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The Reconfiguration of Philosophy

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Abstract

In this paper I would like to present the relationships between philosophy and metaphysics through some questions presented by Heidegger, Hegel and Husserl. What emerges at the end of the analysis is a new intrinsic necessity for philosophy: its reconfiguration, as Leo Lugarini in his book *Filosofia e Metafisica* (1964) underlines.

From an historical point of view, the idea of philosophy has been associated for centuries with those of metaphysics in the strictly sense of ontology: in other words the philosophy was thought as a research on the essence itself.

However, already from Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1807), philosophy has reconfigured itself as a 'science of the experience of consciousness' and, proceeding along the same path, Husserl has delineated a phenomenology of the *Lebenswelt*.

What remains then of metaphysics?

Is the point of philosophy to go beyond metaphysics, as Heidegger suggested?

Surely his disappointing question: 'Why are there beings at all, and why not far rather Nothing?' (1929) is a call for a necessary change of perspective: focus is not a prior essence but the being itself which enables the possibility of the essence. Nevertheless, Heidegger too goes on to build a metaphysical conception: the next step, taken by Hegel and later clarified by Husserl, is bringing the question of human acting to the middle of philosophy - of what happens in *interiore homine*.

This is the reconfiguration of philosophy that I would like to suggest in this paper and this new perspective in the history of philosophy can be considered as one of the greatest achievements of the phenomenological method.

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Introduction

Looking at the relationships between philosophy and metaphysics, through some questions presented by Heidegger, Hegel and Husserl, Leo Lugarini highlights an intrinsic necessity for philosophy: its reconfiguration.

The subtitle of the volume *Philosophy and metaphysics*¹ is precisely *Researches on the concept of philosophy*², and this is Lugarini's central purpose.

But, at the end of his research, will he be able to find an universal acceptable concept of philosophy?

We will see that, through a critical historical analysis, the idea of philosophy has been associated for centuries with that of metaphysics in the strict sense of onto-log-y: in other words, philosophy was conceived of as research on essence itself.

However, already Hegel in the *Phenomenology of spirit* (1807) reconfigured philosophy as a *science of the experience of consciousness* and, proceeding along the same path, Husserl delineated a phenomenology of the *Lebenswelt*.

What remains then of metaphysics?

Is the point of philosophy to go beyond metaphysics, as Heidegger suggested?

Surely his disappointing question: *Why are there beings at all, and why not far rather Nothing?*³ is a call for a necessary change of perspective: focus is not a prior essence but the being itself which enables the possibility of the essence. Nevertheless, Heidegger too goes on to build a metaphysical conception: the next step, taken by Hegel and later clarified by Husserl, is bringing the question of human acting to the middle of philosophy - of what happens *in interiore homine*.

The question is not *What is the essence?*, but properly: *For what reason do we pose the question of the essence?* The ground could be only in our self and, consequently, it could not be definitively given from the outside but is given only in the *movement of consciousness*⁴, similarly to the idea of philosophy and the activity of philosophy itself.

The consciousness of this reconfiguration of philosophy is presented, in Hegel and Husserl, in the awareness of a crisis of the philosophy that has proceeded along its history.⁵

Philosophy must have a meaning in our everyday, practical lives: the merit of Hegel's *Aufhebung* is to have shown the different relationship between experience and truth, calling out the absurd pretention of the idea that our knowing analyzes an object from a different and higher point of view.

¹Lugarini, L. (1964) *Filosofia e metafisica*, Urbino: Argalia. Translation from Italian to English by the Author.

² Translation by the Author.

³Heidegger, M. (1929) *What Is Metaphysics?* in *Pathmarks*, edited by William McNeill, Cambridge University Press 1998, 96.

⁴ As Hegel would have said.

⁵ For the analysis of the crisis in Husserl see *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1935).

In fact, it is to say that we are always by the object and, though we don't have consciousness of it yet, we are already and ever by philosophy, by being.

To this purpose, *The unexpected answer*¹ of the painter René Magritte seems to me an illuminating example of the reconfiguration of philosophy: the master of Surrealism has painted a closed door of an apartment in which an unformed opening discloses the night. Supposing that the unformed opening is a human figure, this is what happens: if the door represents the threshold of philosophy it could not simply be opened with a mechanical and pre-established action – like turning the door handle to enter – the man is already inside it, i.e. the man is at the middle of the door, at the middle of the being, without any possibility to go away to see the world from a privileged position.

§ 1. *Back to the roots of philosophy: the meta-physics and the essence itself*

Aristotle at the beginning of the first chapter of the *Metaphysics* book XII indicates the principle or the first cause which metaphysics attempts to analyze: the substance, i.e. the *ousia*. In reality the word «metaphysics» doesn't come from Aristotle and, for instance, in his texts the philosopher used the term «first philosophy» to concern this field of knowledge which configures itself as research about first causes and principles.

As Aristotle said at the beginning of the book IV, metaphysics is ' [...] a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature'², this subject will be referred to with the our term «ontology».

Moreover the «first philosophy» has a further meaning: is a research about God, who is the supreme Principle and the absolute first Cause, for this reason metaphysics is «theological science» or simply theology as well. Such a *science* investigates objects above physics - precisely meta-physical objects - and, in this sense, it is properly meta-physics: its possession is not possible for the human being as we read in the first book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: ' [...] "God alone can have this privilege", and it is unfitting that man should not be content to seek the knowledge that is suited to him'.³

The distinctive metaphysical question *What is being?* has been from Aristotle identified with the question *What is substance?*, i.e. with a question that aims to establish if a divine substance exists or not and which are its peculiar features.

And indeed the question which, both now and of old, has always been raised, and always the subject of doubt, viz. what being is, is just the question, what is substance? For it is this that some assert to be one, others more than one, and that some assert to be limited in number,

¹ See the figure at page 17.

² Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, book IV in *The complete works of Aristotle*, The Revised Oxford Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes, vol. II, Bollingen Series LXXI, 2: Princeton University Press 1991, 1584.

³ Ivi, book I, 1555.

*others unlimited. And so we also must consider chiefly and primarily and almost exclusively what that is which is in this sense.*¹

Aristotle's metaphysics configures itself indeed as a *theory of substance* and its question, more than be oriented to discover being itself, wants to look into the first essence of being itself through the embodiment of being, i.e. the substance. Aristotle imposes a strong mark on the meaning of *first philosophy* and after him metaphysical research will be oriented to highlight the *quidditas* of the essence itself.

At the beginning there was meta-physics onto-logical orientation, Aristotle's *first philosophy* which poses at the center essence itself and considers wise the person who investigates the first principles and causes of the essence itself. As we've just seen for Aristotle the possession of the *Knowledge* of being concerns God and not the human being, however this divine science is deserving to be desired and honored and, in order to do that, the man must research mainly this science, i.e. he must philosophize.

But does philosophy really coincide with metaphysics? Is it possible for the continuous embodying of being which has to be seen in the history of philosophy - in particular by Aristotle - to disclose the being *qua* being?

The way which brings one to truth, as Aristotle well alerted, is difficult, but the very beginning of his *Metaphysics* 'All men by nature desire to know'², seems to be of good omen for this research.

Will philosophy be able to descend in order to be in man's reach?

§ 2. *The disappointing question about nothing*

'Why are there beings at all, and why not far rather Nothing?'³, asked Heidegger at the end of *What is Metaphysics?*. With this point the reconfiguration of philosophy prospected by Leo Lugarini begins - i.e. the investigation of 'what must be understood under philosophy; does philosophy in itself really coincide with metaphysics or does it cover a different configuration?'⁴.

On the basis of this question the necessity to *overcome* metaphysics as well as the consequent reconfiguration of philosophy emerges. Moreover, in *What is metaphysics?* Heidegger specifies his metaphysical interest in the *nothing* with these words: 'The nothing does not merely serve as the counterconcept of beings; rather, it originally belongs to their essential unfolding as such. In the being of beings the nihilation of the nothing occurs'⁵.

According to Heidegger, metaphysics with its persisting research into the first and privileged essence has lost its original aim: being itself, which remains hidden under the blunders of human scientific investigation, pretends through a *representational thought* to 'explore the thing from outside, in such a way, to

¹ Ivi, book VII, 1624.

² Ivi, book I, 1552.

³ Heidegger, M. (1929), 96.

⁴ Lugarini, L. (1964), 9. Translation by the Author.

⁵ Heidegger, M. (1929), 91.

apprehend it intrinsically'¹. On that account, metaphysics remains ignorant of its own foundation, as expressed clearly by Lugarini:

*Metaphysics, by Heidegger, consists in such a manner of thought which in the lack of caution of these oblivions has its proper (ill-founded) foundation, i.e. its own original dimension; which not only thinks being ignoring its difference from essence, but also, as a principle, it escapes to everything that diverges from the essence. What must be realized, instead, is the absolute other of the essence which is hidden inside it as its constitutive moment. By Heidegger the realization that it's only by the force of the absolute other of itself that the essence could be eventually grounded is the first step towards overcoming metaphysics.*²

The *absolute other* of the essence is just *nothing*, which directs us in front of being and places us in question. But, it must be asked, when and how could we experience the nothing? Heidegger has identified a properly human mood which brings man forward to the nothing itself: *Angst* [Anxiety] characterized from 'the indeterminateness of that in the face of which and concerning which we become anxious [...]'³, the fact that there is nothing, any-thing, to become anxious about. What was impossible in the metaphysical perspective actually happened: the essence's disappearance.

What remains now? The nothing or perhaps the very searched for being hidden behind the essence?

Certainly we, as human beings, are there for the first time; our being alone with the nothing, the only one who could give us the key to Being's door:

*The question of the nothing puts us, the questioners, ourselves in question. It is a metaphysical question. Human Dasein can comport itself toward beings only if it holds itself out into the nothing. Going beyond beings occurs in the essence of Dasein. But this going beyond is metaphysics itself. This implies that metaphysics belongs to the "nature of the human being". It is neither a division of academic philosophy nor a field of arbitrary notions. Metaphysics is the fundamental occurrence in our Dasein. It is that Dasein itself.*⁴

Here is Metaphysics again, but haven't we exceeded it? The Metaphysics we face now has its foundation in Being, and we discover ourselves inside it as existential beings. The original meaning of the word «metaphysics» has not been cancelled but re-grounded: the being-in-itself couldn't take place in the several essences analyzed in the history of philosophy, because between being and essence there's a profound difference: 'on one side there is essence, "what every time is essence", on the other side there is being, "what enables the essence to be effectively essence and not instead no-thing", which is to say

¹ Lugarini, L. (1964), 24. Translation by the Author.

² Ivi, 48. Translation by the Author.

³ Heidegger, M. (1929), 88.

⁴ Ivi, 96.

“what in the essence, if it’s properly an essence, constitutes the being”. Therefore the ontological difference appears’¹.

With attention to the *ontological difference* we can look at ancient philosophy investigating the original grounds which have never been seen before, in this sense we can say that metaphysics, after being overcome, wakes up and re-starts as necessary to the existential human being. It can be said, indeed, that man is intrinsically metaphysics as much as, thanks to the encounter with nothing, he will find himself above and over the essence itself in its totality. Metaphysics onto-logically structured has been discovered to be a particular configuration of philosophy, not philosophy itself, which as we have seen is already beyond metaphysics together with the human being, its artificer.

§ 3. *Hegel’s reconfiguration: experience*

Man speaks the language of Being as his own nature and, for instance, it will be possible for him to achieve the truth of Being, of what is appropriate for him.

Heidegger had perceived that truth must be searched in ourselves, and what needs to be in question was properly the existential being, however the turn in this direction was already taken by Hegel, who had proposed an authentic *phenomenology of knowledge*.

In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel expresses the necessity for philosophy to become a science, i.e. that the knowledge is self-guaranteed and constitutes, in such a way, the measure and the support of philosophical thought.

Through the journey of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which brings consciousness step by step from *sense-certainty* to the *absolute knowing*, the raising of philosophy to science will be realized. Through this process it will be later discovered that the journey itself, which has an introductory function, is already the philosophical and scientific knowledge.

Human knowledge and truth are no longer opposites because the *absolute knowing* is implicitly at the beginning of the philosophical path. It couldn’t be otherwise. In fact: if there were a difference between consciousness and the object, who could guarantee that the object would be really knowable by consciousness?

This critical operation of the intellect, typical of gnoseologism, is soundly expressed in the *Introduction* of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*:

[...] if the Absolute is supposed merely to be brought nearer to us through this instrument, without anything in it being altered, like a bird caught by a lime-twig, it would surely laugh our little ruse to scorn, if it were not with us, in and for itself, all along, and of its own volition. For a ruse is just what cognition would be in such a case, since it would, with its manifold exertions, be giving itself the air of doing something quite

¹ Lugarini, L. (1964), 42. Translation by the Author.

*different from creating a merely immediate and therefore effortless relationship.*¹

The *exposition of how knowledge makes its appearance*² is the way chosen by Hegel to explain the necessity of knowledge to become science. Here he speaks of *appearance* that designates the truth which develops itself as actuality: ‘Appearance is the arising and passing away that does not itself arise and pass away, but is “in itself” [i.e. subsists intrinsically], and constitutes the actuality and the movement of the life of truth’³. The phenomenon is its proper appearance. In this sense *appearance* and *truth* belong to the same root, they are not opposed, false. Instead being another thing from truth, there is a transition from the form to the act as Lugarini said in his *Philosophy and Metaphysics*:

*The Standpoint assumed here characterizes itself for the being-with-us of the absolute, i.e. of “what in actuality is” or, preferably, of “truth” itself, in general. The absolute’s being-with-us indicates its original presence for consciousness; ergo involves that truth, in general, from the beginning and then is always given clearly to us, on the other side, we are originally by the truth although we don’t see it. Therefore Erscheinung and Wahrheit simply cease to oppose themselves.*⁴

Hegel gives to philosophy a conversion which reconfigures philosophy as a *science of the experience of consciousness*, the step only drafted by Heidegger is realized by Hegel: the *absolute knowing* must be sought in human consciousness. Its performance articulates the development of truth that unearths in every step the reality itself.

For this reason it must be said that nothing is known that is not in experience, or, as it is also expressed, that is not felt to be true, not given as an inwardly revealed eternal verity, as something sacred that is believed, or whatever other expressions have been used. For experience is just this, that the content – which is Spirit – is in itself substance, and therefore is an object of consciousness. But this substance which is Spirit is the process in which Spirit becomes what it is in itself; and it is only as this process of reflecting itself into itself that it is in itself truly Spirit. It is in itself the movement which is cognition – the transforming of that in-itself into that which is for itself, of Substance into Subject, of the object of consciousness into an object of self-consciousness, i.e. into an object that is just as much superseded, or into the Notion. The movement is the

¹ Hegel, G. W. F. (1807), *Phenomenology of Spirit* translated by A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press 1977, 47.

² Ivi, 49.

³ Ivi, 27.

⁴ Lugarini, L. (1964), 26. Translation by the Author.

circle that returns into itself, the circle that presupposes its beginning and reaches it only at the end”.¹

Experience represents a crucial moment in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which transforms the immediate identity of thought and being in a mediate one: ‘*Inasmuch as the new true object issues from it, this dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on itself and which affects both its knowledge and its object, is precisely what is called experience [Erfahrung]*’.² Then, without experience, no knowledge would exist for human beings. Philosophy is rooted in the experience of consciousness that asks itself what is, for itself, knowledge: ‘Consciousness provides its own criterion from within itself, so that the investigation becomes a comparison of consciousness with itself [...]’.³

Experience, phenomenologically intended, reaches a total amplitude, comprehending in itself the whole of the conscious life, so, in its phenomenological sense experience includes the whole system of consciousness, i.e. its entire world. Because it embraces *the entire system of consciousness*⁴, the phenomenological attitude of observing and receiving the thing as it gives itself means ‘to penetrate in us in order to chase and receive, as it gives itself, the original movement of rising up and developing the “thing” itself into the horizon of our experience’⁵. In the whole conscience’s horizon, whose field of activity is the entirety of conscious life, the *absolute knowing* will constitute philosophy as a science. *Absolute knowing* appears in the moment in which consciousness catches in itself its essence; i.e. when there’s a correspondence between concept and object. When finally *phenomenon* fits essence or truth, phenomenology of spirit becomes actually science:

*Whereas in the phenomenology of Spirit each moment is the difference of knowledge and Truth, and is the movement in which that difference is cancelled, Science on the other hand does not contain this difference and the cancelling of it. On the contrary, since the moment has the form of the Notion, it unites the objective form of Truth and of the knowing Self in an immediate unity.*⁶

After having covered the way we - as consciousness - unfold, Hegel’s *Phenomenology* embraces the human’s work in all its universality. The *absolute knowing* contains in itself all the shapes of spirit, however, being itself properly a shape, *absolute knowing* cancels the other shapes, but in reality it re-claims them removing their split chronological dimension:

¹ Hegel, G. W. F. (1807) , 487-488.

² Ivi, 55.

³ Ivi, 53.

⁴ Ivi, 56.

⁵ Lugarini, L. (1964), 105. Translation by the Author.

⁶ Hegel, G. W. F. (1807), 491.

*As its fulfilment consists in perfectly knowing what it is, in knowing its substance, this knowing is its withdrawal into itself in which it abandons its outer existence and gives its existential shape over to recollection. Thus absorbed in itself, it is sunk in the night of its self-consciousness; but in that night its vanished outer existence is preserved, and this transformed existence – the former one, but now reborn of the Spirit's knowledge – is the new existence, a new world and a new shape of Spirit. In the immediacy of this new existence the Spirit has to start afresh to bring itself to maturity as if, for it, all that preceded were lost and it had learned nothing from the experience of the earlier Spirits. But recollection, the inwardizing, of that experience, has preserved it and is the inner being, and in fact the higher form of the substance.*¹

Spirit is aware that it must to go back. *Absolute knowing* is not a static unity, but has a strong tension. Hegel could not have said where this tension will lead, surely his *opened door* will not ever be closed. It was then Husserl who continued the phenomenological proceeding and who has properly gone back to the drawing-board.

§ 4. Husserl's reconfiguration: phenomenology of *Lebenswelt*

Husserl's reconfiguration of philosophy describes itself as a phenomenology of *Lebenswelt* which has our everyday life as a primary theme. In the conjunction of philosophy and life-world there's a definitive break with the metaphysical tradition, which was configured as a question about the essence from a higher point of view.

Nevertheless, Husserl distinguishes from the ancient tradition 'what he considers as an "authentic metaphysics", qua "universal science of supreme grounds of being". For its features of researching what is ultimate, the authentic metaphysics coincides, according to Husserl, with "first philosophy". The *erste Philosophie* asserts itself as the main theme, into the program to establish the rigorous scientificity of philosophy'². The task of establishing a *first authentic philosophy* reflects the original aims of classical metaphysics as Aristotle had designed although never realized. Husserl with his transcendental phenomenology wanted to realize it. The results of philosophy as a *rigorous science* are surely '*metaphysical*, if it be true that ultimate cognitions of being should be called metaphysical. On the other hand, what we have here is *anything but metaphysics in the customary sense*: a historically degenerate metaphysics, which by no means conforms to the sense with which metaphysics, as "first philosophy", was instituted originally. Phenomenology's purely intuitive, concrete, and also apodictic mode of demonstration excludes all "metaphysical adventure", all speculative excesses'³.

¹ Ivi, 492.

² Lugarini, L. (1964), 143. Translation by the Author.

³ Husserl, E. *Cartesian Meditations* (1929), translated by Dorion Cairns, Netherlands: Springer - Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999, 139.

Under *first philosophy*, Husserl intends, the one in itself first, on the basis of essence's internal grounds and, for its priority, the other sciences must underlie it and will be named, for instance, *second philosophies*. In the new conception of philosophy through phenomenology, the *epoché*, i.e. putting into parenthesis the persuasions counted as valid, including all sciences, assures that anything will be presupposed as already given: it's not possible thinking about something known outside the knowledge itself. Once obtained, through *epoché*, the apodictic evidence of *ego cogito*, we assist at the appearance of something which gives itself evidently to our conscience; i.e. the *phenomenon* or the *Sache selbst*. In this way, the radical new beginning of every rigorous knowledge resides in the dimension of the things' authentic appearance and in the consequent stance of receiving *phenomena* as they are in themselves; precisely this stance was possible through the phenomenological *epoché*.

In the *Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1935), Husserl identifies the crisis of European sciences in their not making a question out of their manner of proceeding, rather than in the issue of not achieving results. Questioning the activity one is engaged in is the essential point of beginning of philosophize. The credit of Cartesian doubt lies just in this radical skepsis which critically puts man at the center of his activity, as Leo Lugarini claims: 'In the Cartesian doubt, Husserl discovers the results to show that at least one thing is certain: "that I doubt and, further, that this world appears to me sensibly, that I have now these and those perceptions, that I judge them so and so [...]"¹.

What remains left to do for the phenomenologically reduced *ego*? As Hegel would have said, it remains only the *reine Zusehen*:

We can describe the situation also on the following manner. If the Ego, as naturally immersed in the world, experiencingly and otherwise, is called "interested" in the world, then the phenomenologically altered – and, as so altered, continually maintained – attitude consists in a splitting of the Ego: in that the phenomenological Ego establishes himself as "disinterested onlooker", above the naïvely interested Ego».²

Thanks to the transcendental conversion, philosophy can restart from the *ego* who 'can become the "non-participant onlooker" at himself – including furthermore every Objectivity that "is" for him, and as it is for him'³.

After having gained self-certainty, and therefore having landed at the level of transcendental subjectivity, it sets the problem of coming out from this solipsism. If the previous reductions have reduced the *other* to *own* and, in general, the world to my conscience's sphere; how could the *solus-ipse* meet the other-egos-for-itself?

In front of the same landscape, two different *egos* surely have several perceptions of the single view; nevertheless the fact that the first *ego* could replace the second *ego* occupying its position, i.e. swapping places with the

¹ Lugarini, L. (1964), 163. Translation by the Author.

² Husserl, E. (1929), 35.

³ Ivi, 37.

first one, and even then being in front of the same horizon, experiencing - through empathy – its same feelings, this simple situation attests that: ‘*there can exist only a single community of monads*, the community of *all* co-existing monads’¹. Here we are arrived at the last step of transcendental reduction: intersubjectivity. Thanks to this final step the lost world, put into parenthesis at the beginning of the phenomenological process, has been regained: but is it the same world? Is Husserl’s thought one of the several philosophical doors which could be closed after him? Surely not, after all: how could we close again our own door?

Husserl’s phenomenology, as already Hegel’s, takes sense from ourselves. Such a philosophy, based on the existential being, as Heidegger wished, will certainly not ever come to an end:

The Delphic motto, “Know thyself!” has gained a new signification. Positive science is a science lost in the world. I must lose the world by epoché, in order to regain it by a universal self-examination. “Noli foras ire,” says Augustine, “in te redi, in interiore homine habitat veritas”.²

Conclusion

What is to be obtained through the reconfiguration of philosophy?
Is this reconfiguration definitive or is it a never-ending process?

The investigation has reached an unexpected result. The experienced result is the radical transformation of the same meaning of the question of ground: philosophy’s basis, rather than being essence, being or factual, is what brings us to conceive essence or being to one hand and, on the other hand, to limit and maintain us into factual. We are ourselves ground, i.e. what happens in interiore homine.³

So Lugarini claims commenting on the outcome of the developed way. Actually, it’s not possible to speak about a conclusion if we hold to philosophical task as Hegel, Heidegger, Husserl and Lugarini had all intended it. What does appear to a not naïve philosopher, *epochizing*, beyond Magritte’s door? An *unexpected answer*: staying in the doorway in order to not follow again into intellectualism which pretends to embrace everything.

At the end, what does it mean to be arrived? If truth, as we’ve discovered, lives in ourselves we must give a new sense to the objects we encounter in the life-world, i.e. giving a new sense to philosophy.

It’s now understandable in which way in front of Magritte’s door the man breaks it with his human figure in order to gain his original position, renouncing at the beginning the more comfortable and misleading *habit* of opening philosophy’s door and going beyond.

¹ Ivi, 140.

² Ivi, 157.

³ Lugarini, L. (1964), 182. Translation by the Author.

Being on the look-out at the middle of oneself as the door, occupying such an uncomfortable and difficult position for man, who is constantly tempted to cross easier ways promising a comprehensive knowledge they will not acquire, begs man to reconfigure his own knowledge every time it goes away from the conscious life's internal intentionality, never giving up to tiredness.

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Figure 1. *The Unexpected Answer*, René Magritte 1933

