pre-constituted associational networks, such as charitable associations and youth organizations all revolving around the mosques. At first, a many authors note, such expansion was even encouraged by the incumbent dictators, namely Sadat and Ben Ali, to counterbalance the power of Leftists opposition at a time of radical changes in the national political economy from state planning toward the free market. But when the expansion of the "parallel Islamic sector" bypassed the boundaries of regimes' toleration, it was just too complex and too heterogeneous to be effectively dismantled. In Egypt it entailed "private mosques; Islamic voluntary associations, including welfare societies, cultural organization, health clinics; and Islamic-profit commercial and business enterprises, such as Islamic banks, investment companies, manufacturing firms, and publishing houses" (Wickham 2002, 97). The reasons for this spread are due to both the will of the incumbent rulers and to the intrinsic features of the Islamic appeal. On the one hand, Ben Ali, Sadat and Mubarak, who first saw in the Islamists an ally in the containment of the left, when confronted with the problem of containing the Islamists themselves opted for a policy of selective accommodation (Bianchi 1989). In this way, lacking the legitimacy of their predecessors, they repressed more radical Islamist groups and closed an eye on the moderate ones, which effectively benefited from the political liberalization inaugurated in the 1970s (Wickham 2002), fearing to be regarded as religion offenders by their populations. This kind of policy was more evident in Mubarak's Egypt then in Tunisia where Ben Ali intermittently targeted moderates as well. On the other hand, since late 1980s, Islamists policy programs proposed some vague form of democracy grounded on religion as guarantor of the national moral integrity with no clear plan on economic issues (Pahwa 2013). Contrary to the case of the Leftist parties, whose political and economic program is naturally oriented toward just some segments of society (the same the state wanted under its control) Islamist were therefore more naturally inclined to reach the different segments of society through different means, from those taking advantage of the services provided by charitable associations to those benefiting from profit-oriented commercial enterprises.

For Masoud (2014) and Cammet (2014), this organizational advantage is at the heart of the Islamist strength and the concomitant weakness of the left sanctioned by the ballot

boxes in occasion of the founding elections. This reading is also in line the findings presented in chapter four where the explicative power of the organizational models outweighs that of the socio-economic ones in both countries. In this regard, if the argument about the irrelevance of political parties within transitions grounding on the observation that the previous political system did not allow their genuine proliferation (Collombier 2013; Eyadat 2015) is to be dismissed, it is nonetheless true that some of the tenets grounding this position explain why this organizational advantage has been crucial in 2011-2012 Tunisia and Egypt. At the time of founding elections following decades of authoritarianism or semi-authoritarianism, voters are required to choice across a multitude of parties, which are new or however distant from voters after the strict conditions under the previous regime. In such cases, it is too naïf to believe that voters will cast their preference by picking the party which best suits their policy preferences for they simply lack the time to develop the required knowledge of the entire spectrum constituting the electoral offer (Dalton and Weldon 2007). Instead, it is arguable to think that voters' choice will be influenced by agents of political intermediation (Dalton and Klingemann 2007). This recent field of studies holds that the "varying channels and processes through which voters receive information about partisan politics" influence the voting behavior itself (Gunther et al. 2016, 3). For the founding elections in Tunisia and Egypt this claimed is further confirmed by the fact that voters were not able to properly locate parties on a policy space (Masoud 2014) and that, out of it, there was no correlation between parties-voters convergence on salient issues and the final vote choice (Çarkoğlu, Krouwel, and Yıldırım 2013).

Not being able to rightly appraise different political alternatives, voter simply choose the only party they probably really came in touch with after the ousting of the left from its natural channels of mobilization in parallel with the accommodation of Islamist associations. In Masoud's words, "though the majority of poor Egyptian voters prefer significant redistribution and a large welfare state, they are unable to connect these preferences with parties that most espouse them [i.e. the Left parties], voting instead for Islamist politicians who, by virtue of their embeddedness in dense networks of religious organization, are able to speak to voters in way that leftists are not" (Masoud 2014, 181). In this regard, Islamists' advantage was more remarked in Egypt than in Tunisia. The assets controlled by Ennadha are in no way comparable to those of the Muslim

Brotherhood. Nonetheless, it just sufficed to walk into Tunisian parties' headquarters and regional offices in 2011-2012 to understand that there was not play for Ennadha's competitors.

5.4.2 Divided structures of competition and transitional parties' reputation

Beyond the arbitrary recourse to repression, the other tool underpinning the survival of authoritarian rulers was the division between legal and illegal opposition. This had the scope to prevent the unification of oppositions asking for change which could threaten regime stability, but also to "commit those who are permitted entrance into the formal political sphere to maintaining the rules of the game" (Lust-Okar 2005, 38) by simply accepting to play by them.

In authoritarian Tunisia and Egypt, legal opposition were mainly constituted by Leftist parties: MDS and lately the Ettajdid (the once PCOT) in Tunisia, and the NPUP in Egypt, just to name the most long-lived that in the past have been able to mobilize mass protests. Islamists, by contrast, under authoritarian rule have never been legalized even though were allowed to develop organizational networks and to participate in elections as independent. This distinction has created great unbalances in political parties' reputation awarding the Islamists but disadvantaging the Lefts. While the latter were perceived as part of the system, formers' alleged extraneity to the authoritarian machine allowed them to present themselves as the true alternative to the previous regime able to grant citizens a new beginning once it collapsed.

Drawing from Dahl (1971), Lust-Okar (2005) notes that the entrance into the formal political competition, for very different reasons (Cavatorta 2007) in context of mixed political systems (wherein some groups are included but not others) is subordinated to the acceptance of limits upon both the political participation and the competition. Even though this might not be always explicit, it is always the product of playing by the established rules. In order to enter into the legal political space and its governing institutions, opposition parties renounced to their more extreme claims and to their ambition of provoking an alternation of government altogether. This pushed legalized parties into a vicious circle. By moderating their stances, they started losing their political

relevance in terms of programmatic platform, and as consequence, in terms of electoral support that made their survival more dependent on regime benevolence which in turn lead them to further align with the regime and loosing further voters. The effects of such mechanism are all the more evident at the beginning of the 2000s. The new millennium brought with it the creation of new Leftist parties and organizations, and, more importantly, a shift of balance within the Arab Left between political parties and civic associations in favor of the latter as far as genuine opposition to the regime was concerned. In light of the inefficacy of partisan engagement, the new generation of leftist activists chose the path of engagement in the civil society. This trend led to the emergence of movements such as the "Kifaya", the Palestinian Youth Association for Leadership and Rights Activation in Egypt and the Tunisian League for Human Rights (LTDH). Despite their Leftist leanings, these new activists do not describe themselves as Leftist, finding it useless to have partisan or ideological affiliations (Langohr 2004; Cavatorta 2012). New Leftist parties however also arose. They barely represented the working classes – thus acknowledging the rupture with their natural constituencies that occurred during the eighties and nineties- and focused instead on the wider themes of democratization, social justice and human rights. The creation of the Congrès pour la République (CPR) in Tunisia, the emergence of the Al Karama in Egypt are instances of this evolution.

Islamist formations, and in particular the Muslim Brotherhood, while operating at the grassroots level of social activism and participating in the election as independents, were never legalized, and their 'brand' was never approached to the regime and they continued to perceived as an effective vehicle of change and the real alternative to the status quo.

5.5 SHAPE AND REASONS OF THE 2011 ELECTORAL GAP AWARDING ISLAMIST PARTIES

True enough, during the 2010 uprisings and in the following months, the North African public appeared open, if not cherishing, to the installation of a civic state able to recover those lands from uneven economic development and unfair redistribution. Even though many observers expected Islamists to have a role in the transition process, nobody

forecasted their eventual dominion. After surveying citizens' political orientations and beliefs, this account confirms the presence of a gap of representativeness in that what people appeared to wanted was far from what they voted for. This discrepancy is at the heart of stunning disparities in parties' power which concur to the formation of their strategy profile at the time of installation. Indeed, the more the seats controlled inside the deciding body, the lesser the payoff from compromise with the other political forces. And this is a piece of the puzzle accounting for the different transition's outcome in Tunisia and Egypt. In the first case, Islamists had the relative majority of seats but needed the cooperation of other parties in order to pass any kind of legislative provision. In the second case, Islamists together controlled the absolute majority of seats and didn't need to negotiate with oppositions.

The reasons of the electoral gap conducive to the uneven distribution of power among the decision-making actors are twofold. The varying degree of distortion produced by the different electoral systems adopted in Tunisia and Egypt can account for cross-countries differences in the distribution of power among the political parties involved in the 'constitutive phase'. Therefore the electoral systems are to be enlisted in the immediate cause of the Egyptian failure and the Tunisian success. Yet, this explanation falls short in accounting for the dominant role of Islamists across the region and for the different strength they had across the two countries considered. Structural explanations shows how authoritarian regime favored the proliferation of Islamists at the expense of the Left thus provoking an electoral gap at the time of the 2011 founding elections.

On the one hand, the cooptation of Left parties through their legalization, combined with their eradication from common leftist mobilization channels, has undermined their effectiveness. At the end, those parties were reduced to empty shells and leftist political opposition fragmented in an uncountable numbers of organization. The leftist electoral offer in 2011 was then absolutely inconsistent for it was dispersed across a series of new parties. This effect was remarkable in Tunisia were the sum of left votes amounted to around fifty percent but the first leftist party positioned around 8%. By contrast, Islamists status of illegality has allowed them to maintain a certain independence form the regime. In this way, their capabilities of being a true alternative to it have never been put in question (despite MB's members figured among the MPs) and their 'brand' never knew reputation crises.

On the other hand, regimes' repression has jeopardized the left while passively allowing the growth the Islamic parallel sector. Such disparity is at the base of the misperception of the political offer, our second component of the aforementioned electoral gap. Indeed, people with the political inclinations showed before 'voted for jobs, not Islam' (Robbins and Tessler 2011). The very circumstance that voters identified Islamist parties as more redistributive than the leftist ones (Çarkoğlu, Krouwel, and Yıldırım 2013; Masoud 2014)is due to the fact that the former could enjoy on much more channels to arrive to people than the latter one. This effect was particularly pronounced in Egypt where Islamists structures and networks eventually constituted a veritable 'parallel sector'.

6 UNFAIR PATTERNS OF COMPETITION AND THE POLARIZATION OF TRANSITIONAL PARTY SYSTEMS

Out of the theoretical model sketched in the third chapter to analyze parties' behavior within transitions, the last aspect to take into consideration, after the demand of social representation and parties power resources, is the ideological positioning of parties themselves. The model showed indeed that whenever centripetal trends (derived from a shared understanding of the political and social outlook of the future regime or from the fear of a protracted stalemate) outweigh the centrifugal pushes stemming from the extant social divisions and parties' power advantage, then parties' temptation to unilaterally impose their will (or defect altogether, depending on power resources), gives up the step to cooperation, which becomes the dominant strategy thus fostering a consensual constitution-making. Such centripetal trends are usually conceived in terms of polarization resulting from parties' positioning on the policy space. While in the past this was deemed to be the result of the demand of representation, more recent studies have indeed brought to the fore the active role parties have in shaping the polarization of the party system in which they operate. This aspect becomes particularly intriguing in light of the results from chapter four which show that indeed Tunisia and Egypt do not substantially differ in the nature and depth of social divisions. Drawing from both the inclusion-moderation literature and post-democratization studies, this chapter will show that the 'choices parties define' reflects the cost of cooperation under authoritarian rule.

6.1 THE RELIGIOUS DIVIDE AND POLARIZATION PARTIES WORK OUT

6.1.1 The pernicious effects of polarization within installations

Concerns about the nature and kind of social divisions, so as those related to the institutional and the structural sphere informing transitional parties' resource distribution, acquire relevance inasmuch as they account for the conditions fostering a consensual

mode of transition suitable for democratic installation. On the same guise, ideological distance among the actors involved might comprise the such process.

Thus far, it seems that the outcome of the transitions from authoritarian rule is to be attributed to different distributions of power within the two party systems. While in Tunisia Ennadha won the relative majority of sets, in Egypt the Islamist parties represented by FJP and Nour controlled the absolute majority of seats. The eventual failure of Egypt in engineering a self-enforcing democracy is therefore in line with Przeworski's claim that in cases of known and uneven power distribution the 'constitutive phase' will only be aimed to consolidate winners' power advantage and not a self-enforcing democracy (1991). However, previous records of transitions from authoritarian rule prove that enduring democracy can be a possible outcome also in such kind of assets, and various explanations have been set forth. Some scholars look at the ideological orientation of the winning coalition searching for 'committed democrats' (McFaul 2002; Ozzano 2013). Others pinpoint to the ideological distance between the actors involved in the installation phase. While these two research strategies in some points overlap (Clark 2006; Schwedler 2013a), the rationale underneath them varies considerably. The first moves from the idea that democracy can be one factions' unilateral imposition; the second, by contrast, conceives democracy as a win-win solution for all the parties involved stemming from their cooperation. This latter understanding will be here privileged for three entangled reasons. First, it is more in line with both the procedural and the substantive definition of democracy by acknowledging the presence of a minority whose vital interests should be nonetheless safeguarded. Second, it also allows to better ground the research of its genesis (Higley and Burton 1989). Third, by stressing on the importance of bargain and inclusion, which is conducive to regime's legitimation, it guides the researcher not on the conditions favoring the emerge of whatsoever democratic agreement, but a self-enforcing one (Weingast 1997).

As saw in the previous chapters, the rise of democracy, i.e. a limited form of democracy that institutionalizes uncertainty while granting the vital interests of all the factions involved, is all about a coordination game entailing the resolution of the commitment problems. These latter become particularly relevant when religious parties previously holding anti-democratic stances are involved in the 'constitutive phase' (Haynes and Ben-Porat 2013; Higley and Burton 1989; Kalyvas 1996; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986;

Ozzano 2013; Ozzano and Cavatorta 2013; Przeworski 1991; Weingast 1997). The actors taking part into the installation process are deemed to agree on a set of rules grounding the institutional set up of their countries and sometimes, as in the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, also on a shared definition national identity (Zeghal 2013). Actors' interests, values and beliefs play a central role in fostering the search for focal points, i.e. a set of norms to which everybody accept to be bounded by, if not constituting themselves as such. In this regard, the level of political polarization, here simply defined as the ideological distance among the actors involved (Russell J Dalton 2008; Sartori 1976) becomes a fruitful indicator about the viability of such compromise.

6.1.2 Parties as countervailing mechanisms to polarization?

Instead of thinking of polarization as the mere result of mass' orientations, or as the result of the number of parties allowed by electoral systems, recent contributions have more or less explicitly pinpointed to the active role political parties play in determining the degree of polarization within democratization processes. Contrary to what assumed by the political sociology, political parties are not mere incubators of pre-existent political demands residing in the civil society. Nor is their behavior entirely and straightforwardly driven by given electoral systems. Rather, in order to maximize their power position, they act as combiners of pre-political life experiences (Enyedi 2005; Kitschelt et al. 1999). Therefore, their saliency within the transition is not only the result of the decisions they take in their governmental capacities during the installation phase (Katz 2014; Mair 2002), but also of their hitherto organization of the interplay between pre-existent social and political divisions and political institutions (Kitschelt et al. 1999) by mean of their representative agency (Mair 2002). In Enyedi words:

> "In their attempt to mold the political landscape, parties face institutional and social constraints and adjust their appeal accordingly, but they also invent, facilitate and destroy political identities, underplay social divisions and shift group boundaries. The clusters of pre-political life-experiences and dispositions present both opportunities and

> constraints for politicians. They can mobilize these structural and attitudinal differences, but they can also identify symbols that unite various groups by tapping what is common in them. The potential room for maneuver is considerable since individual interests and values can be combined with other values/interests in a large number of ways". (Enyedi 2005, 700)

Out of this understanding, political parties not only play an active role in determining which cleavages will be politically represented within the party system by brokering among disperse allegiances, values and interests (Deegan-Krause and Enyedi 2010; Enyedi 2005, 2008; G. Evans and De Graaf 2013; Raymond 2014), but in so doing they also have an active and decisive role in fostering party systems' polarization (Bermeo 1990; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Tepe 2013). Political entrepreneurs' decisions about the salience to attribute to certain issues (offered by national critical junctures or simple political developments) and the position to take about them determine the nature of party alignments and the programmatic competition at the base of different kinds of representation. In this latter regard, parties may decide to reduce the political distance, as emphasized by earlier transitologists (Bermeo 1990; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986) or to increase it, thus affecting considerably, in a way or another, the prospects for a democratic agreement to come about.

6.2 POLARIZATION PARTIES DEFINE: THE POLITICAL SPACE IN 2011 TUNISIA AND EGYPT

6.2.1 Locating parties on a political space

The decisions parties take in structuring the political space are primarily embodied into their party manifestos. Through these document, they make clear their political program to voters and other parties as well. By so doing they emphasize the relevance of certain issues and also take a position on them, thus defining the boundaries of the political space, which is the degree of polarization. For this reason, students of political science have started to infer the degree of party systems' polarization from such documents.

The interest on parties' platform has recently born out of the exigency of locating them on a political space guided by different research questions. To this end, and in alternative to voters' survey, four main techniques have been developed relying on both qualitative and quantitative approaches. As far as the former are concerned, they constitute the first attempts at locating parties on a traditional left-right continuum, which basically constitutes the one-dimensional division of party systems across western consolidated democracies. To do so, earlier studies thus recurred to expert surveys whereby prominent scholars were asked to assign a score indicating the positioning on the aforementioned dimension of their countries' parties on specific issues (Herbert Kitschelt et al. 1999). The same rationale is also at the base of the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), which up to now constitutes the major comparative effort to detect the structure and the development of party systems across time and space covering all free, democratic elections since 1945 in more than 50 countries (mostly OECD ones). Also in this case, parties are assigned a score locating them on the left-right continuum. Yet, such score stems directly from parties' manifestos. In so doing, each of such texts is first divided in quasi-sentences, through the process of "unitizing", with the aim of grasping a particular message that will fall into particular predefined categories on the base of what is supposed to be "left" or "right". In such a way each party is located within the political space according to the ratio of rightist and leftist sentences contained in its political program[66] (Budge and Klingemann 2001; Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987). For its broadness and its drive toward more quantitative-friendly approach, the CMP has stimulated more quantitative and computer-assisted techniques for inferring parties' positions from texts. The two most popular at the time of writing are *Wordscores* (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003) and *Wordfish* (Slapin and Proksch 2008). Both methods use 'words' as data, but in a slightly different way. Without entering into complex technicalities, which are beyond the scope of this review, in the first case parties are assigned a political position depending on the usage of words compared to reference texts. In the second case, parties' final placement depends on the frequency and the distribution of words across their manifestos. Each of the aforementioned techniques have strength and shortcomings, and, as the literature debate shows, no one is better than others. Expert surveys outperform as far as

[66] More precisely, the RILE score (right-left index score) is calculated as: [(R-L)/(R+L)]%.

reliability is concerned, but their validity is affected from respondents' bias (Curini 2010; Volkens 2007). CMP is a suited tool for comparisons, but while leaving room for human classification errors (Mikhaylov, Laver, and Benoit 2012) its reference categories are not applicable outside its cradle countries nor seem to bode well neither there because of their outdating (Mölder 2016). *Wordscores* allows for automated controlled parties positioning but it nonetheless requires the identification of appropriate reference texts and the assignment of reference values to them while posing scaling problems and time-series comparison (Lowe 2008; Slapin and Proksch 2008). *Wordfish* largely fills these gaps but leaves the researcher with the hard task of interpreting the substantive meaning of the stemming political dimensions (Grimmer and Stewart 2013).

6.2.2 The case for an unsupervised approach

The different techniques aforementioned, regardless their qualitative or quantitative nature, are divided into supervised or unsupervised approaches (Benoit and Däubler 2014). In the first case, the substantive content of the left-right division is already predefined and parties are located accordingly to their distance from what is deemed to be left or right. By contrast, under the second approach researchers adopt an agnostic approach and policy dimensions are considered latent variable derived by "scaling observable party behavior" (ibid. 5). Instead of being already predefined, the substantive content of the left-right dimension is object of empirical research starting from how parties locate in an undefined political space.

While the first approach is theoretically driven by the contributions of political philosopher and leading political scientists, the latter saw its emergence thanks to the development of machine learning and its application into the field of political sciences (Gabel and Huber 2000). As the methods stemming from them, each of them has strengths and weaknesses. Supervised approaches provide researchers with more information but may fall into excessive rigidity or may fail to account for the emergence of new political divisions, which are nonetheless salient (such as the so called valence issues). Unsupervised approaches, by contrast, guarantee room for any kind of division but hardly allow for cross-countries comparisons and has been vibrantly criticized for "assum[ing]

that we know more about the positions of key political actors, relative to each other, than we know about the substantive meaning of key policy dimensions" (Benoit and Laver 2006, 50. Quoted in Benoit and Däubler 2014).

The cases of 2011 Tunisia and Egypt guides nonethless the choice on this latter appproach. It is so both for the historical peculiarity of those countries and, as consenquence, for the current state of the art in such field. On the one hand, both countries come from more or less fifty years of semi-authoritarianism, without developing any genuine party-politics allowing to have an idea of what party competition was about. Further, their political tradition is vastly different from that of OECD countries and existing categories of what is left or right in those countries hardly applies to North African ones. On the other hand, at the time of writing, no effort to produce expert surveys data has been put forth. The only unsupervised technique among those enlisted before is *Wordfish*, so it will be used in this context. However, while seemingly being the result of lack of feasible alternatives, *Wordfish* perfectly suits the agency-based approach here adopted to understand polarization in that it assumes that party manifestos embodies overall party ideology resulting from the bargain and the strategic choices of political parties' elites (Proksch and Slapin 2014; Slapin and Proksch 2008).

6.2.3 Measuring polarization in 2011 Tunisia and Egypt

"Bag-of-words" models like this one, assume that the use of some words but not others in party manifestos contribute to grasp parties' positioning on a political space without defining it a priori. Instead, this is derived by the estimated words parameter. This characteristic makes *Wordfish* particularly appealing for having an idea of the political space in Tunisia and Egypt because we are left indeed with little authoritative guidance in assessing on what political competition is really about. To define the political space and locating political parties in it, *Wordfish* relies on a scaling model whereby words distribution is assumed to follow a Poisson naïve Bayes distribution formally put as:

$$y_{ijt} \sim Poisson(\lambda_{ijt})$$
$$\lambda_{ijt} = exp(\alpha_{it} + \psi_j + \beta_j * \omega_{it})$$

Where y_{ijt} is the count of word *j* in a party *i*'s manifesto at a time *t*. Out of this model, the placement of a political party within a political space at a specific time is a function of party elections fixed effect (α_{it}), word's fixed effects (ψ_j) and the specific weight β_j that a word has in discriminating between party *i*'s manifesto positions at a time *t* (ω_{it}).
In estimating the model (for more details see Slapin and Proksch 2008), *Wordfish* returns then two set of results. The first is an estimation of political parties' positioning on the latent dimensoin with a confidence interval for each manifesto. The second is a set of parameters accounting for the role of each word in concurring to parties' placement. In this sense, words that are highly recurrent in each manifesto will have little role in determining it. By contrast words that are frequently repeated in just one of them will for sure be considered as important in determinng it (and have higher betas). While *Wordfish* proves really useful in placing political parties on a political space over time, in our case only one electoral race will be considered, so party-election fixed effects and party position across time will be constant. Heceforth, the function to be here estimated becomes:

$$\lambda_{ij} = exp(\psi_j + \beta_j * \omega_i)$$

6.2.3.1 Party manifestos as data

The data are of course constituted by the party manifestos in Arabic collected during field research or through political parties' official websites. Because in both countries several political parties didn't even present an electoral manifesto, the criterion followed has been that of using only those of parties gaining at least 10 seats in the parliament. By so doing, this allows to cover the 50% and 80% of the parliament seats in Tunisia and Egypt respectively while also surveying more parties than are the effective parliamentary ones (4,6 in Tunisia and 1,9 in Egypt)[67]. In Tunisia the surveyed parties are Ennadha, CPR,

[67] The number of relevant parties is calculated as follow: $N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^2}$ where *p* represents the proportion of seats gained by each party (Laakso and Taagepera 1979).

PDP, Ettakatol and Aridha, while for Egypt the selected manifestos are those of the FJP, Nour, Building and Development Party, SDP, Free Egyptians, New Wafd and Wasat.
Each document has followed a pre-processing that consisted in cleaning the text from useless elements. This procedure is very common in text analysis (Krippendorff 2013) and is aimed at retaining only what is strictly necessary by getting rid of numbers, punctuation and so. For the same reason, words are usually processed so as to reduce them to their roots through the stemming process. For some languages, like English, German, Italian, these procedures are very accurate. However, the stemming for the Arabic language is 'not a solved problem' (Nielsen 2013, 111) because it is a highly inflected language with a high rate of infixing. Contrary to most common languages, the same roots may then have very different meaning not only depending on the prefix or suffix, but also on a single letter inside the word itself (which is for instance the case for plurals or active forms). Following a rather conservative approach, the stemming package used here is the 'arabicStemR' recently developed for R users by Richard Nielsen. Here below an example of how it works:

Table 6.1: Stemming process with arabicStemR

Original text	الثورة باسم الديمقراطية The revolution in name of democracy
Stemmed text	ثور ديمقراط Revolution democracy

6.2.3.2 Results

After having preprocessed the relevant texts, the *Wordfish* model algorithm is applied in the two countries separately considered. As reported in figure 6.1, in both countries Islamist parties, namely Nour, Wasat, Building and Development party and FJP in Egypt and Ennadha in Tunisia, fall on the left side of the political spectrum, while more secular parties occupy the other extreme of the political spectrum. In Egypt, the right side of the political space is occupied by the Social Democratic Party and right/secular parties occupy the center. In Tunisia, Ennadha is isolated on the left side of the spectrum, while

PDP is located in the center and on the other extreme there are Ettakatol, CPR and al-Aridha.

Figure 6.1: Estimated party positions in 2011 Tunisia and Egypt



Even though, in line with our expectations, the political space appears to be coherently divided between Islamists and secular parties -even though the moderate Wasat is surprisingly closer to Nour than other secular parties – this cannot be said a priori, for, as previously explained, *Wordfish* relies to an unsupervised approach. To assess what determines this division, it is then necessary to look at the estimated word parameters shown in the word plot (figures 6.2 and 6.3). Here the words contained in the corpus made up of all the party manifestos analyzed follow an "Eiffel Tower" distribution. Words on the top-center of the plot are those with higher fixed effects but low betas because are indifferently used from all the parties. By contrast, the words with greater weights, considered in absolute values, are those that majorly discriminate the placement of a given party in the political space (and therefore have low fixed effects). In our case, words with negative betas determine party positioning positioned on the left in figure 5 while words with positive betas are those affecting the positioning of parties on the right side.

By looking at the word plot in Egypt, reported in figure 6.2, there is a difference in the topics addressed in party manifestos and, therefore, of language. Among the words with the lowest betas (on the bottom left of the plot), there are indeed "homeland", "Hamas" and "Israel", in red on the left side of the graph in figure 6.1, denoting an international

vocation of these parties and the salience regional politics has on the agenda of those formations. By contrast, parties on the right side seem to be more concerned with internal issues and civic engagement, stressing on "economy", "election", "activism" and "citizenship" (enlightened in red on the bottom right of the plot in figure 6.2). Words with highest fixed effects, on the top-center of the word plot, and that therefore are widely used by all the Egyptian parties are, from the highest psi's scores "Egypt", "state", "job" and "politics". Furthermore, on the center of the plot, "stability" and "change" emerge indiscriminately as major concerns of all parties along with the reference to "our identity" (yes, the stemming package sometimes fails), meaning that for political entrepreneurs identity politics in Egypt goes hand in hand with transitional politics.

Figure 6.2: : Word weights vs. word fixed effects on the Islamist/Secular divide in Egypt



In the case of Tunisia (figure 6.3), the words having the highest fixed effects which therefore appear more frequently with the same emphasis on all the party manifestos are (in order of psi values): "state", "politics" (indeed the root of the word politics) and "nation". These are enlightened in red on the top-center of the plot. Other words of common use (in red of the center) are challenge and elections, which denote the awareness of the historical moment and the stemming priorities. Out of this common language, differences emerge in the attention devoted by parties to certain issues rather than others.

By looking to the beta coefficients, it emerges that parties on the right side of the spectrum devote more attention to the themes of employment and independence (from the French economy and from free market policies, but also from the political paradigms of western countries) as denote the words “jobs” and “independence” in red on the right side of the x axis. On the other hand, among the top 50 words with negative betas there are “occupations”, “exclusion” and “marginalization” (in red in the left) denoting Ennadha’s attention to the issues of social justice probably due to its entrenchment in all the Tunisian landscape and especially in the poorer areas. Yet, it also emerges also a strong reference to the religious tradition embodied by the words “hadith”, “haji” and “our identity” enlightened in red. Nonetheless, there emerge also a tension to recall the revolutionary slogans, and to reassure the public about the achieved moderation on gender issues, as is evident by the frequent use of the words “dignity” and “women” (sic for the stem).

Figure 6.3: Word weights vs. word fixed effects on the Islamist/Secular divide in Tunisia



Indeed, this adds little to the common understanding about the political competition in Tunisia and Egypt: the main dividing theme is the role of religion in politics and the Egyptian political space is more polarized than the Tunisian one. However, an interesting finding nonetheless emerges. In Tunisia, Ennadha is located on the extreme of the political space far distant from the other political forces. By contrast, in Egypt, the

Islamists FJP is located on the center of the political space equally distancing form Islamists and Leftists. This acknowledgment doesn't necessarily imply that the FJP was more moderated that Ennadha – after all, one side is entirely populated by Islamists parties-, nor necessarily that the center of the Egyptian political space was lees democratic than the Tunisian one because populated by an Islamist party – the division regards questions of identity, in both countries the word "democracy" is on the center of the political space. Rather these findings show that, in ideological terms, the eventual coalition with other Islamists was not as granted as previously supposed. Why not even try to dialogue with other secular parties? But also, where these different degree of polarization stem from?

6.3 PARTIES' STRUCTURING POLITICS: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PAST

6.3.1 Formal structures, political learning and polarization

In constituting themselves as 'combiners' of the interplay between society and institution, thus determining both the nature and the depth, i.e. polarization, of political divisions, transitional parties play a 'signaling game' bounded by social political orientations and previous political legacies. While some authors downplay parties' ability in mastering individual interests and values - because the conditions characterizing previous semi-authoritarianism prevented the organization of political parties by posing on them severe limits on their activities or outlawing them (Albrecht 2010) and pushed individuals to dissimulate their preferences (Kuran 1991)-, most scholars pinpoint to the determining role of previous political learning in accounting for large part of parties' choices when molding the political landscape (Bermeo 1990).

Because the role of religion in politics and society has emerged during the transitions here considered as a divisive issue catalyzing the political debate, the scholarly traditions upon the authoritarian resilience and the inclusion-moderation hypothesis pinpoint to both the structures and the dynamics shaping the political learning of the political parties involved

in the critical phase of installation. These studies hold that the polarization of the religious divide depends on the previous relationships between the religion and the state and between the state and its oppositions. For Lust (Lust 2011), whether or not undemocratic regimes of the MENA region base their legitimacy on Islam, determines secularists' perceived threat of political Islam and, therefore, the mistrust toward them eventually conducive to a radical distancing from these groups. This hypothesis applies to the Muslim-majority countries in that the inception of the 'liberalization' phase coincided with the Iranian revolution and after witnessed the civil war in Algeria. In this regard, the incentives for secularists to push in the direction of democratic reform varied depending on whether the regime already based its legitimacy on Islam or nor. In the former scenario, the case for fearing more room for Islamist oppositions was little because so is the perceived change with the status quo. By contrast, in the second case scenario, secularist felt more and more threaten by a radical depart from the incumbent secular regime and self-censored their demands of further overtures, siding, in case, with the regime. Yet, religious polarization can also derive from how the regime shapes its relation with its oppositions. As saw in the previous chapter, Arab autocracies rely on divided structures of competition with the aim of altering the cost of cooperation between the varying opposition groups. The mechanism triggered by such division are conducive mutual distrust, and hence, polarization around the topics through which the regime justifies the division between legal and illegal groups. In Tunisia and Egypt, up to 1970s the division was between "too leftist" parties and acquiescent ones, but from that moment on the lines of inclusion and exclusion relied on the division between Islamists and secularist – thus polarizing the religious divide. When such way of structuring conflict occurs within regimes relying on a secular legitimation system, then the effects on the polarization of the religious divide are simply magnified. As Lust (2005) notes, Islamists illegal oppositions will try to exploit mass demonstration organized by the legal ones so as to avoid the ax of repression. However, precisely because they were excluded from the formal contestation, secular legalized opposition will be highly uncertain about their strength and their true intentions and therefore will opt to avoid any form of mass demonstration in order not to risk losing their acquired privileges as consequences of either regime repression or Islamists' takeover. At the same time, their exclusion from the formal sphere will push Islamists to radicalize their political programs and their means

of contestation thus further precluding any form of dialogue, or collaboration with other oppositions and/or dividing both fronts on the issue of whether to join forces against the regime or not (Lust-Okar 2005; Lust 2011). This reading is completely complementary to that furnished by the inclusion-moderation hypothesis according to which Islamist formations will moderate their agenda, thus reducing the polarization of the overall party system, inasmuch as they are allowed to contest elections following their inclusion into the formal political sphere (Kurzman and Naqvi 2010; Schwedler 2011, 2013a).

However, as a matter of fact, the formal structures of contestation were the same for Tunisia and Egypt. In both countries access to formal politics was granted to a limited number of secular parties, while Islamists were excluded. Indeed, in both regimes Islamists had nonetheless the opportunity to contest elections as independent and/or within larger electoral blocs, but the rate at which this occurred in Egypt outweighed by far that of Tunisia. Hence, following this line of reasoning, it is to be expected that one once the regime collapsed, the Egyptian party system was less polarized than the Tunisian in force of Egyptian Islamists' longstanding participation into the electoral arena. Yet, the contrary applies. The political space in Egypt was more polarized than that of Tunisia both in terms of ideological distance between the competing parties and for the presence of extreme religious parties such as those running under the Islamist bloc (Tepe 2013).

6.3.2 Beyond mere configurational explanations: political center and polarization

To account for both cases where inclusion in the political sphere is not conducive to moderation and cases in which Islamists undergo an ideological revision of their stances approaching pluralism and democracy in the absence of any involvement into the formal political sphere, less configurational and more contextual explanations have been proposed by either revisiting the inclusion-moderation hypothesis or radically departing from it.

From within the inclusion-moderation paradigm, a revision has occurred around the mere definition of moderation. At the time of its appearance, the concept of moderation (so as the entire approach itself) was ancillary to that of democratization (Bermeo 1990, 1997).

The very term ‘moderation’ was then simply used as a substitute for ‘more democratic’ (Ly Netterstrøm 2015) suffering from the normative and tautological biases often attributed to the entire stream of democratization studies (Anderson 2006; Clark 2006; Schwedler 2007; Wegner and Pellicer 2009). Such pitfalls are partially recovered by acknowledging the relational nature of the concept of moderation and by clearly spelling out the conditions under which it can be equated with democratization. For Somer then, moderation is “an adjustment to at least some attributes of the centre in a particular country at a certain time” (2014, 246) where the center is the overall political outlook of a given country in a given time. In his words:

> I maintain that the concept of centre has three components. The political-institutional component refers to the characteristics, values and interests of the dominant state institutions and agents, and of the dominant actors in “political society”, such as the main political parties. The social component involves the characteristics, values and interests of the median voters and of the dominant actors in civil society, including the main economic power holders and the intelligentsia. The international component captures the external context of moderation, and denotes the main international alliances and position of the country in global politics and economy. (2014, 248)

As the case of Turkey shows, the inclusion of Islamist formations into a given formal political sphere is not automatically conducive to their acceptance of democratic norms and values, nor it is conducive to democratization. What really matters under this reading are the effects exerted on parties’ political adaptation and political learning by this complex and compounded center. As consequence, the real gateway to democratization is not the inclusion of anti-system parties into the political competition, but rather the construction of a democratic center. This can happen through hegemony or cooperation of opposition forces. Even though this conclusion proposes the problem of the feasibility of cooperation enlighten by Lust and other hard-core structuralists, it nonetheless has the merit of broadening the scope of the analysis beyond the simple inclusion into the electoral contestation while radically narrowing the extent to which moderation is conducive to democratization by contextualizing it.

In line with the notion of 'center' but totally departing from the inclusion-moderation approach, Cavatorta and Merone (2013) argue instead that the moderating path of the Tunisian Ennadha is not to be attributed to its institutional inclusion, which never occurred indeed, but rather from the characteristic of the Tunisian society and its political tradition. Tunisians, the authors claim, were inherently hostile to both assertive political Islam and to radicalization grounding instead their social and political culture on the peaceful co-existence of different and varied identities under the notion of 'Tunisianité'. Therefore, they were ill-disposed toward Ennadha so as it appeared in the 1970s. Confronting with its initial exclusion from both the institutional arena and the society, the authors contend that the journey toward moderation was due to the necessity of escaping alienation and irrelevance both in the society and in the political arena. Contrary to the mainstream inclusion-moderation hypothesis, the push factor to moderation was not inclusion but rather exclusion. Nonetheless, accordingly with Tepe's version of the inclusion-moderation hyptesis, Ennadha's moderation took the form of an adjustment to some fortunate attributes of the Tunisian society.

While the reference to the nature of the Tunisian society in constituting the democratic center might appear only partial (or too culturalist) to confidently equate moderation with democratization, and underplays the capacity of political parties to act as countervailing mechanisms to centrifugal pushes within society (Bermeo 1990; Tepe 2013), this contribution has the merit of shifting the focus from the formal structures of competitions to the informal factors triggering nonetheless moderation above and beyond them. In so doing the authors locate the conditions making Islamists' moderation conducive to the mutual recognition and acceptance with secularist forces in "the common destiny of repression" (Cavatorta and Merone 2013, 870), which could be a fruitful point of departure to grasp cross-country differences in the degree of polarization across Tunisia and Egypt.

6.4 DIVIDED THEY STOOD, DIVIDED THEY FAILED

If the structuring of politics is a signaling game wherein past political experiences serve as focal points, then it might be the case too look at the relationships between Islamists and secularists under the authoritarian rule. This topic is not new indeed. Attempts at coalition building between the different oppositions have constituted the focus of several studies under the assumption that their unification would have undermined the survival of the incumbent dictators. As the following review will report, while in Tunisia attempts at coalition building under Ben Ali were quite successful, in Mubaraks' Egypt they weren't. Yet, in any case the two dictators were forced to leave in 2011 indicating that unification of oppositions was not necessary to topple the regime. Nonetheless, as this section will show, past records of attempts of coalition building undertook by the different opposition groups account for their effects on the installation phase in two ways. First, as predicted by Somer (2014), this enables the construction of a 'democratic center' and the parties here included in this effort tend to moderate thus reducing transitional party systems' polarization. Second, and more importantly, this enables the parties involved to resolve their commitment problems.

At present, the two major narratives presented before (i.e. formal and informal structural-based account) account for the conditions fostering successful cooperation or not. The different experiences across Tunisia and Egypt confirms that what indeed mattered for the success of such attempts was not only the formal division of oppositions between legal and illegal groups, but also the informal manipulation of the oppositions by the hand of the dictator. The case of Egypt exemplifies this point. On the one hand, the regime successfully co-opted legal oppositions each and every time these engaged in coalition building with other (legal and illegal) opposition groups. On the other hand, the FJP, which enjoyed a twofold power advantage for its informal inclusion into the polity and its control of the largest part of the mobilized public, had little incentives to engage in any kind cooperation with others. First, it didn't need any change in the status quo to be admitted into the political competition. Second, it regarded with increasing mistrust successful opposition movements, such as Kefaya, for they were likely to deprive its monopoly over opposition voices – and therefore it tried to undermine them. In Tunisia, by contrast, the regime never intervened at undermining attempts at coalition building by

inducing precise groups to break ranks, rather it recurred to indiscriminate violence toward the entire coalition. Further, Ennadha, which was the strongest opposition group in terms of mass support, in light of its total exclusion, needed to change the status quo if it wanted to institutionalize such power.

6.4.1 Coalition building in Tunisia

Relations between Islamists and their secular counterparts have never been so hostile as some describe it. Indeed, Islamists engagement in politics was triggered by labor protests and coincided with the birth of the MSD that since the beginning constituted itself as an interlocutor thus influencing the same political agenda of Islamists.

As already said, these latter's awareness of the social problems, and therefore the need to go beyond the preaching and theological debate in order make the difference for believers' lives, arose in the mid-1970s along with the labor protests of those years which encountered Islamists' sympathy. As Gannouchi (Ennadha's leader) had occasion to say: "The workers' revolt […] had awaken us to the importance, and to the social and economic ramifications, of the problems the workers had been complaining of. Prior to that moment, we had only been preoccupied with the issues of *da'wah* [preaching] and *tabligh* [sacred message] and with pure intellectual debate" (Tamimi 2001, 50). Since that moment, the Islamists realized that Tunisians' diseases were more related to the failure of Bourguiba's economic policies and its ruling style than to a lack of pietism. Gannouchi and its clique soon felt the need of intervening in politics by proposing policy alternatives. In so doing, the impact of the left played a role of paramount importance. Jama'a welcomed Mestiri's initiative to found a new party and a dialogue between these two factions arose which had the effect of introducing to Islamists themes as alien up to that moment as political liberalism, redistribution human rights and democracy. The realization that the lack of this latter was the ultimate cause of Tunisia's hard times created a meeting point with other important oppositions which never proactively sided with regime's anti-Islamist campaigns, but on the contrary in some occasion even manifested solidarity to the Islamists when violent waves repression hit them. On the one hand, departing from government's rhetoric, the MSD never regarded the Islamists as threat and

refused to ally with the RCD in order to form a common front against Ennadha at the 1989 general elections, the only election Gannouchi's party was allowed to contest. On the other hand, between 1989 and 1992, during the regime's harsh repression of the Islamic movement, the Tunisian League for Human Rights took the defenses of Ennadha, firmly denouncing the violations of human right perpetrated on party's adherents and sympathizers by the regime.

These early instances of a mutual recognition eventually led the opposition parties to a genuine cooperation, if not to an alliance, as was the 2003 "Call from Tunis". In this occasion, for the very first time, Islamists and Secularists signed a common document to "rally the Tunisian citizens around the democratic alternative, to which they all aspire"[68]. After expressing a deep concern for the current political situation, all the subscribers of this document engaged themselves to adopt a new constitution, thus establishing a political regime whose legitimation would be exclusively ground in popular sovereignty; to guarantee freedom of belief, and to fight against the perverse effects of both globalization and subjugation on the country's economy. One year later, Ennadha, PDP and CPR joined forces to boycott the elections and encouraged by this successful experience created in 2005 the 18 October Coalition. This had the aim to "lay the foundations for a democratic transition and […] build a strong civil society that is capable of withstanding and throwing back all attempts at undermining the foundations of the democratic system"[69]. Worried by the escalation of repression, justified by the 10 December 2003 Anti-Terror Law, directed against the personal freedom and the freedom of association and expression, the Tunisian Communist Labour Party, Islamists –i.e., Ennadha- and liberal parties, such as the MDS, PDP and the CPR, joined again their forces against the authoritarian regime. At first, it was just a hunger strike for freedom of information and expression, the release of political prisoners and, the adoption of a law on a general amnesty, but later it became a permanent platform for discussion. Compared with the 2003 "Call for Tunis", the new coalition presented very few substantial differences. However, it inaugurated a new style of co-operation, based on a steady confrontation between the different factions of the coalition, under the assumption that a

[68] Extract from the French version of the issues Declaration. See: "Déclaration de Tunis", 17 Juin 2003, Aix-en-Provence.
[69] See: "Founding Charter of the 18 October coalition"

unifying spirit, along with the right to disagree, would better face the regime in that unbalanced competition. The participant political parties decided to guide their efforts in the establishment of clear political principles and political proposals allowing to guide the transition from the incumbent authoritarian regime and the Coalition was able to survive, despite regime repression, up to the uprisings periodically gathering the different political parties which discovered in each other a partner in the fight for democracy. Part of their efforts resulted in the publication in 2010 of a volume from the sibylline title *Our way to democracy*.

6.4.2 Coalition building in Egypt

Relationships between Islamists and secularists in Egypt, by contrast, were not as fortunate, nor meaningful as those of their Tunisian counterparts. Contrary to the case of Tunisia, the politicization of the Muslim brotherhood occurred at least as before as 1952, when it played an active role from the ranks of the Free Officers. Probably because the quietist strategy initially adopted by the Brotherhood, in the first years of the new republic it never engaged into open criticism with it, but it nonetheless pursued political activities competing with the left for the support of some segments of masses, remarkably students and professionals. For this reason, up to the 1990s, relationships between Islamists and secularist, in particular leftists, were quite antagonistic and two episodes are worth remembering. On the one hand, in occasion of the labor strike of 1977, the Brotherhood sided with the regime who ultimately repressed the protesters while blaming on leftist parties behind it. On the other hand, the Left welcomed the initiative of the regime to intervene on syndicate elections, with the 1993 Unified Law for syndicates, with the aim of containing the Islamist presence on them (Abdelrahman 2009).

Attempts at alliance building between all the opposition forces can be subdivided into two periods. From early 1980s to late 1990s attempts at joining forces against the regime were led by political parties pursuing grand reforms, but proved largely unfruitful. After, from the 2000s oppositions cooperation took the form of spontaneous issued-based movements guided by the principles of consensus and independence (Abdelrahman 2009) whose membership was open to individuals but not to political parties. Not surprisingly,

in no of such occasions were radical religious groups, such as Nour, involved. The only Islamist movements partaking such initiatives were the FJP and Wasat.

In 1983, promises of undertaking the road to pluralism and multipartitism were nonetheless balanced by several restrictions contained in the electoral law which nullified the introduction of a closed-list proportional system. The law in question stipulated indeed an 8% legal threshold, prevented electoral alliances between opposition parties and excluded independents from the electoral race. As saw in the previous chapter, such provisions hampered the capacity for oppositions to gain electoral seats, either because if legalized they had few chances to go beyond the electoral threshold alone or, if illegal, they could not file independent candidates (Blaydes 2011; Masoud 2014; Posusney 2002). In light of this limitations, all opposition groups – legalized or not- joined forces to form the National Committee for the Defense of Democracy (NCDD) with the aim of pushing the regime to return to the previous system or at least for adopting an "unconditional open list proportional representation system" (Shehata 2010, 93). However, this initiative had the unintended consequence of pushing the regime to force the hand. The parliament was dissolved and early elections were called. In response, the members of the NCDD announced their intention to boycott elections. Yet, the Wafd party nonetheless broke ranks and decided to participate, thus provoking the dissolution of the NCDD. The same dynamic applied both in 1986 and 1988. In both cases, the NCDD revived its activities following constitutional court's pronouncement about the unconstitutionality of the electoral law (that regulating the 1983 elections in the first case and that regulating the 1986 elections in the second one). In both cases, parties gathering in the NCDD saw in SCC's rulings the occasion to make their voice heard and to finally take part in the electoral race. However, in both cases the coordination failed. In the first case, Wafd disowned the pact according to which opposition leaders would have run elections under its list. In the second case, and again, another party, namely the NPUP, decided to contravene NCDD's decision to boycott elections, this time definitely burying the NCDD. Interestingly, the repetition of the same dynamics pushes Shehata (2010) to wonder with Shukr (1994) whether it is a coincidence that in each instance a party broke ranks, that same party gained a large number of seats in the upcoming elections.

Another attempt for opposition parties to form a common front against the regime came under the impulse of the Committee for Coordination of Professional Syndicates in 1989.

Concerned by the loss of liberty in several arenas of the polity, the Committee succeeded in inviting the major political opposition forces, along with other civil society's associations and NGOs to draft shared principles and goals that would have coordinate their conduct. In its scope and modus operandi, this attempt was the one which most resemble the Tunisian 18 October Coalition. After one year of discussion, this so-called National Consensus Project came up with a document very similar to the Tunisian *Our way of democracy* asserting as fundamental and guiding tenets those of pluralism, civic and political freedoms, limited government, popular legitimation and secularism. Agreed by the majority of participants, the draft document left Nasserists and Islamists discontent. The first denounced the absence of specific provisions making the state responsible for national development. The second refused the principle of secularism and pushed for the insertion of a specific clause making the Shari'a the principal source of legislation. None of these requests was satisfied. The two groups defected and the project of adoption of a national consensus charter collapsed.

The Committee for Coordination among Political Parties and Forces (CCPPF), established in 1995, constitutes the last attempt seeing the explicit involvement of Egyptian political parties partaking shared initiatives. This draw much from both the NCDD and from the National Consensus Project. Very much like the former, it tried to coordinate parties' behavior within elections. As the latter, it had also the ambition of working out an "agreed program for political and constitutional reform" (Shehata 2010, 97). While all parties agreed to such political program, even if largely paralleling that of the national consensus project – nor sharia neither state interventionism were mentioned -, electoral coordination failed, again, both in 1997 and in 2000 posing and end also to the experience of the CCPPF.

The new millennium signed the inception of a new phase of opposition coordination characterized by the absence of political parties, which proved really bad at making a common front, and the search of consensus (Abdelrahman 2009; Kraetzschmar 2011). Two remarkable initiatives in this sense were the Egyptian Popular Committee for the Support of the Palestinian Intifada (EPCSPI) and more popular Kifaya, which in part the former. The first, born in the aftermath of the Palestinian Intifada and still dominated by political parties, even though not officially, avoided to purse grand political reforms and inaugurated a new form of issue-based political activism, which in the case was the

affirmation Egypt's distancing from Israel. Despite MB members' uneasiness in founding itself into a coalition dominated by the left, this formula allowed the EPCSPI to survive for almost five years, up to its confluence into Kifaya. This latter directed activists' attention on more internal policy issues pushing toward more pluralism, freedom and democracy, but it insisted on the principles of individual membership and consensus as deliberating principle. In light of this and of its success in gathering mass support and infusing popular activism on the masses, the major opposition parties conceived it as a competitor and were always ambivalent toward it (Shehata 2010). Yet, this hostility did not prevent Kifaya to survive up to the moment of writing despite internal major disagreements upon its posture with political Islam, which occasionally resurge.

6.4.3 Common destiny of repression, incentives for joining forces and the resolution of the commitment problem

In Tunisia, opposition parties ventured in coalition building only in few occasion which proved all, even though at varying degree, successful and instructive. After the 2011 elections, the importance of finding a "common ground" occupied the space of several debates in and out state institutions and was also one of the grand themes of an international conference organized by Center for Study of Islam and Democracy in March 2013. In all these occasions, the spirit of the 18 October Coalition was, and still is, evoked with the hope this can be infused also into other political forces that were absent at that time, like Nidaa (CSID 2016). Even though some consider it as a political work of 'outdated history' (ibid.), and others don't see it as particularly remarkable in its political achievements (Haugbølle and Cavatorta 2011), the 18 October Coalition is rightly pinpointed as crucial for Tunisia's democratization processes because it served as a forum for discussion which helped secularist and Islamists to overcome their possible mutual mistrust. The very fact that both factions engaged on a 5-years political debate whereby they agreed on a common political program largely helped them to resolve their commitments problems thus moderating the salience upon religion in the aftermath of the uprisings.

In Egypt, by contrast, the many attempts at coalition building among all opposition parties proved all largely unsuccessful. The NCDD and the CCPFF failed because of parties' expectations of immediate gains, while the National Consensus project aborted under the lack of agreement between Islamist and secular upon the role of religion in politics.

By broadly looking at the two party systems, the greater ideological polarization in Egypt is surely due to the presence of more radical Islamist parties (Nour and BD) than the mainstream ones (FJP and Wasat), which never had occasion to moderate for they were never included into the electoral competition, nor into the political debate, nor were they ever engaged into the several attempts at coalition building. However, polarization alone cannot sufficiently account for the lack of a coalition of national unity for leading the transition as that formed in Tunisia by Ennadha, CPR and Ettakatol. Indeed, as figure 5 showed (see chapter five), the FJP, who alone controlled around 40% was equally distant form both other Islamist parties as it was from the secular ones. So ideological proximity would have allowed both kind of coalitions. Why then didn't the FJP opt for a government of national unity that would have ease the installation process? Because of both external opportunities and past records of confrontation with other oppositions. The availability of other strong parties belonging to the same political family made FJP's choice to coalesce with them all the more natural, even though Nour would subsequently back the military coup. Further, the FJP, contrary to Ennadha, despite its moderation didn't managed to solve its commitment problems with secular oppositions. The many attempts at coalescing have always been sabotaged by either the regime, who succeeded in coopting the minor parties by promising them more seats, or by the FJP itself. Indeed, it saw in such initiatives a potential enlargement of its competitors' following risking to dip into the basin of voters it managed to secure precisely because of regime's benevolence, as the previous chapter showed. Confronting with these records, not only the seculars never arrived at having a clear idea upon FJP's true intentions, but the FJP could not credibly trust the secular oppositions in light of their past propensty at withdrawing from whatsoever coordination initiative. In this regard, FJP's experience proves that moderation is not conducive to democratization unless commitment problems are solved. However, this does not only apply to religious parties, as emphasized by Kalyvas and the major part of inclusion-moderation theorists, but all the parties involved in a given political system.

The fact that Tunisians succeeded where Egyptians failed doesn't mean that the former were simply better at compromising than the latter. Regime's strategies account also in this case. While in Tunisia the regime responded with indiscriminate repression to coalitions building, in Egypt the regime remained faithful to the divide-et-impera strategy, or what Brumberg (2013) pinpointed to as the regional variant of the protection-racket policy, that is the reliance of the governing power on its ability to manipulate identity conflicts by playing one group against the others and to subsequently furnishing its protection as a guarantee for their survival. Being politicized within such environment, Egyptian political parties replicated this behavior also during the transition alternatively recurring to the judiciary -as the secular left did-, or to the military -as every party, FJP included, did during the different stages of the transition and that culminated with the invocation of the military coup from the vast majority of the political parties.

CONCLUSIONS

This work arose from the need to understand what is at the base of the different trajectory of Tunisia and Egypt in their way to democracy but without renouncing to the insights offered by the two seemingly alternative and irreconcilable paradigms produced by the discipline at the time this research started, namely democratization studies and the authoritarian reliance (or post-democratization studies). Both paradigms offer indeed invaluable insights for the comprehension of the Arab Politics in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, yet their normative and theoretical rigidity risks to break the scholarly community into two not communicating factions.

While the first reads the events in 2011-2013 Tunisia and Egypt as processes of transitions from authoritarian rule (even though one eventually failed), the second conceives them as instances of the authoritarian upgrade or at best as a change in the ruling coalition. While the first focuses on socio-economic determinants, actors and processes, the second looks to the structures instead. Nonetheless, the two are much more complementary than thought. While democratization studies offer a precious theoretical framework to appraise 2011-2013 events in the region but are deemed to be too much concerned on what 'ought to be', post-democratization studies are really useful in enlightening 'what actually is' but fall nonetheless short in locating the causal links in time and space. After all, there were no such structures sitting inside the People Assembly or the National Constituent Assembly taking decisions for the future of their countries, but this cannot allow researchers to get rid of them.

The hinge between these two paradigms has been found in this work by coming back to basics. That is by drawing from the theoretical framework of earlier transitologists and putting political parties front and center, as they deserve. This procedure has the merit to be faithful to the reality and suits the need to host the two aforementioned paradigms into a unified understanding providing for punctual explanations.

Actually, the transitions in Tunisia and Egypt proceeded along a similar path up to the point whereby political parties took control of them from within the aforementioned representative institutions at the time of installation. This phase involves the search for an agreed and self-enforcing compromise providing for a limited form of government and the protection of participants' vital interests. It should be a consensual decision-making

requiring the cooperative behavior of the actors involved, that in the cases here analyzed were precisely political parties. Within this delicate and necessary phase, political parties' options were either to collaborate with the others or not. By reappraising the concept of agency proposed by transitologists to suit the unique nature of political parties as intermediate institutions, parties' choice for one option or the other is the result of the interplay of pre-existent social divisions, their power resources and their ideological distance. Each of them has been therefore analyzed separately.

The focus on pre-existent social divisions moved from the assumption that parties might be somewhat responsive to the demands of their electorate. In this regard, deeply divided societies are deemed to hinder democratic installations, which largely coincide with the process of constitution making, in light of the need for a "pre-constitutional societal consensus regarding shared norms and values that underpin the state" (Lerner 2011, 27), or what has been alternatively referred to as the sentiment of national unity (Rustow 1970) or some set of shared beliefs (Elster 1995, Higley and Burton 1989). From this understanding, the analysis upon the determinants of voting behavior at occasion of the 2011-2012 founding elections in Tunisia an Egypt was aimed to search for possible cleavages, understood as forms of closure of social relationship (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 216). A cleavage so defined is then the result of the overlap of the socio/economic conditions of individuals, their beliefs and political preferences, but also of the organization through which they socialize. Each of these levels has been then considered both separately and in conjunction with the others though a multinomial model on survey data furnished by the Arab Barometer project. This analysis has revealed that in both countries the discriminants in the vote choice between Islamist and secular parties were the role of religion in law-making and the organizational intermediaries. The more the respondents preferred Shari'a as a source of law and the more they attended mosques the more the probabilities they will vote for Islamists. Interestingly, this latter organizational model accounted more than others in predicting the vote choice of respondents. What was at stake then was not a cleavage properly defined, but rather a divide on the role of the Shari'a in the law-making arguably influenced by how people socialize. For its configuration then, the depth of the 2011 social divisions in Tunisia and Egypt was not so severe to have a great role in the overall transition process by outbidding parties - also because at the time of the founding elections, the implementation of the Islamic law was

not even mentioned among the perceived priorities. Hence, the remaining two factors might have had a deeper role.

No doubt that the uneven distribution of power between Islamists and their secular counterpart was more pronounced in Egypt than in Tunisia and accounted for the different fate of the two countries. But where did it come from? The different electoral systems used, pure proportional in Tunisia and mixed in Egypt, account for different degrees of distortion between the votes received and the seats gained by Islamist parties, but it does not explain 'the Islamist dominion', that is the systematic preponderance of Islamists in both countries and their takeover in Egypt. Moreover, such dominion seems not justified by the political aspirations which inspired the Arab uprisings, that indeed spoke a leftist jargon, nor by individuals' political orientations and beliefs. This aspect is enlightened by pinpointing to the structures of competition underneath the survival of the previous authoritarian regime, emphasized by post democratization studies. The division between legal and illegal opposition, engineered with the scope of preventing the unification of oppositions by altering the cost of cooperation, and the concomitant recourse to violence had benefited Islamists while at the same heavily undermining its rivals, in particular the left. First, the division between legal and illegal opposition, which largely overlapped with the division between secular and Islamist oppositions, allowed the co-optation of the secular while leaving Islamists at the margins of the formal structures of political participation, even though in some cases they run election as independents. This had the twofold effect of depicting the left as part of the system, inducing to the disaffection of its voters and its fragmentation into a myriad of small parties, while awarding Islamists with reputation. Second, the use of repression proved indeed more effective in jeopardizing leftists' channels of mobilization than Islamists ones. It was so both because the constituencies of the left largely overlapped with those the regimes wanted to secured for their maintenance, but also because the natural channels of leftist mobilization, such as trade unions, universities, poor areas and so on, were much more institutionalized and easily recognizable than those infiltrated by Islamists, like charitable associations, health-care centers and the like. As a result, during the last thirty years of authoritarian rule, the partisan left almost disappeared, while Islamists, sometimes under the benevolence of the regime for counterbalancing leftist oppositions, controlled a 'parallel sector'. This double advantage created by the previous authoritarian structures is at the heart of the twofold

electoral gap characterizing the 2011 founding elections in both countries. One the one hand, by mean of their embeddedness into religious organizations, Islamist parties outperformed the left in reaching voters who would otherwise prefer a leftist option, but that they actually didn't even know to exist. On the other hand, Islamists' formal state of illegal party during the authoritarian era awarded the Islamist brand with a reputation as the truly alternative to the previous regime. This electoral gap was evident in both Tunisia and Egypt, but more in this latter case for the wider network Islamists managed to control. Nonetheless, the dominant position of one faction (in this case the Islamist one) over the others, while being potentially hurting for the prospects of an agreement, doesn't necessarily mean the impossibility to reach it. In this regard, the ideological distance among parties is deemed to account for the possibilities to attain such result. The lesser, the more the prospects for a self-enforcing constitution to see the light.

Measurements of polarization across the two party systems show that indeed, in 2011, Egypt was more polarized than Tunisia for the presence of more radical religious parties. Nonetheless, they also reveal that Egyptian FJP party, who alone controlled 40% of parliamentary seats was equally distanced from both other Islamists parties and the secular ones. In this sense, the ideological proximity could have allowed both an Islamist coalition, or one of national unity like the Tunisian Troika. What ultimately pushed the FJP to look to parties of the same political family, was not much its lack moderation, as expected from the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, but rather the absence of a common ground with other secular parties on the guise of that established in Tunisia between Ennadha and the other oppositions with which it eventually formed a government of national consensus. While under authoritarian rule Tunisian Islamists and secularists ventured in fruitful coalition building to contrast Ben Ali's rule, in Egypt such kind of attempts failed. On the one hand, whenever coalition building among opposition parties surfaced, the secular forces were successfully coopted by the regime. On the other hand, the FJP, had no incentives in joining forces with others because its informal participation in elections granted by the regime allowed it to have nonetheless some kind of institutional power while monopolizing the opposition front. Other radical Islamist parties didn't even try to engage in such common initiatives. Hence, rather than varying degrees of polarization, cross countries differences in previous experiences of coalition building, prove to be crucial for the installation phase. These are to be attributed to the different

strategies at the base of regime maintenance. While in Tunisia the regime responded with indiscriminate repression to coalitions building, in Egypt the regime remained faithful to the divide-et-impera strategy, that is the reliance of the governing power on its ability to manipulate identity conflicts by playing one group against the others and to subsequently offer its protection as a guarantee for their survival. Such dynamics not only prevented the establishment of some kind of common ground which could have solved parties' commitment problems, but was also replicated by political parties during the phase of installation –as was evident in left parties' resort to the judiciary to settle political disagreement or in the final invocation of the military intervention to solve the 2013 political deadlock from the major part of them.

To recompose the puzzle, from the perspective of party politics the different outcomes of the transitions across Tunisia and Egypt are to be attributed to the unbalanced distribution of power among the political parties involved in the phase of installation and to unsolved commitment problems. These aspects are in large part attributable to the structures and the mechanisms underneath the survival of the previous authoritarian regimes by mean of the different context of political socialization and the different opportunity structures laid down to the political parties which took control of the transition once those regimes collapsed.

To conclude with a reference to O'Donnell and Schmitter's founding contribution, these findings are not a deterministic capitulation. The results of the transition in Tunisia and Egypt were not pre-determined as the present findings may suggest. After all, transitions are always moments of exceptional politics characterized by a high degree of indeterminacy. This work was only aimed to explain the different outcomes observed, holding the processes as they actually were. Had a different electoral system been adopted in Egypt, probably a different research question would have been developed.

Despite the little light made by the present work, the Arab politics currently offers itself to political scientists as an unspoiled land. Being this study one of the few conducted through quantitative methods, which are indeed quite common when other regions of the worlds are concerned, and the first quantitative text analysis on Arab party manifestos, much more efforts are needed to deal with Arab politics in a more systematic way and to produce empirical data. This entails the development of more survey data, but also of

political-system level data, such as expert surveys or all other means enabling researchers to assess the kind of representation political parties are mapping out. No such kind of project has seen the light thus far. No doubt this requires the effort of women and men, and significant resources as well. But before that, it is necessary to start conceiving the Arab politics as just *politics*, spurred of any 'exceptional' venue or prejudice.

ANNEX

Table 7.1: Variables construction

Variable	ABII question	Coding
House income	Q1016: Which of these statements comes closest to describing your household income?	1 = our household income does not cover our expenses and we face significant difficulties in meeting our needs 2 = our household income does not cover our expenses and we face some difficulties in meeting our needs 3 = our household income covers our expenses without notable difficulties 4 = our household income covers our expenses well and we are able to save
Schooling years	Q1003: Level of education	0 = illiterate/no formal education 6 = elementary level 9 = preparatory/basic 13 = secondary level 16 = BA degree 18 = MA and above
Urban/Rural	Q13: Urban/Rural	0 = urban 1 = rural
Marginalized	Q1: Province/Governorate/State	0 = favored areas (Tunis; Ariana; Manouba; Nabeul; Zaghouan; Bizerte; Sousse; Monastir; Mahdia) 1 = marginalized areas (Beja; Jendouba; Kef; Siliana; Kairouan; Kasserine; Sidi Bouzid; Gafsa; Touzeur; Qbli; Qabs; Medenine; Tataouine)
Self-definition of religiosity	Q609: Generally speaking, would you describe yourself as…?	1 = not religious 2 = somewhat religious 3 = religious
Cultural conservativism	Q60101-Q60116: Questions regarding individual attitude toward gender equality	Continuous variable from 1 to 4 (whereby conservativism increases)
Suitability of democracy	Q512: To what extent do you think democracy is appropriate for your country?	Ordinal variable from 1 to 10 (increasing suitability)
State preference	EG815/T917: Do you prefer that the state be…?	1 = civil state 2 = religious state
Islamic law	Q6052: The government and parliament should enact laws in accordance with Islamic law.	1= strongly disagree 2 = disagree 3 = agree 4 = strongly agree

Popular will	Q6051: The government and parliament should enact laws in accordance with the people's wishes.	1= strongly disagree 2 = disagree 3 = agree 4 = strongly agree
Trust in institutions	Q2012: trust in the juduciary Q2014: trust in the police Q2018: trust in the SCAF	1= absolutely don't trust 2 = trust to a limited extent 3 = trust to a medium extent 4 = trust to a great extent
Mosque attendance	Q6105: Do you attend Friday services?	1 = never 2 = sometimes 3 = most of the time 4 = always
Trade Union Membership	Q5013: Are you member of a professional association/trade union?	0 = no 1 = yes

Table 7.2: Variables construction for detecting leftist orientations

Variable	ABII question	Coding
Pluralism	Q5181: How suitable if for your country a parliamentary system wherein all parties can contest elections?	1 = not suitable at all 2 = somewhat suitable 3 = suitable 4 = very suitable
Redistribution	Q2061 What is the most important |challenge facing your country today?	1 = economic redistribution 2 = fight against corruption 3 = stability and internal democracy 4 = others 4 = don't know
Secularism	Q6052; Q6061-Q6064: Questions related to the source of law and the role of religion in politics	Index from 1 to 4 (as resulting from a factor analysis on a polychoric correlation matrix)
Gender equality	Q6012 - Q6014: Questions regarding individual attitude toward gender equality	Index from 1 to 4 (as resulting from a factor analysis on a polychoric correlation matrix)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdelrahman, Maha. 2009. "'With the Islamists?—Sometimes. With the State?—Never!' Cooperation between the Left and Islamists in Egypt." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 36(1): 37–54.

Achcar, Gilbert. 2013. *The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising*. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.

Ahmed, Amel, and Giovanni Capoccia. 2014. "The Study of Democratization and the Arab Spring *." *Middle East Law and Governance* 6: 1–31.

Albrecht, Holger. 2005. "How Can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt." *Democratization* 12(3): 378–97.

———. 2010. *Contentious Politics in the Middle East: Political Opposition under Authoritarianism*. ed. Holger Albrecht. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.

Albrecht, Holger, and Dina Bishara. 2011. "Back on Horseback: The Military and Political Transformation in Egypt." *Middle East Law and Governance* 3: 13–23.

Albrecht, Holger, and Oliver Schlumberger. 2004. "'Waiting for Godot': Regime Change without Democratization in the Middle East." *International Political Science Review* 25(4): 371–92.

Albrecht, Holger, and Eva Wegner. 2006. "Autocrats and Islamists: Contenders and Containment in Egypt and Morocco." *The Journal of North African Studies* 11(2): 123–41.

Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh, Sami. 1994. *Les Musulmans Face Aux Droits de L'homme (Religion, Droit et Politique : Études et Documents)*. Bochum: Verlag Dr Dieter Winkler.

Alexander, Christopher. 2016. *Tunisia: From Stability to Revolution in the Maghreb*. New York: Routledge.

Allal, Amin. 2009. "Les Mobilisations Protestataires Dans La Région Minière de Gafsa En 2008." In *L'état Face Aux Débordements Du Social Au Maghreb: Formation, Travail et Protection Sociale*, eds. Miriam Catusse, Blandine Destremau, and Éric Verdier. Paris: Editions Karthala, 173–86.

———. 2010. "Réformes Néolibérales, Clientélismes et Protestations En Situation Autoritaire." *Politique africaine* 117(1): 107–25. http://www.cairn.info/revue-politique-africaine-2010-1-page-107.htm.

Allani, Alaya. 2009. "The Islamists in Tunisia between Confrontation and Participation: 1980–20081." *The Journal of North African Studies* 14(2): 257–72.

Allinson, Jamie. 2015. "Class Forces, Transition and the Arab Uprisings: A Comparison of Tunisia, Egypt and Syria." *Democratization* 22(2): 294–314.

Andersen, David, Jørgen Møller, and Lasse Lykke Rørbæk. "Democratization State

Capacity and Political Regime Stability." (February 2015): 37–41.

Anderson, Lisa. 1991. "Political Pacts, Liberalism, and Democracy: The Tunisian National Pact of 1988." *Government and Opposition* 26(2): 244–60.

———. 2006. "Searching Where the Ligth Shines: Studying Democratization in the Middle East." *Annual Review of Political Science* 91(1): 189–214.

———. 2011. "Demystifying the Arab Spring Lisa Anderson.pdf." *Foreign Affairs* 90(3): 2–7.

Angrist, Michele Penner. 1999. "Parties, Parliament and Political Dissent in Tunisia." *The Journal of North African Studies* 4(4): 89–104.

———. 2013. "Understanding the Success of Mass Civic Protest in Tunisia." *Middle East Journal* 67(4): 5–19.

Asseburg, Muriel, and Heiko Wimmen. 2016. "Dynamics of Transformation, Elite Change and New Social Mobilization in the Arab World." *Mediterranean Politics* 21(1): 1–22.

Awad, Ibrahim. 2013. "Breaking out of Authoritarianism: 18 Months of Political Transition in Egypt." *Constellations* 20(2): 275–92.

Ayubi, Nazih. 1995. *Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East*. New York: St Martin Press.

Bâli, Aslı Ü, and Hanna Lerner. 2017. *Constitution Writing, Religion and Democracy*. eds. Aslı Ü Bâli and Hanna Lerner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barany, Zoltan. 2011. "Comparing the Arab Revolts: The Role of the Military." *Journal of Democracy* 22(4): 17–27.

Başlevent, Cem, Hasan Kirmanoğlu, and Burhan Şenatalar. 2005. "Empirical Investigation of Party Preferences and Economic Voting in Turkey." *European Journal of Political Research* 44(4): 547–62.

Bayat, Asef. 2013. "The Arab Spring and Its Surprises." *Development and Change* 44(3): 587–601. http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/dech.12030 (December 1, 2015).

Beblawi, Hazem. 1987. "The Rentier State in the Arab World." *Arab Studies Quarterly* 9(4): 383–98.

Bellin, Eva. 2000. "Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, and Democratization in Late-Developing Countries." *World Politics* 52(2): 175–205.

Benoit, Kenneth, and Thomas Däubler. 2014. "Mapping Policy Preferences from Texts" Conference, May 15–16, 2014, Berlin *Putting Text in Context : How to Estimate Better Left-Right Positions by Scaling Party Manifesto Data Using Item Response*.

Berman, Chantal E, and Elizabeth R Nugent. 2015. *Regionalism in New Democracies: Sub-National Variation in Tunisia's 2014 Parliamentary Elections*.

Bermeo, Nancy. 1990. "Rethinking Regime Change." *Comparative Politics* 22(3): 359–77.

———. 1997. “Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict during Democratic Transitions.” *Comparative Politics* 29(3): 305–22.

Bianchi, Robert. 1989. *Unruly Corporativism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Bill, James, and Robert Springborg. 1994. *Politics in the Middle East*. 4th ed. New York: Harper Collins College Publishers.

Blaydes, L., and J. Lo. 2012. “One Man, One Vote, One Time? A Model of Democratization in the Middle East.” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 24(1): 110–46.

Blaydes, Lisa. 2010. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2011. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bokhari, Kamran, and Farid Senzai. 2013. *Political Islam in the Age of Democratization*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bou Nassif, Hicham. 2017. “Coups and Nascent Democracies: The Military and Egypt’s Failed Consolidation.” *Democratization* 24(1): 157–74.

Boubekeur, Amel. 2016. “Islamists, Secularists and Old Regime Elites in Tunisia: Bargained Competition.” *Mediterranean Politics* 21(1): 1–21.

Boughzala, Mongi, and Mohamed Tli Hamdi. 2014. *Rural and Regional Development and Inequality in Tunisia*. Tunisia.

Boulby, Marion. 1988. “The Islamic Challenge: Tunisia since Independence.” *Third World Quarterly* 10(2): 590–614.

Brown, Nathan J. 2012. *When Victory Is Not an Option: Islamist Movements in Arab Politics*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

———. 2013a. “Egypt: A Constitutional Court in an Unconstitutional Setting.” In *Constitutional Transitions and Global and Comparative Law Colloquium*, New York, 1–20.

———. 2013b. “Egypt’s Failed Transition.” *Journal of Democracy* 24(4): 45–58.

———. 2017. “Islam and Constitutionalism in the Arab World.” In *Constitution Writing, Religion and Democracy*, eds. Aslı Ü Bâli and Hanna Lerner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 289–316.

Brownlee, Jason. 2002. “...And Yet They Persist: Explaining Survival and Transition in Neopatrimonial Regimes.” *Studies* 37(3): 35–63.

———. 2007. *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2013. “Egypt ’ S Failed Transition”, *Journal of Democracy* 24(4). 1-37

Brownlee, Jason, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds. 2015. *The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brumberg, Daniel. 2013. “Transforming the Arab World’s Protection-Racket Politics.” *Journal of Democracy* 24(3): 88–103.

Brynen, Rex, Pete W. Moore, Bassel F. Salloukh, and Marie-Joëlle Zahar. 2012. *Beyond the Arab Spring: Authoritarianism and Democratization in the Arab World*. Boulder, CO: Rienner.

Budge, Ian, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 2001. *Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945-1998*. eds. Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, and Eric Tanenbaum. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Budge, Ian, David Robertson, and Derek Hearl. 1987. *Ideology, Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses of Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies*. eds. Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek Hearl. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Burnham, Kenneth P., and David R. Anderson. 2004. “Multimodel Inference.” *Sociological Methods & Research* 33(2): 261–304.

Cammett, Melani, and Pauline Jones Luong. 2014. “Is There an Islamist Political Advantage?” *Annual Review of Political Science* 17(1): 187–206.

Capoccia, G., and D. Ziblatt. 2010. 43 Comparative Political Studies *The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond*.

Carey, John M. 2013. *Tunisia Electoral Formula*.

———. 2014. “Party Systems and the Choice Sets Voters Confront in Transitions to Democracy.” In *Workshop on Democracy and Regime Change*, Istanbul: Sabanci University, 1–31.

Carey, John M., and Andrew Reynolds. 2011. “The Impact of Election Systems.” *Journal of Democracy* 22(4): 36–47.

Carey, John M., and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1995. “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas.” *Electoral Studies* 14(4): 417–39.

Çarkoğlu, Ali, André P.M. Krouwel, and Kerem Yıldırım. 2013. “Post-Arab Spring Elections: A Comparison of Voting Advice Application Results.” In *ECPR General Conference*, , 1–35.

Carothers, Thomas. 2002. “The End of the Transition Paradigm.” *Journal of Democracy* 13(1): 5–21. http://muse.jhu.edu/content/crossref/journals/journal_of_democracy/v013/13.1carothers.html.

Cavatorta, Francesco. 2007. “‘More than Repression: The Significance of Divide et Impera in the Middle East and North Africa –The Case of Morocco.’” *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 25(2): 187–203.

———. 2012. “Arab Spring: The Awakening of Civil Society. A General Overview"." *European Institute for the Mediterranean (IEMed)*: 75–85.

Cavatorta, Francesco, and Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle. 2012. “The End of Authoritarian

Rule and the Mythology of Tunisia under Ben Ali." *Mediterranean Politics* 17(2): 179–95.

Cavatorta, Francesco, and Fabio Merone. 2013. "Moderation through Exclusion? The Journey of the Tunisian Ennahda from Fundamentalist to Conservative Party." *Democratization* 20(5): 857–75.

Chandra, Kanchan. 2005. "Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability." *Perspectives on Politics* 3(2): 235–52.

Chandra, Kanchan, and Cilanne Boulet. 2003. *A Model of Change in an Ethnic Demography*.

Choi, Jaehwa, Michelle Peters, and Ralph O. Mueller. 2010. "Correlational Analysis of Ordinal Data: From Pearson's R to Bayesian Polychoric Correlation." *Asia Pacific Education Review* 11(4): 459–66.

Clark, Janine. 2004a. *Islam, Charity, and Activism: Middle-Class Networks and Social Welfare in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

———. 2004b. "Social Movement Theory and Patron-Clientelism." *Comparative Political Studies* 37(8): 941–68.

———. 2006. "The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in Jordan." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 38(1): 539–60.

Collombier, Virginie. 2013. *Politics without Parties. Political Change and Democracy Building in Egypt Before and After the Revolution*. Firenze.

Colomer, Jopseph M. 1995. *Game Theory and the Transition to Democracy: The Spanish Model*. Aldershot Hants: Edward Elgar.

Cross, Ester, and Jason Sorens. 2016. "Arab Spring Constitution-Making: Polarization, Exclusion, and Constraints." *Democratization* 0(0): 1–24.

Curini, Luigi. 2010. "The Preferences of Political Experts and Their Impact on Ideological Bias. An Unfolding Analysis Based on Benoit-Laver Expert Survey." *Party Politics* 16(3): 299–321.

Cutright, Phillips. 1963. "National Political Development : Measurement and Analysis." *American Sociological Review* 28(2): 253–64.

Dahl, Robert A. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Dalton, R. J., and S. Weldon. 2007. "Partisanship and Party System Institutionalization." *Party Politics* 13(2): 179–96.

Dalton, Russell J. 2008. "The Quantity and the Its Measurement , and Its Consequences." *Comparative Political Studies* 41(7): 1–22.

Dalton, Russell J., and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 2007. "Citizens and Political Behavior." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, eds. Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. New York: Oxford University Press, 3–27.

Deegan-Krause, Kevin, and Zsolt Enyedi. 2010. “Agency and the Structure of Party Competition: Alignment, Stability and the Role of Political Elites.” *West European Politics* 33(3): 686–710.

Democracy), CSID (Center for the Study of Islam and. 2016. *The Movement 18 October 2005 to 2016*.

Diamond, Larry. 1992. “Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered.” *The American Behavioral Scientist* 35(4): 450–99.

Diamond, Larry Jay. 2002. “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes.” *Journal of Democracy* 13(2): 21–35. https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v013/13.2diamond.html (November 11, 2015).

Diwan, Ishac. 2013. “Understanding Revolution in the Middle East: The Central Role of the Middle Class.” *Middle East Development Journal* 5(1): 1–30.

Driessen, Michael D. 2014. *Religion and Democratization: Framing Religious and Political Identities in Muslim and Catholic Societies*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Duverger, Maurice. 1954. *Political Parties*. London: Methuen.

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, and Emma C Murphy. 1996. “Transformation of the Corporatist State in the Middle East.” *Third World Quarterly* 17(4): 753–72.

El-Mahdi, Rabab. 2011. “Labour Protests in Egypt: Causes and Meanings.” *Review of African Political Economy* 38(129): 387–402.

Elff, Martin. 2009. “Social Divisions, Party Positions, and Electoral Behaviour.” *Electoral Studies* 28(2): 297–308.

Elkins, Z. 2010. 43 Comparative Political Studies *Diffusion and the Constitutionalization of Europe*.

Ellen Lust. 2009. “Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East.” *Journal of Democracy* 20(3): 122–35. http://muse.jhu.edu/content/crossref/journals/journal_of_democracy/v020/20.3.lust.html.

Elsayyad, May, and Shima’a Hanafy. 2014. “Voting Islamist or Voting Secular? An Empirical Analysis of Voting Outcomes in Egypt’s ‘Arab Spring.’” *Public Choice* 160(1–2): 109–30.

Elster, Jon. 1995. “Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process.” *Duke Law Journal* 45(2): 364–96.

Elster, Jon, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss. 1998. *Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Enyedi, Zsolt. 2005. “The Role of Agency in Cleavage Formation.” *European Journal of Political Research* 44(5): 697–720.

———. 2008. “The Social and Attitudinal Basis of Political Parties: Cleavage Politics Revisited.” *European Review* 16(3): 287–304.

Evans, Geoffrey, and Nan Dirk De Graaf. 2013. *Political Choice Matters: Explaining the Strength of Class and Religious Cleavages in Cross-National Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Eyadat, Zaid. 2015. “A Transition without Players: The Role of Political Parties in the Arab Revolutions.” *Democracy and Security* 11(2): 160–75.

Franklin, Mark N. 1992. “The Decline of Cleavage Politics.” In *Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries*, eds. Mark N. Franklin, Thomas T. Mackie, and Henry Valen. , 383–405.

Frye, Timothy. 2010. *Building States and Markets After Communism: The Perils of Polarized Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. “The End of History?” *The National Interest* (16): 3–18.

Gabel, Matthew J., and John D. Huber. 2000. “Putting Parties in Their Place: Inferring Party Left-Right Ideological Positions from Party Manifestos Data.” *American Journal of Political Science* 44(1): 94–103.

Gandhi, Jennifer, and Ellen Lust-Okar. 2009. “Elections Under Authoritarianism.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 12(1): 403–22.

Garcia-Rivero, C., and H. Kotze. 2007. “Electoral Support for Islamic Parties in the Middle East and North Africa.” *Party Politics* 13(5): 611–36.

Geddes, Barbara. 1998. “A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe.” *Comparative Political Studies* 28(2): 239–74.

———. 1999. “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?” *Annual Review of Political Science* 2(1): 115–44.

———. 2006. *Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?* Los Angeles, CA.

Gelvin, James L. 2004. *The Modern Middle East: A History*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gessoumi, Mouldi. 2014. “The Map of the Tunisian Left.” In *Mapping of the Arab Left*, ed. Khalil Kalfat. Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung North African Office, 16–43.

Ginsburg, Tom, Zachary Elkins, and Justin Blount. 2009. “Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?” *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 5: 201–23.

Glaeser, A R D L, Rafael L A Porta, and Andrei Shleifer. 2004. “Do Institutions Cause Growth ?” *Journal of Economic Growth* 9: 271–303.

Grimmer, Justin, and Brandon M. Stewart. 2013. “Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts.” *Political Analysis* 21(3): 267–97.

Gunther, Richard, Paul A. Beck, Pedro Magalhães, and Alejandro Moreno. 2016. *Voting in Old and New Democracies*. eds. Richard Gunther, Paul A. Beck, Pedro

Magalhães, and Alejandro Moreno. New York: Routledge.

Gunther, Richard, and Anthony Mughan. 1993. "Political Institutions and Cleavage Management." In *Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad*, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institutions, 272–301.

Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R Kaufinan. 1997. "The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions." *Comparative Politics* 29(3): 263–83.

Halpern, Manfred. 1963. *Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hamid, Shadi. 2014. "Political Party Development Before and After the Arab Spring." In *Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East*, ed. Mehran Kamrava. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 131–50.

Van Hamme, Gilles, Alia Gana, and Ben Rebbah Maher. 2014. "Social and Socio-Territorial Electoral Base of Political Parties in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia." *The Journal of North African Studies* 19(5): 751–69.

Hashemi, Nader. 2009. *Islam, Secularism and Liberal Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Haynes, Jeffrey, and Guy Ben-Porat. 2013. "Religion, Secularization and Democracy in the Mediterranean Region: Problems and Prospects." *Mediterranean Politics* 18(2): 153–69. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629395.2013.799322.

Herb, Michael. 2004. "Princes and Parliaments in the Arab World Author." *Middle East Journal* 58(3): 367–84.

Heydemann, Steven. 2007. 13 The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brooking Institution *Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World*.

———. 2016. "Explaining the Arab Uprisings: Transformations in Comparative Perspective." *Mediterranean Politics* 21(1): 1–13.

Hibou, Béatrice. 2011. *The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Higley, John, and Michael G. Burton. 1989. "The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns." *American Sociological Review* 54(1): 17–32.

Hilal, Jamil. 2014. "Introduction: On the Self-Definition of the Left in the Arab State." In *Mapping of the Arab Left: Conteemporary Leftist Politics in the Arab East*, eds. Jamil Hilal and Katja Herman. Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Regional Office Palestine, 8–34.

Hinnebusch, Raymond. 1981. "The National Progressive Unionist Party : The Nationalist-Left Opposition in Post-Populist Egypt." *Arab Law Quarterly* 3(4): 325–51.

———. 2005. "Political Parties and Trade Unions." In *A Companion to the History of the Middle East*, Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 334–54.

———. 2010. "Toward a Historical Sociology of State Formation in the Middle East."

Middle East Critique 19(3): 201–16.

———. 2015a. "Change and Continuity after the Arab Uprising: The Consequences of State Formation in Arab North African States." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42(1): 12–30. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13530194.2015.973182 (November 9, 2015).

———. 2015b. "Conclusion: Agency, Context and Emergent Post-Uprising Regimes." *Democratization* 22(2): 358–74.

———. 2015c. "Introduction: Understanding the Consequences of the Arab Uprisings – Starting Points and Divergent Trajectories." *Democratization* 22(2): 205–17.

———. 2015d. "Towards a Historical Sociology of the Arab Uprising." In *Routledge Hanbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization*, ed. Larbi Sadiki. New York: Routledge, 39–50.

Horowitz, Donald L. 1993. "Democracy in Divided Societies." *Journal of Democracy* 4(4): 18–38.

Hostrup Haugbølle, Rikke, and Francesco Cavatorta. 2011. "Will the Real Tunisian Opposition Please Stand Up? Opposition Coordination Failures under Authoritarian Constraints." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 38(3): 323–41.

Howard, Philip N., and Muzammil M. Hussain. 2011. "The Role of Digital Media." *Journal of Democracy* 22(3): 35–48.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

———. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman and London: University of Oklaoma Press.

Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. 1982. "An Islamic Alternative in Egypt : The Muslim Brotherhood and Sadat." *Arab Studies Quarterly* 4(1/2): 75–93.

———. 1995. "Liberalization and Democrtization in the Arab World: An Overview." In *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World*, eds. Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble. Boulder: Rienner, 29–57.

Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. 2005. *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Jamal, Amaney A., and Mark A. Tessler. 2008. "Attitudes in the Arab World." *Journal of Democracy* 19(1): 97–110.

Jung, Dietrich. 2011. "Unrest in the Arab World: Four Questions." *Insight Turkey* 13(3): 1–10.

Kalyvas, Stathis N. 1996. *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

———. 2000. "Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious

Parties." *Comparative Politics* 32(4): 379–98.

Kandil, Hazem. 2012a. *Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen: Egypt's Road to Revolt*. New York: Verso.

———. 2012b. "Why Did the Egyptian Middle Class March to Tahrir Square?" *Mediterranean Politics* 17(2): 197–215.

Katz, Richard S. 2014. "No Man Can Serve Two Masters: Party Politicians, Party Members, Citizens and Principal-Agent Models of Democracy." *Party Politics* 20(2): 183–93. http://ppq.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/20/2/183?rss=1.

Ketchley, Neil. 2013. 56 Comparative Studies in Society and History *"The Army and the People Are One Hand!" Fraternization and the 25th January Egyptian Revolution*.

Khiari, Sadri, and Olfa Lamloum. 1999. "Tunsie: Des Élections En Trompe-L'œil." *Politique africaine* 76(4): 106–15.

Kienle, Eberhard. 1998. "More than a Response to Islamism: The Political Deliberalization of Egypt in the 1990s." *Middle East Journal* 52(2): 219–35.

———. 2000. *A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt*. London: IB Tauris.

Kitschelt, H. 1995. "Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies: Theoretical Propositions." *Party Politics* 1(4): 447–72.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1992. "Political Regime Change: Structure and Process-Driven Explanations?" *American Political Science Review* 86(4): 1028–34.

Kitschelt, Herbert, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski, and Gábor Tóka. 1999. *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kostenko, Veronica V., Pavel A. Kuzmuchev, and Eduard D. Ponarin. 2016. "Attitudes towards Gender Equality and Perception of Democracy in the Arab World." *Democratization* 23(5): 862–91.

Kraetzschmar, Hendrik. 2011. "Mapping Opposition Cooperation in the Arab World: From Single-Issue Coalitions to Transnational Networks." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 38(3): 287–302.

Kraetzschmar, Hendrik, and Francesco Cavatorta. 2010. "Bullets over Ballots : Islamist Groups , the State and Electoral Violence in Egypt and Morocco." *Demcoratization* 17(2): 326–49.

Krippendorff, Klaus. 2013. *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*. Third. London: Sage Publications. http://www.sagepub.in/textbooks/Book234903 (January 15, 2016).

Kuenzi, M., and Gina Lambright. 2005. "Party Systems and Democratic Consolidation in Africa's Electoral Regimes." *Party Politics* 11(4): 423–46.

Kuenzi, Michelle, and Gina Lambright. 2001. "Party System Institutionalization in 30 African Countries." *Party Politics* 7(4): 437–68.

Kuran, Timur. 1991. “Sparks and Prairie Fires : A Theory of Unanticipated Political Revolution.” *Public Choice* 61(1): 41–74.

Kurzman, Charles, and Ijlal Naqvi. 2010. “Do Muslim Vote Islamic?” *Journal of Democracy* 21(2): 50–63.

Kuznets, Simon. 1995. “Economic Growth and Income Inequality.” *The American Economic Review* 45(1): 1–28.

Laakso, Markku, and Rein Taagepera. 1979. “‘Effective’ Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe.” *Comparative Political Studies* 12(1): 3–27.

Landau, David. 2012. “The Importance of Constitution-Making.” *Denver University Law review* 89(2): 1–23.

Landolt, Laura K., and Paul Kubicek. 2014. “Opportunities and Constraints: Comparing Tunisia and Egypt to the Coloured Revolutions.” *Democratization* 21(6): 984–1006.

Laver, Michael, Kenneth Benoit, and John Garry. 2003. “Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data.” *American Political Science Review* 97(2): 311–31.

Lee, Terence. 2009. “The Armed Forces and 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia.” 42(5): 640–69.

Lerner, Hanna. 2011. *Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lesch, Ann M. 2014. “Troubled Political Transitions: Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.” *Middle East Policy* 21(1): 62–74.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2002. “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.” *Journal of Democracy* 13(2): 51–65.

Lieckefett, Michael. 2012. “La Haute Istance et Les Élections En Tunisie: Du Consensus Au ‘pacte Politique’?” *Confluences Méditerranée* 82(3): 133–44.

Linz, Juan J. 1990. “The Perils of Presidentialism.” *Journal of Democracy* 1(1): 51–69.

Linz, Juan J., and Alfred C. Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.” *The American Political Science Review* 53(1): 69–105.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan. 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. New York: Free Press.

Lowe, Will. 2008. “Understanding Wordscores.” *Political Analysis* 16(4): 356–71.

Luciani, Giacomo. 1995. “Resources, Revenues, and Authoritarianism in the Arab World: Beyond the Rentier State?” In *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 211–27.

Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2005. *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lust, Ellen. 2011. "Missing the Third Wave: Islam, Institutions, and Democracy in the Middle East." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 46(2): 163–90.

Luxemburg, Rosa. 1906. *The Mass Strike*. London: Bookmarks.

Ly Netterstrøm, Kasper. 2015. "The IslamIsts' Compromise in Tunisia." *Journal of Democracy* 26(4): 110–24.

Maghraoui, Abdeslam. 2002. "Depoliticization in Morocco." *Journal of Democracy* 13(4): 24–32.

Mainwaring, Scott. 1998. "Party Systems in the Third Wave." *Journal of Democracy* 9(3): 67–81.

Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy R. Scully. 1995. *Biulding Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Mair, Peter. 2002. "Populist Democracy vs. Party Democracy." In *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, eds. Yves Mény and Yves Suret. Basingstoke UK: Palgrave, 81–98.

Makara, Michael. 2013. "Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring." *Democracy and Security* 9(4): 334–59.

Masoud, Tarek. 2014. *Counting Islam: Religion, Class and Elections in Egypt*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

McCarthy, Rory. 2015. "Protecting the Sacred: Tunisia's Islamist Movement Ennahdha and the Challenge of Free Speech." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 194(January): 1–18.

McFaul, Michael. 2002. "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in thePostcommunist World." *World Politics* 54(2): 212–44.

Merkel, Wolfgang. 1998. "The Consolidation of Post Autocratic Democracies : A Multi Level Model." *Democratization* 3(3): 37–41.

Merone, Fabio. 2015. "Enduring Class Struggle in Tunisia: The Fight for Identity beyond Political Islam." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42(1): 74–87.

Migdal, Joel. 1988. *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mikhaylov, Slava, Michael Laver, and Kenneth R. Benoit. 2012. "Coder Reliability and Misclassification in the Human Coding of Party Manifestos." *Political Analysis* 20(1): 78–91.

Mölder, Martin. 2016. "The Validity of the RILE Left–right Index as a Measure of Party Policy." *Party Politics* 22(1): 37–48.

Moore, Barrington Jr. 1965. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Boston:

Beacon.

Morlino, L. 2005. “Anchors and Democratic Change.” *Comparative Political Studies* 38(7): 743–70.

Morlino, Leonardo. 1995. “Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe.” In *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 315–88.

———. 2011. *Changes for Democracy: Actors, Structures, Processes*. New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 2012. “Un’Elezione Non Fa Primavera.” *L’Espresso*: 84–88.

———. 2015. “Transition to Democracy: What Theory to Grasp Complexity?” *Historien* 15: 13–31.

Moustafa, Tamir. 2012. *Drafting Egypt’s Constitution: Can A New Legal Framework Revive A Flawed Transition?*

Murphy, Emma C. 1999. *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia: From Bourguiba to Ben Ali*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Negretto, Gabriel L. 1999. “Constitution-Making and Institutional Design. The Transformation Presidentialism in Argentina.” *European Journal of Sociology* 40(2): 1–33.

Nielsen, Richard. 2013. *The Lonely Jihadist: Weak Networks and the Radicalization of Muslim Clerics*. Doctoral dissertation: University of Harvard.

North, Douglass C., and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.” *The Journal of Economic History* 48(4): 803–32.

O’Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. “Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusion about Uncertain Democracies.” In *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*, eds. Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Withehead. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Ozzano, Luca. 2013. “The Many Faces of the Political God: A Typology of Religiously Oriented Parties.” *Democratization* 20(5): 807–30.

Ozzano, Luca, and Francesco Cavatorta. 2013. “Introduction: Religiously Oriented Parties and Democratization.” *Democratization* 20(5): 799–806.

Pahwa, Sumita. 2013. “Secularizing Islamism and Islamizing Democracy: The Political and Ideational Evolution of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers 1984–2012.” *Mediterranean Politics* 18(2): 189–206.

———. 2017. “Pathways of Islamist Adaptation: The Egyptian Muslim Brothers’ Lessons for Inclusion Moderation Theory.” *Democratization* 0(0): 1–19.

Parolin, Gianluca Paolo. 2013. *(Re) Arrangement of State/Islam Relations in Egypt ’s Constitutional Transition*.

Pellicer, Miquel, and Eva Wegner. 2014. “Socio-Economic Voter Profile and Motives for Islamist Support in Morocco.” *Party Politics* 20(1): 116–33.

———. 2015. *Who Votes for Islamist Parties – and Why?*

Penner Angrist, Michele. 1999. “The Expression of Political Dissent in the Middle East: Turkish Democratization and Authoritarian Continuity in Tunisia.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41(4): 730–57.

Perkins, Kenneth J. 2004. *A History of Modern Tunisia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Perthes, Volker. 2004. *Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Pierson, Paul. 2004. *Politics in Time: History, INstitutions and Social Analysis*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Posusney, Marsha Pripstein. 1997. *Labor and the Sate in Egypt: Workers, Unions and Economic Restructuring*. New York: Columbia University Press.

———. 2002. “Multi-Party Elections in the Arab World: Institutional Engineering and Oppositional Strategies.” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36(4): 34–62.

Proksch, Sven-Oliver, and Jonathan B Slapin. 2014. “Ideological Clarity in Multiparty Competition : A New Measure and Test Using Election Manifestos.” *British Journal of Political Science* 46(3): 591–610.

Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2006. “Self-Enforcing Democracy.” *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*: 1–21.

Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Putnam, Robert D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Raiffa, Howard. 1982. *The Art and Science of Negotiation*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Randall, V., and L. Svasand. 2002. “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies.” *Party Politics* 8(1): 5–29.

Randall, V., and L. Svåsand. 2002. “Introduction: The Contribution of Parties to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation.” *Democratization* 9(3): 1–10.

Randall, Vicky. 2001. “Party System and Voter Alignments in the New Democracies of the Third World.” In *Party System and Voter Alignment Revisited*, eds. Lauri Karvonen and Stein Kuhnle. London and New York: Routledge, 238–60.

Rawls, John. 1993. *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Raymond, Christopher. 2014. "Party Agency and the Religious-Secular Cleavage in Post-Communist Countries: The Case of Romania." *Political Studies* 62(2): 292–308.

Resta, Valeria. 2013. "'Democracy Is the Only Way Ahead': Relations between Islamists and Secularists, and How to Enlarge the Common Ground between Them." In *CSID Conference*, Tunis.

Reynolds, Andrew. 2002. *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*. ed. Andrew Reynolds. New York: Oxford University Press.

Robbins, Michael, and Mark Tessler. 2011. "Tunisians Voted for Jobs, Not Islam." *Foreign Policy*.

Roll, Stephan. 2016. "Managing Change: How Egypt's Military Leadership Shaped the Transformation." *Mediterranean Politics* 21(1): 23–43.

Rosenblum, Nancy L. 2003. "Religious Parties, Religious Political Identity, and the Cold Shoulder of Liberal Democratic Thought." *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 6(1): 23–53.

Ross, Michael L. 1999. "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse." *World Politics* 51(2): 297–322.

Roy, Olivier. 1994. *The Failure of Political Islam*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens. 1992. *Capitalist Development and Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rustow, Dankwart A. 1970. "Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model." *Comparative Politics* 2(3): 337–63.

Sadiki, L. 2002. "Political Liberalization in Bin Ali's Tunisia: Façade Democracy." *Democratization* 9(October 2014): 122–41.

Sadiki, Larbi. 2002. "Bin Ali's Tunisia: Democracy by Non-Democratic Means." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 50(3): 497–513.

Said, Atef. 2012. "The Paradox of Transition to 'Democracy' under Military Rule." *Social Research: An International Quarterly* 79(2): 397–434.

Salloukh, Bassel F. et al. 2015. *The Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon*. London: Pluto Press.

Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. *Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1987. *A Theory of Democracy Revisited*. Chathman, N.J.: Chathman House.

Schedler, Andreas. 2002. "The Menu of Manipulation." *Journal of Democracy* 13(2): 36–50.

———. 2006. *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*.

Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Schlumberger, Oliver. 2007. *Debating Arab Authoritarianism : Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes*. Stanford University Press.

Schmitter, Philippe C. 2010. "Twenty-Five Years, Fifteen Findings." *Journal of Democracy* 21(1): 17–28.

Schwedler, Jillian. 2007. "Democratization, Inclusion and the Moderation of Islamist Parties." *Development* 50(1): 56–61.

———. 2011. "Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypotesis." *World Politics*.

———. 2013a. "Islamists in Power? Inclusion, Moderation, and the Arab Uprisings." *Middle East Development Journal* 5(1): 1350006-1-1350006–18.

———. 2013b. "Spatial Dynamics of the Arab Uprisings." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 46(2): 230–34.

Shehata, Dina. 2010. *Islamist and Secularists in Egypt: Opposition, Conflict and Cooperation*. New York: Routledge.

———. 2014. "The Arab Uprisings and the Prospects for Building Shared Societies." *Development* 57(1): 84–95.

Shteiwi, Musa M. 2014. "The Jordanian Left: Today's Realities and Future Prospects." In *Mapping of the Arab Left: Conteemporary Leftist Politics in the Arab East*, eds. Jamil Hilal and Katja Herman. Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Regional Office Palestine, 58–83.

Slapin, Jonathan B, and Sven-Oliver Proksch. 2008. "A Scaling Model for Estimating Time-Serial Positions from Texts." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(3): 705–22.

De Smet, Brecht. 2014. "Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Egypt." *Science and Society* 78(1): 11–40.

Somer, Murat. 2011. "Does It Take Democrats to Democratize? Lessons From Islamic and Secular Elite Values in Turkey." *Comparative Political Studies* 44(5): 511–45.

———. 2014. "Moderation of Religious and Secular Politics, a Country's 'centre' and Democratization." *Democratization* 21(2): 244–67..

Stacher, Joshua. 2011. "Blame the SCAF for Egypt's Problems." *Foreign Policy*.

———. 2012a. *Adaptable Autocrats: Regime Power in Egypt and Syria*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

———. 2012b. *Adaptable Autocrats: Regime Power in Egypt Ans Syria*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

———. 2015. "Fragmenting States, New Regimes: Militarized State Violence and Transition in the Middle East." *Democratization* 22(2): 259–75.

Stepan, Alfred C. 2000. "Religion, Democracy, and the 'Twin Tolerations.'" *Journal of*

Democracy 11(4): 37–57.

———. 2012. “Tunisia’s Transition and the Twin Tolerations.” *Journal of Democracy* 23(2): 89–103.

Stepan, Alfred, and Juan J. Linz. 2013. “Democratization Theory and the ‘Arab Spring.’” *Journal of Democracy* 24(2): 15–30.

Storm, Lise. 2014. *Party Politics and the Prospects for Democracy in North Africa*. Boulde, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Storsm, Lise, and Francesco Cavatorta. 2018. *Political Parties in the Arabic World*, Edinbrugh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd.

Strauss, Roger. 1938. “The Relations of Religion to Democracy.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 2: 37–38.

Szmolka, Inmaculada. 2015. “Exclusionary and Non-Consensual Transitions Versus Inclusive and Consensual Democratizations: The Cases of Egypt and Tunisia.” *Arab Studies Quarterly* 37(1): 73–95.

Tamimi, Azzam S. 2001. *Rachid Gannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Tarrow, Sidney. 1998. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Contentious Politics*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tavana, D. 2011. “Party Proliferation and Electoral Transition in Post-Mubarak Egypt.” *The Journal of North African Studies* 16(4): 555–71.

Tavana, Daniel L. 2012. “Electoral System Choice in Revolutionary Egypt.” (March).

Taylor, William C. 2014. *Military Responses to the Arab Uprisings and the Future of Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East: Analysis from Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tepe, Sultan. 2013. “The Perils of Polarization and Religious Parties: The Democratic Challenges of Political Fragmentation in Israel and Turkey.” *Democratization* 20(5): 831–56.

Tessler, Mark. 2003. “Arab and Muslim Political Attitudes: Stereotypes and Evidence from Survey Research.” *International Studies Perspectives* 4(2): 175–81.

———. 2010. “Religion, Religiosity and the Place of Islam in Political Life: Insights from the Arab Barometer Surveys.” *Middle East Law and Governance* 2(2): 221–52.

———. 2011. *Public Opinion in the Middle East: Survey Research and the Political Orientations of Ordinary Citizens*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Tessler, Mark A., and Eleanor Gao. 2005. “Gauging Arab Support for Democracy.” *Journal of Democracy* 16(3): 83–97.

Tezcur, G. M. 2010. “The Moderation Theory Revisited: The Case of Islamic Political Actors.” *Party Politics* 16(1): 69–88.

Thomassen, Jacques. 2005. *The European Voter: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies*. ed. Thomassen Jacques. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tilly, Charles. 1985. "War Making and State as Organized Crime." In *Bringin the State Back In*, eds. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tsebelis, George. 2002. *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Turam, Belina. 2007. *Between Islam and the State: The Politics of Engagement*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Valbjørn, Morten. 2012. "Upgrading Post-Democratization Studies: Examining a Re-Politicized Arab World in a Transition to Somewhere." *Middle East Critique* 21(1): 25–35.

———. 2015. "Reflections on Self-Reflections – On Framing the Analytical Implications of the Arab Uprisings for the Study of Arab Politics." *Democratization* 22(2): 218–38.

Vandewalle, Dirk. 1980. "Bourguiba, Charismatic Leadership and the Tunisian One Party System." *Middle East Journal* 34(2): 149–59.

Vermunt, Jeroen K., and Jay Magidson. 2005. "Factor Analysis With Categorical Indicators: A Comparison Between Traditional and Latent Class Approaches." In *New Developments in Categorical Data Analysis for the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, eds. L. Andries van der Ark, Marcel A. Croon, and Klaas Sijtsma. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 41–62.

Volkens, Andrea. 2007. "Strengths and Weaknesses of Approaches to Measuring Policy Positions of Parties." *Electoral Studies* 26(1): 108–20.

Wegner, Eva, and Miquel Pellicer. 2009. "Islamist Moderation without Democratization: The Coming of Age of the Moroccan Party of Justice and Development?" *Democratization* 16(1): 157–75.

Weingast, Barry R. 1997. "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law." *The American Political Science Review* 91(2): 245–63.

Welzel, Christian. 2009. "Theories of Democratization." In *Democratization*, eds. Christian W. Haerpfer, Patrick Bernhagen, Ronald Inglehart, and Christian Welzel. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 74–91. http://usir.salford.ac.uk/8023/.

Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky. 2002. *Mobilizing Islam : Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt*. Columbia University Press.

———. 2004. "The Path to Moderation : Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party." *Comparative Politics* 36(2): 205–28.

———. 2011. "The Muslim Brotherhood and Democratic Transition in Egypt." *Middle East Law and Governance* 3: 204–23.

———. 2015. *The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement*. Princeton

and Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Wilson, Ian Douglas. 2015. *The Politics of Protection Rackets in Post-New Order Indonesia: Coercive Capital, Authority and Street Politics (Asia's Transformations)* New York: Routledge.

Yacoub, Hussein. 2014. "The Lebanese Left: The Possibility of the Impossible." In *Mapping of the Arab Left: Conteemporary Leftist Politics in the Arab East*, eds. Jamil Hilal and Katja Herman. Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Regional Office Palestine, 82–101.

Ben Yahmed, Béchir. 2011. "Jours de Victoire." *La Jeune Afrique*.

Yardimci-Geyikci, Sebnem. 2015. "Party Institutionalization and Democratic Consolidation: Turkey and Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective." *Party Politics* 21(4): 527–38.

Yeh, Jiunn-rong, and Wen-chen Chang. 2009. "The Changing Landscape of Modern Constitutionalism : Transitional Perspective." *National Taiwan University Law Review* 4(1): 145–84.

Yom, S. L. 2005. "Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 9(4): 14–33.

Zartman, I. William. 2015. *Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the Intifadat*. ed. I. William Zartman. Athens: University of Georgia Press.

Zeghal, Malika. 2013. "Competing Ways of Life: Islamism, Secularism, and Public Order in the Tunisian Transition." *Constellations* 20(2): 254–74.

Zemni, Sami. 2014. "The Extraordinary Politics of the Tunisian Revolution: The Process of Constitution Making." *Mediterranean Politics* (June): 1–17.

Zemni, Sami, Brecht De Smet, and Koenraad Bogaert. 2013. "Luxemburg on Tahrir Square: Reading the Arab Revolutions with Rosa Luxemburg's The Mass Strike." *Antipode* 45(4): 888–907.