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SPECIALIZATION VS COMPETITION: AN ANATOMY OF INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE

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Specialization vs Competition: an Anatomy of Increasing Returns to Scale³

Abstract

We develop a two-sector model of monopolistic competition with a differentiated intermediate good and variable elasticity of technological substitution. This setting proves to be well-suited to studying the nature and origins of external increasing returns. We disentangle two sources of scale economies: specialization and competition. The former depends only on how TFP varies with input diversity, while the latter is fully captured by the behavior of the elasticity of substitution across inputs. This distinction gives rise to a full characterization of the rich array of competition regimes in our model. The necessary and sufficient conditions for each regime to occur are expressed in terms of the relationships between TFP and the elasticity of substitution as functions of the input diversity. Moreover, we demonstrate that, despite the folk wisdom resting on CES models, specialization economies are in general neither necessary nor sufficient for external increasing returns to emerge. This highlights the profound and non-trivial role of market competition in generating agglomeration economies, endogenous growth, and other phenomena driven by scale economies.

Keywords: External Increasing Returns; Variable Elasticity of Substitution; Specialization Effect; Competition Effect.

JEL Classification: D24, D43, F12, L13

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Introduction

What happens to an economy when it gets larger (say, in terms of population)? The answer to this question is of paramount importance for understanding, for example, agglomeration economies in new economic geography, economic growth in endogenous growth theory, the home market effect in international trade, etc. To a large extent, all these phenomena are driven by external increasing returns to scale (EIRS), meaning that, following a given increase in the size of the economy, the resulting increase in the aggregate output is more than proportional. EIRS may emerge for different reasons and they play a fundamental role in shaping market outcomes. Specialization is among the most important sources of scale economies: more room for the division of labor is likely to boost aggregate productivity. On the other hand, EIRS are also inherently driven by product market competition: larger markets lead to tougher competition across firms, for higher demand invites more firms, which eventually results in lower prices, lower markups, and larger firms. According to Sandmo (2011, Ch. 3), this dichotomy has been conceptualized at least as early as by Adam Smith (1776), who was a prominent spokesman in favor of both a deeper division of labor and freer competition. We believe, however, that the interaction between these two forces has never been systematically studied within a unified model. Indeed, in the literature such forces have been mainly analyzed independently from each other within two different families of models. While the consequences of specialization have been studied for the most part by means of two-sector monopolistic competition models in which the final good sector technology displays constant elasticity of substitution (CES) across the differentiated inputs (e.g. Ethier, 1982), the analyses of the competition effect have been primarily provided within monopolistically competitive environments with variable elasticity of substitution on the consumer's side (Behrens and Murata, 2007; Zhelobodko et al., 2012; Bilbiie et al., 2012; Bertolotti and Etro, 2016).⁴ As a result, the *joint* role of specialization and competition in generating EIRS and shaping market outcomes has till now received very little attention.

What makes the understanding of the combined effect of these two forces even more intriguing is that they need not always spur aggregate production. First, according to Kremer (1993), more complex technologies involving a larger number of production tasks and/or more differentiated intermediate inputs may be detrimental to manufacturing activities, e.g. due to higher risks of failure. In other words, complexity diseconomies, as opposed to specialization economies, may occur. Second, recent theoretical studies of market competition show that tougher competition need not always lead to lower prices. For instance, Chen and Riordan (2007) have proposed a model of price increasing competition, while Zhelobodko et al. (2012) study both price-decreasing and price-increasing competition within a unified model.

In this paper, we look closer at the nature and sources of EIRS, and study how they affect the market outcome. To achieve our goal, we develop a two-sector model in which

⁴Both originating from Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1979, 1981), these two approaches are definitely related. However, as will be seen below, they differ in several important respects. Bridging the two is part of our contribution.

the production function in the final good sector is non-specified. In this model, the specialization/complexity effect is fully captured by how TFP varies with input diversity, while the competition effect is described by the behavior of the elasticity of substitution. For this reason, in our setting these two magnitudes are treated as fundamental primitives.

Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, although our model generates a rich array of equilibrium behavior modes, we provide a full characterization of the impact of horizontal innovation⁵ on prices, markups, and wages. To be more precise, we state necessary and sufficient conditions for competition to be (i) either price-decreasing or price-increasing, (ii) either markup-decreasing or markup-increasing, and (iii) either wage-increasing or wage-decreasing. The first condition involves only TFP as a function of input diversity, the second is based solely on the behavior of the elasticity of substitution, while the third blends both. Thus, we clearly map the fundamental primitives of the model into a set of the various modes of competition it generates.

Second, we endogenize the number of firms under free entry, and derive a simple necessary and sufficient condition for EIRS in the final good sector to occur. This condition is also expressed in terms of the TFP and the elasticity of substitution as functions of input diversity, and is shown to be equivalent to the wage-increasing nature of the market outcome. Furthermore, we demonstrate that specialization economies are, in general, neither necessary nor sufficient for EIRS to emerge. This unexpected result stands in a sharp contrast to what happens in the CES world, where the competition effect vanishes because of the lack of impact of entry on the toughness of competition. As a consequence, under the CES specialization economies are the only source of EIRS. This explains why specialization economies have long been viewed as the dominant factor of scale economies,⁶ while the impact of market competition was, in this regard, definitely underestimated. On the contrary, our result signifies the non-trivial role of market competition in generating agglomeration economies, endogenous growth, and other phenomena driven by external increasing returns.

Third, we find that the competition effect may either reinforce or weaken the impact of the specialization effect on aggregate output. This possibility has not been taken into account by horizontal R&D-based endogenous growth models (including Benassy, 1998). These models focus on the positive effects of specialization, disregarding other possible effects (of either sign) which stem from an increase in the toughness of market competition. In our analysis, the way in which the competition effect interacts with the specialization effect depends on whether the inverse demand elasticity for the intermediate inputs is a decreasing or an increasing function of the number of such inputs.

In addition, our approach provides a micro-foundation of the complexity externality, which may lead to a reduction of TFP in the final good sector in response to expanding variety of intermediate inputs.⁷

⁵Following the literature, what we understand by horizontal innovation is entry of new intermediate input producers.

⁶See Fujita and Thisse, 2013, Ch. 3, for a modern treatment.

⁷Examples of how this externality may work in growth theory can be found in Howitt (1999), Dalgaard and Kreiner (2001), and Bucci (2013).

Finally, our main results hold for any production function which satisfies the properties of symmetry, strict quasi-concavity, and constant returns to scale (CRS), as well as having well-defined marginal products of inputs.

We believe that our contribution makes a further theoretical advancement compared to recent work on monopolistic competition with variable elasticity of substitution on the final consumer's side, including Zhelobodko et al. (2012). Indeed, these authors only distinguish between price-increasing and price-decreasing competition as in their model, prices and markups always move in the same direction in response to market size shocks. The reason behind the deep differences in the results of the two settings, despite their formal similarity, is as follows. The counterpart of our TFP function in Zhelobodko et al. (2012) would be the aggregate utility measure as a function of product variety. As has been shown recently by Dhingra and Morrow (2015), the behavior of the utility level in this type of model is crucial for welfare analysis, but is fully unrelated to the properties of free-entry equilibrium,⁸ while the elasticity of substitution yields a sufficient statistic for equilibrium behavior. On the contrary, what crucially matters for the market outcome in our model is the interplay between the specialization/complexity effect and the competition effect, mathematically captured through a condition expressed in terms of both the TFP and the elasticity of substitution. This ultimately justifies why we need two fundamental primitives instead of one.

Literature review. The pioneering work by Ethier (1982) is crucial for understanding the role of specialization economies in generating EIRS. Ethier's paper still remains one of the workhorse models in endogenous growth theory, as well as in urban and regional economics. Giving full credit to this work, we find it fair to say that the way in which the interaction between specialization and competition may generate EIRS is definitely understudied in the literature. We believe that the main reason for this resides in the widely used assumption that the technology in the final sector has CES. This assumption is appealing as it leads to major gains in tractability. The flipside is that the equilibrium markup, which may serve as a reverse measure of the toughness of competition, remains unaffected by entry, or by market-size shocks. As a consequence, the competition effect is washed out in this type of model. Both the horizontal innovation paradigm in endogenous growth theory (Grossman and Helpman, 1990; Krugman, 1990, Ch. 11; Romer, 1990; Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991), and the Marshallian externalities approach, first used by Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990) to study agglomeration economies at the city level,⁹ are essentially based on the CES assumption. For this reason, neither of these literatures allows us to distinguish clearly between the impacts of specialization/complexity and toughness of competition on aggregate output and wages. The present paper aims to fill this gap.

Wage inequality has recently gained new interest in international trade studies (Amiti and Davis, 2012; Helpman et al., 2010). In this regard, our findings suggest that this inequality may stem, at least in part, from the cross-country differences in the interaction between

⁸See also Benassy (1996) for an earlier contribution in the same line of inquiry.

⁹Duranton and Puga (2004) and, more recently, Fujita and Thisse (2013) provide extensive surveys of this strand of literature.

specialization and competition. Another issue that empirically motivates our theoretical analysis is the relationship between city size and wages. The exact form of this relationship is ambiguous, even though it is widely acknowledged by urban and regional economists that larger cities pay, on average, higher wages. Typically a log-linear relationship implied by the CES model is estimated with city-specific dummies being commonly used to improve the fit (Duranton, 2014). Our paper provides a microeconomic foundation for potentially more flexible empirical strategies using non-linear specifications and/or non-parametric estimation methods.¹⁰

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium for a given number of input-producing firms. We also suggest a classification of competitive regimes in the intermediate input sector, based on the impact of entry on prices, markups, and wages. Section 4 deals with a free-entry equilibrium, and studies how the interaction between the specialization/complexity effect and the competition effect generates EIRS. Section 5 concludes.

The Model

The economy is composed by two vertically related sectors. The intermediate inputs sector (sector \mathcal{I}), produces a differentiated intermediate good under monopolistic competition. The number of firms in this sector (\mathcal{I} -firms) is endogenous due to free entry, while the only production factor is labor. Workers are homogeneous, each inelastically supplying one unit of labor. The labor market is perfectly competitive.

The final good sector (sector \mathcal{F}) involves a unit mass of perfectly competitive firms (\mathcal{F} -firms) sharing the same CRS technology, which uses varieties of the intermediate good as inputs. The main departure of our modeling strategy from Ethier (1982) and other numerous subsequent papers lies in working with a non-specified production function instead of the widely used CES technology.

Sector \mathcal{F}

The production of the homogenous final good requires a continuum $[0, n]$ of inputs, each representing a specific variety of a horizontally differentiated intermediate good. All firms operating in sector \mathcal{F} are endowed with the same production function F :

$$Y = F(\mathbf{q}), \tag{1}$$

where $\mathbf{q} = (q_i)_{i \in [0, n]}$ is the vector of inputs used in production, while n stands for the number

¹⁰Needless to say, we acknowledge that factors other than specialization economies and market competition also play a significant role in determining the city size-wage gap. Moreover, this gap may be different across workers being heterogeneous in experience and/or ability (see, e.g., Baum-Snow and Pavan, 2012). However, these issues are outside the scope of the present paper.

(or, more precisely, the *mass*) of intermediate inputs, as well as for the number of input-producing firms.

We make the standard assumptions about $F(\mathbf{q})$. First, $F(\mathbf{q})$ is concave in \mathbf{q} , which implies that each input exhibits a diminishing marginal product (see Appendix 1 for a mathematical definition of marginal product under a continuum of inputs). Second, $F(\mathbf{q})$ is positive homogenous of degree 1, so that there are CRS. Finally, we focus on *symmetric* production functions, *i.e.* such that any permutation of intermediates does not change the final output, Y . The reason for imposing such a symmetry, which typically holds in monopolistic competition contexts, is to refrain from placing any ad hoc asymmetries on sector \mathcal{I} .

In what follows, the duality principle will prove useful. Each \mathcal{F} -firm seeks to minimize production costs,

$$\min_{\mathbf{q}} \int_0^n p_i q_i di \quad \text{s.t.} \quad F(\mathbf{q}) \geq Y, \quad (2)$$

treating the total output Y as given. The *cost function* $\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{p}, Y)$, defined as the value function of the cost minimization problem (2), provides a description of the technology dual to the one based on the production function.¹¹ Because of CRS, a well-defined *price index for intermediate goods* $P(\mathbf{p})$ exists, which satisfies

$$\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{p}, Y) = YP(\mathbf{p}). \quad (3)$$

In the CES case, the cost function and the price index are given, respectively, by

$$\mathcal{C}(\mathbf{p}, Y) = Y \left(\int_0^n p_i^{1-\sigma} di \right)^{1/(1-\sigma)} \quad \text{and} \quad P(\mathbf{p}) = \left(\int_0^n p_i^{1-\sigma} di \right)^{1/(1-\sigma)}. \quad (4)$$

To show that our approach is flexible enough to encompass a broad range of the technologies used in the literature, we proceed by providing a gallery of examples.

1. CES: variations on a theme. The three assumptions just introduced (concavity, CRS, and symmetry) are simultaneously satisfied by the standard CES production function:

$$F(\mathbf{q}) \equiv \left(\int_0^n q_i^\rho di \right)^{1/\rho}, \quad 0 < \rho < 1. \quad (5)$$

At least two immediate extensions of (5) come to mind. First, the constant ρ in (5) may be replaced by a function of n . This is the case studied by Gali (1995), who assumes that varieties become better technological substitutes as their number increases, *i.e.* $\rho'(n) > 0$.

¹¹Duality theory in production, for the case of a finite set of inputs, was developed in pioneering works by Shephard (1953) and Uzawa (1964).

Second, a multiplicative TFP term varying with n may be introduced, like in Ethier (1982) and Benassy (1998):

$$F(\mathbf{q}) = n^\nu \left(\int_0^n q_i^\rho di \right)^{1/\rho}, \quad 0 < \rho < 1. \quad (6)$$

2. Translog technologies. For a simple example of a non-CES technology satisfying our assumptions, consider a production function given by

$$\ln F(\mathbf{q}) = \frac{1}{n} \int_0^n \ln q_i di - \frac{\alpha}{2} \left[\int_0^n (\ln q_i)^2 di - \frac{1}{n} \left(\int_0^n \ln q_i di \right)^2 \right], \quad (7)$$

which may be viewed as an infinite-dimensional counterpart of the translog specification, which has been widely used in early empirical works on production functions estimation (for a survey see, e.g., Kim, 1992). Another example of a tractable non-CES technology is given by the translog cost function (Feenstra, 2003) satisfying

$$\ln \mathcal{C}(\mathbf{p}, Y) = \ln Y + \frac{1}{n} \int_0^n \ln p_i di - \frac{\beta}{2} \left[\int_0^n (\ln p_i)^2 di - \frac{1}{n} \left(\int_0^n \ln p_i di \right)^2 \right]. \quad (8)$$

3. Kimball-type production functions. Kimball (1995) represents, to the best of our knowledge, one of the very first (and few) macroeconomic papers where a non-CES production technology is employed in sector \mathcal{F} . Namely, the production function $Y = F(\mathbf{q})$ is implicitly defined by means of the so-called “flexible aggregator”:

$$\int_0^n \phi \left(\frac{q_i}{Y} \right) di = 1, \quad (9)$$

where $\phi(\cdot)$ is an increasing, strictly concave, and sufficiently differentiable function.¹²

At this stage, a question may arise: does working with an *arbitrary* well-behaved CRS technology really buy substantially more flexibility compared to focusing on, say, Kimball’s aggregator (9), or another reasonably broad class of production (or cost) functions? We believe the answer is positive, the reason being that our approach allows capturing a rich variety of competition regimes and is flexible enough to capture some empirical controversies a narrower model would not.¹³ In Section 2.3, we give a mathematically more precise argument in favor of our modeling strategy.

Specialization economies vs complexity diseconomies. We are now equipped to give precise definitions for the specialization economies and complexity diseconomies. We find it useful, however, to preface the formal definitions valid for the general case with a brief informal discussion based on the special case of the augmented CES technology (6).

¹²To guarantee that a solution to (9) does exist for any n , one should assume additionally that $\phi(0) \leq 0$, while $\phi(\infty) = \infty$. When $\phi(\cdot)$ is a power function, we obtain the CES specification as a special case of (9).

¹³See Table 1 and the discussion below in Section 3.2.

In equation (6), when sufficiently negative, ν is a measure of the magnitude of the *complexity effect*: a larger number of intermediate inputs being simultaneously combined within the same production process can lead to a reduction in aggregate output (we come back to this issue immediately below). To be more precise, *complexity diseconomies* are said to occur iff $\nu < 1 - 1/\rho$, otherwise *specialization economies* take place. The logic behind these definitions is as follows: evaluating the total output Y given by (6) at a symmetric vector of inputs,¹⁴ we obtain $Y = n^{\nu+1/\rho}q$. The above inequalities keep track of whether Y increases more or less than proportionately with n . The baseline case described by (5) corresponds to $\nu = 0$, hence the baseline CES technology always exhibits specialization economies.

In order to extend these definitions to any symmetric CRS technology, we consider the behavior of F at a symmetric outcome, i.e. when $q_i = q$ for all $i \in [0, n]$. Denote by $\varphi(n)$ the level of output that can be produced when a firm uses one unit of each intermediate input.¹⁵ Given a \mathcal{F} -firm's total expenditure E on intermediate inputs under unit prices, the *specialization economies* capture the idea that the division of labor generates productivity gains, namely a larger variety of intermediate inputs allows to produce a larger amount of final output. To put this in a more formal way, note that, because of CRS, output of the final good equals $q\varphi(n)$ when q units of each intermediate are employed. Hence, the specialization effect takes place iff

$$\frac{E}{n}\varphi(n) > \frac{E}{k}\varphi(k), \quad \text{where } k < n.$$

In other words, *specialization economies occur iff* $\varphi(n)/n$ *increases with* n , or, equivalently, when the elasticity of $\varphi(n)$ exceeds 1:

$$\frac{\varphi'(n)n}{\varphi(n)} > 1. \tag{10}$$

Otherwise output of the final good decreases with the intermediate inputs' range. In the latter case, we face *complexity diseconomies*.

TFP function. Since $\varphi(n)/n$ captures how total output of the final good varies with input diversity, the total quantity of the differentiated input employed being fixed, we find it reasonable to dub $\varphi(n)/n$ the *TFP function*. Since this function will play a crucial role in what follows, we choose to treat it as one of the two fundamental primitives of our model (the second one to be defined below). We may equivalently define *specialization economies as the situation when the TFP function increases in* n .

Specialization vs complexity: a dual description. We now come to developing a dual description of the trade-off between specialization and complexity. To do so, we observe that when the price schedule for the intermediate inputs is symmetric, i.e. when $p_i = p$ for all $i \in [0, n]$, then the final-good producer will purchase all inputs in equal volumes: $q = Y/\varphi(n)$. As a consequence, total cost equals $Ypn/\varphi(n)$, while the price index at a symmetric outcome

¹⁴i.e. such that $q_i = q$ for all $i \in [0, n]$, where $q > 0$ is given.

¹⁵Formally, $\varphi(n) \equiv F(\mathbf{I}_{[0,n]})$, where \mathbf{I}_S is an indicator of $S \subseteq [0, n]$.

boils down to

$$P = \frac{n}{\varphi(n)} p. \quad (11)$$

Combining (11) with our definition of specialization economies, we may conclude that *the price index decreases (increases) with the range of inputs iff specialization economies (complexity diseconomies) take place.*

In order to provide some intuition on the nature of the trade-off between specialization economies and complexity diseconomies, consider the following examples. For the standard CES technology (5), the TFP function is a power function of the form $\varphi(n)/n = n^{1/(\sigma-1)}$. Since $\sigma > 1$, specialization economies take place. The same is true for any production function described by the Kimball's flexible aggregator (9) with $\phi(0) = 0$, for which $\varphi(n)/n = \phi^{-1}(1/n)$. On the contrary, the translog production function (7) exemplifies complexity diseconomies. Indeed, evaluating (7) at a symmetric input vector, we find that $\varphi(n) = 1$ for all $n > 0$. As a consequence, (10) is violated, which means the presence of complexity diseconomies. Finally, the dual approach allows to see that the translog cost function (8) describes a technology which is, in a sense, a *borderline* case: as implied by (8) and (11), the TFP function $\varphi(n)/n$ is identically one. Thus, *neither specialization economies nor complexity diseconomies occur*, i.e. these two forces fully balance each other.¹⁶

Proposition 1 below summarizes the main properties of all the example production functions mentioned above.

Proposition 1.

- (i) *Kimball flexible-aggregator technologies (9) satisfying $\phi(0) = 0$ exhibit specialization economies;*
- (ii) *the translog production function (7) generates complexity diseconomies;*
- (iii) *the translog cost function (8) shows exact balance between specialization economies and complexity diseconomies.*

Proof. See Appendix 2. \square

This result demonstrates that non-pathological CRS technologies with differentiated inputs exhibit versatile behavior. Proposition 1 also highlights the flexibility of our approach, which encompasses a wide variety of such technologies. In particular, our way of modeling production technology is more general than the one proposed by Kimball (1995), for two very different reasons. First, because in Kimball's original framework the range of inputs is fixed, it cannot capture the impact of the specialization/complexity effect on the market outcome. Second, as implied by Proposition 1, Kimball-type production functions include neither the augmented CES, nor the translog technologies.

¹⁶See Chen and Chu (2010, Eq. 4, p. 250) for another example of production function where the aggregate effect of variety expansion is suppressed because the specialization and complexity consequences of an increase in the number of available varieties of intermediate inputs have the same magnitude but opposite sign.

Sector \mathcal{I}

There is a continuum of intermediate input producers sharing the same technology, which exhibits increasing returns to scale. Firm i 's labor requirement for producing output q_i is given by $f + cq_i$, where $f > 0$ is the fixed cost and $c > 0$ is the constant marginal production cost. Thus, the profit π_i of firm i is defined by $\pi_i \equiv (p_i - cw)q_i - f$, where w is the wage rate.

Demand for inputs. The market demand firm i faces stems from the first-order condition for cost minimization in the \mathcal{F} -sector:

$$p_i = \lambda \Phi(q_i, \mathbf{q}), \quad (12)$$

where $\Phi(q_i, \mathbf{q}) \equiv \partial F / \partial q_i$ is the marginal product¹⁷ of input i , while λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the firm's program (2). It follows from the envelope theorem that the value of λ equals the marginal production cost, i.e. $\lambda = \partial \mathcal{C} / \partial Y$ for all Y and \mathbf{p} . Combining this with (3), we obtain the following inverse demand schedule for input i :

$$\frac{p_i}{P(\mathbf{p})} = \Phi(q_i, \mathbf{q}). \quad (13)$$

Weak interactions. As stated in the introduction, market interactions between producers of inputs are crucial for our results. For a better understanding of the nature of these interactions, a further inquiry on the properties of the marginal products $\Phi(q_i, \mathbf{q})$ is needed.

First, $\Phi(q_i, \mathbf{q})$ decreases in q_i , which is a straightforward implication of diminishing marginal returns. This property means that inverse demands (13) are downward-sloping. Second, $\Phi(q_i, \mathbf{q})$ does not vary with individual output q_j of any firm $j \neq i$, given that the outputs of firm i and all the other firms (except j) remain unchanged (see Appendix 1 for details). This second property has a far-reaching implication: input-producing firms are not involved in truly strategic market interactions, but rather in *weak interactions*, meaning that the individual impact of each firm on the demand schedules of its competitors is negligible.¹⁸ In other words, it is the aggregate behavior of firms that determines the market outcome, as no single firm has per se enough market power to strategically manipulate the market. This is typical in existing monopolistic competition models and is in the line with Chamberlin's "large group" assumption.

For the sake of illustration, consider again the CES case. The marginal products are given by

¹⁷Formally, the partial derivatives $\partial F / \partial q_i$ are not well-defined in the case of a continuum of inputs, which may seem to be an obstacle for working within a framework where the functional F is non-specified. It turns out, however, that putting slightly more structure on the space of input vectors \mathbf{q} potentially available for the final good producers makes things work *as if* the marginal products were well-defined. See Appendix 1 for technical details.

¹⁸See Combes et al. (2008, Ch. 3) for a thorough discussion on the nature of weak interactions in monopolistic competition models.

$$\Phi(q_i, \mathbf{q}) = q_i^{\rho-1} \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{q}), \quad \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{q}) \equiv \left(\int_0^n q_j^\rho dj \right)^{(1-\rho)/\rho}. \quad (14)$$

As implied by (14), in the CES case Φ is downward-sloping in q_i , while the demand shifter $\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{q})$ is invariant to individual changes in q_i .

Firm i faces the inverse demand schedule (13) and seeks to maximize its profit. Formally, firm i 's profit-maximization program is given by

$$\max_{p_i, q_i} [(p_i - cw) q_i] \quad \text{s.t.} \quad p_i = P(\mathbf{p}) \Phi(q_i, \mathbf{q}), \quad (15)$$

where $P(\mathbf{p})$ is the price index, which now plays the role of a market aggregate, as it includes all the information on market prices relevant for firm i 's profit-maximizing pricing decisions.

In line with the idea of weak interactions, individual changes in firms' prices have a negligible impact on $P(\mathbf{p})$. In other words, each \mathcal{I} -firm takes the value of P as given. Hence, (15) may be restated as

$$\max_{q_i} [(P \Phi(q_i, \mathbf{q}) - cw) q_i], \quad (16)$$

where P may now be treated as a parameter.

The first-order condition for (16) is given by

$$\Phi(q_i, \mathbf{q}) + q_i \frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial q_i} = \frac{cw}{P}. \quad (17)$$

Furthermore, given the mass n of \mathcal{I} -firms, the quantity profile \mathbf{q} must satisfy the labor balance condition

$$c \int_0^n q_i di + fn = L, \quad (18)$$

which equates total labor supply to total labor demand.

The second-order condition, as well as technical details of possibly multiple solutions, are discussed in Appendix 3.

The role of $\sigma(n)$. The first order condition (17) for profit maximization may be recast as

$$\frac{p_i - cw}{p_i} = \eta(q_i, \mathbf{q}), \quad (19)$$

where η is the *marginal product elasticity*:

$$\eta(q_i, \mathbf{q}) \equiv - \frac{\partial \Phi}{\partial q_i} \frac{q_i}{\Phi(q_i, \mathbf{q})}. \quad (20)$$

At a symmetric outcome, when $p_i = p$ and $q_i = q$ for all $i \in [0, n]$, (19) boils down to

$$\frac{p - cw}{p} = \frac{1}{\sigma(n)}, \quad (21)$$

where $\sigma(n)$ is defined by

$$\sigma(n) \equiv \frac{1}{\eta(q_i, \mathbf{q})} \Big|_{q_j = q_i \ \forall j \in [0, n]}. \quad (22)$$

Because $\sigma(n)$ is a key ingredient of our model, further comments on this function are needed. First of all, $1/\sigma(n)$ represents the *profit-maximizing markup*, hence $\sigma(n)$ may serve as a measure of the degree of product market competition. Thus, the behavior of $\sigma(n)$ with respect to n shows how the toughness of competition varies with firm-entry. In particular, $\sigma'(n) > 0$ would mean that competition gets tougher when more firms enter the market, which is probably the most plausible case, though not the only possible one. Second, as stated by (22), $\sigma(n)$ is also the inverse marginal product elasticity. In other words, $\sigma(n)$ keeps track of whether the marginal product decreases at a higher or lower rate when the intermediate good becomes more differentiated. Finally, $\sigma(n)$ also reflects the degree of product differentiation. Indeed, note that in the CES case $\sigma(n) = \sigma$ is constant, σ being the *elasticity of technological substitution* across inputs. Hence, the higher σ , the less differentiated the intermediate good is. In the non-CES case, $\sigma(n)$ also yields an inverse measure of product differentiation, which now varies with n . It can be shown that $\sigma(n)$ is, in fact, the true elasticity of technological substitution across inputs¹⁹ evaluated at a symmetric outcome.

Before proceeding, a comment is in order on why $\sigma(n)$ is independent of q . This is due to the CRS assumption, just like in Bilbiie (2012) the analogous property of $\sigma(n)$ on the consumption side is due to the homotheticity of preferences. The marginal product $\Phi(q_i, \mathbf{q})$ is positive homogenous of degree zero (see Appendix 1 for a formal proof), and so is $\eta(q_i, \mathbf{q})$. Hence, varying q in (22) evaluated at a symmetric outcome under any given n does not shift the right-hand side of (22). As a result, $\sigma(n)$ depends solely on the number of firms.

The pricing rule (21) implies that competition gets tougher (softer) in response to entry of new \mathcal{I} -firms when $\sigma(n)$ increases (decreases). Recalling that $1/\sigma(n)$ is the profit-maximizing markup, we may rephrase this as follows: competition may be either *markup-decreasing* or *markup-increasing*. Which of the two scenarios comes true is fully determined by sector \mathcal{F} 's demand for inputs. Under the CES technology profit-maximizing markups are unaffected by entry of new \mathcal{I} -firms. Under the translog technologies, the profit-maximizing markups are given by:

Translog production function	Translog expenditure function
$1 - \alpha n$	$\frac{1}{1 + \beta n}$

Hence, both these technologies induce markup-decreasing competition. Finally, when the production function is given by (9), we have

¹⁹As defined by Nadiri (1982). See Parenti et al. (2014) for mathematical details of extending Nadiri's definition to an environment with a continuum of inputs.

$$\frac{1}{\sigma(n)} = - \frac{\xi \phi''(\xi)}{\phi'(\xi)} \Big|_{\xi=\phi^{-1}(1/n)}. \quad (23)$$

In this case, competition is markup-decreasing iff the elasticity of $\phi'(\cdot)$ is an increasing function, otherwise it is markup-increasing.

The TFP and the elasticity of substitution as the fundamental primitives of the model

We have seen that the TFP-function $\varphi(n)/n$ and the elasticity of substitution $\sigma(n)$ determine the key properties of, respectively, the \mathcal{F} -sector and the \mathcal{I} -sector behavior. For this reason, we choose to treat these two magnitudes as the *fundamental primitives* of the model. Such a choice will prove to be safe, as both the taxonomy of competition regimes (Section 3) and the necessary and sufficient condition for EIRS to emerge (Section 4) will be given in terms of these two functions.

We now come back to justifying the level of generality we choose to work on (see the discussion following equation (9)). At this level of generality, the TFP function and the elasticity of substitution may be viewed as two *independent ingredients* of our approach, in the sense that the information about one of them is generically insufficient to recover the other, which makes both of them the true primitives of our model. Focusing on a more specific class of technologies would imply a non-trivial relationship between the two. To illustrate this point, consider the family of production functions described by Kimball's flexible aggregator (9). In this case, the TFP function is given by

$$\frac{\varphi(n)}{n} = - \frac{\phi(\xi)}{\xi} \Big|_{\xi=\phi^{-1}(1/n)}, \quad (24)$$

while the elasticity of substitution satisfies (23). As a consequence, the two fundamentals are linked via the aggregator function $\phi(\cdot)$, which allows unambiguously recovering one of them from the other by means of “reverse engineering” (see Appendix 4 for technical details). Moreover, Kimball's aggregator cannot capture some very simple and intuitive ways of the elasticity of substitution's potential behavior. In particular, it can be shown (see Appendix 4) that there exists no aggregator function $\phi(\cdot)$, such that the resulting elasticity of substitution were of the form $\sigma(n) = 1 + \beta n$, i.e. linear in n .²⁰ These arguments illustrate how focusing on certain classes of production functions may lead to a priori unsuspected restrictions on the primitives of the model.

²⁰This case corresponds to the translog cost function (8). See, e.g., Bilbiie *et al.* (2012), or Parenti *et al.* (2014).

Entry and the market outcomes

In this section, we focus on studying the consequences of horizontal innovation (or, equivalently, the entry of new input-producing firms) on market outcomes. We fully characterize the behavior of the economy in response to entry and highlight the fundamental role of the relationship between the TFP function and the elasticity of substitution in shaping various competition regimes.

Equilibrium for a given number of \mathcal{I} -firms

Because the final output is consumed only by workers, product market balance suggests that $Y = wL$. This is possible only when the price index P equals 1. Indeed, firms' profits are given by $(1 - P)Y$. Hence, if $P < 1$, each firm would supply infinitely many units of Y . On the contrary, if $P > 1$, total supply of the final good is zero, since no firm is willing to start production under negative profits.

Combining $P = 1$ with (11) pins down the equilibrium price for the intermediate inputs at a symmetric market configuration:

$$p^*(n) = \frac{\varphi(n)}{n}. \quad (25)$$

The intuition behind (25) is as follows. If the price for inputs exceeds $\varphi(n)/n$, then the supply of the final good, hence the demand for inputs, are equal to zero. Consequently, firms producing intermediate goods will reduce prices in order to attract at least some demand. If, on the contrary, prices are lower than $\varphi(n)/n$, the supply of Y will be infinitely large, and so will be the demands for inputs, which would lead to an increase in prices.

As implied by (25), *at a symmetric equilibrium, the input price increases (decreases) with the number of firms n in sector \mathcal{I} when specialization economies (complexity diseconomies) occur* (see Section 2.1). This is so because the right-hand side of (25) is exactly the TFP function.

Equation (25) may seem puzzling, as it implies that market interactions in sector \mathcal{I} are fully irrelevant in determining input prices.²¹ As a matter of fact, on the one hand it is absolutely true that the game between input producers depends crucially on the market structure, and so do the profit-maximizing prices when the number of firms is endogenous (see Section 4.1 below). On the other hand, however, input-producing firms accurately anticipate the equilibrium value of the price index, which is determined outside sector \mathcal{I} . Namely, it is driven to $P = 1$ by (i) perfect competition in sector \mathcal{F} , and (ii) the correctness of the intermediate firms' expectations. In other words, under the assumption that the number of input-producing firms is given, things work *as if these firms were price-takers, even though they are actually price makers*. We conclude that this property is a distinctive feature of

²¹Moreover, observe that (25) is fully independent of our assumption that sector \mathcal{I} is monopolistically competitive. This relationship, indeed, would hold under any market structure which allows for a symmetric equilibrium (e.g., under symmetric Cournot or Bertrand oligopoly).

models a lá Ethier (1982) compared to models of monopolistic competition a lá Dixit-Stiglitz (1977), where the final good is differentiated.

It is also worth mentioning that, because the labor market is perfectly competitive, the \mathcal{I} -firms take the wage w as given. Thus, the role of the equilibrium wage in this context is to align profit-maximizing prices with (25).

We now determine the equilibrium wages and aggregate final output, along with the equilibrium output per-firm. Combining (21) with (25) and $P = 1$ yields

$$w^*(n) = \frac{1}{c} \frac{\sigma(n) - 1}{\sigma(n)} \frac{\varphi(n)}{n}. \quad (26)$$

Furthermore, plugging (26) into the product market balance $Y = Lw$, we obtain:

$$Y^*(n) = \frac{L}{c} \frac{\sigma(n) - 1}{\sigma(n)} \frac{\varphi(n)}{n}, \quad (27)$$

Equations (26) and (27) are important because they suggest a decomposition of equilibrium wages and the aggregate final output (up to the coefficients $1/c$ and L/c , respectively) into the product of the *competition effect* captured by $[\sigma(n) - 1]/\sigma(n)$, and the *specialization/complexity effect* captured by $\varphi(n)/n$. The former increases with n iff $\sigma'(n) > 0$, while the latter increases if specialization economies prevail over complexity diseconomies.

Finally, the per-firm output $q^*(n)$ is determined from the labor balance condition (18), which takes the form

$$(cq + f)n = L \quad (28)$$

at a symmetric outcome. Clearly, $q^*(n) = (L - fn)/(cn)$ always decreases with n .

The impact of entry on prices, wages, and markups

In our model, prices, wages, and markups are all endogenous. Putting together (25), (21), and (26), we observe that the entry of new firms need not move these variables in the same direction. In what follows, we say that competition is (i) *Price-decreasing* if $\partial p^*/\partial n < 0$, and *price-increasing* otherwise; (ii) *Markup-decreasing* if $\partial[(p^* - cw^*)/p^*]/\partial n < 0$, and *markup-increasing* otherwise; (iii) *Wage-decreasing* if $\partial w^*/\partial n < 0$, and *wage-increasing* otherwise.

Proposition 2 summarizes the main results of sub-section 3.1 in terms of the above taxonomies.

Proposition 2. *In the framework of the model presented, competition is (i) price-increasing (price-decreasing) iff the \mathcal{F} -firms enjoy specialization economies (suffer from complexity diseconomies); (ii) markup-decreasing (markup-increasing) iff $\sigma'(n) > 0$ ($\sigma'(n) < 0$); and (iii) wage-increasing (wage-decreasing) iff the following inequality holds (does not hold):*

$$\frac{\varphi'(n)n}{\varphi(n)} + \frac{\sigma'(n)n}{\sigma(n)} > 1. \quad (29)$$

Proof. Claims (i) and (ii) follow, respectively, from (25) and (21). The equivalence of $dw^*/dn > 0$ to (29), which is implied by (26), proves part (iii). \square

The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. Whether competition is price-decreasing or price-increasing is determined solely by the properties of the TFP function $\varphi(n)/n$. In contrast, the behavior of markups in response to entry can be fully characterized in terms of the elasticity of substitution $\sigma(n)$ across input varieties. Finally, both $\varphi(n)$ and $\sigma(n)$ play a role in determining the impact of entry in sector \mathcal{I} on the equilibrium wage. The condition (29) states that, for the market outcome to be wage-increasing, it must be that either TFP, or the elasticity of substitution, or both grow sufficiently fast in n .

Two more comments are in order. First, getting a bit ahead of our story, we say here that (29), which involves both $\varphi(n)$ and $\sigma(n)$, yields *a necessary and sufficient condition for EIRS to emerge* (see Proposition 3 in Section 4). Hence, information about the TFP function is insufficient to detect the presence of scale economies: one also needs the elasticity of substitution which captures the market interactions between \mathcal{I} -firms.

Second, we believe that Proposition 2 also highlights a considerable difference between our results and those recently obtained by Zhelobodko *et al.* (2012). These authors find that the additional entry of firms leads to a reduction or hike in markups depending solely on how the elasticity of substitution varies with the individual consumption level. However, in their setting markup-decreasing competition is also price-decreasing and (because labor is chosen to be the numeraire) wage-decreasing, and vice versa. In our model, this is not necessarily the case. To show this, we find it worth contrasting visually our results about the impact of \mathcal{I} -firms' entry on prices, markups and wages across different types of production functions. Table 1 provides a summary for the CES and both types of translog technologies.

	Translog cost function	CES production function	Translog production function
Price	No effect	\uparrow	\downarrow
Markup	\downarrow	No effect	\downarrow
Wage	\uparrow	\uparrow	No effect

Table 1: The impact of entry on prices, markups and wages for different types of production functions

Table 1 shows that under the translog cost function prices are neutral to entry, while markups (wages) decrease (increase) in response to a larger number of firms. In the CES case, both prices and wages increase in response to more firms entering the intermediate input market, while the markup remains unchanged. Finally, with a translog production function wages remain unchanged when new firms enter, while both prices and markups fall. These findings highlight the key role of the interaction between the specialization/complexity effect and the competition effect in determining the nature of market outcomes.

How can the results summarized by Proposition 2 and Table 1 be related to data? Rosenthal and Strange (2004) provide strong empirical evidence that wages in larger cities/regions are higher. Whether the same holds for prices is debatable. For example, Handbury and

Weinstein (2015) describe higher prices in larger markets as a “common finding”, but show that this relationship can be reversed after controlling for several measurement biases. As seen from claim (i) of Proposition 2, our approach allows for both price-increasing and price-decreasing competition and draws a clear-cut demarcation between the two cases in terms of the tradeoff between specialization economies and complexity diseconomies. This unification could be viewed as a theoretical reply to the inconclusive empirical findings. Finally, much less empirical work has been done on markups. However, Bellone et al. (2015) provide evidence that markups are lower at larger markets.

To sum up, a considerable amount of empirical work tends to suggest that larger markets exhibit *higher prices, lower markups, and higher wages*. Table 1 reveals that neither the CES production function, nor any of the two translog technologies can fully capture this pattern. What kind of production function would be able to do that? Proposition 2 suggests a qualified answer. According to (29), if competition is both price-increasing and markup-decreasing, then it is also wage-increasing. Hence, any production function that exhibits both specialization economies ($n\varphi'(n)/\varphi(n) > 1$) and increasing elasticity of substitution ($\sigma'(n) > 0$) generates price-increasing, markup-decreasing and wage-increasing competition. In particular, any Kimball-type production function, such that $\phi(0) = 0$ and the elasticity of $\phi(\cdot)$ is an increasing function, does the job.

External increasing returns to scale

This section describes how the interaction between the specialization/complexity effect and the competition effect generates production externalities. Hence, it plays a central role within the whole analysis.

Free-entry equilibrium

We define a *symmetric free-entry equilibrium* as a vector $(p^*, q^*, n^*, w^*, Y^*)$, which satisfies (25), (21), (26), the labor balance condition (28), and the zero profit condition

$$(p - cw)q = wf. \quad (30)$$

Equilibrium number of firms. We first pin down the equilibrium number n^* of \mathcal{I} -firms. To do so, we divide both sides of (30) by pq to obtain

$$\frac{p - cw}{p} = \frac{wf}{pq},$$

which, using $pq = wf + cwq$, may be restated as follows:

$$\frac{p - cw}{p} = \frac{f}{f + cq}. \quad (31)$$

In other words, at a symmetric free-entry outcome the markup of any intermediate

firm equals the share of fixed cost in firm's total production cost. This should not come as a surprise, because it is the presence of a fixed cost which generates increasing returns to scale, hence grants market power to firms.

Combining (31) with the pricing rule (21) and the labor balance (28), we obtain:

$$\sigma(n) = \frac{L}{fn}. \quad (32)$$

The equilibrium number of firms n^* is uniquely pinned down by (32) iff the elasticity of $\sigma(n)$ exceeds -1 , which holds when $\sigma(n)$ is either increasing or decreasing “not too fast” in n . In other words, (32) has a unique solution n^* when competition is either markup-decreasing or “not too much markup-increasing”. If this is not the case, then multiple equilibria may arise. However, since we assume that $\sigma(n)$ is continuous and exceeds 1, (32) has always at least one solution $n^* > 0$, which implies that a symmetric free entry equilibrium always exists.²²

Specialization and competition under free entry. Given n^* , using (21) and (30) yields the equilibrium firm's size:

$$q^* = \frac{f}{c} \cdot [\sigma(n^*) - 1]. \quad (33)$$

According to (33), any (f/c) -preserving shock that generates additional entry in the intermediate sector would lead to a hike (a reduction) in firms' size iff $\sigma(n)$ is an increasing (decreasing) function of n .

Plugging (33) into the production function of sector \mathcal{F} , we obtain the resulting *aggregate production function*:

$$Y^*(L) = \frac{L}{c} \cdot \frac{\sigma[n^*(L)] - 1}{\sigma[n^*(L)]} \cdot \frac{\varphi[n^*(L)]}{n^*(L)}, \quad (34)$$

while plugging n^* into (26) pins down the equilibrium wage w^* :

$$w^* = \frac{1}{c} \cdot \frac{\sigma[n^*(L)] - 1}{\sigma[n^*(L)]} \cdot \frac{\varphi[n^*(L)]}{n^*(L)}. \quad (35)$$

In equations (34) and (35), the term $[\sigma(n^*) - 1]/\sigma(n^*)$ captures the competition effect, which stems from sector \mathcal{I} . This term increases with n , hence with the population size L , iff competition is markup-decreasing. The term $\varphi(n^*(L))/n^*(L)$ describes the specialization/complexity effect and increases with population iff specialization economies take place, which is equivalent to price-increasing competition (Proposition 2).

In order to clarify how the degree of competitive toughness may impact the aggregate production function, we observe that total output $Q^* \equiv n^*q^*$ in sector \mathcal{I} is given by

$$Q[L, n^*(L)] = \frac{L}{c} \cdot \left[1 - f \frac{n^*(L)}{L} \right] = \frac{L}{c} \cdot \frac{\sigma(n^*) - 1}{\sigma(n^*)}. \quad (36)$$

²²In order to choose meaningful equilibria when they are multiple, we can restrict ourselves to *stable* equilibria, i.e. those for which the elasticity of $\sigma(n)$ evaluated at $n = n^*$ exceeds -1 .

Equation (36) follows from (28), (32), and (33). Using (36), the aggregate production function (34) may be restated as follows:

$$Y^*(L) = \frac{\varphi[n^*(L)]}{n^*(L)} Q[L, n^*(L)]. \quad (37)$$

The first term in (37) captures the specialization/complexity effect in sector \mathcal{F} , while the second term keeps track of the competition effect. In other words, in our framework *competition among input-producing firms affects total output of the final good through the total amount of the intermediate input*. More precisely, equations (32) and (36) imply that $Q[L, n^*(L)]$ increases more (less) than proportionally with L iff competition is markup-decreasing (markup-increasing). This, in turn, leads to competition generating a tendency toward external increasing (decreasing) returns to scale in sector \mathcal{F} . Compared to the standard CES model (where Q is readily verified to be exactly proportional to L , so that a competition effect cannot be taken into account), in the general case that we are analyzing *there are two sources of EIRS: the specialization/complexity effect and the competition effect*.

This explains why using a CES production function may cause some limitations in various economic contexts. To see this in more detail, consider again equations (34) and (35) above. These two equations are basically the same and differ just by a constant term (L/c and $1/c$, respectively). When specialization economies take place, the term $\varphi[n^*(L)]/n^*(L)$ increases with n^* . As for the competition effect, $[\sigma(n^*) - 1]/\sigma(n^*)$, it rises with n^* under markup-decreasing competition, and falls otherwise. Therefore, solely in the former case (markup-decreasing competition) is the specialization effect on both aggregate output and wages reinforced by the competition effect. This is no longer true when competition is markup-increasing: in this case, the specialization effect would be weakened by the competition effect stemming from a larger mass of firms entering the intermediate sector. Notice that, if the production function were CES, then the term $[\sigma(n^*) - 1]/\sigma(n^*)$, appearing in both (34) and (35), would be constant. As a consequence, the specialization effect would be the only source of external increasing returns to scale in the final good sector.

How scale economies emerge

We are now equipped to characterize the comparative statics of the free-entry equilibrium with respect to the population size L . Our main interest in this exercise is to reveal how aggregate output varies with L , namely how EIRS in the \mathcal{F} -sector emerge.

Under a positive shock in L , the left-hand side of equation (32) remains unchanged, while the right-hand side is shifted downwards. As a consequence, the equilibrium mass n^* of firms increases with L whenever the equilibrium is stable (see Section 4.1). Combining this with (34), we find that at equilibrium the average product of labor, $Y^*(L)/L$, increases with L iff $[\sigma(n) - 1]\varphi(n)/n$ is an increasing function of n , or, equivalently, iff competition is wage-increasing.

We can now state the key result of our paper.

Proposition 3. *External increasing returns to scale take place iff (29) holds, or, equivalently, iff competition is wage-increasing.*

As discussed in Section 3, what renders competition wage-increasing or wage-decreasing in our model is the *interplay* between the competition effect and the specialization/complexity effect. Therefore, Proposition 3 stresses the importance of the interaction between the two effects in generating Marshallian externalities. Indeed, by comparing (29) with the necessary and sufficient condition (10) for specialization economies to arise, we find that that the former contains an additional term, $n\sigma'(n)/\sigma(n)$, which captures the competition effect and is missing in (10). Hence, (29) and (10) coincide iff $\sigma(n)$ is constant, which corresponds to the standard CES case. This explains why both the endogenous growth and the agglomeration economics literatures have generally explained the emergence of EIRS by appealing solely to the presence of specialization economies. Meanwhile, the role of market interactions among firms in this process has been largely (and perhaps undeservedly) neglected.

As for the relationship between n^* and L , our analysis shows that n^* increases less (more) than proportionally to L iff competition is markup-decreasing (markup-increasing). Combining this with (34) yields the following result.

Proposition 4. *Compared to the CES case, markup-decreasing competition dampens the specialization effect, but simultaneously triggers a positive competition effect. Under markup-increasing competition, the situation is reversed.*

Table 2 summarizes in a compact way our results about the roles that market-size and the interaction between the specialization effect and the competition effect play in determining the equilibrium market-outcome under markup-decreasing and markup-increasing competition:

	$\sigma'(n) > 0$	$\sigma'(n) < 0$
n^*	increases less than proportionally in response to an increase in L	increases more than proportionally in response to an increase in L
Y^*, w^*	specialization effect weakened, positive competition effect	specialization effect reinforced, negative competition effect

Table 2: The impact of market-size and the interplay between the competition and the specialization effects in determining the equilibrium market-outcome: markup-decreasing vs markup-increasing competition

Examples

For a better illustration of the role played by the interaction between the specialization/complexity effect and the toughness of competition in generating EIRS, consider the following examples.

CES production function. In this case, equation (32) is linear, i.e. the number of firms is proportional to total labor supply L . Hence, the competition effect is washed out, and the specialization effect is the only source of external increasing returns. The aggregate production function is given by

$$Y^*(L) = AL^{1/(1-\rho)}, \quad A \equiv \frac{\rho}{c} \left(\frac{1-\rho}{f} \right)^{\rho/(1-\rho)}.$$

Translog cost function. Combining (8) with (32) yields $\beta n^2 + n = L/f$, which implies $n^* = \left(\sqrt{1 + 4L/f} - 1 \right) / (2\beta)$. In this case, the number of firms grows proportionally to \sqrt{L} . This is because, unlike the CES case, competition is tougher in a larger market. Furthermore, as stated by part (iii) of Proposition 1, complexity diseconomies and specialization economies *exactly offset each other*. Therefore, the competition effect becomes the main force shaping the resulting aggregate production function which is given by

$$Y^*(L) = \frac{f}{4\beta c} \left(\sqrt{1 + 4L/f} - 1 \right)^2. \quad (38)$$

Equation (38) suggests that the average product of labor $Y^*(L)/L$ increases in L for all $L \geq 0$. In other words, external increasing returns take place. However, the source of these increasing returns is radically different from that in the CES case. Namely, *agglomeration economies stem here solely from market interactions between firms*, while in the classical CES-based models they are generated entirely by technological externalities embodied in the specialization/complexity tradeoff.

Translog production function. In this case, the competition effect is even stronger. Indeed, as implied by (7), (32) takes the form: $1 - \alpha n = fn/L$. Hence, $n^* = L/(\alpha L + f)$, which implies that the equilibrium mass of firms is bounded from above by $1/\alpha$. In other words, even when population L grows unboundedly, the number of firms the market invites to operate remains limited due to very tough competition. The aggregate production function is given by

$$Y^*(L) = \frac{\alpha}{c} L. \quad (39)$$

Thus, in the case of the translog production function, the resulting technology exhibits *constant returns to scale*. This result is in line with Proposition 3: EIRS arise only when competition is wage-decreasing, while under the translog production function entry has no impact on wages (see Table 1 in Section 3.2).

A micro-foundation for an S-shaped production function. Finally, we provide a simple micro-foundation for an S-shaped aggregate production function, which has been widely used in growth theory and development economics, especially in the analysis of poverty traps.²³ In this regard, consider a Kimball-type technology associated with the aggregator function $\phi(\xi) \equiv a\xi^\rho - b$, where a and b are positive constants, while $0 < \rho < 1$. Here, a can serve as a measure of “overall” TFP, while b shows the strength of the complexity externality. Solving in closed form for the production function, we obtain

²³See Skiba (1978), and, more recently, Azariadis and Stachurski (2005), as well as Banerjee and Duflo (2005), for examples on the possible consequences of using S-shaped production functions within these two branches of economic literature. The idea dates back at least to Shapley and Shubik (1967).

$$F(\mathbf{q}) = A(n) \left(\int_0^n q_i^\rho di \right)^{1/\rho}, \quad A(n) \equiv \left(\frac{a}{1 + bn} \right)^{1/\rho}. \quad (40)$$

The TFP function underlying (40) is given by

$$\frac{\varphi(n)}{n} = \frac{1}{n} \left(\frac{an}{1 + bn} \right)^{1/\rho}, \quad (41)$$

while the elasticity of substitution across inputs is constant and is given by $\sigma = 1/(1 - \rho)$, just like in the standard CES case. Using (41), it is readily verified that $\varphi(n)/n$ increases in the input diversity n for all $n < 1/(\rho b)$ and decreases otherwise. Hence, the TFP function is *bell-shaped*, meaning that specialization economies occur when the intermediate input is *not too much differentiated*, otherwise complexity diseconomies prevail.

The resulting aggregate production function $Y^*(L)$ reads as

$$Y^*(L) = \frac{f}{1 - \rho} \left(\frac{L}{L + af/(1 - \rho)} \right)^{1/\rho}. \quad (42)$$

According to (42), increasing returns to scale arise when L is sufficiently small; otherwise, decreasing returns to scale occur.

Concluding remarks

Using a two-sector model with a perfectly competitive final good sector, a monopolistically competitive intermediate input sector and variable elasticity of technological substitution across intermediate inputs, we have singled out two sources of EIRS: the specialization/complexity effect and the competition effect. The former is generated within the final good sector and shows how employing more varieties of intermediate inputs fosters/deters the production of the final good, while the latter stems from the market interactions among firms within the intermediate input sector. The market outcome is determined by the combined behavior of the TFP and the elasticity of substitution, which are both functions of the input diversity. In other words, the interplay between the competition effect and the specialization/complexity effect plays a key role in shaping the equilibrium properties.

We have fully characterized market behavior in terms of the relationships between the two above effects. This characterization has been useful in clarifying the origins of external increasing returns. In particular, we have shown that, due to the interference of a non-trivial competition effect, the presence of specialization economies is neither necessary nor sufficient for scale economies to emerge. This result highlights the limitations of the CES monopolistic competition approach to modeling the scale externalities, which overlooks the relevance of the competition effect, as the level of market power does not vary with the number of firms. Therefore, our analysis points to the need for more work on the role of market competition in shaping agglomeration economies, endogenous growth and other economic phenomena

driven by scale effects. Finally, we argue that our theoretical findings are in line with recent empirical evidence on the behavior of prices, markups and wages with respect to the size of the economy.

A last remark is in order. Our decomposition of scale economies into two components has been done at the theoretical level. However, given the growing amount of applied research aimed at estimating the impacts of TFP shocks and variable markups on the economy, we believe that a similar exercise can also be done empirically. Using our model as a basic setting for structural econometrics would require extensions to the cases of heterogeneous firms, multiple final-good sectors, and probably also imperfect market structures alternative to monopolistic competition, where one can build on d’Aspremont et al. (1996, 2007), Atkeson and Burstein (2008), and Amiti et al. (2016). We leave these tasks for future research.

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Appendices

Appendix 1. Marginal products under a continuum of inputs

We restrict our attention to such input vectors \mathbf{q} that have a finite second moment, i.e. $\int_0^n q_i^2 di < \infty$. In other words, $\mathbf{q} \in L_2([0, n])$. Intuitively, this assumption allows *mean* and *variance* of the input vector to be well-defined.

We also assume Frechet-differentiability, i.e. we postulate that there exists a functional $\Phi : \mathbb{R}_+ \times L_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$, such that

$$F(\mathbf{q} + \mathbf{h}) = F(\mathbf{q}) + \int_0^n \Phi(q_i, \mathbf{q}) h_i di + o(\|\mathbf{h}\|_2) \text{ for all } \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{h} \in L_2. \quad (43)$$

In (43), $\|\cdot\|_2$ stands for the L_2 -norm, i.e. $\|\mathbf{h}\|_2 \equiv \sqrt{\int_0^n h_i^2 di}$, whereas $\Phi(q_i, \mathbf{q})$ is the *marginal product* of intermediate input i . Concavity of F implies that Φ is decreasing in q_i .

Lemma. *Let $F : L_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ be a Frechet-differentiable functional, which is positive homogeneous of degree 1. Then (i) $\Phi(q_i, \mathbf{q})$ is positive homogenous of degree zero in (q_i, \mathbf{q}) , and (ii) the Euler's identity*

$$F(\mathbf{q}) = \int_0^n q_i \Phi(q_i, \mathbf{q}) di, \quad (44)$$

holds.

Proof. To prove (i), rewrite (43) as follows:

$$F(t\mathbf{q} + t\mathbf{h}) = F(t\mathbf{q}) + \int_0^n \Phi(tq_i, t\mathbf{q})th_idi + o(t\|\mathbf{h}\|_2) \text{ for all } \mathbf{q}, \mathbf{h} \in L_2, t \in \mathbb{R}_+. \quad (45)$$

Dividing both sides of (45) by t and using homogeneity of F , we obtain

$$F(\mathbf{q} + \mathbf{h}) = F(\mathbf{q}) + \int_0^n \Phi(tq_i, t\mathbf{q})h_idi + o(\|\mathbf{h}\|_2). \quad (46)$$

Combining (43) with (46), we find that $\phi(tq_i, t\mathbf{q})$ is a Frechet derivative of F computed at \mathbf{q} for any $t > 0$. By uniqueness of Frechet derivative, $\phi(tq_i, t\mathbf{q})$ must be independent of t , which proves part (i) of the Lemma.

To prove part (ii), note that (43) implies the following identity:

$$\frac{F((t + \tau)\mathbf{q}) - F(t\mathbf{q})}{\tau} = \int_0^n \Phi(tq_i, t\mathbf{q})q_idi + \frac{o(\tau)}{\tau} \text{ for all } \tau \in \mathbb{R}. \quad (47)$$

Using homogeneity of F and Φ , we obtain (44) as the limiting case of (47) under $\tau \rightarrow 0$. Q.E.D.

Appendix 2. Proof of Proposition 1.

(i) If a production function satisfies (9), we have

$$\frac{\varphi(n)}{n} = \frac{1/n}{\phi^{-1}(1/n)}. \quad (48)$$

Because $\phi(\cdot)$ is increasing and concave, it must be that $\phi^{-1}(\cdot)$ is increasing and convex. If $\phi(0) = 0$, then the elasticity of $\phi^{-1}(\cdot)$ always exceeds 1. As a consequence, $\varphi(n)/n$ decreases in $1/n$ and increases with n .

When $\phi(0) \neq 0$, the above argument is no longer valid. Indeed, as implied by (41), production function given by (40) provides a counterexample. This completes the proof of (i).

(ii)-(iii). As shown in Section 2.1, under (7) we have $\varphi(n) = 1$, while (8) yields $\varphi(n) = n$ for all $n > 0$. Combining this with the definition (10) of specialization economies completes the proof. \square

Appendix 3. SOC and no multiplicity of equilibria

Observe that the left-hand side of (17) is positive homogenous of degree zero. This implies that the solution of (17) cannot be unique. Indeed, multiplying a solution of (17) by a constant yields another solution. The ‘‘proper’’ equilibrium is pinned down by the labor balance condition (18).

To guarantee that equation (17) is compatible with profit-maximizing behavior by firms, the second-order condition must hold, which amounts to assuming that the real operating profit $[\Phi(q_i, \mathbf{q}) - cw/P]q_i$ of firm i is strictly quasi-concave in q_i for all \mathbf{q} .

In order to ensure that a continuum of asymmetric Nash equilibria in the firms' quantity-setting game does not arise, we introduce a stronger assumption: *the left-hand side of (17) is decreasing in q_i for any \mathbf{q}* . Imposing this condition is equivalent to assuming that the operating profit of each firm is strictly concave in its output. This assumption holds for the CES and, more generally, for any production function of the type (9) such that

$$-\frac{\phi'''(\xi)}{\phi''(\xi)}\xi < 2 \quad \text{for all } \xi > 0.$$

This rules out the possibility of asymmetric equilibria because (17) has a unique solution $q_i^*(\mathbf{q})$, which is the same for all firms $i \in [0, n]$. See, e.g., Gorn et al. (2012) for a formal treatment of multiple asymmetric equilibria in a monopolistically competitive setting.

Appendix 4. The relationships between $\varphi(n)$ and $\sigma(n)$ within Kimball family

We show here how focusing on the family of Kimball's flexible aggregator technologies (9) may generate firm, hence potentially restrictive, linkages between the two fundamentals, $\varphi(n)$ and $\sigma(n)$. Then, the elasticity $\sigma(n)$ of substitution across differentiated inputs can be uniquely pinned down if one knows the TFP function $\varphi(n)/n$. Indeed, observe that (24) implies

$$\phi(\xi) = \frac{1}{\varphi^{-1}(1/\xi)}.$$

Plugging $\phi(\cdot)$ into (23) yields $\sigma(n)$ as a single-valued function of n .

In order to recover the TFP function knowing $\sigma(n)$, we proceed as follows. Using (23) and observing that $n = 1/\phi(\xi)$, we find that a candidate aggregator function $\phi(\cdot)$ must be an *increasing and concave* solution to the following second-order ODE:

$$\frac{d^2\phi}{d\xi^2} = -\frac{1}{\xi} \frac{d\phi}{d\xi} \cdot \frac{1}{\sigma(1/\phi)}. \quad (49)$$

Whether (49) has a solution satisfying the desired properties for a given function $\sigma(\cdot)$ is a priori unclear. The following result illustrates the restrictions imposed by focusing on Kimball's family of technologies.

Claim. *There exists no increasing and concave aggregator function $\phi(\cdot)$, under which (9) would generate a linearly increasing elasticity of substitution $\sigma(n) = 1 + \beta n$ with $\beta > 0$.*

Proof. Assume the contrary. Then, using $\sigma(n) = 1 + \beta n$ and (49), a candidate aggregator function $\phi(\cdot)$ must be an increasing and concave solution to

$$\frac{d^2\phi}{d\xi^2} = -\frac{1}{\xi} \frac{d\phi}{d\xi} \cdot \frac{\phi}{\phi + \beta}. \quad (50)$$

The general solution of (50) is defined as a solution to

$$\xi = A \exp \left\{ -\frac{\exp(a)}{\beta} \cdot \text{Ei} [a - \ln(\beta + \phi)] \right\}, \quad (51)$$

where $A > 0$ and $a \in \mathbb{R}$ are integration constants, while $\text{Ei}(\cdot)$ is the exponential integral defined by

$$\text{Ei}(x) \equiv \int_1^{\infty} \frac{\exp(-xz)}{z} dz.$$

It is readily verified that the right-hand side of (51) is a decreasing function of ϕ for any given values of A and a . As a consequence, each solution $\phi(\xi)$ to (50) is a decreasing function, hence it cannot serve as an aggregator function in (9). \square

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