

BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS,
AND INDUSTRIAL POLICIES IN ITALY

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This paper focuses on the organization of business interests and on the interaction between them and regional governments in the field of industrial policies.

While the structures and activities of regional governments have been fairly extensively researched, the organization of business interests in Italy is still a largely unexplored terrain. We have only scant information about the characteristics, internal life and modus operandi of business interest associations. Moreover, little is known on the interaction between such associations representing business interests and regional governments, on the mutual influence these two actors exert upon each other. Given the present state of empirical research, therefore, the paper can only have a tentative and exploratory character (1).

I shall start by describing some features of the organization of business interests in Italy, which bear directly upon the problem of industrial policy-making at the regional level.

The Organization of Business Interests

In Italy business interests are organized and represented by eight nation-wide associations (2). Two represent private industry (CGII, CPMI), three artisan firms (CASA, CGIA, CNA), and the remaining three cooperatives (AGCI, CCI, LNC). In terms of organizational structure they fall into two broad categories: four are second-order confederations, made up of

autonomous territorial and sectoral affiliate associations; four, on the contrary, are first-order, membership associations, internally articulated in territory- and product-defined subunits (3).

The presence of three business interest associations in the artisan and cooperative sectors can be explained largely in political terms. In fact, similarly to agriculture and trade, the pattern of business interest associability in these two sectors is heavily influenced by political factors. This state of affairs reflects a frequently-noted characteristic of Italian society: a lack of autonomous associations organizing and representing societal interests (Pizzorno, 1980: 37). With the partial exception of bourgeois (especially industrial) interests, since the end of the 19th century interest groups have always been sponsored by political parties and have developed under their protective umbrella. Interest groups have relied upon the resources - organization, participation, legitimacy - provided in large measures by parties: these resources were vital for the groups' emergence and consolidation. As a consequence, interest groups became strongly identified with and dependent upon the political subculture (mainly the Catholic or the Socialist) that had generated them in the first place.

In the period following the Second World War, political parties - especially Christian Democracy and the Communist Party - played a very influential role in the complex process which, after the abolition of the fascist corporatist system,

led to a new configuration of interest articulation with the establishment of democratic representative organizations. This meant that not only inter-organizational competition was influenced by political factors, but that the interest groups themselves served as instruments of inter-party competition.

As far as the artisan sector is concerned, the two largest and most influential associations (CGIA and CNA, in this order) were established in the immediate post-war period as competitive organizations under the sponsorship of, respectively, Christian Democracy and the left parties, with a view to increasing party penetration into this large section of the independent middle classes and attracting its political support (4). The third association, CASA, was later set up as an interest organization linked to and sponsored by the Republican and Social democratic parties.

CGIA and CASA are second-order confederations, made up of, respectively, 107 and 54 local membership associations. CNA, on the contrary, is a first-order association, along a model of more centralized organizational control over the periphery. For the territorial articulation of the interests it represents, CNA has established a large number (97) of local subunits at the provincial level.

As to the cooperatives, the three associations are fully integrated in the respective political subcultures, according to a pattern similar to that of artisan associations (5). The three associations representing cooperatives are all first-order organizations, i.e. firms join directly the national

association. Their organizational structure is fundamentally similar and is based upon an integrated network of horizontal (territory-defined) and vertical (product-defined) subunits. These subunits are an internal articulation of the national association and not autonomous organizations in their own right (with a separate budget, constitution, staff, etc.). The three associations' organizational model, therefore, is identical to that of mass political parties and large trade unions and responds to the functional imperative of hierarchical control (6). To some extent, this is a legacy of the post-war period, when between parties and associations there existed strong political and organizational links: especially in the case of PCI and DC, the associations were somehow thought of as "transmission belts" of the parties' policies and strategies. This situation has been evolving in the past twenty years, as a result of considerable changes in the political climate and in the economic environment. The links between parties and interest associations have loosened, and there has been an increasing emphasis on the representation of the business interests of their members and on the provision of services to them.

The other two business associations (CGII and CPMI, usually known as Confindustria and Confapi) have different origins and different structures. Confindustria, the oldest and most important industrial national association in Italy, is a second-order confederation representing a large number of territorial and sectoral affiliate associations.

Chronologically, the sectoral, industry-specific, associations have been established first, beginning from the last quarter of the 19th century, mainly in the textile and engineering sectors (Angelini, 1981). But at the beginning of the 20th century territorial associations started to be established, grouping firms operating in the same area irrespective of sectoral differentiation. These local business associations were mainly employers' organizations and were intended as a counterpart to the local Chambers of Labour, in order to defend employers' interests and coordinate their action toward labour. The small size of most firms and the great territorial differences, in terms of industrial structure and socio-economic development, among Italy's various areas, provided a powerful incentive to the diffusion and consolidation of these local business associations (Berrini, 1983).

Confapi is a confederation of territorial associations, mainly located in the northern and central areas of the country. It was established in the immediate post-war period as a representative of small- and medium-sized firms in direct competition with Confindustria.

For the purposes of this paper, it is important to highlight one specific feature of the system of business interests representation in Italy, which emerges clearly from what has been said in the preceding paragraphs: the marked prevalence of the territorial articulation of interests is in fact centred upon a ramified and extensive network of local

associations. This can be seen in Table 1. The backbone, the basic units, of the system of business interests representation is the territorial organizations (7). The number of territorial organizations is far larger than the number of sectoral, industry-specific, organizations. What is more important, as far as the latter are concerned, only the affiliates to Confindustria enjoy the status and the resources of autonomous associations. The others are all internal articulations (subunits) of the central organizations, with only limited autonomy and influence on the decision-making process.

The role of territorial associations has become increasingly important since, in addition to their established employers' functions; they have started to provide for their members a growing range of services (legal, administrative, financial, commercial, etc.) vital for the management of the firms (8). As a consequence, a division of labour has become established between territorial associations providing selective goods (assistance in labour matters and services) for members, and the national or peak associations providing public goods (mainly political representation) for business as a whole. Of course, this is a simplification and a generalization of a much more complex situation. Above all, territorial associations, in their dealings with local institutions and parties, do represent business interests at the political level. The above statement, nonetheless, emphasizes a crucial aspect of the organization of business

interests. The division of labour between centre and periphery means that at the local level inter-organizational competition is largely based upon the supply of different, more attractive or cheaper selective goods. This is particularly true for small-sized or artisan firms which find it more convenient to rely on associations for those services, necessary to their activity, they are not able, or willing, to generate internally.

The reliance on local associations as service structures has been increasing in the 1970s, as bureaucratic and administrative requirements have become more complex, the need for specialized information and assistance has grown, and new challenges (technological change, marketing problems, financial stringencies, etc.) have made life for small-sized firms more difficult (9). This has resulted in an instrumental orientation toward business associations, has lessened the role of identity or solidarity incentives, and has loosened the subcultural character of participation in associative action.

The Impact of Regions on the Organization of Business Interests

In 1970 the first Councils of the fifteen "ordinary" regions (in addition to those of the five "special" regions already established) were elected, culminating more than two decades of intense political and intellectual battles

(Gourevitch, 1978; Leonardi et alii, 1981). Arguably, the creation of the ordinary regions was one of the most important developments in Italian politics and government in the republican period.

What was the impact of the establishment of regional governments on the organization and the representation of business interests?

First, and most obviously, the establishment of elected governments at the regional level induced a process of regionalization of business associations, in order to be able to deal adequately with the new institutions. An intermediate level was created between the national and the local associations, centre and periphery, the two traditional poles of business interest organization. The creation of regional structures has been formally accomplished almost everywhere by all associations, with the partial exception of Confapi (see Table 1). However, the diffusion of these intermediate organizations should not be overemphasized. In the first place, a varying but significant number of regional associations exist only on paper; in practice they have never started functioning. In the second place, even where they do function, these associations in general tend to be rather weak organizations, poorly institutionalized and with limited resources. In the third place, they are to a large extent dependent upon either the provincial associations they federate or the national organizations of which they are an internal articulation. This dependence is first of all

financial. No regional organization has an autonomous source of revenue: with the exception of Confindustria, all regional associations are financed directly by the centre. Furthermore, the centre is also the source of their legitimacy as political representatives of the region's firms, in the face of the open hostility of the provincial associations that are rather unhappy in seeing their prerogatives eroded by the newcomers.

Limited resources and autonomy, poor institutionalization, ill-defined organizational status seem to be characteristics common to a large part of regional business associations, although there are differences among the various associations and, within the same association, among the various regions (10). In these respect, the situation of business interests at the regional level contrasts markedly with that of other interest groups, notably trade unions. The latter in fact appear to have quite resolutely taken the road of the regionalization of their organization and to have transferred to regional structures considerable resources and functions. It remains yet to be seen if and how the strengthening of the regional organizations within trade unions, and other interest groups as well, will affect the organization of business interests in any significant degree.

This is the general picture. It is, however, necessary to qualify the above statements by taking account of the different internal structure of the various business associations. We have seen that the three associations

representing cooperatives and one of the associations representing artisan firms (CNA) are centralized organizations. The establishment of regional "federations" was for them an internal organizational change, which did not have to overcome the resistance of autonomous local affiliates. This enabled them to accomplish the regionalization of their structures in an easier, faster and more thorough way.

The situation of the two associations representing industrial firms (Confindustria and Confapi), and to a lesser extent of the other two artisan associations, is remarkably different. They are truly second-order confederations, where territorial associations dominate the internal decision-making process (11). The establishment of new regional organizations as real representatives of business interests at the regional level meant inevitably a loss of prerogatives for the provincial associations. Provincial associations feared the creation of regional federations as an attempt by the confederation to check their autonomy and loosen their hold upon the central organization. Given the distribution of power within the two confederations, the local associations were likely to resist successfully such unfavourable developments. As a result, the regional federations, grouping provincial associations, have been formally established but they have not been granted any autonomous resources nor have their tasks been set out in any clear way. Confindustria regional federations are dominated by provincial associations, that finance and, to

a large extent, staff them. Confapi regional federations, on the other hand, lead a rather precarious existence, thanks mainly to the support they get from the centre.

Other factors influenced the process of regionalization of business interests organizations. Let us take, for example, the artisan sector. The regions were delegated the powers concerning the sector which were formerly held by the Ministry of Industry. Through their policies and prerogatives, regions are therefore in a position to affect directly and substantively this important section of the regional economic system (see Falcon, 1979). Political representation at the regional level thus became a necessity for artisan interest associations. To this it must be added that in Italy institutionalized participation by interest organizations in the provincial and regional artisan committees are provided by law. Organized artisan interests hold a majority within these committees, which are entrusted with important policy-making functions. Again, this provided an extremely powerful incentive to set up regional organizations for the participation into these public bodies.

The situation of industry is very different. The regions have only limited powers in the industrial field and there is no form of institutionalized participation into public policy-making. De facto, regions are not crucial institutions for industry. Furthermore, it has to be remarked that some regional governments are controlled by political coalitions led by the Communist Party, of which private business is

rather wary and whose legitimacy it is not too anxious to uphold.

What have been the relationships between regional governments and organized business interests?

First of all, they have varied in the different regions and economic sectors.

As to the artisan sector, for the reasons briefly suggested above, relationships have been intense and cooperative virtually everywhere. As stipulated by state laws, artisan associations, proportionally to their membership, have been incorporated into public policy-making. This has given rise to a sort of corporatized pluralism: interest associations retain their organizational autonomy, do not enjoy any monopoly of representation and compete with each other; at the same time they institutionally take part in policy-making, enjoy a remarkable degree of self-government, and are recognized as official spokesmen of the entire sector (although they represent only about fifty per cent of artisan firms) (Massera, 1983). Furthermore, artisans are an important constituency for the regional political class. Regional governments - of whatever political orientation - through their favourable policies have been actively trying to capture the consensus of this section of the independent middle classes (12). In this way they have contributed, together with national legislation and policies, to the survival - and indeed to the consolidation - of this traditional sector of the economy (13).

Besides these common trends, the relationships between artisan associations and regional governments have been to a large extent patterned by what La Palombara (1964) called parentela, an elective affinity between interest groups and parties based on a shared ideology and political orientation. Especially in the regions characterized by well-established political subcultures (such as "white" Veneto or "red" Emilia-Romagna), there has been a privileged relationship between regional government and institutions, and the artisan associations sharing the same subcultural roots. These privileged relationships obviously draw on the well-established links between political parties and interest groups, which were suggested at the beginning. This partnership is mutually advantageous: the regional political class consolidates its legitimacy and consensus; the association strengthens its dominant position in the sectoral system of interest representation. On the whole, and this is what matters most, the two actors contribute to the stability of the local political system.

A similar pattern can be detected in the relationships between regional governments and associations representing cooperatives. Although the latter do not enjoy an institutional role in the policy-making process, they are one of three interest groups regional governments pay a great deal of attention to, particularly in the regions where cooperatives are an important element of the local economy (Italy's centre-north-east). As in the case of artisan

associations, the relationships between regions and interest groups are of the parentela type and deeply affected by the different political subcultures.

The picture changes considerably when we turn to industry. The relationships between regional governments and industrial interest associations range from good to non-existent, displaying wide regional variations. A number of ecological factors have been put forward as possible independent variables to explain such variations. It has been suggested (14) that the differences in the patterns of interaction between the two actors can be explained by the socio-economic structures of the regions. This explanation is based on the well-known model of the "three Italies" (Bagnasco, 1977). According to this interpretation, in the first area (Italy's north-west), characterized by an industrial structure made up of large-sized, technologically advanced firms and of a network of small- and medium-sized firms linked to the former, relationships are good and well-established, based on consultation and cooperation. Business associations are recognized as legitimate and crucial interest groups; they play an active role in the formation of regional industrial policies. In the second area (Italy's centre-north-east), where small- and medium-sized firms producing mainly consumer goods predominate, relationships are, on the whole, less cooperative and sometimes conflictual. The associations representing private capital are not as strong and influential as in the northwestern area and face the

aggressive competition of powerful associations representing cooperative and artisan firms (to which regional governments tend to give privileged status and access). Private industry does not play any special role in the process of industrial policy-making. In the third area (Italy's south), which is only partially industrialized and is split between a few giant (state-owned) firms and a plethora of micro-firms, relationships are virtually non-existent. Interaction between business interest associations and regional institutions is episodic, not institutionalized, and has an ad hoc character. Informal and clientelistic contacts based on personal relationships and influence largely replace organized political representation (15).

But the socio-economic context is not sufficient as a variable to explain the different patterns of relationship between regional institutions and organized industrial interests; above all, it is not able to explain variations within the same area. Political variables can help to make sense of some of the differences, which can be observed. For example, in Italy's second area the kind of political coalitions controlling regional governments tends to affect the relationships with private business. In general terms, regional governments controlled by Christian Democracy tend to have better and more cooperative relationships with the interest associations representing private industry than regional governments controlled by the Communist Party do. This depends as much on the different attitudes and behaviour

of regional governments toward private capital as on the different perception and posture of organized business. In Communist-dominated Emilia-Romagna, for example, the regional federation of Confindustria has taken a rather negative and defensive attitude toward the region's policies in the industrial field, in practice advocating as little intervention as possible without putting forward alternative proposals. On its part, the regional government is keeping private business under pressure by promoting the development of cooperatives and by favouring the interest groups closest to it.

In addition to these ecological factors some weight must be given also to endogenous factors, i.e. those internal to the interest organizations themselves. Given the ill-defined status and the limited resources they enjoy, regional federations prove to be most effective and influential if among their members there is a dominant provincial association. This is the case in both Piedmont and Lombardy (north-west), whose regional federations are generally rated as the strongest and most effective in dealing with regional governments. In both regions there is a provincial business association, which is clearly dominant and therefore able to exercise hierarchical control over the other provincial associations (they are by far the two most important territorial associations affiliated to Confindustria). Since these territorial associations dominate the internal life of the respective regional federation, and hence can influence in

large measure their behaviour, the latter do not become autonomous organizations competing with the former for the political representation of regional business interests. In other words, regional federations become an extension of the dominant provincial associations, increasing their power and making them even more representative vis-a-vis regional institutions. As long as the regional federations go on depending on a single dominant provincial association for their resources and legitimacy, the potential conflicts between the two organizations are kept to a minimum and the regional federations' representativeness and effectiveness are consequently enhanced.

Organized Business Interests and Regional Industrial Policies

The prerogatives of the regions in the field of industrial policies are set out in and delimited by the 1948 Constitution. According to article 117 of the Constitution, regional governments were to be granted powers in such diverse areas as health, housing, urban planning, agriculture, vocational training, museums and libraries, tourism, spas, etc. In the industrial field the law-making powers of ordinary regions were kept to a minimum (Massera, 1983). In fact, article 117 does not mention at all industry among the areas in which the regions can exercise their powers. This apparent limit, however, has been overcome in several ways. First, the Constitution expressly mentions the artisan sector

(artigianato) among the areas of regional intervention. This is crucial. Since most firms are very small in size (let us say, ten employees), by extension artigianato can in fact cover a substantial section of the regional industrial structure (16). Second, the regions' powers cover issues such as territorial and urban planning, vocational training, and public works, which are indirectly of great relevance for industry. Third, regions have tended to bypass constitutional limitations by setting up independent bodies and companies (often in partnership with private actors) to carry out interventions formally outside their jurisdiction.

After an initial period (1970-72), during which regions wrote their statutes and got organized, in the last decade most regional governments have used their powers and resources to do something in the industrial field. The main types of regional intervention have been: improvement of industrial locations, provision of infrastructure, establishment of regional financial companies, drawing up of plans for industrial restructuring, and, above all, provision of financial support (subsidies, grants, cheap loans, etc.) to small-sized firms (17).

Broadly speaking, regional policies in the industrial field have not been particularly impressive in terms of far-sightedness and effectiveness (Lassini, 1979, 1980). In the main, with only few exceptions, such policies have been piecemeal, uncoordinated, and short-term. They have had a marked ad hoc and particularistic character, above all as

adaptive responses to local crises and requests of support. Basically, policies have been distributive, in the form of financial contributions and incentives of various kinds (18). Instead of anticipating events with a strategic approach, regional governments have in large measure resorted to incrementalism. This kind of policies has contributed to a very limited extent to improve the regional industrial system, to bring about the adjustments necessary for the firms to meet successfully the new economic challenges, or to respond to the need of a changing industrial environment (19).

In assessing the performance of regions in the field of industrial policies it is fair to keep in mind the limitations and constraints under which regional institutions operate. There is no doubt that the powers and resources granted to the ordinary regions in this specific policy area are, on the whole, scanty and fragmentary. It is true as well that a national frame of reference for local industrial policies is lacking, which makes any planning at the regional level a difficult exercise. These are the usual complaints made apologetically by regional policy-makers. But other factors help to explain why regional industrial policies turned out to be of the sort I suggested. Here I want to call attention to the articulation of business interests and to their relationships with political parties, drawing on what I have said in the preceding sections of the paper.

We have seen that the representation of business interests is fragmented along a number of cleavages (size,

legal status of the firms, political allegiance). The different interest groups arising out of these cleavages have different organizational structures, pursue different strategies, and to do so they exploit different resources.

The associations representing artisan and cooperative firms rely in the different political contexts mainly upon their privileged channels of access to and influence on decision-makers of the same political "family". As representative, especially as far as artisans are concerned, of small-sized and relatively weak business interests they tend to concentrate on demands for financial support and protective measures. In this way they establish clientelistic relationships with the political parties controlling regional governments. On the other hand, the associations representing industrial firms are less interested in the kind of distributive and short-term measures sought after by artisan and cooperative firms. At the same time the territorial associations, with the exceptions of Piedmont and Lombardy, do not have the ability to aggregate the interests of their members and transform them into demands to feed into the policy-making process. The result is that, in many cases, regional associations are content with interventions of limited scope.

In sum, the configuration of business interests and the modes of their political representation are conducive to distributive and particularistic policies, often based upon clientelistic relationships between political parties and

interest groups. This hypothesis seems corroborated e contrario by the cases of Piedmont and Lombardy, the two regions that, relatively speaking, have attempted a more consistent and strategic approach to industrial problems: here the representation of business interests is less fragmented, inter-organizational competition is affected to a lesser degree by privileged relationships with parties in government, and one dominant industrial association has been able to exercise an effective leadership in this policy area. In this context, therefore, the relationships between regional governments and industrial associations are more institutionalized and stable, the making of industrial policies is based more on collective political negotiation than on diffuse group pressures or personal influence.

If the characteristics of interest representation affect policies, in its turn the distributive and fragmentary character of regional policies does not provide any incentive to the aggregation and redefinition of business interests, to the emergence of different modes of their political representation. In this way policies and interest organization reinforce each other in a vicious circle. It is unlikely that this state of affairs will change in the foreseeable future. These patterns of policy-making and interest articulation are too entrenched in the character of the political system, both at the local and national level, and in the structure of the industrial system. The substance of regional industrial policies is likely to remain the same,

unless some deep change takes place. In the second half of the 1970s trade unions appeared to be willing to push for a change in policies and policy-making at the regional level. But they did not succeed and ended up being trapped in the established patterns, unable to do anything about it (20).

On the whole, at the regional level there are no institutionalized procedures for industrial policy-making, which provide for the participation of organized business interests (or, for that matter, trade unions). The influence which business interests bring to bear on regional governments is still very much based on pressure, collective and individual, formal and informal. This dominant pattern of pressure politics is accompanied by the clientele relationships, which link interest groups with political parties. Beyond the smokescreen of ritualistic consultations and joint meetings between policy-makers and interest groups, policies are fundamentally the result of these fragmented and conflicting lobbying activities. Political parties - and party factions - still play a crucial role in the policy-making process (21) and do not appear willing to give up any of their prerogatives for the benefit of organized interests and institutionalized participation.

To conclude, both the representation of interests and the policy-making process retain a fundamentally pluralist character. In this respect, I do not see any clear trends toward forms of local corporatism (with the partial exception of the artisan sector) or, even less, established corporatist

patterns. These brief and tentative remarks upon the interaction between organized business interests and regional governments lead me to question whether some form of corporatism is possible at all in Italy.

Table 1

Territorial and sectoral business organizations in Italy, 1980

- National Sectoral association organizations	Provincial organizations	Regional organizations	
-- AGCI	76	17	7
CASA	54	16	17
CCI	98	20	14
CGIA	107	20	27
CGII	106	20	98
CPMI	54	8	9
CNA	97	18	6
LNCM	98	20	10
-- Total	690	139	188

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AGCI: Associazione Generale Cooperative Italiane
 CASA: Confederazione Autonoma Sindacati Artigiani
 CCI : Confederazione Cooperative Italiane
 CGIA: Confederazione Generale Italiana dell'Artigianato
 CGII: Confederazione Generale Italiana dell'Industria
 CPMI: Confederazione della Piccola e Media Industria
 CNA : Confederazione Nazionale dell'Artigianato
 LNCM: Lega Nazionale delle Cooperative e Mutue

Notes

- 1) The paper grows out and tries to combine the results of my participation in two research projects. On the one hand, the comparative research on The Organization of Business Interests directed by P.C.Schmitter and W.Streeck. On the other hand, a research project sponsored by the Istituto per la Scienza dell'Amministrazione Pubblica (ISAP) of Milan and directed by G. Romagnoli, on the interaction between regional governments and unions in the formation process of industrial policies
- 2) In the paper I do not take into consideration the two employers' associations - ASAP and INTERSIND - which represent state-owned firms
- 3) For a detailed exposition of this terminology see Schmitter and Streeck (1981)
- 4) See the excellent Istituto Cattaneo (1968). On PCI's strategy toward middle classes see Hellman (1976)
- 5) See Istituto Cattaneo, op.cit. The LNC was established in 1886 as a national association organizing and representing the interests of cooperatives. The largely Socialist-dominated LNC enjoyed a monopolistic position in the representation of cooperatives until the First World War. In the 1919 Catholic forces established the CCI as a competitive organization. The third association was established in 1952 when Republicans and Social democrats left the LNC and formed the AGCI
- 6) This is best exemplified by the LNC. See Zan (1982), Ch. 8
- 7) Local organizations usually cover an area corresponding to the administrative unit called 'province' (provincia), although sometimes - in the country's most industrialized areas - they cover a smaller territory
- 8) This has been a general trend for business interest associations, but, understandably, it has been more marked for the associations organizing small-sized and artisan firms
- 9) See the data and remarks in Lassini (1984)
- 10) In particular, the associations representing cooperatives seem to have given a high priority to the establishment of regional organizations
- 11) For example, they control 80 per cent of the votes of Confindustria General Assembly (quoted by Berrini (1983): 228)

- 12) See Pizzorno (1974)
- 13) On the survival of traditional middle classes in Italy see the remarks in Berger (1974). For an analysis of state and regional policies in the artisan sector see Falcon (1979)
- 14) The suggestion comes from Luca Lanzalaco, who is currently working on his doctoral dissertation at the European University Institute in Florence about "Regional Devolution and Local Corporatism in Italy"
- 15) See the results of a research carried out in the Catania area (Eastern Sicily) in Catanzaro (1979)
- 16) This differs according to the specific industrial structure, both in terms of sectoral specialization and employment, of each region. See Fondazione Agnelli (1974)
- 17) A good summary of regional industrial policies can be found in Lassini (1979)
- 18) For a definition of distributive policies, and their implications for the political system, see Lowi (1972)
- 19) This picture probably describes more accurately the situation in the regions in the centre-north-eastern area of the country. For Veneto see Bagnasco and Trigilia (1984); for Emilia-Romagna I draw on my own research
- 20) Cf. Bagnasco and Trigilia, op.cit., on how things went in Veneto
- 21) Interest groups often complain that they get consulted after decisions have been already taken

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