UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI MILANO

The Transparencies and the Opacities of Experience

Intentionalism, Phenomenal Character, and Moods

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The question, O me! so sad, recurring—What good amid these, O me, O life?

Answer.

That you are here—that life exists and identity

That the powerful play goes on, and you may contribute a verse.

—Walt Whitman

There's no such a thing as simple. Simple is hard.

—Martin Scorsese

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many people, in many different ways, have contributed to this work, not necessarily by reading it, or commenting on it or discussing it with me. I would like to thank them all here

First of all, I have to thank Paolo Spinicci. He has supervised this work, read the drafts and discussed them with me. Perhaps, he does not fully agree with me on some of the points I make here. Thus, I have a to thank him twice. Indeed, his comments and criticisms have been important for me and have helped me see many issues under new light. We have known for many years and now we have eventually come to a point of disagreement. This is good news for me, I believe, because it is probably the sign that I am getting an independent thinker. On the other hand, I guess it is good news for him too. Over and above many other things, I will always be indebted to him because he taught me how to be an open-minded philosopher. After all, I am sure, he knows quite well that he is here, in every single page of this work.

Many of the ideas that I discuss in this dissertation are the results of my interactions with Uriah Kriegel or are in many ways dependent on the work I have done with him. Thus, he deserves a special mention too. I am indebted to Uriah for a huge amount of things. He has unofficially supervised me for a large part of these past few years while I was abroad, both in the United States and in Paris. Although he was not obliged to do that, he has always read my works and discussed them with me; he has always listened to me carefully and taken seriously my weird views and often confused ideas. More importantly, he has helped me clarify those views and ideas and taught me how to put them in a clear and structured shape. Unfortunately, I believe the road is still quite long, but (at least) I hope I am taking the right path. For all that, for being a very nice person and a gentle soul, and for many other things—

like, for example, offering a bed when I had no place to stay before leaving Paris—I have to say (at minimum) a huge "THANKS!" to him.

Alberto Voltolini first put me in touch with Uriah. So, I would like to thank him for that and for accepting of being a member of my defense committee.

Clotilde Calabi has read a large part of this work and given very useful comments and notes. More generally, she helped me in many ways during these years. I sincerely thank her for all that. Also, I would like to thank Sandro Zucchi. Few days before I left for the United States, he wrote to me an email that taught me more about life than tons of philosophy books. I know that I can always find him in his office with his feet on the desk. And that is enough.

Luca Barlassina and I have been friends for years. Our favorite hobby is having five hours long conversations on Skype once or twice per week. Sometimes, on these occasions, we set aside important things and start to talk about philosophy. It is always a pleasure for me—I have to say. Luca is a good philosopher and discussing with him is always challenging and useful. Such discussions have influenced my work more than Luca knows and more than I will be able to openly admit next time we are going to meet on Skype. Therefore, I thank him here, so I can avoid doing it in person.

Thanks to Giuliano Torrengo for discussing with me some of the topics of this dissertation and for giving me the chance to present some of the materials I had on moods at the Seminar of Philosophy of Language and Mind. I also thank the participants for very useful comments.

Also, I would like to thank all the following persons of the Philosophy Department of the University of Milan: Matteo Andreozzi, Mattia Brancato, Costanza Brevini, Chiara Brozzo, Francesco Della Gatta, Angelica Kaufmann, Samuele Iaquinto, Kristina Pučko, Maria Sole Marinelli, Francesca Pullano, Elisa Paganini, Michele Sandrini, Andrea Scanziani, Corrado Sinigaglia, Silvano Zipoli Caiani.

During my PhD, I spent long periods abroad. I was firstly visiting scholar at the Philosophy Department of the University of Arizona (from August 2011 to July 2012) and, then, visiting student at Institut Jean Nicod in Paris (from January 2013 to July 2013). Thus, I thank Chris Maloney and François Recanati for having welcomed me in their institutions. These two experiences were definitely crucial for writing this dissertation, for my research and, more generally, for my life. In either occasions, I have met wonderful persons who have really helped me increase the quality of my work and seriously contributed to make my

periods abroad nice and enjoyable. So, I thank them all for both these reasons. However, let me explicitly mention here Emil Salim, Bill Oberdick, and Andrea Pittarello: while I was in Tucson, they really helped me find my own way and have been true friends. I am sincerely grateful to them. Alexandre Billon, Pavlina Josisova, Sara Packalén, Max Seeger, Joulia Smortchkova, Vasilis Tsompanidis, and Dan Zeman were good fellows during my Parisian days. I thank them all: they have really made my stay in Paris "a moveable feast." For sharing very nice moments and conversations and very good food and red wine, I also thank Chiara Destri and Francesca Rebasti: my two flat-mates in the tiny apartment in Rue des Saints-Pères.

I cannot forget my friends. Thank you guys! I really do not have to explain why.

This last year and in particular these last few months were quite hard. Many (more or less serious) difficulties, complications, and problems have occurred to me. Nevertheless, here I am at the end of the road. Thus, I would like to reserve a final "Thanks" for those difficulties, complications, and problems: they made me stronger and forced me to be more confident in myself.

Doing this PhD gave me many opportunities: I could travel, see the world—which I could have never done otherwise—, meet wonderful people and do what I like the most: philosophy. The only words I manage find to describe my situation are the following two: I was lucky and privileged. Anyway, nothing comes for free: some costs had to be paid. Clearly, this is not the place to list them. So, I am not going to do that. However, let me just mention one, the greatest. While I was in the United States, my grandfather died and I could not come back to say "Goodbye" to him one last time. Although I am aware this is only a partial compensation, I still feel that this might be the right moment for doing what I could not do at that time and dedicate this work to him: "Ciao Nonno Babbo! Questa è per te!".[1]

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[1] Goodbye, grandpa! This is for you!

INTRODUCTION

THE BACKGROUND AND THE VERY GENERAL TOPIC: TWO FEATURES, THREE PROBLEMS

In this moment your mind is probably populated by many different thoughts. Perhaps, some of them concern this dissertation, surely many others concern things related to your work or your life. Needless to say, it is very hard for me to read your mind and guess what are the objects of your thoughts. Yet, there is still something I can know for sure about your thoughts, although I cannot look inside your mind: I know for sure that your thoughts (all of them) are *about* something.

This looks quite trivial, and it is in fact—but *only* in the following sense. It is trivial *to notice* that your thoughts are about something, since it is trivial (or not really informative) to say that thinking is always thinking *about* something: this is something we know quite well. On the other hand, though, it is definitely not trivial *that* thoughts *have aboutness* and *that* the latter looks as an essential feature of them: indeed, not every object seems to have such a property. For example, ordinary objects like cars, trees, shoes, sub-atomical particles, etc. are not *about* anything.

Now, what I have just said about thoughts applies to many other mental states of ours like beliefs, desires, hopes, etc.: they always *concern* or are *about* or *of* something. As Searle (1983) notes:

> If I tell you I have a belief or a desire, it always makes sense for you to ask, 'What is it exactly that you believe?' or 'What is it that you desire?'; and it won't do for me to say, 'Oh I just have a belief and a desire without believing or desiring anything.' My beliefs and desires must always be about something. (Searle, 1983: 1)

This power of *being about* or *representing* other things—usually, things and states or event of the world, but also non-existents—that at least some mental states have is a remarkable feature of human mind and is what philosophers use to call *intentionality*.

Our mental life, however, seems to involve something more. Indeed, there is *something it is like* to have a mind: there is something it is like to be in certain mental states of ours. For example, there is something it is like to see a certain shade of red, which is *qualitatively* very different from, say, what it's like to feel a terrible toothache or from what it's like to get angry at somebody. More generally, there is something it is like to be a subject: there is something it is like to be me, which is qualitatively different from what it's like to be you, and both these things are presumably very different from what it's like to be a bat (Nagel, 1974) or a cat, etc. In other words, having a human mind also involves *consciousness* or *being conscious*—and this is another remarkable feature it has.

Consciousness is constitutively related to subjectivity and seems to be fully accessible only from the point of view of a subject (the first person point of view). This is usually understood in two senses: first, if a creature is not conscious, that creature is not in the position to know what consciousness is; second, if I am a conscious creature and so there is something it is like to be me, nobody who is not me is in the right position to know exactly what it is like to be me.

Intentionality and consciousness are plausibly the two most remarkable features of human mind. Both are pervasive in our lives: in a way, we know them very well, as long as we are directly acquainted with them. However, they are very far from being philosophically (and scientifically) well understood. On the contrary, they are still problematic and puzzling, if not mysterious: they raise some of the most relevant and deep issues for today's philosophy of mind.

On the one hand, it is hard to tell what is consciousness' right place in nature, given its particular reluctance to physicalistic explanations. Indeed, what neurophysiology and neurosciences tell us about consciousness just do not seem to be capable/adequate to capture the *explanandum* itself, namely, the what-it's-likeness of our conscious experience. Consider pain, for example. What science provides us with is a very detailed explanation of the neural processes and machineries underpinning our feeling of pain. This indubitably counts as a great step forward and true progress in knowledge. Still, it seems to leave completely untouched what we would like (and expect) to be explained: that is, how and why pain feels that particular way. The feeling of pain itself, its distinctive what-it's-likeness, seems to stand completely unexplained, given today's neurophysiology and neuroscience. In other words, we have the impression as of an *explanatory gap* (Levine, 1983).[1] Bridging this gap is what Chalmers (1995, 1996) has famously called the *hard problem of consciousness*.[2,3]

On the other hand, intentionality too raises problems concerning its naturalization. Consider again the case of thoughts: as we were mentioning above, it is impossible for us to think without also thinking *of* something. By contrast, as we have already noticed, ordinary physical objects like cars, trees or sub-atomical particles do not seem to be *inherently* representational. If they represent, they do that only *derivatively*. Moreover, as many have argued,[4] even words and languages, *qua* signs and systems of signs, seem to derive their power of representing (their being meaningful in this particular case) from the original power of representing of mental states. If this is correct, then (non-derivative) intentionality is a serious candidate for being the specific mark of mentality, as it looks as a property that only mental phenomena can have essentially—as Brentano (1874/1973) has famously claimed. However, if so, then a problem arises. Indeed, how can something inherently intentional (the mental) arise from something that is not inherently intentional (the physical)? How can our essentially

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[1] The scientific description in third person, on the one hand, and what is available to first person, on the other, appear as fundamentally foreign to each other. And it is not fully clear how they relate. This is one of the sources of the problem.

[2] Notice that the problem is not whether or not there is a connection between consciousness and its physical base, this is taken for granted, but rather *why* and *how* they came to be in such a connection to each other and, in particular, *why* and *how* consciousness can arise from a physical basis.

[3] This description is only sketchy and not a fully exhaustive characterization of the problem: it is not meant to convey the impression that the problem cannot be solved. Whether or not the problem *can* be solved is, indeed, part of the problem itself. There is no room here for covering all the replies that can be provided to the hard problem. For a very good and exhaustive taxonomy and characterization of the different options see Chalmers (2003).

[4] Fodor (1987); Haugeland (1981); Searle (1980, 1983, 1992).

representational thoughts arise from the essentially non-representational physical particles composing our brain?[5,6]

So far, thus, two features, two huge problems. However, there is also a third problem. Indeed, as soon as the distinction between intentionality and consciousness is drawn, a couple of new questions immediately arise: Are these two features of our mind related? And, in case they are, what is the nature of such a relation? Actually, then, the situation is even more complicated: we have two features and three problems.

As Chalmers (2004) points out, it is hard to deny that there is some connection between conscious states and intentional states. At least some experiences—perceptual and visual experiences in particular—seem to be the *trait d'union* between intentionality and consciousness as long as they exhibit both intentional and conscious features. Thus, the two real questions are: (1) Does *every* experience have intentional features? (2) Provided that the conscious and the intentional dimension of the experience are intertwined, is that just a matter of fact or a matter of principle? These two general questions, which arise at the interface of consciousness and intentionality, define the very general topic of this dissertation.

Of course, dealing with such a topic continuously implies references to, as well as reflections and considerations on, questions concerning the nature of intentionality and the nature of consciousness. Those questions, thus, constitute the background of this work.

THE SPECIFIC TOPIC: THE TRANSPARENCIES AND THE OPACITIES OF EXPERIENCE

In the early 1990s, the debate on these issues generated a great divide among philosophers—what Ned Block (1996, 2003) has famously called "the greatest chasm in the philosophy of mind." According to some, intentionality and consciousness are in principle related. Others, instead, have held that intentionality and consciousness are not in principle related or, at least, that the latter outruns/goes beyond the former. I call these two groups of views (respectively) Intentionalism and Anti-intentionalism.

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[5] Kriegel (2013b).

[6] Another important problem raised by intentionality is the fact that non-existents can be objects of thought. See Chapter 1, §2 for more details.

Over the last twenty years, however, Intentionalism has increased its popularity among philosophers and is now a sort of mainstream in philosophy of mind. Moreover, it has been held in a more specific and particularly strong version that ultimately identifies consciousness and intentionality.[7]

One interesting feature of Intentionalism is that it makes very appealing promises. In its early days, indeed, it was a strong reductionist claim. Roughly, the idea was reducing consciousness to intentionality and intentionality to a tracking relation[8]—*i.e.* a natural and causal relation, obtaining between a mind/brain/cognitive system and the external environment, that enables the organism to keep track of and acquire information about the outside world. Put it other way, the idea was killing two birds with one stone: get the hard problem of consciousness solved in purely physicalistic terms by means of a physicalistic solution to the problem of intentionality.[9] In this way, if true, Intentionalism promises to offer a quite straightforward way to solve the hard problem and elegantly find a place for consciousness in nature.

It is important to notice that, even in case one does not want to be a reductionist—and there are many non-reductionist intentionalists nowadays[10]—Intentionalism is still an appealing option.[11] Indeed, by embracing Intentionalism the non-reductionist has still a framework that allows her to look at intentionality as a fundamentally conscious phenomenon. In this way, one is still in the position to reduce two problems to one. In particular, in this case, the problem of intentionality turns out to be just an aspect of (or something that cannot be independently solved of) the problem of consciousness. Moreover, in any case, Intentionalism offers an easy way to connect the two most remarkable feature of our mind and get a more unified picture.

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[7] Sometimes this version of Intentionalism is called Strong Intentionalism. In the rest of this introduction, "Intentionalism" will be referred to this view.

[8] Advocates of this version of Intentionalitsm are, among others, Dretske (1995, 1996, 2003), Lycan (1996a, 2001), and Tye (1995, 2000).

[9] Importantly, Intentionalism is not an eliminativist claim, but a reductionist one: it is a theory of consciousness that does not neglect the issue or deny that consciousness exists, but tries to show a way for reduction.

[10] They basically reject the idea that intentionality is (entirely) reducible to tracking, but accept that identification of intentionality and consciousness. Some stop here and claim that intentionality and consciousness are equally fundamental (e.g., Chalmers, 2004; Pautz, 2008). In this case, identity is to be understood in a looser sense as equivalence (Chalmers, 2004 explicitly makes this claim). Others go further and want to ground intentionality in consciousness (e.g., Horgan and Tienson, 2002). In both the cases, however, the problem of intentionality is considered as an aspect of the problem of consciousness.

[11] Intentionalism is orthogonal to the divide between reductionists and non-reductionists. Since it is an identity claim, it might well be that intentionality comes to be reducible to consciousness.

However, being appealing is not the same thing as being true. So, why should one believe in an intentionalist account of consciousness at all? The main, direct, strong reason comes from introspection, which is supposed to be a way to get direct evidence about consciousness. Such a reason is the so-called *transparency of experience* (Harman, 1990; Moore, 1903). In a nutshell, the transparency of experience is an introspective thesis, based on an introspective datum, according to which (roughly) all that there is about our conscious experience, as it is revealed in introspection, is nothing but what that experience itself represents, *i.e.* its content.[12] Clarify what this exactly means is part of what this dissertation is concerned with, so it will become fully clear later, as we go along. However, to get a first intuitive grasp on this point, consider again the experience of seeing a blue bike. Now, if you try to introspect and focus on what it's like for you to undergo that particular blue-experience, you only get blueness as instantiated by a certain object, *i.e.* the bike—no matter how hard you try to focus on the blue-quality alone. Put it other way, the only features you manage to be directly introspectively aware appear to you as properties belonging to worldly, external, mind-independent objects. This is why your experience is transparent: the focus of your introspection seems to literally go all the way through your experienc*ing* to directly get what is experienc*ed*.

As long as it suggests that it is introspectively impossible to directly spot non-represented (so non-intentional) conscious properties, this is taken to be a strong, direct evidence in support of Intentionalism. It is direct because it supposedly comes from direct observation of consciousness; and it is strong because it has to do with something that looks as an intuitively undisputable phenomenological datum.

In this dissertation, I focus on and address the issue of the transparency of experience and its relations with Intentionalism. I will consider why and how transparency exactly supports Intentionalism, what is the scope of transparency, what exactly is its strength, and what are the consequences on Intentionalism in case transparency fails. In particular, I will argue for the two following claims: (i) experience is *not* transparent in the sense required by intentionalism; so, and for the same reasons, (ii) introspection does not support Intentionalism but, on the contrary, offers strong reasons *against* it—if one looks closer and more accurately at what is introspectively available and if the appeal to introspection itself makes sense.

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[12] A better and more systematic formulation will be offered in Chapter 1, §4.

In general, my view is that things are much more complicated than they appear given Intentionalism. In particular, the move from introspection to the identification of consciousness and intentionality strikes me just as a too fast and easy solution to a very hard problem.

On the other hand, I believe that Intentionalism is a serious philosophical progress, as long as it sees the deep connections between intentionality and consciousness and tries to account for them in a unified way. So, although my conclusions will be against Intentionalism, I believe that a brute rejection of this view would be too hasty, after all. A more balanced and constructive attitude would be, instead, trying to build up a better theory that (a) retains the best of what Intentionalim offers and (b) drops what is wrong. This work can be seen, thus, as a small and modest contribution to a better understanding of what is wrong with Intentionalism, in the perspective of making a step forward toward the construction of such a better theory.

In order to make my points, I will largely rely on the case study of moods— states like anxiety, depression, elation, grumpiness, gloominess, irritation, etc.—that are usually considered a particularly hard case to handle for the intentionalist. Moods are conscious states, but (at least sometimes) do not appear to represent anything: they just seem to involve purely qualitative conscious features or "raw feelings." *Prima facie*, then, moods appear to be a case in which the identification of conscious states and intentional states fails.

Of course, intentionalists have provided their own replies and offered their own accounts for moods. However, here I will try to argue that those accounts are ultimately inadequate or poorly motivated. So, in a way or another, they fail. If I am right, then the reasons why they fail are intimately connected with the reasons why (at least) some moods are not transparent (opaque) experiences. In this way, the analysis of moods will pave the way to more general considerations concerning, on the one hand, transparency, its scope, its strength and, on the other, Intentionalism.

Before providing a summary of the structure of this work, let me add a couple of final notes concerning methodology and terminology.

First, methodology. In my discussion I will appeal/refer to introspection, to what introspection provides, etc. It is, thus, to be preliminarily clarified that this does not count, in any sense, as a matter of personal choice or taste. On the one hand, this is simply the way the issue is discussed in the literature. On the other hand, it is hard to see how it could be

otherwise: the nature of the problem itself requires such a treatment. When it comes to experience and questions concerning its what-it's-likeness, what is available (and manifest) to a first person point of view is crucial. In general, the treatment of the problem of the intentional status of conscious states cannot avoid the first person point of view: part of the issue itself, part of what is to be explained, is available only from this perspective. So, the point is not defending (or denigrating) introspection, first person analyses, etc. Rather, the point is simply "playing by the rules"—so to speak. One might choose not to play the game, but if one decides to play, then one has to do that according to the rules and at one's best. This is also what I will try to do by combining in a rigorous way phenomenological analyses, introspective data, conceptual analyses, and arguments.

Second, terminology. As I said, the general topic of this dissertation is at the intersection of two questions concerning the scope of intentionality and the relation between the conscious features and the intentional features of the experience. This characterization was helpful to make clear and highlight the connections between the three problems I have singled out at the very beginning of this introduction. In the rest of this dissertation, however, I will have to use a slightly more precise terminology. So, I will drop generic terms such as "intentional features" and "conscious features," and replace them with (respectively) "intentional content" and "phenomenal character." These terms will be officially introduced and fully clarified in Chapter 1. However, intuitively, intentional content is what an intentional state represents, whereas phenomenal character is the what-it's-likeness of a conscious state. This terminological choice will not produce any loss in the substance, but it is in many ways more precise. It will also help better focus on what are the "features" in question and, moreover, is more adherent to the standard terminology used in the literature.

THE STRUCTURE

I now sketch and summarize the main structure of this dissertation. As I have conceived it, the reader can choose to read this section before reading the whole dissertation, in order to have a preliminary map of the structure of the work and of my arguments; or she can choose to read it at the end, as a recap of what has been done.

In *Chapter 1* my aim is twofold. On the one hand, I set up the stage by introducing the key terminology and the main views and by offering a more precise formulation of

Intentionalism and transparency. On the other hand, I show the connections between the two and how the latter is supposed to provide direct evidence for the former. In particular, I show what are the two main arguments from transparency to Intentionalism and stress that the main assumptions behind those arguments—and behind the appeal to transparency itself— are: (i) that phenomenal character is introspectable and (ii) that introspection is a reliable source of evidence concerning the nature of phenomenal character.

In *Chapter 2* I start to consider moods and explain why they are a problem for Intentionalism. In particular, in order to make clearer the issue at stake, I exploit what I will call the Incoherent Triad (IT). The latter helps show that the issue lies in a conflict between, on the one hand, the phenomenologically plausible datum that moods do not exhibit directedness and, on the other hand, the theoretical commitments of Intentionalism. Then, I survey the general strategies that are in principle available to the intentionalist to solve the conflict in (IT) and, thereby, build up an account of moods. In doing that, I also introduce two constraints that a satisfying intentionalist account of moods has to meet, (C1) and (C2):

(C1)　　　　　It must provide good candidates for moods' intentional contents/objects;

(C2)　　　　　It must be such that, in every case, moods' phenomenal character is identical to intentional content.

In *Chapter 3* I deal with the first of the two intentionalist accounts of moods on the market. I call it the Standard Intentionalist Account of Moods (SIAM). Roughly, SIAM's strategy consists in denying that moods exhibit genuine undirectedness: on the contrary, they would exhibit generalized directedness and, thereby, represent very general objects/contents– –namely, the world as a whole or frequently changing objects. Against this proposal I argue that the following disjunctive claim is true: SIAM does not satisfy (C1) or, if it does, it does not satisfy (C2). As for the first disjunct, my argument is as follows. SIAM does not satisfy (C1) because an account in terms of generalized objects/content is not phenomenologically adequate to capture all the cases of moods. Those experiences, indeed, do exhibit genuine undirectedness, as long as they are not other-presenting experiences—that is, in undergoing and/or introspecting them, nothing that can be appreciated as other then the experience itself seems to be involved. And this is part of their phenomenal character. Afterwards, I argue for the second disjunct: if SIAM satisfies (C1), then it fails to satisfy (C2). To do that, I consider a

different case: that of moods, like irritation or nervousness, that (allegedly) represent frequently changing objects. I show that, in those cases, the phenomenal character is not entirely dependent on the (alleged) intentional content. Therefore, I conclude, SIAM is not a proper intentionalist account of moods.

In *Chapter 4* I discuss the Edenic Intentionalist Account of Moods (EIAM), whose strategy is quite different from the one adopted by SIAM. In the first part of this chapter, I introduce the account. On the one hand, EIAM acknowledges that there are at least some genuinely undirected moods; one the other, it aims at showing that they still have content. In particular, they would represent unbound affective properties. In the second part, I draw two important conclusions. First, I show that EIAM's strategy ultimately commits this view to accept that genuinely undirected moods are *opaque* experiences. Indeed, the minimal condition for an experience to be transparent is the same minimal condition an experience has to meet to exhibit directedness—namely, being other-presenting. And this is exactly what genuinely undirected moods lack. Accordingly, undirected moods are opaque experiences and so the scope of the transparency thesis is to be reduced. (This has further consequences that I address in Chapter 6.) Second, I argue that the opacity of genuinely undirected moods makes EIAM poorly motivated. In other words, without the introspective evidence provided by transparency, EIAM might be convincing from an intentionalist point of view, but it is not convincing for those who are not already intentionalists. In other words, although there might be *internal motivations* to accept it, EIAM lacks an *external motivation*, as I call it. That is, from a theory-neutral perspective, there seems to be no strong reason to accept the view.

In *Chapter 5* I combine the results achieved in chapters 3 and 4 and draw some conclusions concerning Intentionalism about moods and Intentionalism in general. First, I argue that EIAM is preferable to SIAM because (a) it is phenomenologically more adequate; (b) it is explanatorily more powerful; (c) it *conditionally* satisfies the constraints (C1) and (C2) fixed in Chapter 2—in other words, if EIAM satisfies (C1), then it also satisfies (C2). However, as I will have shown in Chapter 4, EIAM is poorly motivated. Therefore, in the best case (EIAM), Intentionalism about moods is poorly motivated; in the worst (SIAM), an intentionalist account does not even get off the ground. So, here is my minimal conclusion: moods' phenomenal character—and, in particular, undirected moods' phenomenal character—is a serious problem for Intentionalism.

However, in the last section of Chapter 5, I argue that the situation is even worst for the intentionalist: the opacity of undirected moods not only counts as a lack of evidence in support of an intentionalist account of moods, but it also counts as a direct and strong evidence *against* such an account. Indeed, that undirected moods are opaque experiences means that their phenomenal character, as it is revealed by introspection, is such that it cannot be identified with intentional content. This is a legitimate conclusion about phenomenal character as long as introspection counts as a legitimate source of evidence about phenomenal character itself. (Such a way to look at introspection is presupposed by the appeal to transparency itself.) So, if one takes transparency (and more generally introspection) to provide direct and strong evidence in support of the claim that phenomenal character is intentional content, then, and for exactly the same reasons, one should also accept that opacity offers strong evidence *against* that claim. Thus, I conclude, at a closer look, introspection offers strong reasons to reject Intentionalism as a theory concerning the nature of phenomenal character.

In *Chapter 6* I address the consequences that the opacity of undirected moods has on transparency itself. In particular, I use the distinction between strong and weak transparency (Kind, 2003) and suggest that experience is not *strongly* transparent, but *weakly* transparent— where this means that, in principle, it is not introspectively impossible to be directly aware of non-represented components of the phenomenal character of experience. So, my proposal is that the transparency thesis is not to be rejected altogether, but it is to be reduced in its strength and understood in terms of weak transparency. I firstly argue for this nuanced view of transparency as the best interpretation for what happens within the domain of the affective experiences (emotions and moods). Then, I propose to extend the interpretation to the case of perceptual experience and thereby to experience in general. Although the case of perception is far more problematic, I try to show that there are still some grounds for interpreting it in terms of weak transparency. The final picture, thus, is that of an experience which is not uniformly (and strongly) transparent (or opaque), but that has a wide range of *different degrees* of transparency and opacity, which vary according to the specific kind of experience one undergoes and the different level (or degrees) of introspection one (is able) to reach.

This result raises a question as to whether or not the non-represented properties one directly spots in introspection can still play a role in representing. In the final section of the chapter I quickly address this question and argue that they plausibly do in the case of vision. The case of undirected moods seems, instead, more complicated. However, my proposal will

be that we should be open to concede that also moods' phenomenal character can play role in representing. In support of this claim, I introduce a distinction suggested by Kriegel (2013c) between subjective and objective mental representations and argue that, given what introspection provides, moods can be representations only in the objective sense—however, whether or nor they actually are is an issue that cannot be settle based on introspection alone.

In the *Conclusion* I start with taking stock of what has been achieved. If I am right, the main results I get in this dissertation are the following. Undirected moods are opaque experiences. This is enough to put in question transparency and Intentionalism. Hence, my twofold conclusion: (i) experience is not transparent in the sense required by Intentionalism—the interpretation I favor is that it is weakly transparent; thus, contrary to what is usually thought, (ii) introspection does not support Intentionalism but, on the contrary, offers strong reasons against it—if one looks closer and more accurately at what is introspectively available and if the appeal to introspection itself makes sense. In the second section of the Conclusion, I maintain that, although the upshot suggests that Intentionalism should be rejected, this is to be done in a constructive way. So, in the very final paragraphs I offer some general and rough considerations on how to make sense of an alternative view that keeps the best of the intentionalist proposal and, at the same time, drops what is wrong with it.

CHAPTER 1

INTENTIONALISM AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THE EXPERIENCE

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

In this chapter I introduce the transparency of experience and Intentionalism. Since my purposes here are mainly introductive, I will largely limit myself to accomplish the following two tasks: (i) presenting Intentionalism and the main introspective data/intuitions behind the idea of transparency and (ii) showing in what way transparency has been taken to be the main motivation in support of Intentionalism.

I will start with introducing the standard distinction between phenomenal character and intentionality and offering some more details on intentional content (§§1, 2). Then, I will move to characterize the opposition between Intentionalism and Anti-intentionalism(§3). Sections 4-6 are, instead, devoted to transparency. I will describe the introspective intuitions behind the transparency-thesis, offer a formulation of the thesis and illustrate how it is supposed to motivate Intentionalism—in particular, I will be concerned with the different arguments from transparency that have been put forward in the literature. Finally (§7), I will provide more

positive details on Intentionalism itself, in order to better specify this view. In this way, all the key elements will be introduced and the whole discussion will be set up.

1. INTENTIONALITY AND PHENOMENAL CHARACTER

A traditional distinction in the philosophy of mind is between *phenomenal character* and *intentionality*.

What intentionality exactly amounts to is still a matter of controversy among philosophers. So, it is hard (almost impossible) to offer details concerning intentionality without also embracing a particular theory thereof. However, fortunately, here something less demanding is required: what we need, indeed, is a general characterization of the main, general guidelines of the notion of *intentionality* we will be working with. Those guidelines are (more or less) coincident with the commonalities between the different ways intentionality is understood in the literature. In a nutshell, the main, intuitive idea behind the notion of *intentionality* is that mental states[13] have the power of *pointing* beyond themselves toward something else.[14,15]

Nowadays, the most general way of characterizing this idea of pointing, and thereby intentionality, is by means of the notion of *representation*. Intentional states are *representations*, or better, *mental representations*. Being a representation, in turn, involves instantiating some *representational property*, *i.e.* the property of having a certain *content*. Intuitively, the content of a mental representation, also called *intentional content*, is what that mental representation represents. For example, if John thinks that Gabriel García Márquez is a novelist or believes that the Earth is round, John's belief and thought represent (respectively) *that* Gabriel García Márquez is a novelist and *that* the Earth is round. So, John's belief and thought are intentional states. If Mary desires (or hopes) that England win the next football World Cup, Mary's desire (or hope) is intentional as it represents *that* the England wins the 2014 football World Cup.

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[13] Some distinguish between mental states and mental events. I will not make this distinction in this dissertation.

[14] In the extant literature, this idea is also expressed by means of the notion of *directedness*. Intentional states are usually said to be directed upon certain entities. However, for reasons that will become clearer later (Chapter 2, §1), I prefer not to use this notion in this preliminary characterization of intentionality.

[15] This intuition is quite evident if one looks at the origin of the word "intentionality." Indeed, it comes from the Latin word "*intentio*," which literally means tension, stretching. For more on that see, e.g., Crane (2001: 8-10), Jacob (2010: §1).

Importantly, intentional states can represent non-existents. For example, John can believe that dragons are spitfire creatures—even though (quite plausibly) dragons do not exists—as well as Mary can believe that Harry Potter is a young magician—even though (quite plausibly) Harry Potter does not exist. As Kim (1996) remarks:

> Schliemann looked for the site of Troy. He was fortunate; he found it. Ponce de León looked for the fountain of youth, but he never found it. He couldn't have, for it wasn't there. It remains true, though, that he searched for the fountain of youth. The nonexistence of Bigfoot or the Loch Ness monster has not prevented people from looking for them. Not only can you look for something that in fact does not exist, but you can apparently also believe in, think of, write about, and even love a nonexistent object. Even if God should not exist, he could be, and in fact has been, the object of these mental acts or attitudes on the part of many people. (Kim, 1996: 20)

Propositional attitudes—beliefs, desires, thoughts, etc.—are usually taken to be typical cases of intentional states, since they are always contentful. More intuitively, the idea is that it seems impossible to have beliefs, desires or thoughts that are not beliefs, desires or thoughts of/concerning/about something.[16] This is a common assumption and I am not going to put it in question here.

At this point, the widespread consensus is over and many questions like the following arise: What is it for a state to be a representation? What are the conditions for having content and what exactly is intentional content? Is being a representation a monadic or a relational property that something has? Depending on the replies one gives to these (and many others) question, one embraces one specific theory of intentionality or another. However, here we do not need to take any explicit stance on these matters. For the moment, it is enough to hold fixed an understanding of intentionality in terms of representation and the idea that there is a representation whenever there is content.[17]

Now, the focus of this work will be on a particular class of mental states: *experiences*. Experiences are phenomenal states, *i.e.* states such that there is *something it is like* (Nagel 1974) to undergo them. For example, if I see a shade of red, I am in certain state that feels *qualitatively* different from, say, seeing a shade of green or blue. At the same time, there is something it is like to be me, which is (plausibly) qualitatively different from what it's like to be you or any another person or conscious being. What it's like to undergo a certain experience

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[16] See the Introduction.

[17] Further specifications on content will be offered in §2.

amounts to its *phenomenal character* (or *qualitative character* or *experiential character*[18,19]). Experiences are individuated by their phenomenal character and, whenever there is something it is like to be in a certain state, that state is an experience.[20] The properties that characterize what it's like to undergo a certain experience, the phenomenal character of that experience, are *phenomenal properties* (or *qualitative properties* or *qualities* or *qualia*). Colors, shapes, spatial relations, tastes, sounds, sensations of heat or cold, etc., all contribute to the phenomenal character of experience. Therefore, they are examples of phenomenal properties.

Now, two experiences E and E' are the same phenomenal state if and only if they share the same phenomenal character. This means that, if E and E' are slightly different in their phenomenal character, this is sufficient for them to be two distinct phenomenal states. For example, seeing a red car parked over the street and seeing a red car crossing the street differ in their phenomenal character, so they are not the same phenomenal state. Likewise, seeing a red car seen from behind is not the same phenomenal state of the visual experience of the same red car seen from the front.[21]

So far, we have distinguished between intentional states and experiences, intentional content and phenomenal character, representational and phenomenal properties. Now, it is a substantive claim, though quite accepted, that *at least some* experiences are not only phenomenal, but also intentional states. For example, visual experiences are usually taken to be both phenomenal and intentional. Supposes, I am seeing a red car parked over the street. Surely, there is something it is like for me to undergo such a mental state: in seeing a red car, for example, I have a red-experience with its own peculiar red-feeling that makes it *qualitatively*

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[18] The idea that phenomenal character is to be introduced gave rise to huge debates in the last (approximately) thirty years in the philosophy of mind. On the one hand, Block (1978), Jackson (1982), Nagel (1974) have argued in favor of this notion by means of different arguments and famous thought experiments. On the other, Dennett (1988, 1991) has famously argued against the introduction of phenomenal character and held an eliminativist position. However, such a view is quite out of fashion nowadays and almost everybody, in some way or another, agrees that phenomenal character is to be admitted at some level. So, nowadays, the two dominants positions are reductionism and primitivism about phenomenal character.

[19] Here I take these two expressions to be equivalent to phenomenal character. It might seem natural to say that phenomenal character exhausts the subjective dimension of one's experience, whereas representational content exhausts its objective dimension. However, I am not assuming this equivalence here. On the one hand, according to some other theories, phenomenal character does not depend on subjective factors. This is also known as *phenomenal externalism* and has been held and defended, among others, by Byrne and Tye (2006), Dretske (1996), Lycan (2001) and Tye (1995, 2000). On the other hand, according to others (e.g., Kriegel, 2009), subjective character of experience is a component of phenomenal character. In particular, it corresponds to the for-me-ness of experience.

[20] So, on my characterization, it is true by definition that experiences have phenomenal character.

[21] I am following Siegel (2011). However, this is not an uncommon characterization.

different from, say, a green-experience or a yellow-experience. However, is this all that there is about such an experience? It seems that it is not. Indeed, it is quite plausible to say that my experience also *represents*. In particular, it represents something as being red, as having a certain shape—or even as being a car, in case one wants to count also high-level properties as featuring in the content of perception.[22] Accordingly, as long as they are representational, experiences can also *misrepresent*: they can represent a content that does not correspond to anything in the world. Illusions or hallucinations are such cases.

Recently, some have challenged the view that perceptual experiences are representations and held that they are direct relations to the object we perceive. In other words, on this account, in undergoing a perceptual experience, we are not representing, but we are in direct contact with an object of the outside world. This is what distinguishes perception from hallucination.[23] This view is also known as Naïve Realism or Disjunctivism (e.g., Brewer, 2006, 2011; Campbell, 2002; Martin, 2004, 2006; Travis, 2004). However, in this work, I am going to assume that visual experiences—and perceptual experiences in general—are intentional states and that hallucinations are perceptual visual experiences.

Whether or not *every* experience is intentional is a matter of huge controversy and is also part of what I will be dealing with in this dissertation. So, I leave this open for the moment.

Another issue that has recently been largely discussed in the literature concerns the scope of phenomenal character. To make a long story short, the question here is as to whether or not propositional attitudes and high-level cognitive states are experiences. According to some, they are and so there is a *cognitive phenomenal character* (or *cognitive phenomenology*) (e.g., Crane, 2013; Chudnoff, 2013; Goldman, 1993; Horgan and Tienson, 2002; Kriegel, 2011a; Pitt, 2004, 2009, 2011; Searle, 1980, 1991; Siewert, 1998, 2011; Strawson, 1994, 2011).[24] Others have instead denied this claim (e.g., Carruthers and Veillet, 2011; Lormand, 1996;

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[22] Some (Bayne, 2009; Butterfill, 2009; Masrour, 2011; Siegel, 2006, 2009, 2011) have recently defended the idea that the content of perception is *thick*, *i.e.* that we literally perceive not only low-level properties—such as color, shapes, spatial relation, etc.—, but also high-level properties, such as natural kinds, causality, agency, etc. Others (Brogaard, 2013; Byrne, 2009; Jackson, 1977; Peacocke, 1983; Tye, 1995, 2000) have argued against this view and held that the content of perception is *thin*. The position that the issue as to whether perceptual content is thick or thin is indeterminate, instead, has been defended by Logue (2013). I am not committing to any of these views here, since my claim is simply a conditional one.

[23] Illusions are still perceptions, but they involve errors at the level of judgment.

[24] It seems plausible to add Husserl (2001/1990a, 2001/1900b) to the list of those that would argue in favor of this view, although he did not do that in the context of the contemporary debate.

Pautz, 2013; Prinz, 2011; Tye and Wright, 2011).[25] I am not going to take a stance on this issue here, and I will limit myself to the low-level states—in particular, perceptions and affections (emotions and moods).

In conclusion, to a first approximation, we can say that undergoing an experience involves phenomenal character and, at least in some cases, representing a certain intentional content. Accordingly, even though experience is always one and unitary, it can exhibit two different dimensions: intentionality and phenomenal character.

2. MORE ON INTENTIONAL CONTENT

So far we have worked with a more or less intuitive characterization of intentional content, understood as what an intentional state represents. Can we say something more? In this section I will be concerned with that.

In the examples of intentional states that I have provided in the previous section the content was always expressed by sentences introduced by a that-clause. So, given those examples, it seems natural to think that intentional content has a *propositional* nature.[26,27] Thus, intentional states would represent that something is the case or, equivalently, that a certain object o_1 instantiates a certain property F or is in a certain relation R with other objects o_2, o_3, … o_n.

If this is correct, then intentional contents are propositions and intentional states have *conditions of satisfaction*—or, equivalently, they can be *assessed for accuracy*.[28] Let us take, for example, John's belief that the Earth is round. The content of John's belief is *that* the Earth is round. By representing the content <the Earth is round> John's belief is representing its own conditions of satisfaction—*i.e.* the conditions at which it is true or false. In particular, it is satisfied (true) if and only if the Earth is round—otherwise, it is not satisfied (false).

Intentional states representing different contents have different conditions of satisfaction. For example, if Mary believes that the Earth is round but also believes that England won the football World cup in 1966, then these two beliefs of Mary's have different conditions of

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[25] Others, e.g., Schwitzgebel (2008) argue that the issue cannot be solved due to the unreliability of introspection

[26] This claim will have to be revised soon.

[27] I am not taking any stance here on the nature of proposition. This view is supposed to be quite compatible with the different accounts.

[28] Another equivalent expression is conditions of correctness.

satisfaction, since they are true at different conditions. Moreover, different kinds of intentional states are said to be satisfied in different ways. For example, a belief is satisfied, when true; a desire is satisfied, when fulfilled; etc. Accordingly, if John believes that there is some beer in the fridge and it is the case that there is some beer in the fridge, then John's belief is true. On the other hand, if John desires that there is some beer in the fridge and it is the case that there is some beer in the fridge, then John's desire is fulfilled.

Clearly, as long as they are representations and have content, intentional states have also the power of *misrepresenting*.[29] In other words, it may well be that they represent the world as being in a way it is not. If so, the state is not satisfied.[30] For example, if John believes that Barack Obama is the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, John's belief is misrepresenting: *i.e.* it is false.[31]

As it emerges from this picture, thus, the structure of intentionality seems to be the following:

(SSC)   Subject—State—Content.[32]

Roughly, these are the very general outlines of a standard picture of intentionality, as it has been traditionally understood in the analytic philosophy of mind—at least in the last thirty years. So, I am taking this account to be quite representative of the analytic "orthodoxy" concerning intentionality—and this is why I am presenting it. Many conceptions of intentionality and intentional content involved in the debate this dissertation is concerned with are slightly modified versions of or departures from this standard and quite general picture. One relevant modification is the following.

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[29] See, e.g., Dretske (1994, 1995).

[30] Notice: this clearly does not mean that the state does not have conditions of satisfaction.

[31] For these reasons, many take the criteria for intensionaly, *i.e.* the failure of existential generalization and the failure of substitution *salva veritate*, as the criteria for intentionality (e.g., Chisholm, 1957; Tye, 1995, 200; Kriegel, 2008b). This has been disputed by, among others, Crane (2001 and Searle (1983). On their view, mental states are intentional on the following two conditions: (i) they have content that can be inaccurate (or an objet, according to Crane, that may not exist): (ii) they have an aspectual shape, *i.e.* they present their content/object in a certain way or under some aspect. As Crane puts it: "[At] its most general, the idea of aspectual shape is just the idea that there is no such thing as a thought about, or an awareness of, an object *as such*—that there is no such thing as what we might call 'bare' presentation of an object." (Crane, 2001: 20). Here I leave open both these possibilities.

[32] Where a state is psychological mode expressed by a psychological verb (e.g., believing, thinking, desiring, etc.), and content is a proposition introduced by the that-clause. Another way to put this is the following: a mental state M (of a subject S) represents that *p*.

As I have just said, on the orthodox view, *every* intentional state is a propositional attitude—*i.e.* the content of every intentional state is captured by a proposition (e.g., Chalmers, 2004; McDowell, 1994; Peacocke, 1983; Searle, 1983; Thau, 2002; Tye, 1995, 2000).[33] Now, this claim has been challenged. Indeed, some (e.g., Crane, 2001, 2003; Montague, 2007) have maintained that intentional content need not to be propositional.[34] Typically, the supporters of this view use to appeal to cases like, e.g., love or imagination, in which it seems hard to capture in propositional terms what the experience represents.[35] For example, if John loves Mary, it is hard to tell what are the conditions of statifaction of John's love. Still, John's love clearly has an object:[36] Mary. The same goes for Mary imagining, say, a pine tree: Mary's imaginative state has an object, *i.e.* the pine tree.[37] On this view, thus, intentional states are also able to represent entities that are not captured by a proposition—e.g., ordinary things, persons, properties, etc.—insofar as they are *about* those entities. Such intentional states lack conditions of satisfaction, but are *about* something—*i.e.*, they have an object. This point is a matter of controversy also among the intentionalists. However, for the purposes of this dissertation, it is instrumentally better to assume the most liberal view, namely, that intentional content can be non-propositional.[38]

In making such a move, though, we have to distinguish (at least) two conceptions of intentional content: *objectual content* and *propositional content*. Propositional content is what I have described above. An intentional state has such a content as long as it has conditions of satisfaction. On the other hand, an intentional state has objectual content when it is *about* (or of or concerns) an object, *i.e.* when it has an *intentional referent*.[39] If this is correct, then a

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[33] The idea is that intentional states are *all and only* those states that have conditions of satisfaction.

[34] Needless to say, the claim is not that no intentional state has propositional content, rather there are some intentional state that do not have propositional content.

[35] Crane (2001) also maintains that bodily states, such as pain represent and have non-propositional content. This is a more controversial case.

[36] Clearly, "object" here is not synonymous of "thing." But it is to be understood in a broader sense: something close to "object of thought."

[37] Some supporters of the propositional content view have offered paraphrases of statements like "John loves Mary" such that also states like love, that *prima facie* appear to lack propositional content, turn out to have such a content. In this way, states like love are irreducible intentional. Another strategy, followed by Searle (1983), is reducing the intentionality of states like love or hate to a "more primitive" intentionality, such as that of beliefs or desires. A third strategy is mixing up the two options above. For a discussion (and critique) of these strategies see, e.g., Montague (2007).

[38] This is not really going to affect the main points of this dissertation. Moreover, it will make the exposition much easier.

[39] The referent can be a non-existent.

distinction is also to be drawn between two sorts of intentionality: propositional and referential intentionality.[40]

At this point, it is natural to ask what (if any) is the relation between these two sorts of content/intentionality. Now, plausibly, every state representing a propositional content is also about the components of its content. For example, John's thought that the Earth is round not only represents that the Earth is round (or the Earth as round or roundness as being instantiated by the Earth) but is also about Earth and roundness. This is likely to be true of every intentional state having propositional content.[41] In any case, this is true of every intentional experience, which is what we will be concerned with. So, I will assume here that referential intentionality is a necessary condition for propositional intentionality. This is coherent with the choice of assuming the most liberal view about content. On the other hand, I will not assume that referential content is sufficient for propositional content, since this would automatically mean claiming that referential content is propositional.[42]

Let me now make fully explicit some terminological choices I will be taking, given what I said above. As I will use it here, "intentional content" is to be understood in a quite broad sense—a sense broad enough to cover the two conceptions of content I have just distinguished right above. I will also use the expression "intentional object." In this way, I mean to refer to the intentional referent that constitutes the whole objectual content of a referential intentional state. Furthermore, given that referential content is a necessary condition of propositional content, intentional objects—as I use the term—can also figure as sub-components in the propositional content of a propositional intentional state—typically, they occupy the position of the subject or the predicate in the statement expressing the full proposition.[43] This in itself is not committal to any substantive characterization of the nature (if any) of intentional objects.

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[40] This distinction is due to Kim (1996). He labels these two different understandings of intentionality as (respectively) content intentionality and referential intentionality. I am not using Kim's terminology here, because my notion of *content* here is wider. However, the substance does not change. (See also Voltolini, 2006).

[41] One might be worried about cases of general content like <all mammals are animals>: this content is not about any mammal in particular. However, since we are including properties as possible intentional referents, a state representing that content will be about the properties being mammal and being animal.

[42] On this view intentional states refer to single objects only by means of representing a certain propositional content. For example, if John believes that his laptop is turned off, John's belief is about John's laptop as long as the former represents the latter as turned off.

[43] In this way, intentional objects can be content themselves, in the case of referential content, but also part/components of propositional contents.

From a metaphysical point of view, intentional objects are very complicated entities to account for and their ontology is "a can of worms"—as Kriegel (2008b) has effectively noticed. Fortunately, we do not need to settle those metaphysical issues here. However, let me just stress the following point concerning some relevant consequences for intentionality of the ontological debate on intentional object. The structure (SSC) seems to naturally suggest that intentionality is a triadic or a dyadic relation. However, if intentional states can represent dragons, Harry Potter, Bigfoot, etc. and those things do not exist, a question arises: How can intentionality ever be a relation, given that relations only obtain between existents? Questions along these lines convinced many to try to construe a plausible ontology of intentional objects (e.g., Jackson, 1977; Parsons, 1980; Priest, 2005; Salmon, 1988) in order to explain the nature of these entities and in what sense they exist (or do not exist). In order to avoid the ontological commitment to intentional objects, others have followed the strategy of dropping the idea that intentionality is essentially relational: *i.e.*, when intentional states represent non-existents intentionality is just non-relational (e.g., Crane, 2001).[44] Others again are eliminativist about intentional objects and, for this reason, argue for non-relational views of intentionality (e.g., Kriegel, 2007, 2008b).[45] Whether or not intentionality is a relation (and what kind of relation) is a question that we can leave open here. Yet, the reader has to be aware that these are all possible options.

3. INTENTIONALISM *VERSUS* ANTI-INTENTIONALISM

3.1. Intentionalism

Provided that the notion of *phenomenal character* makes sense and so does the distinction between the two dimensions of experience—and set aside the questions concerning cognitive phenomenology, the ontology of intentional objects and the relational nature of intentionality—we can now move on. The main issues are two.

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[44] Crane defends what he calls a *schematic account* that rejects any substantive view of intentional objects. In other words, intentional objects would have no nature of their own, but would just be objects in a sense very close to the grammatical sense of "object:" "The object of a sentence is not, as such, a certain kind of entity, and the object of a thought is not, as such, a certain kind of entity. If we were dividing the things in the world up into metaphysical kinds we might list the properties, relations, physical objects, abstract objects, events, processes … but we would not need to mention, in addition, the intentional objects" (Crane, 2001: 22). For a discussion of this account see, e.g., Voltolini (2009; 2013a).

[45] More precisely, Kriegel defends an adverbialist ccount (at least) of the most fundamental kind of intentionality. See also Kriegel (2011: Ch.3).

First of all, there is a question concerning the *scope* of intentionality. Indeed, unlike the naïve realist, one might accept that perceptions are intentional and still deny that other kinds of experiences are. For example, John Searle (1983) denies that experiences like (at least) certain cases of anxiety or elation are intentional. Likewise, Ned Block (1990, 1996, 2003) argues that orgasms are not intentional. By contrast, many others (e.g., Byrne, 2001; Dretske, 1995; Lycan, 1996a, 2001; Tye, 1995, 2000) have strongly defended the opposite view, namely, the idea that every experience is intentional—call this the *Intentionality of Experience Thesis* (IET):

(IET)   Every experience is intentional.[46]

A second issue concerns *what is the relation* between phenomenal character and intentional content. Clearly, the very general options here are two: one is that phenomenal character and intentional content (at least in principle) are separable, the other is that they are inseparable. Horgan and Tienson (2002) call these views (respectively) *Separatism* (SEP) and *Inseparatism* (INS):

(SEP)   Phenomenal character and intentional content are (in principle) separable

(INS)   Phenomenal character and intentional content are (in principle) inseparable.

Surely, one might look at these two issues as mutually independent and just be interested in one of them without also being interested in the other. However, as a matter of fact, they are closely related in the extant literature and often come as intertwined. For reasons that will be clearer soon, people use to discuss them together. Now, the intersection of these two issues is what gives rise to *Intentionalism*.[47] Indeed, on the one hand, being an intentionalist is a particular way to be an inseparatist. Yet, on the other, it requires more, since

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[46] Importantly, (IET) is not to be confused with the Brentanian thesis that intentionality is the *mark* of the mental (Brentano, 1973/1874). The Brentanian thesis excludes that consciousness is the mark of the mental, and, although many intentionalist would agree with that, not every intentionalist would. Some, e.g. Chalmers (2004) and Pautz (2008, 2013), argue that intentionality and consciousness are equally relevant to capture the mental. Others, e.g. Horgan and Tienson (2002), McGinn (1988), Siewert (1998), Strawson (1994, 2008), argue that consciousness is more fundamental.

[47] In the literature, there is no uniform terminology: many call Representationalism what I am calling Intentionalism. There is no substantial difference.

Intentionalism combines Inseparatism with (IET). So, embracing Intentionalism means, in the first place and in its more general form, embracing both (INS) and (IET).

As far as I can see, exploiting the combination of (INS) and (IET) is the most general way of characterizing Intentionalism. In *this sense*, thus, the latter is not a single theory, but a *family* of theories. Accordingly, there are many ways of being an intentionalist and different criteria can be provided to classify the views within the intentionalist family and build up a taxonomy. Here I will consider two: *strength* and *purity*.

Strength. Whether a version of Intentionalism is more or less strong ultimately depends on the way it understands (INS). *At minimum*, (INS) can be understood in terms of *metaphysical supervenience*. If so, then Intentionalism is the claim that phenomenal character and intentional content co-vary with metaphysical necessity. This is *Weak Intentionalism*. However, usually, intentionalists understand (INS) as an *identity* claim, according to which phenomenal character *is nothing over and above* a species of intentional content (Byrne, 2001; Dretske, 1995, 1996, 2003; Harman, 1990; Jackson, 2004, 2005; Lycan, 1996a, 2001; Tye, 1995, 2000, 2002, 2009). So understood, Intentionalism is not only a theory of the relations between phenomenal character and intentional content: it is also a theory of the *nature* of phenomenal character that "aims to tell what phenomenal character *is*" (Tye, 2000: 45). This is *Strong Intentionalism*.[48]

Purity. Intentionalism can also be *pure* or *impure*. On *Pure Intentionalism*, phenomenal character is intentional content with no other specifications (e.g., Thau, 2002; Mendelovici, 2010, 2013b). However, this view faces (at least apparent) difficulties. For example, if I believe that the car is red and I see that the car is red, I am representing the same content but the phenomenal character, in the two cases, is clearly different. Moreover, it seems that the content <the car is red> alone is not sufficient to provide/determine/be identical to what I experience when I undergo a visual experience of a red car—and so it does not capture its what-it's-likeness. If so, we would immediately have a counter-example to Intentionalism.[49] For this reason, many intentionalists specify some further conditions that have to be met in order for the content to provide/determine/be identical to phenomenal character. This is *Impure Intentionalism* (e.g., Chalmers, 2004; Dretske, 1995; Lycan, 1996a, 2001; Tye, 1995,

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[48] Of course, Weak and Strong Intentionalism are the two extreme points: there are many different intermediate options between supervenience and identity.

[49] Clearly, pure intentionalists have their own rejoinders and proposals to avoid this issue. I cannot face these issues here. For more on that see Bourget and Mendelovici (2014); Lycan (2008); Mendelovici (2010; 2013b).

2000), which comes in many different versions, depending on the different conditions the content has to meet in order to be phenomenal character.[50] What it is to be stressed for now, however, is that those further constraints are constraints *on content*: in other words, they specify a certain species of content. This allows phenomenal character to be entirely described in terms of content and conditions on the latter.

Clearly, it would be very hard to handle all the possible versions of Intentionalism at once. Moreover, they are sometimes very different theories with very different implications and commitments. So, in this dissertation, I will be mainly concerned with Impure Strong Intentionalism, which is the most widespread version of Intentionalism. There is also another reason, though, behind this choice: Strong Intentionalism is also a theory of phenomenal character, as such it is more interesting than a mere supervenience claim.

For our purposes, then, Intentionalism will be the view that can be formulated as follows (INT):

(INT)   Necessarily, (i) every experience E is intentional and (ii) E's phenomenal character is identical to E's intentional content (that meets some further conditions).

From now on, I will refer to Intentionalism as the view that holds (INT)—unless otherwise specified. Also, I will omit the phrase "that meets some further conditions." When understood this way, Intentionalism is no longer a family of theories, but one specific theory of the nature of phenomenal character.[51]

3.2. Anti-intentionalism

At this stage, it should be clearer why the debate concerning the scope of intentionality is usually intertwined with the debate concerning the relation between intentional content and phenomenal character. The point is the rise of Intentionalism as a theoretical option and the consequent rise of a debate on Intentionalism itself. Now, since Intentionalism understands

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[50] For example, according to Dretske (1995) and Tye (1995, 2000), what makes intentional content phenomenal its being *non-conceptual* and *poised* to form perceptual beliefs and desires. On this view, intentional states involving phenomenal character are PANIC states (where PANIC is the acronym for poised, abstract, non intentional content). I will say more on this in §7. According to Lycan (1996a), each modality of experience imposes its own constraints on content.

[51] Nonetheless, it is possible to specify different understandings of (INT), depending on how one understands the notion of *content*, for example. I am not pointing them out here, but as we go along (§7).

phenomenal character and intentential content as ultimately one and the same thing, debating on Intentionalism and finding counter-examples to it means finding cases in which phenomenal character is not intentional content. This can take two forms: denying that some experiences are intentional or, more modestly, that their phenomenal character cannot be entirely captured by their content. Accordingly, the debate on Intentionalism is located at the intersection between the debate on (IET) and on (INS). And so will be this dissertation.

All this leads us to the domain of the opponents of Intentionalism: *Anti-intentionalism*. Let me conclude this section, thus, with saying something about this view. As I will understand it here, Anti-intentionalism is something really broad: not a single specific view but, again, a huge a family of theories. In a nutshell, on the characterization I am going to offer, whatever view that explicitly rejects (INS) or (IET) or both qualifies as a version of Anti-intentionalism. Accordingly, every separatist view counts as a version of Anti-intentionalism. Yet, Separatism does not exhaust the field of Anti-intentionalism. Thus, in principle, there are three main ways of being an anti-intentionalist. Here they are, ordered according to their strength.

Strong Anti-intentionalism rejects both (INS) and (IET). On this view, phenomenal character is (in principle) separable from intentional content and there are some mental states that are not intentional. This view has been held by, among others, Ned Block (1990, 1996, 2003), Thomas Nagel (1974), Christopher Peacocke (1983).

Moderate Anti-intentionalism rejects (IET) and accepts (INS). On this view, phenomenal character and intentional content are inseparable, but there are non-intentional mental states. This view might appear somewhat puzzling at a first glance, but one way to make sense of it might be considering the relation between phenomenal character and intentional content in terms of some anti-symmetric relation on the side of phenomenal character. As far as I can see, for example, John Searle (1983, 1991, 1992) holds such a view. (One of the implications of this view can be that consciousness is more fundamental than intentionality.)

Weak Anti-intentionalism rejects (INS) and accepts (IET). On this view, phenomenal character is separable from intentional content, but every mental state is still intentional. One way to make sense of this view would be understanding exhibiting phenomenal character and

having content as two separate/separable properties that every experience possesses. So, they would just co-occur.[52]

4. THE TRANSPARENCY OF EXPERIENCE

Now we have the menu of all the views. So, we can consider what motivates Intentionalism. In principle, this requires the proper motivations for two claims: the claim that every experience is intentional and the identity claim. As a matter of fact, however, finding a motivation for the identity claim is enough. Indeed, if the phenomenal character P of an experience E is identical to E's content, then E is intentional. So, the strategy is providing a reason to believe that the identity claim is true of every phenomenal character. Once one has such a reason, one has also reasons to believe that every experience is intentional. At this point, the so-called *transparency of experience* comes in as long as it is usually taken to be the main motivation to accept the identity claim.

The next three sections (§§ 4, 5, 6), thus, will be devoted to illustrate transparency and how exactly it is supposed to motivate and pave the way to Intentionalism. In this section, I will firstly give an intuitive characterization of transparency as an introspective datum; after that, I will propose an explicit standard formulation of the transparency-thesis. In §5, I present the arguments from transparency to Intentionalism. In §6, I add some further considerations on the relation between transparency and Intentionalism.

The transparency (or diaphanousness) of experience (Moore, 1903; Harman, 1990; Tye, 1995, 2000, 2002)[53] is an *introspective thesis* based on *introspective observations*, so on introspective data or intuitions.[54] Sometimes, these two slightly different senses of transparency are confused or conflated. However, it is better to keep them separated, since there are many ways to formulate the thesis, whereas the datum is (or should be) univocal—at it is also what is

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[52] At the best of my knowledge, I do not know whether or not such possibility has ever been explored or defended by someone, but it strikes me as a coherent view and thereby as a theoretical possibility. Something similar, indeed, has been defended by Amy Kind (2013) against Intentionalism about moods. According to Kind, moods might well have content but their phenomenal character is still not dependent on that content. I do not know, however, whether Kind would defend something like that for every kind of experience, so I cannot impose Weak Anti-intentionalism on her.

[53] The idea that experience is *transparent* or *diaphanous* has been put forward explicitly by G.E. Moore (1903) in the first decade of the last century. Arguably, also Thomas Reid (1764/1974) held something very close to the idea of transparency, as Kind (2003) has shown.

[54] Here I will understand the expressions "introspective datum" and "introspective intuition" as more or less equivalent.

ultimately more important. So, here I separate between what I call the transparency-datum (or intuition) and the thesis of the transparency of experience.

Let us start with the former. In order to get it right, let us follow what Michael Tye (2000) suggests in the following passage:

> Focus your attention on the scene before your eyes and on how things *look* to you. You see various objects; and you see these objects by seeing their surfaces. … In seeing these surfaces, you are immediately and directly aware of a whole host of qualities. You may not be able to name or describe these qualities but they look to you to qualify the surfaces; you experience them as being qualities of the surfaces. None of the qualities of which you are directly aware in seeing the various surfaces look to you to be qualities of your experience. You do not experience any of these qualities as qualities of your experience. For example, if blueness is one of the qualities and roundness another, you do not experience your experience as blue or round. … If you are attending to how things look to you, as opposed to how they are independent of how they look, you are bringing to bear your faculty of introspection. But in so doing, you are not aware of any inner object or thing. The only objects of which you are aware are the external ones making up the scene before your eyes. Nor, to repeat, are you directly aware of any qualities of your experience. Your experience is thus transparent to you. (Tye, 2000: 45-7)

First of all, the transparency-datum is something we can directly appreciate by performing introspection. But what does this datum amount to? Tye is quite straightforward on that: in introspection, the only things one gets are (apparently) external, mind-independent objects and their features—surfaces, colors, shapes, etc. So, if am seeing a red car and I introspect on such an experience, what I get is the object I have in front of me with its own properties. Full stop. No matter how hard I try to focus on my experience itself, the only things I get are the car, its surface and a range of properties that introspectively appear as properties of the car (or of its surface). In other words, if I try focus on the color-quality *red*, what I am introspectively aware of is the redness of the car. This is the transparency-datum.

If this is the datum, then in introspection colors and shapes appear as properties of the *represented* object(s) of the experience. This, in turn, suggests the following two points: (i) properties like colors and shapes are represented properties; (ii) no property/quality of the experience is introspectively available. Harman (1990) in his own description of transparency particularly emphasizes this latter point:

> When Eloise sees a tree before her, the colors she experiences are all experienced as features of the tree and its sorroundings. None of them are experienced as intrinsic features of her experience. Nor does she experience any features of anything as intrinsic features of her experience. And that is true of you too. There is nothing special about Eloise's visual experience. When you see a tree, you do not experience any features as intrinsic features of your experience. Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of your visual experience. I

predict that you will find that only features there to turn your attention to will be features of the three. (Harman, 1990: 39)

At this stage, it should be clear why experience is said to be *transparent* or *diaphanous*. In a nutshell, the intuition behind the metaphor is that, our introspective attention goes all the what through out experienc*ing* to get to what is experienc*ed*—*i.e.* objects and their properties.

Let me now add some further clarifications.

First, both Harman and Tye, in describing what introspection provides, claim that no property of the experience itself is introspectively available to us. However, *prima facie*, there is a difference between them. Harman qualifies what is not available by means of the expression "intrinsic features of the experience," whereas Tye just refers to properties of the experience itself without qualifying them as intrinsic. So, one might wonder whether they are referring to different things. In fact, they are not. As they use them, the expressions "intrinsic features of experiences" and "properties of the experience itself" are equivalent. In particular, as far as I can see, what they have in mind is the following idea. If undergoing a certain experience involves representing,[55] then (in principle) we can distinguish between a *vehicle of representation* (what does the representing) and a *content of representation* (what is represented).[56] Now, the properties that figure in the side of content are represented, while those that figure in the side of the vehicle are not represented. When Harman and Tye use (respectively) the expressions "intrinsic features" and "properties of the experience itself," they are referring to the properties of the vehicle, *i.e.* the non-represented properties.[57] Given that, in what follows, I will use expressions like "intrinsic property of the experience," "property of the experience itself," "quality of experience," etc., as equivalent expressions to refer to non-represented properties of the vehicle of the representation.

Second, one might be worried that Tye's way of describing the datum is committed to (or implies in some way) excluding that we introspect properties of experience at all. This is correct, if one interprets "property of experience" in a narrow, strict sense as those properties that do not figure in the content. On the other hand, if one understands "property of experience" in a wider, less strict sense, then we can introspect properties of experience, even

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[55] This does not imply Intentionalism.

[56] See, e.g., Dretske (2003).

[57] Harman exploits the analogy with painting and denies that there is such a thing as mental paint, *i.e.* a vehicle of representation we are introspectively aware. Block (1996, 2003, 2010) and Loar (2003a, 2003b)also exploit the idea of mental paint, but to defend the opposite claim.

on Tye's description. Indeed, if a property of experience is whatever property that can figure either in the content or in the vehicle, then also represented properties are properties of experience, although they are different from the non-represented one. Usually, qualifying a property of experience as intrinsic serves the scope of making explicit that one is not referring to an experience property in the wide sense, but in the narrow sense.

Third, the relevant opposition to bear in mind, and to be preserved, is the distinction between the vehicle and the content and their properties. Characterized this way, the transparency-datum is that properties figuring in the content of the representation are what we have introspective access to. So, whatever the terminology one may use, it should be such that it does not cause any loss of this point.

Fourth, the transparency-datum is twofold: it has both a *negative* and a *positive* side. In other words, there is something one *is* introspectively aware of, *i.e.* properties of the represented objects (positive side). On the other hand, at the same time, there is something one is *not* introspectively aware of, *i.e.* properties of the experience itself (negative side). In turn, this suggests two slightly different interpretations (or emphases): a negative one and a positive one. The negative interpretation (or emphasis) stresses the fact that no intrinsic properties of the experience are found in introspection. The positive one, on the other hand, emphasizes that the only properties we have direct, introspective access are experienced as properties of the represented object(s). Harman (1990) seems to privilege the former, whereas Tye (1995, 2000) the latter.

With that in mind, the following quite standard formulation of the thesis of the transparency of experience (TE) can be given:

(TE)   In introspection, one is not aware of intrinsic features of experience, but the only properties one is directly aware of are represented properties.

According to intentionalists, (TE) is an *necessary* claim whose scope is such that *every* kind of experience is transparent.

5. TRANSPARENCY AS MOTIVATION FOR INTENTIONALISM

The debate on the nature of phenomenal character can be also characterized as a debate concerning the nature of phenomenal properties—the properties that are responsible for phenomenal character. When we things put things this way, the opposition between Intentionalism and Anti-intentionalism can be understood as follows. According to Intentionalism, phenomenal properties are represented properties. Indeed, if the properties that are responsible for phenomenal character are represented, then phenomenal character itself is represented and, thereby, can count as a species of intentional content. On the other hand, anti-intentionalists claim that phenomenal properties (or at least some of them) are intrinsic qualities of experience, *i.e.* non-represented properties. Indeed, on Anti-intentionalism, phenomenal character outruns or is independent from intentional content.

Now, transparency is supposed to settle this debate in favor of Intentionalism. But, in what way? Perhaps, intuitively, one can already see what is the answer to this question. However, in this section, I will be concerned with showing how exactly transparency supports Intentionalism. In particular, I will present two arguments from transparency to Intentionalism. They are slightly different: one is a deductive argument, whereas the other one is at the best explanation. The former has been offered by Harman (1990), the latter by Tye (2000). I will start with Harman's (§5.1) and then present Tye's (§5.2).

5.1. Harman's argument

Harman (1990) offers a deductive argument from transparency to Intentionalism. The idea is that the transparency-datum combined with some other premise leads directly to conclude in favor of Intentionalism. So, let us give a closer look to this argument and examine it step by step.

The first premise is that phenomenal character is usually understood as introspectively observable and so are the properties that compose phenomenal character, *i.e.* phenomenal properties. In other words, the main idea here is that introspection is a reliable source of information concerning phenomenal character. This assumption seems independently quite plausible.[58] As Kriegel (2009) notes:

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[58] In general, the main tacit assumptions in the background of all this debate are (i) that introspection is reliable and (ii) that what is phenomenal is also introspectable. (ii) is challenged by Block (1995, 2011). According to Block, there would be phenomenal character is not entirely introspectable. As far as I can see, Block here is

It would be quite odd if there was something it was like for the subject to have her experiences, and yet she could have no introspective access to what it was like for her. The thesis does not say that phenomenal character is necessarily introspected; only that it is necessary that it be in principle possible to introspect it. And the notion that phenomenal character must be in principle introspectively accessible seems quite plausible. (Kriegel, 2009: 70)

Moreover, there is no disagreement between the intentionalist and the anti-intentionalist on this point.[59] The difference is not in considering phenomenal properties as introspectable, but in the further characterization of those properties. According to intentionalists, phenomenal properties are represented properties, whereas anti-intentionalists claim that phenomenal properties are non-represented properties.

The second premise is transparency itself. At this point, thus, it should be quite clear in what way the combination of these two premises leads to Intentionalism. On the one hand, phenomenal properties are introspectively accessible. On the other, the only properties to which one has introspective access to are represented properties. So, in principle, there are two options here: either there are no phenomenal properties at all or, if there are, they are represented properties. Since intentionalists are not eliminativist about phenomenal character, the conclusion to be drawn is that phenomenal properties are represented properties.

The idea, thus, is that transparency and introspection play a crucial role in settling the question and deciding between two competing accounts. As long as it predicts that intrinsic qualities of experience are introspectable *qua* phenomenal properties, Anti-intentionalism is ruled out by transparency.

Here is a way of reconstructing Harman's argument:

HARMAN'S ARGUMENT FROM TRANSPARENCY

(P1)   Phenomenal properties are introspectively accessible.

(P2)   The only properties one has introspective access to are represented properties. Therefore,

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understanding introspection in terms of access consciousness. If this is right and if it is true that phenomenal consciousness overflows access consciousness as Block argues, then (ii) is not acceptable and Haman's argument can be defeated. If this is correct, at least one version of Anti-intentionalism would be compatible with transparency. Be that as it may, I am not going to address this issue here, since my aim is not defending transparency. If Block is right, then transparency does not rule out Anti-intentionalism.

[59] Probably an exception would be Ned Block, see above fn. 46.

(Conclusion)   Phenomenal properties are represented properties.[60]

5.2. Tye's argument

According to Tye, the step from transparency to Intentionalism is to be understood in terms of best explanation. So, his strategy is slightly different from Harman's

As far as I can see, the first step of his argument can be regarded as a reply to a possible rejoinder that the anti-intentionalist might attempt against the argument described in §5.1. The anti-intentionalist, indeed, might object to Harman's argument that what we introspect as properties of the object are in fact properties of the experience itself. Tye's reply to the anti-intentionalist is that making such a claim would mean convicting experiences of a massive error. This is just implausible, according to Tye, In his own words:

> To suppose that the qualities of which perceivers are directly aware in undergoing ordinary, everyday visual experiences are really qualities of the experiences would be to convict such experiences of massive error. That is just not credible. It seems totally implausible to hold that visual experience is systematically misleading in this way. Accordingly, the qualities of which you are directly aware in focusing on the scene before your eyes and how things look are not qualities of your visual experience. (Tye, 2000: 46)

In a nutshell, Tye claims that it is implausible that our experience turned out to *be* so radically different from the way it *looks* to us, when we perform introspection. So, it is just implausible that the properties that introspectively appear as represented properties were properties of the experience itself. Therefore, based on these observations, it is highly *plausible* to say that Anti-intentionalism is ruled out by transparency.

However, Tye maintains, Intentionalism is not the only explanation of transparency—and here is where the second part of the argument begins. A sense-data theorist has an explanation for the transparency-datum—and indeed, G.E. Moore is standardly taken as the first supporter of transparency. According to the sense-data theorist, the properties we are aware of in introspection are properties of immaterial surfaces or sense-data, but not of the experience itself. However, according to Tye, although the sense-data theory is *one* explanation of transparency, it is far from being *the best* explanation of it. Accordingly, Intentionalism is to be embraced. Here is the argument as Tye puts it:

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[60] In this formulation I am excluding the possibility of eliminativism about phenomenal properties and phenomenal character since, as I said, intentionalists are not eliminativist about phenomenal character.

Phenomenal concepts do not inform their possessors that phenomenal character is a certain sort of content. The identification of the former with the latter is a hypothesis that is justified in terms of its explanatory power. Nothing in the character of phenomenal concepts rules out the possibility that the qualities of which we are directly aware, when we introspect, are really qualities of immaterial surfaces, or sensa, presented to us by material objects. Admittedly, these surfaces must be three-dimensional, in some sense, for they are experienced as such, and that patently requires further explanation. But the sense-datum possibility, in my view, is ultimately eliminated on additional grounds: its unnecessary complexity, its postulation of nonphysical causes (given that phenomenal character is causally efficacious), and its counter-intuitiveness in denying that the surfaces of which we are directly aware are not just plain, old material surfaces. What introspection and phenomenal concepts rule out is the possibility that the qualities to which we have direct introspective access are qualities of experiences. (Tye, 2000: 53-4)

This is Tye's argument reconstructed, thus:

TYE'S ARGUMENT FROM TRANSPARENCY

(P1)   In introspection, the properties we are directly aware of look as properties of the object that one experiences.[61]

(P2)   It is implausible that the properties one is directly aware of are not properties of the object being experienced, but properties of experiencing.[62] Therefore,

(Conclusion 1)   The best explanation of (P1) is that the properties one is directly aware of are not properties of experiencing the object but of the object being experienced.

(P3)   There are two competing explanations, E1 and E2, of (Conclusion 1): Either phenomenal character is intentional content or sense data (E1) and their properties are the objects of perception (E2).

(P4)   E1 is better than E2. Therefore,

(Conclusion 2)   Phenomenal character is intentional content.

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[61] I am reformulating the positive side of (TE) in this way to capture the looking/being contrst, since this distinction is important (i) for the rejoinder of the anti-intentionalist and (ii) to understand Tye's reasoning. I am also using "properties of the objects" instead of "represented properties" in order to capture the fact that the transparency-datum allows for an interpretation in terms of sense-data, which is important for the second part of the argument.

[62] I take this formulation in terms of the opposition between the object being experienced and the experiencing from Kriegel (2009: 71)

So, Tye's strategy amounts to considering transparency as an *explanandum*, whose best explanation is Intentionalism. Firstly, the latter is defended as an explanation of the datum against Anti-intentionalism. Secondly, it is defended as an explanation against the sense-data theory.

To sum up, the transparency-thesis is an introspective claim supported by the transparency-datum. The latter is the fact that, when we introspect and pay attention to our experience, we do not manage to get anything but the object that we are experiencing plus a range of properties experienced as properties of that object. The thesis, thus, is that introspection on our experience does not reveal anything but represented properties.

Under the assumption that introspection is reliable and phenomenal character is introspectable, we can thus say that in introspection we cannot directly be aware of any (alleged) non-represented component of phenomenal character. In other words, no intrinsic qualities of experience are introspectively accessible to us. Even if one tries hard to spot any of those properties, one cannot succeed. For example, if I see a red car and try to focus on the color-quality *red* and what it's like for me to undergo that red-experience, I can't get anything different from the redness of the car. Introspectively, what it's like for me to undergo that red-experience, is always a matter of representing something red. There is nothing non-represented that is/becomes available to me in introspection.

Accordingly, transparency strongly supports the claim that phenomenal character is intentional content and, thereby, supports Intentionalism. On the one hand, it (directly or indirectly) rules out Anti-intentionalism. On the other, Intentionalism is the best explanation of the transparency-datum. One final, important note: Intentionalism is not an eliminativism claim on phenomenal character or phenomenal properties. As we know, the claim is instead that phenomenal character is nothing over and above a particular species of content.

6. TRANSPARENCY AND INTENTIONALISM

At the end of §4 I mentioned that (TE) is held as an necessary claim and its scope is taken to be unrestricted—in other words, it is true of every kind experience. Let me know offer some further remarks on this point. This will help better clarify the relation between Intentionalism and transparency.

That (TE) is necessary means here that it is not possible (for an ideal introspector) to have direct access to intrinsic qualities of experience. What about the unrestricted scope? The

example we have moved from to illustrate the datum and the thesis was taken from visual experience. So, *prima facie*, it seems plausible to agree that transparency is valid for that kind of experience. At least for now, we can take this for granted.[63] But what about other perceptual experiences such as, for example, auditory perception or taste? And what about non-perceptual experiences, such as pains or emotions? In those cases things are definitely more complicated. For example, some have denied that transparency applies to emotion or emotional experiences (e.g., De Sousa, 2004; Kind, 2013); others (e.g., Aydede and Faulkerson, forthcoming) have denied that pain and pleasure are transparent. The question concerning the scope of transparency is one of the central questions of this dissertation. So, I am not going to offer any full reply to this question in this chapter. I can anticipate what follows, though: my own view is that (TE), at least in the interpretation I am discussing here, is not true of every kind of experience. Part of this work will be dedicated to argue for this claim.

However, what matters now is something slightly different, namely, stressing the fact that intentionalists use to defend the idea that (TE) has the largest scope.[64] In particular, Michael Tye in many different places has strenuously defended the transparency of all experience—and not just the transparency of some kinds of experiences.[65] *Prima facie*, it is easy to see why: transparency is the main motivation for Intentionalism, given that it provides a straightforward way to build up arguments in support of that view. Yet, in itself, this might not be so interesting: if that was all, then the relation between transparency and Intentionalism would be not so strict, after. It would be more interesting, instead, if not only existing arguments, but also some deeper reason connected Intentionalism to transparency. In this way, some more intimate relation between the two would be uncovered.

The key move to find such a relation is changing the question from *how* transparency motivates Intentionalism to *why* it is able to do that. Ultimately, transparency motivates Intentionalism because it offers *direct* and *strong* evidence that phenomenal character is nothing but a species of content—on the assumption that phenomenal character is introspectively available to us. The evidence is direct because it comes from direct introspective observation

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[63] Some (e.g., Block, 1990, 1996, 2003; Boghossian and Velleman, 1989, 1991) have proposed some putative counter-examples to transparency. For example, blurry vision or phosphene-experiences. I am not addressing these counter-examples here. I will consider the question as to whether or not vision is transparent in Chapter 6.

[64] See also Kind (2003, 2007).

[65] This is Tye's position now (*i.e.* from 1995 on). Before the explicit formulation of Intentionalism he had a different view: he was supporting adverbialism (Tye, 1975, 1984) and his view was that not every experience is transparent (Tye, 1992).

on what it is to be explained, namely, phenomenal character; also, it is strong because it is introspective evidence and introspection is supposed to be a reliable method to discover facts about phenomenal character (recall, that is the assumption of the whole debate). All this, though, is a double-edged sword. Indeed, should something that is not content be found in introspection, then, by virtue of exactly the same reasoning, we would have the opposite evidence: content is not all that there is about phenomenal character.[66] This is the reason why the intentionalists want every experience to be transparent.

Clearly, this is just a quick reply that serves to fix the idea that (a) the connection between Intentionalism and transparency is not merely an extrinsic one and (b) not only the possibility of building up an argument seems to be implied by such a connection. More needs to be said on this point. In particular, whether or not Intentionalism can resist the failure of transparency is one crucial question that dissertation wants to address.

To my mind, emotional experiences and in particular moods offer a very interesting case study that is worth considering. Indeed, moods—states like anxiety, depression or elation—are a case particularly hard for the intentionalist, since in (at least) some of them no object/content but only "raw feelings" seem to be involved. Intuitively, then, one might think that it is quite trivial that transparency and Intentionalism just fail in those cases. However, intentionalists have offered their own replies and proposals, in which they try to show that Intentionalism, and in particular the identity thesis, applies to moods too. I am not convinced that those proposals are really able to solve the problems of Intentionalism. So, investigating the intentionalist accounts of moods, pointing out their limits, and understanding the reasons why they fail will offer—I believe—a good basis for further and more general considerations and conclusions concerning the scope and the strength of transparency and on how Intentionalism is affected by those conclusions.

Accordingly, in the next four chapters (2, 3, 4, 5) I will be mainly concerned with moods and Intentionalism. Before starting with that, though, let me conclude this chapter with a further distinction within the field of Intentionalism: the distinction between Wide and Narrow Intentionalism. The next section will be devoted to that. In this way, the preliminary setup will be done.

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[66] At this point the problem for the intentionalist would be the following: either she shows that those cases are cases of transparent experiences or she shows that Intentionalism is plausible independently of the failure of transparency. Both these tasks are hardly sustainable, as I will argue.

7. WIDE *VERSUS* NARROW INTENTIONALISM

In order to do draw the distinction between Wide and Narrow Intentionalism, I will move from some particular interpretations of transparency. Let me start, then, with another quote from Tye (2000):

> When we introspect our experiences and feelings, we become aware of what it is like for us to undergo them. But we are not directly aware of those experiences and feelings; nor are we directly aware of any of their qualities. The qualities to which we have direct access are the *external* ones, the qualities that, if they are qualities of anything, are qualities *of external things*. (Tye, 2000: 51)[67]

Similarly, Dretske (1996) maintains:

> The experiences themselves are in the head …, but nothing in the head … need have the qualities that distinguish these experiences. How is this possible? How is it possible for experiences to be in the head and, yet, for there to be nothing in the head that has the qualities we use to identify and distinguish between them? One possible answer is the answer externalism provides: the qualities by means of which we distinguish experiences from one another are *relational* properties—perhaps (on some accounts of these matters) *intentional* properties—of the experiences. Just as we distinguish and identify beliefs by what they are beliefs about, and what they are beliefs about in terms of what they stand in the appropriate relations to, so we must distinguish and identify experiences in terms of what they are experiences *of*. Thus does externalism—and, as far as I can see (if we ignore dualism), *only* externalism—explain why the properties that individuate experiences (red, green, sour, sweet, hot, cold) are not (or need not be) properties of the experiences. The experiences are in the head, but what makes them the experiences they are—just like what makes beliefs the beliefs they are—is external. (Dretske, 1996: 144-5)[68]

In both the passages quoted above the central idea is quite straightforward. The properties we experience, which are also the properties we are aware in introspection, are not only represented properties, but also properties of the *external* objects of the world. So, what Dreteske and Tye are saying here is that, in undergoing an experience and introspecting that experience we are aware, by means of a representation, of properties that are really (as opposed to just apparently) external and mind-independent properties. As such, they can be instantiate by mind-independent and external objects.[69]

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[67] Emphasis mine.

[68] Emphasis in original.

[69] The view held by Dretske and Tye is not to be taken as a version of Naïve Realism. Indeed, the latter denies that our relation with the external objects is a relation of representing them. Naïve realists have also proposed interpretations of the transparency-datum that are strong externalist interpretations. For example, Martin (2002)

If so, all the qualities that make up phenomenal character—like, e.g., colors, shapes, sensations of heat and cold, etc.—are ultimately properties of the external objects. If I see a red car and my experience is accurate, the redness I am experiencing as a property of the car *is* a property—whatever such a property might correspond to—of the car (*i.e.* the mind-independent object existing in the external world). Accordingly, phenomenal character is not in one's head—to use Putnam's (1975) famous expression. In other words, phenomenal character does not depend (or locally supervene) on the brain (or the micro-physical structure) of the subject but is dependent on external factors (what is outside of one's mind/brain). As a consequence, two molecular duplicates do not necessarily share the same phenomenal character. This view is usually called *Phenomenal Externalism*.

Now, this view implies (at least to some extent) *Content Externalism*, *i.e.* the view that intentional content is *wide* and so dependent on/determined by external factors (what is outside of one's mind or brain). The core idea here is the following: if phenomenal character is a species of content and content is wide, then phenomenal content is wide as well.

Thus, advocates of this particular declination of Intentionalism are externalists about content and about phenomenal character as well. This, in turn, is usually accompanied by an understanding of intentionality in terms of *tracking relation*. Very roughly, the idea of tracking is the following: mental states represent (are intentional) when they carry information about/keep track of the external world/environment. More precisely, but still roughly, a mental state M represents some state S of the outside world/environment if and only if M carries information/keeps track of S and S does or would (reliably) cause M. Back to a familiar example, if I see a red car, my experience represents, say, the color of the car as it carries information about something in the external environment which is reliably causing my visual experience of redness. Representing, thus, would be a *natural relation* that connects a brain state to something in one's external environment—and some conditions are to be satisfied, in order for that relation to obtain. Correspondingly, the content of a representation is (dependent on) whatever in the external environment causes M.[70]

I call *Wide Intentionalism* the view that combines Phenomenal Externalism, Content

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argues that transparency supports Naïve Realism against Intentionalism. I do not address these issues here, though, since I am not concerned with Naïve Realism.

[70] Clearly, the causal relation involved is to be further specified. According to the different constraints one imposes on such a relation, one gets different versions of this view arise. The most popular are three: Dretske's (1981, 1988, 1995) *Teleosemantics*, Fodor's (1987, 1990) *Asymmetric Dependence*, and Millikan's (1984, 1989) *Biosemantics*.

Externalism, and a tracking theory of mental representations. Byrne and Tye (2006), Dretske (1995, 1996, 2003), Lycan (1996a; 2001), Tye (1995, 2000, 2009), among others, have defended versions of this view.

The reason why Wide Intentionalism is popular among many philosophers mainly resides in the promise of "naturalizing the mind,"[71] *i.e.* explaining all mental phenomena in purely materialistic/functional terms, without appealing to "properties of any ontologically 'new' sort" (Lycan, 2008: §2.1). To make a long story short, the proposal involves a double reduction: first of all, intentionality is explained, and so naturalized, in terms of tracking relation; secondly, phenomenal consciousness is understood in terms of representation and, thereby, indirectly reduced to tracking as well. If this works, then there seems to be a straightforward way for solving what Chalmers (1995, 1996) has called the hard problem of consciousness.[72] As Siewert (2006) notes:

> One may believe that [Wide Intentionalism] offers us the only hope for a natural scientific understanding of consciousness. The underlying thought is that a science of consciousness must adopt this strategy: first conceive of intentionality (or content or mental representation) in a way that separates it from consciousness, and see intentionality as the outcome of familiar (and non-intentional) natural causal process. Then, by further specifying the kind of intentionality involved (in terms of its use, its sources, its content), w can account for consciousness. In other words: "naturalize" intentionality, then intentionalize consciousness, and mind has found its place in nature. (Siewert, 2006: §9)

Probably, the most known and popular version of Wide Intentionalism is Tye's PANIC theory (1995, 2000). PANIC is an acronym that stands for *poised*, *abstract*, *non-conceptual*, *intentional content*. According to this theory, phenomenal character is identical to PANIC. So, in order for there to be phenomenal character, content has to be such that the following four conditions are all fulfilled:

Poisedness. A content is poised if and only if it plays a specific *functional role*, that is, it "stands ready and available to make a direct impact on beliefs and/or desires" (Tye, 2000: 62).

Abstractness. A content is abstract if and only if only abstracts can enter into content as its components. This does not mean that a certain content does not represent concrete entities: in fact, it does, but always in virtue of a certain relation with some (relevant)

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[71] This is also the title under which Dretske's Jean Nicod Lectures have been published (Dretske, 1995).

[72] See the Introduction.

abstract entity. For example, if I see a red car, what I am representing is the abstract property *redness* as instantiated by something.

Non-conceptuality. A content is non-conceptual if and only if, in order to have that content, a subject is not required to have the concepts that a theorist would use to describe (or state) the conditions of satisfaction of that content. For example, in order to represent the car as being red, I do not need the concept RED. In other words, redness can be represented even if one lacks the concept RED.

Intentionality. A content is intentional if and only if the following two conditions apply: (i) the failure of existential generalization and (ii) the failure of the test of the substitutivity of co-referential terms *salva veritate* (Chisholm, 1957).[73] For example, if I see a red car, then the content of this experience is intentional. Indeed, (i) from the fact that I represent a red car I cannot infer that *there is* a red car that I am representing—I might be misrepresenting, e.g., hallucinating. (ii) Suppose that the surface of the car being red is identical to its having a certain reflectance property F.[74] That does not entail that I have an experience of F as instantiated by the surface of the car: what I am representing is a certain property as an instance of redness, not as an instance of F-ness. So, on PANIC theory, intentionality is understood in terms of *intensionality* (at least to some extent).

My aim in this chapter is not to discuss the *pro* or *contra* of Wide Intentionalism nor those of the PANIC theory. Rather, what I want to stress is just that, although this is the most common way of understanding Intentionalism and thereby transparency, it is *one* way of doing that. Another option is what I call here *Narrow Intentionalism*. Advocates of this view are, among others, Bourget (2010), Chalmers (2004, 2006), Crane (2001, 2003), Horgan and Tienson (2002), Kriegel (2002, 2008a), Levine (2003), Mendelovici (2010, 2013a, 2013b), Pautz (2008, 2009, 2010), Shoemaker (1994).

According to Narrow Intentionalism, phenomenal character is a species of narrow content, *i.e.* it depends (or locally supervenes) on the intrinsic molecular structure of the brain/subject. Accordingly, two molecular duplicates necessarily share the same phenomenal character. This is also known as *Phenomenal Internalism*. Narrow intentionalists need not deny

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[73] It is controversial that (i) and (ii) are good criteria for intentionality (for more on that see for example Crane, 2001).

[74] I am taking this from Kriegel (2009: Ch.3).

that there is wide content, in addition to narrow content: they can be pluralists about content (e.g., Chalmers, 2006; Horgan and Tienson, 2002).[75,76]

Finally, they can understand at least some form of intentionality in non-relational terms as a monadic property of mental states or of the brain (e.g., Kriegel, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2011b: Ch. 3; Mendelovici, 2010, 2013c).[77,78]

With regards to transparency, thus, when narrow intentionalists assert that we are introspectively aware of objects and their properties, they are not committing to the claim that this is dependent on of what exists is in the external world. One typical case is colors: many narrow intentionalists deny that colors—those phenomenal qualities we are familiar with—exist in the external world, although they are represented by our visual experiences and contribute to the phenomenal character of our experience.[79]

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[75] Chalmers (2006) calls this pluralism about content.

[76] There is no wide agreement on what narrow content exactly is. So, different versions of Narrow Intentionalism can be defended according to what are one's specific views concerning narrow content. Usually, however, narrow content is understood in terms of Fregean senses. Another option that has been put forward in the last years is that narrow content is essentially phenomenal. These two option might be also combined.

[77] These accounts arise from the difficulties of the Tracking Theory of Mental Representation (TTMR). Mendelovici (2010, 2013c) points her fingers on the difficulties of TTMRs with misrepresentations (*i.e.*, non veridical representations). TTMRs handle quite easily cases of occasional misrepresentations. Yet, according to Mendelovici, they encounter serious issues in providing a satisfactory account of *reliable misrepresentations*, *i.e.* systematically non-veridical representations. Accordingly, she has recently challenged TTMRs and introduced an alternative theory that is able to better account for reliable misrepresentations, on this account mental representation is not a relation, but a *production* of the mind. On the other hand, Kriegel (2013b) distinguishes between two notions of *mental representation*: *objective representations* and *subjective representations*. Take the case of a brain in a vat that has visual experiences as of a red apple. According to Kriegel, there is a sense in which the brain in a vat does represents the red apple and a sense in which the brain in a vat does not represents the apple, but the state of the computer (or machine) that produces in it visual images of the red apple. The first sense captures the idea of subjective representation; the second captures the idea of objective representations. Kriegel argues that TTMRs are incomplete as it is not able to account for subjective representations. (More on that will be said in Chapter 6, §4.) The notion of *subjective representation* seems to suggest a non-relationalist account of intentionality—and elsewhere Kriegel defends such an account (Kriegel, 2007, 2008b, 2011b: Ch. 3)—or, at least the idea that subjective representations are not dependent on relations with the environment, but on the microphysical structure or psychological processes of the subject/brain. Many other objections have been raised against TTMRs. For a survey, see Bourget and Mendelovici (2014).

[78] Notice that embracing Narrow Intentionalism does not entail denying physicalism.

[79] For example, Chalmers (2006) defends such a view. Something similar is defended by Mendelovici (2010). According to her, colors are examples of reliable misrepresentations (Mendelovici, 2010, 2013c) (For more on reliable misrepresentations see above fn. 65 and Chapter 4, §1.4.)

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I introduced the main terminology and framed the debate and the general topics this dissertation will be concerned with. In §§1 and 2 I started with the standard, basic distinction between phenomenal character and intentionality and offered more details about intentional content. Then (§3), I characterized the opposition between Intentionalism and Anti-intentionalism the one as concerning both the scopes of intentionality and the nature of phenomenal character. In particular, Intentionalism, as I will understand it here, is the view according to which (i) every experience E is intentional and (ii) E's phenomenal character is identical to E's intentional content.

At this point, I introduced the transparency of experience. I described the transparency-datum and offered a formulation of the thesis of the transparency of experience (§4). The main point of transparency is that we only have introspective access to represented properties. After that, I showed in what ways this introspective datum is taken to support Intentionalism. There are two arguments from transparency: one, offered by Harman (1990), assumes transparency *plus* the introspectability of phenomenal character and directly concludes that Intentionalism is true; the other, put forward by Tye (2000), is at the best explanation and considers Intentionalism the best explain of the transparency-datum (§4). In §6 I put forward some further consideration on the reasons why transparency supports Intentionalism: the former supports the latter because it provides *direct* and *strong* evidence that phenomenal character is nothing but a species of content. The idea is that phenomenal character, as it is revealed by introspection, is nothing but content.

Finally (§7), I distinguished between two different ways of understanding Intentionalism and transparency: Wide Intentionalism and Narrow Intentionalism. Wide intentionalists are externalists about phenomenal character, and more generally about content. Usually, they also understand intentionality in terms of tracking relation. On the other hand, narrow intentionalist are internalist about phenomenal character, they are not committed to wide content and usually are not satisfied with an understanding of intentionality in terms of tracking relation.[80]

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[80] There may be exceptions, though, e.g., Kriegel (2011b).

CHAPTER 2

THE PROBLEM OF MOODS

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

In this chapter I start to deal with moods. The latter are states like elation, joy, depression, anxiety, irritability, gloominess, grumpiness, etc., and are usually characterized in connection to (or by contrast with) emotions—*i.e.* states like happiness, fear, anger, love, sadness, etc. All these are affective states[1] and share some relevant feature, but they differ in (at least) one important respect. Like visual experiences, emotions *exhibit directedness*. In other words, they are manifestly object-involving experiences. For example, if I am afraid, angry, in love or sad, then I am afraid of, angry at, in love with, or sad for something or somebody. Moreover, typically, I can tell what is the object I am afraid of, angry at, in love with, or sad for[2]— e.g., I am able to say that I am angry at my brother, in love with my girlfriend or sad that my football team lost the last match.

Conversely, when one is gloomy, grumpy, elated or depressed, it seems harder to say

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[1] For the scopes of this dissertation the affective domain does not include pain and pleasure. They belong instead to a separate domain that I call algedonic. This is basically a stipulation and is a slight deviation from the standard use. However, for the present purposes, this is not really relevant.

[2] In a sense, I have to tell what is the object of an emotion in order to give a proper report of that emotion.

what are the objects or the contents of one's gloominess, grumpiness, elation or depression.[3] States like those, indeed, just seem to be "raw feelings." So, often, people, when asked about their mood, say that they are not able to tell what their experience represents (or is directed at): they just feel themselves that particular way—e.g., gloomy, irritated, depressed, elated, anxious, etc. Full stop: this looks as a sufficient qualification of those states.[4] On the one hand, then, being in a certain mood is a qualitative state having a certain distinctive phenomenal character—which allow for the individuation of the specific mood one is in. On the other hand, the qualities composing that phenomenal character do not seem to be represented at all by one's experience: indeed, they do not appear to belong to any specific object or be localized in any specific point of the space—either inside or outside of one's body—they appear *free floating*. Nothing over and above the peculiar way it feels to undergo a certain mood seems to be involved in a mood.[5] In other words, on the face of it, moods appear to be purely qualitative experiences not seeming to represent anything at all. So, unlike emotions, moods do *not* seem to exhibit directedness.

Prima facie, thus, one plausible and natural diagnosis seems that moods *lack* intentional content. As a consequence, they would be *non-intentional states*—as Searle (1983) and (more recently) Deonna and Teroni (2012) have maintained. If so, then the immediate consequence is that Intentionalism is false.

However, intentionalists have defended their view and offered alternative accounts of moods' phenomenal character that aim at being compatible with moods having intentional content. So, firstly, they have provided some candidate intentional contents/objects for mood experiences. In addition, they have also defended both (a) the *identity* of moods' phenomenal character and their intentional content and (b) the *transparency* of mood-experiences. (This is not by accident. Intentionalists are clearly forced to do that because of two main reasons: first, if the identity claim fails, then Intentionalism is false; second, Intentionalism is committed to

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[3] To some extent it seems even ungrammatical to say that we are gloomy, grumpy, elated about something or someone.

[4] Contrast this with the case of, e.g., thoughts in which it is not sufficient to say that one is thinking: one has always to say that she is thinking *of* something.

[5] What I mean is not that, while we are in a certain mood, we cannot experience or think to objects, etc. This would be clearly false. While in a mood, we can well perceive objects or think to objects, etc. What I mean here is that no object seems to be involved *as the object of the mood*. So, if we abstract and consider the mood alone "isolated" from the network of the overall experience, it seems to involve nothing over and above a certain "raw feeling."

transparency. [6])

My main aim in this chapter is introducing the problem of moods. I start with some preliminary tasks: clarifying what I mean by "directedness" (§1) and specifying how the moods/emotions distinction will be understood (§2). This will pave the way to a full explanation of what the problem of moods exactly amounts to and what are the constraints a satisfying intentionalist reply to such a problem should meet (§§3, 4).

1. DIRECTEDNESS AND INTENTIONALITY

Above I have mentioned intentionality and directedness: two crucial notions for the present discussion. So, let me start with some notes on that.

We are already quite familiar with intentionality. Indeed, as we saw in Chapter 1, experiences are intentional in the sense that they *represent*, *i.e.* have intentional content. In particular, usually, they represent objects as having certain properties.

Now, what about directedness? On one common understanding, "directedness" is just as another way to say intentionality. [7] In particular, directedness is used to (somewhat metaphorically) covey the idea of the aboutness of intentional states. The latter are often said to be directed upon a certain object/content as long as they are about/represent that object/content. However, this is not the way I am using "directedness" here.[8,9]

How am I using "directedness" here, then? As I am using the term here, directedness is something having to do with what is *phenomenally manifest* to the experiencer. Unfortunately, when understood this way, directedness is something hard to give a rigorous or good definition of. However, it can be characterized by means of an intuitive example. Consider a visual experience of a red a car. As we already know, such an experience is intentional, so it has aboutness: it is *of* a red car. Now, a quite largely accepted fact is that a visual experience of

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[6] See Chapter 1, §§4-6.

[7] Bourget (2010); Bourget and Mendelovici (2014); Crane (2001, 2003); Dretske (1995); Searle (1983).

[8] Clearly, this does not mean that I want to deny that intentional states have directedness in this sense. My choice is one of purely terminological convenience. See below fn. 15.

[9] By the way, if I were using "directedness" in this sense, then the problem of moods would be a trivial one. Actually, there would be no problem at all. Indeed, as long as undirected, moods would just be non-intentional experience "by definition," so to speak. Therefore, Intentionalism would be trivially false. Now, to my mind, there is a serious problem of moods for Intentionalism, but it is completely different from this caricature and is much deeper: this is what I want to deal with in this chapter. Accordingly, the sense in which I will use "directedness" here will have to be such that, at some point, the problem comes to the surface—not immediately and not trivially, though. See below fn. 15.

a red car is also *as of* a red car.[10] In other words, the phenomenal character of that experience is such that it presents the subject with a certain object of the world, the car, having certain properties, being red, etc. In this way, the red car is phenomenally manifest to the subject of the experience, while she undergoes that experience of a red car. In this sense, that visual experience exhibits directedness toward the red car.

Thus, here is (roughly) what I mean when I say that an experience E exhibits directedness: the phenomenal character of E is such that E's object/content is (at least) part of what is phenomenally manifest to the subject, while she undergoes E.[11] This characterization is in many ways rough, but it should fit our needs.[12,13] Unlike visual experiences and emotions, then, moods are usually described as lacking directedness in *this* sense.[14,15]

The following clarifications are now in order.

First, importantly, on this characterization of directedness, the experiencer is not required to be in posses of the concept DIRECTENDNESS, in order to have experiences that exhibit directedness. Nor is she required of being able to spot (directly or indirectly)

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[10] I am indebted to Luca Barlassina for this formulation.

[11] It is to be clear that this way of characterizing directedness is not a substantive claim about experience. That (at least) some experiences exhibit such a directedness is quite accepted. What is controversial is the relation between intentionality and directedness. However, the characterization I have suggested is not committal to any specific view.

[12] Let me stress that this is not a substantial definition of what directedness is, but just a characterization that helps clarify how the terms "directedness"—and many expressions connected to it—will be used here.

[13] As long as directedness, so understood, has to do with phenomenal character I prefer to say that experiences *exhibit* directedness as opposed to say that they *are* directed. However, for the sake of simplicity, I will take the expression "exhibiting directedness" and "being directed" as equivalent. This is possible because directedness here will not be used in two different manners. So, there is no risk of generating ambiguity.

[14] Quite unsurprisingly, some intentionalists (e.g., Tye, 2008) dispute this description, not because of what is meant by "directedness," but because they do not think the description is adequate and applies to moods. More details on that will be offered later on.

[15] The reasons behind this terminological choice are mainly two. First, terminological parsimony: it is better to avoid an unnecessary multiplication of the terms. Second, keeping the two senses of "directedness" clearly separated and distinguished will help get a better grasp on the problem of moods as I understand it as long as it will help avoid confusions and unmotivated conflations. Clearly, I cannot anticipate here what the problem is, since this is what the first part of this chapter is devoted to. For the moment, thus, I can just stress that the terminological choice is largely motivated by reasons of convenience: I believe it is better in order to better explain exactly why moods are a problem for Intentionalism and where the problem lies.

directedness as such.[16] Moreover, I am not assuming that directedness is a primitive property or notion.[17]

Second, as I have characterized it, directedness is not equivalent to intentionality. These two things might turn out to be one and the same thing, but they also might not. So, on my characterization, it is a substantive claim that directedness is intentionality.

Third, I have said that experience exhibits directedness, so directedness is a property of the experience. Thus, one might be worried that this is in contrast with transparency and, thereby, in contrast with Intentionalism as well. If that were the case, it would not be nice, since Intentionalism is what I am targeting here. I have two things to say on this point. First of all, concerning Intentionalism in general, my characterization of directedness is perfectly compatible with Intentionalism. As far as I can see, Intentionalism should be more worried about undirectedness than about directedness. Secondly, coming to transparency and directedness being a property of experience, here is my reply: being transparent is a property of the experience too, but it is a property that one attributes to experience, given what is introspectively available—which, according to transparency, is not the experience itself. Nothing in what I have said so far prevents one to understand directedness in exactly the same way: a property that one attributes to the experience, given what is phenomenally/introspectively directly available to one. This is not excluded by, and is perfectly compatible with, the characterization of directedness I have given above.[18]

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[16] There are some further specifications that can be given on what is or is not required for directedness. I will say more on that in §6.1, when I will be discussing a possible counter-reply to my objection to SIAM. This is just a preliminary clarification.

[17] According to e.g., Loar (2003a, 2003b) directedness is a primitive. According to, e.g., Frey (2013), Masrour (2013), Strawson (2008) is not a primitive. See also Kriegel (2007, 2011b: Ch. 3).

[18] In addition, what I have said so far does not suggest any priority between phenomenal character and intentional content: it is perfectly compatible both with the idea that the directedness of an experience is a consequence of that experience having a certain content (e.g., Byrne, 2001; Dretske, 1995, 1996, 2003; Lycan, 1996a, 2001; Tye, 1995, 2000, 2002) and with the opposite claim that experience has content as a consequence of having a certain phenomenal character (e.g., Kriegel, 2007, 2008b; 2011b, 2013a; Horgan and Tienson, 2002; Loar, 2003a, 2003b; Pitt, 2004; Mendelovici, 2010; Siewert 1998). It is also compatible with directedness being an intrinsic non-relational property of experience (e.g., Frey, 2013; Kriegel, 2007, 2008b; Loar 2003a, 2003b) or a relational property (e.g, Dretske, 1996; Lycan, 2001).

2. MOODS AND EMOTIONS

Let me now turn to the moods/emotions distinction. Such a distinction, based on directedness,[19] has been presupposed in the introductory section. However, it is a disputable distinction and, in fact, has been largely disputed in the literature. So, in this section I offer some clarifications on the way I will understand such a distinction.

To begin with: Why has the moods/emotions distinction been put in question? Firstly, one might point out that a non-independent characterization of moods based on a distinction with emotions requires one to have (at least) a good definition of emotions themselves. Yet, a satisfying definition of emotions is still far from being achieved.

Secondly, and more importantly, it is not clear *how ultimate* the emotions/moods distinction is. In other words, it is not clear *to what extent* moods and emotions can be considered as *two* separate classes (as opposed to *one* and the same class) of affective states. Clearly, this is partially dependent on what is the specific understanding of emotions one has. There is something more, though. Indeed, it is a widely accepted phenomenological fact about affective states that there is a relevant *phenomenal continuity* between those experiences intuitively classified as emotions and those experiences intuitively classified as moods. For example, irritation seems to be phenomenally very close to anger (or rage), as well as gloominess is phenomenally close to sadness, joy to happiness, etc.[20] This also makes plausible the hypothesis that, for (almost) every mood, there is a corresponding emotion sharing some relevant phenomenal features. If so, irritation would be the mood-counterpart of anger, gloominess the mood-counter part of sadness, joy the mood-counterpart of happiness, and so on.

Some (e.g., De Lancey, 2006; Fish, 2005; Frijda, 1994; Goldie, 2000, 2002; Prinz, 2004; Solomon, 1993) have, thus, stressed such a phenomenal continuity and taken it as a sign of an *ontological continuity*. In brief, moods would be a subclass of emotions with some distinctive features; however, no ultimate ontological distinction—and thereby no distinction in nature— could be drawn between them and emotions. On the contrary, others (De Sousa, 2014;

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[19] Further factors in support of this claim are that emotions are usually short-lasting episodes and caused by a specific stimulus, whereas moods typically may last longer and do not appear to be caused by any specific stimulus.

[20] In addition, there are "border-line cases," like anxiety, in which such a continuity is particularly evident. One might be anxious without being anxious about anything in particular, but she might also be anxious about, e.g., tomorrow's exam. In cases like these, the distinction between an anxious-mood and an anxious-emotion appears to be just a matter of degree concerning the specificity of the target-object of the state.

Deonna and Teroni, 2012; Kind, 2013; Lormand, 1985; Montague, 2009; Sizer, 2000) have held the opposite view: despite some phenomenal commonalities, moods and emotions would still be two *distinct* classes of affective states.

These are deep issues concerning the very nature of moods and emotions. Yet, it is not my aim to settle them here, since they go far beyond the purposes of this chapter—and, more generally, beyond the scopes of this dissertation. That said, we still have two problems: first, we do need a more or less stable terminology; second, although the distinction based on directedness is problematic, there seems to be a true insight in it. So, what to do?

Concerning the terminology, a nice suggestion comes from Mendelovici (2013b). As she notes, for the scopes of a discussion on moods and Intentionalism, it might be useful to consider moods and emotions as natural kinds picked out by terms whose reference is fixed (at least partly) by ostension of examples presenting typical features.[21] So, as I will use it here, "mood" will refer to a class of affective states typically exemplified by the ones mentioned the introductive section of this chapter: anxiety, depression, elation, gloominess, grumpiness, irritation, etc.; whereas "emotion" will refer to a class of affective states typically exemplified by love, anger, fear, sadness, etc.

As for the distinction, what we have to do is just try to clarify at what level this distinction is drawn. Given the present context, it can suffice to stress that a distinction between affective states can be legitimately drawn, independently of how ultimate it is. And, after all, there is no need here to deny such a distinction. Indeed, it is widely accepted that, over and beyond the *continuity*, there is also a *phenomenal discontinuity* within the affective domain: again, some experiences appear to be directed, whereas others do not. Regardless of whether or not this is ontologically relevant, it is surely *phenomenologically* relevant and allows for a phenomenological distinction—*i.e.* distinction concerning the phenomenal character. Needless to say, one might have (more or less) strong, independent reasons for considering the apparently undirected affective states as special cases of emotions or as belonging to a separate category. In any case, that does not affect the main phenomenological point we are

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[21] There are many reasons that make such an assumption very plausible in general (see, e.g., Prinz, 2004; for reasons against this view, see instead Griffiths, 1997.). However, in addition to and quite independently of them, there are many others that make it a convenient move for setting up a discussion on Intentionalism about moods. On the one hand, this move is compatible with, and thereby neutral on, different ways of drawing the moods/emotions distinction. On the other, it is perfectly compatible with Intentionalism being truth too. Therefore, it is not an unfair assumption.

considering here: a phenomenological distinction can be drawn. And that is enough for the scopes of the present work.

To sum up, then, here is the upshot: moods differ from emotions in that they do not appear to be directed at an object.[22,23] I consider this as a phenomenological distinction—a distinction concerning phenomenal character—that can be drawn within the domain of the affective states. This allows me to say that there are at least two *phenomenally* different classes of states within the domain of affective states. On the other hand, it is not committal as to whether or not those two phenomenally different classes are also ontologically different. In what follows, indeed, I will remain neutral on whether or not such a phenomenological distinction also corresponds to a distinction at the ontological level.

3. THE PROBLEM OF MOODS

Usually, moods are taken to be counter-examples to Intentionalism. Accordingly, the intentionalist accounts of moods aim at showing that Intentionalism is, instead, compatible with them. So, in order to fully understand the intentionalist accounts of moods, it is to be preliminary clarified why moods are supposed to be counter-examples to Intentionalism. In this section, I will be concerned with that.

Before starting, let me be clear on the following point. Since in this section I have to show what Intentionalism has to reply to, I will instrumentally adopt the point of view of the anti-intentionalist. This does not mean that I will *defend* an anti-intentionalist approach to moods in this chapter (or in this dissertation). Nor does this mean that I am going to argue *against* Intentionalism in this section—indeed, that requires that the details of the different intentionalist accounts of moods be given, which I have not done yet. Rather, I will try to make as plausible as possible the point of view of the anti-intentionalist, in order to point out clearly the difficulties and the challenges that moods raise to Intentionalism. Accordingly, I will present what I believe is the best way to exploit moods against Intentionalism.

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[22] Clearly, one might notice also that moods usually last longer than emotions and, thereby, consider this as a typical feature of moods. To my mind, this might well be correct. My emphasis on undirectedness, then, is not aimed at excluding the extension in time; rather, it is due to undirectedness being the crucial feature to be discussed in relation to Intentionalism.

[23] Under this point of view, then, the question as to whether the states that typically appear undirected are a subclass of emotions or belong to a different class of affections does not really touch the main challenge an intentionalist theory has to face, *i.e.* accounting for moods' undirectedness. Intentionalism, indeed, is concerned with emotions' and moods' phenomenal character rather than emotions' and moods' ultimate nature.

Thus, the aims of this section are the following two: (a) showing the issue and its depth and (b) paving the way to the exposition and the discussion of the intentionalist replies. At the moment, then, it does not matter whether or not what I will be presenting in this section is really a knock-down argument: what matters is, instead, that it is good enough to enable the discussion on Intentionalism about moods to start. In other words, it has to do its job: paving the way to the intentionalist replies.

3.1. A bad strategy

Let me start with some general notes and clarifications concerning what it takes for an experience to count as a counter-example to Intentionalism. An experience is a counter-example to Intentionalism if it falsifies the intentionalist claim (INT):

(INT)   Necessarily, (i) every experience E is intentional and (ii) E's phenomenal character is identical to E's intentional content.

This means that moods are a counter-example to Intentionalism, if they are not intentional or their phenomenal character is not identical to their intentional content or both. Given that, there are two ways to be anti-intentionalist about moods:

Strong and Moderate Anti-intentionalism. On these views, moods are not intentional. As a consequence their phenomenal character cannot be identical to their intentional content. (e.g., Deonna and Teroni, 2012; Searle, 1983).

Weak Anti-intentionalism. On this view, moods may be intentional, but their phenomenal character is not identical to their intentional content (e.g., Kind, 2013).

Now, what we need is a plausible way to attack Intentionalism by exploiting moods as a case against it. So, given what I have said so far, the following two options seem the most immediate and straightforward strategies available:

Radical strategy: Showing that moods are not intentional.

Moderate strategy: Showing that moods' phenomenal character is not identical to their intentional content.

Deonna and Teroni (2012) and Searle (1983) pursue the Radical strategy:

Moods, like emotions, have a characteristic phenomenology. ... Unlike emotions, however, and this is the principled distinction between the two types of affective phenomena, moods do not appear to be intentional in that they never target specific objects. (Deonna and Teroni, 2012: 4)

Beliefs, fears, hopes, and desires are Intentional; but there are forms of nervousness, elation, and undirected anxiety that are not Intentional. A clue to this distinction is provided by the constraints on how these states are reported. If I tell you I have a belief or a desire, it always makes sense for you to ask "What is exactly that you believe?" or "What is it that you desire?"; and it won't do for me to say "Oh I just have a belief and a desire without believing anything or desiring anything". My beliefs and desires must always be about something. But my nervousness and undirected anxiety need not in that way be *about* anything. (Searle, 1983: 1)

Prima facie, this line of reasoning is quite straightforward: from the fact that moods do not exhibit directedness, both Deonna and Teorni and Searle directly conclude that moods are not intentional. So, here is their argument—call it the *Argument from Undirectedness* (AU):

THE ARGUMENT FROM UNDIRECTEDNESS

(P1)   Moods do not exhibit directedness. Therefore,

(Conclusion)   Moods are not intentional.

Clearly, if (AU) succeeds, then Intentionalism is false, since the first of the conjuncts in (INT) would be false. (P1) is a phenomenological/introspective claim about moods: unlike emotions, they do not seem to be directed experiences.

However, what is not very clear about (AU), as it stands, is what exactly forces one to conclude from moods' undirectedness to their being non-intentional. As Kind (2013) this step is too quick. I agree with Kind[24] that the non-intentionality of moods does not necessarily follow from their undirectedness, unless (I add) one assumes the following premise:

(P2)   Intentional experiences exhibit directedness.[25]

If we add (P2) to (AU), we get the following argument—I call it the *Argument from Directedness* (AD), since the role of directedness is crucial now:

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[24] Here, though, I am providing reasons that are different from the ones offered by Kind.

[25] The logical form of this claim is: For every experience E, if E is intentional, then E exhibits directedness. According to this formulation, directedness is a necessary condition for intentionality, which is equivalent to undirectedness being a sufficient condition for non-intentionality. I choose this formulation without the negation for sake of simplicity and clarity.

THE ARGUMENT FROM DIRECTEDNESS

(P1)   Moods do not exhibit directedness.

(P2)   Intentional experiences exhibit directedness. Therefore,

(Conclusion)   Moods are not intentional.[26]

Now, the question becomes: What are the reasons to accept (P2)? Some reasons come, again, from phenomenological/introspective observations on our experience. Consider standard cases of intentional experiences, such as visual experiences and emotions, for example. They always exhibit directedness. If I see a blue bike, that blue bike is clearly part of what it's like for me to undergo that experience. Likewise, if I am afraid of a dog, the dog I am afraid of contributes to the what-it's-likeness of that episode of fear. In other words, the object/content represented by the experience is part of what is phenomenally/introspectively available to me, when I undergo those experiences—at least, when those experiences are phenomenally conscious. So, intuitively, this suggests that intentional experiences exhibit directedness. This might be a reason to accept (P2).

At this point, surely, one might think that finding a way to reply to (AD) is quite easy, after all. Indeed, the justification of (P2) is not very strong and it might be put in question. For example, one might point out that, given what experience provides, it is definitely not guaranteed that directedness is a necessary condition for intentionality: it might well be a sufficient condition and that would be enough for (P2) being false. Moreover, in general, it is not quite clear why the anti-intentionalist should commit to a claim such as (P2) to argue against Intentionalism. Recall: an anti-intentionalist might well accept that moods are intentional but reject the identification of phenomenal character with intentional content.

I believe that the moral to be drawn from all this is the following: at the end of the day, the Radical strategy is not a good way to bring up to the surface where the problem of moods exactly lies for the intentionalist. To be more explicit, this strategy exploits (AU) and (AD) as arguments *against the intentionality* of moods rather than arguments *against Intentionalism*. Clearly, if moods are non-intentional, then Intentionalism is false, but Intentionalism appears only an "incidental" target of (AU) and (AD).

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[26] Clearly, a further assumption here is that moods are experiences, but this seems to be quite plain and uncontroversial.

So, what is the alternative? One option may be following Kind: she pursues the Moderate strategy and so attacks directly the identity claim held by Intentionalism. However, the problem in this case, is that Kind's argument presupposes the intentionalist accounts of moods, as long as it is a counter-reply to them. So, we cannot use it to introduce those accounts. Moreover, precisely because it is a counter-reply, it concedes a lot to those accounts: something that we are not in the position to concede at the moment.

To my mind, there is a further limit, which both the strategies mentioned above share: they focus on only one of the two conjuncts in (INT). I am not saying that this is not legitimate—in fact, it is perfectly legitimate. My point is rather that this is not fully satisfying, at least if one wants to appreciate the depth of the issue moods raise to Intentionalism. What we are looking for, in a nutshell, is a way to show how exactly the phenomenological/introspective datum of moods' undirectedness can be exploited to build up a case against Intentionalism and not against one single claim that happens to be held by Intentionalism.[27]

As far as I can see, this can be done if one focuses on Intentionalism *as a conjunction* of two claims. This is what I call the *Unitary strategy* (US): US's focus is not on a single claim, among those held by the intentionalist, but on the conjunction itself. This strategy tries to show that Intentionalism has a problem with moods precisely because it cannot really keep separated intentionality and phenomenal character. In particular, US suggests that the problem of moods lies in the triangulation between, on the one hand, the theoretical commitments of Intentionalism and, on the other, the phenomenological/introspective datum of moods' undirectedness. More precisely, the idea is that there is a tension (or a conflict) between the datum and the theoretical commitments. My suggestion, thus, is that this strategy is to be adopted, if one wants to better appreciate what exactly the problem of moods consists of. But, what is this tension I have just mentioned? In the next subsection I will be concerned with that. In this way the problem will be brought up to the surface.

3.2. *The unitary strategy*

The discussion in the previous subsection has something to teach:

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[27] I am referring in particular to the Radical strategy here, since Kind's argument wants to target Intentionalism.

1. In principle, moods' undirectedness need not be in conflict with their being intentional––some theoretical steps are required to move from the former to the latter.
2. Attacking Intentionalism only on the point of the intentionality of moods might not be a good strategy due to the reason before.
3. There is still something that (AD) shows: (AD) shows that if one takes (P1) together with (P2), then one gets that moods are not intentional. This might *prima facie* sound quite trivial but, as it will turn out in a moment, it is not.

Let me focus on this latter point. The Argument from Directedness is valid, the only question about it concerns its being sound. So, maybe it does not prove that moods are intentional, but it *does* show that *if* (P1) and (P2) are true, then it is to be false that moods are intentional. So, given the Argument from Dirctedness, the following three claims cannot be true at the same time:

(P1)   Moods do not exhibit directedness.

(P2)   Intentional experiences exhibit directedness.

(IM)   Moods are intentional.

The Argument from Directedness, thus, suggests that there is a tension between (P1), (P2) and (IM). Now, the question is: In what way does all this serve the anti-intentionalist cause? I will illustrate that in what follows.

Recall that the main problem with the Argument from Directedness was finding a strong justification for (P2). In particular, it was not clear why the anti-intentionalist has to commit to such a claim. Yet, without that claim the argument does not go through. So, we got stuck. However, at that time, our focus was on trying to get a case against Intentionlism by denying the intentionality of moods. If we now adopt the perspective suggested by the Unitary strategy and switch the focus on Intentionalism as a conjunction of two claims, things start to change. Let us see why.

Intentionalism holds the conjunction of the following two claims:

(I)   Every experience E is intentional.

(II)   E's phenomenal character is identical to E's intentional content.

At a closer look, the two claims above seem to commit the intentionalist to (IM) and (P2). Why? For what concerns (IM), it is easy to see: (IM) is a direct consequence of (I). As for (P2), the reason is the following. According to Intentionalism, phenomenal character *is* nothing over and above intentional content—as (II) states. As a consequence, then, what an experience represents (its object or content) is not only a part of the phenomenal character of the experience: it *is* the phenomenal character of the experience.[28] Accordingly, it seems natural to say that, if a contentful experience exhibits phenomenal character, then it must also exhibit its intentional content/object. But, if so, then it exhibits directedness. Hence, we get (P2).

Given that, it should be easy to see now where is the tension: the tension is between, on the one hand, (IM) and (P2)— *i.e.* the consequences of theoretical commitments of Intentionalism—, and, on the other hand, (P1)—*i.e.* the phenomenological/introspective datum about moods. (P1), (P2) and (IM) cannot be true at the same time. Indeed, as the Argument from Directedness shows, *if* (P1) and (P2) are true, then (IM) is false. On the other hand, *if* (IM) is true, then either (P1) or (P2) is to be false.

Accordingly, (P1), (P2) and (IM) can be true pairwise, but, when taken together, they give rise to the following *Incoherent Triad* (IT):

THE INCOHERENT TRIAD

(P1)   Moods do not exhibit directedness.

(P2)   Intentional experiences exhibit directedness.

(IM)   Moods are intentional.

What the Unitary strategy helps point out, thus, is that embracing Intentionalism is what brings about a commitment to the claim that moods are intentional, but also the commitment to the claim that intentional experiences exhibit directedness. When these two commitments are paired with the datum about moods' undirectedness, the problem for Intentionalism immediately comes to the surface. Indeed, as we have seen, moods' undirectedness can be compatible with each of the commitments singularly taken, but it is not compatible with them, when they are taken together. In *this* sense, thus, moods are a counter-

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[28] If so, Intentionalism seems to be committed to a claim that is even stronger than (P2).

example to Intentionalism: if it is true that they do not exhibit directedness, then Intentionalism cannot be true of moods.

Therefore, in a nutshell, the problem of moods for Intentionalism lies in the conflict between, on the one hand, the theoretical commitments of the theory itself and, on the other, an intuitive datum, that appears hard to deny. The Incoherent Triad above brings such a conflict up to the surface and the intentionalist has to find a way to solve it.

Let me notice that adopting the Unitary strategy completely overturns the situation of the previous subsection. In the previous subsection, the anti-intentionalist was committing to (P2) in order to find a way to deny that moods are intentional and, thereby, get a counter-example to Intentionalism. However, this did not seem a good way to go. Switching the focus from the conjuncts to the conjunction made the difference and produced the opposite scenario: now the anti-intentionalist does not have to find a justification for (P2), since it is clear that it is the intentionalist that is committed to that claim. In this way, it is much easier to exploit moods against as a case Intentionalism and to show where the issue lies for the intentionalist.

(Incidentally, there might be such a justification for (P2)—but, this is not the point. The point is, instead: Why should the intentionalist struggle to find such a justification, given that (a) she is not necessarily committed to (P2) and (b) the aim is targeting Intentionalism and the intentionalist, instead of committing to (P2)?)

Other benefits of the Unitary strategy are the following two: first, it shows quite well where exactly the problem lies; second, it shows that the point is not only whether or not moods are intentional, but the interactions between the constraint on intentionality and the consequences of the identity claim—this interaction is the main point of Intentionalism.

As I said at the beginning of this section, what I have been presenting here is just the problem of moods. So, the fact that we managed to spot this problem by means of the Unitary strategy does not mean that the Unitary strategy offers a knock-down argument against Intentionalism. What we have achieved so far is just that there is a problem for Intentionalism, since moods appear to be a potential counter-example to the view, in the sense specified above. However, we are still left with the intentionalist replies to this problem: we have to check whether or not they are convincing. This is what I will be doing in the rest of this chapter and in the next two chapters (3 and 4).

4. INTENTIONALIST STRATEGIES

Before starting the detailed discussion of the intentionalist accounts of moods, let me offer a general and schematic survey of the main strategies that are available to the intentionalist, given the problem of moods, *i.e.* given the Incoherent Triad.

In principle, the intentionalist has two ways to solve the problem of moods:

Option 1. The first option consists in (a) arguing that the description of moods' phenomenal character in terms of undirectedness is not accurate and, thereby, (b) providing a better phenomenological description. This option, on the other hand, accepts that intentional states exhibit directedness. This strategy gives rise to the Standard Intentionalist Account of Moods (Crane, 1998, 2001; Goldie, 2000, 2002; Seager, 1999, 2002; Tye, 2008)

Option2. This second option consists in showing that the intentionalist is in fact not committed to the claim that intentional experiences exhibit directedness. In this case, the intentionalist accepts the standard intuitive description of moods in terms of undirectedness. This strategy gives rise to the Edenic Intentionalist Account of Moods (Mendelovici, 2013a; 2013b).

In either case, the task is not trivial. One difficulty shared by both the options is that the burden of the proof in on the intentionalist. In the first case, this is because a description of moods' phenomenal character in terms of undirectedness looks intuitively right. In the second case, instead, the burden of the proof is on the intentionalist because, *prima facie*, it is hard to see how it is possible to deny (P2) and still be an intentionalist.

In addition, each option has its own specific difficulties. The difficulty of pursuing option 1 resides in providing strong reasons to accept a re-description of the phenomenology of the affective states. Indeed, such a re-description must be better (phenomenologically more adequate) than the one in terms of undirectedness that has been given so far. Finding a better description of the phenomenal character of moods does not seem an easy task to be accomplished: the risk is failing and/or providing a counter-intuitive/inadequate/*ad hoc* description.

As for option 2, it implies that there are experiences whose phenomenal character is such that one does not seem to be presented with any object/content in undergoing them.

Accordingly, the difficulty is that the intentionalist has to provide some candidate intentional objects/contents for those experiences that suits well their undirectedness. This looks particularly difficult. On the other hand, if this strategy turned out to be really viable, it would be a definitely stronger case in support of Intentionalism about moods.

It is quite evident, thus, that in either cases the reply to the problem consists in providing a satisfying intentionalist account of moods. Clearly, such an account has to *jointly satisfy* the following two constraints, (C1) and (C2):

(C1)   It must provide good candidates for moods' intentional contents/objects;

(C2)   It must be such that, in every case, moods' phenomenal character is identical to intentional content.

Clearly, (C1) and (C2) are to be jointly satisfied. Indeed, if an account only satisfies (C1), then is not an intentionalist account, since the identity claim is not preserved.[29]

Here is the upshot, thus. The problem of moods for the intentionalist ultimately consists in finding a proper intentionalist way to solve the conflict brought up to the surface by the Incoherent Triad. In principle, there are two ways to do that: the first is finding a better phenomenological description for the case of moods, the second is providing a convincing story to accept that, although undirected, moods are still intentional experiences. Each of these two options corresponds to a different intentionalist account of moods. As such, thus, it has to meet the two constraints, (C1) and (C2), fixed right above.

In the rest of this chapter I will deal with the Standard Intentionalist Account of Moods. The next chapter will be devoted to the Edenic Intentionalist Account of Moods.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I moved to deal with moods. To begin with, I offered some clarifications on directedness (§1) and introduced the phenomenological distinction between emotions and moods. As I have characterized it, this distinction amounts to the fact that, while the former

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[29] This is the reason why, if the account fails I call it (more or less equivalently) "not proper" or "not satisfying" or "not good:" it is improper, not satisfying or not good from the point of view of what it is required in order to be an intentionalist account—namely, preserving the identity claim.

exhibit directedness, the latter do not. In sections 3 and 4 I introduced the problem of moods. In particular (§3), I argued that this problem amounts to finding a way to solve the conflict brought up to the surface by the Incoherent Triad of the following three claims: (1) moods do not exhibit directedness; (2) intentional experiences exhibit directedness; (3) moods are intentional. In section 4, I offered a survey of the two strategies that an intentionalist can pursue in order to solve the problem of moods. Moreover, I argued that giving a satisfying intentionalist reply to this problem amounts to providing an intentionalist account of moods that jointly satisfies two constraints: (C1) it must provide good candidates for moods' intentional contents/objects; (C2) It must be such that, in every case, moods' phenomenal character is identical to intentional content.

CHAPTER 3

THE STANDARD INTENTIONALIST

ACCOUNT OF MOODS

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

I concluded Chapter 2 with a survey of the two strategies available to the intentionalist in order to reply to the problem of moods. In addition, I fixed two constraints, (C1) and (C2), an intentionalist account of moods has to *jointly* satisfy in order to be a satisfying intentionalist reply to the problem of moods. I recall them below:

(C1)   It must provide good candidates for moods' intentional contents/objects;

(C2)   It must be such that, in every case, moods' phenomenal character is identical to intentional content.

In this chapter, I discuss the Standard Intentionalist Account of Moods (SIAM) and, in particular, I will focus on Michael Tye's (2008) version of this account, which I consider the best. My conclusion will be that SIAM fails. More precisely, here is my plan. I start with introducing SIAM (§1). Against it, I argue for the following disjunctive claim (§§2, 3): SIAM

does not satisfy (C1) or, if it does, it does not satisfy (C2). In other words, SIAM does not provide good candidates intentional objects/content (§2) or, even in case it does, those candidates intentional objects/contents (or at least some of them) are such that the identity of phenomenal character and intentional content is not preserved (§3). Therefore, SIAM fails. If I am right, it will also turn out that at least some moods are not (fully) transparent.

1. THE STANDARD INTENTIONALIST ACCOUNT OF MOODS

In this section, after distinguishing between two ways to look at moods' undrectedness (§1.1), I introduce the Standard Intentionalist Account of Moods (SIAM) (§1.2).

1.1 Strong vs. weak undirectedness

As we know, SIAM's general strategy to solve the problem of moods consists in offering a different description of moods' phenomenology and then arguing that such a description is adequate and able to capture moods' phenomenal character.

Now, so far the phenomenal character of moods has been described in terms of undirectedness. *Prima facie*, this description seemed to fit quite well with what is phenomenologically/introspectively available. However, one might argue that, at a closer look, such a description of the phenomenology of moods is not *completely* accurate or, at least, that it is (to some extent) ambiguous. Indeed, at a closer look, the *Undirectedness of Moods* (UM):

(UM)   Moods do not exhibit directedness

seems to leave open two possible readings, one weak and one strong. I call them (respectively) *Weak Undirectedness of Moods* (WUM) and *Strong Undirectedness of Moods* (SUM):

(WUM)   Moods do not exhibit directedness toward *anything in particular*

(SUM)   Moods do not exhibit directedness toward *anything-full-stop*.

Clearly, the Incoherent Triad presupposes (SUM).[1] Indeed, interpreting (UM) in terms of (SUM) is what is required in order for (P1), (P2), and (IM) to give rise to an incoherent

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[1] My characterization of the undirectedness of moods and of strong undirectedness of moods is different from the one that Kind (2013) offers. She uses the label "strong undirectedness" to refer to the thesis that moods are never directed at anything particular. Indeed, she contrasts such a thesis with what she calls "undirectedness moods," *i.e.* the claim that moods are typically not directed at anything particular. On the other hand, here I want to

triad. Now, if (WUM) turned out to be the right way to read (UM), *i.e.* the reading that better capture's the phenomenal character of moods, then: it would be true that moods lack directedness towards *particular* objects, but that would not force one to conclude that they lack *directedness at all*. It might well be, indeed, that they still possess some sort of *generalized directedness*. In this way, the Incoherent Triad would be defused. In a nutshell, then, here is the strategy pursued by the intentionalist in advancing SIAM: on the one hand, she argues that *every* case of moods' undirectedness is reducible to a case of weak undirectedness; on the other, she positively accounts for weak undirectedness by means of some candidate intentional objects/contents capable to explain the generalized directedness of moods.

One final, terminological note. In order to avoid confusion, hereafter I will use "generalized directedness" to refer to weak undirectedness and "genuine undirectedness" to refer to strong undirectedness. That said, I come now to illustrate SIAM in more details.[2]

1.2 Moods represent general intentional objects/contents

The intentionalist's starting point is to note that the main characteristic of moods seems to be that, when one undergoes a certain mood, one is not able to tell what one's experience is about because moods, unlike emotions, have *no specific focus or target*. As Tye (2008) puts it:

> Sometimes, we just feel happy. Our happiness does not seem to be directed on *anything in particular*. To take another example, Californian car drivers are notable for experiencing road rage. This is anger that is not directed against *any one particular* car driver. It is anger of a *more general sort*. And some people are just angry people. They feel angry and act aggressively without their anger having *any definite* focus. (Tye, 2008: 43)[3]

This leads to acknowledge that moods lack directedness toward specific objects, but not necessarily they have to lack directedness at all. On the contrary, according to SIAM, moods' phenomenology can still be explained in terms of intentional content. Roughly, the very idea is the following: moods do not exhibit directedness toward anything particular because they represent something general,[4] namely, *the world as a whole* or *many objects changing across the time*.

In particular, according to Tye, moods, like emotions, have both an inward and

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contrast the idea that moods are not directed at all, (SUM), with the idea that they are not directed at anything particular, (WUM).

[2] My main source is Tye (2008), but a very similar account is offered by Goldie (2000, 2002) and Seager (1999, 2002).

[3] Emphasis mine.

[4] "General" here is to be mainly understood in contraposition to "specific."

outward intentionality.[5] The inward intentionality consists in mapping the modifications in one's overall functional equilibrium (this is supposed to be a general object too). As for outward intentionality, it may be of two kinds. For example, one can feel irritated and whatever she encounters becomes the object of such an irritation/nervousness.[6] So, in cases like this, there is no particular object because the object of the mood keeps changing across the time as long as the mood lasts. Each token experience is, then, directed at some specific object, but the experience itself is not directed at any specific object. This is the *frequently changing objects* (FCO) case.

A slightly different case is when one feels, e.g., suddenly elated and is not able to tell what that sudden elation is directed at. In this case, according to Tye, the object of the moods is the *world as a whole* (WAW):[7] "the subject thinks that the world is a wonderful place (or something similar)" (Tye, 2008: 44).[8,9,10]

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[5] On Tye's view moods are emotions (Tye, 1995, 2008). More precisely, he calls moods "endogenous emotions" (Tye, 2008). As I have explained in Chapter 2, §1, I distinguish between them. So, in this particular case, I am imposing my own terminology on Tye. However, this does not affect the main point he is making.

[6] Tye (2008) talks of anger, but the point does not change. I prefer not to use anger because it might be confusing. Indeed, one might say that anger is an emotion and that is the reason why it is possible to find an object.

[7] It is hard here to say more about that and specify clearly what the nature of the object-world consists of: this depends on too much complex metaphysical view. One might want to say that the world is the maximal set of the objects one can experience; others might want to say that it is the set of what actually exists, etc. This is an issue that cannot be addressed here. What it is to be stressed, instead, is the opposition between the world as a whole and the universal quantifier: the former is one single specific entity, the second is an operator that binds a variable and allows for as many substitution of that variable as the objects of the domain are. So, if one says that the world is awful, she is saying that one specific object has a certain property; by contrast, if one says that everything is awful, she is saying that no matter what object in the domain have the property of being awful.

[8] Seager (1999) adds *everything* among the possible general intentional objects of moods. However, it is not clear what Seager exactly means with "everything" here. The first and more natural impression is that it should be treated as a universal quantifier. However, at a close look, this is not so plausible. Indeed, if it were a universal quantifier, then it should be specified what has the larger scope between the quantifier and the operator "represent" in statements expressing the content of a mood M, like "M represents everything as *F*." If a large scope is assigned to "represent," then the quantifier is part of the intentional content. However, this seems to over-intellectualize the experiences: it just does not seem phenomenologically adequate to say that a universal quantifier is part of the content of one's experience when one is in a certain mood. Suppose John is elated and his elation is directed at everything. It just does not seem to be the case that John's elation is representing that, for every *x*, *x* is bright or joyful. On the contrary, it seems definitely more plausible (and phenomenologically adequate) to say that, *no matter what* John might experience, his elation is going to represent it as being bright/joyful. In the latter case, the quantifier is not part of the content. Accordingly, assigning the quantifier the larger scope seems a much better way to go. Yet, if this is correct, then John's elation should be accounted in the following way: for every *x*, John is representing *x* as being bright/joyful, etc. But, at this point, it is not clear what is the difference with the case of frequently changing objects. On the other hand, another option is that by "everything" one might mean "everything all at once," but then, in this case, it is no longer clear what would be the difference with the world as a hole. (To my mind, this second option is what Seager (1999) has in mind— even considering the examples he gives.) So, my proposal is to exclude "everything" from the list of the candidate intentional objects. Indeed, (i) if it is a quantifier, then it reduces to the frequently changing object case; (ii) if it is not a quantifier, it reduces to the world as a whole case.

But, how does the mechanism of the double intentionality work exactly? According to Tye, it is just the same mechanism at work in the case of emotions. In his own words:

> The external item E is initially represented by a perceptual state or a non-perceptual thought. That representation then normally triggers a bodily response R, which is sensed. The emotional state represents E, via its evaluative feature, as causing R (or alternatively in some cases as being accompanied by) R. (Tye, 2008: 35)

Back to the examples above, in the case of irritation/nervousness an object is experienced (or thought) as having some evaluative property—plausibly, in this case, as being bothering or frustrating or irritating (or something similar). This triggers a modification in the overall body state registered by the system (inward directedness). At this point, the mood represents the bothering/frustrating/irritating object as causing that bodily modification (outward directedness). The case of sudden elation is slightly different. Indeed, in that case, the WAW is not represented as causing the bodily modifications (although the bodily modification are registered). This is what marks the difference between sudden elation and other cases of elation—e.g., Tye mentions the case of a young academic whose paper has just been accepted by major journal; in this case it is clear that the acceptance is responsible for the state of elation.

So much for intentional content. What about phenomenal character? Firstly, there is a *continuity* in the intentional content that guarantees the phenomenal continuity between emotions and moods. According to SIAM, such a continuity is explained by fact that both emotions' and moods' phenomenal characters are ultimately due to representing objects as having evaluative features.[11]

Secondly, there is also a relevant phenomenological difference between moods and emotions: the latter exhibit directedness toward particular object, whereas the former do not. As I have stressed, SIAM understands moods' phenomenal character in terms of generalized

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[9] The difference in content between these two cases can be formally highlighted as follows. Frequently changing objects case: a mood M represents o_1 as being F at t_1, o_2 as being F at t_2, … o_n as being F at t_n. World as a whole case: a mood M represents w as being F, where w = the world a s whole.

[10] The general intentional objects are somewhat different from each other: the world as a whole is one specific object; frequently changing objects are many different particular objects. They all have a generalized nature, but due to different reasons. Although, in a sense, it is one particular object, the world as a whole is general because of its nature. As for the frequently changing objects, in this case the content is general because many specific object across the time are represented. Concerning inward intentionality, the subject is receiving generalized information concerning the modification in the *overall* functional equilibrium of one's body.

[11] The phenomenal continuity between moods and emotions is an important feature. So, being able to preserve such a continuity is a virtue of Tye's account, to my mind.

directedness, which, in turn, is explained by means of the generality of the intentional objects/contents of moods: the objects represented by moods are, as we have seen, more general than those represented by emotions, which are typically directed at specific items of the external world—things like, e.g., animals, people, ordinary objects, specific events, etc. Hence, the explanation of the generalized directedness exhibited by moods.

Thirdly, there seems to be a phenomenological difference within the class of moods themselves. This is explained by appealing to two different sorts of intentional objects/contents for moods: FCO and WAW. So, again, to a difference in content corresponds a difference in the phenomenal character.

Since everything seems to be explained by means of intentional content: it seems that the identity of phenomenal character to intentional content is guaranteed and so Intentionalism is safe.[12]

2. GENERAL INTENTIONAL OBJECTS/CONTENTS DO NOT CAPTURE ALL THE CASES

As I have presented it, SIAM is a reply to the Incoherent Triad (Chapter 2, §3) and aims at showing that all the cases of moods' undirectedness are suitable for being accounted in terms of general intentional objects/contents (FCO, WAW), as long as they are reducible to cases of generalized directedness. Now, if SIAM is a good intentionalist way to solve the conflict shown by the Incoherent Triad, then it has to jointly satisfy the two constraints fixed in §4, (C1) and (C2). In other words, SIAM has to offer a good explanation of what is the content of moods, (C1), and this content is to be such that moods' phenomenal character is identical to their intentional content, (C2).

I maintain that SIAM does not jointly satisfy (C1) and (C2). So, it is not a satisfying intentionalist account of moods. I will argue for that in the next two sections. In particular, against SIAM, I defend the following disjunctive claim: SIAM does not satisfy (C1) or, if it satisfies (C1), it does not satisfy (C2).

Here is my plan, thus. In this section I argue for the first disjunct: SIAM does not satisfy (C1). As far as I can see, indeed, it is possible to raise some doubts as to whether FCO and WAW are really capable to suit well all the cases of moods. Firstly, I will present these doubts

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[12] SIAM is a reductionist view, so identity is to be understood as *identification/reduction*.

(§2.1); then, I consider the possible intentionalist replies and explain why those reply are not very convincing (§2.2). In the next section (§3), I will turn to the second disjunct and argue that, even in case SIAM satisfies (C1), still it does not satisfy (C2).

2.1 Many cases, but not every single case

One first reason in support of the claim that SIAM does not satisfy (C1) is offered by Voltolini (2013). In criticizing Crane's (2001) account of moods, he points out that, if WAW is the object that a mood M represents, that M fails to satisfy the two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for intentionality that Crane himself imposes: (i) possibly, what the experience represents does not exist; (ii) what the experience represents is given in a certain way (aspectual shape).

According to Voltolini, WAW fails to satisfy (i) because it is not clear how one can be, e.g., depressed about a non-existent world—this is (i). As for (ii), WAW seems just a too general object for being represented by depression in a given way such that the subject of depression may fail to recognize that what she is depressed about is in fact the same object represented in a different way by another experience.

If this argument succeeds, then one of the two candidate intentional objects that SIAM provides is not a good candidate intentional object for moods. As a result, every mood should be accounted for in terms of FCO. Yet, this is openly inadequate, since the WAW cases seem to be slightly different cases from the FCO cases. And this is the reason why supporters of SIAM appeal both to FCO and to WAW. Therefore, the conclusion is that SIAM does not fulfill (C1).

As far as I am concerned, I tend to agree with Voltolini's point. However, I believe that, in addition to what he says, further *phenomenological reasons* can be given, in order to show why SIAM fails to satisfy (C1). In particular, my view is that, if one looks at the phenomenology of moods, then it turns out that SIAM's proposal is not capable to capture *every* case of moods. In other words, moods seem to represent FCO and WAW in *many* cases, but not in *every* single case, which is instead what they are required to do.[13] I will argue for that in the rest of this

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[13] Mendelovici (2013b) makes a similar point. She maintains that special intentional objects such a FCO and WAW account for a broad range of cases, but there are still cases they are not able to capture. Those are the genuine apparently undirected moods. However, she just says that without giving any further details and without showing why the characterization provided by SIAM is not exhaustive. She probably takes it as intuitively true. I do not think it is immediately evident, although I agree with Mendelovici. So, par of what I do in this section is trying to spell out this shared intuition and show why FCO and WAW do not capture the phenomenon to be

section—and, in doing that, I will grant to the intentionalist that WAW satisfies Crane's conditions. If I am right, it will also turn out that not every case of moods' undirectedness can be described in terms of generalized directedness.[14]

Take the case of anxiety. One might be anxious about something particular, e.g. tomorrow's exam. This, however, is not a problematic case. In this case, anxiety looks manifestly directed at something. Yet, there are also cases in which one just feels anxious and is not able to tell what she is anxious about. This is undirected anxiety and this is what it is to be explained by SIAM. Now, according to the latter, we have two options to account for undirected anxiety: in terms of FCO or in terms of WAW. In order for the theory to be adequate, at least one of those two options has to adequately explain undirected anxiety.[15]

Accounting for undirected anxiety in terms of FCO does not seem phenomenologically adequate. The phenomenology of FCO cases, indeed, involves the variation of many particular objects across the time, but an experience of undirected anxiety does not seem to feel that way. Perhaps, there are states of anxiety that change their objects across the time so that, at the end of the day, one is not able to tell what specific object one's anxiety was really about. However, in such a case: (i) every single token-experience exhibits directedness towards a specific object; (ii) the lack of particular object appears to be the result of an introspective reasoning/inference rather than something *immediately felt*. By contrast, in undirected anxiety, one need not to go through many experiences to realize that one's experience does not exhibit directedness towards any particular object. A best description, indeed, may be that one feels anxious *no matter what* one encounters/experiences, which seems to be a symptom of a certain degree of independence of the feeling from the many objects one might encounter.[16]

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explained. I do not deny that there are cases of moods directed at those objects, but I believe that they are not exactly the same cases as the case that is relevant here.

[14] One might think that my argument here targets SIAM's capability of satisfying (C2) rather than its capability of satisfying (C1). As far as I can see, this is not quite right. Saying that there are phenomenological reasons to consider FCO and WAW as inadequate to cover all the cases of moods does not immediately mean that they are inadequate for the identification of phenomenal character and intentional content. Rather, it means that, in at least certain cases of moods, they do not seem to be what those moods represent, if one considers the phenomenology of those moods. And this can be appreciated by considering and contrasting what it's like to undergo genuine FCO and WAW cases with what it's like to undergo more dubious cases. Consideration concerning the identity of phenomenal character and intentional content require something more. Needless to say, however, it is trivial that if SIAM fails to satisfy (C1), then it fails to satisfy (C2).

[15] One might complain that there may be a third option, inward directedness: I will treat it separately in §2.2.3.

[16] To my mind, the phenomenal character of FCO moods too is quite independent from what one encounters in one's experience. I will argue for that in §3. However, there is still a difference between the independence from specific objects of undirected anxiety and that of FCO moods. The latter do not seem to depend on any specific object, although they involve many; the former does not seem to involve any object all.

The other option is that undirected anxiety is a WAW case. Now, there seem to be (more or less) striking cases of moods that are directed at WAW. In these cases, perhaps, one is disposed to say things like "The world is F!"—for example, "The world is wonderful!", if one is elated, or "The world is awful!", if one is depressed.[17] However, it is doubtful that, in undergoing an experience of undirected anxiety, one would attribute an evaluative property to the world. In the first place—one might note—it is not even clear *what* evaluative property one should attribute, and this looks somewhat significant. Crane (1998) suggests that the relevant property, in the case of anxiety, is *being threatening*. To my mind, being threatening is rather a property represented by fear. Anyway, let us assume that Crane is right. Accordingly, in undergoing undirected anxiety, one's experience would be directed at WAW represented as threatening. So, by analogy to the cases above, in undergoing such a state, one should be disposed to say something like "The world is threatening!". Yet, again, this just seems to be phenomenologically inaccurate. In undergoing a state of undirected anxiety, one does not seem to be disposed to project one's own feeling to the world, simply because the world does not seem to be inherently involved in/part of the experience. So, if this is correct, undirected anxiety does not seem to be a WAW case either. And the same goes for some forms of depression and elation—usually called objectless depression and sudden elation—that are really close to undirected anxiety, under this respect. Indeed, as the latter, those experiences do not seem to involve any object at all, specific or general. It is plausible to say, then, that all those experiences are undirected in a way that is not exactly the same as that in which the FCO cases and the WAW cases are undirected. And this difference is ultimately due to a *substantive difference in the phenomenal character*.

This is a relevant point. So, let me offer more details to better explain what I have in mind. To do that, I will contrast my claim with what an intentionalist as, e.g., Crane could say.[18] My claim, so far, is that the phenomenal character of some states like undirected anxiety does not seem suitable to be captured by an explanation in terms of FCO or WAW—in other words, an explanation in terms of generalized directedness.

Now, as far as I can see, Crane could reply as follows:

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[17] Take, for example, Louis Armstrong's famous "And I think to myself/what a wonderful world."

[18] I do that for two reasons. First, I want to make the dialectic more vivid. Second, I believe that discussing this passage from Crane can help better clarify my claim. Thus, I am not choosing Crane because he is my specific target, but just as representative of what a supporter of SIAM might reply to what I have said so far.

> Everyone will agree that there is such a thing as being anxious and yet not being able to give an answer to the question "what are you anxious about?". But this by itself does not show that anxiety can lack intentionality. For one thing, we have just seen that asking "what is X about?" is not always the most uncontroversial way of deciding whether X is intentional. And more importantly, it should not be a condition of a state's being intentional that the subject of that state must be able to express what the state's content is, or even which kind of state it is. Every theory of intentionality must allow that subjects are not always the best authorities on all the contents of their minds. (Crane, 1998: 238)

So, Crane's point in the passage quoted above is that, after all, it might well be that one is not able to tell what one's experience is about. Yet, in itself, this is not such a big problem for the intentionalist: that a subject is able to express the content of the state is not a condition for that state being intentional.

To my mind, here Crane is underestimating the depth of the issue. As he puts it, the issue is a matter of not being able to *tell* what experience represents, *i.e.* not being able to *express* what is the content of the experience. I agree on the letter of that, but I disagree on the substance. In particular, I suspect that the disagreement concerns the reasons why one is not able to tell or express. Let me explain. As far as I can see, there are two main reasons one might not be able to tell or express something. First, one might not have the appropriate/relevant skills or concepts or conceptual tools, etc. For example, in the case of the content of the experience, one might just be a bad introspector or lack the appropriate/relevant concepts (or conceptual tools) to spot and/or express exactly what is the content of one's experience. This happens sometimes—quite often, actually. And, as far as I understand, this is what Crane has in mind.

However, in some other cases, one is not able to tell or express something simply because *there is nothing to tell*. This is a second possible reason to explain one's not being able to tell, and it is what I have in mind: I believe that this is precisely the case of moods like undirected anxiety, objectless depression or sudden elation. The problem with those experiences, indeed, is not that one lacks the concept to categorize and express something presented. The issue here is, rather, *phenomenological*: it does not concern conceptualization, but the phenomenal character of the experience. In the case of undirected anxiety, what one lacks are not the appropriate concepts, but the feeling of being dealing with something *other* than one's experience itself—*i.e.* an object in the minimal sense of "object." This is a *minimal phenomenological condition* for describing the experience as directed and is not realized in this

case.[19] This condition is phenomenological because it concerns the phenomenal character of the experience. Here is another way to put this is: what it's like to undergo an experience such as, e.g., undirected anxiety does not involve anything appearing as other than the experience itself.

The issue, thus, concerns the lack of this minimal phenomenological condition, which is something more basic than lacking the relevant concepts to exactly tell what the object/content of the experience is. A non-conceptualist like Crane should convene on this point.

Accordingly, the point is not that, in undergoing undirected moods, one is not able to tell *what* is being represented. Rather, the point is that one is not able to tell *whether or not* something is being represented. What is missed, in cases like undirected anxiety, is the minimal sense of directness, which has to do with being presented with something other than the experience itself. There is, thus, a phenomenological difference between being directed at something general (FCO and WAW) and lacking directedness altogether. And such a difference can be (and is) *experienced*, since it involves some component of phenomenal character.

This is my claim, thus. Cases like undirected anxiety, objectless depression, sudden elation are substantively phenomenally different from moods representing FCO and WAW. As a consequence, the intentionalist cannot reduce all the cases of moods' undirectedness to cases of generalized directedness exactly because not every case of moods' undirectedness can be accommodated in terms of generalized directedness of some sort. And this is due to the fact that not every mood meets the minimal phenomenological condition—or one of the minimal conditions—for exhibiting directedness. That is, not every mood is such that what it's like to undergo that mood involves something appearing as other then the experience itself—more shortly: not every moods is an other-presenting experience (or has an other-presenting phenomenal character).[20]

By contrast, those moods that are suitable for being accounted in terms of FCO or WAW are suitable for being accounted in those terms because, in some way, they are other-presenting experiences, although their objects are very general or frequently changing. If this

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[19] Those conditions will turn out to be particularly relevant also for what concerns the relations between undirectedness and transparency. So, more on these conditions is to be said and will be said in Chapter 4, §2. For the moment, these intuitive notes should suffice to make the point I want to make in this chapter.

[20] I borrow the locution "other-presenting" from Masrour (2013).

is correct, then no kind of directedness—no matter how generalized—will ever be able to capture what one is phenomenologically confronted with in undergoing, say, undirected anxiety, simply because no description in terms of directedness of whatever sort applies to that experience, since it lacks the minimal phenomenological conditions for being described that way.

If so, SIAM is phenomenologically inadequate when it comes to cases like undirected anxiety, objectless depression, sudden elation, etc. Indeed, the strategy of reducing every case of moods' undirectedness to generalized directedness excludes, from the very beginning, that there is a phenomenological difference to account for. More, it posits a similarity where there is a substantive phenomenological difference. *That* is inadequate. Hence, it seems plausible to conclude that undirected anxiety, objectless depression, sudden elation, etc., are cases of *genuine undirectedness*. So, they are *genuinely undirected*.

Now, this leads to conclude that the re-description that SIAM offers of moods' phenomenal character is not fully adequate. Indeed, if I am right, it is false that every case of moods' undirectedness ultimately amounts to a case of generalized directedness. A the same time, this also means that FCO and WAW are not good candidate intentional objects for cases like undirected anxiety, objectless depression or sudden elation: they are *phenomenologically* inadequate. In a few words, they do not seem to be what those moods represent, simply because those moods do not seem to represent anything at all.

Therefore, FCO and WAW are not able to cover all the cases of moods: they may be good candidate intentional objects for many moods, but not to for *every* single mood. And this is enough for claiming that SIAM fails to satisfy (C1).

2.2. Replies on the side of SIAM

At this point, there are several replies that the intentionalist could attempt: I will examine them in this subsection and argue that they are still unconvincing.

2.2.1. First option: "There is no such a thing!"

One radical option is just to deny that the phenomenology of undirected anxiety or objectless depression or sudden elation, etc., does not involve any object and, so, insist that it can be reduced to one of the two cases of generalized directedness—FCO and/or WAW. This strategy is not very promising, though.

Firstly, in order to pursue it and avoid begging the question, one should provide a neat

case in which some sort of object is involved in those experiences. Yet, as we have seen, the problem is precisely that none of the objects available to the intentionalist seems to be part of the phenomenology of experiences like undirected anxiety.

Secondly, denying that there are at least some moods that appear genuinely undirected seems to be dangerously close to denying that there is a problem for the intentionalist, something that an intentionalist has to explain about moods' phenomenal character. After all, if there is a genuine problem for the intentionalist, then this is due to the fact that there *are* experiences in which one just feels anxious or depressed or elated, and nothing over and beyond that feeling in one of those peculiar ways seems to be involved. If one disagrees on that, then one should more coherently deny that there is a problem. Trying to reduce all moods to cases of generalized directedness seems just a too easy shortcut. [21]

Finally—and this is a third point—many intentionalists seem to admit that moods are hard to be treated by Intentionalism exactly because at least some of them do not appear to be directed at anything at all (e.g., Dretske, 1995; Lycan, 2008; Mendelovici, 2013a, 2013b).

2.2.2. Second option: inward intentionality

A second option is appealing to inward intentionality. Recall, indeed, that SIAM is a double intentionality model, namely, outward and inward intentionality. So, the intentionalist could, on the one hand, grant that cases like undirected anxiety lack *outward* intentionality—so no *outward* directedness would exhibited—but, on the other, say that the mood in question exhibits *inward* directedness. In other words, undirected anxiety, objectless depression, sudden elation, etc., would represent only some modification in the general functional equilibrium of one's body. In this way, the third species of phenomenal character would be accounted for by means of a third species of intentional content. At a first sight, this seems the best among the options available to the intentionalist. However, there are several counter-replies one could give.

First of all, one note: SIAM does not contemplate the option that emotions/moods (the model is unitary) may be inwardly intentional or outwardly intentional or both; on the contrary, the model imposes that they are *both* inwardly *and* outwardly intentional in every case. So, it seems that, if one wants to buy SIAM, then one also has to buy also the fact that

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[21] Actually, some intentionalist replies to the problem of moods appear as border-line cases: it is not very clear whether they aim at explaining and providing an answer to a problem or, rather, explaining the problem away.

moods are required to have both the directions.

So, if one decided to explain undirected anxiety in terms of inward intentionality alone, one should be disposed to do the same for all moods and leave the double directedness to emotions.[22] According to this account, moods would be bodily states.[23] This seems to change the nature of SIAM in a significant manner. However, let us set this aside and ask: Would this model work for moods? There seem to be reasons to deny that it would.

Firstly, this would lead to drop the analyses in terms of FCO and WAW, and these might not be good news for the intentionalist. Indeed, although the general intentional objects were not able to account for all the cases of moods, they were able to manage many cases of moods (at least partially). So, by buying the inward intentionality account, one would gain the possibility of accounting for the undirected anxiety-like cases, but one would also lose the possibility of accounting for the FCO cases and the WAW cases. One might still reply that the latter are not genuine moods, whereas the former are, but that is not a great reply: it just seems *ad hoc*.

Secondly, one is not really guaranteed that such an account would be able to fully accommodate even the undirected anxiety-like cases. Surely, in the case of undirected anxiety, the bodily reactions typically involved in undergoing that state are felt. Still, it seems that what it's like beng anxious is not entirely reducible to (and grasped by) those bodily changes. As Mendelovici (2013b) notes:

> [A]t least some of the distinctive phenomenal characters of moods don't seem to be matched by the bodily changes we are aware of. For example, in an anxiety attack, one might experience difficulty breathing, sweating, and a racing heart. However, representation of such bodily states does not fully capture the *anxiousness* present in the experience, something like a feeling of unsettledness, discomfort, or dread. If there are phenomenal characters involved in moods that do not seem to be matched by any contents involving changes bodily states, then such contents cannot account for them. (Mendelovici, 2013b: 140)

So, there are bodily changes associated with undirected anxiety, but those changes do not seem to exhaust all the phenomenal character of the state. In other words, one's feeling of anxiety is not (entirely) localizable in one's body. Clearly, it is not just that anxiety is not located in one specific point/part of the body. The point is that the kind of discomfort involved in feeling anxious does not seem to have—or to have only—a physical/physiological

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[22] Probably, this would not be compatible with Tye's view, but this is not relevant in this case.

[23] This is Tye's former account of moods and emotions (see Tye, 1995).

nature. As Kind nicely puts it, "it does not seem to be rooted in the state of my body" (Kind, 2013: 121).[24]

2.2.3. Third option: to appear is not to be

A third option is insisting, along the lines of Crane's reply quoted above, that the fact that moods like undirected anxiety appear undirected is not a good reason to maintain that they also lack an object/content. To my mind, this strategy makes sense, only in the following two cases.[25]

1.   First, one has an alternative story about the content of these particular cases of moods that (a) is able to explain the their peculiar phenomenal character and (b) does not appeal to FCO or WAW. Indeed, if there are substantive phenomenological differences between FCO cases, WAW cases and undirected anxiety-like cases, then there are also (at least) three species of phenomenal character. So, according to Intentionalism, another species of content is required—otherwise, there would be three different species of phenomenal character, but only two species of intentional content. And this would not be a desirable outcome for the intentionalist, since it would mean that (at least) two different species of phenomenal character depend on one and the same species of content. (This is not allowed, if phenomenal character is to be identical to intentional content. Indeed, if that were the case, not even a supervenience claim would be true.) However, this is not the case of SIAM. The supporter of SIAM, indeed, accounts for undirected anxiety-like cases in terms of FCO or WAW. So, she does not provide a story like the one described above.

2.   Second, one claims that lacking the minimal phenomenological conditions for

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[24] Moreover, as both Mendelovici (2013b) and Kind (2013) note, there are some bodily changes we do not represent at all. Take, for instance, the case of secretion of some hormones, e.g. cortisol (this is Mendelovici's own example): they are bodily reactions involved in some moods, but it is fair to say that we do not represent bodily changes of this sort at all. In other words, this is not the sort of thing we are aware of in undergoing a mood. Furthermore, even if in some way we were representing those things, such a representation would appear as phenomenologically completely "foreign" to the phenomenal character of a mood-experience. In other words, if this is really what we represent, then it does not seem to match the phenomenal character of a mood-experience in any way. Clearly, this is a problem for the intentionalist inasmuch as she must reduce phenomenal character to representational content and there seems to be no way here to accommodate what it is represented by a mood-experience and what it is like to undergo that experience.

[25] The views described in these two cases can be held independently or together.

directedness does not imply lacking an object/content. This might be true.[26] Yet, I am not sure it will serve well Intentionalism. It is, indeed, hard for me to see how this move does not imply some dissociation of content and phenomenal character or, at least, some departure from transparency. Clearly, at that point, the issue would be whether or Intentionalism can be true even in case transparency fails. To my mind, this is precisely the issue that the discussion on cases like undirected anxiety brings up to the surface. Before dealing with this issue, though, a better account of those cases would be required—the possibility of Intentionalism without transparency has to be tested on the best account. I believe Mendelovici (2013a, 2013b) has such an account, but it presupposes a very different intentionalist framework. So, I set all this aside now, since I will be concerned with that in the next two chapters (3, 4). For the moment, however, let me just stress that the supporters of SIAM do not want to drop transparency: given SIAM's proposal, indeed, if transparency fails, it is not clear what would be the main motivation for the identity claim.[27] So, in any case, any option that somehow implies (or seems to imply) a departure from transparency seems not an option for SIAM.

Thus, that none of the counter-replies available to the intentionalist willing to defend SIAM are really good options. If this is correct, then there are grounds to make the claim that SIAM does not offer good (or fully satisfying) candidates for mood's intentional content/objects. So, SIAM does not meet (C1).

Now, if the arguments, the replies and the analyses I have proposed are correct, then describing at least some moods (undirected anxiety, objectless depression, sudden elation) as genuinely undirected is, instead, appropriate and phenomenologically more adequate than a description in terms of generalized directedness. This thus mean that the re-description suggested by SIAM is not entirely acceptable. Therefore, SIAM's strategy to solve the Incoherent Triad fails exactly for the same reasons SIAM fails to offer good candidate intentional objects.

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[26] Let me stress that this is not really against the claim I am making in this section. In this section, I am not claiming that moods like undirected anxiety have no object/content. What I am claiming, instead, is something weaker. Indeed, all I am saying is that, if moods like undirected anxiety have content and Intentionalism has to be true of them, then that content cannot be spelled out in terms of FCO or WAW, since the FCO cases and the WAW cases are substantively phenomenologically different from cases like undirected anxiety. So, FCO and WAW are not good candidates, since they are the only candidates proposed by SIAM, SIAM does not meet (C1).

[27] Notice that it might be that SIAM, as it stands, might not have the resources to deal with a departure from transparency, but some other version of Intentionalism might have the resources for that. I will discuss this possibility in Chapter 4.

Let me stress again the main point I have made in this section before moving to the next one. There are non-phenomenological reasons to doubt whether WAW is a good candidate intentional object for moods. This was Voltolini's point. My own point, instead, was that, even if we concede WAW to the supporter of SIAM, there are still also phenomenological reasons for the claim that SIAM does not satisfy (C1): describing every case of mood as representing FCO or WAW is *phenomenologically inadequate*. FCO and WA do not seem to be the intentional objects/contents of every mood, simply because (at least) some moods can be properly described as genuinely undirected experiences. Recall what I have pointed out in §2.1: (i) there is some minimal phenomenological condition for exhibiting directedness, *i.e.* being other-presenting, and (ii) the phenomenal character of the undirected anxiety-like cases is such that they do not satisfy that condition. Indeed, in undergoing them, nothing other then the experience itself seems to be presented to us. *This* is the reason why, in those cases, we say that we are not able to tell what those experiences represent. *This* is what makes them phenomenologically different from FCO cases and WAW cases. The fact that SIAM not only does not offer an account able to explain such a difference but also does not even notice the difference (or denies it) is what makes SIAM phenomenologically inadequate and explains the reason why it fails to satisfy (C1).

3. THE FAILURE OF IDENTIFICATION

If my arguments in §6 go through, then SIAM does not offer good candidate intentional objects/contents for moods, since they are not able to capture all the cases of phenomenal character associated with moods. However, this is not the only problem that SIAM has—or so I will argue in this section. In particular, I maintain, SIAM does not satisfy (C2), so it fails to identify phenomenal character and intentional content. In order to show that, I will assume, for the sake of the argument, that SIAM meets (C1) and, thereby, that all moods do represent general intentional objects/contents—*i.e.* FCO and WAW. In this way, I will offer another argument against SIAM that is also quite independent from the one I have given in the previous section.

Here is my plan for this section, then. In §3.1 I argue that, at least in some cases, the phenomenal character is not dependent on intentional content. To do that, I need not to appeal to the complicated cases like undirected anxiety or objectless depression or sudden elation. On the contrary, I will consider something "easier:" standard FCO moods—such as

irritation or nervousness—that seem to fit pretty well the model provided by SIAM. In §3.2 I defend the idea that FCO moods' phenomenal character is not dependent on intentional content from many possible intentionalist replies. The independence of phenomenal character from intentional content has two major consequences. The first is that phenomenal character is not identical to intentional content. Therefore, if SIAM satisfies (C1), then it does not satisfies (C2). So, SIAM is not a satisfying intentionalist account of moods and, thereby, does not solve the problem of moods. The second consequence is that FCO moods are not (fully) transparent experiences.

3.1. Independence of phenomenal character and intentional content

Le me start with stressing, once again, the difference between emotions and moods. First of all, for example, consider fear. Surely, being afraid of a dog feels different from, say, being afraid of the dark or being afraid of an exam or being afraid of flying, etc. The different objects one could be afraid of essentially contribute to the phenomenal character of the specific fear one is undergoing. If the object changes, then phenomenal character changes: different objects, different phenomenal characters. In addition, if the object disappears, fear disappears too. In other words, being afraid of a barking dog does not feel the same way as being afraid of taking a plane or as being afraid of the exam. Likewise, it cannot be that being afraid of a dog lasts over and beyond the dog being the intentional object of my fear.[28] In general, emotions not only represent (or exhibit directedness toward) a certain specific object, but are also strictly related to that object. That particular object being represented, indeed, plays an essential role in order for a certain emotion to stand and last. Thus, roughly, the connection between an emotion, its phenomenal character, and its intentional object/content is very strict.

By contrast, as we know, moods differ from emotions significantly exactly under this respect: they do not exhibit directedness and their lasting seems quite independent from whatever particular object might happen to come under the focus of one's experience. Suppose I am irritated or nervous. It seems typical of being in that sort of mood that I feel bothered/disturbed/frustrated by *any* thing I encounter (none of those things being the object of one's irritability) and that such an irritation lasts for a quite long time, independently of

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[28] One could protest that this is somewhat inaccurate and maintain that one could keep feeling afraid for quite a while after the scary object disappeared. To my mind, it is true that one might feel for quite a while uncomfortable, but this is a *consequence* of having been afraid, not being afraid itself.

each single object represented. As we know, this is explained by SIAM in terms of FCO: irritation is one of those moods that represent many different objects changing across the time.

Given that, it is plausible to say that what is represented at any given moment of time by moods like irritation or nervousness does not really contribute in any way to the individuation of the mood.[29] In other words, unlike emotions—and this is exactly the specificity of moods—, one and the same mood can exhibit directedness towards many different things at different times and still be the one and the same experience.[30] (This is, by the way, at least part of what vehicles the undirectedness typical of moods.) So, in short here is what we have in the case of moods: many objects, on the one hand, but the feeling of one, unitary, enduring experience, on the other. This sounds as a plausible description of the phenomenology of FCO moods— and this is what makes them quite different from emotions. One might, then, wonder and ask what explains such a unity, sameness, and continuity of the experience, given SIAM. This is not fully clear to me. To my mind, this is (at least) partially due to the fact that SIAM is ultimately not able to account for them. I will argue for that now.

Let us come back to Tye's (2008) explanation. He describes FCO moods as *dispositions to experience a certain emotion many times*. Indeed, in referring to road-rage, a case similar to irritation, he explicitly notes:

> Consider first the case of road rage. It is natural to think of this as a dispositional state, namely the disposition to experience anger at other drivers who drive too close or who block one's way. Each actual, token experience of anger in such a case is directed on one (or several) other driver(s). (Tye 2008: 43)

According to Tye, road-rage is a disposition to undergo many different token experiences of rage directed at different objects. In this way, each token experience has its own specific object.[31]

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[29] Recall that experiences are phenomenal states, so states that are individuated by their phenomenal character. See below fn. 30 and Chapter 1, §1.

[30] Recall, moods are phenomenal states, so their individuation is based on their phenomenal character. This means that, if a mood can be individuated independently of every specific object it might be representing at a given moment in time, then that object is not really an essential part of the phenomenal character of that mood. And, indeed, it seems possible that one feels irritated or nervous even in case no object is actually being represented as bothering/disturbing/frustrating. This seems to be true of irritation, nervousness and of many other similar moods as well—(at least) all those suitable for an analysis in terms of FCO. The different specific objects/contents those moods represent at any given moment of time, thus, do not seem to really contribute to their phenomenal character. This is a problem for SIAM, as long as it seems to leave room for some independency of phenomenal character from what is represented.

[31] To my mind, road-rage is not a neat case of mood, since rage is involved, and rage is an emotion. So, one could argue that the case offered by Tye is a little bit tendentious and selected *ad hoc*—or that he is modeling

The major problem here is the following: if Tye's analysis were correct, then an episode of irritation would be nothing over and above a mere collection (or succession or even an algebraic sum) of many distinct, detached, and discrete episodes of anger or rage happening at different points in time. Accordingly, the phenomenal character of irritation would be nothing over and above a succession of the many, different phenomenal characters of those different episodes of anger or rage. But that just seems phenomenologically quite wrong. As I have already noticed, in undergoing a mood like irritation, a subject has the impression of being in *one*, unitary, long-lasting experience (episode) rather than having the impression of going trough a collection of many short-lasting, detached, and distinct token emotional experiences (episodes) of anger or rage. In other words, there seems to be an *experienced continuity* between what happens at different times when one is irritable. Such a continuity is exactly what allows (or part of what allows) one to self-ascribe *one and the same* irritable mood as opposed to a succession many single episodes of anger or rage.[32]

Now, the unity, sameness, and continuity experienced in undergoing irritation, which are (at least) part of what it's like to undergo that mood, do not seem to depend at all on the represented object/content at any given time. On the contrary, they seems to be there, *independently of* what is represented, since the object/content varies across the time, but the mood in question feels exactly as one and the same experience. In other words, the mere succession of the many objects/contents of the many different episodes of fears might explain the fact that irritation does not exhibit directedness toward a specific object. Yet, this seems just too poor to capture the phenomenology of the whole experience. Indeed, when we feel irritated, we feel as if every single episodes of anger or rage were involved in one and the same long lasting overall experience of irritation (o nervousness). This is exactly what allows one to say that she is irritated as opposed to saying that she got angry many different times during the

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moods on emotions. However, let us bypass this problem: to my mind, it is plausible to assume that Tye would say exactly the same for irritation, which is sufficiently close to road-rage (although not the same thing) and, clearly, is also a mood. So, I will talk of irritation from now on.

[32] Moreover, such a continuity is also what makes really sense of the idea that a mood representing FCO does not exhibit directedness towards any specific object—an idea that Tye himself defends. Indeed, if there are many single token experiences coming one after the other, then each of them is focused on one specific object; so, as a matter of fact, each of them exhibits directedness toward that specific object. But, then, why should one defend the idea that moods are directed at nothing in particular? It would seem more coherent to say that there are many emotions, each of them having its own specific object, and that's it. On the contrary, if there is one unitary experience whose objects vary across the time, then the idea that that experience is directed at nothing in particular makes more sense.

day.[33] Tye's account, as it stands, is not able to explain those unity, sameness, and continuity, given that it is not clear what in content would explain those phenomenal components of the experience.

So, if the intentionalist is not able to explain these components of the phenomenal character of moods in terms of content, then this means that (at least) part of moods' phenomenal character does not depend on what (if any) they represent.

3.2. Replies

I come now consider the replies that a supporter of SIAM can provide to the arguments in the previous section. In particular, for the sake of simplicity, I will focus on the experienced continuity. Indeed, as I will argue, the replies are not satisfying. As a consequence, there is at least one component of the phenomenal character of moods like irritation or nervousness that does not depend on content. And this is enough for our scopes.

There are basically two strategies available to the intentionalist, at this point. One is accepting that the continuity is something experienced and, then, trying to account for it in terms of content. Call this *Conservative Strategy* (CS). The other is denying that the continuity is experienced—call this *Non-conservative Strategy* (NCS). I will argue that none of them is satisfying. I will start with CS, then I will move to NCS.

3.2.1. Conservative strategy

As far as I can see, there are three ways to pursue CS. I am going to discuss each of them separately.

Option 1: The evaluative property represented in the content is responsible for the continuity. In this case, the idea is that, since the evaluative property F represented as belonging to many different objects at different times is what does not vary in the content of a mood, it is a natural candidate to explain the continuity. The problem with this solution is the following. Take the case of fear. Suppose that you undergo a fear of a dog at t_1, then a fear of a snake at t_2, then a fear of the dark at t_3, and so on. Now, in these cases the dog, the snake, the dark, etc., are all represented as having the same evaluative property F—say, being dangerous. So, according to this explanation, there should be a phenomenal

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[33] I do not want to claim that this is true in every case. However, irritation and nervousness strike me as cases in which one is quite distinctly aware of the mood itself.

continuity between undergoing them such that you report what happened at t_1-t_3 as three moments of one and the same episode of fear. This is clearly wrong, though: you would not say something like that; rather you would say that you have gone through three different episodes of fear. So, now, if the evaluative property F being constantly represented does not lead to experience what happens in t_1-t_3 as one and the same episode, why should it be able to do that in the case of moods? Clearly, the same evaluative property F being represented in different contents guarantees a phenomenal similarity between different experiences. However, this, in itself, is still not sufficient to guarantee the experienced continuity of the experience.[34]

Option 2: The bodily feelings are responsible for the continuity. According to this solution, the modifications in the overall equilibrium of one's body are the responsible for the continuity of the experience. The idea is that different specific objects cause the same bodily feelings. This is not really convincing too, and the reasons for that are quite similar to the ones already provided against Option 2. Indeed, there is a strong connection between the evaluative property and the bodily reactions. According to SIAM, an object o is represented as F because it is represented as causing (or accompanied by) a specific pattern bodily reaction. So, it seems plausible to say that three episodes of fear e_1, e_2, e_3, happening at three different times t_1, t_2, and t_3, and representing (respectively) three different objects o_1, o_2, o_3 represent o_1, o_2, o_3 as having the same property F, because o_1, o_2, o_3 cause the same pattern of bodily reaction. However, again, e_1, e_2, and e_3 are experienced as three different episodes as opposed to one and the same. So, even the bodily changes do not seem to be enough to guarantee the experienced continuity in the case of emotions. Again, why should they guarantee such a continuity in the case of FCO moods?

Moreover, the patterns of bodily changes available seem to be less than the moods one should account for. So, it is possible that two moods, M and M', share the same patter of bodily reactions but are different moods that are experienced neither as one and the same mood nor as the same episode of the same mood.

Option 3: Every mood represents WAW. This solution is quite radical: it suggests we should drop an

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[34] If that was really the case, every time the same property is represented as belonging to two different objects o_1 and o_2, there should be a unitary, continuous experience. But that is clearly false. Consider another case: visual experiences. Suppose I represent a car as red at t_1 and a bike as red at t_2, what occurs at t_1 is not the same experience occurring at t_2.

account of moods' undirectedness in terms of FCO and embrace an account in terms WAW. The idea is that being directed at WAW guarantees the continuity of experience, since every single object entering in the focus of one's experience belongs to the world.[35] This proposal does not seem phenomenologically adequate, though. As I have noticed above (§2.1), there are genuine WAW cases. They have their own peculiar phenomenology and it sounds implausible that every case of mood could be reduced to that phenomenology. Moreover, in the genuine WAW cases the focus of one's experience is not on many specific targets, but on *all at once*, as it were, since the target is WAW. This seems to conflict with the phenomenology of moods like irritation or nervousness. Indeed, although they are not directed at anything particular, they do not seem to be directed at all at once either, but rather at many different objects at different times. Thus, an explanation in terms of FCO looks better.

Accordingly, none of the options of CS I have discussed above seem to work and be able to explain the experienced continuity of a mood experience in terms of content.

3.2.2. Non-conservative strategy

Since CS does not seem to work, the intentionalist could try to go with NCS: she could deny that there is any experienced continuity in undergoing a FCO mood. This amounts to defend the idea that there is no such a thing as a one and unitary experience of a mood, but just many emotional episodes whose frequency or recurrence is explained by the subject by appealing to a disposition to undergo those emotions. This self-attribution of that disposition would be the self-attribution of a mood. In this way, there would be no experienced continuity, but only an *ex post*, introspective reconstruction and, *based on that*, a self-attribution of the mood.

The main cost of this explanation is that it excludes that one can have direct, immediate awareness of being in a certain mood: such an awareness would be always reached by virtue of a direct awareness of the emotional episodes *plus* some sort of introspective reasoning on those episodes. This does not sound really plausible to me. However, I set this worry aside, and focus on the following two problems

First, the appeal to the frequency or recurrence of certain emotional experiences is not

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[35] Or, it would be better to say: one's world.

in itself sufficient to characterize what happens in undergoing a mood. Indeed, one could be disposed to frequently and recurrently undergo certain emotions—e.g., fear—due to one being a timorous person. Yet, this is a trait of the character of that person, and as such it is not the same thing as a mood. On the other hand, it might just be the other way around: one might undergo different episodes of fear, because one runs into many scary things, and that's it. That does not seem to require any disposition of the subject in order to be explained. (Rather, it could probably be explained in terms of disposition of a certain environment to cause experiences of fear to a subject.)

Second, NCS does not seem only a way of getting rid of the experienced continuity of a mood, but something more radical, namely, a way to get rid of the phenomenal character of the mood itself—and thereby of the problem itself. Indeed, if being in a certain mood is the result of an *ex post* reasoning based on a collection of one's own experiences in a given range of time, then, at a closer look, it seems there is nothing it is like to undergo that mood. This would be a really strong version of reductionism about moods' phenomenal character—to be fair, it sounds more like eliminativism. This is just *too strong*, even from the point of view of the intentionalist. Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that moods have their own peculiar phenomenal character, different from the phenomenal character of emotions. This is hard to deny. In addition, there seems to be no reasoning involved in self-attributing a certain mood. Finally, the explanation in terms of FCO was introduced exactly to explain the phenomenal character of some moods—namely their undirectedness—, and not to deny that those moods have a phenomenal character.

Tye (2008) seems to oscillate between defending a version of CS in terms of the first option and NCS. However, as long as both the position seems to fail, it is not very relevant to determine which position exactly Tye defends. (Moreover, independently of what Tye says, it is interesting to analyze and discuss the different options an intentionalist has.)

Nonetheless, there is a sense in which what Tye says is relevant, if one still wanted to try to defend Intentionalism. Indeed, to support Intentionalism, one might point out that Tye does not distinguish between emotions and moods, and so probably he does not even distinguish between moods' phenomenal character and emotions' phenomenal character. If so, then it could well be that undergoing a mood is nothing but undergoing a collection of many distinct token emotional experiences. In *this* sense, it would not be such a great scandal being eliminativist about moods' phenomenal character, after all. My reply to this objection is

two-fold.

First, one thing is true: Tye considers what I am calling moods as cases of emotions; yet, he does not seem to be eliminativist about moods' phenomenal character. Indeed, independently of the specific terminology he employs, he explicitly draws a phenomenological distinction close to the distinction I have drawn in §2: he acknowledges that there are some emotions that are not directed at anything in particular, but are of a more general sort. For example, this is what he says about Californian drivers' road-rage: "This is anger that is not directed against any one particular driver. It is anger of a more general sort" (Tye 2008: 43).

Second, regardless of what Tye says, an intentionalist could decide to be eliminativist about moods' phenomenal character. This, though, does not seem a very good choice, since nobody—not even those who defend SIAM—really wants to deny that moods have their own peculiar phenomenal character.

If this is correct, then NCS is not a good solution.

3.3. Final remarks

So, to sum up, it seems that defending the idea that moods represent FCO leads the intentionalist to the following dilemma: *either*

(i)   She accepts that there is an experienced continuity in undergoing a mood (CS), but then she has to admit that such a continuity is not dependent on the intentional content; *or*

(ii)   She rejects the experienced continuity (NCS), but then

(a)   It is obscure what distinguishes a mood from a trait of character, on the one hand, and singular contiguous episodes of emotion, on the other;

(b)   She also rejects that FCO moods have a phenomenal character of their own, and this is counter-intuitive.

Let me now add two important remarks, on order to block some possible confusion.

First, notice that this does not mean that an account in terms of FCO is wrong as an account of what moods like irritation or nervousness represent: one might well accept that FCO is a good way to account for certain moods' interntional content without accepting Intentionalism about moods—in particular, without accepting that moods' phenomenal character is entirely reducible to the FCO intentional content. The problem is that intentional

content alone does not seem to be able to account for the experienced continuity of that mood, which is what enables one (a) to tell that she is in a mood (as opposed to an emotion) and in that specific mood (e.g., irritation as opposed to gloominess), and (b) to say that that mood represents FCO.

Second, no appeal to the fact that the content is impure can solve the issue. Indeed, Impure Intentionalism—the variety of Intentionalism I am discussing here—introduces the notion of impure content (or impure properties) to explain why phenomenal content differs from other species of intentional content. However, this has to do with the represented properties of the represented objects. (Recall: that the properties figuring into content are impure means that they are *representationally* impure.[36])

Now, this does not help get rid of the problem I have raised here simply because the experienced continuity of, say, being irritated does not seem to be a represented property at all, but rather a property of the experience itself. So, appealing to some constraints on content does not help, if one has not already shown that that continuity depends on content—but SIAM does not offer any plausible candidate.[37] The appeal to impurity can help only to explain why a certain content starts to be such that there is something it is like to represent it, but does not help show that something is a component of the content.

If I am right and none of the counter-replies on the side of the intentionalist works, then it can be concluded that what guarantees the experienced continuity of a FCO mood is due to its phenomenal character—and, probably, to a certain typical pattern of felt intrinsic qualities of experience involved in undergoing that mood. As Kind (2013) notes, those qualities can vary and change in intensity, but they seem to do that quite independently of the many object a mood can be directed at. In undergoing a FCO mood we experience those qualities, and based on them we are able to pick out the specific mood we are in.

A first consequence, thus, is that the identification of phenomenal character and intentional content fails. Indeed, if FCO moods' phenomenal character varies independently of their intentional content, then it cannot be identical to it either. This means that SIAM

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[36] For example, if I believe that the car is red and I see that the car is red, there is a sense in which the content my belief and my experience represent is the same. However, the problem is that they do not have the same phenomenal character. So, to solve this issue, the idea behind Impure Intentionalism is that intentional content has to meet some further conditions in order to become phenomenal character. See Chapter 1, §3.

[37] Notice that in the case of vision the situation is the opposite: phenomenal properties appear as features of objects.

does not satisfy the constraint (C2).[38] Now, if we combine this result with the result of §6, then we should conclude that SIAM does not satisfy (C1) or, if it does, then it does not satisfy (C2), which is exactly what I wanted to defend in this chapter. Put it other way, SIAM does not jointly satisfy (C1) and (C2).

The other consequence of the independence of phenomenal character from intentional content is that the transparency thesis fails to apply (at least) to FCO moods. Indeed, according to transparency, in introspection one cannot be aware of non-represented components of phenomenal character. But, as I have just shown, at least in the case of FCO moods it seems definitely possible to be introspectively directly aware of some component of phenomenal character that are not represented, as long as it is possible to separate (at least partially) phenomenal character from what the experience represents: the experienced continuity of moods like irritation or nervousness does not seem to belong to content. So, FCO moods are not (fully) transparent.[39]

Notice that the reasons why FCO moods are not transparent are phenomenological— and, by the way, it would be hard to see how it could be otherwise. I am not drawing an inference of the following kind here: the phenomenal character of FCO moods is not entirely reducible to content, therefore FCO moods are not (fully) transparent experiences. What I want to stress is that there are phenomenological reasons to accept the claim that FCO mood are not transparent and those reasons have been brought up to the surface during the discussion on whether or not FCO moods' phenomenal character is identical to their intentional content. There are thus phenomenological reasons in support of that claim that it is not, and the same reasons support the claim that FCO moods are not (fully) transparent. In other words, the analyses and the considerations offered in this section lead to two conclusions at the same time. This is a further sign of the strong connection obtaining between Intentionalism and transparency.

What about the transparency of cases like undirected anxiety, instead? As I have said, I will deal with this question in the next chapter.

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[38] Notice that this conclusion is particularly strong. Indeed, if phenomenal character is (at least to some extent) independent from intentional content, then not only is it false that phenomenal character is identical to intentional content, but also it is false that phenomenal character supervenes on intentional content. Accordingly, even Weak Intentionalism is targeted by this conclusion.

[39] I am using the expression "not (fully) transparent" to convey the intuitive idea that, introspectively, content is available but, on the other, hand it is also possible to spot some non-represented component of the experience.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, in this chapter, I introduced SIAM and argued against it. In particular, I defended this disjunctive claim: Intentionalism about moods does not satisfy (C1) or, if it does, then it fails to satisfy (C2). This is the way I got to this result.

Concerning the first disjunct, as Voltolini (2013) points out, WAW does not meet the formal conditions to be a good candidate intentional object. In addition, and that was my own argument, FCO and WAW are not phenomenologically adequate to capture cases like undirected anxiety, objectless depression, sudden elation, basically due to phenomenological reasons. Those moods, indeed, lack the minimal phenomenological conditions for being described as directed experiences. So they are not cases of generalized directedness. Therefore, FCO and WAW do not apply. I have defended this claim against some possible rejonders coming from the intentionalist (§2).

Finally (§2), I moved to defend the second disjunct: if SIAM satisfies (C1), it does not satisfy (C2). Here I have assumed for the sake of the argument that (C1) is satisfied and argued that in at least one case, the FCO moods, the phenomenal character of the experience is (at least) partially independent of the content. My argument was, again, based on phenomenological observations and, in particular, on the fact that there is an experienced continuity in the experience of undergoing FCO moods that cannot be accounted for in terms of content. Due to the same reasons I have also concluded that FCO cases are not (fully) transparent experiences.

CHAPTER 4

THE EDENIC INTENTIONALIST

ACCOUNT OF MOODS

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

In the previous chapter I was concerned with the Standard Intentionalist Account of Moods (SIAM). As I argued, in the best case, it is not able to preserve the identity of phenomenal character to intentional content and the transparency of moods; in the worst, it does not even provide good candidate intentional objects/content for moods. Accordingly, it is not a satisfying intentionalist solution to the problem of moods.

I will consider now a different intentionalist option recently put forward by Angela Mendelovici (2013a, 2013b). I call it *Edenic Intentionalist Account of Moods* (EIAM). In three, very short sentences, here is the proposal she advances: some moods do not exhibit directedness. This is because they do not represent *any* object.[40] However, they still represent something, namely, *unbound affective properties*. This proposal, thus, on the one hand, grants to the anti-intentionalist that there are genuinely undirected moods; on the other, it aims at showing that

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[40] Clearly, here "object" does not mean intentional object, but something more restricted. "Object" here means something pretty close to ordinary object, or ordinary object *plus* general objects like WAW. According to *this* use of "object," thus, entities such as, e.g., properties are not objects. On the contrary, they can be considered intentional objects, since the notion of *intentional object* is wider. This is a substantial point. I will come back on that later in §1.6.

Intentionalism is able handle and account for those cases too. As we already know, this is another way (very different from SIAM) to face the challenge raised by the Incoherent Triad and solve the conflict between the phenomenological datum that moods are undirected and the theoretical commitments of Intentionalism.

In this chapter, I present and discuss this account. After introducing it (§1), I will argue that EIAM is committed to accept that undirected moods are not transparent, as long as it grants that they are genuinely undirected. In this way, I will settle the question of the transparency of undirected moods left open in the previous chapter and, thereby, draw my first conclusion: undirected moods are opaque experiences (§2). This has two main consequences. One concerns transparency itself: given the results, the transparency-thesis is either to be revised or to be rejected. However, I will not address this problem here, but I postpone it until Chapter 6. The second consequence concerns EIAM itself. As I will argue, indeed, without the introspective evidence provided by transparency, the strength of Mendelovici's proposal is reduced: it might be convincing from an intentionalist point of view, but it is not fully convincing from a theory-neutral standpoint. So, this will be my second conclusion (§§ 3, 4).

1. EIAM INTRODUCED

In this section, I present Mendelovici's account. In order to properly understand her view, it might be useful to say something on the account of emotion she provides (§§1.1-1.4) and then move to moods (§§1.5, 1.6). Indeed, what she defends is an intentionalist unitary view, and she puts particular emphasis on the phenomenal continuity between moods and emotions.[41]

1.1. The content of emotions

Let me start with contrasting emotions with perceptual experience. If one sees a barking dog, one will experience a certain object as having certain properties, which are ordinarily represented by perceptual experiences—in this case, as having a certain size, hair of a certain

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[41] Notice that this does not necessarily commit Mendelovici to claim that moods and emotions are one and the same class of affective states. Indeed, she does not take a stand on that, but just assumes that moods and emotions are psychological kinds, picked out by ostension of typical cases (see Mendelovici, 2013b).

color, etc.[42] However, according to Mendelovici, if one is *afraid* of a barking dog, then one is not only perceiving the dog as having certain properties available to perception, but she is also experiencing the dog as *scary*.[43] In other words, in being afraid of a barking dog, one has an *emotional experience* of the dog itself. The phenomenal character of this kind of experience seems to be a distinctive one and outruns the phenomenal character of an ordinary perceptual experience. Thus, the specificity of emotional experiences is presenting us with *emotionally* qualified objects (as opposed to *perceptually* qualified objects).

According to Mendelovici, thus, emotional experiences represent their object as having certain emotional qualities. Those emotional qualities she calls *affective properties*. Scariness is an example of affective property. More generally, it seems possible to get an affective property from every emotional predicate that can qualify an object an emotion represents. In the next subsections I will focus on affective properties, in order to further articulate and clarify Mendelovici's proposal.

1.2. Accounts of affective properties

Why affective properties? According to Mendelovici, an account of emotions' intentional content in terms of affective properties offers the best explanation of the distinctive phenomenal character of emotions. As pointed out about above, being afraid of a dog does not seem to be reducible to perceiving a dog. Moreover, being scary seems to be a property *of* the dog, something that somehow belongs to (or qualifies) it. An account in terms of affective properties best explains these two phenomenological facts quite easily.[44] In addition, it is able

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[42] Whether or not properties like being dog and barking figure in the content of the perceptual experience is something I leave open here. If one believes that natural kinds can be perceived, then the object is also perceived as a dog; otherwise, it is not and the content <o is a dog> is the content of a perceptual belief. The same goes with barking, *mutatis mutandis*. For the sake of simplicity, hereafter I will refer to the object of perception as a dog, although in this way I do not want to commit to the idea that perceptions represent natural kinds.

[43] In this section, since I am just presenting Mendelovici's view, I will report her description of the phenomenology of emotion without putting into question whether or not, or to what extent, it is adequate. I will make some remarks on her phenomenological considerations on emotions in §4.

[44] The concurrent explanations for emotional phenomenal character are in terms of bodily states and intentional objects. Before advancing the proposal of affective properties, Mendelovici considers these options and argues that both are not satisfying, as long as they do not seem to be capable to fully account for the distinctive phenomenal character of emotions. The bodily states account explains the phenomenal character of emotions in terms of bodily reactions: emotions are bodily perceptions, so they involve a certain awareness of some bodily states. For example, rage involves that one's heart starts racing, that one's blood pressure starts raising, and so on. Against this view Mendelovici raises two standard objections. First, it seems that different emotions are associated with the same bodily state and so with the awareness of the same bodily states. Second, according to this account, emotions seem to be inwardly directed, so it is not clear how to account for the outward directedness that emotions exhibit. As for the intentional object account, it maintains that the phenomenal character of an

to explain the differences between the different emotional state-types in terms of content: they are due to the different represented affective properties represented—fear represents scariness, joy joyfulness, frustration being frustrating, etc. But, what do affective properties exactly amount to?

Mendelovici lists three possible candidates compatible with Intentionalism: physical properties, response-dependent properties, and Edenic properties.

Option 1: Physical ordinary properties. According to an account in terms of physical properties, affective properties would be properties of the same kind as, say, having a mass or being a table. Thus, they would be subject-independent properties that can be instantiated by the mind-independent objects of the world.

Option 2: Response-dependent properties. According to an account in terms of response-dependent properties, affective properties would be dispositions of the objects to cause certain effects or mental reactions in the subject. For example, the scariness of a dog would be the disposition of the dog to cause a certain state, fear, and some behavioral/physical reactions (e.g., trembling or escaping) in us. Clearly, on such an account, affective properties would be relational (as opposed to monadic) properties.

Option 3: Edenic properties. In order to be properly grasped, this option requires that the notions of *Eden* and *Edenic properties* be briefly introduced. Chalmers (2006) argues that taking our visual experience *at face value* provides us with certain visual qualities (such as colors, shapes, etc.) presented as primitive properties instantiated by objects.[45] For example, if I see a red car, the face value of such a visual experience is that I am confronted with a non-further reducible property, redness, qualifying the car I am seeing. Very roughly, the scenario in which the phenomenal character of our visual experience, taken at face value, perfectly matches the objective structure of the outside world is what captures the idea of Eden.[46] More precisely, in Chalmers' own words, *Eden* (or an *Edenic world*)[47] is "a

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emotion is due to the intentional objects represented by that emotion. Mendelovici points out that, although is plausible that the specific object represented contributes to the phenomenal character, it is not sufficient to explain the phenomenal differences between a perceptual experience of a dog and an emotional experience of a dog. The object is the same, but the phenomenal character is different.

[45] By "primitive property" here I mean to refer to a property that is not reducible to any other property and thereby is to be assumed as part of the fundamental metaphysical structure of the world.

[46] Chalmers discusses whether Eden and Edenic worlds are metaphysically possible worlds. He declares he is inclined to say that they are. However, I set this discussion aside here, since it is not crucial for the present purposes. For more details see Chalmers (2006: §9).

world with respect to which our visual experience is perfectly veridical" (Chalmers 2006: 75). "Perfect match"—or more or less equivalently "perfect veridicality"—here means that the way one visually *perceives* the world to be is exactly the way Eden *is*—at least, with respect to what one visually perceives. For example, colors are presented by visual experience, taken at face value, as a primitive qualities instantiated by objects. Accordingly, Eden is the world in which colors, as we perceive them, are primitive (and probably monadic) properties instantiated by objects—so, they are part of the primitive structure of Eden and are exactly as we perceive them to be. The same goes for all the other visual phenomenal primitives we are presented with by our experience taken at face value. Those properties that are primitives in Eden are *Edenic properties*.

Now, clearly, we do not live in Eden. Indeed, as we *came to know*, there is a mismatch between the way *we perceive* the world to be and the way the world *is*. For example, we know that colors as we perceive them—whatever they might be—do not belong to the primitive structure of our world and thereby are not primitive properties instantiated by the objects of our world. So, even in case our visual experience is veridical, and reliably keeps track of the outside world, it still does not perfectly match it.[48] In the case of colors, some physical or dispositional properties are responsible for our color-experiences, and our veridical experiences usually keep track of them. However, those properties are not colors, if by "colors" we mean those phenomenal qualities of objects, available to visual perception, we are familiar with. Eden and Edenic properties, thus, are for us just a matter of phenomenology. To put it other way and borrow a famous locution due to Wilfrid Sellars (1963), they are the (phenomenally) *manifest image* of the outside world, as we receive it through visual perception.

An Edenic account of affective properties takes this picture suggested by Chalmers and extends it to emotional experiences. Thus, the idea is considering affective properties as primitives of Eden. In particular, they would be those emotional qualities that our emotional experience, taken at face value, presents us with. In being afraid of a dog, I experience the dog as scary, and scariness is presented to me as qualifying the dog in

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[47] In principle, there is a slight difference between using "Eden" and "Edenic world." The second is probably more precise because it alludes to a set of possible words rather than alluding to one word. However, whether an Edenic scenario is one possible world or a set of possible worlds is not really relevant for the present purposes. So, for seek of simplicity, here I will use simply "Eden."

[48] According to Chalmers this is *imperfect* veridicality, which he distinguishes from the *perfect* veridicality mentioned before (see Chalmers, 2006: 73).

more or less the same manner as redness is presented to me as qualifying a car, when I see a red car.[49] On such a view, affective properties would be *sui generis* properties—*i.e.*, they would not be reducible to other properties, physical or response-dependent. Moreover, they would be *subjective* properties: since we do not live in Eden, affective properties are not instantiated by any object of our world, but are only components of the phenomenal character of our emotional experience.

1.3. Affective properties as Edenic properties

Among those listed above Mendelovici (2013b) endorses the third option and argues against the other two. Her argument is at the best explanation:

> The main advantage of the Edenic view over other versions of intentionalism about emotions is that it gets the phenomenology right. By taking emotion experiences at face value, it delivers affective properties that are phenomenologically familiar. Another advantage of the Edenic view is that it can automatically account for the phenomenal difference between emotions and emotion-related thoughts. Consider the cases of fearing a dog, on the one hand, and believing that a dog is scary, on the other. On both the ordinary physical properties view and the response-dependent view, both mental states arguably attribute the same properties to the same object. We have a case of two experiences that are intentionally alike but phenomenally different, which is a counterexample to intentionalism. (Mendelovici, 2013b: 139)

Affective properties are supposed to explain the distinctive phenomenal character of emotions and, in particular, to explain (i) what makes the case that emotions have the phenomenal character they do, and (ii) what distinguishes emotions from other experiences and states. So, the properties they amount to must fit (i) and (ii). Now, according to Mendelovici, both physical ordinary properties and response-dependent properties do not seem capable to do that. Here are the reasons she provides.

First of all, they do not take the phenomenology of emotions right. On the one hand, ordinary physical properties seem phenomenologically "foreign" to what emotional experience presents us with. For example, it is hard to see how the representation of some physical properties of a dog can be turned into the phenomenologically familiar experience of fearing the dog. On the other hand, response-dependent properties do not seem to take phenomenology right in the sense that it seems phenomenologically inadequate to say that, in undergoing an emotion, we represent an object as having the disposition to cause or elicit

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[49] Clearly, I do not mean here that they do in the same *phenomenal* manner. Rather, I mean that both qualify objects.

certain (physical or behavioral) reactions in us. Again, according to Mendelovici, the dog's being scary does not seem to be a relational property of the dog, but rather a monadic property it appears to instantiates—scariness seems to be a quality of the dog in the same way redness appears to be a property of a red car.

Secondly, both ordinary physical properties and response-dependent properties do not seem to be able to account in terms of content alone for what distinguishes emotions from emotion-thoughts. If being afraid of a dog amounts to represent its being scary and the scariness represented by fear is just a physical or dispositional property of the dog, then it is just not clear what distinguishes the fear of the dog from, say, the belief that the dog is scary. It seems plausible to say that, if one believes that a dog is scary, then one is representing the dog as having a certain physical or dispositional property. But, if exactly the same property is part of the content of the experience of fear, then being afraid a dog and believing that the dog is scary have exactly the same content. However, they differ in phenomenal character.[50] It is, thus, not clear what should account for this difference.

One immediate rejoinder available to the intentionalist *à la* Tye here is arguing that emotions are PANIC states.[51] As such, they have non-conceptual content: the latter explains the difference in phenomenal character between believing that the dog is scary and being afraid of the dog. In other words, this reply suggests an impure intentionalist account. According to Mendelovici, however, this is not convincing: introducing impure (non-representational) elements[52] does not solve the issue. In short, it is not clear how exactly those impure elements (that are phenomenologically foreign) give rise to the phenomenologically familiar qualities one experiences. That does not seem to be explained by this move. Yet, on the other hand, this is exactly what is to be explained by an intentionalist account. In Mendelovici's own words:

> This appeal to nonconceptual content is unconvincing. It's unclear how representing a property in a way that does not allow me to reidentify it on multiple occasions entirely occludes its representational content to me. It's also unclear how, on a view like Tye's, the phenomenologically familiar phenomenal characters of emotions arise from the occluded representation of phenomenologically foreing properties. … [I]t' s unclear just how this proposal can be made work. Since being nonconceptual is arguable a nonrepresentational feature of

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[50] One could maintain that belief does not have any phenomenal character, in which case things are even worst.

[51] See Chapter 1, §7.

[52] See Chapter 1, §3.

mental states, Tye's view is a version of impure intentionalism. … The intentionalist focuses here efforts on showing that representational content is relevant to phenomenal character, but is she is to appeal to impure factors, she must motivate the relevance of those factors as well. In cases where the representational contents attributed to a state are phenomenologically foreign, she must make plausible the claim that impure factors can turn the phenomenologically foreign contents into phenomenologically familiar phenomenal characters. It's difficult to see how this can be motivate in the case of Tye's nonconceptual contents, and one might worry that it is likely to be similarly difficult to motivate other attempts to make impure elements do similar work." (Mendelovici, 2013b: 165-7)

On the other hand, an Edenic account does not suffer from these problems. It has the great advantage of taking phenomenology right. Indeed, on an Edenic view, since experience is taken at the face value, affective properties are identified with those qualities that the phenomenal character of experience presents us with. For this reason, they cannot be phenomenologically unfamiliar (or foreign) to us. In addition, the Edenic view is able to account for the differences between emotions and emotions-thoughts just in terms of content. Indeed, the property represented by the belief that the dog is scary is not the same as the scariness represented by the fear of a dog.[53]

From all this is also clear that EIAM counts as a version of Pure Intentionalism, as long as it does not appeal to any non-representational feature of content.

1.4. Emotions as reliable misrepresentations

At this point, one might protest that such an account has (at least) one huge drawback. If affective properties are Edenic properties, then they do not correspond to any instantiated property in the outside world. So, to put it again in Sellars' terminology, an Edenic account seems to take quite right the (phenomenally) manifest image of the world, but what about the *scientific* image of the world? In other words, one might be worried that the view does not (perfectly) fit and accommodate the scientific picture of the world and, thereby, is not able explain the relation between what we represent and what is actually out there. In that case, we would be left with a somewhat discomforting, non-unitary, and puzzling general picture, whose elements do not seem to perfect combine with each other. If so, the view would not be so appealing, after all.

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[53] One might be worried by this appeal to *sui generis* properties. In other words, the natural question here is: Isn't this a way to posit new entities whose existence we are committing to? Mendelovici's reply is that, in fact, her proposal does not commit her to the existence of Edenic affective properties. She insists that her claim is just that affective states *represent* those properties: this does not amount to say that they exist or are instantiated.

Mendelovici acknowledges that affective properties, so characterized, are foreign to our scientific image of the world: there is no emotion-independent evidence for their existence and it is highly implausible that objects do instantiate these properties. Yet, she has a proposal to bridge the gap between what is phenomenally manifest and our scientific knowledge. This can be reconstructed in two steps. First, it is to be explained how we come to (mistakenly) attribute to objects properties they actually do not have. In this regard, she suggests that the intentionalist can plausibly adopt *figurative projectivism* (Shoemaker, 1991). According to such a view, we (mistakenly) attribute certain properties—affective properties in this case—to objects as a result of our interests, mental features or constitution.[54]

Second, in order to explain the relation between the content of emotions and the properties actually instantiated by the objects in the outside world, she exploits the notion of *reliable misrepresentation* (Mendelovici, 2010, 2013c): emotions would be reliable misrepresentations. In other words, although emotional representations are never veridical—or, in Chalmers' term, they are never perfectly veridical—, they are still reliable in that they "misrepresent in the same way all or most of the time" (Mendelovici, 2013b: 138). Emotional representations, thus, keep track of a complex disjunctive set of actually instantiated properties that, due to different reasons, are relevant for our cognitive system. For example, in the outside world there is no such a thing as scariness as received from our experience taken at face value. So, the dog we are afraid of does not instantiate scariness—it just *phenomenally appears* to do that. In this sense, fear misrepresents. However, even though it misrepresents the dog as scary, fear still tracks some property that is actually instantiates by the dog—e.g., the property of being harmful or threatening. Every time (or most of the times) this property is actually instantiated by the dog, fear misrepresents the dog as being scary. In this sense, it is reliable.

1.5 From emotions to moods

To sum up thus, according to Mendelovici, emotions represent objects as instantiating affective properties (or, equivalently, affective properties as instantiated by objects). Affective

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[54] Following Shoemaker (1991), Mendelovici contrasts figurative projectivism with *literal projectivism*, the view defended by Boghossian and Velleman (1989, 1991), according to which the properties we (mistakenly) attribute to objects are instantiated by experience. Mendelovici argues that a figurative projectivism is the option that an intentionalist must follow, since literal projectivism seems to be committed to non-representational *qualia*, and this is an option that the intentionalist cannot account for. I will not offer more details on that heret: for more on projectivism see Boghossian and Velleman (1989, 1991), Bourget and Seager (2007: 266-8), Shoemaker (1991), Wright (2003).

properties are the emotional qualities provided as primitives by the phenomenal character of emotional experience taken at face value. Accordingly, they are Edenic properties. In this way, the intentional content perfectly matches the phenomenal character of emotions: they are literally *identical*. However, intentional content does not match what (if any) is in the outside world in that it systematically represents objects as instantiating properties that are actually not instantiated (or, equivalently, properties that are actually not instantiated as instantiated).[55] In *this* sense emotions misrepresent. On the other hand, they are reliable as long as this is the way they keep track of the (non phenomenally manifest) property actually instantiated by the represented object.

So much for emotions. What about moods? From the point of view of their phenomenal character, moods are very similar to emotions, according to Mendelovici. She accepts SIAM's proposal that, in some cases, moods represent intentional objects such as the world as a whole (WAW) or at frequently changing objects (FCO). More precisely, her proposal is that, exactly as in the case of emotions, moods represent their objects as instantiating affective properties. So, for example, a case of elation directed at WAW, represents WAW as joyful—or something along these lines.

On the other hand, she also wants to allow for genuinely undirected moods, *i.e.* moods that do not exhibit directedness (or just undirected moods). So, she maintains that at least some moods—such as undirected anxiety, objectless depression, sudden elation, etc.—do not exhibit directedness toward *any* object, general or specific. This is an important point of disagreement between Mendelovici and SIAM: the latter, indeed, understands moods' undirectedness as generalized directedness and, for this reason, does not seem to take right the phenomenology of moods.[56] By contrast, the former wants to take phenomenology at face value and, thereby, she accepts genuine undirectedness. But, how can undirected moods be intentional if they are genuinely undirected? In other words, how can Intentionalism be combined with the proposal of accepting genuinely undirected moods?

Mendelovici's proposal goes as follows. She maintains that undirected moods do not represent *any* object. Yet, this does not mean that they do not represent anything at all. Indeed, according to Mendelovici, undirected represent *unbound* affective properties, *i.e.*

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[55] This is a relevant difference between Mendelovici's Intentionalism and an Intentionalism *à la* Tye. According to the latter, indeed, experiences are reliable representations: phenomenal character fully matches the content and the represented properties are instantiated properties of objects.

[56] See Chapter 3, §2.

affective properties not qualifying any object. This would explain their phenomenal character, and in particular the fact that they do not exhibited directedness. For example, objectless depression would represent unbound pointlessness (on the assumption that pointlessness is the right affective property involved by depression); sudden elation would represent unbound joyfulness, and so on. In Mendelovici's own words:

> While I think there are many cases of moods that are directed at ourselves, the world as a whole, or indeterminate or changing objects, I also want to allow for genuinely undirected moods. Undirected moods seem to be a lot like directed moods and emotions, except that they lack intentional objects. My suggestion is to accept this appearance at face value. My proposal is that moods are what we get when we have an emotion without an intentional object: a representation of *a mere affective property*. (Mendelovici, 2013b: 141)[57]

Now, if Mendelovici is right, then EIAM looks better than SIAM in that it respects the phenomenology of moods, at the same time, is able to explain it—whereas SIAM does not seem to be fully satisfying in both these regards.[58],[59] Moreover, (a) her account explains the phenomenal continuity[60] between emotions and moods—which is due to emotions and moods representing exactly the same kind of properties; yet, (b) it also explains the phenomenal discontinuity between affective states—which is due to the fact that moods are not directed at object. Finally, since affective properties are both phenomenal properties and represented by moods, the account preserves the main claim of Intentionalism: the identity of phenomenal character and intentional content. So, every variation in the former corresponds to a variation in the latter. In particular, the phenomenal difference between a directed mood and an undirected one is due to the following difference in content: the former represents an affective property F as instantiated by an object, the latter represents an affective property F' unbound.

1.6 Further clarifications

Some further clarifications are now in order. First of all, that affective properties are represented unbound does not mean that they are represented as *non-instantiated*. Rather,

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[57] Emphasis mine.

[58] See Chapter 3, §2.

[59] For a full comparison of SIAM and EIAM see Chapter 5, §2.

[60] The phenomenal continuity between moods and emotions basically articulates in two facts. First, moods and emotions seem to involve the very same qualities. Second, for every emotion there seems to be a correspondent mood.

instances of affective properties are actually represented, the point is they do not qualify any object.

Second, as far as I can see, that affective properties are represented unbound does not mean that they are represented *as* (being) unbound. In order to appreciate the difference, consider the following to statements:

(1)   M represents WAW as F

(2)   M represents F as unbound

(3)   M represents (the property) F.

In (1) M is a directed mood that represents WAW as instantiating a certain affective property F; in (2) being unbound is represented as a property of an affective property F and explicitly figures in the content as one of its components; in (3) the affective property F is the only component of the content and, thereby, the content is objectless. As far as I can see, (3) is the most plausible candidate to capture what Mendelovici has in mind. Using "unbound" to qualify the represented affective property is just a way of specifying that the content of undirected moods does not contain any object, but a mere property. Moreover, if (2) were the right interpretation, then undirected moods would have a very complicated content: something pretty close to the content of an introspective belief—or something similar.[61] And this just sounds as an over-intellectualization of the experience.

Third, according to EIAM, moods are objectless but contentful. Here the following clarification is important. As Mendelovici uses it, "object" does not seem to be equivalent to "intentional object"—at least it is not equivalent to the understanding of intentional object we have been working so far. Indeed, in denying that moods have an object, Mendelovici seems to use the word "object" to refer to ordinary objects *plus* the special objects that can be represented by moods (WAW and FCO). Yet, the notion of *intentional object* is wider: for example, properties can be intentional objects, but are not objects in the previous sense.[62] Thus, when it will be relevant to disambiguating between the two understandings of "object," I will mark the difference in the following way: I will use "object*" to refer to the narrower

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[61] At best, one could argue that F is represented as unbound by introspection on the undirected mood.

[62] Indeed, properties are not ordinary objects or special objects, but can well be intentional objects.

notion and "object**" to refer to the wider. When the distinction is not necessary, I will instead use "object."

Fourth, there are two worries one might naturally have, at this point. First of all, if one understands intentional content in terms of accuracy, conditions of satisfaction, etc., then one might be worried by the fact that the content of undirected moods, on EIAM, is not captured by a proposition. So, how to count unbound properties as intentional content? Secondly, *prima facie*, unbound properties seem a very unusual sort of content. So, as Kind (2013) points out, since the plausibility of EIAM largely rests on the possibility of representing unbound properties, one might wonder what such a representations would exactly amount to and whether there are any other examples of representations of unbound properties.

Mendelovici treats these two worries as two parts of one and the same problem: the problem of whether or not unbound properties *can* be represented. First of all, she argues that intentional states need not to represent propositional content. So, she is believes in non-propositional content.[63] Take, for instance, the case of love: it does not seem to have propositional content, but it is still intentional. The same seems to be true of concepts:

> For example, the concept CAT can occur outside the context of a propositional mental state. This occurs when we just think *cat* without thinking that anything is a cat or any other proposition concerning cats. Just as you can think about your mother without thinking any proposition involving your mother, the idea of a cat can occur to you without you thinking any proposition about a cat. That we can have such states is introspectively obvious. (Mendelovici, 2013a: 131)

Instead of objects, however, predicative concepts represent properties. Thus, according to Mendelovici, concepts are not only examples of non-prospositional representations, but are also examples of representations of unbound properties. Predicative concepts, like CAT, represent properties. Yet, in doing that, they need not to qualify any object: we can just think the content <cat> without thinking that anything is a cat (Mendelovici, 2013b: 141). This should offer a reason to believe that mere properties not qualifying any object can be represented. So, the idea is: although the most familiar type of content has an object-property structure, the latter need not to be necessarily the structure of every case of intentional content.

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[63] See Chapter 1, §2.

2. UNDIRECTED MOODS ARE NOT TRANSPARENT

In this section, I argue that EIAM *cannot* preserve the transparency of undirected moods and is committed to accept that they are not transparent, as long as it accepts that there are genuinely undirected moods. Indeed, if an experience does not exhibit directedness—*i.e.* it is genuinely undirected—, then it also lacks the minimal condition to be transparent—or so I will argue. On the one hand, this result answers to the question concerning the transparency of undirected moods I left open in the previous chapter. On the other hand, it has relevant consequences both on transparency and on EIAM itself. I will deal with the consequences on EIAM in this chapter (§§3, 4), while I postpone until Chapter 6 the consequences on transparency.

As we know, Mendelovici wants to allow for undirected moods. She does that for two reasons. The first is that she wants to make her account phenomenologically more plausible than SIAM. So, on this point, we are on the same board: there are at least some moods whose phenomenal character simply cannot be adequately phenomenologically described in terms of generalized directedness.[64] The second reason is that acknowledging this point and offering a way to account for such a phenomenal character in intentionalist terms makes her proposal very strong.

Now, after allowing for undirected moods, Mendelovici denies that those experiences represent any object*. However, on her view, they still represent something, *i.e.* unbound affective properties. At this point, thus, it might be natural to ask whether or not undirected moods exhibit directedness toward the affective property they represent. Call this property-directedness. This is not clear, based on what Mendelovici says. However, as far as I can see, given the purposes of her account, she is committed to say that moods do not exhibit property-directedness, if she really wants to grant that there are at least some genuinely undirected moods. I will argue for that in what follows.

Let me start with assuming, for the sake of the argument, that those experiences that Mendelovici calls "undirected moods" do in fact exhibit property-directedness. If so, then that some moods appear genuinely undirected would just mean that they do not exhibit directedness toward any object*—call this object*-directedness. Now, if that is really what Mendelovici means, then it is hard to see why she talks of genuine undirectedness. Indeed, she

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[64] See Chapter 3, §2.

would just be proposing another way of re-describing moods' undirectedness in terms of a certain directedness, and her proposal would not be so different from SIAM's, after all. Only, instead of proposing a description of undirected moods' phenomenal character in terms of generalized directedness (as SIAM does), she would be describing it in terms of property-directedness. In that case, her proposal would suffer from the following two problems: (i) she would not really be allowing for genuinely undirected moods, since property-directedness does not count as a case of genuine undirectedness;[65] (ii) she would not really be granting the phenomenological point she wants to grant to the anti-intentionalist and, thereby, the strength of her proposal would be significantly affected.

Accordingly, if Mendelovici really wants to grant that some moods appear genuinely undirected, then she has to concede also that *no* directedness is exhibited by those moods.[66] Indeed, this is (i) what allowing for genuinely undirected moods requires and (ii) what the anti-intentionalist's description of the phenomenology of undirected moods amounts to. This then means that undirected moods do not exhibit property-directedness.

Moreover, and this is a second and more important point, Mendelovici's motivation in conceding to the anti-intentionalist that at least some moods do not exhibit directedness is rooted in the phenomenal character of those experiences themselves. Now, that phenomenal character itself leads to conclude that no property-directedness is exhibted by undirected moods. As we saw in Chapter 3 (§2), undirected moods' phenomenal character is such that they seem to lack the minimal phenomenological condition for being described as directed experiences, namely, being other-presenting experiences—in undergoing them, nothing *other than* the experience itself seems to be involved in the experience. On the one hand, this clearly means that no (apparently) mind-independent object* is involved in the experience. On the other, it also means that the affective qualities that *are* involved do not appear to be (or belong to) something other than the experience itself. And, as far as I can see, this just means that no

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[65] Indeed, genuine undirectedness is when *no* intentional object/content is part of what is phenomenally manifest to the subject when she undergoes a certain experience. Suppose that an experience E exhibits property-directedness. If so, then a property P is E's intentional object and is also part of what is phenomenally manifest to the subject, when she undergoes E. Therefore, E cannot be genuinely undirected. One reply here could be restricting the sense of "genuine undirectedness," but that does not touch the main point, which is phenomenological: undirected moods do not seem to involve any intentional object.

[66] In other words, they do not exhibit directedness toward any object** at all, and not only toward any object*.

property-directedness is exhibited, as long as introspection does not reveal the qualities involved in the experience as the intentional objects of the experience.[67]

Now, to my mind, this strongly suggests a further point: that undirected moods lack the minimal condition for being *transparent experiences* too.[68] Indeed, when one introspects an undirected mood, no intentional object (of whatever sort) is introspectively revealed/manifest. This means that the intentional content/object of an undirected mood (if any) is not immediately introspectively available. It is, thus, hard for me to see in what way (or sense) such an experience could be transparent. This is a somewhat intuitive way to put my point, I will try to better spell it out now in what follows.

Consider, first, a neat case of transparency: visual experiences. What one gets from introspection on them are (apparently) external,[69] mind-independent objects***** and some other features—such colors and shapes—that appear as properties of those (apparently) external, mind-independent objects*****. The objects and the properties introspectively appear to be other than the experience itself. And this conveys the strong impression of being introspecting the content of the experience (as opposed to our experience) and makes visual experiences fully transparent. (It also provides the main motivation to consider the visual qualities involved in visual experiences as represented properties.) As Frey (2013) notes, the phenomenal character of transparent experiences cannot lack this minimal feature of being other-presenting:

> It seems that no matter how simple or peculiar an experience may be, we always appreciate its sensuous element as being *present* or *before us* in a way that the objects of most beliefs and judgments are not. That is, when we phenomenally appreciate a sensuous element in an experience, we appreciate it as being both something other than ourselves and as standing in opposition to ourselves. (Frey 2013: 76)

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[67] Interestingly, the fact that some moods do not exhibit object*****-directedness seems to be in some way connected to the fact that they do not exhibit property-directedness either. In particular, the latter seems depend on the former, I would be tempted to say. Since no object***** appears to be involved in the experience, then there is nothing the affective qualities (that instead are involved) appear to qualify. So, they do not appear as the properties of something (evidently) appearing as other than the experience itself. As a consequence, there is no immediate impression of property-directedness and, thereby, no evident reason to consider those qualities as represented properties instead of qualities of the experience itself.

[68] To my mind, all this, in itself, does not exclude that undirected moods represent/have content. However, it is to be clarified in what sense. So, I set this aside for the moment. I will be back on this point in Chapter 6, §4.

[69] By "external" here I mean that the objects****** appear distally located. I borrow this qualification from Frey (2013).

Accordingly, Frey expresses the transparency of visual experiences by means of the following two (interdependent) statements:[70]

(T1)   The sensuous elements that one phenomenally appreciates in an experience are always appreciated as *other*.

(T2)   The sensuous elements that one phenomenally appreciates in an experience are never appreciated as being, being instantiated in, or being about the self qua experiential subject (or a state/mode thereof).

Since visual experiences are the paradigm of transparency, it seems quite reasonable to generalize (T1) and (T2) to get the following two constraints—(T1*) and (T2*)—such that, if an experience does not meet them, then it is not transparent:

(T1*)   The qualitative elements that one phenomenally appreciates in an experience are always appreciated as *other*.

(T2*)   The qualitative elements that one phenomenally appreciates in an experience are never appreciated as being, being instantiated in, or being about the self qua experiential subject (or a state/mode thereof).

Thus, if this is correct, one minimal phenomenological condition for describing an experience as transparent is the impression in the subject of being presented with something other than the experience itself. [71] On the one hand, this is the same minimal phenomenological condition for describing an experience as directed;[72] on the other hand, this is precisely what one does not receive in undergoing/introspecting an undirected mood. Again, in the case of undirected moods no object* is introspectively available: the only things

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[70] Frey calls this Core-transparency. I am modifying his terminology according to mine.

[71] In the case of exhibiting directedness, being presented with something other than the experience itself is what conveys to the experiencer the impression of directedness. If this is missed, then directedness is missed. In the case of transparency, if the introspector does not have the impression of being dealing with something that is not the experience itself, then she does not have the impression of being introspecting the content of the experience.

[72] This sense of being presented with something other than experience itself is what conveys the impression of being introspecting the content of the experience. If this is lacked, it is plausible to say that one has the impression of being dealing just with the purely qualitative, phenomenal dimension of experience. There is thus no evidence to consider those qualities as represented properties instead of qualities of the experience.

one gets from introspection are the affective qualities involved in the experience, which do not (introspectively) appear as properties of any (apparently mind-independent) object*, though. Nor do they appear themselves as the intentional objects of the experience. Thus, I conclude, a undirected mood experience is not transparent.

Accordingly, the core-reason why undirected moods do not exhibit directedness looks the same reason why they are not transparent, at least to some extent. (Moreover, all this signals that there must be some strict connection between exhibiting directedness and being transparent.[73] However, I am not going to further explore such a connection here.)

One might object that (T1*) and (T2*) simply offer the conditions for the transparency of visual experiences, or perceptual experiences in general. However, they cannot be generalized to all the experience as such. Here is my reply. If we accept the usual intentionalist description of emotional experiences, according to which emotions are transparent, then (T1*) and (T2*) also apply to emotions. Since the intentionalist's defense of the transparency of moods is based on the analogy with emotions, (T1*) and (T2*) have to be valid for moods too.[74]

What I have said above offers principled reasons for believing that, if one accepts that some moods are genuinely undirected, then one has also to accept that they are not transparent. Therefore EIAM is committed to deny the transparency of undirected moods.

Another (non principled) reason, instead, is that Mendelovici herself (more or less explicitly) confirms that undirected moods are not transparent in some passages like the one I am quoting below:

> The affective qualities of undirected moods don't introspectively seem to qualify anything at all. So it seems that introspection cannot be used to support intentionalism about undirected moods in the same way in which it can be used to support intentionalism about color experience. Introspection is silent on whether the affective qualities of undirected moods are represented

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[73] According to Loar (2003a, 2003b), exhibiting directedness (phenomenal directedness in Loar's terminology) is just transparency (diaphanousness) plus the idea that the intentional object does not have to be actual. Also Kriegel (2007) takes exhibited directedness (phenomenal directedness in his terminology) and transparency to be strictly connected.

[74] I am not sure that the intentionalist description of the phenomenology of emotions is really accurate. In particular, I am not sure that transparency fully applies to emotion. However, I am not putting this in question here. I will raise this problem later on in this chapter (§4). The continuity and the analogy between moods and emotions is particularly stressed by Mendelovici, for reasons that will be clearer later (§4). As far as I am concerned, I am not fully convinced that such a continuity/analogy could be pushed further a certain limit—or at least that it is not so unproblematic to do that. However, since this is, instead, an assumption that the intentionalist makes, I am not putting it in question here. If these assumptions are not legitimate, then so much worst for the intentionalist.

contents or something else. (Mendelovici, 2013b: 144)

To be fair, she is not using the word "transparency" here. However, it seems quite clear that, in saying that introspection cannot be used to support Intentionalism about undirected moods, she is referring to that.

All this suggests that allowing for undirected moods being opaque experiences is an outcome of EIAM, as long as the latter grants to the anti-intentionalist that at least some moods are genuinely undirected. This clearly raises some issues at the level of what exactly motivates the view, since, as we know, transparency is usually taken to be the main evidence for the identity of intentional content and phenomenal character. Mendelovici, however, is aware of this issue. Probably, to some extent, she is biting the bullet and accepting this result as a necessary cost to be paid, if one wants to provide an intentionalist account that is phenomenologically more adequate and accurate. She has indeed something to say to address the issue concerning the motivation of EIAM. However, I am not going to face this question in this section, since I will diffusely deal with that in the next two sections (§§3, 4).

Let me now, instead, consider an objection to what I have said so far. The objection goes as follows. If the assumption is that phenomenal character is intentional content, then intentional content is available every time phenomenal character is available. The point is just that the subject is introspectively aware of phenomenal qualities without being also aware of those phenomenal qualities that are the content of her experience. What happens, then, in the case of undirected moods is that the subject is not introspectively able to tell that what she is dealing with is the content of her experience. But that content is in any case, as a matter of fact, what she is aware of. So, the experience is transparent because the content is in *this* way available to introspection.

As far as I can see, there are two replies one could give to this objection.

First of all, as I have already pointed out, undirected moods seem to lack something very basic, which is instead usually involved in transparent experiences. What happens in undirected moods, indeed, is not just that one is not able to tell that what she is being presented with is the content of her experience: neither any particular skill in recognizing content as content nor the notion of *content* are required in order for one to appreciate the phenomenon of the transparency of experience. Something less demanding is needed: that minimal sense (and not the notion) of directedness conveyed by the impression that something (other than the experience) is being presented—in other words, again, experience is to be

other-presenting.[75] As stressed above, this is precisely what undirected moods lack. What happens in those cases is, indeed, that one does not have the impression of dealing with anything but her own experience itself—and this is precisely why those experiences are taken to be (genuinely) undirected. So, it seems that, due to this reason, if one accepts genuine undirectedness, then she also has to accept that undirected moods are not transparent.

Second, according to the objection above, here is what happens when one introspects an undirected mood: one is primarily aware of certain affective qualities that (introspectively) appear as purely phenomenal qualities. However, on Mendelovici's account, those phenomenal qualities are also the intentional content of the experience, since they are also represented by the experience. Now, if this description is correct, then the conclusion cannot be that the experience is transparent. Indeed, according to defenders of transparency, the awareness of phenomenal character *as* phenomenal character is dependent on the awareness of content (Tye, 2000, 2003).[76] So, if in introspecting one's own experience one is primarily aware of the phenomenal qualities alone without also being aware of those qualities as being instantiated by something, then that experience is not transparent. Again, this does not mean that one is required to be in possession of notions like those of *content* or *instantiation* or *phenomenal character* (or even *transparency*)[77] in order to appreciate the phenomenon of transparency—that would just be too demanding. On the contrary, again, this only means that, in order for transparency to stand, an experience has to be such that the phenomenal qualities involved in the experience are introspectively appreciated as features of (apparently mind-independent) objects*. And that requires that the experience is other-presenting.

If all this is correct, then this shows that, if one accepts that there are undirected moods, then one also has to accept that they are opaque experiences. Accordingly, EIAM is committed to the opacity of at least some moods, as long as grants that they do not exhibit directedness.

In Chapter 3, I have offered independent phenomenological reasons to believe that at least some moods are genuinely undirected moods. This combined with the results achieved in this section suggests that at least some moods, undirected moods, are to be considered *opaque*

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[75] This is more or less along the same lines of my reply to Crane's (1998) point in Chapter 3, §2.1.

[76] More precisely, according to Tye, one is only aware *of* content. The awareness of phenomenal character is always awareness *that* an experience has that phenomenal character.

[77] Those are theoretical notions that philosophers employ in order to offer a theoretical description of a certain phenomenon.

experiences. So, the transparency-thesis turns out to be false of undirected moods. This is the first conclusion I draw in this chapter. Such a conclusion has consequences both for transparency and for EIAM. As for transparency, in particular, the point is what to do now: Is the transparency-thesis to be rejected? Can it still be held, although revised in its scope or strength? I set these questions aside momentarily: I will be dealing with them in Chapter 6. In the rest of this chapter, instead, I am going to focus on the consequences of the opacity of undirected moods for EIAM.

3. HOW TO LIVE WITHOUT TRANSPARENCY AND BE INTENTIONALISTS: MENDELOVICI'S ARGUMENT

The failure of transparency in the case of undirected moods also generates problems for EIAM. In particular, while from a theory-neutral standpoint it might be acceptable that transparency fails, this is clearly harder to be accepted from the point of view of the intentionalist—and Mendelovici's point of view *is* the point of view of the intentionalist—, given that transparency is supposed to be the main motivation to accept Intentionalism. Thus, *prima facie*, undirected moods' lack of transparency appears to be a serious problem that concerns not just the general possibility of providing an explanation of phenomenal character in terms of intentional content, but rather what are the proper motivations to accept such an explanation. In particular, the problem is that there is no evidence of content. To put it other way, what appears to be the main virtue of Mendelovici's account might turn out to be its main drawback, as long as it directly leads to the rejection of transparency, at least in the case of some moods.

This issue is double-faced. The first face is *internal* to the point of view of the intentionalist and concerns *which version* of Intentionalism one should embrace. I call this the problem of the *internal motivation*. The point here is the following. On the one hand, Mendelovici's proposal (a) offers an explanation of undirected moods in terms of intentional content and (b) seems to be more respectful of the phenomenology of moods. This is clearly a virtue of the account. On the other hand, however, an intentionalist might be worried by the fact that it does not defend the transparency of undirected moods. To put it other way, an intentionalist might think that a good reason not to accept EIAM's story about the content of undirected moods is precisely the fact that it is not supported by evidence. Thus, the question

is: Is Mendelovici able to provide the intentionalist with a good reason to believe in EIAM, although the latter involves giving up to the failure of transparency?

The second face is *external* to the intentionalist's point of view: it goes beyond that and involves a theory-neutral point of view. I call this the *external motivation* problem. In this case, the worry is more radical and does not concern *what* version of Intentionalism about moods is to be embraced, but *whether or not* Intentionalism about moods is to be embraced at all. In other words, the question is: If the qualities involved by undirected moods do not appear to qualify objects, why should one believe that those qualities are represented properties and thereby that they are the intentional content of the experience? Put it other way: If some moods are opaque, why should one accept an intentionalist account of moods as opposed to another view? Is EIAM convincing from a theory-neutral point of view?[78]

As pointed out before (§2), Mendelovici acknowledges that introspection on undirected moods does not bring any direct evidence to consider the affective qualities as represented properties. So, she is aware of the difficulties concerning the motivations of the view and has an argument to address this issue. I will introduce her argument in this section and then discuss it in the next one.

In a nutshell, her proposal is that introspection offers *indirect reasons* to consider the qualities involved by undirected moods as represented properties. In particular, she argues as follows. Emotions and moods involve exactly the same affective qualities. In the case of emotions, those qualities behave as represented properties: they qualify objects. This is why they are taken to be components of content in that case. Therefore, she concludes, affective qualities are represented properties also in the case of undirected moods.

Here is the argument, as she herself explicitly presents it (Mendelovici, 2013a):

MENDELOVICI'S ARGUMENT

(P1)   The affective qualities involved in moods are involved in corresponding emotions.

(P2)   The affective qualities involved in emotions are represented affective properties. Therefore,

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[78] Clearly, the two faces of the problem are, at least to some extent, related. Indeed, if the external motivation problem is not solved, then this might be in itself a good reason to find the view not very appealing even from the point of view of the internal motivation. After all, one might think that it is not so convenient to buy a view that is not convincing from a theory-neutral point of view. More on that in Chapter 5, §2.

(Conclusion)   The affective qualities involved in moods are represented affective
                      properties.

The main idea behind Mendelovici's Argument (MA) is that there is direct introspective evidence for considering the affective qualities involved in emotions as represented properties of objects. This just means considering emotions as transparent experiences, exactly as visual experiences. This is what justifies (P2). Also (P1) is justified by introspection. Now, since the very same affective qualities are represented in the case of emotions, Mendelovici concludes, those qualities are represented properties even in the case of undirected moods. So, even if transparency does not apply to undirected moods, the fact that it applies to emotions *indirectly* motivates the choice for Intentionalism—namely, the choice of considering the affective qualities involved in strongly undirected moods as represented properties.

4. IS EIAM MOTIVATED?

In the previous section I argued that the problem of properly motivating Intentionalism about moods, given the failure of transparency, has two faces: the internal motivation problem and the external motivation problem. I have also introduced the argument put forward by Mendelovici to address this issue, (MA). Now, I will discuss (MA) and check whether it is able to reply to the issue. My claim is that it is not, in the following sense: (MA) replies to the internal motivation problem, *i.e.* it provides the intentionalist with reasons to believe in Mendelovici's version of Intentionalism. However, it does not reply to the external motivation problem: it is not enough to persuade one who is not yet an intentionalist to buy an intentionalist account of moods.

4.1. Two worries

There are two suspect moves in (MA). The first is the assumption behind the justification of (P2), namely, the idea that emotions are fully transparent exactly as visual experiences are. The second is the inference in force of which the conclusion is reached. As far as I can see, both these moves can be disputed and so two worries against (MA) can be raised. These worries might not be ultimate, compelling reasons to reject Mendelovici's proposal, they just pave the way to the discussion. This is the plan, then. First, I present the worries (§§4.1.1, 4.1.2). Then, I focus on the second worry and present two different replies to it, (MA)* and

(MA)**: each of them corresponds to a different reconstruction of (MA). I will discuss (MA)*

and (MA)** separately and show that they ultimately suffer from the same problem: they are

not fully persuading from a theory-neutral point of view (§§4.2, 4.3). This will lead me to

conclude that (MA) does not reply to the external motivation problem (§4.4).

4.1.1. First worry: The justification of (P2)

The first worry concerns the justification of (P2). The latter is justified by the idea that

emotions are fully transparent, exactly like visual experiences. Mendelovici presents this as a

quite uncontroversial phenomenological fact. Yet, it does not look so uncontroversial, as she

instead would like it to be. For example, De Sousa (2004) notes:

> Perceptions, as recently pointed out by Alva Noë, are "transparent" in the sense that when you
> attempt to depict your visual field you just end up drawing a picture of the room you are in
> (1999, 124–26). By comparison, emotions are relatively opaque: often the effect of passion is
> precisely the reverse: when the angry man, or the joyful bride, or the jealous husband attempt to
> describe the world, they succeed only in describing their own state of mind. (De Sousa, 2004: 64)

Deonna and Teroni (2012) and Kind (2013) also make similar remarks.[79],[80]

The problem here is that it is not so easy to say that affective qualities attach to objects

in exactly the same way as, say, colors do. Colors, as they appear introspectively, seem to be

mind-independent features of (apparently) mind-independent objects in a strong sense: they

do not seem to be related to/dependent on the subject in any way.[81] This is what is

introspectively manifest to us. By contrast, it is at least a disputable introspective report that

the same thing is true in the case of affective qualities. Indeed, the latter do not appear to be

completely subject-independent features. Even if one describes the object of one's fear as

scary, one is picking out not only something in the object, but also some subjective condition

or feeling. This seems a better and more fair and neutral introspective report.

Here, thus, Mendelovici seems to be forcing what introspection provides: she claims that

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[79] As far as I can see, also Prinz's (2004) account of emotions would not accept that emotions are (fully) transparent. According to Prinz, indeed, what emotions represent is not what one is introspectively, directly aware of. Moreover, elsewhere Prinz (2012: Ch. 1) explicitly argues against the transparency.

[80] Notice that the point here is not that emotions are not transparent with regards to their objects: as long as they exhibit directedness toward those objects they are transparent to those objects. The point here is rather that, unlike perception, they are not *fully transparent*.

[81] This is all about how colors introspectively *appear* from the point of view of the experiencer. Thus, it is not relevant here that they might actually be in some way subject-dependent properties. What matters here is just that this is not what they appear to be.

the phenomenal qualities involved in emotions qualify the object one is representing and then explains those qualities in terms of affective properties. Now, to my mind, she has a reason to force introspection. This reason is that she basically seems to be operating *within* an intentionalist framework. So, she does not have to persuade other intentionalists that emotions are transparent and can also assume that some intentionalist account of emotions has to be true. What she is left with, then, is "just" arguing that *her account* is the best within that framework, as long as it better captures the phenomenology of emotions and moods—*provided that* they are (fully) transparent. However, as I have pointed out right above, the (full) transparency of emotions is easy to accept for an intentionalist, but it is not from a theory-neutral point of view. So, the justification of (P2) might be convincing for an intentionalist, but it is far less convincing and evident for one who is not already persuaded by Intentionalism.

If this is correct, then (MA) has problems, since the justification of one of its two premises seems to be quite theory-dependent and implies Intentionalism. Again, this might not be a problem *within* an intentionalist framework, but it is a problem *without* that framework, *i.e.* from a more theory-neutral perspective.

4.1.2. Second worry: The nature of the inference

The second worry, which is quite independent from the one above, concerns the exact nature of the inference that should lead one to conclude that affective qualities are represented properties. Such a conclusion, indeed, does not seem to directly follow from the premises assumed by (MA), (P1) and (P2). Why, after all, should the fact that affective qualities are represented in the case of emotions lead to conclude that they are also represented in the case of moods? The fact that the properties of a certain class, when involved in a certain kind of experiences, are represented does not guarantee that they are represented when they are involved in other kinds of experience. As far as I can see, it is perfectly reasonable to believe that two different kinds of experiences can involve the same class of properties in two different ways—unless one assumes that *being involved in an experience* is one and the same as *being represented*. But it is not clear what independent reasons one would have to believe in such equivalence. Absent those reasons, such an assumption would just mean assuming that Intentionalism is true.

This second worry is a signal that (MA) is to be further spelled out and clarified. In the following two subsections, then, I will present and discuss two different ways of understanding (MA) that correspond to as many reconstructions of the argument. The first, (MA)*, is a

deductive way of arguing. The second, (MA)**, is an argument at the best explanation—to my mind, this is the best way to capture the nature of the argument that Mendelovici is proposing. In any case, both (MA)* and (MA)** are not fully convincing. In particular, if one assumes a theory-neutral perspective, there are reasons to resist both of them, and this is a consequence of accepting that at least some moods are opaque—or so I will argue. All this clearly affects the strength of Mendelovici's proposal: it might be convincing for an intentionalist, but it is far less persuading for those who are not yet intentionalists.

4.2. (MA)*

One (and probably the easiest) way to face the difficulties pointe out above and make (MA) work is considering moods and emotions as being one and the same kind of experience. If that was the case, then Mendelovici's conclusion would be much more plausible and easy to get: it is indeed plausible—Mendelovici might argue—that experiences of the same kind behave in the same way, if they involve the same class of properties. If so, the argument would require two additional premises, (P3) and (P4), that Mendelovici does not make explicit in her formulation:

(P3)   If experiences of the same kind involve the same class of properties, then they behave in the same way with respect to that class of properties

(P4)   Emotions and moods are experiences of the same kind

This solution guarantees (MA)'s validity, but does not guarantee its being sound, since there is no strong evidence for accepting (P4), which is, on the contrary, a disputable and controversial claim.[82,83] However, something in the vicinity of (P4), but less demanding, can be asserted here. After all, in order for the argument to work, what Mendelovici really needs is just that undirected moods are tokens of mood-types that can also be tokened by a directed

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[82] See Chapter 2, §1.

[83] A further option would be to say that being represented is an essential property of the class of affective qualities. Yet, it is not very clear in what independent way one could assert that affective properties are essentially represented properties. Whether or not they are represented in the case of moods seems to play a relevant role in defining such a status. Accordingly, one cannot assume that affective properties are essentially represented before determining whether or not they are also represented in the case of moods. Moreover, it is not fully clear to me what it exactly means that being represented is an essential property of a class of property. That would rather be the case of being representational, but being representational is not the same as being represented (see, e.g., Block, 1996; Kind, 2001, 2003).

state. And that seems to be the case.[84] Take anxiety: in some cases, it does not exhibit directedness, but in other cases it does—for example, one might be anxious, say, about tomorrow's exam. So, the idea here would be to hold (P3) and turn (P1), (P2), and (P4) into (P1*), (P2*), and (P4*):

(P1*)   The affective qualities involved in undirected moods are involved in corresponding directed moods

(P2*)   The affective qualities involved in directed moods are represented affective properties

(P4*)   Directed and undirected moods are experiences of the same kind

Accordingly, (MA) would be turned into (MA)*:

(P1*)   The affective qualities involved in undirected moods are involved in corresponding directed moods

(P2*)   The affective qualities involved in directed moods are represented affective properties

(P3)   If experiences of the same kind involve the same class of properties, then they behave in the same way with respect to that class of properties

(P4*)   Directed and undirected moods are experiences of the same kind

(Conclusion)   The affective qualities involved in undirected moods are represented affective properties

(MA)* improves (MA). Yet, it is not fully convincing. As far as I can see, there are problems with accepting (P2*) and (P3). In either case, these problems are related to the fact that undirected moods are opaque. Let me focus on that now.

4.2.1. (P2*)

(P2*) is justified only if directed moods are fully transparent experiences. However, one might

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[84] At least that is the case according to Mendelovici (2013a: 132). Clearly, if it is not the case that every undirected mood is corresponded by a directed one of the same type, then this is a further issue for Mendelovici's argument.

point out that this is definitely not obvious for the following three reasons.

First, as already noticed in §4.1.1, it is not introspectively so evident or uncontroversial that emotions are fully transparent. Now, in the best case, directed moods are analogous to emotions. So, if introspection does not provide any ultimate evidence to believe that emotions are fully transparent experiences, it does not provide any ultimate evidence to support the transparency of directed moods either.

Second, as I argued in Chapter 3 (§3), there are reasons to believe that at least some directed moods—namely, the FCO cases—are not fully transparent experiences, as long as some components of their phenomenal character are likely to be independent from their intentional content.

Third, the opacity of undirected moods might be exploited to cast doubts upon the transparency of directed moods and, thereby, upon (P2*). Let me further explain this point. One might concede that the case of emotions is open, namely, that it is introspectively unclear whether or not experience is fully transparent. This is because we do not have any neat case of (full) transparency as well as we do not have any of (full) opacity. However, the case of moods is quite different. On the basis of what Mendelovici herself says, we have indeed a case of opacity: undirected moods (§2). So, here is the situation: on the one hand, we have that, as in the case of emotions, it is dubious that directed moods are fully transparent; on the other hand, though, we have some introspective evidence for considering undirected moods as opaque experiences. Accordingly, if one wanted to provide a unified account of moods, one might take such introspective evidence as offering some reasons in favor of the idea that *all* moods, directed and undirected, are not (fully) transparent experiences. This clearly, in turn, would seriously undermine an intentionalist account of directed moods.

This is exactly the same way of reasoning behind Mendelovici's argument, although, quite interestingly, it goes exactly the other way around. Mendelovici takes directed moods to be explanatorily prior; thus, since she wants to provide a unified account of moods, she extends the intentionalist account of directed moods to the undirected ones. This can be done *only if* one assumes that there is enough evidence to apply an intentionalist account to directed moods. Such an evidence, on Mendelovici's reasoning, is provided by introspection and, in particular, by the alleged (full) transparency of directed moods. However, as pointed out above and in Chapter 3, introspection does not provide evidence for believing in the (full) transparency of directed moods—on the contrary, it seems to be highly dubious that directed

moods are (fully) transparent. There is, instead, some introspective evidence to say that undirected moods are opaque. One might, then, take them to be explanatorily prior and, thereby, settle both the issue as to whether or not directed moods are transparent and the issue as to whether or not Intentionalism applies to directed moods. In other words, the failure of transparency in one case would undermine the idea that transparency applies to all the uncertain cases. This, in turn, undermines Intentionalism being true of all those cases. If this is correct, then one has reasons not to accept (P2*).

Why shouldn't one accept this reasoning? From a theory-neutral point of view, there is no particular evidence to accept the transparency of moods, there is instead more introspective evidence to accept the opacity of at least some of them.[85] If so, why should one take the uncertain transparency of directed moods to be more relevant than the more secure opacity of the undirected ones?

One might reply, on the side of Mendelovici, that undirected moods are the *explanandum* and, as such, they cannot be (part of) the *explanans*. This is why the direction of the explanation goes from the directed ones to the undirected ones. My counter-reply is that undirected moods are the *explanandum* for Intentionalism, since the latter has to prove that it is able to account for those cases too. By contrast, Anti-intentionalism might not have any problem in accounting for undirected moods. So, in that case, they would not be the *explanandum*. What it is to be explained, at least to some extent, depends on which theory one assumes: it is theory-dependent.

Again, extending the intentionalist account to undirected moods can make perfect sense from the perspective of the intentionalist: one who has already endorsed Intentionalism, has an intentionalist story concerning directed moods, and wants to accommodate the case of undirected moods—provided that a good candidate intentional content is individuated. By contrast, this is not a plain move from a theory-neutral perspective—namely, the perspective of one that wants to weigh what are the motivations to accept Intentionalism about moods and whether they are strong enough.

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[85] Recall that Mendelovici, in accepting that some moods do not exhibit directedness, is granting a point to the anti-intentionalist, because the latter seems to take right the phenomenology of the undirected anxiety-like moods. And accepting genuine undirectedness, at least for some moods, leads to acknowledge that those moods are not transparent. This is why, from a theory-neutral perspective, there is introspective evidence that undirected moods are opaque.

4.2.2. (P3)

Clearly, all the discussion in §4.2.1 presupposes that one wants to provide a unified account of moods—in other words, that one accepts (P3). Alternatively, one might believe that the opacity of undirected moods has ultimately nothing to tell about the transparency of directed moods. In this case one would not be looking for a unified account of moods. This would save (P2*). Yet, needless to say, it would still not play in favor of (MA)*, since in rejecting a unified account one would be rejecting (P3).

One might not have any particular antecedent reasons to reject (P3). However, since some moods turned out to be opaque, one might think that this is a sufficient evidence not to deny that directed moods are transparent,[86] but rather to deny that (P3) is true. From a neutral perspective, indeed, what we have in the case of moods could just be seen as nothing but the fact that moods behave in two different ways with respect to affective qualities. So, given this situation, why should one accept that moods have to behave in a unified way? Moreover, why should one accept (P3), and thereby conclude that undirected moods represent affective properties, instead of *rejecting* (P3), accepting that undirected moods just behave differently from the directed ones and concluding that undirected moods involve affective qualities without representing them? In short, why shouldn't one take undirectedmoods as a counter-example to (P3)?

Clearly, the intentionalist wants to defend the possibility of providing a unified (intentionalist) account of moods because one case in which Intentionalism does not apply is enough to undermine the whole theory. But this is not the same from a theory-neutral point of view. A non-intentionalist may have no specific interest in providing a unified account of moods and could just give up to the idea that a unified account cannot be provided. Needless to say, it would be better if we had a unified account. Yet, the possibility of providing a unified account must be supported by evidence in favor of a unified account. If data go in the opposite direction, then this option is to be set aside.[87,88]

One might reply that the possibility of EIAM, in itself, provides the evidence we need for a unified account of moods, as long as EIAM is able to explain, in intentionalist terms, the

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[86] Whether or not directed moods are transparent would be almost irrelevant in this case.

[87] Alternatively, one might conclude that moods are not one unitary class. In this way, one could provide a unified account of each class. Clearly, that would save (P3), but would not solve the problem for (MA)*.

[88] Notice that this problem would be even more dramatic if one accepts that directed moods are transparent.

case of undirected moods by providing a candidate intentional content for those experiences. My counter-reply is that, in the present case, this would be circular. Indeed, we are considering the premise of an argument providing reasons to believe in EIAM. What this argument motivates, in particular, is the reasons for accepting a crucial part of EIAM, namely, the claim that undirected moods represent affective properties. The possibility of a unified intentionalist account of moods strictly depends on this claim. If there are not good reasons to accept this claim, *i.e.* if the argument fails, then EIAM is not fully motivated. And this would also undermine the possibility of EIAM as a successful intentionalist account of moods. So, we cannot exploit EIAM as justification of one of the premises of the argument that is supposed to play a crucial role to make EIAM fully motivated.[89]

To sum up, both (P2*) and (P3) are fully justified, if one already works within an intentionalist framework. By contrast, from a theory-neutral point of view, there are not compelling reasons to accept them. (Needless to say, one might find both (P2*) and (P3) unconvincing or just one of them.) Thus, if this is correct and (MA)* is the right way to understand Mendelovici's reasoning, then her argument is valid. However, its being sound is undermined when the argument is regarded from a theory-neutral perspective.

Let me just stress the following point before considering another possible reconstruction of (MA). I am not claiming that the right thing to do is asserting that directed moods are to be accounted for in non-intentionalist terms or that a unified account of moods cannot be given at all. Rather, what I am claiming is something weaker. I just want to point out that, as it stands, (MA)* suffers from some difficulties in providing a ultimate motivation to buy EIAM, as soon as one goes beyond the boundaries of an intentionalist framework. And this is basically due to lack of evidence, namely, the fact that some moods (the undirected ones) turn out to be opaque experiences.

4.3. (MA)**

One way to face all the difficulties encountered so far is just setting aside (P3) and (P4*), dropping the idea of giving a deductive argument, and just arguing at the best explanation more or less in the following way. Since affective qualities behave as represented properties in

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[89] Moreover, nothing prevents one to give a non-intentionalist unified account. For example, one might tell a projectivist story about moods—recall that Mendelovici herself supports some version of projectivism. That would explain both the undirected and the directed cases. Why should one believe in EIAM as opposed to believe in the projectivist account?

all the other cases—emotions and directed moods—, the most reasonable conclusion to be drawn seems that those properties are represented even in the case of moods that do not exhibit directedness. And this is why one should embrace EIAM. Thereby, (MA) would be turned into (MA)**:

(P1**)	The affective qualities involved in undirected moods are involved both in corresponding directed moods and emotions.[90]
(P2**)	The affective qualities involved both in directed moods and emotions are represented affective properties.[91]
(P3*)	It is implausible that the affective qualities involved and represented in the case of directed moods and emotion are not represented in the case of undirected moods. Therefore,
(Conclusion)	The affective qualities involved in undirected moods are represented affective properties.

Mendelovici is not explicit as to whether she is arguing at the best explanation. Yet, as far as I can see, (MA)** seems to better capture the way her argument works: on the one hand, it is a way of acknowledging that providing a definitive, deductive proof that affective qualities are represented by undirected moods is probably too hard; on the other, it gives some reasons to accept EIAM, despite the latter implies acknowledging that undirected moods are opaque.

Nonetheless, to my mind, even (MA)** does not sound definitive from a theory-neutral standpoint. I am going to argue for that now, by pointing out three reasons that one who is not yet an intentionalist might have to resist to (MA)**: I am listing them below.

First, (MA)** assumes that emotions and directed moods are fully transparent and so that Intentionalism is the best explanation in those cases. The idea, then, is that this fact is enough to motivate the extension of an intentionalist account to the case of undirected moods, since the same types of states and the same class of properties are involved: if affective properties are represented in all the other cases, then this suggests that they are represented also in the case of undirected moods. Now, all this might talk to an intentionalist, but does not

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[90] This premise is just the result of combining (P1) and (P1*).

[91] This premise is just the result of combining (P2) and (P2*).

really seem to talk to, or motivate, those that are not already fully convinced by Intentionalism. Indeed, as I have noticed above in §4.1.1 and §4.2.1, it is definitely not obvious that emotions and directed moods are fully transparent: this is much easier to accept if one is already an intentionalist.

Second, one might point out that one and the same explanation—namely, that the affective qualities involved in emotions and moods are represented—is being exploited to account for two different, and to some extent contrasting, phenomena: in the case of emotions and directed moods, it explains their transparency; in the case of undirected moods, it accounts for the opposite situation—namely, the fact that the qualities involved in the experience do not appear to qualify any object. One might argue that this is suspect and, if not *ad hoc*, at least strongly (and uniquely) motivated only by the urge of defending Intentionalism. Indeed, *if* one accepts that there are relevant analogies between the phenomenal character of emotions and directed moods and the phenomenal character of standard cases of transparent experiences such as vision, then the extension of an account in terms of represented properties to emotions and directed moods is understandable and acceptable. After all, one could say, all these experiences involve objects and properties that seem to qualify those objects. Yet, this is not what one gets in introspecting undirected moods: introspectively, indeed, they are opaque and do not appear to involve any object. So, the question is: What, independently of the urge of defending some version of Intentionalism, justifies the extension of an intentionalist account to these particular cases of affective experiences, given that they exhibit a relevant phenomenal difference from the other cases mentioned above?

Perhaps, a natural reply to this question is that some unified account of the phenomenal character of affective states has to be provided. Now the question is: Why a unified account as opposed to a non-unified one, given that we have quite different introspective data that are not easy to be combined together? Again, this is quite clear, if we consider the point of view of the intentionalist: the latter needs a unified account because Intentionalism is to be true of every kind of experience. However, it is less clear from a theory-neutral point of view.

Anyway, let us set this aside and, for the sake of the argument, assume that there are pressing reasons to provide a unified account. There is still another issue—and this is the third point I want to make. Indeed, as far as I can see, the introspective evidence available is compatible with *non-intentionalist* unified accounts of the phenomenal character of emotions

and moods. For example, one could say that the unifying element is the fact that affective qualities are involved in affective experiences, not as components of the content, but rather on the side of the state. One might then tell some projectivist[92] story to accommodate those cases (if any) in which the affective qualities appear to be properties of objects.[93,94]

Clearly, such an account would assign a relevant explanatory role to the opacity of undirected moods. Mendelovici goes, instead, the other way around: she assumes that the (alleged) transparency of emotions and directed moods is more relevant than the opacity of undirected moods to determine the nature of the phenomenal character of affective states. As I have already pointed out, it is definitely dubious whether emotions and directed moods are fully transparent, but this is not what I want to stress now. Rather, what I want to stress is the following point: even on the assumption that emotions and directed moods are transparent, it is not clear why it could not be that the discovery that some moods are not transparent has to tell something relevant and deep concerning the nature of the phenomenal character of affective states. After all, we are provided with both (alleged) transparent and opaque experiences. So, if a unified account is to be provided, why should the transparent experiences weigh more than the opaque ones? Why not the other way around? It is clear why the Intentionalist assigns priority, or in any way a major role, to the (alleged) transparency cases. But, from a neutral standpoint, it is definitely not clear why one should be forced to do that. So, in other words, the following question arises here: Why should one opt for an *intentionalist* unified account of the phenomenal character of affective states?

One might reply to this question by saying that an intentionalist account is *preferable*, ultimately because, if Intentionalism works, then there are high hopes to make consciousness fit with a naturalistic picture and solve the hard problem of consciousness. Here is my

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[92] Clearly, that would be the equivalent for affective qualities of literal projectivism about colors, *i.e.* the view defended by Boghossian and Velleman (1989, 1991).

[93] The possibility of a literal projectivist account of affective qualities has not been deeply explored yet, at the best of my knowledge. However, in the present context we can assume that it is possible, since Mendelovici herself mentions this possibility and defends a version of projectivism (figurative projectivism) about affective qualities (see §1.4). Now, one might ask whether the transparency of affective experiences and projectivism about affective qualities are really compatible. (Clearly, one should first of all accept that transparency stands in the case of affective states, but if it does not stand, then so much worst for EIAM and Intentionalism in general.) Since a full projectivist account of affective qualities has not been provided yet, this might be difficult to say. However, I do not see any principled reason against such a compatibility. Moreover, if one reasons by analogy with projectivism about colors (which instead has been explored), it seems plausible to say that they are compatible. Indeed, as McLaughlin (2003) points out, projectivism about colors does not imply that transparency is false. More generally, Kind (2003) notes that support for transparency bridges the intentionalism/non-intentionalism divide.

[94] Defending such a view is not my aim in this chapter. I am just pointing out that it seems to me a possibility left open by what introspection provides.

counter-reply. As Kind (2013) points out, this motivation is loaded. Intentionalism has to prove that it is able to solve the hard problem. So, from a theory-neutral point of view, it cannot be the best choice only on the basis of what it promises to do. After all, as far as we know, the hard problem might not be solvable. Thus, there must be another, independent way to evaluate whether Intentionalism succeeds or fails—and so whether it actually solves the hard problem.

Usually, transparency is considered the main reason to believe in Intentionalism, as long as the latter would be the best explanation of the former (Tye, 1995, 2000, 2003). However, transparency is exactly what undirected moods lack. So, something else (other than transparency) is needed to motivate the choice for Intentionalism in the case of undirected moods. The problem, though, is that nothing else seems to be left. Maybe one could appeal to the fact that Intentionalism works in all the other cases and that is enough to motivate an intentionalist unified account of affective states.

However, this is *not* enough, if one assumes an external point of view. Indeed, from that point of view, the perspective is overturned: Intentionalism is not yet taken to be true, but it is still to be *proven* true—and it has to be proven true of *every single case*, since it is a universally quantified claim.[95] Affective states do not appear to be one single case, since they exhibit a relevant difference concerning their phenomenal character: some exhibit directedness, whereas some others do not. Accordingly, when it comes to the case of undirected moods, since they exhibit a peculiar phenomenal character and are not transparent, the possibility of extending Intentionalism is exactly what is to be motivated. So, it cannot be itself the motivation. But, then, we are back to the original problem: if one looks at undirected moods themselves and their phenomenal character, one does not seem to find any strong motivation for Intentionalism.

Moreover, the appeal to the fact that Intentionalism works in all the other cases seems a somewhat suspect move for the following further reason: it seems to exclude from the very beginning the possibility of finding counter-examples to Intentionalism. Instead, a counter-example must be possible—at least, in principle.

To conclude, if (MA)** is the right way to look at (MA), then the argument is not so convincing from a theory-neutral perspective: there are reasons to resist it. In the best case, it is not clear why one has to extend the account of (alleged) transparent experiences to those

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[95] Moreover, it is also asserted as a metaphysically necessity.

that are opaque. In the worst, the fact that there are opaque experiences might even provide some reasons to go the other way around and extend an anti-intentionalist account to the (alleged) transparent ones. In addition, it is definitely not obvious that emotions and directed moods are (fully) transparent.

4.4. Taking stock

To sum up, the failure of transparency in the case of undirected moods opens a problem concerning the motivation to accept EIAM. This problem has two faces: on the one hand, it concerns what is the motivation to accept EIAM from the point of view of an intentionalist—this is the internal motivation problem; on the other hand, it concerns the question as to what is the motivation to accept EIAM, so an intentionalist account, from an external, theory-neutral perspective—this is the external motivation problem.

The solution suggested by Mendelovici is motivating EIAM by means of indirect evidence coming from introspection. She has an argument to defend this proposal, (MA). I have proposed two different reconstructions of (MA): one deductive, (MA)*, and one at the best explanation, (MA)**—which is, to my mind, the best way to look at (MA). However, both ultimately suffer from the same problem: they rely on assumptions that are easy to make and justify if one is already an intentionalist, but not so easy or evident if one assumes a more theory-neutral standpoint—namely, if one is looking for a reason to believe in Intentionalism. This strongly depends on the fact that the failure of transparency in the case of undirected moods generates a lack of evidence for adopting Intentionalism. Accordingly, (MA) seems convincing if it is considered within an Intentionalist framework, but not without that framework. My conclusion, then, is that Mendelovici has a reply to the internal motivation problem, but not to the external motivation problem. So, EIAM is less convincing, when looked from an external point of view. This does not mean that EIAM is to be rejected, but that there are reasons to resist it. Accordingly, granting that undirected moods lack transparency seems to sensibly affect the strength of EIAM. So, quite interestingly, the main virtue of the account, from an intentionalist perspective, is also its weak point, when it is looked from an external perspective.

One might protest that, in putting forward (MA), Mendelovici's aim is not replying to the external motivation problem. If so, then (MA) should not be evaluated as a reply to that issue. To be fair, it must be admitted that, from what she says, it is clear that Mendelovici

wants to deal with the problem of motivating EIAM, given that introspection does not provide any direct evidence for it. So, to some extent, she *is* addressing the problem of EIAM's being motivated. What is not clear is *to what extent* she is doing that. That is, it is not clear whether she understands this problem as a double-faced question, as I have presented it here, or just as the problem of motivating her view, EIAM, with respect to SIAM—*i.e.* the internal motivation problem. In *this* sense, she might not be addressing the external motivation problem. However, this is not enough to say that (MA) should not be evaluated as a reply to the motivation problem. Indeed, the fact that Mendelovici might not have considered or explicitly noticed the external motivation problem does not remove the problem itself. On the contrary, the external motivation problem is still there, independently of Mendelovici's intentions: if an intentionalist reply to the problem of moods has to be fully motivated, then that problem has to be addressed. As long as (MA) is the only reply Mendelovici provides, then it has to be evaluated as if it were her reply to the full problem.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I introduced Mendelovici's intentionalist account of moods, EIAM (§1). Such an account accepts that there are genuinely undirected moods. As I argued, this means that those experiences exhibit neither object*-directedness nor property-directedness. Accordingly, if no directedness is exhibited, then it seems plausible to conclude that undirected moods are opaque experiences. Indeed, in lacking the minimal condition to exhibit directedness, they also lack the minimal condition to be transparent. This, in turn, combined with the results reached in Chapter 3, leads to the general conclusion that undirected moods are opaque (§2). This is the first conclusion I wanted to argue for.

Clearly, such a conclusion has both effects on transparency itself and on how EIAM is motivated. I set the former aside and, in the second part of the chapter (§§3, 4), I dealt with the latter. In particular (§4), I argued that the argument that Mendelovici offers to motivate EIAM, (MA), does provide the *already*-intentionalist with reasons to buy her view—so, it replies to the internal motivation problem. However, it is not strong enough to persuade a *wannabe*-intentionalist—*i.e.* one who is not yet an intentionalist and is looking for strong reasons to endorse Intentionalism. So, EIAM does not reply to the external motivation problem. Thus, the failure of transparency, affects the strength of EIAM: it might be convincing from an intentionalist point of view, but it is not so convincing from an external

perspective. This was my second conclusion.

CHAPTER 5

INTENTIONALISM ABOUT MOODS: A BALANCE

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

In Chapter 2 I presented the problem of moods, while in Chapter 3 I discussed the Standard Intentionalist Account of Moods (SIAM)—typified by Tye's (2008) version. My conclusion was that SIAM does not provide good candidate intentional content/objects for moods or, if it does, it is not able to preserve either the identity of phenomenal character and intentional content or the transparency of moods. Therefore, it is not a satisfying intentionalist reply to the problem of moods.

In Chapter 4, I considered a different intentionalist account: the Edenic Intentional Account of Moods (EIAM) put forward by Mendelovici (2013a, 2013b)—which is an extension to emotion and moods of Chalmers' (2006) Edenic account of the content of visual perception. I concluded that, since it is committed to the opacity of undirected moods, EIAM is poorly motivated from a theory-neutral point of view. Indeed, the argument that Mendelovici offers to motivate the view—the appeal to indirect introspective evidence—might be enough to persuade an intentionalist, but it is not enough to persuade one who is *not yet* an intentionalist.

All this has two orders of consequences. In the first place, it has consequences on transparency. As I have already pointed out (Chapter 4, §2), indeed, if the transparency of moods cannot be defended, then the transparency thesis either is to be rejected or is to be somehow revised. In the second place, it has consequences on Intentionalism about moods itself. Before dealing with transparency, thus, I want to recap and draw some more general conclusion concerning Intentionalism about moods—and, more generally, concerning Intentionalism as such. This is my main aim in this chapter. Here is my plan, then.

Firstly, I will compare SIAM and EIAM with respect to the solutions they offer to the problem of moods—*i.e.* the ways the attempt to solve the conflict brought up to the surface by the Incoherent Triad. This will help summarize and recap the two views and their difficulties (§1).

Secondly, I will make explicit the theoretical frameworks behind SIAM and EIAM. In this way, I will show that, however intentionalists, the two accounts belong to two different versions of Intentionalism, (§2.1).

Thirdly, I will consider the *pro* and the *contra* of both the views (§2.2). My final balance will be that there are reasons for considering EIAM as a option better than SIAM (§2.3). Accordingly, if one wants to be an intentionalist and choose one of the two proposals, it is preferable to opt for EIAM. If I am right, then this is situation: the best of intentionalist options on the market is poorly motivated. This suggests that moods' phenomenal character is still a serious problem for Intentionalism in the following sense: in the worst case, SIAM, there are reasons to reject Intentionalism about moods; in the best case, EIAM, there are no compelling reasons to accept it.

However, on the basis of the considerations I will provide in the last section (§3) concerning the connections between Intentionalism and transparency, my conclusion will be much stronger, namely, that there are principled reasons coming from introspection to reject Intentionalism about moods. Therefore, Intentionalism altogether is to be rejected.

1. SIAM, EIAM, AND THE INCOHERENT TRIAD

In this section I compare SIAM and EIAM with respect to the way they deal with the Incoherent Triad (IT). Let me start with recalling (IT):

THE INCOHERENT TRIAD

(1)   Moods do not exhibit directedness.

(2)   Intentional experiences exhibit directedness.

(3)   Moods are intentional.

As we already know, (IT) brings to the surface a conflict between a pair of claims, (2) and (3), the intentionalist seems to be committed to accept and a phenomenological/introspective datum, (1). What (IT) is supposed to show is that, if (1) is true then Intentionalism cannot be true as well. In other words, there is a conflict between the phenomenological/introspective observations on moods' undirectedness and the theoretical commitments of Intentionalism.

SIAM's strategy to solve the conflict was re-describing on (1) in terms of generalized directedness as opposed to genuine undirectednss. According to such an interpretation, moods would not represent any specific intentional object, but only general intentional objects/contents, the world as a whole (WAW), or frequently changing objects (FCO). As I have already pointed out, this is a problematic move, as long as it does not seem to take the phenomenology of moods right, at least in the undirected anxiety-like cases. Moreover, there are cases of generalized directedness, such as the frequently changing objects cases, in which the phenomenal character of the experience seems to (at least) outrun the intentional content. So, SIAM's reply to (IT) does not seem to be able to preserve the main claim of the intentionalist: the identity of phenomenal character and intentional content—*a fortiori*, it does not preserve transparency either. Therefore, it fails to reply to (IT).

Now, what about EIAM? Recall that the core of Mendelovici's strategy was biting the bullet and granting to the anti-intentionalist the following phenomenological point: at least some moods—again, undirected anxiety, objectless depression, sudden elation, etc.—do not exhibit directedness toward any object, whether general or specific. So, there are genuinely undirected moods. However, she wants to show that granting this point does not entail dropping Intentionalism. Accordingly, her proposal aims at making sense of the possibility that undirected moods have some intentional object/content, *i.e.* unbound affective properties, despite they do not exhibit directedness. In other words, to exploit the object*/object** distinction introduced in Chapter 4 (§1.6), Mendelovici maintains that undirected moods do not exhibit directedness toward any object*, but still represent some object**. In doing that,

she seems to understand directedness as object*-directedness. If so, then her way to look at (IT) is the following—call it (IT*):

(1)   Moods do not exhibit object*-directedness.

(2)   Intentional experiences exhibit object*-directedness.

(3)   Moods are intentional.

If this reconstruction is correct, then her strategy is denying (2). In particular, her suggestion is that being object*-directed is not a necessary condition for being intentional. Her proposal, indeed, is that undirected moods are contentful, even though they are not directed at objects*. In particular, they represent unbound affective properties. Her idea is that there can be non-propositional contents representing properties without objects*. Mendelovici's case for such a claim are predicative concepts, which would represent properties without representing objects*. This is also what happens in the case of genuinely undirected moods— she argues. So, this is the reason why they do not exhibit object*-directedness but still represent. Moreover, this account preserves the identity of phenomenal character and intentional content. Indeed, the represented unbound affective property is nothing but the affective quality involved in the experience. Mendelovici wants to show that one can deny (2) and still be an intentionalist.

This reply has to be motivated, though. In particular, a reason has to be provided to consider the qualities involved in the experience as represented properties as opposed to intrinsic qualities of experience. And this is where the main problems with EIAM arise—as I pointed out in Chapter 4 (§4). Indeed, one might even accept that there can be contents without objects*. However, showing that unbound properties *can* be represented in general is not enough to draw the conclusion that Mendelovici wants to draw here as it does not show yet that undirected moods *do* have that sort of content. So, some further evidence is to be provided in support of the claim that unbound properties *are* represented by undirected moods. Absent such an evidence, the most plausible conclusion is that those properties are not represented and so they are not content. If so, then the conflict in (IT) would not be solved.

In particular, the required evidence for Mendelovici' proposal should come from introspection, since the latter is what intentionalists (and Mendelovici too) use to appeal to in all the other cases. In other words, one would naturally expect that, if undirected moods had a content, they would be transparent experiences and, thereby, exhibit some sort of directedness

toward what they represent—*i.e.* affective properties. In other words, one would expect that, even thought they do not exhibit object*-directedness, they exhibit property-directedness (*i.e.*, a certain object**-directedness).

However, it is plausible to say that, if at least some moods are to be genuinely (strongly) undirected, then they do not exhibit *any* directedness—not just object*-directedness but also property-directedness. In turn, this leads to deny that undirected moods are transparent experiences (see Chapter 4, §2). Accordingly, if Mendelovici really wants to grant that at least some moods are genuinely undirected, then she seems to be committed to deny that those experiences are transparent.[1] But, if this is correct, then it is no longer clear what should motivate the reply that undirected moods represent unbound affective properties.

Mendelovici addresses this difficulty concerning the motivation of the view by arguing that there is *indirect* introspective evidence that leads to conclude that moods represent unbound affective properties. However, such an argument is still not fully convincing: it seems to be easier to accept from the point of view of an intentionalist (*internal*) than it is from the point of view of a non-intentionalist (*external*).

To sum up, thus, in order to solve the conflict in (IT), SIAM forces the phenomenology of moods and, even in case it succeeds in its reply, it is not able to preserve neither the identity of phenomenal character and intentional content of moods nor the transparency of moods. On the other hand, EIAM seems phenomenologically more adequate and *potentially* replies to (IT). That is, it has a coherent story about the content of undirected moods. However, as long as it allows for genuinely undirected moods, it commits to those experiences being *opaque*. Thereby, a problem arises concerning the motivation for accepting EIAM's story about undirected moods' content, if one is not already an intentionalist.

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[1] Recall, there are (at least) two reasons to believe that Mendelovici is committed to say that undirected moods do not exhibit object**-directedness. First of all, what the anti-intentionalist has in mind, when describes some moods as not exhibiting directedness, is something more radical than object*-directedness. (After all—the anti-intentionalist could say—if moods' undirectedness were just lacking object*-directedness, this would not be a genuine case of undirected. Thus, at that point, there would not be a principled difference between SIAM and EIAM. Secondly, from a phenomenological point of view, there seems to be no property-directedness exhibited by those experiences, as long as the affective qualities cannot be easily told apart from the experience itself.

2. SIAM *VERSUS* EIAM

In this section I start with stressing the differences between EIAM and SIAM (§2.1). After that, I compare the *pro* and the *contra* of the two accounts, make a balance (§2.2) and argue that, reasoning from the point of view of the intentionalist, EIAM is preferable to SIAM (§2.3).

2.1. Two Intentionalisms

The first and most striking difference between EIAM and SIAM is that, compared to the latter, the former better fits with the many different aspects and complexities of the phenomenal character of affective states. In particular, on the one hand, SIAM has to deny that such cases exist and claim that the phenomenal character of every mood is to be described in terms of generalized directedness and, thereby, is to be reducible either to a FCO case or to a WAW case. On the other hand, instead, EIAM is able to allow for cases of genuine undirectedness. This is a virtue of such an account due to two reasons: first, it makes it more respectful of the phenomenology of moods;[2] second, it makes it stronger from an intentionalist point of view, since it concedes something to the anti-intentionalist.

Now, an important point to be stressed is that such a virtue is basically due to the fact that Mendelovici assumes what is phenomenally manifest to the experiencer as a starting point of her analysis. In other words, her account is from the very beginning construed to take phenomenology right and primarily provide an explanation of phenomenal character. Mendelovici moves from the phenomenological consideration that the qualities involved in affective experiences, affective qualities, usually appear as primitives qualifying objects. Accordingly, affective qualities are both phenomenal primitives and *primitives of the explanation*.[3] In this way, they are not reduced to any other more fundamental non-phenomenal kind of properties. In addition, this enables Mendelovici to avoid the appeal to other phenomenally "foreign" kinds of properties, such as physical properties or response-dependent properties. In this way, she is able to explain phenomenal character by means of phenomenal properties. On

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[2] Clearly, provided that the phenomenological description offered by Mendelovici is the right phenomenological description—I am not going to put that in question now.

[3] This, in turn, may imply a certain *priority of phenomenal character over intentional content*. Mendelovici is not explicit on that, so we cannot impose oh her such a view. However, we can say that assuming an Edenic view is at least compatible with a certain (perhaps explanatory) priority of phenomenal character. As already pointed out, affective properties, which are phenomenal properties, are assumed as primitives of the explanation. (The notion of *priority* here is to be understood in a broad sense: as a generic anti-symmetric relation.). Be that as it may, I am setting aside these issues concerning priority..

the other hand, the fact that those qualities appear as properties of objects guarantees that we are dealing with something represented, so with a species of content.[4] So, intentional content perfectly matches the phenomenal character of affective states. Hence, they are one and the same thing.

All this suggests that Mendelovici's account implies a commitment to the two following background assumptions:

Pluralism about content: As long as phenomenal character is content and does not depend on external features, it is *narrow* content. On the other hand, the idea of reliable misrepresentations suggests that, besides narrow content, also have *wide* content. So, the account involves pluralism about content: many different types of contents are allowed by EIAM.[5]

Phenomenal Internalism: Phenomenal character, as long as it involves properties that are not instantiated in outside world but are subjective, does not depend on what there is outside of one's mind in the external environment. This is internalism about phenomenal character, or phenomenal internalism.

In other words, EIAM counts as a version of Narrow Intentionalism, and its capability of respecting the phenomenology of affective states appears strictly related to that. Accordingly, working within a narrow intentionalist framework is also what enables Mendelovici to allow for genuinely undirected moods, provide an intentionalist account for them, and thereby preserve both the phenomenal continuities and the differences between emotions, directed moods and undirected moods.

On the other hand, SIAM moves from very different set of background assumptions:[6]

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[4] Recall this is Mendelovici's argument (see Mendelovici, 2013a, 2013b; see also Chapter 4, §3).

[5] This is not surprising: Chalmers (2006, 2010), in presenting the idea of Eden and Edenic content, wants to allow for many different contents of perceptual experience.

[6] At the best of my knowledge, every supporter of SIAM is a wide intentionalist except Crane (1998, 2001), who instead advocates Narrow Intentionalism. This suggests that, perhaps, SIAM is not incompatible with Narrow Intentionalism. However, the following to points are important: (i) SIAM has been elaborated within the framework of Wide Intentionalism; (ii) even if it is compatible with Narrow Intentionalism, it is not strictly dependent on that framework as it is, instead, EIAM.

Content Externalism: The only intentional content allowed is *wide* content. Accordingly, what one represents in one's own experience of the world are just objects of the world and their properties.

Phenomenal Externalism: Identifying phenomenal character with intentional content means that phenomenal character is what it is represented, so, given content externalism, what it is outside of one's mind in the external environment.

Unlike EIAM, thus, SIAM counts as a version of Wide Intentionalism. So, here is the second relevant difference between the two accounts: they involve very different theoretical frameworks, although they are both intentionalist proposals. Therefore, they are not only two different intentionalist accounts of moods, but also belong to two different versions of Intentionalism.[7]

2.2. A balance

I will now compare the two accounts by listing their *pro* and *contra*. I start with SIAM and then move to EIAM.

2.2.1. SIAM

Pro. The main points *in favor of* SIAM are the following three:

(i)   It preserves *to some extent* the phenomenal continuity between moods and emotions.

(ii)   It does not introduce new notions and does not appeal to *sui generis* properties. (affective properties, Edenic properties) or types of contents (unbound properties).

(iii)   It *programmatically* aims at preserving transparency.

Contra. The main points *against* SIAM are the following two:

(i)   It does not seem to be able to fully respect the phenomenology of moods: at least some moods are genuinely undirected. Yet, if one accepts SIAM, then one has to deny that and reduce every case of moods' undirectedness to generalized directedness. This just seems phenomenologically inadequate and creates problem

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[7] Moreover, EIAM counts as a version of Pure Intentionalism, whereas SIAM counts s a version of Impure Intentionalism (see Chapter 4, §1.3)

for the identification of phenomenal character and intentional content (Chapter 3, §2.).

(ii)   Even if one grants that every case of moods' undirectedness is in fact a case of generalized directedness, it still seems plausible to advance some doubts as to whether SIAM succeeds in preserving the identity of phenomenal character and intentional content and the transparency in at least one of the standard cases of generalized directedness—namely, the FCO case (Chapter 3, §3).

2.2.2. EIAM

Pro. The main points *in favor of* EIAM are the following three:

(i)   It preserves the phenomenal continuity between moods and emotions.

(ii)   It is preserves the phenomenology of undirected moods, as long as it has a story concerning the undirected moods being contentful, which does not force one to reduce every case of moods' apparent undirectedness to a case of generalized directedness.

(iii)   It can be integrated with SIAM, as long as it allows for FCO and WAW cases.

Contra. The main points *against* EIAM are the following two:

(i)   It is theoretically quite expensive. In order to accept EIAM, one has to commit to many strong assumptions. So, it seems that the theoretical costs to be paid in order to buy EIAM are very high: too many assumptions, too many new notions to accept, such as Edenic properties, Edenic content, reliable misrepresentations, unbound properties being represented, etc. (Especially a wide intentionalist might have such a worry.[8,9])

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[8] I have already presented Mendelovici's (2013b) argument in support of this choice in Chapter 4 (§1.3), so I will not add anything on that. I just refresh her main point in this footnote. In a nutshell, her argument is at the best explanation and, very roughly, goes in the following way. Only if we take affective properties as Edenic properties, we are able to adequately account for their phenomenology. This is basically due to the fact the embracing the other options—physical properties or response-dependent properties—leaves open the following two issues that are, instead, solved, if one adopts Edenic properties. First, since the other options consist in phenomenologically "foreign" properties, the connection between those properties and what it is phenomenally manifest to the experiencer should still be explained. Second, the other options do not seem to favor an account in terms of content alone of the phenomenal differences between emotional thought and emotional experiences.

[9] Recall, wide intentionalists, as long as they are externalists about content, also defend a tracking theory of intentionality: reliable misrepresentations does not fit with that approach to intentionality, since standard tracking theories of intentionality (Dretske (1981, 1988, 1995); Fodor (1987, 1990, 1994); Millikan (1984, 1989)

(ii)   It does not preserve the transparency of undirected moods (Chapter 4, §2).

2.3. EIAM is preferable

Given §2.2.1 and §2.2.2, my conclusion is that EIAM is preferable to SIAM, from the point of view of the intentionalist. As far as I can see, the main reasons to draw such a conclusion are the following three.

A first reason has to do with Intentionalism being, in the first place, a theory concerning the nature of phenomenal character. As such, one important constraint on such a theory is that it has to be as much phenomenologically adequate as possible. EIAM respects moods' phenomenology more than SIAM does, as long as it allows for undirected moods.

Secondly, EIAM looks explanatorily more powerful than SIAM. In a few words, it is more adequate to the phenomenology of moods because it allows for more different types of phenomenal character—directed and genuinely undirected moods. And it can do that, because it has an explanation for the case of undirected moods, which SIAM instead lacks.

Thirdly, recall the two constraints on a good intentionalist account of moods I introduced in Chapter 2 (§4):

(C1)   It must provide good candidates for moods' intentional contents/objects;

(C2)   It must be such that, in every case, moods' phenomenal character is identical to intentional content.

A good intentionalist account has to jointly satisfy (C1) and (C2). Now, from what I said above in §2.2.1 and argued in Chapter 3 (§§2, 3), SIAM does not even satisfy (C1) or, if it does, it fails to satisfy (C2). In other words: in the best case, the candidate intentional content/objects it provides for moods are not such that the identity of intentional content and phenomenal character is preserved; in the worst, it is not even able to provide candidates for all the cases of phenomenal character to be accounted for.

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are in conflict with the *possibility* of reliable misrepresentations, as Mendelovici (2010, 2013c) argues. Mendelovici (2013b) replies to an objection to reliable misrepresentations. The objection is: reliable misrepresentations are contrary to common sense, in that they (systematically) represent object as other than they are. Her reply here is, first of all, that it is not clear why one should expect that our commonsense view of emotion is correct. Secondly, in any case, it is not plain that being contrary to commonsense weighs more than the virtues of the view: for example, the fact of respecting the phenomenology of moods more than the other intentionalist option, SIAM, does. One might, however, be also worried concerning whether there are actual cases of reliable misrepresentations. For a reply to this question see Mendelovici (2010: Ch. 5).

On the other hand, from what I have said in §2.2.2, EIAM seems to satisfy (C1) and (C2), at least conditionally, that is: *if* EIAM satisfies (C1), then it also satisfies (C2). It is therefore better than SIAM.

Clearly, the antecedent of the conditional right above strongly depends on how much Mendelovici's argument for motivating her view that undirected moods represent unbound affective properties (Chapter 4, §3) is persuasive. So, one might make the following point. If Mendelovici's argument is not able to provide a satisfactory answer to the external motivation problem, then it is doubtful whether EIAM is actually able to satisfy (C1): if there are poor motivations to believe that unbound affective properties are represented, then it is legitimate to doubt that such a proposal is actually viable—and if it is not, EIAM does not even satisfies (C1).

This is a serious worry concerning EIAM and, clearly, also affects Intentionalism about moods as such. Indeed, if EIAM is the best intentionalist account of moods and it is not properly motivated, then this means that the reasons to accept Intentionalism about moods as such are not so compelling.

At this point, one might also add that the fact that EIAM is not properly motivated provides a reason to *drop* the view, even from an intentionalist point of view.[10] If so, SIAM would be the only intentionalist account to deal with. After all, one might say, SIAM does not suffer from this problem. To my mind, this proposal should be resisted for several reasons. First of all, SIAM too has a problem concerning its meeting constraint (C1). Secondly, if SIAM does not meet (C1), it is because it is not sufficiently phenomenologically adequate, so it lacks phenomenological motivation exactly like EIAM. Thirdly, if SIAM meets (C1), there are still reasons to believe it does not meet (C2), whereas if EIAM meets (C1), then it also meets (C2). So, in the worst case, there is no difference between the two options, but there *is* difference in the best case. Thus, choosing EIAM rather than SIAM seems in any case more convenient than opting for SIAM. Accordingly, to my mind, EIAM is preferable or more promising, if not better, than SIAM.

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[10] One might be wondering that this looks a worry that a wide intentionalist might want to raise against EIAM. However, I do not think a wide intentionalist would/should exploit EIAM's lack of compelling motivation and go this way. First, I do not think she *would* due to the following reason. Independently of what specific version of Intentionalism she advocates, the intentionalist would agree with the assumptions of the argument that Mendelovici advances to motivate EIAM. Second, I do not think she *should* due to the following reason. The only alternative to EIAM is SIAM, which is even worst. Accordingly, if one is a wide intentionalist, the best strategy to deal with EIAM seems to be trying to make it compatible with Wide Intentionalism rather than argue that it is not properly motivated.

Be that as it may, in any case, this proposal would be an objection to the claim that EIAM is better than SIAM, but it would not be such a big progress for Intentionalism about moods itself, since SIAM has its own deep problems with satisfactorily accounting for moods––I have already listed them above and discussed them in Chapter 3 (§§2, 3). So, independently of which one of the two accounts an intentionalist might consider the best, the phenomenal character of moods still remains a serious problem for Intentionalism.

3. A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE

So far, the result concerning the intentionalist accounts of moods is that they face serious issues and are ultimately not satisfying replies to the problem of moods since their strategies to solve the contrast between the claims in the Incoherent Triad fail. Given that, the conclusion I have drawn at the end of the previous section is that moods' phenomenal character is a serious problem for Intentionalism.

One might reply to this point that the fact that Intentionalism has such problems when it comes to moods may be a matter of contingency, after all: due to contingent reasons no intentionalist proposal among those elaborated so far is able to deal with moods, but this does not mean that, in principle, Intentionalism cannot solve the issue. I doubt that this is correct. Indeed, as far as I can see, the reason behind the failure of SIAM and EIAM is a *principled reason*. In a nutshell, the phenomenal character of undirected moods, as it is revealed by introspection, is such that it cannot be identified with intentional content. Such a conclusion is motivated by the same assumptions that otherwise motivate the idea that transparency provides direct, strong reasons in support of Intentionalism—or so I will argue in this final section. If I am right, then Intentionalism cannot be true of moods.

First of all, let me recall what has been done in the previous chapters. In Chapter 3 (§2), I argued that genuinely undirected moods, such as undirected anxiety, lack some minimal phenomenological condition that allows one to describe them as directed experiences. More precisely, when one undergoes them, nothing but the experience itself seems to be involved. In other words, they appear genuinely undirected because their phenomenal character is not other-presenting. This affected SIAM's proposal of accounting for this peculiar phenomenal character in terms of intentional objects/contents such as FCO or WAW.

In chapter 4 (§2), I showed that one minimal phenomenological condition for being transparent is precisely that experience is other-presenting. Indeed, only if experience is other-

presenting the minimal condition for appreciating the qualities one experiences as belonging to something other than the experience itself is realized. Thus, being transparent is closely related to exhibiting directedness. Moreover, this other-presenting feature is also crucial for attributing an object/content to the experience: indeed, this "something other" experience presents one with is (quite naturally) taken to be the intentional object/content of the experience. So, put it other way, the fact that experience exhibits directedness is the minimal condition for its being transparent, insofar as it is also the minimal condition of the introspective availability of the object/content of the experience and, thereby, for introspectively appreciating the qualities/features involved in the experience as being on the side of the content.

This led to conclude that genuinely undirected moods are opaque experiences, insofar as they are not other-presenting experiences. But this also raised two problems for Intentionalism, despite Mendelovici's tentative of accommodating genuinely undirected moods: (i) if undirected moods are opaque, we do not have any introspective justification for attributing a content to those experiences; (ii) if so, then we do not even have introspective reasons to say that the exhibited phenomenal character *is* content. As a consequence, we do not have any direct, strong introspective reason in favor of Intentionalism. Thus, this is why the lack of transparency leads to a lack of evidence for Intentionalism: if an experience is not transparent, then we do not have direct and strong introspective reasons to attribute content to that experience and so to identify phenomenal character with content.

However, this is not yet a principled reason against Intentionalism: it might well be that we lack introspective reasons to say that phenomenal character and intentional content are identical, but we might find other non-introspective reasons to make such a claim. A principled reason against Intentionalism would be, instead, a reason to believe that Intentionalism *cannot* be true of moods. The crucial step toward such a reason is recalling *why* introspection is so relevant and *why* transparency is supposed to count as direct, strong evidence in support of Intentionalism.

First point: introspection is relevant because the main assumption of the whole debate on the nature of phenomenal character is that introspection is reliable and provides direct evidence about the nature of phenomenal character. To put it other way, content comes in as the *explanans* in a debate in which (i) phenomenal character is the *explanandum* and (ii)

introspection is regarded as the best method to acquire information about the nature of that *explanandum*.

Accordingly, and this is the second point, here is why transparency provides direct, strong evidence for Intentionalism: as long as it is an introspective datum, transparency offers direct introspective evidence for the claim that phenomenal character is content. Somewhat crudely and roughly: we perform introspection to know more about the nature of phenomenal character and we find out that all we can introspect is nothing over and above content. This happens because, when we introspect, we are presented with something appreciated as other than the experience itself and every feature/quality we are presented with is appreciated as belonging to that "something other." So, the components of phenomenal character are introspectively appreciated as being on the side of content. And this is a fact about phenomenal character itself.

Now, in the case of opaque experiences, such as undirected moods, things are exactly the other way around: we are not presented with anything that we appreciate as other that then experience itself. So, on the one hand, the minimal condition for introspectively spotting a content is not realized in that case. On the other hand, experience *does* exhibit a certain phenomenal character that we are able to introspect. This produces the fact that the features/qualities composing that phenomenal character are not introspectively appreciated as belonging to something other than the experience itself. So, in the case of an opaque experience, the minimal conditions for identifying phenomenal character with content are not realized. What we introspect is phenomenal character, but it cannot be identified with content. Once again: this is a fact about phenomenal character itself.

Here is why, thus, Intentionalism has problems with opaque experiences such as moods: if genuinely undirected moods are opaque experiences, then this means that their phenomenal character lacks the minimal conditions to be introspectively identified with content.[11] This counts as a principled reason against Intentionalism about moods because it excludes in principle an intentionalist account of undirected moods. Indeed, it is a fact about the phenomenal character of those experiences that such a phenomenal character lacks the minimal conditions for being identified with content.

If this is correct, then a strong conclusion has to be drawn: the opacity of undirected moods is not merely lack of evidence in favor of an intentionalist account of moods; rather, it

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[11] This also explains why Tye (1995, 2008) insists in defending their transparency.

counts as strong direct, evidence *against* such an account. But then, as long as Intentionalism is a universally quantified claim concerning the *nature* of phenomenal character,[12] the opacity of moods offers a strong reason to reject not only Intentionalism about moods, but Intentionalism as such.[13]

Thus, transparency and opacity are perfectly specular: if one accepts that the former provides direct, strong evidence to identify phenomenal character and intentional content, then one also has to accept that the latter provides evidence against such an identification. Indeed, the reason that makes transparency an evidence for Intentionalism is the same reason that makes opacity an evidence against.

Let me conclude this section with the following two notes. First, once again, the main (explicit) assumption here is that introspection provides evidence concerning the nature of phenomenal character. Such an assumption is presupposed by the appeal to transparency itself. One might not like this or refuse the idea that introspection in general is a (reliable) source of evidence. In that case, though, one should not appeal to transparency either—it does not seem to make much sense rejecting introspection, on the one hand, and exploiting transparency as an evidence, on the other hand. If one appeals to transparency, then one is also attributing a strong role to introspection in providing evidence concerning the nature of phenomenal character.

Second, in order for there to be introspective direct evidence for the claim that phenomenal character is intentional content, the latter is to be *in principle* (directly) available to

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[12] This is why it is also asserted as a metaphysical necessity.

[13] A possible reply on the side of the intentionalist here would be biting the bullet and argue that phenomenal character is not a natural kind. This would have at least the effect of limiting the rejection of Intentionalism to Intentionalism about moods and blocking the rejection of an intentionalist account of every experience. This would bring about a restriction of the scope of the intentionalist claim, which would not be true of moods, but could still be true of some other experiences—e.g., visual experiences. Kind (2007) has a counter-reply to this move, however. In a nutshell, she offers two reasons to reject it. First, she argues that it is *ad hoc*. Indeed, the proposal of distinguishing between different natural kinds corresponding to different phenomenal characters seems to be motivated *only* by the fact that Intentionalism fails to account for a subclass of phenomenal character. But, Kind argues, this is not a good reason to accept that phenoemenal character is not a natural kind. The failure of Intentionalism, indeed, does not prove that two subclasses of phenomenal characters correspond to two different natural kinds (Kind, 2007: 415). Some independent reason should be provided. A second reason to reject the intentionalist reply is that it is not clear why an intentionalist should accept to restrict the scope of her claim. Indeed, accepting a restriction on Intentionalism is quite in contrast with the programmatic declarations of the view itself. Recall, the aim of the intentionalist is providing a theory of the nature of phenomenal character *in general*. Accepting restrictions on Intentionalism means accepting that not every phenomenal character can be identified with intentional content. In this way, thus, the intentionalist would be just accepting that Intentionalism, at least as a theory that identifies phenomenal character and intentional content (which is the relevant sense for us here) cannot succeed in principle (Kind, 2007: 415). So, quite curiously (and somewhat paradoxically), she would end up accepting something very close to the conclusion I am suggesting here: that Intentionalism, as a general theory of the nature of phenomenal character, fails.

introspection. (If that were not the case, it would not be clear how transparency could offer any evidence that phenomenal character is content.) Thus, the appeal to transparency also seems to imply a notion of *content* such that the intentional content is something that can in principle be introspected. Accordingly, in addition to the idea that introspection is capable of revealing the nature of phenomenal character, there is another (less explicit) assumption at work in the appeal to transparency that concerns the notion of *content* in use. As long as Intentionalism exploits transparency, then, it also assumes such a notion of *content*. This, in turn, implies that content can be introspectively recognized as such.[14] As a consequence, certain conditions are to be satisfied in order for one to be able to attribute content to experience. In other words, again, directedness is to be exhibited. So, we are back to what is above: that an experience is other-presenting is a minimal condition presupposed by transparency.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I focused on the consequences that the failure of transparency has on Intentionalism about moods. In particular, I started with recapping and comparing SIAM and EIAM with respect to the way they solve the conflict shown by the Incoherent Triad (§1). After that I showed that they belong to two different versions of Intentionalism. Then, I considered the *pro* and the *contra* of both the accounts and made a balance. The following three reasons pushed me to claim that EIAM is the best of the two intentionalist options concerning moods:

1. It is phenomenologically more adequate, as long as it allows for genuinely undirected moods;
2. Since it is phenomenologically more adequate, it is also explanatorily more powerful;
3. If it satisfies (C1), then it satisfies (C2)—whereas SIAM does not satisfy (C2), even in case it satisfies (C1).

However, as long as EIAM is the best version of Intentionalism about moods but is also poorly (or not strongly) motivated from a theory-neutral point of view, Intentionalism does not

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[14] This does not mean that one needs the concept CONTENT or the concepts of what is represented in the content. This only means that one is introspectively able to tell at least whether or not one's experience is of/about something.

seem to offer a fully satisfactory story about moods: indeed, in the worst case (SIAM), there are reasons to reject Intentionalism about moods; in the best case (EIAM), there are no compelling reasons to accept it. (Ruling out EIAM on the basis of its being poorly motivated does not seem quite right and, in any case, is not a real progress.) All this suggests that moods' phenomenal character—or, at least, the phenomenal character of some of them—is still a serious problem for Intentionalism. This is my minimal conclusion.

In the final section (§3), though, I argued for something stronger, namely, that there is a principled reason for rejecting Intentionalism about moods: the phenomenal character of undirected moods, as it is revealed by introspection, is such that it cannot be identified with intentional content. The main reasons for drawing such a conclusion are connected with the results of the analysis on moods and the role usually assigned to introspection and transparency by intentionalists. As long as transparency stands, there is direct and strong evidence to believe that Intentionalism is true, since transparency is an introspective datum and, as such, a source of direct evidence concerning the nature of phenomenal character. However, if one accepts this, then one has also to accept that, should an experience turn out to be opaque, there would be some direct and strong evidence *against* Intentionalism. And this is the case of undirected moods.

Also, I pointed out that the appeal to transparency presupposes a notion of *content* such that the latter is to be in principle directly accessible to introspection.

All this suggests that the connections between Intentionalism and transparency are much stronger and deeper than it appears on the surface. Transparency is not only the main premise of an argument in support of Intentionalism: it offers principled reasons to believe in Intentionalism, as long as it is taken to be an introspective datum that tells something about the nature of phenomenal character.

For these reasons, thus, the opacity of undirected moods is not merely a lack of evidence in support of the claim that phenomenal character is intentional content, but rather offers a principled reason against this claim. As a consequence, it is not just that the phenomenal character of undirected moods is a serious problem for Intentionalism. In fact, it is something more: the phenomenal character of moods offers a strong reason to reject the view. If there are grounds to accept that at least some moods are genuinely undirected and thereby opaque, then one has to admit that there is also at least one case in which phenomenal character cannot be identified with intentional content. Accordingly, Intentionalism about moods is to

be rejected, even in its best version—*i.e.*, EIAM. Therefore Intentionalism, as long as it is to be true of every experience and phenomenal character, is to be rejected altogether. This is my stronger conclusion.

CHAPTER 6

A NUANCED VIEW OF TRANSPARENCY

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

In chapters 2 and 3 I argued that neither the Standard nor the Edenic intentionalist account of moods is able to defend the transparency of moods. Clearly, our views concerning transparency are to be somehow affected by these results. However, it is still to be determined how. In this chapter I deal with that.

In a nutshell, my proposal will be that the opacity of moods is not sufficient to reject transparency altogether, but strongly suggests a more nuanced way to look at it. I rely especially on Kind's (2003) distinction between two different understandings of transparency: strong and weak transparency. Following Kind, I suggest that the understanding of transparency is to be revised in its strength and, more precisely, it is to be weakened. In other words, *weak transparency* is to be embraced (§1). As far as I can see, this is exactly what the introspective data concerning affective states suggest. Moreover, they are better interpreted in the light of it. Indeed, if one appeals to weak transparency, the (apparently) heterogeneous data provided by introspection can be quite easily and coherently combined in one unitary

interpretation (§2). In addition, although it is far more problematic, I suggest that such an interpretation can be extended to the transparency of experience in general (§3).

If I am right, then it is possible to directly introspect non-represented qualities of experience not only in the case of undirected moods, but in also in the case of other kinds of experience and in case of visual experiences too. This raises a question as to whether or not those non-represented qualities still play a role in representing. In the final section (§4), I address this issue and argue that they plausibly do in the case of vision. The case of undirected moods seems, instead, more complicated. However, my proposal will be that we should be open to concede that also moods' phenomenal character might play a representational role. In support of this claim, I introduce a distinction suggested by Kriegel (2013b) between subjective and objective mental representations and argue that, given what introspection provides, moods can be representations only in the objective sense.

1. IN SEARCH FOR AN INTERPRETATION

Here is the situation so far. On the one hand, there is quite straightforward evidence that visual experiences are transparent. On the other hand, affective experiences appear to be much more complicated and dubious. First, the transparency of emotions can be (and has been) put in question (Chapter 4, §4) and, in any case, whether or not emotions are (fully) transparent seems to be highly dependent on the introspective/phenomenological intuitions one has. Second, there is reason to take at least some directed moods as not (fully) transparent—as I argued in Chapter 3 (§§3). Third, undirected moods are likely to be opaque experiences (Chapter 4, §2)

The data, thus, are quite heterogeneous and this complicates things and the choice between the two standard solutions that are *prima facie* available: rejecting transparency altogether or restricting its scope.

On the one hand, rejecting transparency altogether is not satisfying because of the introspective data concerning visual experiences that look quite neat cases of transparency. On the other hand, restricting the scope of transparency, if not excluded, seems a hard task. Indeed, if the opposition between transparent and opaque experiences were exactly coincident with the boundaries of the different domains of experience—perceptual experiences and affective experiences—, then we would have a clear threshold between what is transparent and what is opaque, and it would be possible to draw a neat demarcation line—and thereby

restricting the scope of transparency. But this is not the case: indeed, at least in the case of affective experiences, we have also differences *within* the same domain. This makes definitely obscure where exactly the limit of the scope of transparency is to be put.

One might insist that the limits of the scope of transparency within the affective domain run along the lines of the distinction between directed moods and undirected moods: the former would be still transparent, whereas the latter would not. However, again, this is disputable, since at least some directed moods (those that represent frequently changing objects) do not appear (fully) transparent experiences. Moreover, some emotions are not neat cases of (fully) transparent experiences as well.[1] In other words, the affective domain appears a non-uniform territory, and such a condition just makes hard to define the boundaries of the scope of transparency.

If this is correct, then the differences between experiences concerning their being transparent are at two different levels: first, at the level of the different domains of experiences, since there are differences between perceptual experiences and affective experiences; second, at the level of the domain of affective experience itself, since there are also differences between the single types of experiences belonging to that domain. So, two questions arise: First, how to deal with the differences between perceptual experiences and affective experiences? Second, how to deal with the differences between the different kinds of affective experiences?

Now, the problem is that one would like to find a way to reply to these questions that be as much unitary and unified as possible. So, to make a long story short, it seems to me that (at least part of) what generates the issue is the following tension: on the one hand, one is naturally tempted to look for a unitary way to combine all the material coming from introspection; on the other hand, the material itself looks very heterogeneous, if not (to some extent) contrasting, and one wants to preserve those differences.

One easy way to deal with such an issue in one single, quick move is just acknowledging that the data available need not to (or even cannot) be put together. One might just take as a brute fact about experience that there is such heterogeneity: this is a datum in itself—one might argue—and we cannot go beyond it. This is enough to put in question transparency. Full stop.[2]

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[1] Recall Chapter 4, §4.

[2] It goes without saying that, if that were true, then Intentionalism would be in great troubles.

To my mind, this is legitimate—and I suspect it is one way an anti-intentionalist would like to go. However, I do not find this solution fully satisfactory, for the following reasons. First of all, this would be much easier to accept, if the differences were just between different domains of experience: we could simply accept that experiences belonging to different domains (perceptual experiences and affective experiences) behave in different ways. But, again, the situation is a bit more complicated: it just seems weird that experiences not only belonging the same domain (emotions and moods) but also of the same kind (moods) exhibit such a great discontinuity. Moreover, if a way to accommodate the differences in the introspective data were available and viable, then this would be a much better way to go, because it would provide a unitary and coherent interpretation—which is, in my opinion, preferable.[3] This is a sufficient reason for checking whether such a way to go is available.

As far as I can see, another way to go *is* available, and it can be found having in mind the distinction between strong and weak transparency, suggested by Amy Kind (2003).[4] This distinction helps find a way to collect and keep together the *prima facie* heterogeneous introspective material under one, unitary and coherent interpretation.

2. WEAK TRANSPARENCY AND AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCES

In this section, I focus on affective experiences and propose that, at least in that case, revising transparency in its strength and embracing weak transparency offer a nice way to put together into one, coherent interpretation the heterogeneous material within the affective domain. I do not face here, instead, the problem of how the introspective data coming from perception and affection are to be combined.

I start with introducing Kind's distinction (§2.1) and, then (§2.2), show how it paves the way to a more nuanced view of transparency for the affective domain. In particular, I claim that, on the one hand, a revision in the strength of transparency is supported by the data coming from introspection on affective experiences; on the other, such a revision offers a unitary and coherent interpretation for them. So, my conclusion will be that, at least in the case of affective experiences, transparency is not to be rejected altogether, but revised in its strength: more precisely, it is to be weakened.

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[3] Notice that this would not favor Intentionalism in any case. Indeed, if such a unitary interpretation of transparency were available, all the critiques I raised to Intentionalism about moods would still stand.

[4] The same distinction is also in Kind (2007, 2010).

2.1. Strong transparency versus weak transparency

According to Kind, there is an ambiguity in the way transparency has been understood. Indeed, there seem to be two different, implicit understandings of transparency that can be distinguished in the extant literature, based on the strength one assigns to the idea that one has not direct introspective access to the qualities of experience.

Recall the transparency-thesis:

(TE)   In introspection, one is not aware of the intrinsic features of experience, but the only properties one is directly aware of are represented properties.

The ambiguity that Kind is pointing out concerns the negative side of (TE)—*i.e.*, what one is not introspectively aware of. On a strong interpretation, "one is not aware of the intrinsic features of experience" means that it is *introspectively impossible* to focus the intrinsic qualities of one's experience. By contrast, on a weaker interpretation, that would just be *difficult*, but *not impossible*. The former is *Strong Transparency* (ST), the latter is *Weak Transparency* (WT):

(ST)   In introspection, it is *impossible* for one to be aware of the intrinsic features of the experience and the only properties one is directly aware of are represented properties.

(WT)   In introspection, it is *difficult*[5] (*but not impossible*) for one to be aware of the intrinsic features of the experience and the properties one *can* be directly aware of are not only represented properties.[6]

(ST) expresses the understanding of transparency we have worked so far. And, indeed, it is the idea of transparency that intentionalists (e.g., Dretske, 1995; Harman, 1990; Lycan, 1996a; Tye, 1995, 2000, 2002) have in mind and favor. This is not by accident: they are

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[5] "Difficult" or "hard" might refer (i) to the effort one has to put in order to manage to spot the intrinsic qualities of experience or (ii) to the fact that there are few cases of experiences in which one manages to spot the intrinsic qualities of one's experience. Kind does not make clear her understanding. However, my understanding will be broad: it covers both (i) and (ii).

[6] I am readapting Kind's formulation of (WT) and (ST) to my own formulation of transparency, (TE). I quote her version here: "*Strong Transparency*: it is *impossible* to attend directly to our experience, i.e., we cannot attend to our experience except by attending the objects represented by that experience. *Weak Transparency*: it is *difficult* (but not impossible) to attend directly to our experience, i.e., we can most easily attend to our experience by attending to the objects represented by that experience" (Kind, 2003: 230).

committed to such an understanding of transparency as the latter is the main motivation to accept their view. Indeed, transparency supports Intentionalism as long as it provides evidence to the claim that phenomenal character is identical to intentional content.[7] And (ST) secures this point, since it states that it is introspectively impossible to focus on phenomenal features that are not represented.

On the other hand, as Kind shows, many other philosophers that mention transparency seem to refer to something weaker, namely, (WT).[8] They do not want to say that it is impossible to focus on phenomenal character alone, but just that usually it is very difficult. To provide an example, Kind (2003: 229) quotes the following passage from G.E Moore:

> [T]he moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see *what*, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous. Yet it *can* be distinguished if we look attentively enough, and if we know that there is something to look for. (Moore, 1903: 25)[9]

If weak transparency were the right way to understand the transparency of experience, then Intentionalism would be in serious troubles, since it would mean that, at least in principle, it is introspectively possible to focus on non-represented component of phenomenal character. Thereby, at minimum, there would not be introspective support for the claim that phenomenal character is identical to intentional content. But, as I argued at the end of Chapter 5 (§3), there are serious grounds to say something stronger: there would be some introspective direct evidence against Intentionalism.[10]

Clearly, the mere fact that a distinction can be drawn, in itself, is still not enough to determine which one, among strong and weak transparency, is the right way to understand transparency. This is, instead, to be determined on phenomenological grounds, as Kind herself points out. At this point, thus, the results we achieved from our analyses concerning affective experiences come into the picture. It seems, indeed, that they offer some phenomenological evidence that weak transparency is not only a possible way to understand

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[7] See Chapter 1, §§4-6; Chapter 5, §3.

[8] For more details, see Kind (2003: 228-33).

[9] Quoting Moore to make a case for (WT) is a particularly effective move, since he is supposed to be the "father" of the transparency intuition and is also quoted by both Harman and Tye, when they introduce transparency in their own works.

[10] Kind (2003) agrees on this point: she argues that Intentionalism as such would be false, if (WT) were the right way to look at transparency.

transparency, but also the right way to do that—at least for what concerns the domain of affective experience. Let me focus on that now and explain why.

2.2. A more nuanced view of transparency for affective experiences

Recall what we have. Emotions exhibit directedness. So, the object/content they represent is phenomenally/introspectively manifest. However, it might be disputed whether or not all the components of the emotional experience one is introspectively aware of appear belong to side of the intentional objects/content—which is what it is required in order for those experiences to be transparent. According to intentionalists like Mendelovici (2013a, 2013b) and Tye (2008), emotions are exactly like visual experiences, so all the elements composing the phenomenal character of emotions (evaluative or affective properties) introspectively appear as properties of the represented objects. According to others (e.g., De Sousa, 2004), instead, this is not phenomenologically/introspectively obvious: in particular, the qualities involved in emotions do not appear to be properties of the represented objects. Thus, emotions would not be transparent—or at least, not fully transparent.

Be that as it may, since the main problem is with moods, I leave this question open. For the sake of the argument and simplicity, I will take for granted that intentionalists are right: in the case of emotions, the qualities involved in the experience appear as properties of the represented objects. If this is not the case—as I believe—then nothing changes for my proposal—on the contrary, so much worst for strong transparency (and Intentionalism).

As I have argued,[11] there are at least some directed moods (those representing frequently changing objects) that do not seem (fully) transparent, since part of their phenomenal character outruns the (alleged) intentional content. Moreover, undirected moods are likely to be completely opaque, as long as they do not exhibit any directedness: in undergoing those experiences and introspecting them, no object/content seems to be presented, but one has the impression of dealing (directly and primarily) with phenomenal qualities that seem to be part of the experience itself.

Now, as far as I can see, all this suggests that strong transparency can hardly be applied to affective experiences. Even if one assumes that intentionalists are right on emotions, there are still cases of full opacity (undirected moods). In addition, there are intermediate cases (some directed moods) of at least partial opacity (or partial transparency), in which some

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[11] See Chapter 3, §§2, 3. Kind (2013) also thinks they are not fully transparent.

intentional object/content is introspectively available, but phenomenal character looks quite independent from that.

My proposal is, thus, that all this is to be interpreted in the light of weak transparency. Indeed, inasmuch as it allows both for cases in which one can introspectively be aware of phenomenal character alone and for cases in which one is not able to do that, weak transparency offers a coherent interpretation of the differences between emotions, directed moods, and undirected moods. Moreover, if it is true that undirected moods are intermediate cases, then the situation within the affective domain makes quite tempting to look at the issue concerning the transparency of affective experiences as a matter of degree. Weak transparency fits pretty well with that too.

Accordingly, on the one hand, the material coming from introspection on affective experiences, supports weak rather than strong transparency. On the other hand, weak transparency helps make sense of the discontinuity within the affective domain and collect the data under one, unitary, and coherent interpretation.

Our original concern was looking for a way to put some *prima facie* heterogeneous material together into one unitary interpretation. Weak transparency, thus, offers a way out, at least in the case of affective experiences. Distinguishing between the two interpretation of (TE), (ST) and (WT), is thus the key move toward a more coherent and unitary story about the transparency of affective experiences: it is not introspectively impossible to attend some non-represented component of phenomenal character. According to this story, transparency as such is not to be rejected in the case of affective states: what is to be rejected is the strong interpretation of transparency. However, in this way, transparency is significantly revised in its strength, insofar as cases of opacity are allowed. This is, thus, a more nuanced view of transparency that accommodates the differences and the complexities, at least within the domain of affective experiences.

In addition, and quite interestingly, if one buys such a story, then one also gets for free a possible explanation of why there are contrasting intuitions about emotions. If affective experiences are weakly transparent, then it is possible that different people can get contrasting results from introspection on them—and on emotions in particular. This is because weak transparency leaves open both the possibility that one is not able to focus on the qualities of experience alone and the possibility that one is able to do that. Different introspective reports,

then, would no longer be due to an irreconcilable clash of intuition, but to a possibility left open by introspection itself.

3. EXTENDING THE INTERPRETATION

In the previous section, I argued that the heterogeneous data offered by introspection on affective experiences support an understanding of transparency in terms of weak transparency, which, in turn, helps build up a unitary and coherent interpretation of the data themselves. However, I limited myself to the affective domain of experience. In this section, I claim that there are grounds to extend this interpretation to all the experience. In other words, the strength of transparency in general is to be revised and weakened. Although this is not plain, I will argue for that in what follows. In particular, I will offer two main reasons to accept weak transparency as the right way to look at the transparency of experience in general. The first (§3.1) is that, once one has weak transparency and the latter works, it is not clear why one should also have strong transparency. The second (§3.2) is that it is not plain that in all the cases of introspection on visual experiences we are not able to focus on non-represented components of phenomenal character. This, in turn, suggests an analogy with the case of affective experiences.

3.1. A first reason: If you can go weak, why go strong?

Let me start with making explicit some preliminary and immediate skepticism one might have concerning the claim that I am trying to defend here. One might grant to me that weak transparency fits with experiences belonging to the affective domain and, yet, ask why what works in that case should work also in the case of perception. In other words, what are the grounds on which the interpretation can be extended? After all, one might point out, perception—and visual experiences in particular—are the standard, paradigmatic cases of strong transparency. Moreover, there is no such a thing as a counterpart of undirected moods counterpart in the case of visual perception. So, why should one accept that strong transparency does not apply to perception, given that this looks (at least *prima facie*) quite counter-intuitive? Why can't it just be that strong transparency works for perception, whereas weak transparency works for the experiences belonging the affective domain? In other words, why can't it just be that the domain of perception and the domain of affection simply differ concerning transparency since they are different domains of experience?

As far as I can see, these doubts are legitimate. However, again, I believe that a unitary interpretation, if available, would be a better way to go. So, I will try to offer some reasons to show why I believe that such a way is available and, thereby, a uniform and coherent understanding of transparency can be provided. For the sake of simplicity I will focus on visual experience, which is also the strongest case. So, if weak transparency can be applied to vision, I assume it should work for all the other cases of perception—and for experience in general.

One first reason is that, once one has the notion of *weak transparency* and such a notion works and applies to some cases of experience, strong transparency just seems to lose its appeal. Saying that some experiences are transparent in the sense of strong transparency, whereas others are transparent in the weak sense, might be useful from an intentionalist point of view, since it secures that, at least in some cases, Intentionalism is strongly supported by introspection. Yet, if one assumes a more theory-neutral point of view, this is not relevant at all. On the contrary, one might just find quite weird that transparency has to be understood in terms of strong transparency in some cases and in terms of weak transparency in other cases.

Moreover, weak transparency perfectly captures what happens when one introspects one's own visual experiences.[12] So, under this regard, weak and strong transparency are equally able to capture and describe what happens when one introspects one's own visual experience. In addition, weak transparency is able to explain other cases that strong transparency cannot explain—namely, affective experiences. It is, thus, not clear why one should prefer the former, when one already has the latter.

Clearly, if one wants to defend Intentionalism, then there is a reason to prefer one to the other, at least in the case of visual experience. Indeed, it is true that both the understandings of transparency fit equally well with the introspective data coming from visual experiences. There is one difference, however: the difference is in what the two understandings exclude or do not exclude. Weak transparency does not exclude that, in principle, there could be also cases of vision in which one could introspectively focus on phenomenal character alone. By contrast, strong transparency excludes such a possibility. Needles to say, this is why an Intentionalist wants to go with strong transparency. Yet, this is a poor motivation: the fact that strong transparency suits better the interests of the intentionalist is not, in itself, a sufficient reason to accept it.

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[12] Recall weak transparency allows that one is not able to directly introspect non-represented qualities of experience.

However, independently of whether or not one is an intentionalist, one might still be unsatisfied with this first reason I have offered. Indeed, as far as I can see, one might reply that the only cases against strong transparency come from moods. Now one might ask: Why what comes from affective experiences should be relevant for vision at all? In other words, it might just be that in the case of visual experiences it is in fact impossible, and not only very difficult, to focus on phenomenal character alone. If that were the case, then strong transparency should be adopted for visual experiences, because weak transparency would not be adequate to properly capture that impossibility. So far, there seems to be no case against the strong transparency of visual experiences, since we do not have visual counterparts of undirected moods. Thus, because of that, it is fine to provide two different interpretations for the two different domains of experience we are considering.

As far as I am concerned, I do not think this is really a compelling way of reasoning. First, it is based on the assumption that affective experiences have nothing to say about visual experiences. Second, it seems to forget that it would be quite weird if transparency turned out to be a non-unitary phenomenon that cannot be read under one and the same interpretation.

On the other hand, however, this objection raises an interesting challenge: it pushes us to provide some evidence for the claim that it is introspectively possible for us to directly focus on non-represented components of phenomenal character even in the case of visual experience. So, the objector points her finger on an interesting point: if there were a direct case in support of weak transparency also in the case of vision, then we would have a stronger ground to extend weak transparency to visual experiences—and thereby to experience in general. I will deal with this challenge in the next subsection by offering a second reason for the proposal of extending the interpretation provided in the case of affective experiences.

3.2. A second reason: color inversion cases

A first point to be stressed is the following. As I have already noticed, there is no visual counterpart of undirected moods. Thus, it is hard to find a case for vision that works exactly like the case of moods for affective experiences. To be fair, as far as I can see, there is no such a case: visual experience always exhibits directedness and, insofar as this is true, one cannot come up with cases of full opacity. Although this does not necessarily mean that we have to abandon the idea of extending weak transparency, it might instead mean that we will never be able to have any direct evidence for that account. If so, then extending weak transparency to

visual experience may still be a legitimate move, but it would be motivated only by the urge of providing a unitary account for the phenomenon transparency rather than direct evidence coming from vision itself.

On the other hand, the following point has to be stressed as well: there is no need for a visual counterpart of undirected moods, in order to accept weak transparency for vision. What is required, instead, is something weaker, namely, a case in which one could directly introspect the components of phenomenal character without introspecting them as represented properties. If such a case were available, then we would have grounds to accept weak transparency for vision too and, thereby, to accept a unitary account of transparency in general. Exploring this possibility is what I will be concerned with in this subsection.

Many putative counter-examples to the transparency of visual experiences have been provided. Some (e.g., Block, 1996; Boghossian and Velleman, 1989) have appealed to cases like blurry vision, phosphene-experiences, afterimages, etc. All these would be experiences in which, besides the represented properties of represented objects, one would also be aware of some visual qualities that appear to be properties of the experience itself. Intentionalists (Lycan, 1996b; Tye, 2000: Ch. 4; 2003) have offered their own replies and denied that, in undergoing those experiences, one is aware of properties that are not represented. Be that as it may, I am not going to discuss those cases here. So, I set them aside.

Other two standard, putative counter-examples to transparency are the well-known thought experiments of the inverted spectrum (Shoemaker, 1982) and Inverted Earth (Block, 1990, 1996; 2003; Harman, 1982). They are supposed to show that it would be possible to keep separated the phenomenal character and intentional content of visual experience. If so, then strong transparency clearly fails also in the case of vision. To my mind, these are more interesting cases. So, I am going to focus on them now and, in particular, for the sake of brevity, on the Inverted Earth scenario.

3.2.1. Inverted Earth

Let me, first, briefly recall below what the Inverted Earth thought experiment amounts to. Here it is in Block's (1996) own words:[13]

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[13] I am using here the 1996 version of the thought experiment. In the 1990 version you are kidnapped by a group of mad scientists and took on Inverted Earth unbeknownst to you. This has the effect that, at some point, you start to belong to the Inverted Earth community unbeknownst to you. In this version, on the contrary, (i) you are aware of being moving to Inverted Earth and (ii) you consciously start to belong to the new community. I choose the 1996 version because this small modification has the following two advantages that Block himself stresses:

Inverted Earth is a place that differs from Earth in two important ways. First, everything is the complementary color of the corresponding earth object. The sky is yellow, the grass-like stuff is red, etc. Second, people on Inverted Earth speak an inverted language. They use 'red' to mean green, 'blue' to mean yellow, and so forth. If you order paint from Inverted Earth and you want yellow paint, you FAX an order for "blue" paint. The two inversions have the effect that if inverters are inserted behind your eyes (and your body pigments are changed), you will notice no difference when you go to Inverted Earth. After you step off the space-ship, you see some Twin-grass. You point at it, saying it is a nice shade of "green", but you are wrong. You are wrong for the same reason that you are wrong if you call the liquid in a Twin-earth lake 'water' just after you arrive there. The grass is red (of course I am speaking English not Twenglish here). But after you have decided to adopt the concepts and language of the Inverted Earth language community and you have been there for 50 years, your word 'red' and the representational content of your experience as of red things (things that are really red) will shift so that you represent them correctly. Then, your words will mean the same as those of the members of your adopted language community. (Block, 1996: 41-2)[14]

This thought experiment is supposed to describe a scenario in which the phenomenal character of experience stays the same while the content changes. This is *prima facie* not compatible with strong transparency.

Two immediate lines of reply on the side of the Intentionalist are the following. The first is denying that the scenario is metaphysically possible. According to this reply, the Inverted Earth case does not describe a real possibility. The idea is that, if one goes to Inverted Earth, one's experience of grass feels red, so the difference in intentional content is accompanied by a difference in phenomenal character.

The second reply is arguing that the scenario describes a case of misrepresentation (Lycan, 1996a; Tye, 2000: Ch. 6). On Inverted Earth one's experience of grass feels green but, for some reasons, one is misrepresenting Inverted Earth's environment: one is representing the grass as instantiating greeness, whereas it instantiates redness.

As Kriegel (2002) points out, these two strategies are not really satisfying: the first does not take the reports of introspection right, whereas the second seems to work only if the number of the cases of inversion is very small. In other words, as long as you are the only one travelling to Inverted Earth, an explanation in terms of misrepresentation works. But, what if at some point the population of Inverted Earth is composed by half of native Inverted

"The change has two advantages: first, it makes it clearer that you become a member of the new community. On the old version, one might wonder what you would say if you found out about the change. Perhaps you would insist on your membership in the old language community and defer to them rather than to the new one. The new version also makes it easier to deal with issues of remembering your past of the sort brought up in connection with the inverted spectrum in Dennett, 1991" (Block, 1996: 42).

[14] One crucial assumption of the thought experiment is externalism about content.

Earthlings and half of native Earthlings with inversion lenses put on their eyes (speaking the language of Inverted Earth)? And, even worst: What if at some point on Inverted Earth the number of native Earthlings (with inversion lenses put on their eyes) overcomes the number of native Inverted Earthlings, or the latter extinguish? In these cases we would have that there is the majority (or even the totality) of a population of an environment that systematically misrepresents the environment itself: this is not really a desirable outcome or cost to pay, if something better is available.

To my mind, what the Inverted Earth thought experiment teaches to us, in the first place, is that some sort of distinction is to be drawn between the color *that appears* and *the appearing* of a color to a subject: such a distinction is what we become aware in the first place by means of performing the thought experiment. Is that one and the same as saying that we become directly aware of the qualitative aspects of the experience and, thereby, rejecting strong transparency? No, as far as I can see. So far, indeed, two concurrent accounts of the "appearing of the color" are available.

Option1. One option is that the appearing of the color is a color-quality: a qualitative property of experience by means of which the color-properties is represented by experience. On this view, the thought experiment would help us become directly aware of those color-qualities. Thereby, it would also help us become directly aware of the way in which color-properties are represented. More precisely, considering the switch from Earth to Inverted Earth would make us aware of the fact that, when we look at the grass, nothing changes in the qualitative aspects of our visual representation—*i.e.* in the way experience represents (or in the representing). What changes is only its content. Roughly, then, the idea is that figuring out the Inverted Earth scenario enables us to separate the *vehicle of representation* (what does the representing—in this case: the experienced color-quality, e.g. the way it feels to see red or green) from the *content of the representation* (what is represented—in this case: the color-properties redness or greeness). In normal conditions, we do not appreciate any such a distinction. We do not even notice it when we introspect on our everyday experience. But the thought experiment is designed exactly to enable us to appreciation such a subtle distinction.

This view, or something in the vicinity, has been defended by, among the others, Block (1990, 1996, 2003) and Loar (2003a, 2003b). If this is the right way to look at the Inverted Earth case, then visual experience is surely not strongly transparent, since we

can introspectively directly focus on properties of the experience itself. On the other hand, this is clearly compatible with weak transparency.

Option 2. The other option is that the appearing of a color is some represented property. This is an elegant and sophisticated proposal advanced by Shoemaker (1994) and Kriegel (2002)—call it the Kriegel-Shoemaker account (KS). The strategy is exploiting Shoemaker's work on inverted spectra[15] and extending it to the Inverted Earth case. To make a long story short, the basic idea is that visual experiences of colors have two layers of content: in seeing something red one is representing not only redness as instantiated by that object, but also what red looks like to oneself. The former is the color-property, the latter is an appearance property: they are both represented properties, but of different sort. In particular, appearance properties are to be understood as dispositional features of a surface: they play the role of eliciting certain qualitative properties in the subject, *qualia*,[16] which are responsible for the phenomenal character of the experience. One way to construe such qualitative properties is Shoemaker's own way, on which they would be functional properties of some sort. However, this does not seem a good solution, since functional properties always leave open the possibility of an inversion and, thereby, this leaves open the risk of frustrating the explanation.[17] Kriegel offers his own suggestion to overcome this difficulty: he maintains that these qualitative properties elicited by the dispositional properties of surfaces are to be understood as "the material realization of phenomenal experiences" (Kriegel, 2002: 185). On such a view, thus, *qualia* would be subpersonal, intrinsic properties of the subject. This solution: (a) avoids the problem of Shoemaker's proposal and (b) does not resurrect the inversion problem.[18] Accordingly, here is what happens, when you move from Earth to Inverted Earth: one level of content of your visual experience changes—the one representing the color-

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[15] E.g., Shoemaker (1991, 1994, 1996).

[16] This is the term that Kriegel and Shoemaker themselves use.

[17] As Kriegel points out: "The obvious problem with Shoemaker's conception of qualia is that it resurrects the problem of inverted qualia, which the account was designed to avoid. Recall that in the inverted spectrum scenario, the sky experiences of First and Second have the same functional role. So the sky elicits experiences with the same functional role in First and Second. If qualia are indeed functionally definable, then the sky is eliciting the same qualia in First and Second. If so, the phenomenal content of First's and Second's experiences is the same. But Shoemaker wants to hold that they are different." (Kriegel, 2002: 185)

[18] Clearly, it might sound problematic for some other (independent) reasons. For example, one might be worried that this solution faces a problem with multiple realizability. This is an issue that Kriegel replies to, but I am setting this problem aside here (for more details, see Kriegel, 2002: 186-7).

property—, whereas the other one—the one representing the appearance property—does not. So, sameness in phenomenal character is not sameness in the way our experience represents a different content, but sameness in one of the two layers of content involved in our visual experience. On this view, the thought experiment enhances the power of our ordinary introspection, but in the following sense. On the one hand, it forces us to *postulate qualia*—in performing the Inverted Earth thought experiment, we also discover that there are two layers of content. On the other hand, it does not enable us to directly introspect *qualia*: they *underpin* phenomenal character and so there is nothing it is like to undergo them.[19] Phenomenal character, *i.e.* appearances properties, is all that is available to introspection. This view is, thus, compatible with strong transparency.

So, to sum up and make a little bit of order, here is what we have so far. Inverted Earth offers a way to enhance our ordinary introspective capacities. In particular, it enables us to focus on some phenomenal properties of our visual experience. The question is what those properties amount to: Are they qualities of experience or represented properties? If the first option is the right one, then (at least in some cases) we can introspect non-represented qualities components of the phenomenal character of visual experience and thereby strong transparency is in trouble. By contrast, if it is the other way around, then strong transparency is safe. Thus, the question is: Which one is the right way to go?

To my mind, although the second option is a stable and coherent view and it is also quite appealing—especially if one has sympathies for Intentionalism—, there are still reasons to prefer the first one. I will now illustrate those reasons by raising some worries concerning KS. If this is correct, then we can consider Inverted Earth as a case supporting weak transparency.

3.2.2. Problems with KS's way of conceiving *qualia*

One reason not to be satisfied with KS has to do with the way it understands *qualia*: *qualia* as non-experienced and, thereby, non-introspectable properties of the subject.

First of all, it is important to stress that construing *qualia* this way is essential to KS. Indeed, this is what paves the way to the separation of *qualia* and phenomenal character, and

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[19] This is the same both in Shoemaker's and in Kriegel's way of construing *qualia*.

such a separation is, in turn, crucial to the claim that the sameness in phenomenal character you notice in moving from Earth to Inverted Earth can be cashed out in terms of content. On the contrary, if *qualia* featured in the phenomenal character, then the sameness in phenomenal character would be accountable in terms of properties of experience.

Now, on this view, *qualia* are rather theoretical entities than experienced qualities, and this is quite unusual. Indeed, *qualia* are usually understood the opposite way, namely, as experienced qualities and thereby (at least in principle) introspectable features of experience. So, the worry one might raise here is that *qualia* so construed are hard to make sense of and, ultimately, to conceive of. Accordingly, as long as it requires those entities, KS would not really be a viable option. As Loar (2003b) puts it:

> Shoemaker is right in holding that the conceivability of inverted spectra does not entail introspectable qualia. But his defence of qualia abandons what seems to me essential to qualia, that they are phenomenally introspectable. My concept of a quale is the concept of a property that presents itself as a non-relational feature of experience. This is not stipulation. I do not know what to make of the idea of a phenomenal quality that cannot be directly attended to. I have no grip on how to conceive such a property, for a quale is a way it is like to be in a certain state. (Loar, 2003b: 80)

Prima facie, the supporter of KS might reply that this is not a matter of conceivability, but just a matter of labeling. In other words, the conceivability of non-introspectable *qualia* would depend on how one understands *qualia*: if one defines *qualia* as Loar does, then there is a problem; but if one defines *qualia* according to KS, then the problem disappears.

As far as I can see, this move takes the issue as a merely verbal one and is not really a good defense of KS. On the contrary, it is a way of trivializing the issue. The real question here does not (or not only) concern the label "*qualia*" but, more importantly and primarily, whether or not *qualia*—*i.e.* the non-represented properties that are responsible for phenomenal character[20]—are introspectable.[21] And this is not a mere problem of labeling, but something deeper having to do with the way *qualia* are to be understood and, ultimately, conceived. The matter is precisely what is the right way to conceive *qualia*: labeling is just a consequence of that. So, the point is whether or not there is a strong reason for ruling out the possibility that what we introspect are *qualia*. If KS is able to provide us with such a reason, then it is right on

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[20] KS and Loar agree on that.

[21] By the way, treating the question as a mere matter of labeling does not exclude, in itself, that non-represented property of experience responsible for phenomenal character are introspectively available.

how *qualia* are to be conceived; otherwise, it is not. Absent this reason, KS is not safe: at best, the proposal is poorly motivated; at worst, it is false.[22]

In their discussion on color-inversion scenarios, both Kriegel and Shoemaker mention transparency as the main reason to exclude the possibility that *qualia* are introspectable. This seems to offer a reason to rule out introspectable *qualia*.

One might protest, though, that this reply is somewhat circular, given the context of our discussion. In the present context, introspective *qualia* cannot be ruled out by appealing to transparency, since the present context is precisely a discussion on that: whether or not Inverted Earth affects the strength of transparency—that is, transparency's capability of counting as an evidence against introspectively accessible *qualia*. Accordingly, it cannot be assumed that such qualities are not introspectively accessible because of transparency, under pain of circularity.

If this is correct, then the conclusion one should take is that KS has problem, as long as it requires non-introspectable *qualia* for its explanation, but there seems to be no strong, independent reason to understand *qualia* as non-introspectible. This suggest that the appeal to *qualia* is required to do full justice to our intuition concerning the Inverted Earth case, but those *qualia* are to be conceived in the usual way, *i.e.* as introspectable qualities of experience.[23]

3.2.3. Reformulating KS

To my mind, however, charging KS of circularity is too hasty and ultimately wrong. There is another way to look at the appeal that Kriegel and Shoemaker make to transparency, which also leads to a new way to formulate their proposal. Such a reformulation does more justice to their global strategy, avoids the charge of circularity, and opens up to a more interesting discussion, at the same time. Moreover, it also counts as a way to reply to the worry concerning *qualia* illustrated above in §3.2.2. Let me explain

As far as I can see, the reason why Kriegel and Shoemaker appeal to transparency is not

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[22] Clearly, the option that Inverted Earth itself offers such a reason is not viable. Indeed, as we know, Inverted Earth is compatible with the possibility that *qualia* are introspectable.

[23] In principle, another option would be available to the supporter of KS: dropping *qualia*. Yet, that would not be very promising. Indeed, if there are no *qualia*, but there are still appearance properties, it is hard to explain what is the difference between the latter and the represented color-properties, since the former would lose their nature of subject-relative properties. This has two consequences: (i) it would be hard to find a reason to accept appearance properties; (ii) the Inverted Earth case could only be explained in terms of misrepresentation or should alternatively be rejected as metaphysically impossible, since there would be only one layer of content: both these solutions are not appealing, as pointed out above. Clearly, one way out would be accepting introspectable *qualia*, but this is not an option to the supporter of KS.

because they want to defend non-introspectable *qualia*. Rather, it is quite the opposite: they have to introduce non-introspectable *qualia*, because they aim at showing that transparency is compatible with the possibility of conceiving scenarios such as Inverted Earth.

The main idea behind KS is that, on the one hand, we have quite striking introspective intuitions both in the direction of transparency of visual experience and in the direction of the possibility of cases like Inverted Earth. On the other, the problem is that these intuitions seem to conflict. What KS aims at doing, thus, is finding a way to accommodate this apparent conflict. This is an important progress, to my mind. First of all, it is an attempt of providing a unitary account that puts together all our introspective intuitions concerning visual experience. Secondly, it is a serious attempt of dealing with the difficulties (instead of avoiding them) that arise form those intuitions.

Here is KS's reasoning, then. First, the following three statements seem to have some plausibility, individually taken.

(1)   Transparency holds.

(2)   There is no introspectable difference in phenomenal character between, say, perceiving grass on Earth and perceiving grass on Inverted Earth.

(3)   You are not misrepresenting when you perceive, say, grass on Earth and grass on Inverted Earth.

(1)-(3) have usually been taken to form an incoherent triad. So, KS offers a way out. In particular, the proposal is: introducing appearance properties and non-introspectable *qualia* is the only way to solve the conflict and make the three statements above consistent. Accordingly, the notion of *non-introspectable quale* would be a cost to be paid in order to preserve the truth of (1) and avoiding rejecting (3).

This reasoning is not circular, since the aim here is (a) assuming our intuitions about transparency and (b) showing that there is an coherent account on which those intuitions about transparency are compatible with the other intuitions that lead to build up the Inverted Earth scenario. According to this reformulation, KS would be the *best explanation* of the Inverted Earth case, as long as it is the only one that is able to preserve all our intuitions. Clearly, all this presupposes the following implicit assumption: every view that assumes introspectable *qualia* is inconsistent with (1).

At this point, the supporter of KS might argue, that a proper reply to KS should take the burden of dealing with *this* strategy that I have just described. To my mind, this way of putting KS is (a) more respectful of Kriegel's and Shoemaker's original intentions and (b) a more interesting way to look at KS—and to the overall the discussion too. I also believe that some nice insights of KS are brought up to the surface, when one puts it this way. Still, I believe that there are reasons to resist to KS, even in this new (better) formulation. Here is my reply, thus. In two, short sentences: (i) I believe that it is false that KS is the *only* explanation for the Inverted Earth that it is able to fully respect our intuitions; (ii) I also believe that KS is not the *best* explanation. I am going to argue for that in more details now.

First of all, KS does not distinguish between weak and strong transparency. In principle, this means that (1) can be read in two ways:

(1*)   Strong transparency holds.

(1**)   Weak transparency holds.

However, we have to assume that Kriegel and Shoemaker understand (1) as (1*), since they rule out the possibility of introspectable *qualia*. Put in terms of weak/strong transparency, then they assume that visual experience is strongly transparent, until proven otherwise. And what they want to do is proving that strong transparency can resist the Inverted Earth scenario. Yet, the inconvenience of all this is that KS forces us to postulate obscure entities such as non-introspectable *qualia*. Now, introducing those obscure entities hard to conceive is a necessary cost to be paid, *if* they turn out to be the only solution to accommodate our (apparently) contrasting introspective intuitions. According to Kriegel and Shoemaker, that is what they are. Here is the issue with KS and the core of my reply, then.

First of all, it is false that KS is the only solution available. Indeed, once we have a distinction between weak transparency and strong transparency, the situation is different, if our concern is accommodating the introspective intuitions about the transparency of visual experience and color inversion cases. With the weak/strong transparency distinction at hand, an alternative story can be told: introducing weak transparency, and interpreting (1) as (1**), is the key move. On the one hand, this perfectly preserves the mutual compatibility of (1)-(3). On the other, there is no need to appeal to non-introspectable *qualia*, since weak transparency is perfectly compatible with introspecting non-represented properties of experience. So, according to this story, the Inverted Earth case would be explained by means of those

introspectable non-represented properties.

Such an explanation is not only an alternative to KS, but is also a better choice, to my mind. Indeed, everything being equal in terms of explanatory power, an explanation that appeals to *qualia*, but avoids construing them as non-introspectable, is preferable to one that appeals to *qualia*, but is forced to construe them as non-introspectable. And this is my second point: KS is not the best explanation. But, if this is correct, then Inverted Earth supports weak transparency.

3.3. The interpretation extended

Let me sum up. If my arguments go through, then cases like Inverted Earth would help us increase the power of our introspection and notice directly the qualitative features of our experience—which usually we are not able to notice, neither in experience nor in ordinary introspection. In other words, if Inverted Earth is conceivable and succeeds, then it counts as case for weak transparency, in the sense that assuming weak transparency puts us in the position of providing the best explanation for the case: first, it enables us to accommodate our introspective intuitions about ordinary cases od visual experiences and introspection; second, it does not force us to assume non-introspectable *qualia* that are hard to conceive—whereas one has to assume them, if one wants to defend strong transparency.

Thus, if I am right, there are reasons to consider visual experience suitable for a treatment in terms of weak transparency. So, there are grounds to extend the interpretation of transparency in terms of weak transparency and, thereby, get that unitary interpretation of the introspective data that we were looking for at the beginning of this chapter. Thereby, what we have is a unitary account of the phenomenon of transparency, not only for the domain of affective experience, but also for experience in general.[24] This account is composed of three elements. I now illustrate them.

The *first element* is an interpretation of transparency in terms of weak transparency, where this means that it is not introspectively impossible for us to be directly aware of the intrinsic qualities of our experience. On the contrary, as subjects of the experience, we are in the position to directly introspect those qualities: we are not guaranteed to succeed, but we are not in principle forbidden from succeeding.

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[24] Recall, my focus has been on visual experience because it is supposed to be the most striking example of strong transparency. If weak transparency can be applied to vision, then it can be applied to perception in general.

Moreover, what happens in the domain of visual experience suggests that there are different levels of introspection that we can reach. And this is the *second element* of the account I am suggesting. In this regard, Loar (2003b) offers a nice, systematic taxonomy of the different levels (and corresponding degrees) at which we perform introspection: absent a better proposal, I am happy to adopt it here. Loar distinguishes three different levels of introspective attention:[25]

Unreflective transparency. This is the level of our everyday experience: we do not reflect on our visual experience or attend to it, we just undergo it. We encounter a mind-independent world made of objects, their properties, etc.

Transparent reflection. This is the level of introspection we usually reach to attend our current experience. At this level, one pays attention to the visual experience one is undergoing, takes a step back from it and is not able to find anything but objects and their properties. As Loar notices, this is where supporters of strong transparency use to stop.[26]

Oblique reflection. This is the level at which we compare different experiences, actual and possible, present and past, we make variation, etc. In a nutshell, it is the level of introspective attention required to consider scenarios like Inverted Earth.[27]

Accordingly, at the level of unreflective transparency and transparent reflection, we just consider our current experience(s) and nothing else, and we are not able to focus on the qualities of experience. However, if we deepen our reflection by considering other past/possible experiences and/or operate variations, we are performing oblique reflection. At this level, we manage to become aware of those properties.[28]

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[25] Actually, the first is not even introspection is just the level of the experience. So, it can be considered as the level at which the degree of introspective reflection is zero.

[26] I am using my own terminology here: Loar uses the term "representationists," but there is no substantial difference.

[27] What is relevant here is not the model itself: this is just a sketch. As far as I can see, it can be improved or even replaced with another one (if better). The relevant point here is that Loar's model stresses the fact that we can perform introspection at different levels and degrees and is also compatible with our transparency intuitions.

[28] As I am presenting them here, these three different ways of directing our attention toward experience are three levels, corresponding to three different degrees of introspection, ordered from the more superficial to the deeper. Loar's proposal can be also regarded as not posing any hierarchy, at least among transparent reflection and oblique reflection. On this view, they would just be different ways of performing introspection. This is a legitimate way of putting Loar's proposal. So, if one believes that this is better, one can go this way, and reformulate what I am saying accordingly. As far as I can see, this is not going to change the core and the substance of my claim. The only consequence I manage to figure out is the following. Probably, if one excludes

The *third element* is that our capability of becoming aware of the qualities of experience depends on (at least) two factors: the kind of experience we are introspecting and the level (or degree) of introspection we perform.

The general (and very rough) picture we get, thus, is that of an experience which is not uniformly (and strongly) transparent (or opaque), but that has a wide range of *different degrees* of transparency and opacity, which are strictly dependent on and vary according to the specific kind of experience one undergoes and the different level (or degrees) of introspection one (is able) to reach/perform. Undirected moods and visual experiences are the two extreme poles that define the range of the possible variations of the transparencies and the opacities of our experiences.

All this suggests a further interesting point concerning introspection itself: not only the power but also the notion of *introspection* turns out to be enhanced and richer, on this view. So, what we have, according to the interpretation I am suggesting, is that, on the one hand, the strength of transparency is diminished, but this is corresponded, on the other hand, by an increase of the power and richness of introspection. These are the two main ingredients of the unitary interpretation I am proposing in this chapter, basically following the suggestions put forward by Kind and Loar.

Now, at this point, I can see at least one objection to my proposal. In particular, one might protest that the notion of *introspection* I am working with here is too much liberal. In other words, according to this objection, figuring out cases like Inverted Earth and reflecting on them would not count as introspection. I can concede to this objection that when we perform the thought experiments of Inverted Earth or inverted spectrum from an *interpersonal* point of view, one might dispute whether or not *that* is a form of introspective reasoning— although I believe it is.[29] However, when we perform the thought experiment from an *intrapersonal* point of view, we clearly assume a first person perspective and reason on our own experiences. As far as I can see, that does count as introspection. Moreover, I am not alone on

that there is a hierarchy between transparent reflection and oblique reflection, one would want to say that the question as to whether the qualities involved in visual experience ultimately belong to content or to the experience itself is introspectively underdetermined, since we have two very different introspective outcomes in relation to the different introspective stance we take. This would mean that there is lack of introspective evidence in support of (as opposed to evidence against) Intentionalism about vision. For what concerns transparency, embracing this second option would still amount to reject strong transparency about vision. As for myself, I admit my own inclination is favoring a hierarchical view. However, I am quite open to accept the other solution too.

[29] I believe it is because, even in the interpersonal cases, one exploits materials coming from one's own first person experience.

this point: in the literature, indeed, it is quite accepted that the intuitions that help building up Inverted Earth or inverted spectrum cases are introspective intuitions and the material we exploit to operate the variations and figure out the scenarios comes from introspection on our own experiences.

One might attempt the rejoinder that this is first person analysis, but not introspection: the latter would be more restricted. Yet, this looks as a merely verbal point. If one wants to call introspection one (or more) of the levels I distinguished above, this is fine. However, this move does not really touch the main point at stake here: some intrinsic properties of experience are available at some level of our first person investigation on experience itself. On the one hand, this has to affect in some way the claim that we cannot be directly aware of those properties.[30] On the other, this cannot be accepted by the supporters of strong transparency, in that they want to deny that we have *any* sort of direct access to those properties from our first person point of view. More, they want to claim that those properties are merely theoretical constructions not corresponding to any existing entities.[31]

Needless to say, much more should be said on introspection, its nature, reliability, etc., but this goes beyond the scopes of this chapter—and, more generally, beyond the scopes of this dissertation. So, I am not going further on that here and I will limit myself to these quick notes.

4. THE INTRINSIC QUALITIES OF EXPERIENCE AND THE TWO NOTIONS OF *CONTENT*

If I am right, then even in the case of visual perception we are (in principle) able to spot certain intrinsic qualities of experience. In this final section, I will add some remarks concerning these introspectable qualities of experience. This will be useful in order to bring to the surface a relevant distinction between two notions of *content* and *representation*.

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[30] This is even more important because this is supposed to be an argument to rule out those qualities or reduce them to represented properties.

[31] Clearly, the claim that there is no access of any sort to the qualitative properties of experience paves the way to the stronger claim that those properties do not exist. Indeed, if they cannot be directly spotted but only postulated, then there is no strong, direct evidence to introduce them. If (i) there is no strong, direct evidence to introduce them and (ii) a easier concurrent explanation of the phenomena they are supposed to explain that does not appeal to them, then they can be easily ruled out.

4.1 Qualities that represent

First of all, let me make clear the following point. The properties in question are intrinsic qualities of experience in the sense made explicit in Chapter 1 (§3): "intrinsic" means "non-represented." I leave open here whether or not those qualities of experience are intrinsic in any other sense.

Now, the fact that we can become directly aware of those non-represented properties raises a question as to whether or not they still play any role in representing. It seems quite reasonable to say that, in the case of visual experience, they do. As far as I can see, there are two reasons for this claim.

The first comes from the thought experiment itself. Consider again Inverted Earth and the case of colors. Suppose you look at grass on Earth and then on Inverted Earth. In both cases your experience is a greenish-experience of grass. However, if you are on Earth, that green-quality is the vehicle of a representation of greenness, whereas if you are on Inverted Earth the green-quality is the vehicle of a representation of redness. The green-quality you spot in this way is a property of experience but, at the same time, it is representational insofar as it *plays the role* of representing a color-property—and, in figuring out the switch from Earth to Inverted Earth, you are in the position of noticing such a representational role.

The second comes from the extant literature. There is indeed a quite widespread consensus concerning the limits of cases like Inverted Earth or inverted spectrum: a common idea is that, even in the best case, they are not strong enough to enable us to become directly aware of raw visual qualities, *i.e.* visual qualities that do not play any role in the representing. That also Block (1996) acknowledges.[32] If so, it seems plausible to say that, even though they are not represent*ed*, the visual qualities we can directly introspect are still represent*ing* properties.[33,34]

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[32] Brian Loar (2003b: 87) makes a similar point: "Block takes Inverted Earth to be an argument for the conceivability of colour qualia—and so it is, I think. But I do not see it as giving us a grip on raw colour qualia. What is true is that we can conceive colour-related qualitative features of visual experience that are independent of the surface properties of objects, whatever they may be. Those features of experience, however, are best regarded (not as raw qualia but) as property-directed qualia."

[33] Block (1996) and Kind (2001) capture the distinction between represented and representing properties by means of a distinction between two different types of representational properties. However, I did not use the same terminology here because I find the -ed/-ing opposition more straightforward and less confusing. Moreover, as I have characterized it here (Chapter 1, §1), a representational property is by definition a property of a mental state, *i.e.* the property of representing a certain content.

[34] So, even in case one believes there are non-representing components of visual experience, they are out of the reach of one's introspection.

Now, what about undirected moods? *Prima facie*, it seems that we should say that the qualities composing their phenomenal character are both non-represented and non-representing properties of experience. Indeed, as we know, undirected moods are fully opaque experiences. As such, they lack the minimal conditions to be assigned a content, as long as nothing other than experience itself seems to be involved in undergoing them. However, is that sufficient to conclude that undirected moods lack content altogether? In order to give a reply to this question, we need to introduce a distinction between two very different notions of *content*. I will introduce it and provide a better characterization thereof in what follows.

4.2. Two notions of mental representation

Kriegel (2013c) distinguishes between two notions of *mental representation*: *subjective representation* and *objective representation*.[35] In order to do that, he exploits a a brain-in-a-vat scenario. Suppose there is a brain that is neuro-anatomically and neuro-physiologically indistinguishable from yours. This brain is locked in a vat full of some nutrient fluid. It is also linked to a machine that, by means of sensory stimulations, causes to it experiences that happen to be subjectively indistinguishable from yours. So, every time the machine is in the state S1, the brain has experiences subjectively indisitinguishable from yours when you see, say, a red car; every time the machine is in S2, the brain has experiences indistinguishable from yours when you see, say, a brown table; and so forth and so on. Assume further that it is impossible to rule out from the inside the hypothesis that you are the brain of this story.

According to Putnam (1981), if you live on Earth and you *are not* the envatted brain, then you and the brain are representing different things every time you both undergo a subjectively indistinguishable experience. For example, suppose you and the brain are undergoing a subjectively indistinguishable visual experience as of a red car. In that case, you are representing the car, whereas the brain is representing the state S1 of the machine that elicits the visual experiences.

Many have agreed with Putnam's account, many others have disagreed. However, the relevant point here is the following: according to Kriegel, the moral of the brain-in-a-vat story is that it suggests a distinction between two notions of *mental representation*. Indeed, on the one hand, there is a sense in which the brain represents the car—this is the subjective representation; on the other hand, there is a sense in which the brain represents S1. So, from

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[35] This distinction has been already mentioned in Chapter 1, fn. 65.

the point of view of what is subjectively represented, you and the brain are representing the same content, whereas from the point of view of what is objectively represented you are not representing the same content—of course, provided that you are not the brain and that you and the brain live in a different environment.

Accordingly, the characterization of the distinction is based on ostension of prototypical, exemplar cases. So, this distinction might turn to be co-extensive with the subpersonal/personal (Dennett, 1969) narrow/wide (Putnam, 1975) or the phenomenal/psychological (Chalmers, 1996) ones. However, as Kriegel remarks, subjective representations are not definitionally personal, narrow, and phenomenal as well as objective representations are not definitionally subpersonal, wide, and psychological.

Now, usually, it is hard to keep these two notions of *mental representation* separated. However, they are *conceptually* distinguishable, since it is possible to imagine scenarios in which they are separate/separable. In particular, Kriegel shows that there are four types of such possible scenarios: (a) the objective representation varies, while the subjective does not and (b) *vice versa*; (c) the objective occurs without the subjective and (d) *vice versa*.[36] An example of (a) is the brain-in-a-vat scenario described right above; the standard inverted spectrum thought-experiment counts as a case of (b); thermometers or the rings on a three-trunk are examples of (c); extreme versions of the brain-in-a-vat case, such as e.g. a free-floating Cartesian mind, are cases of (d).

Kriegel also shows that, while objective representations are easily captured by the standard tracking theories of mental representation, the subjective ones are not: tracking theories of mental representation, as they stand, are not able to capture subjective representations.[37] Here is a sketch of Kriegel's argument. There are two families of tracking theories (the Causal Co-variational Approach and the Teleological Approach), they all impose certain constraints that something has to meet in order to be a representation. In every case, those constraints are such that they do not capture the subjective notion of *representation*.[38] Kriegel's conclusion is that tracking theories are not even concerned with subjective

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[36] According to Kriegel this makes the distinction thorough.

[37] This does not prevent that, in principle, an account in terms of tracking is able to reduce subjective representations to objective representations, as Kriegel himself notes.

[38] For the details of where exactly subjective representations fail to satisfy the constraints imposed by each tracking theory see Appendix A.

representations: this is the most reasonable and charitable way to look at them.[39]

More generally, the problem is that a full, satisfying account of subjective representations is lacked so far. This makes hard to provide a positive, stable, theoretically precise definition of the notion of *subjective representation*—and this is partly why Kriegel recurs to ostension.[40]

However, to my mind, the main point is intuitively quite clear—and this is all we need in the present context.[41] On the one hand, objective representations have to do with the scientific image of the world—to exploit again Sellars' (1962) terminology. On the other hand, the subjective notion has to do with the manifest image of the world or, in other words, with what is phenomenally manifest.[42]

As far as I can see, then, it seems plausible to say that two different understandings of *intentionality* and *intentional content* are brought up to the surface by this distinction and correspond to different notions of *mental representation*. Subjective representations are picked out by considering what is phenomenally manifest to a subject that undergoes a certain experience. As Kriegel (2013c) himself notes:

> Note that insofar as the notion of subjective representation is motivated by consideration of environmentally insulated phenomenal duplicates such as brains in vats, it is prima facie plausible that phenomenal character would be crucial to subjective representation. (Kriegel, 2013c: 165-7)

Thus, it is highly plausible to say that subjectively representing is exhibiting directedness—or at least that exhibiting directedness is a necessary condition for being a subjective representation.

On the other hand, objective representations are connected to the idea of tracking,[43] broadly understood as a natural phenomenon—perhaps, a relation that obtains between the

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[39] It is the most charitable way to look at them because they systematically fail to capture the case of subjective representations. Accordingly, it seems plausible to say that they are not *designed* for that from the very beginning instead of saying that they are designed for that and still systematically fail.

[40] Providing such a positive, stable, precise account is exactly what Kriegel describes as an important part of the agenda of a future theory of mental representations.

[41] Whatever comes from now on is not to be attributed to Kriegel (2013c), but to my own elaboration on his suggestions.

[42] In this sense, Kriegel's proposal seems in the same spirit as Mendelovici's (2010: Ch. 7, 2013b, 2013c) proposal concerning reliable misrepresentations: the standard, classical idea of tracking is not able to fully and satisfactorily account for what is introspectively/phenomenally manifest to us.

[43] By using "tracking" here I mean to refer to the phenomenon the tracking theories of mental representations want to account for rather than one of the specific descriptions of that phenomenon they provide.

brain/mind, the body and the external environment, that has been set in place by evolution, and enables the subject to acquire information and behave accordinlgy. Content in this objective sense, then, has to do with information.

So, back to our question above: Do undirected moods lack content altogether? If by "content" we mean the content of a subjective representation, then the answer to this question is: Yes, due to the reasons we already know. Undirected moods not exhibit directedness, so subjectively, they are not representation, but purely qualitative states.

By contrast, if by "content" we mean the content of an objective representation, then undirected moods may have such a content, as long as it is plausible that undirected moods have a cognitive function and have been set in place by evolution to convey certain relevant information.[44] However, what this function exactly is and what is the nature of such information is still a matter of controversy not only among philosophers but also among cognitive scientists and cannot be decided on the basis of introspection—or, at least, not on the basis of introspection alone.

Accordingly, although undirected moods are not subjectively intentional, they might well be objectively intentional. In other words, the qualitative properties of those experiences that are phenomenally/introspectively manifest to us can still play the role of objectively represent even in the case of undirected moods, although we are not able to introspectively access that content.

Clearly, more should be said on that and what I have offered above is just a very rough sketch, which is not meant to be in any way a proper (or improper) theory of moods. My point here has been rather the following. Once we admit that we are able to introspect the qualities of our experience, a question arises as to whether or not they play any role in representing. In the case of visual experience, it is likely to say that they do. Indeed, even if we can directly spot the qualities of visual experience, those qualities are not raw feelings, but are clearly the vehicle of a content, which is also phenomenally manifest/introspectively available.[45]

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[44] Notice that the fact that moods have an objective content, in itself, is not yet enough for their phenomenal character being the vehicle of that representation—it might be that the two co-occur without any intimate connection. However, the point is rather that, if moods do not represent in the objective sense, then their phenomenal character cannot play any role in the representing.

[45] For what concerns the distinction between subjective and objective representation, it seems highly plausible that visual experiences represent in a subjective sense. (For the sake of simplicity, I am not considering the case of blindsight here.) On the assumption that we are not Cartesian minds and excluding cases of undefeated defeaters, it is plausible to say that they also represent in the objective sense. So, the following is a possible, though very rough and sketchy, a picture. Plausibly, our visual experience tracks what is outside (this is its objective content). Yet, it also presents us with a phenomenally/introspectively manifest content (subjective

More difficult is the case of undirected moods, where no content is phenomenally manifest/introspectively available and we are presented only with raw feelings. After introducing the distinction between subjective and objective representations, my suggestion was that the qualities involved in undirected moods' phenomenal character do not vehicle any subjective representation, as long as undergoing undirected moods involves nothing other than the experience itself. However, this does not mean that their phenomenal character cannot play some role in objectively representing—clearly, on the assumption that undirected moods objectively represent.

Let me stress one final point. Kriegel's distinction is particularly relevant: on the one hand, it helps distinguish two different understandings of mental representation—and thereby of intentionality; on the other, it helps clarify the role, the relevance, and the limits of introspection: what can or cannot be determined concerning our experience, given what introspection provides. In particular, this suggests that a theory of what undirected moods represent (if any) cannot be satisfactorily build up just relying on what is introspectively available.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I argued that the results concerning the restriction of the scope of transparency have to affect our way to look at transparency. However, the latter is not to be rejected altogether, but revised in its strength. In particular, such a revision implies, on the one hand, a reduction of the strength of transparency and, on the other, a greater articulation of the notion of *introspection*. The final result of all this is a more balanced approach to our introspective intuitions that, to my mind, does more justice to their complexity. By adopting such an approach we are able to put together some *prima facie* heterogeneous introspective

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content). At the level of unreflective transparency and transparent reflection, nothing of what is phenomenally/introspectively involved in the experience appears as non-represented. Accordingly, we are not able to draw any distinction between this content and phenomenal character, so the latter is fully identified with the former. However, by switching our introspecting focus to oblique reflection, we manage to directly appreciate (at least) some non-represented components of phenomenal character and, thereby, spot their contribution to representing (at least in the subjective sense). Clearly, all this raises many questions: What (if any) is the relation between subjective and objective content? What is the nature of subjective content? And, if we put undirected moods into the picture, what is the relation between intentional and non-intentional phenomenal character? These are all open questions: what I have said here does not aim at providing any exhaustive reply to them. No reply to such question has been and will be attempted here: this is a task for a research program. Indeed, as far as I am concerned, all those questions figure as prominent open problems for a new theory of intentionality and phenomenal character alternative to Intentionalism (more on that will be said in the Conclusion).

data in a quite respectful way and we do not have to give up a unitary interpretation. In proposing all this, I have made use of different but compatible suggestions due to Amy Kind and Brian Loar.

To begin with, in §1, I pointed out that, given our results, the differences between experiences concerning their being transparent are located at two different levels: first, at the level of the different domains of experiences, *i.e.* perceptual and affective experiences; second, at the level of the domain of affective experience itself. Accordingly, I raised two questions: First, how to deal with the differences between the different domains of experience? Second, how to deal with the differences within the single domain of affective experiences?

I started with looking for a reply to the second question. So, in §2, I introduced and exploited Kind's distinction between weak transparency and strong transparency to accommodate the situation within the affective domain and thereby provide a unitary interpretation of the introspective data in that context. This is itself already an important result: indeed, if one domain of experience is weakly transparent, then it is false that all the experience is strongly transparent. And this means troubles for Intentionalism.

After that, in §3, I proposed to extend this interpretation to visual experience—and in this way to experience in general. Such a proposal was grounded on the following two orders of reasons. The first, in a slogan, can be summarized by the question: What to do with strong transparency, if you already have weak transparency? (§3.1). The idea here was that, once one has the notion of *weak transparency* available, strong transparency just seems to lose its appeal. Indeed, weak transparency (i) perfectly captures what happens when one introspects on visual experiences and (ii) is able to explain other cases that strong transparency cannot explain, namely, affective experiences. The second was the discussion of cases like Inverted Earth, which seems to point toward a direction that is opposite to transparency (§3.2). My main argument here was that an explanation in terms of weak transparency is the explanation that best accommodates our apparently contrasting introspective intuitions on visual experiences.

In case one totally disagrees with me on the possibility of extending weak transparency to visual perception, the more restricted application of weak transparency to the affective domain still stands. And, as I have pointed out above, this is already an important point.[46]

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[46] I admit there is room for disagreement, since the issue is controversial. However, this simple fact itself is already a good and encouraging sign for the supporter of weak transparency, as long as it signals that there are some cracks in the evidence for strong transparency also in the case of vision. In other words, the fact that it is at least disputable that in some cases vision is strongly transparent might be seen as a step further in the direction of weak transparency. Even though surely this does not count as an argument for weak transparency, it is

Finally, in §4, I briefly offered some clarifications in order to specify in some more details what is the right understanding of the qualitative intrinsic features of experience: they are intrinsic *qua* non-represented, but they can be representing properties. This is highly plausible in the case of visual experience. More difficult is the case of moods. My proposal was appealing to the distinction between two notions of *mental representation* suggested by Kriegel (2013b), in order to help clarify the sense in which undirected moods do not represent and the sense in which they might represent—and thereby the sense in which their phenomenal character might be the vehicle of a representation. With that distinction at hand, I have suggested that undirected moods do not represent in a subjective sense, but they might represent in an objective sense. However, establishing whether or not they do that is a task that cannot be (entirely) accomplished on the basis of introspection alone.

At this point, if we combine the conclusion I drew in Chapter 5 with what I said in this chapter, then we should see that the deep reasons behind the rejection of Intentionalism are the same that motivate the interpretation of transparency I have suggested here. Indeed, at a closer look, what introspection shows is precisely that experience is not strongly transparent, but has different degrees of transparencies and opacities. On the one hand, this supports weak transparency; on the other, it offers strong evidence against Intentionalism.

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nonetheless a clue that vision is not that uniform, unquestioned, and unquestionable domain of strong transparency, in which only one univocal interpretation of the introspective data is allowed. In any case, this is not to be underestimated, since it shows that the alleged evidence of strong transparency of visual experience is, so to speak, less "evident" than it may seem at a first glance. This means that there is still some room for interpretation and this at the very least makes the hypothesis of weak transparency an option on the table.

CONCLUSION: A FAREWELL TO INTENTIONALISM

TACKING STOCK

Time has come for tacking stock. The general topic of this dissertation has been the debate on the nature of phenomenal character. As I characterized it in the Introduction and in Chapter 1, this debate is located at the interface between intentionality and phenomenal character and at intersection of two main questions concerning (a) the scope of intentionality and (b) the nature of its relation with phenomenal character. The main views on the table are two families of theories: Intentionalism and Anti-intentionalism. However, my main focus has been on a specific version of Intentionalism, which presents itself as a theory of the nature of phenomenal character, according to which: (a) every experience E is intentional and (b) E's phenomenal character is identical to E's intentional content (*plus* certain further constraints). So, I restricted my use of the label "Intentionalism" to this specific view.

Intentionalism is nowadays very popular among philosophers of mind and is usually taken to be strongly supported by direct evidence coming from introspection and, in particular, by the transparency of experience. The transparency of experience is an introspective claim, based on an introspective datum, according to which, in introspection, one is not aware of intrinsic features of experience, but the only properties one is directly aware of are represented properties. Hence, the identification of phenomenal character and intentional content.

In this dissertation, however, I have tried to show that things are more complicated and that this way to move from what introspection provides to the identification of phenomenal character and intentional content is s bit too quick. In particular, I argued for these two claims: (i) experience is not transparent in the sense required by Intentionalism; (ii) introspection does not support Intentionalism but, on the contrary, offers strong reasons against it—if one looks closer and more accurately to what is introspectively available and if the appeal to introspection itself makes sense. In order to do that, I considered the case of moods and then drawn some more general conclusions from that.

The discussion on moods has highlighted the following two main points:

1. Some moods like, e.g., undirected anxiety, objectless depression, sudden elation are genuinely undirected as long as they are not other-presenting experiences. This is not dependent on some deficiency/inability of the introspector but is a phenomenological fact concerning their phenomenal character: it is constitutively part of what it's like to be in those moods. On the other hand, other moods—e.g., irritation, nervousness—can be assigned a content representing frequently changing objects. Yet, they are not (fully) transparent, since (at least) some components of their phenomenal character do not seem to be in any way part of/dependent on the (alleged) content.

2. The fact that genuinely undirected moods are not other-presenting is crucial for their being opaque experiences. Indeed, a minimal condition for transparency is that something other than the experience itself is introspectively presented to the subject. If nothing other than the experience itself is presented, then the minimal condition to introspectively attribute an object/content to the experience is not realized.

The two points listed right above have important consequences both on Intentionalism and on transparency.

For what concerns the consequences on Intentionalism, the opacity of undirected moods is the major source of problems. Indeed, once one admits that genuinely undirected moods are opaque experiences, it is no longer clear what exactly motivates an intentionalist proposal, even when there is a coherent candidate for undirected moods' intentional content. Transparency counts as a strong motivation to accept the idea that phenomenal character is intentional content. Yet, if transparency fails, this motivation is no longer available. So, there

is no evidence (a) to accept the identity claim, but more radically (b) there is no evidence to take what is phenomenally/introspectively available as the content of undirected moods.

However, as I pointed out in Chapter 5, there is a stronger conclusion that one can draw concerning Intentionalism: the opacity of undirected moods is not merely a lack of evidence for Intentionalism; rather, it counts as evidence against it. The opacity of undirected moods, indeed, just means that the phenomenal character of those experiences, as it is revealed in introspection, is such that it lacks the minimal conditions for being identified with intentional content. This conclusion is legitimate as long as introspection counts as a source of evidence concerning phenomenal character. (And such a way to look at introspection is presupposed by the appeal to transparency itself—otherwise, it would not be clear how transparency could work as a direct evidence for the identity claim.) So, if one takes transparency as providing strong evidence in support of the claim that phenomenal character is intentional content, then, and for the same reasons, one should also accept that opacity offers strong evidence *against* that claim.

Thus, in Chapter 5, my final conclusion was quite strong: Intentionalism, as a theory concerning the nature of phenomenal character, is to be rejected because the opacity of undirected moods offers introspective direct and strong evidence against it.

As for transparency, the fact that there are both opaque and non (fully) transparent moods *prima facie* suggests that the alternative is between reducing the scope of the claim and rejecting the transparency of experience altogether. However, in Chapter 6, with Kind's (2003) distinction between strong and weak transparency at hand, I argued that transparency should not be rejected altogether, but rather revised in its *strength* and thereby understood in terms of *weak* transparency. I proposed such an interpretation for affective experiences and then argued that there are grounds to extend it to experience in general. Experience, thus, is not strongly transparent, but *weakly transparent*. Accordingly, as subjects of the experience, we are (at least sometimes and given certain conditions) in the position of being directly introspectively aware of the non-represented components of the phenomenal character of our experience. As far as I can see, the nuanced view of transparency that I have suggested does justice not only to the complexities and richness of our introspective abilities, but also to the complexity and richness of our experience itself.

The picture we get, thus, is that of an experience that is not uniformly and flatly transparent but has *different degrees* of transparency and opacity, which are strictly dependent on

the specific kind of experience we undergo and on the different kinds (or degrees) of introspection we (are able to) perform. Undirected moods and visual experiences, thus, are the two extreme poles of the range of the possible variations of the transparencies and the opacities of experience.

Hence, my twofold conclusion: (i) experience is not transparent in the (strong) sense required by Intentionalism—the interpretation that I suggest is that it is weakly transparent; thus, contrary to what is usually thought, (ii) introspection does not support Intentionalism but offers strong reasons against it—if one looks closer and more accurately at what is introspectively available and if the appeal to introspection itself makes sense. What supports these two claims is ultimately one and the same reason: given our analyses, what introspection in general shows is that it is possible, though in some cases very hard, to directly attend some qualities of experience—*i.e.* non-represented components of its phenomenal character. On the one hand, this leads to weak transparency. On the other, it counts as evidence against Intentionalism.

A FAREWELL TO INTENTIONALISM

Given that, *prima facie*, the most natural move now seems to be concluding in favor of some form of Anti-intentionalism. Although this is literally correct, I believe that things are, once again, a little bit more complicated. Even though Intentionalism is not the view to be embraced, as far as I can see, Anti-intentionalism too often suffers from exactly the same problems, only in a specular way. So, in order to find a real alternative, we need to be clear about what is fundamentally wrong with Intentionalism. We are now in the position to do that. So, let me say a couple of words on this point: this will pave the way to some positive remarks on how to make sense of an alternative view.

In Chapter 1, I distinguished two subversions of Intentionalism: Wide and Narrow Intentionalism. Wide Intentionalism offers a (apparently) straightforward, elegant, and tempting double reduction: phenomenal character is intentional content and intentional content is what our cognitive system keeps track of (in the standard sense). The transparency-datum is, thus, interpreted in terms of strong transparency and exploited in support of such a claim. This is very appealing because it promises an 'easy' solution to the hard problem of consciousness.

In the light of what we have said at the end of Chapter 6, however, we are now able to see what is the main problem underlying this proposal. Surely, if I am right, one big problem is that the interpretation in terms of strong transparency is to be rejected. However, let us set that aside momentarily. There is still another deeper issue having to do with what transparency is supposed to be an evidence for. Indeed, if Kriegel's (2013c) distinction between the two notions of *mental representation* is legitimate, then the transparency-datum (even when interpreted strongly) cannot offer any evidence for phenomenal character being the content of an objective representation, since introspection (at best) can offer evidence in support of the claim that phenomenal character is the content of a subjective representation.

Consider again the brain-in-a-vat case: the brain's experience is tracking something, but there is no way to introspectively determine what it is keeping track of. What can be introspectively determined is that the brain's experience exhibits directedness toward certain (apparently) external and mind-independent objects having certain properties. So, what is phenomenally manifest to the brain is something that can be described as content, but a content of a sort that requires a different level of explanation from the one provided by standard tracking theories. Indeed, what matters for *this* content is what is introspectively/phenomenally manifest and how the phenomenal structures of the experience offer to the subject something that she can take and describe as what her experience represents—*i.e.* content. So, even in case one could reduce phenomenal character to content by exploiting introspection, one would be reducing phenomenal character to this subjective sort of content. But, as Kriegel shows, this is not captured by the standard notion of *tracking*, which is instead implied by Wide Intentionalism. So, in a nutshell, the main problem of this view is that it does not offer a reduction of what it's like to what is tracked, but rather it ultimately *conflates* the two notions of *mental representation*.

Narrow Intentionalism, on the other hand, seems at least able to notice the difference between these two notions. So, it is a step forward, in this sense. However, the problem of this view is the following. If one accepts that there is some introspectively accessible content that has to do with experience's exhibited directedness, then one also has to recognize that, when experience's phenomenal character is such that no directedness is exhibited, there is no content in this sense either. In other words, there are minimal conditions for an experience to be contentful in the subjective sense, and our analysis on moods shows that at least some experiences do not seem to meet those conditions. This does not mean that those experiences

have to lack content in the objective sense. So, it seems that phenomenal character can play a representational role in the objective sense, even in case it does not represent anything in the subjective sense.

To sum up, Wide Intentionalism does not seem able to recognize the notion of *subjective representation*, whereas Narrow Intentionalism does not seem to recognize that there is some phenomenal character that cannot be identified with content.

If this is correct, then not only an explanation of phenomenal character, but also a new and more comprehensive explanation of the phenomenon of intentionality is required. Indeed, intentionality now appears as a very complex phenomenon that articulates in (at least) two dimensions, a subjective and an objective one. This does not mean that intentionality cannot be a natural kind. The point is rather that a full account of the different forms of intentionality is to be provided and it is to be shown that they ultimately amount to one and the same thing.

On the other hand, the relations obtaining between intentional content and phenomenal character are complex too: for example, subjective intentional content seems to require phenomenal character, but, if I am right about the case of moods, the opposite does not seem always true. Furthermore, it is still to be clarified whether or not and in what way objective intentional content requires phenomenal character.

The point is not denying those complexities, but taking charge of them. If one's aim is trying to find a way to naturalize both intentionality and phenomenal character—and, to my mind, this is the challange—, then this cannot be done in the way that has been so far proposed by Intentionalism, since it ultimately appears a too easy solution to a very hard problem.

Here is a very rough list of at least some of the general, open issues that a new, better theory of intentionality (or mental representation) should address:

- Providing an account of each of the two notions of *mental representation* and of what (if any) is the relation between them;[47]
- Providing an account of what is the relation between phenomenal character that cannot be introspectively identified with subjective content and phenomenal character that can be introspectively identified with subjective content;

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[47] Kriegel (2013c) also puts this point on the future agenda of a theory of mental representation.

- Providing an account of what is the relation between objective representation and phenomenal character.

A comprehensive theory located at the interface of intentionality and consciousness that explicitly addresses and tries to solve the issues listed above is a real alternative to Intentionalism, is required, and is a good candidate for being a step forward in the philosophical understanding of human mind.

In this dissertation I did not offer any such a theory. Building up such a theory is a task pertaining to an entire research program, so it is largely beyond the scopes, the aims, and the possibilities of the present work, which is definitely more modest and more restricted. However, the search for a good theory of intentionality and consciousness is still to be regarded as the very general background problem behind the present work. My own, very small contribution to that here has thus mainly consisted in (i) showing that not all phenomenal character can be identified with subjective content and (ii) more generally clarifying what introspection supports and what does not support. This counts as a step forward, however small, toward a better understanding of the issues at stake and, thereby, toward a better characterization of the theory we need.

Although the road toward a good, fully satisfying theory as described above is still quite long, as far as I know, there is at least one philosophical research program that explicitly takes charge of accounting for the phenomenon of subjective representations and addresses (at least) some of the issues listed above: this is the so-called Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program (Kriegel, 2011b, 2013a).[48] The guiding idea behind this research program is that there is a kind of intentionality, called *phenomenal intentionality*, that is somehow dependent on phenomenal character and is the most fundamental kind of intentionality. This is the framework that the conclusions of this dissertation suggest and in which the dissertation is to be located and wants to contribute to, though modestly.

Now, is this a conclusion against Intentionalism? On the one hand, it is: Intentionalism just does not seem to be a sufficiently sophisticated account for the complexity of the problems it wants to address. On the other hand, as I have stressed, the real alternative to

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[48] People sympathetic with and/or working within the framework of this research program are also, among others, Bourget (2010); Crane (2013); Farkas (2008, 2013); Georgalis (2006); Horgan and Graham (2010); Horgan and Tienson (2002); Horgan, Tienson and Graham (2004, 2006); Loar (1987, 2003a, 2003b); Masrour (2013); Mendelovici (2010); Pitt (2004, 2009, 2011); Searle (1983, 1991, 1992); Siewert (1998); Strawson (1994, 2008).

Intentionalism is not embracing Anti-intentionalim, but rather finding a theory that is adequate to the complexity of the phenomena to be accounted for. For example, it should now be clear that theory of intentionality has to be also a theory of consciousness (or *vice-versa*), since these two features are really hard to keep separated, especially if we draw the distinction between the two notions of *mental representation*. Many of the classic versions of Anti-intentionalism do not seem to be adequate for that. As far as I can see, thus, the point is not to go *against* Intentionalism, but to go *beyond* it: keeping the best insights and dropping what is wrong. The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program, in this sense, seems the best choice, for the reason I have sketched above and as long as it is quite orthogonal to the distinction between Intentionalism and Anti-intentionalism. This is why I do not want to be against Intentionalism, but I prefer to say "Farewell" to it.

APPENDIX A

TRACKING THEORIES *VERSUS* SUBJECTIVE REPRESENTATIONS

Here is a sketch of where each tracking theory fails in accounting for subjective representations, according to Kriegel (2013c).[1]

CAUSAL CO-VARIATIONAL APPROACHES

Stampe (1977)

> *Constraint*: A mental state M represents a property F just in case Fs cause Ms under the right conditions.

> *Kriegel's reply*: the envatted brain's car experiences do not have cars as their cause under *any* conditions, however they subjectively represent cars.

Fodor (1990)

> *Constraints*: M represents F iff (i) it is a low of nature that Fs cause Ms; (ii) some Fs actually cause Ms; (iii) if any non-Fs cause Ms, the fact that they do is asymmetrically dependent on the fact that Fs cause Ms.

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[1] I am following Kriegel's own formulations of the constraints and I am paraphrasing his points under the label "Kriegel's reply." (Cf. Kriegel, 2013c: 157-9.)

Kriegel's reply: At least, (ii) is violated in the case of the brains-in-a-vat scenario, since none of the brain's car experiences is cause by cars.

Dretske (1981)

Constraint: M representes F iff M is nomically dependent on F.

Kriegel's reply: the brain has experience as of cars even in case being a car is not instantiated

TELEOLOGICAL APPROACHES

Dretske (1988)

Constraints: M represents F iff (i) there is a motor response R, such that has been recruited to have its present tokens cause R, (ii) past tokens of M nomically depended on F, and (iii) it is the case that (i) because it is the case that (ii).

Kriegel's reply: the brain-in-a-vat case fails to satisfy all the constraints: (i) the envatted brain does not have motor response; (ii) past tokens of the brain's car experience did not nomically depend on any past instances of being a car (there where no instances); (iii) there is not reason why the brain has present token car experiences.

Millikan (1984, 1993)

Constraints: (i) M represents F only if there is a system S such that (i) S consumes present tokens of M, (ii) past tokens of M occurred mostly when instances of F occurred, and (iii) S can perform its biological proper function because (i) and (ii) are the case.

Kriegel's reply: the brain's faces no selection pressures, so it does not satisfy (i). But it also does not satisfy (ii), since the brain's past toke car experiences did not occur mostly when instances of being a car did.

APPENDIX B

SOME VERY QUICK NOTES ON SELF-REPRESENTATIONALISM

One might think that, given my arguments, one option for the intentionalist is replying that experiences like undirected are *self-representational*. In other words, very roughly, undirected moods would represent themselves and this would be their content.[1] In this Appendix I offer some very sketchy and very quick clarifications on how my claims are to be understood, *if* one takes this option seriously and considers it as a version of Intentionalism. (Notice that the conjunction in this case is crucial).

First of all, let me stress that the option of the self-representation makes sense, *only if* one takes it seriously—that is *only if* one construes a proper theory of phenomenal character (or consciousness) around this idea. Thus, this option cannot be advanced for the case undirected moods alone: it would just be *ad hoc*.

Now, building up such a theory of phenomenal character would mean (roughly) making the following three moves: (a) drawing a principled distinction between the *subjective character* (for-me-ness) of experience and its *qualitative character* (e.g., the bluish component of a bluish experience), and understand phenomenal character as a combination of subjective character and qualitative character; (b) arguing that there is genuine self-representation, that is arguing

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[1] Moreover, they would turn out to be also subjective representations.

that self-representing is not a case of other-presenting; (c) arguing that intentionality (essentially) involves other-representation *and* self-representation.

First, (a), (b), and (c) are three substantive claims: each of them requires arguments to be accepted. Second, this view has been defended and is known as *Self-representationalism* (see, e.g., Kriegel, 2009). As far as I can see, however, Self-representationalism counts as a substantive departure from Intentionalism as I have considered here. In other words, it is not exactly the same theory of phenomenal character: there are some non-trivial steps that lead from Intentionalism to Self-representationalism.[2]

On Self-representationalism, indeed, both the notion of *phenomenal character* and the notion of *intentionality* are significantly revised and enhanced. On the one hand, according to the self-representationalist, it would be literally true that undirected moods' phenomenal character is identical to their content. On the other hand, though, this is something substantively different from what an intentionalist has in mind (and wants to be true) when she holds that phenomenal character is identical to intentional content. Indeed, the intentionalist usually does not even count subjective character as something to be accounted for. As Kriegel notes:

> Many philosophers, especially representationalists of the sort encountered in §2.1.2,[3] have assumed that the problem of consciousness is qualitative character. But an interesting result of the above conception of the structure of experiential character is that it is actually subjective character that is more central. For although it is important to understand what accounts for experiential differences among conscious episodes, it is more central to the philosophical problem of consciousness to understand what accounts for some mental states (and not others) having experiential character to begin with. (Kriegel, 2011b: 86).

So, my first point is that I have doubts as to whether or not Self-representationalism counts as a version of Intentionalism. One of the implicit assumptions of this dissertation was that Self-representationalism does not count as a version of Intentionalism.

However, if one disagreed with me on this point and instead wanted to count Self-representationalism as a version of Intentionalism, then a further distinction should be drawn within the field of Intentionalism. On the one hand, we would have *Self-representationalist Intentionalism*; on the other hand, we would have *Non Self-representationalist Intentionalism*. Given

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[2] Moreover, as it strikes me, Self-representationalism is already one way to deal with some of the structural problems of Intentionalism. Thereby, it is a way to overcome Intentionalism as I have understood it here. I will be back on this point.

[3] Those philosophers I have called intentionalist in this dissertation.

this distinction, the scope of my claims is to be understood as restricted to Non self-representationalist Intentionalism and my results are—at least at first glance—compatible with Self-representationalism.

Another point to make is that Self-representationalism should in any case be proved true. In other words, before considering the qualities involved in undirected moods in terms of self-representational content, it should be true that there is a genuine self-representational phenomenal character. That is, it should be true that self-representing is not ultimately a case of other-presenting phenomenal character. Put it other way, self-representing states should be such that the experience (or the self) is not presented as other to the subject. And this is not an uncontroversial point. For example, Frey (2013) argues for the opposite claim:

> It is even possible, as Brentano held, that *all* intentional states are, in addition to being directed beyond themselves, self-directed. But when such cases occur, the identity that obtains between that which is intentionally directed and that upon which it is intentionally directed is entirely accidental. Such states are directed upon themselves *qua* other. (Frey, 2013: 85)

Now, if Frey is right, then undirected moods are likely to be non self-representational either. Indeed, it does not seem to me entirely obvious that undirected moods can be described as directed upon themselves *qua* other. This is why the appeal to self-representation is not enough, but the self-representationalist needs self-representation to be something that is not ultimately reducible to other-representation. [4] Clearly, self-representationalists have arguments for that, but I am not going to address them here: I just wanted to show that there is at least a difficulty and that the task is not completely obvious.

The question as to whether Self-representationalism is really a viable option, and not only a theoretical possibility, is still an open question for me, and I do not want to address it here. So, *if* one counts Self-representationalism as a version of Intentionalism, my claims are to be understood as targeting the non self-representationalist versions of Intentionalism. Moreover, *if* one believes that Self-representationalism Intentionalism is true, then one can look at the points I am making here as something that goes in the direction of supporting a self-representationalist version of Intentionalism against a non self-representationalist one—

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[4] Another worry connected to undirected moods is that they would be only self-representational states. So, *if* both the self-representation and other-representation are required for a state to be intentional, then undirected moods might still be a problem even for the self-representationalist. Clearly, one option to avoid this problem is imposing that self-representation is necessary and sufficient for intentionality. But, this seems to raise some further problem. For example, it would be no longer clear what exactly is the role of other-representation. This is weird because being the idea of other-presenting/representing seems strictly related to intentionality.

clearly, the terminology I was working with here should be revised accordingly. In that case, the very rough idea would be that, if one assumes a non Self-representational intentionalist framework, then one is not able to account for cases like moods and is forced to drop Intentionalism.

In general, Self-representationalism strikes me as a view that tries to deal with thosee structural problems that make Intentionalisn ultimately non satisfying. If this is correct, the Self-representationalism goes in the same direction of the points I have made in this dissertation—if not in the letter, at least in the spirit. And, in particular, in the direction of what I said in the Conclusion: going beyond Intentionalism as it has been developed in the last twenty years.

I am definitely aware that more should be said on all this and that these scattered and rough remarks are not exhaustive. However, here I just wanted to make clear what exactly is the scope of my criticisms and how they should be revised and understood, *if* one considered Self-representationalism as a version of Intentionalism.

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

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