

*Principia* on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard:  
Exploring an Uncharted Scholastic Philosophical Genre Across  
Europe

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*Principia* on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard:  
Exploring an Uncharted Scholastic Philosophical  
Genre Across Europe

Part II: Bologna, Cracow, Florence,  
Heidelberg, Prague, and Vienna

edited by

Monica BRÎNZEI and William O. DUBA

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# John Wenck's *Principia* on the *Sentences* (1431) at the University of Heidelberg\*

Andrea Fiamma  
(University of Milan)

Marsilius of Inghen, the first rector of the University of Heidelberg, was also the first to read the *Sentences* at the faculty of theology at this university. His lecture thus initiates the practice of reading the *Sentences* and performing *Principia* in Heidelberg and, since his commentary was influenced by his formation from Paris, he also introduced the Parisian model at this new faculty of theology.<sup>1</sup> In the first twenty years of the fifteenth century, the University of Heidelberg opened its doors to theologians whose teachings conflicted with those of Marsilius of Inghen from various perspectives.

Some, like master Nicholas of Jawor, already from 1402, a few years before the reform of Jean Gerson, were preoccupied with teaching the

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<sup>1</sup> G. RITTER, *Die Heidelberger Universität im Mittelalter (1386–1508): ein Stück deutscher Geschichte* (Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1), Heidelberg 1936, *passim*. Concerning Marsilius’s career in Heidelberg, see: J. MIETHKE, *Studieren an mittelalterlichen Universitäten. Chancen und Risiken* (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, 19), Leiden 2004, pp. 429–452. On his *Sentences* commentary, see M.J.F.M. HOENEN, “The Commentary on the *Sentences* of Marsilius of Inghen,” in *Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, ed. G. R. EVANS (Current Research 1), Leiden-Boston-Köln 2002, pp. 465–506; concerning the *Principia*, see pp. 477–479.

doctrines of the “ancient” theologians of the thirteenth century.<sup>2</sup> The general trend was to verify the orthodoxy of the “modern” transmitted within the faculty of arts. Then, in 1452, the *via antiqua* officially reached Heidelberg. However, it was forbidden to open any kind of debates against the theologians of the *via moderna*. Indeed, in the mid-fifteenth century, the so-called *Wegestreit* (which arose in Cologne thirty years earlier) had already spread to German universities, including Heidelberg.<sup>3</sup>

Among Nicholas of Jawor’s pupils as scholars of the *tritum iter*, the best known was John Wenck of Herrenberg (†1460),<sup>4</sup> whom Gerhard Ritter defined as an “outstandingly brilliant thinker.”<sup>5</sup> Before matriculating

<sup>2</sup> Educated at the University of Prague, Nicholas obtained a licentiate in the Arts (1381) and later in theology; in the latter faculty, he was hired as a teacher (1395) and then in 1397 he also became rector. He left Prague in 1402 due to political dissonance with his university and decided to continue teaching theology at the University of Heidelberg, like other Prague masters before him. He participated in both the Council of Constance and that of Basel. He died in 1435. For the first and still most important monograph on the biography and thought of Nicholas of Jawor, see A. FRANZ, *Der Magister Nikolaus Magni de Jawor. Ein Beitrag zur Literatur- und Gelehrten-geschichte des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts*, Freiburg i.B. 1898. See also J. PETRÁŠEK, *Meide die Häretiker. Die antihussitische Reaktion des Heidelberger Professors Nikolaus von Jauer (1355–1435) auf das taboritische Manifest aus dem Jahr 1430* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, N.F., 82), Münster 2018. About Nicholas of Jawor’s position on the Hussites and his theological sources of Jawor’s work, i.e., Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, and above all Nicholas’s use of Henry of Langenstein’s commentary on *Genesis*, see ed. N.H. STENECK, *Science and Creation in the Middle Ages. Henry of Langenstein (d. 1397) on Genesis*, Notre Dame-London 1976.

<sup>3</sup> See RITTER, *Die Heidelberger Universität*, p. 379. We need to read this as coherent with the contemporary reform of the university statutes in Paris organized by William of Estouteville. On the other hand, it is problematic to use the same categories of *via antiqua* and *via moderna* in the various university contexts and consider the different places and times. See A.L. GABRIEL, “*Via antiqua* and *via moderna* and the Migration of Paris Students and Masters to the German Universities in the Fifteenth Century,” in *Antiqui und Moderni. Traditionsbewußtsein und Fortschrittsbewußtsein im späten Mittelalter*, ed. A. ZIMMERMANN, (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 9), Berlin-Köln 1974, pp. 439–383, see at pp. 459–467. Regarding the problematic nature of these categories, see S. SWIEZAWSKI, “Le problème de la *via antiqua* et de la *via moderna* au XVe siècle et ses fondements idéologiques,” in *Antiqui und Moderni*, ed. A. ZIMMERMANN, pp. 484–493.

<sup>4</sup> R. HAUBST, “Wenck, Johannes,” *Die deutsche Literatur des Mittelalters. Verfasserlexikon* 10/1 (1999), col. 841–847.

<sup>5</sup> See G. RITTER, *Via antiqua und via moderna auf den deutschen Universitäten des XV. Jahrhunderts* (SHAW/PHK 1922, 7), Heidelberg 1922, p. 51: Johannes Wenck was an “überragend genialen Denker” and “überragte sicherlich



in Heidelberg in theology, Wenck studied at the faculty of arts in Paris in the early fifteenth century, when William Lochem and John of Nova Domo taught there.<sup>6</sup> The latter was particularly famous for his teachings, even if his career was short. In fact, during his lessons, John of Nova Domo preferred to comment on Albert the Great's texts instead of Thomas Aquinas's established ones. For instance, he tried to correct Thomas Aquinas's *De ente et essentia* by using some of Albert the Great's doctrines.<sup>7</sup> In addition, John of Nova Domo attacked both the "Platonic" realists, like John of Ripa, and the "terminists" (or "moderns"), like Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen himself.<sup>8</sup>

John of Nova Domo's contemporaries already spoke of "Albertism," even if it was not yet an institutionalized course of studies (or *via*) due to some characteristics of John's university teaching.<sup>9</sup> The young John

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den Durchschnitt seiner Heidelberger Kollegen." See RITTER, *Die Heidelberger Universität*, p. 379, considered that Wenck was the only master who taught in Heidelberg before 1450 whose "dessen Werk uns in die grossen Gegensätze der Zeit hineinschauen läßt."

<sup>6</sup> Z. KALUZA, "Les débuts de l'Albertisme tardif (Paris et Cologne)," in *Albertus Magnus und der Albertismus. Deutsche philosophische Kultur des Mittelalters*, ed. M.J.F.M. HOENEN, A. DE LIBERA (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 48), Leiden 1995, pp. 207–295, see pp. 235–236. John of Nova Domo or of Nieuwenhuyze (†1418), native of the Brabant region, is known as the "founder" of Albertism; see G.G. MEERSSEMAN, *Geschichte des Albertismus*, vol. I: *Die Pariser Anfänge des Kölner Albertismus*, Paris 1933, pp. 20–22. Regarding John of Nova Domo, Heymeric de Campo was his famous pupil. The student claimed that his master in Paris tried to start a new course of studies; this was in keeping with John Gerson's reform.

<sup>7</sup> See JOHANNES DE NOVA DOMO, *De ente et essentia*, ed. MEERSSEMAN, *Die Pariser Anfänge des Kölner Albertismus*, pp. 91–191. This work is to be integrated with the metaphysical writings, see D. CALMA, "Jean de Maisonneuve. L'Albertisme tardif et deux commentaires à la métaphysique," *Przeegląd Tomisty-czny* 24 (2018), pp. 255–287.

<sup>8</sup> Z. KALUZA, "Le *De universali reali* de Jean de Maisonneuve et les *epicuri litterales*," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 33 (1986), pp. 469–516, see p. 474 and p. 483. HEIMERICUS DE CAMPO *Tractatus problematicus*, pars. I (*Contra modernos*), f. 1r, for the opposition against the "modernorum figmenta."

<sup>9</sup> The historiographical judgment on John's teaching is not unanimous. Meersseman was the first to express himself in favor of the hypothesis of an Albertist *via* in Paris (see the previous footnote); the author who instead raised some doubts was H.G. SENGER, "Albertismus? Überlegungen zur *via Alberti* im 15. Jahrhundert," in *Albert der Grosse. Seine Zeit, Sein Werk, Seine Wirkung*, ed. A. ZIMMERMANN (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 14), Berlin-New York 1981, pp. 217–236: from Senger's point of view, if the Albertism "historiographisch rekonstruierbar sein muß," it is necessary "ein kohärentes und konsistentes philosophisches und

Wenck studied in this context, so he as a student in the arts probably supported John of Nova Domo's Albertism, traces of which are also evident in Wenck's later works, and he certainly had a doctrinal orientation averse to that of the moderns.<sup>10</sup>

In 1426, Wenck decided to continue his studies and enrolled at the Faculty of Theology of the University of Heidelberg. In the following year, earlier than traditionally happened for candidates in theology, Wenck began to read his biblical commentary.<sup>11</sup> Then he read the *Sentences* to obtain the title of doctor in theology. We do not know exactly when, in what order, and in what timing he read all those books, but we will later formulate a hypothesis about it. As part of the processes, Wenck sustains the *Principia*, divided into a *sermo* and a confrontation with his *socii*.<sup>12</sup>

Wenck accomplished his lectures on the *Sentences* on February 6, 1432, and it seems that he received his license in theology on September 11, 1432.<sup>13</sup> Soon after, the University of Heidelberg hired him as a theology professor and, because of this assignment, he got involved in

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[...] theologisches System nachweisen zu müssen" (see p. 218). However, the numerous differences between the philosophical conceptions of the authors considered as Albertists make this task very difficult. In fact, for Senger, the sole significant theory shared by all Albertists was the metaphysical doctrine of the flow: that is not enough to demonstrate the existence of an Albertist school in Paris.

<sup>10</sup> R. HAUBST, "Johannes Wenck aus Herrenberg als Albertist," *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale* 18 (1951), pp. 308–324.

<sup>11</sup> HAUBST, *Johannes Wenck*, col. 841 noted that, exceptionally, the doors of the *cursus biblicus* were soon opened to Wenck. He explained it by hypothesizing that Wenck must have already attended a few years studying theology in Paris. However, we have no information to reconstruct that period of Wenck's biography.

<sup>12</sup> According to the University of Heidelberg's statutes, the candidates for the title of doctor in theology should have read all four books of the *Sentences*. See E. WINKELMANN, *Urkundenbuch der Universität Heidelberg*, vol. 1, Heidelberg 1886, p. 21. M.J.F.M. HOENEN, "Neuplatonismus am Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts. Die Prinzipien zum Sentenzenkommentar des Marsilius von Inghen," in *Marsilius von Inghen: Werk und Wirkung*, ed. S. WIELGUS, Lublin 1993, pp. 165–194, see pp. 168–173.

<sup>13</sup> G. TOEPKE, *Die Matrikel der Universität Heidelberg*, vol. II, Heidelberg 1886, p. 591: "Item anno 1427 die 29. mensis Julii M. Johannes Wenck presentatus fuit ad legendum in theologia cursum per M. Nicolaum Magni de Jawor, dedit 1 fl. Item idem eodem anno die 29a mensis Septembris fecit Principia in eundem et in prima die sequentis mensis, sc. Octobris, incepit legere eundem. Item idem anno 1430 3a die mensis Julii presentatus fuit ad legendum Sentencias per prefatum magistrum Nicolaum et Principiavit in eodem anno 1431 29. die mensis

battling against heresy, especially after the Council of Basel, where a renowned debate over Hussites and Begards arose.<sup>14</sup> In this regard, Wenck opened the well-known polemic against Nicholas of Cusa.<sup>15</sup>

The present paper considers John Wenck's *Principia* on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard that survived in the manuscript Tübingen, Universitätsbibliothek, Mc. 31 ff. 138r–143r and ff. 150r–155v. I propose to investigate the structure of those texts to see how they reflect the practice of *Principia* within the University of Heidelberg. The goal is to highlight its specificity and to better understand the academic and doctrinal climate from Wenck's time. The study of these *Principia* is also an occasion to investigate another bachelor from Wenck's time — Bartholomew of Maastricht. He was Wenck's competing peer student (or *socius*) in his *Principium* on Book I of the *Sentences*, since together they debated a few metaphysical questions. Wenck informs us that Bartholomew also replied to him in his own *Principium* and, even if the text did not survive to this day, we have some traces of his ideas through Wenck's second reply in his *Principium* on Book II.

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Januarii, dedit 2 fl. Item anno 1432 idem M. Johannes Wenck finivit Sententias 6<sup>o</sup> mensis februarii." For license, G. TOEPKE, *Die Matrikel der Universität Heidelberg*, vol. II, Heidelberg 1886, p. 594: "anno 1432<sup>o</sup> 11. die mensis Septembris M. Johannes Wenck licenciatus fuit in theologia per M. Nicolaum Magni de Jawor."

- <sup>14</sup> For a mapping of Heidelberg's masters who attended the councils of the first half of the fifteenth century, see H. HAWICKS, "Professors as Envoys, Experts and Inquisitors Heidelberg and Hussitism," in *Acta Universitatis Carolinae. Historia Universitatis Carolinae Pragensis* 60/1 (2020), pp. 245–256, who highlights Nicholas of Jawor's and Wenck's participation in the anti-Hussite controversy of 1430 with the "contra epistolam perfidiae Hussitarum" (1431). FRANZ, *Der Magister Nikolaus Magni de Jawor*, pp. 92–93. See K. BRACHA, *Des Teufels Lug und Trug. Nikolaus Magni von Jauer: Ein Reformtheologe des Spätmittelalters gegen Aberglaube und Götzendienst* (Quellen und Forschungen zur europäischen Ethnologie), Dettelbach 2013. Concerning the spread of Jawor's texts outside the university, see: A. FIAMMA, *Nicola Cusano da Colonia a Roma (1425–1450). Università, politica e umanesimo nel giovane Cusano* (Texte und Studien zur Europäischen Geistesgeschichte, B19), Münster 2019, pp. 116–117, in which we highlighted that Nicholas of Cusa, in the sermons preached in the diocese of Trier between 1430 and 1431, used Nicholas of Jawor's *De sortilegiis*, explicitly mentioning the author's name and the book's title in his *Sermo* II, n. 15, 15–16.
- <sup>15</sup> For the debate between Wenck and Nicholas of Cusa and the questions of begards and Hussites in 15th century Germany see M.K. ZIEBARTH, *Nicolaus Cusanus on Faith and the Intellect. A Case Study in 15th-Century Fides-Ratio Controversy* (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, 225), Leiden 2014, pp. 53–136 and A. FIAMMA, *Nicola Cusano da Colonia a Roma*, pp. 108–132.

Furthermore, I will consider a debate that Wenck engaged in that same spring of 1431 with another of his *socii*, John of Brumbach, who was reading his own *Principium* in Book III of the *Sentences*.<sup>16</sup> Dating and understanding the context of this debate will be helpful in timing Wenck's and his *socii*'s lectures on the *Sentences*. In the two appendices, the edition of Wenck's *Principia I–II* and of Bartholomew of Maastricht's brocards are transcribed from the manuscript Tübingen, Universitätsbibliothek, Mc., no. 31. In the second appendix, I also attempt to identify the textual extremes in Wenck's *Principia* for reconstructing the arguments and counterarguments developed in his debate with his *socius* Bartholomew of Maastricht.

## Wenck lecturing on the *Sentences*

Manuscript no. 31 in the University Library in Tübingen consists of 213 folios containing texts dated 1429–1432. Among them are treatises and letters of masters of the University of Heidelberg, such as Nicholas of Jawor, and approximately sixty sermons *de tempore*, two *Principia*, and a *quaestio* on the Holy Spirit delivered by John Wenck. Franz X. Bantle stated that codex 31 is “ein Konzeptbuch Wencks.”<sup>17</sup> Bantle's conclusion comes from analyzing the hands that copied many of the works in that codex, including the marginal notes: Wenck's handwriting is almost everywhere. While Wenck's *Principium* on Book I is an autograph, the *Principium* on Book II is not. Moreover, his handwriting is recognizable in the texts collected for preparing the *Sentences* commentaries, which are in the other *folia*. They are so full of horizontal and vertical writing on the top, bottom, and side margins that it is challenging to find blank spaces.

The ancient statutes of the University of Heidelberg provided that the four books of the *Sentences* were read in two years, i.e., the first two books in the first year and the third and fourth books in the second.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> R. HAUBST, *Studien zu Nikolaus von Kues und Johannes Wenck aus Handschriften der Vatikanischen Bibliothek* (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, 38/1–3), Münster 1955, pp. 69–71 mentioned both those questions.

<sup>17</sup> F.X. BANTLE, “Nikolaus Magni de Jawor und Johannes Wenck im Lichte des Codex Mc. 31 der Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen,” *Theologie und Philosophie* 38/4 (1963), pp. 536–574; for the attribution of the texts to Wenck, see p. 538.

<sup>18</sup> This was a general university custom in the late Middle Ages. However, sometimes it happened that all four books were read in the same year, as in Paris in

From this, the manuscript Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31 should theoretically transmit the contents of the first year of Wenck's reading of the *Sentences*. As we will see in the analysis of Wenck's final acknowledgements, he pronounced the *Principia* to Books I and II in front of an audience that was not limited to theology masters and students only, but were also extended to colleagues from other faculties. So the reading of the *Principia* did not have to represent a central moment only for students of theology, but for the whole community of the University of Heidelberg.

As for Wenck's *Principia* on Books III–IV of the *Sentences*, they did not survive to the present time. According to the statutes of Heidelberg University, he was supposed to assert the *Principia* concerning the other books in the following semesters. However, from what Wenck anticipated in the *Principia* on Books I–II, we can assume the doctrinal content he should have given them. Regarding incarnation as the fundamental nucleus of Book III of the *Sentences*, it is noteworthy that Wenck had already highlighted the virgin birth of Mary in his first *Principium*; as for Book IV, we will later see the metaphor of the sacrament as medicine against the sins.

Some traces of Wenck's *Principium* on Book III can be reconstructed from a debate that arose after September 25, 1431, when the Cistercian John of Brumbach started his reading of his *Principia* on the *Sentences*. In fact, John of Brumbach is another of Wenck's *socii*, alongside John of Mechlinia.<sup>19</sup> The first section of the code Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 370, composed of 120 folios, presents an extensive collection of *Principia* pronounced by bachelors of the Faculty of Theology in Heidelberg between 1425 and 1445. John of Brumbach's fragments of *Principia* refers to Books III–IV (ff. 60r–67r), and also contains the debates after his lecture (ff. 67r–96v), which includes Wenck's intervention (ff. 76r–76v) and Brumbach's reply (ff. 85r–v).

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1318. See W. DUBA, C. SCHABEL, "Remigio, Auriol, Scotus, and the Myth of the Two-Year *Sentences* Lecture at Paris," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 84/1 (2017), pp. 143–179.

<sup>19</sup> Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 370, f. 60v, 1: "anno m° cccc° xxx° primo". HAUBST, *Studien*, pp. 69–73, described only the outlines of this question, which had to occur after September 25, 1431. The interlocutor should have been the Cistercian John of Brumbach (†1466), later the bishop of Würzburg; for a biography, see S.F. v. PÖLNITZ, "Die bischöfliche Reformarbeit im Hochstift Würzburg während des 15. Jahrhunderts," in *Würzburger Diözesangeschichtsblätter* 8/9 (1941), pp. 102–118.

It is possible that Wenck participated in the debate of Brumbach's *Principium* on the third book in the same semester beginning in September 1431, when Wenck was reading Book II. In fact, we know that Wenck finished reading the first book of the *Sentences* on May 24, 1431, that is, at the end of the semester that begins on January 29, 1431, when he read his *Principium* on the first book of the *Sentences*.<sup>20</sup>

Remarkably, John of Brumbach's first reply to Wenck concerns a topic he addressed in his *Principium* of Book I: the representation of the sacrament as a medicine.<sup>21</sup> Such a metaphor is common to others' *Sentences* commentaries<sup>22</sup> and linked to the concept of the usefulness of studying the Sacred Scriptures, which is the same question that Wenck asked in his *Principium* on Book I.<sup>23</sup> But we have to consider that the specific

<sup>20</sup> Wenck dated his *Principium* on Book I of the *Sentences* at "anno 1431mo in die Valerii," that was January 29, 1431; see Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 138r, l. 1. We have information about the end of his lectures on Book I from the *explicit* of his *quaestio de Spiritu Sancto* of 15<sup>th</sup> May 1431, see Mc. 31, f. 201v, l. 16–21: "De hac questione respondi anno domini 1431° feria tertia ante Pentecostem, que erat quinta decima dies Mai, sub venerabili magistro sacre theologie professore magistro Nicolao de Gawer. Et feria quinta sequenti finivi primum Sententiarum." This date is confirmed by a note by Wenck's handwriting that is found in Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 13r: "feria tertia post ascensionem de Spiritu Sancto in theologia responsurum et Deo duce iam primum librum sententiarum finiturum."

<sup>21</sup> Città del Vaticano, BAV, Pal. lat. 370, f. 85r, l. 4: "sacramenta autem sunt medicina spiritualis ut patet primam questionem magistri mei." The metaphor of the sacrament as a medicine concerns John's first and third responses regarding the relationship between saving grace and human freedom: the first, which we speak of in the body of the text, concerns the appropriateness of engaging in erudition if the grace present in the sacrament cures sins; the second focuses on this same topic by discussing the notion of sacramental causality; and the third instead takes up the metaphor of medicine., however, unlike the first, it discusses moral issues, such as the vices of adultery and concupiscence. Augustine of Hippo's name and the nineteenth book of his *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* are both explicitly mentioned twice; also, Thomas Aquinas mentioned the same source when he dealt with these topics. See, for example, THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Summae theologiae*, tertia pars, q. 65, art. 1, arg. 4, l. 1, ed. Leonina, t. 12, Roma 1906, p. 56: "Augustinus dicit, xix contra Faustum, sacramenta novae legis sunt numero pauciora quam sacramenta veteris legis."

<sup>22</sup> See: ALBERTUS MAGNUS, *Commentarii in quartum librum Sententiarum*, distinctio 7 A, art. 5, ed. Borgnet (Opera Omnia), Paris 1894, vol. 29, p. 161, col. 1, l. 8; BONAVENTURA, *Commentaria in quattuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*, in librum IV, comm. in dist. 1, pars 1, art. unicus, q. 4, ed. Frati Editori di Quaracchi, Firenze 1949, p. 20, col. 1, l. 30; THOMAS DE AQUINO, *In IV Sententiarum*, dist. 23, q. 1, art. 2, quaestiuncula 2, arg. 1, l. 2.

<sup>23</sup> Città del Vaticano, BAV, Pal. lat. 370, f. 85r, l. 5–6: "nec opus caret sacramentis

argument of John of Brumbach's reply against Wenck recalls the doctrine of the *causalitas sacramentorum*, that is presented by Peter Lombard in Book IV of the *Sentences*.<sup>24</sup>

Furthermore, it is interesting that Brumbach was allowed to read the *Sentences* in June 1431 and Toepke adds that he began reading precisely on September 25, 1431. Since Wenck participated in the debate with his *socius* John of Brumbach, then it must be inferred that this occurred during the September 1431 to February 1432 semester. It is also interesting that Wenck discussed Brumbach's *Principium* on Book III, but Brumbach did not reply by mentioning those same *content*, attacking instead Wenck by referring notions of Book IV, as if he had already listened to Wenck discussing that book. This leads us to believe that maybe both Brumbach and Wenck did not start their readings from Book I, but from Books III and/or IV, and that Wenck probably read them together in a single semester, as did, for example, the Cistercian Nicholas of Fonte in those same years.<sup>25</sup>

So, it might be the case that in Heidelberg students could start with Books III and/or IV and then follow up with the reading of Books I and II.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, this would mean that someone, perhaps among the most brilliant students, could have finished their lectures on the *Sentences* in three semesters — that is, in a year and a half, rather than in the canonical two years. It was probably not even compulsory to follow the pre-established order in choosing the books to read. If that were the case, the beginning of Wenck's reading of the *Sentences* should be brought forward by a semester, following the order of reading: III/IV, I, then II. Thus, Toepke's admission date in July 1430 and closing date of the process on February 6, 1432 would also be consistent.

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in statu legis naturae post lapsum, quia non minus est necessaria eruditio que fit per precepta."

<sup>24</sup> Città del Vaticano, BAV, Pal. lat. 370, ff. 85r–v: "rationes dicti domini Johannis Brumbach contra primam questionem M. Johannis Wenck quarti Sententiarum."

<sup>25</sup> TOEPKE, *Die Matrikel der Universität Heidelberg*, p. 593: "Fr. Nicolaus professus ord. Cysterciensis in Fonte salutis anno 1431 die 8<sup>o</sup> mensis Octobris fecit Principium in Sentencias sub M. Johanne Platen, dedit 2 fl. Item idem finivit tercium sententiarum 5<sup>o</sup> Nonas Octobris (sc. 1432) incepitque quartum 13. Kal. Novembris."

<sup>26</sup> HOENEN, "Neuplatonismus am Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts," p. 169, remembered that, according to the Statutes of the University of Heidelberg, the *baccalaureus formatus* pronounced his *Principium* on the third book of the *Sentences* at the beginning of his second year of study. So, the rule was to begin with Book I; this does not mean that there were no exceptions or different habits, perhaps introduced autonomously by the masters.

In summary, Wenck should have followed this reading schedule:

1. Book III–IV: September 1430 to January 1431;
2. Book I: February 1431 to May 1431, finishing the 24<sup>th</sup> May 1431
3. Book II: September 1431 to January 1432, finishing the 6<sup>th</sup> February 1432.

This was hereinafter the scheme of Wenck's *socii* who discussed in the academic years 1430–33 at the Faculty of Theology at the University of Heidelberg.<sup>27</sup>

<i>Socii</i>	1429–1430	1430–1431	1431–1432	1432–1433
John Wenck		P3–4	P1	P2
Bartholomew of Maastricht	P1?	P2	P4	P3?
John of Brumbach				P3
John of Mechlinia				P
John of Bruxelles		P	P?	P?
Nicholas of Fonte				P1
				P2
				P4
				P?
				P?
				P3–4

## The structure of Wenck's *Principia*

We should remember that the structure of the *Principia* on the *Sentences* depended on the customs of each university.<sup>28</sup> In Heidelberg, in 1392–1394, Marsilius of Inghen began his *Principium* with an invocation to God, followed by a praise of theology (called *recommendatio*)<sup>29</sup> and a sermon introduced by a biblical theme. After the *sermo*, he introduced a *questio* and opened a dispute with his peer bachelors, the so-called

<sup>27</sup> For the periods of reading the *Sentences*, see TOEPKE, *Die Matrikel der Universität Heidelberg*, pp. 589–594.

<sup>28</sup> See *Les questions disputées et les questions quodlibétiques dans les facultés de théologie, de droit et de médecine*, ed. B.C. BAZAN, J.W. WIPPEL, G. FRANSEN, D. JACQUART (Typologie des Sources du Moyen Âge Occidental, 44–45), Turnhout 1985.

<sup>29</sup> Concerning the typical structure of the *collatio* in *Principia*, see C. SCHABEL, “The Victorine Pierre LeDuc's *Collationes*, *Sermo finalis*, and *Principia* on the *Sentences*, Paris 1382–3,” *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 87 (2020), pp. 237–334, pp. 238–239.



*socii*.<sup>30</sup> Wenck, in his *Principia*, shadowed a similar structure to Marsilius's and listed the main points at the beginning of his speech on Book I of the *Sentences*:

1. the invocation to the Saints;
2. the *recommendatio*;
3. the *sermo*;
4. the *protestatio*;
5. the *questio* and the debate with *socii*;
6. the *regratiatio*.

### 1. *Invocatio*

The first part of Wenck's *Principium*, on Book I of the *Sentences*, concerns the invocation to the saints. For him, it is an opportunity to show Heidelberg's public his skills as a biblical exegete. So, he surprised the audience by establishing a connection between the book of the prophet Hosea and an eminent representative of pagan philosophy, namely Plato. Wenck introduces this intuition by reminding us that invoking divine aid is a "very healthy (*saluberrime*) custom, which theologians and masters of arts correctly use in the university." Thus, Wenck reminded the audience that even Plato used to implore God, like the prophet Hosea, who announced: *tantum modo in me auxilium tuum*.<sup>31</sup> For Plato, the invocation was an essential component of philosophy, to the point that in *Timaeus*,<sup>32</sup> he dealt with the genres of speech, identifying the four characteristics of good invocations:

1. they are understandable;
2. they are pleasing to God;
3. they are adequate for the purpose the author calls for; and
4. they can easily reach God.

Here is a *caveat*. Wenck clarifies on his motivation to use the model of Plato's doctrine since there is no benefit for a Christian to learn to respect God (religion) from a pagan philosopher. The power of a long

<sup>30</sup> HOENEN, "Neuplatonismus am Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts," p. 168. HOENEN, *The Commentary of Marsilius of Inghen*, p. 479, also points out that the questions at our disposal "do not represent the actual *Principia* he held. They were rewritten, and during the process, Marsilius dropped the debate with his *socii* for reasons that are unclear."

<sup>31</sup> Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 138r, l. 16–17. See *Osee*, 13, 9: "Perditio tua Israhel tantummodo in me auxilium tuum."

<sup>32</sup> PLATO, *Timaeus* 17A, 53C (CPL 0578 a (A)), pars 1, p. 20, l. 10–14.

tradition gives more credibility to his actions. However, Wenck points out that Augustine already appreciated what the pagan philosophers had to say about God and recognized them as “wrongful possessors” of the truth. Even so, Wenck states that we should not be surprised by this translation of Augustine since the biblical book of *Exodus* already prophesied the matter. *Exodus* indeed states that Israel learned from the Egyptians that we must first say what is pleasing to God, not what one feels or wishes for oneself. The reason is that placing oneself as the focal point when praying to God can lead to heresy, just like the venerable Bede asserted to the Christians.<sup>33</sup>

Wenck finally formulated four invocations to God according to Plato’s suggestions. This part of Wenck’s *Principium* develops through references to St. Paul’s letters and the *Psalms*. Later in the text, he also constructs an exciting correspondence between some passages of the prophets Hosea and Isaiah with mentions of Gregory the Great and Augustine. Wenck does not consider the biblical text according to the literal meaning of the terms, as indicated by the so-called “moderns’” model of exegesis. On the contrary, he values its symbolic meanings according to the teaching of the “ancient” schools of the thirteenth century.<sup>34</sup>

In this same section of this *Principium*, it is also possible to highlight construction techniques of theological discourse typical of the fifteenth century, such as a “collage” between existing texts.<sup>35</sup> The one he

<sup>33</sup> Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 138r, l. 35–37. See BEDA VENERABILIS, *Expositio actuum apostolorum* (CPL 1357), c. 4, l. 76; c. 5, l. 42–43.

<sup>34</sup> M.J.F.M. HOENEN, “Marsilius von Inghen in der Geistesgeschichte des Ausgehenden Mittelalters,” in *Philosophie und Theologie des ausgehenden Mittelalters. Marsilius von Inghen und das Denken seiner Zeit*, ed. M.J.F.M. HOENEN, P.J.J.M. BAKKER, Leiden 2000, pp. 21–45, at pp. 24–26 reconstructs the main stages of the discussion on the application of logic to hermeneutics of the biblical text during the late Middle Ages. It underlines the importance of the Parisian Statutes in 1340, the position of Pierre d’Ailly, and the debate’s outcome between dialectics and anti-dialectics in Jean Gerson’s *De duplici logica*. Hoenen pointed out that Marsilius of Inghen followed Gerson’s footsteps, distinguishing the methods to be used in natural philosophy and metaphysics from those to be followed in ethics and theology. This choice allowed Marsilius to also embrace the doctrines of important theologians of the thirteenth century in his *Sentences*, like Alexander of Hales, Thomas Aquinas, and Bonaventure. See Z. KALUZA, “Les sciences et leurs langages. Note sur le statut du 29 décembre 1340 et le prétendu statut perdu contre Ockham,” in *Filosofia e teologia nel Trecento. Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi*, ed. L. BIANCHI (Textes et études du Moyen Âge, 1), Louvain-la-Neuve 1994, pp. 197–258.

<sup>35</sup> The *patchwork* textual reworking technique, also called *bricolage*, was common

composed with a few sentences from Peter Damian's sermons according to the following pattern is quite interesting:

Petrus Damiani, <i>Preces</i> (Patrologia Latina 145)	Johannes Wenck, <i>Principium ad I libr.</i> , in: Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31
t. 1, <i>Orationes ad Trinitatem</i> , col. 919, l. 43–54	f. 139r, l. 7–17
t. 1, <i>Orationes ad Trinitatem</i> , col. 920, l. 15–17	f. 139r, l. 19
t. 1, <i>Orationes ad Trinitatem</i> , col. 920, l. 25	f. 139r, l. 20–21
t. 2, <i>Orationes ad Trinitatem</i> , col. 920, l. 51–54	f. 139r, l. 22–24
t. 2, <i>Orationes ad Trinitatem</i> col. 922, l. 12–19	f. 139r, l. 24–28
t. 26, <i>De s. cruce orationes</i> , col. 927, l. 7–9	f. 139r, l. 28–30
t. 26, <i>De s. cruce orationes</i> , col. 927, l. 13	f. 139r, l. 30
t. 27, <i>De s. cruce orationes</i> , col. 927, l. 43	f. 139r, l. 31–32
t. 27, <i>De s. cruce orationes</i> , col. 927, l. 47–50	f. 139r, l. 33–36
t. 27, <i>De s. cruce orationes</i> , col. 927, l. 51–53	f. 139r, l. 38–41
t. 27, <i>De s. cruce orationes</i> , col. 927, l. 54	f. 139v, l. 2–3

### 2–3. *Recommendatio* and *Sermo*

The next section of Wenck's *Principium* is given by his *sermo* or *collatio*, based on the *recommendatio* of the study of the Bible and the *Sentences*. His *sermo* has a biblical thema with the verse from the prophet Hosea: *perditio tua [Israel], ex te tantummodo in me auxilium tuum* (13, 9). John seems to be motivated to demonstrate his ability as a biblical exegete and his rhetorical skills, establishing a parallel between textual

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in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. See U. ECO, "Riflessioni sulle tecniche di citazione nel Medioevo," in *Ideologie e pratiche del reimpiego nell'alto Medioevo*, Spoleto 1999, pp. 461–484, who has compared the patchwork to the modern second-hand use. M. BRÎNZEI, "Plagium," in *Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach*, ed. I. ATUCHA, D. CALMA, C. KÖNIG-PRALONG, I. ZAVATTERO, Turnhout-Porto 2011, pp. 559–568, at pp. 561f. distinguished different kinds of textual *bricolage*. It is not easy to apply the modern category of plagiarism to the medieval era, in which intellectual activity was conceived as the reworking of the same Christian tradition, often using commentaries. Z. KALUZA, "Auteur et plagiaire: quelques remarques," in *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Qu'est-ce que la philosophie au moyen âge? What is Philosophy in the Middle Ages?*, ed. J.A. AERTSEN, A. SPEER, Berlin 1998, pp. 312–320; U. ZAHND, "Plagiats individualisés et stratégies de singularisation. L'évolution du livre IV du commentaire commun des *Sentences* de Vienne", in *Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl and the Sentences at Vienna in the Early Fifteenth Century*, ed. BRÎNZEI, Turnhout 2014, pp. 85–265.

passages of the biblical books of *Hosea* and *Isaiah* concerning the destruction of Israel. This happened because its inhabitants' exaltation and pride led them to immorality and idolatry. Instead, God showed them the *viam humilitatis elationi oppositam* (f. 140r). So Wenck continues, *moralis homo instruat seipsum debere humiliare et pro subsidio suae salutis ad Deum recurrere* (f. 140v): this is the narrow way of salvation, which few people enter, as explained by the evangelist Matthew.<sup>36</sup> Wenck points out that the greatness of Hosea's words consists in that both perdition and salvation live in them, and the Holy Scriptures are the key to distancing oneself from the first and accessing the second.

Curiously — continues Wenck — in them stand the main themes of the four books of the *Sentences*:

1. "Your perdition" (*perditio tua*) implies the presence of the ineffable mystery of the Trinity.
2. The creation, which originates "from you" (*ex te*), manifests itself in the worthiest of creatures, namely Man.
3. In a certain way, *tantum modo in me* symbolizes the incarnate word brought into the world through the immaculate birth of Mary.
4. "God's help" to humans wounded by sin is a "medicament" like the sacraments.

In his *recommendatio*, Wenck praises the books of the *Sentences* and introduces the question about the meaning of studying theology's works for the salvation of souls.<sup>37</sup> More precisely, Wenck wonders if Lombard's enterprise of moving beyond human capacity — here, we find a reference to the *Prologus* of the *Sentences*<sup>38</sup> — risks drifting toward perdition rather than leading to salvation. For Wenck, one has to remember what Paul had explained, i.e., that "*littera* kills"<sup>39</sup> since it guides to exaltation

<sup>36</sup> *Evang. sec. Matthaëum*, c. 7, v. 14: "angusta porta et arcta via que ducit ad vitam et pauci sunt qui inveniunt eam."

<sup>37</sup> Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 140v, l. 40–41: "utrum studium divinarum litterarum sit in profectum et salutem animarum."

<sup>38</sup> Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 141r, l. 11–13: "in oppositum est magister in prologo, qui, ob premium eterne retributionis, dicit se, de penuria sui ingenioli seu de studio suo, aliquid in gazophylacium Domini missurum." See PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae*, prologus, p. 3, l. 2: "cupientes aliquid de penuria ac tenuitate nostra cum pauperula in gazophylacium domini mittere, ardua scandere opus ultra vires nostras agere praesumpsimus consummationis fiduciam laboris que mercedem in samaritano statuentes, qui, prolatis in curationem semiuiui duobus denariis, supereroganti cuncta reddere professus est."

<sup>39</sup> Ep. Pauli ad Corinthios II, 3, 6.

and inflames pride.<sup>40</sup> Wenck then stresses that he agreed on this conceptual development with his teacher Nicholas of Jawor.

We should add that the same form of *sermo* can be read in his second *Principium*. Wenck begins his second speech by mentioning the same theme from the book of *Hosea* and taking up the duplicate threads from his *Principium* to the first book. However, he clarifies the sources more precisely, frequently providing exact references to the names of authors and books. So Wenck again emphasizes the greatness of *Hosea*'s words by deepening their moral value. He argues that, on closer inspection, there is only one concrete commandment in all the Sacred Scriptures, which reflects the words of *Hosea*, namely the *prosecutio salutis, fugaque perditionis* (f. 150r).

The salvation is *finem fidei nostre*, which is evident in that it is possible to read in passages, well cited by Wenck, of the *Psalms*, the Pauline letters, the Gospels of Luke, Matthew and John, and their Medieval commentators, such as Augustine and Isidore of Seville.<sup>41</sup> There is also a reference from an extract of the *De gestis domini salvatoris* of Simon Fidati from Cascia (†1348). Wenck refers to this book with the title *De morali gloria*, probably because he sourced the manuscript in Heidelberg bore this wording. Simon's name also recurs in other sheets of notes in the same codex Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31. In fact, Simon must have been an author particularly known to Wenck and perhaps also in the context of Heidelberg University itself.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>40</sup> The three arguments are: 1. "Nichil quod occidit aut mortificat est in profectum seu salutem animarum, sed litteram occidit." (Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 140v, l. 42–43. *Ep. Pauli ad Corinthios II*, 3, 6); 2. "Nichil quod inflat et superbiam inducit est in profectum et salutem animarum, cum caritatis proprietates sit non inflare" (f. 141r, l. 1–13. *Ep. Pauli ad Corinthios I*, 13, 4); 3. "Nichil quod ad insaniam ducit est in profectum et salutem animarum, sed littere ducunt ad insaniam." (f. 141r, l. 7–8. *Lib. Actuum Apostolorum*, 26, 24).

<sup>41</sup> Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 150v, l. 28.

<sup>42</sup> Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 151r, l. 19–20: "attende Symonem de Cassia, in opere suo evangelico, libro 14° de morali gloria, capitulo 21°." Wenck also mentions Simon Fidati in marginal notes by his hand in ff. 147r, 157v, 163r–v. For the biography and works, see P. BELLINI, "Simon Fidati de Cascia," in *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité* 14 (1990), col. 873–887. In the code now in Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 123, but originally from the University of Heidelberg, three fascicles have been found (no. IV, V and VI), copied in 1390 in Simone Fidati's *Sermones XIV de morali gloria* (f. 126r–165v), then a glossa of the Gospel of John (f. 166r–220r) and extracts from the Gospel of Matthew with a *collatio* of comments (221r–224v). There is no evidence that Wenck considered this code in drafting his speech. However, this codex is the only one to

#### 4. *Protestatio*

Before continuing with the presentation of the question, Wenck announces that it is time to *progredior*. He actually formulates a *protestatio*, as is customary of the *Principia*. Here, Wenck declares that he does not affirm anything contrary to the faith or utter words that may sound offensive to those who listen to the reading of the *Principium*. (f. 141r)

#### 5. The questions and the debate with the *socii*

A customary moment of the *Principia* is the confrontation with *socii*, i.e., the competing peer bachelors who are debating on a chosen topic. As Wenck recalls,<sup>43</sup> Heidelberg University's customs concerning the opening speeches in reading *Sentences* also contained the appeal of a competing peer student to discuss some doctrinal contents that the candidate brought out in his speech. In the *Principium* on Book I, Wenck introduces his *socius* Bartholomew of Maastrich as follows: *reverendum dominum sententiarum, magistrum meum, Bartholomeum*; and in the

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our knowledge where such a title indicates Simon Fidati's *De gestis domini salvatoris*. Simon Fidati builds a conception on theology centered on interpreting the Gospels and develops a Christology with a robust, practical approach. See W. ECKERMANN, "Simon Fidati von Cascia OESA (†1348). Europäische Theologie im lateinischen Mittelalter," *Augustiniana* 47 (1997), pp. 339–356 provided evidence for the extraordinary diffusion of manuscripts of Simon's work in the fifteenth century, which also led to printing in 1485. Concerning the most relevant of Simon's doctrines, Eckermann mentioned the *Christiformitas*, expressed in his attention to the life of Jesus, also testified by his commentaries on the Gospels. For the contextualization of Simon's work in the history of thought of the late Middle Ages, see *Simon Fidati von Cascia OESA. Augustinische Theologie und Philosophie im späten Mittelalter*, ed. C.M. OSER-GROTE, A.E.J. GROTE (Cassiciacum, 52), Würzburg 2006. In this volume, see Anzulewicz's contribution about the relation between Simon and Albert of Great, an author familiar to Wenck. (H. ANZULEWICZ, "Die Gottähnlichkeit des Menschen und seine Gleichförmigkeit mit Christus: Albert d. Gr. und Simon Fidati von Cascia über die Verwirklichung des Menschen als Mensch und Christ", pp. 305–322), Meister Eckhart (V. PEKTAS, "*Beati pauperes spiritu* (Mt 5,3): Das Armutsideal bei Simon Fidati von Cascia und Meister Eckart: ein Vergleich," pp. 245–268) and Nicholas of Cusa (H. SCHWAETZER, "... dann ist uns unser Vater Augustinus als Beispiel gesetzt! *Christiformitas* bei Nikolaus von Kues und Simon Fidati Gerson," pp. 371–390).

<sup>43</sup> Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 131, l. 35–36: "iuxta consuetudinem hactenus observatam matres nostrae facultatis theologiae." The candidate "in quolibet libro faciendo Principium contra dicta et conclusiones eius vel eorum, qui mecum concurrerint legendo, instare," vide WINKELMANN, *Urkundenbuch*, p. 21, l. 23–25.

margin of the sheet, he adds Bartholomew's birthplace: *de Traiecto superiori*.<sup>44</sup>

### Socius Bartholomew of Maastricht

Bartholomew of Maastricht started reading the *Sentences* in September 1429, about six months before Wenck. His real name was Bartholomeus Snavel, and he was born between 1380 and 1385 in Ulestraten, a village near Maastricht.<sup>45</sup> In June 1400, Bartholomew's name appeared in the list of first-year students of the Faculty of Arts at Heidelberg University. Two years later, on January 20, 1402, he obtained his baccalaureate, and on April 9, 1404, his license.<sup>46</sup> Thanks to his brilliant academic results, Bartholomew earned the assignment of one of the introductory courses in logic at the same faculty, which had only twenty-five teachers at that time.<sup>47</sup> After, Bartholomew was chief of the faculty of arts in the summer semester of 1408 and the winter semester of 1414–15. He then served as rector<sup>48</sup> of his college in 1412–13 and 1419–20.

<sup>44</sup> Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, ff. 138r, l. 7–8; f. 141r, l. 33–35. Wenck's *Principia*, despite still being unpublished, have occasionally been mentioned in some articles; for example, HAUBST, "Wenck, Johannes," col. 846 reported that Wenck would have rejected "nominalist Bartholomew's thesis," according to which God, because of his absolute power, can share the power to also create with creatures. A reference to the Wenck-Bartholomew debate is also in BANTLE, "Nikolaus Magni de Jawor und Johannes Wenck," pp. 562–563. See: A.L. GABRIEL, *The Paris studium. Robert of Sorbonne and his legacy. Interuniversity exchange between the German, Cracow and Louvain universities and that of Paris in the late medieval and humanistic period*, Frankfurt am Main 1992, p. 128 (original publication: "Via antiqua and via moderna and the Migration of Paris Students and Masters to the German Universities in the Fifteenth Century," 1974). In this work, the author argued that Wenck's *Principia* on the *Sentences* had a Thomistic orientation and that Wenck had a relevant role in spreading the realist position in Heidelberg.

<sup>45</sup> R. HAASS, "Bartholomäus von Maastricht," in *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, 1 (1953), col. 610–611.

<sup>46</sup> RITTER, *Die Heidelberger Universität*, Heidelberg 1936, vol. 1, p. 315.

<sup>47</sup> T. MELJKNECHT, *Bartholomeus von Maastricht († 1446) monnik en conciliarist. Met een inventarisatie van zijn nagelaten geschriften en een krit. uitg. van het traktaat 'Victus modestia'*, Assen 1982, p. 2.

<sup>48</sup> Cod. Heidelberg, Universitätsarchiv, UAH M1. T. Meijknecht reports that, in this period, as a master of arts, Bartholomew awarded an academic degree to at least twenty-nine students. However, he later remained in contact with only two of them, with whom he shared the Netherlands as the country of origin: Johannes Vogel of Roermond and Henricus van Diest — see footnote above. He kept contact only with them, probably due to his controversial character, which

In 1426 Bartholomew entered the Cistercian Order at the nearby Maulbronn Monastery. This life choice also emerged in the works he composed in that period, most of which were of a devotional genre.<sup>49</sup> However, Bartholomew had already prepared for this existential turning point in previous years. Concurrently with teaching, as soon as he graduated in the arts, he also completed his studies in theology. Bartholomew obtained his baccalaureate in 1420 under the guidance of Wilhelm Eppenbach. Then, in 1428, he was *baccalaureus cursor* with Nicholas of Jawor and finished his reading of the *Sentences* on February 14, 1432, alongside Wenck.

It is remarkable that both John and Bartholomew were pupils of Nicholas of Jawor. Therefore, should we believe that they had the same ideas in theology and that these were derived *ipso facto* from the teaching of their common master? The question prompts varied and layered responses. However, we cannot examine all of them here. Meanwhile, it will help us at least understand the general scheme of doctrinal orientations in Heidelberg in the first half of the fifteenth century.

As we said before, Nicholas of Jawor is today still considered the founder of the *tritum iter* in Heidelberg. Nevertheless, Bartholomew was not a follower of the *antiqui doctores* as his master was. As Bartholomew himself declares in his brocards and early lectures on the *Appellationes*, he followed doctrines of masters like John Buridan, Henry Totting of Oyta, and Marsilius of Inghen, i.e., he worked within the “path of the moderns,” which in Heidelberg was also called *via marsiliana*.<sup>50</sup> Therefore, it is not surprising that Bartholomew as student elaborated two

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led him to change the monastic habit several times and to open disputes with many of his colleagues, such as Dionysius of Rykel.

<sup>49</sup> An example is the text from the incipit *Ad devocionem excitandam ipsi presbitero* (1427), in Kopenhagen, Kongelige Bibliothek, N y kgl. Saml. 2911 4°, f. 67v–71v or the other one with the incipit *Ad obtemperandum votis humilium ad preconium humilitatis*, in Kopenhagen, Kongelige Bibliothek, N y kgl. Saml. 2911 4°, fol. 87r–100r.

<sup>50</sup> Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 137r, l. 26. Bartholomew’s lecture on Marsilius of Inghen’s *Appellationes* was copied in a code currently present in the Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek in Erfurt and cataloged as ms. CA 4o 277, ff. 131r–135r. I am currently working on this text and will soon publish a paper with its transcription. For a brief history of the *via marsiliana* in Heidelberg, see RITTER, *Heidelberger Universität*, p. 33f and G. RITTER, *Studien zur Spätscholastik*, (Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, 1921/4), vol. I: *Marsilius von Inghen und die okkamistische Schule in Deutschland*, Heidelberg 1921; for a bibliographic panorama, see: D. WALZ, “Die Rezeption der Werke des Marsilius von Inghen in Heidelberg



brocards on the *Sentences* concerning two specific topics, which allowed him to recall the doctrines of the moderns, i.e., the communicability of divine power to creatures and the eternity of the world.<sup>51</sup>

### Bartholomew's brocards

First, let us briefly examine the definition of "brocard." Bartholomew himself claims to formulate "brocardica" and then Wenck also repeats this in *Principium* I (*duo brocardiciva que praefatus magister*, f. 131). The term *brocardum* is surprising for us, since it is neither widespread in the commentaries on the *Sentences* nor in the *Principia*. The brocards belong to a genre used almost only in law schools and university faculties of law for educational purposes. A brocard is a formulation of a general principle in the form of a maxim and exposes a set of laws or a general juridical principle. In brocards, sometimes counterarguments follow the formulation of the principle, which are then also followed by conclusions, which should dissipate doubts on the discussed topic — but sometimes these are not present, as if to underline the antinomic nature of some themes.<sup>52</sup>

The genre of brocards was developed by the glossators of the Justinian *Corpus* during the twelfth century in Northern Italy; while initially the brocards appeared in the manuscripts like notes in the margin of the text, they were later transcribed autonomously.<sup>53</sup> As Bartholomew did

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im Spiegel der ältesten Heidelberger Bibliothekskataloge," in *Philosophie und Theologie des ausgehenden Mittelalters*, ed. HOENEN, BAKKER, pp. 259–288.

<sup>51</sup> MEIJKNECHT, *Bartholomeus von Maastricht*, p. 5 mentions a speech that Bartholomew would have given in Heidelberg in 1433, in which he would have formulated the nominalistic doctrine of "pactum." Meijknecht was referring to the fact that Bartholomew, in the closing section of the text, distinguished between two kinds of "obedience:" in one sense, obedience is what every human being owes to his superior; in another, more general sense, it is to satisfy the desires of others, whoever they are. For Bartholomew, in this way "Deus obtemperat nostris votis si nos obtemperavimus eius preceptis." Meijknecht argues that this would be an allusion to the doctrine of *potentia ordinate*, which he says can be found in William of Ockham's and Gabriel Biel's works. Unfortunately, Meijknecht does not elaborate further on this intuition. However, this theory confirms that Bartholomew remains in the theological tradition of the moderns, even if he does not integrally follow Ockham or Biel, but is instead oriented on Marsilian theology.

<sup>52</sup> S. KUTTNER, "Réflexions sur les brocards des glossateurs," in *Mélanges Joseph de Ghellinck*, vol. 2, Gembloux 1951, pp. 767–792, in part. pp. 790–791.

<sup>53</sup> S. RICCOBONO, "Brocardica," in *Novissimo Digesto Italiano*, vol. 2, Torino 1958, pp. 583–584 claims that the term "brocard" probably derives from the Italian

not study law, the reasons that led him to use that term remain unknown to us. A further element of perplexity is constituted by the fact that we do not know of uses of the term in the theological faculties. However, it is important to note that the text Bartholomew and then Wenck define as a brocard does not reflect what the juridic tradition had identified as such, not even considering the argumentative structure.

In fact, Bartholomew technically formulates not two brocards, but only two maxims, which he then supports with brief arguments not even formulated by himself but extrapolated from his main source, as I will show. Significantly, in the second brocard, Bartholomew mentions the generic term *dictum*, using it as a synonym of brocard. So, we can assume that Bartholomew utilized the term “brocard” in a non-technical way, thereby indicating a mere brief maxim, which can be easily remembered as a “*dictum*.” These are his two *dicta*:

- 1) *Creatio est creature communicabilis de potentia Dei absoluta, prout creatio dicit productionem alicuius ex nichilo et nullo presupponito quantum est ex parte producti;*
- 2) *Quamvis mundum vel aliam rem creatam fuisse ab eterno pro nunc est impossibile, adhuc tamen tale ‘fuisse ab eterno’ non includit repugnantiam per se et absolute.*

We have evidence of such brocards from Bartholomew in a note in Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, but at f. 137r, the text appears anonymous. The hand that transcribed the brocards is the same one that copied an anonymous letter in the verse of the same f. 137 in the Tübingen manuscript. I have established that it was Bartholomew mostly because Wenck quoted the brocards mentioned above in his *Principia* in Books I–II of the *Sentences* and explicitly attributes the paternity to Bartholomew.

Secondly, there are clues in the brocards themselves and in the manuscript to sustain the authorship. For instance, in the conclusion of the second brocard, the author first deems sufficient what has been said. Then, he addresses the reader in the second plural person. He states that, if they wanted to have a third brocard, address more complex and

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transliteration of the name of the bishop of Worms “Burchardus,” who seems to have been used to formulating brief maxims, or perhaps from the Greek “protarchica,” which indicated the most general principles. Pillio da Medicina established the canons of this genre in a work entitled *Libellus disputatorius*; however, it is only with Ottone da Pavia that the “brocard” was elaborated independently of the commented text.

obscure topics (*umbra et difficilia*), or did not have Lombard's text with them *in Helpronna presentem*, then they should reach him *ad Heydelbergum*. Here, they *in una nocte colligētis contra me tot rationes* (f. 137v).

Before proposing an interpretation of these lines, let us consider as a further addition the mentioned letter on the verso of Sheet 137 where the brocards were transcribed. This letter helps us collect information concerning the hand that transcribed the brocards since it is written by the same hand that copied them. In it, the sender turns to his *reverende magister et pater preamande* (f. 137v), complaining that he has not been able to read what he calls "the second" document. This is an interesting testimony of the material exchange between the *socii* to prepare the public debate. Consequently, he has started reading the "third" document only recently.

The author of the letter defends himself, stating that other commitments had occupied him: someone by the name of Gerardus had submitted to him a *valde difficilem* (f. 137v) chapter on the incarnation to which he should perhaps respond in the future (*ad quem deberem sibi respondere fortassis in adventu*, f. 137v), and adds that "pro nunc apud nos in monasterio est dominus decanus in Gundelfinghen et m[agister] Wernherus, Urach conventum, suis cum duobus dominis, qui etiam me, in parte non modica, impediverunt." (f. 137v) Therefore, the letter came from a monastery, and some important masters had been visiting it in those days, like Wernherus Knaebler de Urach.<sup>54</sup>

Based on these annotations, I propose the hypothesis that Bartholomew, who was based in Heidelberg while he was reading the *Sentences*, sent a letter with the brocards' text to the Cistercian monastery of Maulbronn, which he had entered in 1426, perhaps as a testimony of the work he himself was doing at the university. Maulbronn is near the monastery of Heilbronn, another thing Bartholomew mentioned in the brocard.<sup>55</sup> The author of the brocards finally invites those intellectually curious Cistercian brothers to join and discuss with him at the University of Heidelberg.

<sup>54</sup> D. DRÜLL, *Heidelberger Gelehrtenlexikon 1386–1651*, pp. 546–547. Wernherus enrolled in Heidelberg in 1405. He was later licentiate as baccalaureus and taught at the Faculty of Arts in Vienna starting from the WS 1410–11.

<sup>55</sup> In the Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, ff. 102r–108r (in Latin) and 130r–136r (in German, written by Wenck), a letter sent to Heilbronn is also copied from some Bohems named Procob, Smohors, Koranda, Savisz, Smolich, *Fasciculus rerum expetendarum et fugiendarum*, ed. O. GRATIUS, London 1690, t. II, pp. 632–636.

To the current state of our knowledge, it is not possible to know in what circumstances and who copied Bartholomew's brocards in our manuscript, since there are no other traces of the handwriting of the copyist elsewhere in the same codex; maybe it belongs to a Cistercian brother of Bartholomew or to one of his *socii* in Heidelberg, who may have copied the texts and thus made them available to Wenck. However, the sole piece of evidence at this time is that Wenck handled this same Sheet 137 in the drafting phase of his *Principia*. This is shown not only by Wenck's use of Bartholomew's brocards in his own texts, but also by the fact that that sheet in the margins is enriched by numerous notes in Wenck's handwriting with quotations of Bonaventure and with some diagrams concerning topics traditionally addressed in Lombard's *Sentences*.<sup>56</sup>

### Questions and answers

Now there is something more important: as already said, Wenck, in his *Principia*, transcribes both Bartholomew's brocards and places them as the object of the dispute.<sup>57</sup> In the meantime, Bartholomew replied *in suo principio quarti* to the arguments that Wenck introduced in the *Principium* in Book I against him.<sup>58</sup> Curiously, there is no trace of

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See BANTLE, "Nikolaus Magni de Jawor und Johannes Wenck," p. 538.

<sup>56</sup> HAUBST, *Studien*, p. 34f. showed that a sample of Wenck's handwriting can be surely found in Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. Lat. 600, ff. 67r–69v, where Wenck transcribed a sermon he gave in 1441. This manuscript is of particular interest to us because it collects texts by Wenck, his *socius* Bartholomew of Maastricht, Nicholas of Cusa, and a letter of Pope Eugene IV to Heidelberg University (1439), even if they all belong to a period subsequent to the years 1430–32, which are the object of this research: see ff. 31r–34v: NICOLAUS DE CUSA, *Tractatus de auctoritate presidendi in concilio generali*; ff. 37r–48r: BARTHOLOMEUS DE TRAIECTO, *Tractatus de potestate ecclesiae*; ff. 98r–100v: EUGENIUS IV, *Epistola ad universitatem Heidelbergensem*.

<sup>57</sup> Also in this case, the procedure follows the university statutes; see WINKELMANN, *Urkundenbuch*, p. 23, l. 18–31.

<sup>58</sup> Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 152r, l. 5–6. Wenck himself writes the following note at the bottom of f. 151v: "laudabilium virorum vestigia secuturus divino me ad hoc / opitulante suffragio, brevissime duo, in presenti actu / habeo peragere. Prima thema meum solitum iterato / insumere et introducere. Secundo infrascriptum thema / materie huius secundi libri Sententiarum applicare, implicationes magistris / mei, magistris Bartholomei de Traiecto superiori, nunc / in suo principio contra me factas insumere et iuxta / posse dissolvere, cum annexa gratiarum actione / omnipotenti Deo creatori meo, vobis quoque magistris et dominis / meis, qui dignati fuistis, hunc actum vestris presentiis / exornare. Quantum igitur ad primum: Origine omnis / cognitionis et gratie, fontem videlicet omnis

this reply in the Tübingen manuscript. We therefore know that, while Wenck was reading Book I of the *Sentences*, Bartholomew was beginning to read the fourth book, and that in his *Principium* on Book IV he answered Wenck's objections formulated in his first *Principium*. Here, Wenck discussed with Bartholomew the *questio* "utrum studium divinarum litterarum sit in profectum et salutem animarum."<sup>59</sup>

However, starting from Bartholomew's answers, Wenck formulates the second part of his *Principium* to the second book of the *Sentences*. In that folium, he also discussed the *questio* "utrum Deus, qui est origo rerum, sit et finis earundem" (f. 152r). Analyzing Wenck's answers in his *Principium* on Book II enables us to highlight at least a part of Bartholomew's first replies to Wenck. Even if we do not have Bartholomew's reply, we have the arguments that Wenck used to defend himself against the accusations of the *magistri mei, magistri Bartholomei de Traiecto superiori* (f. 152r).

Wenck illustrates the structure of Bartholomew's reply, stating that he (f. 152r):

- 1) *primo solvit rationes meas, quas feci contra dicta sua,*
- 2) *secundo nititur probare quod insufficienter solveri, et non satis fecerim motis suis pro confirmatione suorum dictorum adductis;*
- 3) *tertio replicat de novo contra dicta mea, que posui in questione prima primi Sententiarum.*

Wenck then claims the structure of his speech: in statements (*positiones*), arguments (*rationes*) and replies (*replicas*). In the table attached as Appendix II, we have represented the writings' aforementioned structure, aligning Bartholomew's arguments in f. 137r with the same ones Wenck formulated in his *Principium* on Book I of the *Sentences*. Finally, I identified some textual traces of Bartholomew's *Principium* in Wenck's *Principium* in Book II.

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boni trinitatem / scilicet benedictam, cuius hodie festivitas ab Ecclesia colitur / sic in meum invoco auxilium peragendorum. / In nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti."

<sup>59</sup> Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 140v, l. 40–41. BANTLE, "Nikolaus Magni und Johannes Wenck," pp. 561–562 highlights that, for Thomas Aquinas, the study of Scripture was adequate to understand the customs in the Church, while the moderns disagreed with this.

## Doctrinal aspects of the Wenck-Bartholomew confrontation

We will now discuss the two main topics that have been the object of controversy between Bartholomew and Wenck: the doctrines of the eternity of the world (a) and the divine power and the creation of the world (b). We will underline the main doctrinal aspects for each of them and bring out the arguments of metaphysical interest elaborated by both.

### a) The hypothesis of the eternity of the world (brocard no. 2)

In analyzing Bartholomew's brocards and his debate with Wenck, we will start with the second one, which concerns the hypothesis of the world's eternity.<sup>60</sup> Bartholomew affirms that it is consistent from a mere logical point of view to claim that the world could be eternal. But at the same time, it is impossible to say that this really happens here and now (*pro nunc*). Bartholomew adds that he formulated this theory on the logical legitimacy of the hypothesis of an eternal world following the doctrines of the master *Yainricum de Oyta* (f. 142r). The same formula in the brocard is reproduced *verbatim* from Henry of Oyta's *Questions on the Sentences*, as shown in the following pattern:

<sup>60</sup> Concerning this topic, see O. PLUTA, *Kritiker der Unsterblichkeitsdoktrin in Mittelalter und Renaissance* (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie, 7), Amsterdam 1986. On Oyta's position, see pp. 46 and 96f. Oyta also wrote introductions and commentaries on Aristotelian logic; see HEINRICH TOTTING VON OYTA, *Schriften zur Ars vetus*, ed. H. BERGER, München, 2015. On the relationship between logic and theology in Oyta, see A. MAIERÙ, "Logica aristotelica e teologia trinitaria. Enrico Totting da Oyta," in *Studi sul XIV secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier*, ed. A. MAIERÙ, A. PARAVICINI BAGLIANI (Raccolta di studi e testi 151), Roma 1981, pp. 481–512. On his *Sentences* commentary, see recently: H. BERGER, "Henry Totting of Oyta and his *Quaestiones Sententiarum*," in *The Rise of an Academic Elite: Deans, Masters, and Scribes at the University of Vienna before 1400*, ed. M. BRÎNZEI (Studia Sententiarum, 6), Turnhout 2022, pp. 155–177, esp. p. 160, where he explains that "Totting is among those late medieval scholars who as artists are rather progressive, i.e., nominalistic scholars, whereas as theologians they are rather conservative. 28 In one of his questions on Porphyry, Totting reports and rejects Duns Scotus's view of universals as one of 'aliqui antiquorum logicorum,' viz. that a *natura communis* is 'contracted' by a *differentia* individuals to an individual, such as the common *natura humana* is contracted by the *Sorteitas* to the individual man Socrates. In contrast to that, Totting advocates the view that universals are signs."

HENRICUS TOTTING DE OYTA,  
*Questiones s. II Sent.*,  
 q. 11, a. 2, München, BS,  
 Clm 17468, f. 184rb–va

Conclusio: Quamvis mundum, vel aliam rem creatam, fuisse ab eterno sit pro nunc impossibile, tamen aliquid tale fuisse ab eterno non includit repugnantiam per se et absolute. [...]  
Prima pars patet, quia eius oppositum 'pro nunc' est necessarium eo quod transivit in preteritum. [...]  
repugnaret creature secundum se, vel in ordine ad agens.  
Non primum, quia de ratione creature tria sunt, scilicet 'quod sit ens', et 'quod sit productum ab alio,' et 'quod sit de nichilo.'  
Saltim quantum ad ultimam resolutionem  
 ...

BARTOLOMAEUS DE TRAIECTO,  
*Brocardae duae ad II Sent.*  
 Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31,  
 f. 137r

Secundum dictum posui in conclusione tertia eiusdem articuli quod quamvis mundum, vel aliam rem creatam, fuisse ab eterno, pro nunc est impossibile, adhuc tamen tale 'fuisse ab eterno' non includit repugnantiam per se et absolute". Prima pars patet, quia eius oppositum est 'pro nunc' necessarium eo quod transivit in preteritum. Secundam partem sic declaravit insequendo magistrum Hanricum de Oeyta, quia vel repugnaret creature secundum se, vel in ordine ad agens.  
Non primum, quia de ratione creature tria sunt, scilicet 'quod sit ens', et 'quod sit productum ab alio,' et 'quod sit de nichilo.'  
Saltim quantum ad ultimam resolutionem, probationem ulteriorem dereliquit.

JOHANNES WENCK,  
*Principium ad I Sent.*,  
 Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31,  
 f. 141v

Secundum dictum quod prefatus magister meus posuit in conclusione tertia eiusdem articuli erat istud: quamvis mundum, vel aliam rem creatam, fuisse ab eterno pro nunc est impossibile, adhuc tamen tale 'fuisse ab eterno' non includit repugnantiam per se et absolute. Prima pars patet, quia eius oppositum 'pro nunc' est necessarium eo quod transivit in preteritum. Secundam partem sic declaravit insequendo magistrum Hanricum de Oeyta, quia vel repugnaret creature secundum se, vel in ordine ad agens.  
Non primum, quia de ratione creature tria sunt, scilicet 'quod sit ens', et 'quod sit productum ab alio,' et 'quod sit de nichilo.'  
Saltim quantum ad ultimam resolutionem, probationem ulteriorem dereliquit.

Henry Totting of Oyta discusses, in the second article of his eleventh *quaestio* in Book II, the *possibilitas eternalis productionis ad extra*: whether the world must have a temporal beginning, or whether it is

possible, because it is not contradictory, to postulate according to the teaching of Aristotle the hypothesis of a world without a beginning — a perpetual world.<sup>61</sup> This question only concerns the theoretical possibility of divine creation, since Henry does not intend to describe how the world was really made. God, with his absolute power, freely chose to create our world and how to do it, so he made the world as it is. Therefore, understanding whether this possibility of an eternal world is contradictory is concerned with mere theoretical speculation. But why this is so important for Henry and Bartholomew?

According to the metaphysical tradition established on Ockham's doctrine, God can accomplish anything he wants as long as he does not fall into contradiction. Both Oyta and Bartholomew answer this question by stating that, currently, there is no eternal creature. However, they claimed that, if God wanted to create such a creature, he could do it since the hypothesis of an eternal world is not contradictory from a logical point of view.<sup>62</sup> So, Bartholomew confirms his alignment with the "modern" theologians.<sup>63</sup> At the same time, he marks his distance from

<sup>61</sup> See München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm 8867, ff. 210rb–234rb; Clm 17468, ff. 178va–190vb and Clm 18364, ff. 148ra–168rb. See A. LANG, *Heinrich Totting von Oyta. Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte der ersten deutschen Universitäten und zur Problemgeschichte der Spätscholastik*, (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 32, 3), Münster 1937, pp. 196–201, who consecrated a paragraph at p. 197 on Oyta's *quaestio* 11, illustrating, albeit briefly, the theological reflections of the master Oyta concerning the doctrine of the world's divine creation and pointing out some of his sources. Lang emphasizes that, for Oyta, this doctrine does not concern only the theologians but also the philosophers, who elaborate their own positions through natural reason.

<sup>62</sup> LANG, *Heinrich Totting von Oyta*, p. 197; see HENRICUS DE OYTA, *In II Sent.*, q. 11 a. 1 concl. 3, Ms fol. 180rb, l. 2–8: "Quamvis non sit communicabile creaturae posse creare primo modo, scilicet praecise sue virtuti innitendo nec sit ei communicatum secundo modo de potentia ordinata, nulla tamen videtur prohibere repugnantia eam posse creare secundo modo, hoc est aliquid producere nullum Principium materiale illius productionis supponendo."

<sup>63</sup> For a general overview on this specific topic, see the volume: *The Eternity of the World in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas and his contemporaries*, ed. J.B.M. WISSINK (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 27), Leiden 1990; R.C. DALES, *Medieval Discussions of the Eternity of the World* (Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, 18), Leiden 1990, reconstructs the history of the topic from Eriugena to the fourteenth century, also distinguishing, concerning the latter century, the answers formulated in Oxford and Paris; for a conceptual analysis of the doctrine of the eternity of the world in the thirteenth century, see L. BIANCHI, *L'errore di Aristotele: la polemica contro l'eternità*



the Scotists, who did not worry about logical contradictions, since, from their point of view, God could and can do everything.

Wenck replies to Bartholomew, affirming that this hypothesis is contradictory even if considered only in itself. For Wenck, if it were possible for the world to be eternal, then the following would be the case:

- 1) It wouldn't be contradictory to be simultaneously eternal and created, either concerning oneself nor the agent.
- 2) An eternal creature would no longer be a creature by the definition of *creatura*.<sup>64</sup> Then God would no longer be the creator of the world and the world would not be created.

Wenck therefore concludes that *solum Deum fore eternum (contra secundum dictum eiusdem)* and that the hypothesis of an eternal world cannot even exist as a potentiality. Therefore, he insists on the ontological difference between God and creatures. Nevertheless, Wenck does not proceed further in refuting the ideas Bartholomew developed in this brocard and prefers to consider the first one.

### **b) The divine power and the creation of the world (brocard no. 1)**

Wenck states that Bartholomew formulated the first of his two brocards while he was reading Book II of *Sentences*.<sup>65</sup> In the reading process, he had to wonder if God may have communicated his creative power to the creature.<sup>66</sup> Unlike the previous case, Bartholomew does not highlight any source, nor does Wenck by commenting on this text. However, reading the brocard texts, it seems that Bartholomew was answering a common question in Book II, as others before him for example asked: *Utrum potentia creandi possit communicari alicui creature, ita quod possit creare* or, that is the same: *Utrum Deus potuit communicare creature potentia creandi* and so on by similar terms.<sup>67</sup>

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*del mondo nel XIII secolo* (Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell'Università degli Studi di Milano, 104), Firenze 1984.

<sup>64</sup> Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 142r, l. 5–6. Wenck reminds that there are only three kinds of creatures: “‘quod sit ens,’ ac ‘quod sit producta ab alio’ ac ‘quod sit de nichilo;’” but not eternal creatures.

<sup>65</sup> Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 141r, l. 38: “primum, quod posuit in secunda conclusione questionis prime, II *Sententiarum*.”

<sup>66</sup> Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 131, l. 38. See THOMAS DE AQUINO, *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 43, q. I, a. 2, ed. R.P. MANDONNET, P. LETHIELLEUX, t. 1, Paris 1929, pp. 984–987.

<sup>67</sup> See Magister Petrus de Walse (fourteenth century, Vienna): *Utrum potentia cre-*

For instance, John Capreolus addressed this same question in his commentary on Book II of the *Sentences*.<sup>68</sup> In his reply, he first referred to Thomas Aquinas's conclusions, mostly quoting his *De Potentia Dei*, q. 3, art. 4 and his *Commentary on the Sentences*, Book I.<sup>69</sup> Thomas Aquinas denied that divine power or the virtue to create was communicable to human beings and therefore that it was really communicated, since humans do not create, but they "do," modeling already existing matter. Then Aquinas introduced the concept of "passive creation" to describe the making of Man: the "passive" doings of humans (*factio*) are not comparable to the "active" creation carried out by God (*creatio*).<sup>70</sup>

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*andi sit communicabilis creature*, in Basel, UB, A X 44, ff.7v–9r. Question discussed by A. BAUMGARTEN, L. GRIJAC, "Quelibet creatura est creativa. Traces of Petrus Schad de Walse's theological debates in Vienna at the end of the 14<sup>th</sup> century," in *The Rise of an Academic Elite: Deans, Masters, and Scribes at the University of Vienna before 1400*, ed. M. BRÎNZEI (Studia Sententiarum, 6), Turnhout 2022, pp. 461–508. This *quaestio* was also the topic of a significant quantity of quodlibeta in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; see C. SCHABEL (ed.), *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century*, (Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition, 7), Leiden 2007, p. 480 (Bernardus de Trilia), p. 577 (Petrus Anglicus) and p. 713 (Henry of Ghent, Gerard of Abbeville, Roger Marston, Giles of Rome, Hervaeus Natalis, James of Ascoli, Robert Walsingham, John of Naples, and William of Ockham).

<sup>68</sup> JOHANNES CAPREOLUS, *In II Sententiarum*, dist. 1, q. 3, ed. RR. PP. C. PABAN, T. PÈGUES, t. 3, Turonibus 1902, p. 84.

<sup>69</sup> Thomas Aquinas discussed the same topic in *distinctio* number 43 of his commentary on Book I of the *Sentences*. Generally speaking, the group of *distinctiones* 42–44 of Aquinas's work represented a privileged secondary literature for *Sentences* commentators during the fourteenth century, including William of Ockham. THOMAS DE AQUINO, *In I Sententiarum*, dist. 43, q. 1, a. 2 (*Utrum omnipotentia Dei possit communicari creaturae*), for ex. see arg. 1, l. 1–5, ed. R.P. MANDONNET, P. LETHIELLEUX, t. 1, Paris 1929, pp 984–985: "videtur quod omnipotentia Dei creature communicari possit. Omnipotentia enim Dei non est dignior quam sua bonitas. Sed bonitas eius communicatur creaturis. Ergo et omnipotentia." For a panorama on the history of the interpretations of *potentia ordinata* and *potentia absoluta* in the late Middle Ages, see E. RANDI, *Il sovrano e l'orologiaio. Due immagini di Dio nel dibattito sulla "potentia Dei absoluta" fra XIII e XIV secolo*, (Università degli studi di Milano. Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia, 121, 11), Firenze 1987; W.J. COURTENAY, *Capacity and Volition. A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power* (Quodlibet: ricerche e strumenti di filosofia medievale, 8), Bergamo 1990.

<sup>70</sup> See THOMAS DE AQUINO, *Summae theologiae*, prima pars, q. 65, a. 3, corpus, l. 20, ed. Leonina, t. 12, Roma 1906, p. 60: "creatio autem est productio alicuius rei secundum suam totam substantiam, nullo praesupposito quod sit vel increatum vel ab aliquo creatum." In summary, with "passive creation" in the late Middle Ages it is possible to mean the relationship between God and the creature from the creature's side, while "active creation" indicates the same relationship

John Capreolus summarized some opinions contrary to those of Thomas Aquinas, which he — as he declares — would have found in Adam Wodeham's commentary on Book IV of the *Sentences*. We note a relevant number of textual affinities between these passages from Capreolus copying Wodeham and Bartholomew's first brocard.<sup>71</sup> Moreover, I have identified the same passage quoted by Capreolus in Wodeham's *Oxford Lectures*, a hitherto unpublished work, by consulting a specimen that is found in Bruges, Ms. 172.<sup>72</sup> So it is evident that Bartholomew's position is rooted in Wodeham's text, but we do not know whether he quoted it by directly reading his work or through the mediation of others.

Henry Totting of Oyta drew up an *Abbreviatio* of Adam's *Oxford Lectures*. Abbreviations or summaries were usually for didactic use and circulated above all in university contexts. So, this text, unpublished to date, is present in some manuscripts scattered throughout Europe and conserved in libraries related to the university centers of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.<sup>73</sup> Among them, we are privileged with the copy

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but considered from God's side. See L. SIGNORET, "La création passive dans le Commentaire des *Sentences* de saint Thomas d'Aquin (*In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2). Contribution à l'histoire d'un débat médiéval," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 102/1 (2018), pp. 3–35. See GUILLELMUS DE OCKHAM, *Summa logicae*, pars 1, c. 51, l. 194 and GUALTERUS DE CHATTON, *Reportatio super Sententias*, l. II, distinctio 1, q. 2: "an creatio activa sit possibilis" (art. 1, par. 3, p. 27, l. 18).

<sup>71</sup> JOHANNES CAPREOLUS, *In II Sententiarum*, dist. 1, q. 3, ed. RR.PP.C. PABAN — T. PÈGUES, t. 3, Turonibus 1902, p. 95<sup>b</sup>-b: "quidam alii, ut ponit Adam, 4. Sentent., dist. 1 (q. 1)". A little further on he transmits the mentioned passage from Adam: "non enim oportet quod sit infinita, quia aut hoc esset ratione termini producti, aut ratione modi producendi, aut ratione productionis, aut ratione distantiae inter terminum a quo et terminum ad quem. - Sed primum non impedit, nec exigit infinitatem; quia omnis terminus creationis est finitus. - Nec secundum; cum omnis modus creationis sit finitus, cum sit aliquid extra Deum. - Nec tertium; quia ipsa creatio est finita, cum sit ipsamet creatura [...] Nec quartum; quia nulla est ibi distantia, nec positiva, nec privativa; nec negativa, si qua ibi sit distantia, taxanda est, nisi secundum finitatem termini. [...] Quia nulla apparet contradictio, quod Deus vellet aliquid esse active a creatura, sine passo."

<sup>72</sup> Reference to the *Lectura Ade super quartum Sententiarum*, also manuscripts in Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine 915; Città del Vaticano, Vat. lat. 1110 and Vat. lat. 955. See W.J. COURTENAY, *Adam Wodeham. An Introduction to His Life and Writings*, (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought 21), Leiden 1978, pp. 186–187.

<sup>73</sup> Henry Totting de Oyta composed the *Abbreviatio Lecturae Oxoniensis Adae de Wodeham* between 1373 and 1378, probably in Prague or perhaps in Paris. G. LIST, G. POWITZ (ed.), *Die Handschriften der Stadtbibliothek Mainz*, vol. 1,

in Mainz, Wissenschaftliche Stadtbibliothek, I 53a due to the proximity of this library to the University of Heidelberg. Furthermore, according to the authors of the library catalogue, the second notebook of the codex I 53a, in which Oyta's text was copied, is dated to the second quarter of the fifteenth century — that is, when Bartholomew and Wenck had read the *Sentences*. We have found the same textual passage of Wodeham, quoted by Bartholomew, also in the Oyta's *Abbreviatio*. Since Oyta was the source of the second brocard, it seems to us realistic that Bartholomew had read Oyta's text and considered it while formulating his first brocard.

ADAM WODEHAM,  
*Lectura super quartum Sententiarum*, in: Bruges, BM, Ms. 172, 2va, l. 2–8

... creatura non oportet quod sit infinita, quia aut hoc esset ratione termini producti, aut ratione modi producendi, aut ratione productionis, aut ratione distantie inter terminum a quo et terminum ad quem. Oportet primum non impedit hoc, sive non exigit infinitatem, quia omnis terminus creationis est finitus,

HENRICUS TOTTING DE OYTA, *Abbreviatio Lecturae Oxoniensis Adae de Wodeham*, in: Mainz, Wissenschaftliche Stadtbibliothek, Hs. I 53a, f. 72v, l. 1–9

Primum, omnis virtus est communicabilis creature quam non oportet esse infinitam sed virtutem creativam non oportet esse infinitam, quia aut hoc esset ratione termini producti aut ratione modi producendi aut ratione productionis aut ratione distantiae inter terminum a quo et terminum ad quem. Non primum,

BARTOLOMAEUS DE TRAIECTO, *Brocardae duae ad secundum librum Sententiarum*, in: Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 137r, l. 10–13

Non primum, quia se argueretur infinita vel hoc esset ratione termini producti aut ratione productionis passive aut ratione distantie inter 'terminum a quo' et 'terminum ad quem' aut ratione modi producendi; non primum eo quod omnis terminus productus creationis est finitus. Similiter declaratur secundam, nec tertiam

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Wiesbaden 1990, p. 113. Other copies of Oyta's *Abbreviatio* can be found at Barcelona, Biblioteca de Catalunya 38; Berlin, Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Preußischer Kulturbesitz, lat. 2° 534; Innsbruck, Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Tirol, 944; Klosterneuburg, Bibliothek des Augustiner Chorherrenstiftes, 296; Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellonska, 1176; 1195; 1197; Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 916; 917; Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 15893; 15894; Reims, Bibliothèque d'Etude et du Patrimoine, 504; Rouen, Bibliothèque Jacques Villon, A. 285; Toulouse, Médiathèque José Cabanis, 246; 247; Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, 4371; 4708.

sic cum sit ad extra Deum necessarium, quia ipsa est finita cum ipsa sit creatura [...] Nec quartum; quia nulla est ibi distantia, nec ponitiva, nec privativa sive negativa distantia, si qua sit non est taxanda, nisi secundum quantitatem termini positivivi.

l. 26–27: Non apparet contradictio aliqua quod Deus vellet active aliquid esse a creatura sine passo.

quia omnis terminus productus creationis est infinitus. Nec secundum, quia omnis modus creationis est finitus cum sit aliquem extra Deum. Nec tertium, quia ipsa creatio est finita, cum sit creatura vel aliquid in creatura. Nec quartum, quia nulla est ibi distantia, nec ponitiva, nec privativa sive negativa, quoniam sit taxanda secundum quantitatem termini positivivi.

l. 23–24: Non apparet contradictio aliqua quod Deus vellet active aliquid esse a creatura sine passo.

rationem distantiae, quia nulla est distantia ibi, quoniam taxanda sit secundum quantitatem termini positivivi, qui est finitus.

l. 5–6: Quia nulla contradictio vel repugnantia in hoc, quod Deus per suam infinitam potentiam et immensam bonitatem vellet active aliquid fieri a creatura sine passo.

Doctrinally speaking, the two brocards are connected. In his first brocard, Bartholomew expressed the mere possibility of thinking about an eternal world; similarly, in this second brocard, he did not intend to affirm the actual existence of this possibility-to-be, but only to demonstrate that it was possible that God communicated to creatures all his power to create. Bartholomew states that *creatio est creature communicabilis* (f. 137r), since it is not contradictory to think that God, *per suam infinitam potentiam et immensam bonitatem*, (f. 137r) wants the creature to be able to do something as he can. But, at the same time, Bartholomew finds contradictory that in this existing world a creature could simultaneously be capable of the same power to create that God possesses.

In fact, a creature that could create in such a way would be infinite. It should arise *inter terminum a quo et terminum ad quem* (f. 137r) of the world's creation, that is, as an intermediate “entity” between God and the creature. But this would not be possible since *omnis terminus*

*productus creationis est finitus* (f. 137r), unless such an infinite entity that receives the power to create from God would be an *extra limites* creature (f. 137r). The very definition of a creature, as creatures are here and now, implies that this possibility cannot exist according to the current order. Bartholomew is therefore convinced that God could communicate to the creature the power to create according to God's *potentia absoluta*, but at the same time he affirms that this is not given by *potentia ordinata*.

Nevertheless, it is especially worth noting Bartholomew's argument: from his point of view, a being that would be created and that could create would constitute an obstacle to a correct understanding of the production of the *forma modo naturali de non esse ad esse in materia* (f. 137r). This way, the infinite distance between the creator who gives form (*terminum a quo*) and the creature who receives (*terminum ad quem*) would instead become subject to a *quantitatem termini positivi*, that is creatures that create, which would be mediators between God and the other creatures. Moreover, such intermediate essences would be the secondary causes of the world's creation. God would be like a creative force that develops his power through such middle terms that participate in the creation, as if God *fluat ab agente sibi concreante* (f. 137r): it is a metaphysical scheme that recalls the *Liber de causis*.

We need to consider the hypothesis that Bartholomew could have had the explicit purpose of attacking a Neoplatonic model of the hierarchical universe such as that of Marsilius of Inghen and maybe also of the Scotists, such as John of Ripa's pupils. It is not excluded that doctrinal positions similar to these were supported by his *socii* and masters at the Faculty of Theology in Heidelberg.<sup>74</sup> Or, he may have addressed his charges to Albertists' contemporaries whom Wenck met in Paris as a student in the arts, and thus to Wenck himself, who had engaged in the attempt to integrate the *Book of Causes* in Aristotelian metaphysics.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>74</sup> Regarding the affinities between John of Ripa and Marsilius of Inghen on the conception of the hierarchical universe, see HOENEN, "Neuplatonismus am Ende des 14. Jahrhunderts," esp. p. 177. For a discussion on the school of John of Ripa at the end of the fourteenth century, see M. BRINZEL, "Epilogue: Commentaries on the *Sentences* in Paris around 1370," in *Philosophical Psychology in late Medieval Commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Actes of the XIVth Annual Symposium of the S.I.E.P.M.* Nijmegen 28–30 October 2009, ed. M. BRINZEL, C. SCHABEL, Turnhout 2020, pp. 407–430, at 426–429.

<sup>75</sup> To understand Wenck's reply to Bartholomew, one must remember that in Paris he wrote a brief commentary on the *Book of Causes*, conceived within the Aristotelian *corpus*, according to the interpretation of Albert the Great; see HAUBST,

Perhaps it was no coincidence that Wenck, feeling himself called upon by his *socius*, precisely replied to Bartholomew's first brocard, making it the subject of a broad discussion, which begins in the first *Principium* and continues in the second. In fact, Wenck does not answer the question posed in the first brocard, but has the exclusive purpose of demolishing Bartholomew's arguments, as he said: *contra primum dictum magistri mei* (f. 142r). It must of course be remembered that this debate arose in the context of the practice of the *Principia* and that it was important for Wenck to highlight its dialectical superiority over the *socius* in this section.

Indeed, in Wenck's opinion, there are no creatures to whom God has communicated his power and who have posed themselves as secondary causes of creation (f. 142r). But he is not even convinced that, if God wanted to communicate all his power and attributes, including goodness, to the creature, he could do it. Wenck claims that *plenitudine bonitatis Dei caperet creatura, et capacitas creature activitanti Dei adequaretur, que includunt repugnatiarum maximas et contradictionum* (f. 142r). If God expressed himself in the creature, then *creatura esset finita et infinita* (f. 142r). Nevertheless, Wenck finds this hypothesis unacceptable even potentially *quia creatio est inter non esse et esse, inter que est infinita distantia ad quam actio creature non se extendit* (f. 142r). Wenck's realism appears manifest, and he uses it as a weapon to attack his *socius*. At the same time, it is interesting that he in no way defended the metaphysics of the *De causis*: Parisian Albertism seems already far from his thoughts.

## Principium ad II librum

After Wenck's attack of Bartholomew's brocards in his *Principium* on Book I, Bartholomew rejected Wenck's statements *in suo principio* (f. 152r). Unfortunately, to date, Bartholomew's text has not been found. However, we have evidence of the continuation of the debate: later Wenck elaborated his *Principium* on Book II of the *Sentences*,

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*Johannes Wenck aus Herrenberg als Albertist*, pp. 319–320; M. MELIADÒ, *Sapientia peripatetica. Eimerico di Campo e i percorsi del tardo albertismo*, (Dokimion, 40), Münster 2018, pp. 109–148. M. MELIADÒ, “Le *Questiones super Librum de causis* attribuite a Johannes Wenck. Concezione, fonti e tradizione manoscritta del commento,” in *Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages. New Commentaries on Liber de Causis and Elementatio Theologica*, ed. D. CALMA (Studia Artistarum, 42.2), Turnhout 2016, pp. 225–270.

where he presented some counterarguments against Bartholomew's *Principium*. Here, Wenck repeated some themes already developed in the first *Principium*:

- a) The possibility that God communicates his creative power;
- b) being and not being in creation;
- c) the doctrine of *fluxus entis*.

We will especially highlight Wenck's philosophical arguments. It is interesting to note that the debate between Wenck and Bartholomew, which emerged in the Faculty of Theology, slides more and more on metaphysical questions that instead seem to have to be the subject of discussion in the faculty of arts and not between theologians. However, this shift in thematic focus is not surprising, as it also occurred elsewhere in the discussion of the *Principia*.<sup>76</sup>

#### **a) The possibility that God communicates his omnipotence to creatures**

In his *Principium* on Book I, Wenck raised an objection to Bartholomew from an exegetical point of view: he mentioned the saying of the prophet Isaiah, according to which *gloriam meam alteri non dabo* and concluded that *Deus igitur creationem creature non communicabit* (f. 152v). Now, he informs the audience of his *Principium* on Book II that Bartholomew replied to this objection, distinguishing two kinds of divine glory:

1. in the first way, it is *ipsius Dei magnificentia, summa bonitas vel nobilitas* (f. 152v); if the divine glory is thus regarded, it is God's proper one, *Deus nulli creature communicare potest* (f. 152v). For Wenck, this is how Isaiah referred to divine glory;
2. then *secundo modo gloria Dei dicatur sublimis clara et lata fama eius, quo summe veneratur ab electis suis* (f. 152v). This kind of glory is *tantum virtutem creativam limitatam et dependentem creature communicatam per possibile* (f. 152v).

<sup>76</sup> See M. BRÎNZEI, "Principia on the Sentences in the faculty of Theology of Bologna: The case of Augustinus Favaroni of Rome, OESA (†1443)," *Traditio* 77 (2022), pp. 377–463, see pp. 380–381: "although the debates were held in the faculty of theology, the choice of the topics seem to have been free and often philosophical issues such as epistemology, causality, and modal logic, which were thinly cloaked under a theological title."



We must especially emphasize this last point. For Bartholomew, such communication does not imply, as he had previously argued, that divine glory has been really announced. However, it is without prejudice to the hypothesis that a created entity can create to receive the power to create and thus itself create other entities. Wenck replies against this argument, commenting that *defectuosa est sua [Bartholomew's] solutione* (f. 152v) and offers three counterarguments:

a. The creature depends on God. Wenck points out that the question *utrum creatio sit creature communicabilis* does not require a reasoning *de latria aut cultu Dei, sed de causalitate creature* (f. 152v), as it would concern the law of nature and only secondly the worship of God. Therefore, it is necessary to move from the level of theology to philosophy. Wenck explains that, if Bartholomew's hypothesis about the possibility of such communication were valid, then the creature, through creation, would have received creative power from God. Such power of creation in the creature would not be as absolute. It would be a power received from God and dependent on him, therefore a limited power. So, it would not be the same power to create as God's since it would not be absolute.

Consequently, such communication is not logically possible, nor can Wenck imagine a creature creating another. However, in this case, this creation would depend on the second as its creator and not God, who is the first creator. Then this "third" creature would be unrelated to God. Nevertheless, concludes Wenck, this solution is rejected by faith and denied by reason.

b. The virtue to create. As a second point, he provides further refutations to Bartholomew's previous hypothesis. First, Wenck explains that Bartholomew's expression "active creation" (*creatio activa*) indicates, from a philosophical point of view, a *virtus creativa active* (f. 153r). Nevertheless, this concept's grammar is contradictory: "creation" is a verbal noun, which in Latin ends in "tio," meaning action or passion, not virtue or power, which is about something else in progress, while creating is the act itself.

This contradiction is not the only one Wenck found in Bartholomew's speech. There are others that concern doctrines. For example, commenting on the passage of Isaiah, he affirms that glory is received firstly through God's supreme goodness or nobility and that this supreme glory cannot be communicated to any creature. Then, he simultaneously affirms that God shares this same glory with the creature according to the possibility. This last statement gives rise to the hypothesis that divine

power can be communicated to creatures. Wenck comments that, by doing so, Bartholomew attributes what belongs to God (the absolute power of creation) directly to the creature, which in the making does not need to *aliquo nature fulcimenta* (f. 153r). God does not need an intermediate creature between himself and the creature — not even hypothetically. Wenck adds that, in this way, Bartholomew affirms God's absolute power but denies the ordered one. However, this last statement is wrong since *omnis potentia Dei est ordinate*, as Bonaventure taught.<sup>77</sup>

c. The glory of the creator: Bartholomew concludes that the active power of creation, shared by creatures, is not the glory of God itself, neither in the first nor second way. Wenck criticized this sentence in the *Principium* on Book I. Because of Bartholomew's criticisms on this point, Wenck clarifies that he never equated the *potentiam activam creandi* to the *gloriam Dei*. Furthermore, the prophet Isaiah's passage confirms that creation, which generates and grows through God's omnipotence, aims for God's glory.

## b) Being and nothing

Wenck now repeats an argument he already expressed in his *Principium* on Book I: creation leads from non-being to being, between which there is an infinite distance. Therefore, to create a creature, the creator must have infinite virtue. For this reason, creatures with finite virtue cannot create. Once again, Wenck's theological source is Bonaventure,<sup>78</sup> while his philosophical counterarguments are instead based on the principles of Aristotelian philosophy, which are the following:

a. The principle of non-contradiction. Bartholomew replies that Wenck's argument rests on a *falso fundamento* for a wrong conception of creation. Wenck would believe that creation consists in a movement that begins from a *terminus a quo*, that is, nothing, and comes to a *terminus ad quem*, i.e., being or *aliquid*. Furthermore, not only is there an infinite distance between these terms, but they are also contradictory. For Bartholomew, the representation of the creation *secundum strictitudinem veri sermonis* is false.

Wenck defends his doctrine and claims to have relied on a solid foundation (*verissimo et solidissimo*), that is, the principle of non-contradiction:

<sup>77</sup> Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 153r, l. 18–19: “dominum Bonaventuram super primo sententiarum circa distinctionem 43am, ubi expresse determinat.”

<sup>78</sup> Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 153r, l. 30, specifically his own “Principium secundi Sententiarum.”

*idem esse et non esse est impossibile*. Since being and non-being are contradictory to each other, it follows that only an agent of infinite power, i.e., omnipotent God, can determine that something can be generated from nothing. Indeed, a finite creature cannot act through such infinite power. Therefore, it is neither actual nor possible that the creature can be capable of creating.

Moreover, Wenck reacts against the doctrine that Bartholomew attributes to him, affirming that he does not understand creation as a movement from nothing to something, since *terminus a quo in creatione est met creans, scilicet Deus, in quo non cadit inception* (f. 153v). James's letter also indicates that God has no transmutation, *non est transmutation*.<sup>79</sup> Once again, Wenck places a passage from Bonaventure's *Sentences* commentaries as a seal of his argument.<sup>80</sup>

b. Movement. Wenck says that, according to Bartholomew, creation properly concerns only the *terminus ad quem*, i.e., the being. The "non-being" is nothing; therefore, it cannot be the *terminus a quo* of a movement (*endelechia*). This would be the doctrinal position of the *antiquos doctores* or those who follow the *via magistri mei* Bartholomew. Wenck considers that Bartholomew's understanding is false. To prove it, he refers again to a passage from Bonaventure, which affirms the distinction between *mutatio ad esse, et mutatio ab esse, et mutatio in esse*.<sup>81</sup> So, Wenck claims that, while movement in the finite world is a *mutatio temporalis in esse*, creation takes place with a change in being (*ad esse*), since it is a particular motion that places the being itself here and now. So, in creation, what changes is not the essence but the reason of beings.

c. Difference. Bartholomew affirmed that there is a proper distance only between the things that exist, which also applies to difference. Wenck rejects this statement, recalling Bartholomew to reading the fifth

<sup>79</sup> *Jac.*, I, 17: "Omne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum de sursum est, descendens a Patre luminum, apud quem non est transmutatio nec vicissitudinis obumbratio." On the same verse see also the interpretation of NICOLAI DE CUSA *De dato patris luminum*, c. 5, n. 106, 1–107, 13.

<sup>80</sup> Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 153v, l. 27–28. See BONAVENTURA, *Commentaria in quattuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*, in librum II comm. in distinct. 1, pars 1, a. 3, q. 2, conclusio, ed. Frati Editori di Quaracchi, Firenze 1886, p. 34, col. 2, l. 11–17: "creatio significat exitum de non esse in esse," but that this is not to be understood as a movement that begins in God and ends in creation.

<sup>81</sup> BONAVENTURA, *Commentaria in quattuor libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*, in librum II comm. in distinct. 1, pars 1, a. 3, q. 2, conclusio, ed. Frati Editori di Quaracchi, Firenze 1886, p. 34, col. 2, l. 21.

and tenth books of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*,<sup>82</sup> which state that anything has both concordance and difference and that there is a distance between any opposition.

d. Generation: Bartholomew affirmed that there could be no generation or production without intermediaries. An infinite distance stands between the "term from which" and the "term to which." Bartholomew repeats that this doctrine is rooted in the "common philosophy" tradition, just as he had called the authority of the ancient masters. Wenck replies by opening Aristotle's books again: he highlights *De generatione et corruptione* I and explains that no generation comes from "not-being." In fact, generation *est ex potestate substantia*, and for this reason, the terminus a quo *non est omnino non ens*. Instead, it is the "power of being." So, in the case of creation, "to be" is derived from the "power of being."

e. Incorrect interpretation of the sources. Wenck criticizes Bartholomew's wrong interpretation of the sources with two examples:

*David of Dinant*. Bartholomew incorrectly quotes David of Dinant when he assumes that form and privation relate among them, such as being and nothing, and that the natural agent can resolve their distance. Wenck recalls that Aristotle had explained that privation is not pure nothing but is one of the three principles of natural things. To prove his point, Aristotle suggested the famous example of the relationship between music, musician, and non-musician.<sup>83</sup>

*Thomas Aquinas*. Bartholomew inaccurately quoted a passage from Aquinas's commentary on Book IV of the *Sentences*. Here, he stated that one could not pay attention to the distance of creation from the "non-being" but only to that generated concerning the created being. So, there would be a double distance: that from the non-being to creation, which is infinite, and that from creation to the non-being, which instead is finite. Wenck objects that, in all circumstances, *medium respiciat extrema*, therefore *inimaginabile enim est, et inintelligibile quod distantia inter ens et non ens non respiceret utrumque* (f. 154v).

It is also noteworthy that Wenck admits *ego non multum debeam gaudere* of the wrong interpretation of Thomas Aquinas's thought, as if he felt called into question by such distortions. Therefore, both debate

<sup>82</sup> Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 154r, l. 15–16. See ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica*, V, c. 9, 1018a12–13.

<sup>83</sup> ARISTOTELES, *In Libros Metaphysicorum*, V, 3–4. But Wenck attributes this example to the first book of *Physics*.

opponents seemed to have particular regard for Thomas Aquinas's authority.

### c) The flow of being

Wenck reiterates what he has already stated in *Principium* I, declaring the doctrine of a creature that creates as false. He argued here too that a creature (such, by definition, as an effect produced by creation) could not be simultaneously the object and subject of creating since *idem esset efficiens et effectum, et idem gigneret se*. Wenck informs us that Bartholomew, in his *Principium*, would have accepted the first argument against him on this topic. In his defense, Bartholomew introduced the Thomist concept of *passiva creatio*. However, Bartholomew would have rejected the second part of Wenck's objection, denying having ever argued in favor of a self-generating creature.

Wenck replies that, although Bartholomew was committed to formulating counter-objections, he failed. Following Bartholomew's arguments, Wenck implies that creation emerges as an *ordo fluens a primo in medium* (f. 154v), who would give life to itself and all other creatures, as nothing would be generated by chance, nor directly from God. It does not matter that, in advance, Bartholomew formally denies that he does not adhere to this Neoplatonic doctrine: in fact, according to Wenck, this is what happens if we consider the doctrines expressed in the concluding section of the first brocard, where Bartholomew explained that creating implies a limitation on the creator's part. Therefore, in creating another being from himself, the creator determines a dependence not only of the creature on the creator but also the other way around, *ex parte producentis*.

Instead, Wenck explained that the creature's limitation is determined by itself since it has a *susceptaculum* or *subsistentiam creaturae* (f. 155r) within. Considered from a spiritual point of view, this is what Boethius in *De hebdomadibus* called *quod est*, while in the material one, it is called *materia*.<sup>84</sup> So, Wenck points out that, if the creative activity determines

<sup>84</sup> Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 155r, l. 15–16. Regarding this reply, it is noteworthy that the Albertists (but not Albert the Great) pointed to the matter as the *Principium individuationis* of created entities. See M.J.F.M. HOENEN, "Aliter autem dicunt Thomistae. Das Prinzip der Individuation in der Auseinandersetzung zwischen den Albertisten, Thomisten und Scotisten des ausgehenden Mittelalters," in *Individuum und Individualität im Mittelalter*, ed. J.A. AERTSEN, A. SPEER (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 24), Berlin 1996, pp. 338–353; see in part. pp. 341s where the doctrinal positions of Albertists, Thomists, and Scotists

a limitation of the creator, then this would mean that the creator would have a limited “power to create,” not an infinite one. However, the symbol of faith reminds us that the creator is omnipotent. It is also relevant that Wenck, as a theology student in 1431, still mentions Boethius’s *De hebdomadibus*, which he discussed in Paris. This testifies to a consistent legacy of Albertism in his thought.<sup>85</sup>

## 6. *Regratiatio*

The last part of Wenck’s *Principium* on Book II is a very interesting and unique testimony about the practice of such exercises within the University of Heidelberg. Wenck ends the dispute with his *socius* by addressing appreciations and thanks the public for participate in such a debate. This is what is called an *actio gratiarum*, which became standard at the beginning of the fifteenth century, especially as an echo of the reformation of the faculty of theology from Paris.<sup>86</sup> Wenck uses the term of *regratiatio* and he starts his action *gratiarum* by mentioning his preceptors and masters of his faculty, who were attending the performance of his *Principium*.

Wenck explains at the beginning of his speech that these masters came from different faculties (*ceterique variarum facultatum*, f. 138r), which then he lists in the final acknowledgments: Bartholomew di San Trudone, who at that time was rector of the University of Heidelberg; his teacher Nicholas of Jawor from the theology faculty; John Kirchem from the Faculty of law; Gerard of Hunkirch, who was doctor in medicine; Nicholas Wachnan, the dean of the faculty of arts; and other unidentified baccalaureates and masters.<sup>87</sup> This statement is remarkable because it lets us understand that, in Heidelberg, *Principia* were open to members

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regarding the *Principium individuationis* are distinguished. It is also argued that the first individuated the matter, the second the species of quantity, and finally the Scotists the *haecceitas* itself of the entity. See FIAMMA, *Nicola Cusano da Colonia a Roma*, pp. 210–212.

<sup>85</sup> HAUBST, “Johannes Wenck aus Herrenberg als Albertist”, pp. 314–315; MELIADÒ, *Sapienza peripatetica*, pp. 73–148.

<sup>86</sup> U. ZAHND, “Der Dank und die Meister. Anmerkungen zu einigene *gratiarum actiones* spätmittelalterlicher Sentenzenlesungen,” in *Schüller und Meister*, ed. A. SPEER, T. JESCHKE (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 39), Berlin-Boston 2016, pp. 81–105, at 83–84. W. Baran describes the presence of this practice within the university of Cracow in his PhD: *Les Principia aux Sentences de Benoît Hesse de Cracovie (vers 1389–1456)*, EPHE 2023, pp. 60–64.

<sup>87</sup> See Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 142v, l. 37–f.143r, l. 6. On Kirchem, Gerard of Hunkirch and Nicolaus Wachenheim (Wachnan), see BANTLE, “Nikolaus Magni

of all the faculties from the university and that they were probably important events for the faculty of theology.

## Conclusions

The present study on Wenck's *Principia* has produced some relevant results. In the first section of this chapter, I reconstructed the practice of reading the *Sentences* in Heidelberg in the first half of the fifteenth century considering Heidelberg's statutes, strongly influenced by the canons of Parisian academic custom, and by analyzing the structure of Wenck's speeches: in the first part of his *Principium* I, he introduces an interesting invocation to God, in which he mentioned Plato, then continued with a *sermo* that begins with a biblical theme (*Hosea* 13.9). This sermon is followed by some questions; to find a solution to these questions, he engaged in a debate with his *socius* Bartholomew of Maastricht. The second section of our paper was dedicated to this debate. Analyzing this discussion enabled us to observe a foreshadowing of the controversy between *antiqui* and *moderni* in German universities of the mid- and late-fifteenth century, which still needed to be formalized as *Wegestreit*.

It is now definitely evident that Wenck moves in the context of the recovery of the *communis opinio* of the thirteenth century theologians such as Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas, as endorsed by his master Nicholas of Jawor in the wake of the theological faculties' reform promoted by Gerson in Paris years before.<sup>88</sup> Wenck is far from the Parisian Albertism in which he was educated, yet we have found some traces of his Albertist common doctrines and sources, especially Boethius's *De hebdomadibus*. Wenck's opponent, the master Bartholomew of Maastricht, accepts the

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de Jawor und Johannes Wenck," pp. 558–559. Wachenheim criticized the pilgrimage of children to Mont Saint-Michel in his *Tractatus seu opusculum contra errores quorundam iuvenum masculorum*, which is now in Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Pal. lat. 192, f. 207r–218v: see. RITTER, *Die Heidelberger Universität*, pp. 346s; M.J.F.M. HOENEN, "Denys the Carthusian and Heymeric de Campo on the Pilgrimages of Children to Mont-Saint-Michel (1458)," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 61 (1994), pp. 387–418.

<sup>88</sup> See HOENEN, *Via antiqua and via moderna*, p. 19. Wenck mentions a *communis philosophia* in Tübingen, UB, Mc. 31, f. 154r, l. 31, implying that there existed an interpretation of Aristotle's texts commonly shared in the schools as if there was a fundamental doctrinal unity between the university masters. This conception seems to have been inherited again from Gerson, who worked precisely to convey the impression of a profound unity of theological knowledge.

debate on some specific doctrinal problems: the eternity of the world and the relationship between God and creatures. Bartholomew was follower of the *via marsiliana*, although with some distinctions from the doctrinal positions of the progenitor. So, the two young candidates for the title of master in theology addressed many metaphysical problems, which we summarized here. Appendix II outlines a scheme of the debate between Wenck and Bartholomew.

The debate concerned the issues traditionally discussed in the *Sentences* commentaries. However, both contenders' positions are relevant to understanding the faculty of theology's orientations. Bartholomew shows a good knowledge of the topics aligning with Henry Totting of Oyta's and Marsilius of Inghen's opinions on the world's eternity. Wenck had substantial objections to this. Instead, the debate became more compelling concerning the relationship between God and creatures with relevant theological topics such as divine omnipotence and the creation. In this case, Bartholomew's source was Adam Wodeham, but he probably referred to the abbreviation composed once again by Oyta. Particular concern is being raised around the emanationist scheme of the *Liber de causis*, but indeed both Bartholomew and Wenck rejected this theory. Moreover, both seem distant even from Scotism, that had to appear in Heidelberg — following Marsilius of Inghen's suggestion — a doctrine influenced by Neoplatonism, probably considering John of Ripa as a model of this tradition.

### *Ratio Edendi*

Below are two appendices that contain an edition of John Wenck's *Principia* on Books I–II of the *Sentences* (Appendix I) and Bartholomew of Maastricht's brocards (Appendix II).

Furthermore, in the latter, there is a pattern that reconstructs the details of the debate between John Wenck and Bartholomew of Maastricht that developed between the two speeches. It was possible to reconstruct even Bartholomew's reply to Wenck's arguments from John's replies, which are now lost. All these editions are based on the single manuscript, Tübingen, Universitätsbibliothek, Mc., no. 31: *Principium* I, ff. f. 138r–143r; *Principium* II, ff. f. 150r–155v; brocards, ff. 137r. I could not check the manuscript in the original, since it is in a precarious material situation due to some water damage, therefore I based my edition on a microfilm copy. Thus, in certain circumstances it has



been impossible to fully read the marginal notes and the corrections to the manuscript made by Wenck; those rare cases were marked with an asterisk.

The edition follows, where it is possible, the manuscript's orthography. Its structure has been reproduced, signaling in the right-side foliation changes and enumerating the lines of each sheet. No diphthongization was introduced. The punctuation follows the marks in the manuscripts, but sometimes it was appropriate to introduce pauses with commas or transform short pauses into long ones using the period. We can find editorial additions inserted between square brackets and reports of missing sections indicated as [...]. The *apparatus fontium* contains all the text's explicit quotations and the most evident implicit ones.

### *Legenda*

*	=	<i>incertus</i>
<i>add.</i>	=	<i>addidit</i>
<i>add. in marg.</i>	=	<i>addidit in margine</i>
<i>add. sed del.</i>	=	<i>addidit sed delevit</i>
<i>em.</i>	=	<i>emendavi</i>
<i>iter.</i>	=	<i>iteravit</i>
<i>iter. sed del.</i>	=	<i>iteravit sed delevit</i>
<i>a. c.</i>	=	<i>ante correctionem</i>
<i>p. c.</i>	=	<i>post correctionem</i>
<i>s. l.</i>	=	<i>supra lineam</i>



# Appendix no. I

Johannes Wenck

*Principium in primum librum Sententiarum*

Tübingen, Universitätsbibliothek, Mc. 31, f. 138r–143r

anno 1431<sup>mo</sup> in die Valerii

Venerabiles et egregii patres, magistri, domini, ceterique variarum facultatum viri famosi, illucescente presenti diecula in *Sententias* principian-  
di, annuente Dei gratia quattuor video peragenda:

Primum est divini nominis sanctorumque invocatio.

Secundum, *Sententiarum* Magistri Petri Lombardi antistitis seu pre- 5  
sulis Parisiensis recommendatio.

Tertium, contra reverendum dominum *Sententiarium* magistrum meum  
Bartholomeum de Traiecto superiori consueto more replicatio.

Quartum, Deo et vobis gratiarum actio seu regratiatio.

Quantum ad primum, percelebres viri, cogniti moris institutionisque sa- 10  
luberrime est in elaborandorum initiis principiisve divinum imprecari  
auxilium. Quod tam (per uni)versum (or)bem (cor)uscantis Christiane  
religionis ac fidei professores quam etiam steriles philosophantes longo  
iam decurso tempore faciendum sanxerunt pariter et preceperunt. Non-  
ne in etate quarta seculi Deus ad exorandum inspirans Osee prophetam 15  
clamabat: *Tantummodo in me auxilium tuum*, Osee 13<sup>mo</sup>, <9>? Post  
quem, in etate quinta Platonis in *Thymeo* ad divinitatem hic extat pre-  
catus omni fideli cordi affirmatissime recondendus, videlicet: “Sit meis  
precibus comprehensum maxime, ut ea dicam que Deo placeant, que  
consequenter, que proposito operi decenter, et que faciliter assequi pos- 20  
sint.”

Hanc orationem Platonis quadruplici particula contextam duxi vestris  
reverentiis publicandam, non ut religionem a philosophiis gentium que-  
remus qui in hoc nostros ymitati sunt, a quibus et ipsi huiusmodi reli-  
gionem sumpserunt, sed potius ut ei, cui studium et sollertia est scientie 25  
adulterium non incurrere, doctrinandi formam prescriberem ac resera-  
rem quam prefata oratio effert et edicit luminosissime. Nec superflue,  
5–6 seu presulis] *mg.* 8 de Traiecto superiori] *mg.* 12 universum – \*ustantis]  
*mg.* 13 etiam] *mg.* 14 pariter et preceperunt] *mg.* 18 omni – videlicet] *mg.*  
22 Platonis] *s.l.* 24 hoc] noster *add. sed del.* et] *s.l.* 27–28 nec superflue  
quia] *mg.*

17–21 quinta Platonis – possint: PLATO, *Timaeus* 17A–53C (CPL 0578 a (A)), pars  
1, p. 20, l. 10–14.

quia decet, teste beato Augustino, id quod veritatis edixerunt philosophi gentilium ab eis, tamquam ab iniustis possessoribus, surripere. Quod a  
30 Moyse in *Exodo* prefiguratur, cum Israel spoliavit Egiptios.

Est ergo doctrinandi forma hec: sciendum quod doctrinaturus aliquam scientiam debet dicere, primo ea que Deo placita, non que proprie affectioni aut electioni concupita. Sic namque faciendo effugiet occasionem hereticandi. Unde ayt venerabilis Beda in *Actus apostolorum*:  
35 “Heresis Grece ab electione vocatur, qua quis sibi spretis aliorum dictis quod sequendum putaverit eligit.” Nam ne nostrum velle aut placitum electionis proprie ymitaremur, primitive Ecclesie fuisse describitur *cor unum et anima una*, et quod multitudo credentium rebus suis spretis caritatis invicem copula iuncta est.

40 Unde Ysaie 5<sup>o</sup>, <21> huiusmodi singularitas que prebet hereticandi occasionem dampnatur cum dicitur: *Ve qui sapientes estis in oculis vestris*. Et ad Romanos 12<sup>mo</sup>, <16>: *Nolite esse prudentes apud vosmetipsos*. /138v/

Hac de causa primo precatus sum cum Platone, “ut ea dicam que Deo  
45 placeant.”

2<sup>o</sup> precatus sum ut dicenda dicam consequenter. Ex cuius observantia pullulata iam heresis vigorose extinguitur et funditus eradicatur et enervatur, iuxta regulam beati Gregorii in *Moralibus*. Adversariorum hereses tunc extirpantur dum attenditur quid dicatur consequentius.

50 Orabam 3<sup>o</sup> ut dicerem decenter proposito operi, scilicet ut in hac divinitus inspirata scientia, que radices habet in celo, non aliter quam ex prescripto celesti edoceam. Sic dicit Calcidius ipsius Platonis expositor: “Decenter,” dicit, “si cohereat sermo.”

Postremo, ut dicerem faciliter. Facilioris enim memorie sunt coherentia et que ordinem habent, nam et digeritur citius epulum per fragmina. Et sic relucet ex hac fusa prece Platonis doctrinandi ordo congruentissimus.

Quo ita reserato, in mei principium sic opem invoco divinam:

28 decet] enim *add. sed del.* 29–30 a Moyse] *mg.* 31 est ergo doctrinandi forma hec] *mg.* sciendum] *mg.*, debet ergo *add. sed del.* 32 debet] *s.l.* 33 concupita] *mg.* 34 unde] *s.l.* ayt] namque beate *add. sed del.* 35 quis] quisquis *a.c.* 36–38 nam – quod] *mg. infra* 37 ecclesie] describitur *add. sed del.* 40 huiusmodi] *mg.* 40–41 que prebet – occasionem] *mg.* 44–45 que – placeant] *mg.* 47–48 et enervatur] *mg.*

29 ab eis – possessoribus: AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *De doctrina christiana*, II, c. 40, l. 3, ed. J. MARTIN (CC SL 32), Turnhout 1962, p. 61. 34–36 Beda – eligit: BEDA, *Expositio actuum apostolorum*, c. 5, l. 42–43, ed. M.L.W. LAISTNER, D. HURST, *Opera exegetica*, IV, (CPL 1357), Turnhout 1983, p. 30. 38–39 multitudo – iuncta est: BEDA, *Expositio actuum apostolorum*, c. 4, l. 76, ed. LAISTNER, HURST, p. 28.

## Ad Trinitatem.

O Deus eterne conditor rerum, unus in essentia, trinus in personis, qui me de nichilo fecisti et ad tuam ymaginem et similitudinem formasti, Genesis primo, <26>. *Respice in me, et miserere mei*, Domine, Psalmo 24°, <16>! Tui enim est misericordiam impendere ac tribuere, Tobie 12<sup>mo</sup>, <6>, ubi dicitur: *Benedicite Deum celi et confitebimur ei, quia fecit nobiscum misericordiam suam*. Que, inquam, misericordia tam necessaria est mee fragilitati quod sine ea nec velle nec facere quidquam possum, sicut illud Apostolum non latuit ad Romanos 9<sup>mo</sup>, <16>: *Non est volentis neque currentis, sed Dei est miserentis*. Ubi glossa Augustini: “Non ex libero arbitrio hominis bonum volentis vel operantis ipsa bona voluntas vel operatio, sed ex misericordia Dei, qui per gratiam appositam facit nos velle et currere.”

Nota. Quia ex misericordia est docere, igitur dicit Magister opus ultra vires suscipere. *Deus igitur in adiutorium meum intende*, Psalmo 69<sup>mo</sup>, <2>. *Deus, inquam, omnis gratie, qui vocasti nos in Christo Ihesu modicum passos in eternam gloriam*, prima *Petri* quinto, <10>.

Et oculo tue pietatis, “me inter oblatrantia presentis mundi varia et innumerabilia discrimina” fluct(ibus va)gorum incur(s)um), necessitatibus curisque attritum, tua deplue gratia, que perficiet dans augmentum virtutibus. Confirmet ministrando robur sustinendi tribulationes. Solidans denuo me in Ecclesie unitatem, tibi gloria et imperium in secula seculorum! O beata Trinitas!

## Ad Patrem

Et tu, benedice Deus Pater, qui per tuam *magnam misericordiam* regenerasti nos in *spem vivam per resurrectionem* Filii tui, Domini nostri *Ihesu Christi, ex mortuis, in hereditatem incorruptibilem et incontaminatam et immarcessibilem conservatam* /139r/ *in celis*, prima *Petri* primo, <3–4>. Tue Gratie munus michi impartire et in tua virtute me custodi <1, 5> *per fidem in salutem paratam revelari in tempore novissimo*, “quatenus cottidie fluctuans anima mea in malis tua infusa gratia lucretur, et ad portum eterne tranquillitatis deducatur eruta a miseriis et a scandalis.”

59 ad trinitatem] *mg.* 61 fecisti] *s.l.* et *em.* 64 ubi dicitur] *mg.* confitebimur] confitemini *a.c.* *s.l.* 65 inquam misericordiam] *mg.* 71 currere] Nota. Quia ex misericordia est docere, igitur dicit Magister opus ultra vires suscipere *mg.* 77 fluit gor\*\* in cursu\*\*] *mg.* 79 tribulationes] perfaciendi *add. sed del.* 82 ad patrem] *mg.* 86 in the top margin] Origenes, de Matheo loquens, dicit: Quid enim aliud est thelonia nisi legitima rapacitas, violenta iudicia, violenta iniusticia legem habens patrocinate rapina. 87 michi] *s.l.*

## Ad Filium

Et tu, Fili Dei unigenite, “numquid immensam tue pietatis habundantiam mea valebit iniquitas vincere, quam totius mundi non potuere  
 95 crimina superare? Nam cum pene mundus totus esset ydolatrie deditus, quis te rogare presumeret, ut, quem celi non capiunt, uteri virginalis angustias habitaturus inviseres, mortalitatis nostre membra susciperes, mortis atrocissime tormenta proferres, ut inimicos tuos a mortis debite supplicio liberares? Misericordie ergo tue magnitudinem totius mundi  
 100 supplicia non vicerunt. Quomodo unius canis mortui peccata quantumlibet gravia superabunt?”

Domine ergo mi Ihesu Christe, huius pietatis fomento extinctum anime mee infelicis igniculum reaccende, et iam “absorptum ex deglutientis mortis faucibus educisti”: *Venisti enim querere, et salvum facere quod*  
 105 *perierat*, Luce 19<sup>no</sup>, <10>. Et “quia tante sum fragilitatis, ut me ad te convertere non valeam, converte me ad te, Deus salutaris meus.” Nam si sol materialis tantas habet vires, ut terras illustret, arva fecundet, Tu, sol iustitie, protinus invisens, reviviscere facis et virtutum flores erumpere, et vernantibus fructibus decorare et vestire. “Ut enim antique prevaricationis virus evomeres, temetipsum fecisti humano generi medicinam,”  
 110 sacerdotem et hostiam, redemptorem et pretium.

Ea propter ego ipse, immanissima scelerum mole depressus, non despero, sed spero in tua misericordia, qua factus es protector meus, potentior agno Pascali populum Israhel a plaga mortis liberante. Tuus enim sacratissimus sanguis, qui conditor es angelorum, quantaslibet anime sordes valet abluere, quem Deus Pater misit in *propitiationem pro peccatis nostris*, prima *Iohannis*, 4<sup>o</sup> <10>. Tu, piissime Ihesu Christe, veluti species aromatica redolet, in mortariolo passionis atrita, ut nobis miseris et peccatorum morbo languentibus fieres medicina salutaris. Et

92 ad filium] *mg.* 96 presumeret] *presummeret a. c.* 118 mortariolo] *mortario a. c.*

93–101 et tu – superabunt: PETRUS DAMIANI, *Preces*, t. 1, *Orationes ad Trinitatem*, ed. J.P. MIGNE, (PL 145), Petit-Montrouge 1853, col. 919, l. 43–54. 102–103 extinctum – reaccende: PETRUS DAMIANI, *Preces*, t. 1, *Orationes ad Trinitatem*, ed. MIGNE, col. 920, l. 15–17. 103–104 ex deglutientis – educisti: PETRUS DAMIANI, *Preces*, t. 1, *Orationes ad Trinitatem*, ed. MIGNE, col. 920, l. 25. 105–106 quia – meus: PETRUS DAMIANI, *Preces*, t. 2, *Orationes ad Trinitatem*, ed. MIGNE, col. 920, l. 51–54. 106–109 si sol – vestire: PETRUS DAMIANI, *Preces*, t. 2, *Orationes ad Trinitatem*, ed. MIGNE, col. 922, l. 12–19. 109–110 antique – medicinam: PETRUS DAMIANI, *Preces*, t. 26, *De s. cruce orationes*, ed. MIGNE, (PL 145), Petit-Montrouge 1853, col. 927, l. 7–9. 111 sacerdotem – pretium: PETRUS DAMIANI, *Preces*, t. 26, *De s. cruce orationes*, ed. MIGNE, col. 927, l. 13. 112 ego – depressus: PETRUS DAMIANI, *Preces*, t. 27, *De s. cruce orationes*, ed. MIGNE, col. 927, l. 43. 113–116 potentior – abluere: PETRUS DAMIANI, *Preces*, t. 27, *De s. cruce orationes*, ed. MIGNE, col. 927, l. 47–50. 118–119 veluti species – medicina: PETRUS DAMIANI, *Preces*, t. 27, *De s. cruce orationes*, ed. MIGNE, col. 927, l. 51–53.

/139v/ *Botrus Cipri*, Canticorum primo, <13> “propinans eterne salutis poculum arentia corda Sancti Spiritus inundatione perfundens”. Me ergo errantem oviculam tu, pastor eterne, reduc ad pascue tue semper amena virentia. 120

### Ad Spiritum Sanctum

Et tu, Sancte Spiritus, 125  
 omnium vivificator, Iohannis 6<sup>o</sup> <64>: *Spiritus est qui vivificat*,  
 dator intelligentie, Psalmista: *Intellectum dat parvulis*,  
 elevator ad celestiam, Ezechielis primo, <10, 17>: *Cum elevaretur spiritus de terra, elevabantur et rote sequentes eum.* 130  
 Qui etiam omnia profunda Dei scrutaris, prima ad Corinthios 2<sup>o</sup>, <10>,  
 inspira michi peccatis sanciato vitam Gratie,  
 michi excecato tribue lumen intelligentie  
 michi corpore aggravato donare pure mentis elevationem, ut 135  
 Trinitatis archanum,  
 creationis obiectum,  
 incarnationis misterium  
 et redemptionis sacramentum, que 4<sup>or</sup> libris *Sententiarum*  
 enodantur, cum affectu valeam perscrutari. 140

### Ad virginem Mariam

Nec in impetratu meo pretereo Virginem illam prudentissimam Mariam, celi et terre illuminatricem. Que de sua fecunda virginitate, sine corruptione, floris virginei lumen eternum mundo effudit. Quam deprecor dare michi intellectum luminosum, conceptum stabilem, memoriam tenacem, scientiam certam, fidem firmam, sermonem convenientem audientibus, ad fidei confirmationem, Ecclesie edificationem, ac ad Dei laudem perpetuam. 145

### Ad omnes sanctos et sanctas

Et finaliter vos omnes, sancti et sancte Dei, vestras efflagito pietates orare dignemini pro me, ut oratu vestro presentem laborem finire feliciter 150  
 120 Cipri] id est dolentium de peccatis *scrip. sed. exp.* 124 ad spiritum sanctum] *mg.* 129 elevator] *p.c.* 131–132 qui etiam – Corinthios 2<sup>o</sup>, <10>] *mg.* 134 tribue] *s.l.* 135 corpore] *s.l.* donare] *s.l.* 135–140 ut Trinitatis archa\* – valeam perscrutari] *mg.* 141 ad virginem Mariam] *mg.* 144 floris] *p.c.* 149 ad – sanctas] *mg.* 151 presentem] per *add. sed. del.*

120–121 propinans – perfundens: PETRUS DAMIANI, *Preces*, t. 27, *De s. cruce orationes*, ed. MIGNE, col. 927, l. 54.

valeam, et tutus ab omni tempestate peccati, seu ingruenti malo, tandem imminente morte coronam eterne beatitudinis adipiscar.

Et hec de primo principali.

155 Quantum ad secundum, in recommendationem scilicet *Sententiarum* Magistri, prosiliat in medium thematis in principio cursus mei per me assumptum, quod erat: *Perditio tua ex te tantummodo in me auxilium tuum*, Osee 13<sup>mo</sup> seu penultimo, <6>.

160 Seraphicus ille propheta Ysayas concorditer ad Osee ostendit, capitulo quinquagesimo, <1>, sinagogam habere librum repudii et dimissam a Deo, quia vendidit se ipsam *in iniquitatibus* suis, et dimisit semetipsam *in sceleribus* suis, quibus velud igne accensa et succensa, in flammis ambulat perditionis <50, 11>. Et capitulo quinquagesimo primo 1, revocando ipsam a perditionis itinere, exhortatur eam sequi Deum, qui 165 est salus populi in sempiternum. Sicut et noster propheta Osee verbis thematis prophetat iram Dei seivire in populum Israel ob crimen idolatrie, dicens ipsum populum Israel fore in causa proprie perditionis, non Deum /140r/, quod personant verba thematis: *Perditio tua ex te*. Nec tamen in huiusmodi perditione Deus eum derelinquit, sed erigit et suble- 170 vat ad salutem cum annectit illico medele et salutis efficientem causam, subiungendo: *tantummodo in me auxilium tuum*.

Et ut revertantur ad Dominum, ipsis interius excecatis, externam eorum faciem depingit, eos assimilando nubi matutine, pretereunti rori matutino, pulveri rapti ex area, et fumo de fumariorum <13, 3>, ut propria 175 evanescentia et variabilitate in huiusmodi sensibilibus ymaginibus quasi facientibus inspecta a superbia et elatione, que eos ad ydolatrando induxerat, resiliant, et humilitatis viam, elatione spreta, ipsi arripiant. Unde eis sic ex elevatione seu elatione cordium ad perditionem tendentibus occurrit misericors Deus velud ursa raptis catulis, et indicato eorum 180 periculoso incessu, viam humilitatis elationi oppositam demonstrat salutarem, dum eos allecive alloquitur: *Perditio tua ex te tantummodo in me auxilium tuum*, ad quod supple et “tu recurras, ne pereas.” Ubi propheta noster Osee et perditionis ostendit causam et merendi ostendit nullam sub esse causam, ut ex hoc Ecclesia moraliter hominem instruat 185 se ipsum debere humiliare et pro subsidio sue salutis ad Deum recurrere.

Cum ergo, viri illuminatissimi, effata verba duplicem aperiant viam, 156 thematis] *mg.* 162 accensa] *d. add. sed. del.* 163–164 revocando – itinere] *mg.* 164 eam] *s.l.* 165 populi] in eternum *add. sed. del.* 168 quod] forte *add. sed. del.* thematis] *s.l.* 169 deus] *s.l.* derelinquit] derelinquit *em.* 170 et] *p.c.* 175 huiusmodi] *s.l.* 176 facientibus] faciente(-)bus *em.* 178 seu] *s.l.* elatione] *s.l.* 182 in me] in mox *a.c.* tu] *mg.* 183 propheta noster Osee] *mg.* 186 verba effata] [b-a] *s.l.*



perditionis scilicet et salutis, quarum primam Matheus evangelista, capitulo 7<sup>mo</sup>, <13–14>, vocat latam et spatiosam eo quod *multi intrant per eam*, et secundam *angustam* et artam, quam *pauci inveniunt*, ne ergo periclitentur vestre reverende assistentie, abicite vitia, insistite virtutibus, operamini bonum ad omnes. 190

Super hec omnia, cum intensius verba thematis mente conspicerem et diligenti indagine intuerer, intelligere cepi et hoc reperi propinquius presenti proposito: Quod ipsis Osee propheta in persona Domini Dei, divine et sancte Scripture, quam in breviluquo summatam *Sententias* appellare consuevimus, insignem reseravit dignitatem, et tam perditionis quam salutis fontales aperuit origines. 195

Ad quid nam aliud cuncta divinarum Scripturarum eloquia nisi ad animarum salutem perditionisque fugam tot crebris sunt voluminibus exarata? Quidquid enim precipitur in hiis, quidquid prohybetur, totum proculdubio in profectum redundat animarum, attestante Paulo ad Romanos 15°, <4>: *Quecumque scripta sunt ad nostram doctrinam scripta sunt*. Ad hunc igitur finem etiam sacra refertur Scriptura, ut per eam anime salus requiratur. Quam et Osee, qui salvator aut salvans interpretatur, iuxta sui nominis sacratum misterium, ad suum oppositum, quod est perditio, in maiorem expressit relucentiam, cum sic contextuit: *Perditio tua ex te tantummodo in me auxilium tuum*. /140v/ 200 205

#### Divisio thematis

Quibus quidem verbis sic taliter qualiter inductis materia pariter et laus emicant *Sententiarum*. 210

Innuunt namque primo benedictae Trinitatis ineffabile misterium in effectu merito lugendo expressum, quia *perditio tua*, quoad primum librum.

2<sup>o</sup>, rerum creationem ex nichilo indignissima creaturarum, scilicet homine, ostensam, quia *ex te*, quoad 2<sup>m</sup> librum. 215

Tertio, incarnati Verbi ad mirabile commercium in virgineo partu Marie in esse deductum, quia *tantummodo in me*, quoad 3<sup>m</sup> librum.

4<sup>o</sup> et finaliter, sauciati seu vulnerati hominis salubre medicamentum ex vulnerato mortuo corpore incarnati Verbi stillatum, quia *auxilium tuum*, quoad 4<sup>m</sup> librum. 220

Horum quatuor adinvicem talis est ordo coherentiae quod 2<sup>m</sup> est a primo, quia a Trinitate creatio, et quartum a tertio, quia ab incarnato

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189 ergo] *s.l.* 191 operamini – omnes] *mg.* 193 et – intuerer] *mg.* 198 ad] finis divine scripture *add. mg.* 208 divisio thematis] *mg.* 219–220 auxilium tuum] *mg.* 221 coherentia ve] *mg.*

Verbo vulnere sanatio, et tam creatio quam Verbi incarnatio, quam  
 225 etiam peccatorum remissio a tota prodit Trinitate originaliter, que simp-  
 plicissima emanatione oculis illuxit mortalium.

De primo horum ad animandum predicatorum veritatis dicitur Mathei  
 decimo, <28>: *Timete eum qui potest animam et corpus perdere in*  
*Gehennam.*

De 2<sup>o</sup>, Iob verbis dolore plenus eructans suam miseriam et nichileita-  
 230 tem dicit Iob 6<sup>o</sup>, <13>: *Ecce non est auxilium michi in me.*

De tertio verbi thematis: *Ego Dominus Deus et salvator non est preter*  
*me*, <Osee 13, 4>.

De quarto, Luce decimo, <34>, dicitur parabolice: *Inponens illum in*  
*umentum suum duxit in stabulum et curam eius egit.*

235 Merito ergo tam insigne opus *Sententiarum*, tam salubriter et plane ex  
 dictis Sanctorum in brevibus collectum, egregie suum commendat com-  
 pilatorem, Magistrum scilicet Petrum Lombardi antistitem seu presulem  
 Parisiensem. Ad cuius intelligentiam infirmum et invalidum fore meum  
 240 recognosco ingeniolum, dono tamen Dei inprecato et suffultus, a quo  
 scientia hec salutaris noscitur revelata, prima *Corinthios* 2<sup>o</sup>, <10–16>.  
 Et 2<sup>a</sup> *Petri* primo, <21>: *Non voluntate humana allata est aliquando*  
*prophetia, sed Spiritu Sancto inspirati locuti sunt sancti Dei homines.*

#### Questio

In Dei igitur auxilio

245 *linenum*|241 presentem lecturam non propria temeritate, sed de licentia  
 et ordinatione venerabilium patrum meorum sacre theologie professo-  
 rum, et precipue sub regimine et protectione magistri mei piissimi magi-  
 stri Nicolay de Yawer, aggredior, iuxta thema collationis talem movendo  
 tytulum questionis:

250 Utrum studium divinarum litterarum sit in profectum et salutem ani-  
 marum.

Quod non arguitur primo: nichil quod occidit aut mortificat est in  
 profectum etc. salutem animarum; sed littera occidit, dicente Apostolo  
 2<sup>o</sup> *Corintheorum* 3<sup>o</sup>, <6>: /141r/ *Littera occidit; igitur.*

255 Secundo arguitur ad idem sic: nichil quod inflat et superbiam indu-  
 cit est in profectum et salutem animarum, cum caritatis proprietas sit  
 non inflare, prima *ad Corinthios* 13<sup>mo</sup>, <4> ; sed scientia, que est finis  
 studii divinarum litterarum, illa inflat, quia dicitur prima *ad Corinthios*

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223 sanatio] De primo horum *add. sed. del.* 224 prodit] *mg.*; efficitur *add. sed. del.* 236 collectum] et per *add. sed. del.* 243 questio] *mg.* 245 et 2<sup>a</sup> – presentem] *mg.* (presentem *etiam in textu*) 258 litterarum] *p.c. in mg. scripturarum a. c.*

octavo, <1>: *Scientia inflat*, Glossa Augustini: “id est in superbiam extollit”; igitur. 260

Tertio ad idem: nichil quod ad insaniam ducit est in profectum et salutem animarum; sed littere ducunt ad insaniam, dicit enim Festus Paulo in *Actibus Apostolorum*, capitulo <26>, 24: *Insanis Paule! Multe te littere ad insaniam convertunt*; igitur.

In oppositum est Magister in prologo, qui, ob premium eterne retributionis, dicit se “de penuria” sui ingenioli seu de studio suo aliquid “in gazophylacium Domini” missurum. 265

Protestatio. Antequam ulterius progredior, sicut nedum est laudabilis consuetudinis, verum et michi fore necessarium existimo protestari in primis et ante omnia, quam etiam protestationem in sequentibus habere volo repetitam, videlicet quod in presenti actu nec non in quocumque alio per me fiendo non intendo dicere aliquid quod sit contra fidem orthodoxam sacrosancte Romane Ecclesie, aut eius determinationem, aut contra bonos mores, aut quovis modo piarum aurium offensivum. Quod si oppositum alicuius horum contigerit — quod Deus per suam piissimam misericordiam avertere dignetur — pro nunc ex tunc, et ex tunc pro nunc, revoco, retracto, annulo, et pro non dicto habeo, paratus revocare <et> retractare ad insinuationem caritativi monitoris, et precipue illius vel illorum ad quem vel ad quos pertinet huiusmodi deviantes ad viam reducere veritatis. 270 275 280

Hac igitur laudabili protestatione premissa, sit hec prima conclusio: Doctor hominum, Dominus ipse, solus creator est et eternus.

Prima pars conclusionis huius patet per Psalmistam, *Psalmo* 93°<10>, insipientiam populi redarguentem et dicentem de Domino Deo: *Qui docet hominem scientiam?* 285

Secunda pars conclusionis deducetur Deo concedente per processum primi *Sententiarum*. Hec de 2° principali.

Quantum ad 3<sup>m</sup>, scilicet ad replicandum contra dominum meum reverendum dominum *Sententiarium*, magistrum Bartholomeum de Traiecto superiori, iuxta consuetudinem hactenus observatam matris nostre facultatis theologie, resummmam duo brocardiciva que prefatus magister posuit. 290

Primum quod posuit in 2<sup>a</sup> conclusione questionis prime 2<sup>1</sup> *Sententiarum* erat istud: “Creatio sive potentia creandi est creature communica-

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259 glossa] glosa 268 protestatio] *mg.* 283 psalmistam] dicentem *add. sed del.* 286 deo concedente] *mg.* 289–290 de Traiecto superiori] *mg.* et *em.* 294 sive potentia creandi] *mg.*

295 bilis de potentia Dei absoluta, prout creatio dicit productionem alicuius ex nichilo, id est nullo presupposito, quantum est ex parte producti, puta neque ut subiecto, neque ut termino a quo.” /141v/ Probavit multipliciter.

Primo, quia nulla apparet contradictio vel repugnantia in hoc quod  
300 Deus, per suam infinitam potentiam et immensam bonitatem, vellet active aliquid fieri a creatura sine passo, ita quod innixionem actionis creature ad passum vel terminum a quo et eius habitudinem suppleret Deus, et aliunde secum produceret actionem suam sine passo, sicut prius cum passo.

305 Confirmavit sic, nam si repugnantiam aliquam in se clauderet, maxime esset ista: quia per creationem talem creature attributam argueretur creatura talis creans infinita vel esse extra limites creature posita; sed nullum illorum. Maior est adversariorum. Minor patet. Non primum, quia si argueretur infinita, vel hoc esset ratione termini producti, aut  
310 ratione productionis passive, aut ratione distantie inter terminum a quo et terminum ad quem, aut ratione modi producendi. Non primum, eo quod omnis terminus productus creationis est finitus. Similiter declaratur 2<sup>m</sup>. Nec 3<sup>m</sup>, ratione distantie, quia nulla est distantia ibi quin taxanda sit secundum quantitatem termini positivi, qui est finitus. Un-  
315 de non videtur ibi esse potius distantia infinita que impedit quam in productione qua producitur forma modo naturali de non esse ad esse in materia, primo *Physicorum* Averrois in lectura T<homasina>.

Nec potest dici 2<sup>m</sup>, videlicet quod ponit creaturam extra limites creature, nam cum creare isto modo non excludit dependentiam in ipsa  
320 creatura creature, nec excludit dependentiam ipsius in creando ab alio create secum cui concreat, sed solum innisum ipsius cause secunde super subiectum sive materiam, qua sustentatur actio cuius vicem potest supplere Deus in tali productione seu creatione, non ut Deus sit materia, sed ut vi sua sustentante actionem active, actio sic sustentata fluat ab  
325 agente sibi concreante, ita, videtur, non oportet talem actionem inniti materie.

2<sup>m</sup> dictum quod prefatus magister meus posuit in conclusione 3<sup>a</sup> eiusdem

**297** In the bottom margin of the folio] “Bonaventura in fine 2<sup>1</sup> *Sententiarum* dicit quod 8<sup>us</sup> articulus — saltem quoad partem articuli, qui habet plures partes — in quo magistri Parisienses non secuntur Magistrum distinctione V quarti, quod Deus possit potestatem creandi creature communicare.” **307** infinita] vel ess *add. sed del.* **317** primo – T<homasina>] *mg. et em.*

**311–314** non primum – finitus: ADAM WODEHAM, *Lectura super quartum Sententiarum*, Bruges, BM, Ms. 172, 2va, l. 2–8; HENRICUS TOTTING DE OYTA, *Abbreuiatio Lecturae Oxoniensis Adae de Wodeham*, Mainz, Wissenschaftliche Stadtbibliothek, Hs. I 53a, f. 72v, l. 1–9.

articuli erat istud: quamvis mundum vel aliam rem creatam fuisse ab eterno pro nunc est impossibile, adhuc tamen tale fuisse ab eterno non includit repugnantiam per se et absolute. 330

Prima pars patet, quia eius oppositum pro nunc est necessarium /142r/ eo quod transivit in preteritum.

Secundam partem sic declaravit insequendo magistrum Hainricum de Oeyta: quia vel repugnaret creature secundum se, vel in ordine ad agens. Non primum, quia de re creature tria sunt, scilicet quod sit ens, et quod sit producta ab alio, et quod sit de nichilo, saltem quantum ad ultimam resolutionem. 335

Probationem ulteriorem dereliquit.

Contra hec tam subtiliter et profunde in lucem deducta egregii domini mei et magistri replicare formidarem, si vitiosum et reprehensibile non foret morem laudabilem preterire. Insuper et ambo dicta illa repugnant 2<sup>e</sup> parti conclusionis quam posui, que sonuit solum Dominum Deum creatorem, contra primum dictum magistri mei, et solum Deum fore eternum, contra 2<sup>m</sup> dictum eiusdem. 340

Pono ergo contra magistrum meum prefatum hanc conclusionem: per nullam potentiam Dei creatio est creature communicabilis. 345

Patet primo, quia creatio vergit in gloriam Dei, *Ysaie* XLIII, <7>: *In gloriam meam creavi eum*, et in principio *Genesis* <1, 1> Moyses in gloriam Dei eructat: *In principio creavit Deus celum et terram*. Dicit autem Dominus Deus per prophetam *Ysaia* 42, <8>: *Gloriam meam alteri non dabo*. Deus igitur creationem creature non communicabit. 350

Confirmo, quia creatio est inter non esse et esse, inter que est infinita distantia, ad quam actio creature non se extendit, cum quolibet creatura sit virtutis finite, non infinite. Nulla igitur creatura creabit.

Item creatura creatione est producta et effecta; si igitur ipsa creatura crearet, efficeret creationem, et per creationem esset effecta; igitur idem esset efficiens et effectum, et idem gigneret se, quod non capit intellectus. 355

Tunc ad rationes per magistrum meum Bartholomeum ad probationem primi dicti sui in contrarium adductas.

**334** oeyta] oyta *a.c.* ad agens] *iter. sed del.* **350** 42] *mg.* **351** dabo] *Ysa add. sed del.* **355** ipsa] crearet *ip add. sed del.* **359** adductas] quando *p add. sed del.*

**328–332** quamvis – preteritum: HENRICUS TOTTING DE OYTA, *Questiones s. II Sent.*, q. 11, a. 2, München, BS, Clm 17468, f. 184rb, l. 35–39. A. LANG, *Heinrich Tötting von Oyta. Ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte der ersten deutschen Universitäten und zur Problemgeschichte der Spätscholastik*, (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 32, 3), Münster 1937, p. 197. **334–337** repugnaret – resolutionem: HENRICUS TOTTING DE OYTA, *Questiones s. II Sent.*, q. 11, a. 2, München, BS, Clm 17468, f. 184va, l. 2–6.

360 Ad primam rationem quando sic arguit: “nulla apparet contradictio  
vel repugnantia in hoc quod Deus per suam infinitam potentiam et im-  
mensam bonitatem vellet active aliquid fieri a creatura sine passo,” illum  
declino, quia tunc plenitudinem bonitatis Dei caperet creatura, et capa-  
365 citas creature activitati Dei adequaretur, que includunt repugnantiarum  
maximas et contradictionum. Etiam tunc — ut patuit ex confirmatione  
conclusionis probate — creatura esset finita et infinita.

/142v/ Et ad confirmationem, in qua prefatus magister meus tangit,  
“si aliqua repugnantia argueretur, maxime esset illa: quod argueretur  
creatura creans infinita,” transeat illa.

370 Et quando subiungit, “si creatura creans argueretur infinita, vel hoc  
esset ratione termini producti, aut ratione productionis passive, aut ra-  
tione distantie inter terminum a quo et terminum ad quem, aut ratione  
modi producendi,” dico quod ratione omnium quatuor et cuiuslibet seor-  
sum, cum sint nature limitate. Nec est simile de forma modo naturali  
375 producta, cum in productione naturali presupponatur subiectum. Nec  
etiam solus innisus cause sustentat actionem, cum actio sit secundum  
quam in id quod subicitur agere dicimur.

Et quando magister meus ulterius tangit quod “fuisse creaturam ab  
eterno non includat repugnantiam per se et absolute,” et probat, quia  
380 “nec secundum se, nec in ordine ad agens,” ymmo respondeo quod in se  
includit repugnantiam et etiam in ordine ad agens, cum tam ipsa quam  
agens limitate et finite sint nature, ut fundatum est, et per consequens  
initiate, igitur non ab eterno.

Hec sunt pauca et modica in conspectu magistri mei, cui humilitater  
385 me recomendo.

Et hec de tertio principali.

Quantum ad 4<sup>m</sup> et finale, quoad regratiationem — ut enim dona percep-  
ta ad ea habundantius habenda revertantur ad locum unde exierunt —  
regratior in primis Deo creatori meo de ignita sua bonitate, qui nedum  
390 dedit michi esse et vivere, verum et huc usque perseverare, cui honor et  
gloria in secula.

Deinde regratior Dei genitrici Marie Virgini gloriose, quam laudare  
totus non sufficit orbis, que et quod tristis Eva abstulit, nobis almo  
reddidit germine.

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**365** etiam] ut *add. sed del.* **366** infinita] Ad primam, quia tunc plenitudo bo-  
nitatis caperet creatura et capiat creare actual\*, si creatura crearet iam passum est  
prestantius actione et agente *mg.* **373** ratione] cuiuslibet *add. sed del.* quatuor]  
*mg.* et *p. c.* **378** quod] rem *add. sed del.* **382–383** et per consequens – eterno]  
*mg.* **387** finale] V Ecclesiastes primo *add. mg.* **387–388** ut enim – exierunt] *mg.*  
**390** et] *s.l.*

Deinde regratior toti curie celesti, que et ad Virginis gloriose pro nobis 395  
intercessionem habet etiam intercedere et deprecari, sicut et ipsa Virgo  
gloriat, dicens <Ecclesiastici 24, 15>: *Et in Iherusalem potestas mea.*

Post hec ad inferiora descendendo, regratior domino Bartholomeo de  
Sancto Trudone, rectori huius alme universitatis, capiti nostro, qui sua  
presentia hunc actum dignatus est decorare. 400

Deinde magistris nostris sacre theologie professoribus eximiis, et pre-  
cipue magistro meo, magistro Nicolao Magni de Yawer, sub cuius alis et  
protectione presentem legendi suscepi laborem.

Deinde doctoribus sacrorum canonum.

Deinde specialiter domino et magistro meo, magistro Iohanni /143r/ 405  
Kirchem, sacrarum legum doctori, qui huc usque a contracta notitia sui  
favoris et gratitudinis ad personam meam benevolentiam non destitit  
impendere, nec in futurum, ut spero, desistet.

Deinde regratior magistro Gerhardo de Hunkirch, doctori in medicina.

Deinde magistro Nicolao Wachanan, facultatis artium decano. 410

Postremo etiam regratior singulis sacre theologie baccalariis, aliis ma-  
gistris et baccalariis et dominis, quibus me offero ad beneplacita et man-  
danda.

Anno 1431° Valerii.

Johannes Wenck

*Principium ad secundum librum Sententiarum*  
Tübingen, Universitätsbibliothek, Mc. 31, f. 150r–155v

In nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti. Amen.

In hoc principio 2<sup>i</sup> libri *Sententiarum* magistri Petri Lombardi antistitis Parisiensis, preinvocata benedicta Trinitate, de qua primus tractavit liber, que et gignendis rebus dedit initium et creatrix est mundi, superest de ipsarum rerum creatione cum pietate diligentique perscrutatione sermonem aliquantulum contexere, nam ubi religionis et fidei res geritur, opus est continuis vigiliis excubare, ne quid in eam erroris aut superstitionis germen insiliat.

Verum, venerabiles patres et magistri ceterique in Christo Ihesu fratres dilectissimi, maiorum meorum et predecessorum revocata ante oculos exempla exposcunt dicendi materiam sub verborum alicuius thematici brevitatem perstringere. Ne vaganter et sine tramite decurrens oratio prolem degeneret abortivam, principiorum igitur per me factorum reaccedat thema, illud videlicet: *Perditio tua ex te Israhel, tantummodo in me auxilium tuum, Osee* tertio decimo, <9>.

Michi revolventi, ferventi meditatione, divine Scripture tam spatiosa volumina, ut frequenter hoc unum solet occurrere, quod ipsis consulitur prosecutio salutis, fugaque perditionis. Et non incongrue aut infructuose, ut opinor. Nonne, percelebres viri, finis agendorum, nostra scilicet salus, ponitur fore principium ad operandum, movens universos?

Sicut et archidoctor Ecclesie, beatus Petrus, canonica prima, capitulo primo, <9>, *finem fidei* nostre fore *salutem* insinuavit, extollens laudem credentium in hac verborum forma: *Credientes autem exultabitis letitia inenarrabili et glorificata reportantes fidei vestre finem, salutem animarum vestrarum*, de qua salute exquisierunt atque scrutati sunt prophete, ubi glossa: “Que salus est multum amanda, quia de hac salute multi exquisierunt, quando vel quo ordine salus eterna mundo adveniret.” Quam tamen salutem salutare Dei Ihesus Christus se ipsum esse fatebatur, cum de beatitudine sermonem discipulis effundens, diceret eis eum videntibus: *Multi reges et /150v/ prophete voluerunt videre que vos videtis, et non viderunt, Luce* decimo, <24>. Salutis etiam effectorem Psalmista Spiritu Sancto preinstructus decantabat, cum aiebat: *Dominus, salus mea, Psalmo* 26, <1>.

Verumtamen, et si salutis nostre Dominus Deus causa dicatur, et sit,



sic tamen causa est quod non tota, sed cum voluntate nostra pariter con- 35  
 currente. Quod sensisse beatum Augustinum concepimus, cum dicebat:  
 “Qui creavit te sine te, non iustificat te sine te.” Fulcimentum namque  
 nostre salutis fides est, Teste Apostolo *ad Romanos* decimo, <10>: *Cor-*  
*de enim creditur ad iustitiam, ore autem confessio fit ad salutem.* Quod 40  
 verbum tractans, beatus Augustinus *Super Iohannem* dicit: “Corde cre- 40  
 ditur, quia cetera potest homo nolens, credere non nisi volens.”

Sed quante variabilitatis seu varie velleitatis sit nostra voluntas, que  
 nostre salutis concausa est! Operationes ipse que facimus luce clarius  
 ostentare non cessant, dummodo bona et salubria volumus et illico vix  
 bonis inchoatis ad mala deflectimur, quibus et suplicia meremur. 45

Nec sic derelinquimur peccatis obnoxii, sed a provisorio universorum,  
 Domino scilicet Deo, instabilitati nostre et vagationi voluntarie de ce-  
 lo non modicum statim a mundi exordio promptum et stabilissimum  
 auxilium porrectum est, dum Moyses ille eruditus in omni sapientia  
 Egiptiorum, quem de flumine collectum filia pharaonis ut filium dile- 50  
 xit et subsidiis regalibus fultum, omnibus secularis prudentie disciplinis  
 informatum atque instructum, divinitus intonuit prememoratis antea  
 tenebris abyssalibus peccatorum ignorantie et cecitatis humani cordis.  
 Pro illustratione eiusdem cordis ac stabilitate, ad incommutabile lumen,  
 quod Deus est, se convertens, prophetabat: *Et Spiritus Domini ferebatur* 55  
*super aquas*, Genesis primo, <2>. Quod exponens Ysidorus Yspalensis  
 episcopus dicit: “*Et Spiritus Domini* mystice *ferebatur super aquas*, ut  
 corda scilicet fluctuantia que mentis quietem ammiserant” in melius re-  
 vocaret.”

O igitur peccator huius superlationis Spiritus Domini, noli oblivisci! 60

Quapropter et optime nobis in hac lacrimarum valle mortali vita de  
 gentibus quid agendum in voluntatis nostre stabilitatem /151r/ Apo-  
 stolus consulvit, primo *ad Thimotheum* 2<sup>o</sup>, <4>, pro salute, inquam,  
 nostra et singulorum, Deum simpliciter exorare Filiumque eius unigeni-  
 tum salvatorem nostrum: *Qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri*, Spiritum 65  
 quoque Sanctum veritatis doctorem, ut nostra instabilitas fugatiove ea-  
 rum certitudine contineatur, cum et oratione, veluti hauritorio, ex fonte  
 boni gratia hauriatur. Cui hauriendi studio Psalmista usus est cum velut

**51** secularis] secularibus *a.c.*    disciplinis] discipulis *a.c mg.*    **66** instabilitas] *p.c.*  
*mg.*, fugacitas *a.c.*

**37** qui creavit – sine te: AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *Sermones ad populum*, (CPL 284), *Sermo* 169, ed. S. BOODTS (CC SL 41B), Turnhout 2016, p. 418, l. 374.    **40–41** corde – nolens: AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *In Iohannis euangelium tractatus*, *Tract.* 26, par. 2, l. 15, ed. D.R. WILLEMS (CC SL 36), Turnhout 1990, p. 260.    **57** et sirtus – aquas: ISIDORUS HISPALENSIS, *Expositio in Vetus Testamentum. Genesis* c. 1 (*Gen.* 1.1–28), (CPL 1195 - (M)), p. 4, l. 87.

parvulus, diffidens de suis viribus, et ad gratiam confugiens, cecinit: *Os meum aperui et attraxi Spiritum, Psalmo CXVIII<sup>o</sup>, <131>*, ubi glossa: “Aperui os, petendo, querendo, pulsando et sitiens hausi Spiritum,” id est virtutem faciendi, quam per me habere non potui. *Optimum enim est gratia stabilire cor*, ad Hebreos ultimo, <13, 9>.

Cum ergo tam desides ac pigri simus ad orandum et petendum, contra Salvatoris iussum, *Iohannis* 16, <24>: *Petite et accipietis*, idcirco quemlibet nostrum Deus alloquitur per prophetam Osee, quem ad hoc uxori fornicarie desponsavit ut adulteram animam, cuius vir Deus est, secundum Jeremiam <3, 1>, viro suo, Deo scilicet, reuniret, dicens: *Perditio tua ex te*, ut de perditione nostra, non Deum nostre salutis auxiliatorem, sed nosmetipsos inculparemus.

Sed si libet profundius perditionis auctorem intueri, attende Symonem de Cassia, in opere suo ewangelico, libro 14<sup>o</sup> *De morali gloria*, capitulo 21<sup>o</sup>, post traditam apostolis potestatem predicandi verbum vite, dicentem: “Quomodo salus aut dampnatio incunctanter proveniat aperuit Salvator cum dixit XI discipulis: *Qui crediderit et baptizatus fuerit, salvus erit. Qui vero non crediderit, condemnabitur*, Marci ultimo <16, 16>. Quia sicut creditum adicit credenti salutem, ita neganti contrarium parit. Iuste ergo dampnantur et perduntur increduli, cum in credendis constituta est salus. In credendis quidem fide viva, non mortua, cum Spiritus Sancti per beatum Iacobum expressa sit sententia: *Fides sine operibus mortua est*, Iacobi 2<sup>o</sup> <26>.”

Postulemus igitur in fide salutis gratiam ab omnipotenti Deo, qui vult omnium salutem, “tum ex parte nature date, tum ex parte gratie oblate,” ut dicit dominus Bonaventura circa distinctionem 46<sup>am</sup> primi *Sententiarum*: “Dedit namque Deus nobis naturam secundum quam cognoscere possemus, et cognitum/151v/ querere, et quesitum invenire, et invento inherere, ac per hoc salutem optinere.”

Insuper et gratiam optulit dum Filium suum in hunc mundum misit et optulit in mortem, cuius pretium omnium suffecit saluti. Leges etiam et mandata tribuit salutis, et presto est omnibus inquirentibus, et proprie est omnibus invocantibus eum.

Recte ergo ex persona Dei propheta Osee personat perditionis causam

**70** glossa] glosa **78** reuniret] *s.l.p.c.* **81** intueri] vere\*\* 3<sup>a</sup> *add sed del.* **96** cognitum] et quesitum *add. sed del.* invento] invenire *add. sed del.*

**71** aperui – spiritum: AUGUSTINUS HIPPONENSIS, *Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalmus* 118, *sermo* 27, par. 4, l. 5–7, ed. E. DEKKERS, J. FRAIPONT (CC SL 40.3), Turnhout 1990, p. 1758. **95–97** dedit – optinere: BONAVENTURA, *Commentaria in IV libros Sententiarum*, I, dist. 46, art. unic., q. 1, conclusio, ed. Frati Editori di Quaracchi, Firenze 1886, p. 821, col. 1, l. 22–25.

esse in nobis, pervenire autem ad salutem fore Dei auxilium, dicens: *Perditio tua etc.* Que fuerunt verba vestris reverentiis in principio proposita et sic ruditer introducta.

105

Et hec de primo principali.

/152r/ Quantum ad 2<sup>m</sup> principale, inter omnes prisce auctoritatis viros huius alme matris mee facultatis theologicæ, ab omnibus consuetudo hec hactenus tenta est initiis librorum *Sententiarum*, si quem concurrere contingeret, contra eundem replicare et sibi invicem replicationes pro posse dissolvere.

110

Irdcirco pro solutione replicarum magistri mei, magistri Bartholomei de Traiecto superiori, nuper in suo principio quarti contra me factarum et mecum concurrentis, accedo ad materiam huius 2<sup>i</sup> libri *Sententiarum* Magistri Petri Lombardi antistitis Parysiensis.

115

Verum, si bene memoror, in principio meo primi *Sententiarum*, dum thema hoc *perditio tua ex te, Israel, tantummodo in me auxilium tuum* distingwerem et solito more particulas divisionis quattuor librorum *Sententiarum* applicarem, dicebam pro tunc, quoad 2<sup>m</sup> membrum principale divisi thematis, rerum creationem ex nichilo indignissima creaturarum, scilicet homine, ostensam et manifestatam innui seu includi in hac thematis particula: *Ex te*.

120

Correspondenter ad 2<sup>m</sup> librum *Sententiarum*, quem iam pre manibus

106 Bottom margin] 1431. laudabilium virorum, vestigia secuturus, divino michi ad hoc / opitulante suffragio, brevissime duo, in praesenti actu / habeo peragere. Primo, thema meum solitum, iterato / resumere et introducere. Secundo resumptum thema / materie huius secundi libri *Sententiarum* applicare, replicas magistri / mei, magistri Bartholomei de Traiecto superiori, nunc / in suo principio contra me factas resumere et iuxta / posse dissolvere, cum annexa gratiarum actione, / omnipotenti Deo creatori meo, vobis quoque magistris ac dominis / meis, qui dignati fuistis, hunc actum vestris presentibus / exornare. Quantum igitur ad primum: Origine omnis / cognitionis et gratie, fontem videlicet omnis boni, Trinitatem / scilicet benedictam, cuius hodie festivitas ab Ecclesia colitur / sic in meum invoco auxilium peragendorum. / In nomine patris et filii et spiritus sancti". Schemes and notes on the four books of the *Sentences*. Follows: "Bonaventura in *De luminaribus ecclesie*: Socrates eo quod prohibebat sacrificium fieri Apollini interfectus fuit, cum coleret unum Deum. Et cum Plato suaderet sibi fugam. Ait Socrates: absit, ut negem veritatem, quam asserui. Universale est unum ad multa, scilicet in potentia materie, quod non est completum, [unum] in multis, scilicet partibus, [unum] praeter multa, scilicet in arte eterna per quam consistit. Similitudo enim in qua duo homines assimilantur, stabiliatur et fundetur in aliqua forma stabili generis ad speciem. Ratio universalis non est tota in anima, sed in re secundum processum. 107 High margin] Bonaventura in *De luminaribus ecclesie*. Nulla creatura potest esse purus actus. Cum enim in omni creatura potentia activa coniuncta sit potentie passive, quia receptat est, omnem quod ille due potentie fundantur super diversa Principia rei. 110 invicem] invitit a.c. s.l.; rep add. sed del. 117 tantummodo] h add. sed del.

habemus, qui et incipit “Creationem rerum” etc. In quo quidem libro  
 125 principaliter hominis condicio et eius lapsus sive deviatio determinatur.  
 Qui quidem liber prima sui divisione dividitur in duas partes principa-  
 les: in prima agit Magister de hominis condicione; in secunda autem de  
 eius lapsu, ibi, distinctione XXI<sup>a</sup>: “Videns ergo Deus” etc. Quia vero  
 130 homo communicat cum omnibus creaturis, et creatura facta fuit prop-  
 ter hominem, ideo prima pars subdividitur in duas, quia primo agit de  
 condicione rerum in generali, 2<sup>o</sup> in speciali, distinctione 2<sup>a</sup>, ibi, scilicet  
 “De angelica vero natura.” Presens prima distinctio habet duas partes:  
 prima determinat de condicione rerum quantum ad principium efficiens;  
 2<sup>a</sup> vero quantum ad finem, ibi: “Et quia non neque eius bonitatis” etc.  
 135 Iuxta quam materiam distinctionis moveo talem tytulum questionis:  
 Utrum Deus, qui est origo rerum, sit et finis earundem.  
 Cuius questionis determinationem sequenti lectioni derelinquo.

Et venio ad rationes seu replicas prefati magistri mei, magistri Bartho-  
 140 lomei, qui in suo principio talem tenuit ordinem, videlicet quod primo  
 solvit rationes meas quas in principio meo I *Sententiarum* feci contra  
 dicta sua.

2<sup>o</sup> nititur probare quod insufficienter solverim et non satis fecerim  
 motivis suis pro confirmatione suorum dictorum adductis.

3<sup>o</sup> replicat de novo contra dicta mea que posui in questione prima  
 145 primi *Sententiarum*.

Quia autem magister meus valde diffuse et late dicta sua posuit, de-  
 crevi propter temporis brevitatem eadem strictius perstringere /152v/

Ad primam rationem meam quam posui ad probandum contra magi-  
 150 strum meum quod per nullam potentiam Dei creatio creature sit com-  
 municabilis — et ratio erat hec: “quia creatio vergit in gloriam Dei,  
*Ysaie* 43<sup>o</sup>, <7>: *In gloriam meam creavi eum*. Et in principio *Genesis*  
 <1, 1>, Moyses in gloriam Dei eructat: *In principio creavit Deus celum*  
*et terram*; dicit autem Dominus Deus per prophetam *Ysaiam* <42, 8>:  
*Gloriam meam alteri non dabo*; Deus igitur creationem creature non  
 155 communicabit” —

Respondet Magister meus huic rationi per distinctionem glorie isto

140 in principio – *Sententiarum*] *mg.* 146 sua] lunade *add. sed del.* 148 ad]  
 magister ergo meus ad 151 43<sup>o</sup>] *iter. sed del.*

124 creationem rerum etc.: PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in IV libris Distinctae*,  
 II, dist. 1, c. 1, pars 1, l. 2–4 ed. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae Ad Claras Aquas,  
 Grottaferrata 1971, p. 329. 128 videns – etc.: PETRUS LOMBARDUS, *Sententiae in*  
*IV libris Distinctae*, I, dist. 21, c. 2, pars 1, l. 6, p. 175.

modo, videlicet quod gloria Dei uno modo sit ipsius Dei magnificentia, summa bonitas vel nobilitas, propter quam Deo debetur summe honorificentie cultus. Sed 2<sup>o</sup> modo gloria Dei dicatur sublimis, clara, et lata fama eius, quo summe veneratur ab electis suis. Tunc ultra dicit responsive quod gloriam Dei primo modo dictam, que met Deus est, Deus nulli creature communicare potest, tamen virtutem creativam limitatam et dependentem creature communicatam per possibile dicit vergi in gloriam Dei 2<sup>o</sup> modo dictam. 160

Sed, salva reverentia magistri mei, huiusmodi distinctio non est ad propositum. Et multipliciter defectuosa est sua solutio. 165

Primum sic ostendo: quia cum queritur et investigatur utrum creatio sit creature communicabilis, in quo nostra versatur contentio sive pugna, non inquiritur de latria aut cultu Dei, sed de causalitate creature, quamvis tamen verum sit quod creatura lege nature astringitur secundario et ex consequenti ad Dei honorificentiam et cultum. Isto autem modo, iuxta positionem magistri mei, creatura penitus a servitute absolveretur. 170

Quod sic ostendo: quia creatio est totius substantie secundum totum. Ista est una maxima patens et infallibilis. Creatura igitur per creationem cepit esse a creante potentia. Sed quantum aliquid recipit ab alio, tantum ei tenetur. Si igitur creatura ab alia creatura crearetur, iuxta ymaginationem possibilem magistri mei, et cum possibile sit ponibile, ponatur ergo creaturam creare: tunc creanti creature creatura creata se totam deberet et obligaretur, et nichil Deo, et per consequens ab obsequio Dei huiusmodi creata creatura penitus esset libera et inastrieta et absoluta et nullo modo obligata — quod pia fides respuit, pariter et abnegat ratio. 175 180

2<sup>m</sup> etiam declaro, videlicet quod solutio data ex distinctione prefata /153r/ multipliciter est defectuosa. Primo, quia dicit quod “creatio activa, id est virtus creativa activa, 2<sup>o</sup> modo dicta vergit in gloriam Dei.” Modo hec glossa “creatio activa, id est virtus creativa activa,” 185

**157** magnificentia] De gloria Dei *add. mg.* **163** vergi] *iter. sed del.* **165** distinctio] *est add. sed. del.* **168** quo] *versatur add sed del.* **170** tamen] *mg.* **178** et] *conpe add sed del.* **180** consequens] *oculto et add. sed del.* **181** inastrieta] *iter. s.l.* **187** glossa] *glosa*

**174** quia – totum: BONAVENTURA, *Commentaria in IV libros Sententiarum*, II, 1, pars 1, art. 2, q. 2, p. 29, col. 2, l. 7. **175–177** creatura – tenetur: BONAVENTURA, *Commentaria in IV libros Sententiarum*, II, dist. 1, pars 1, art. 2, q. 2, p. 28, col. 2, l. 15–17. **178** cum – ponibile: GUILLELMUS DE OCKHAM, *Summa logicae*, pars 3, 3 (*De obligationibus*), c. 39, ed. P. BOEHNER, *Opera Philosophica*, I, St. Bonaventure (N.Y.) 1974, l. 46–47, p. 733.

repugnat gramatice, quia cum creatio sit nomen verbale, terminatum in ‘tio’, actionem aut passionem designat, non virtutem sive potentiam, cum potentia sive virtus, ex 9<sup>mo</sup> *Metaphysice*, dicat solum habitudinem et respectum ad actum, non ipsum actum.

2<sup>o</sup>, defectuosa est solutio in hoc quod dicit gloriam primo modo acceptam, scilicet pro supereminentissima magnificentia, aut summa bonitate aut nobilitate Dei, quod sit Deus met, et illa nulli creature communicari possit, et tamen magister meus eandem gloriam creature communicat secundum possibilitatem, cum dicit in sua positione creationem sive “-productionem alicuius ex nichilo, id est nullo presupposito ex parte producti,” creature esse communicabilem de potentia Dei absoluta. In quo quidem dicto Dei proprium, quod est creare, attribuit ipsi creature, in hoc derogans infinite virtuti Dei et omnipotentie eius, que sola non eget ad producendum aliquo nature fulcimenta.

Et in eodem dicto, per potentiam absolutam Dei quam ponit, penitus divinum subtrahit ordinem. Quod sic probo post dominum Bonaventuram super primo *Sententiarum*, circa distinctionem 43<sup>am</sup>, ubi expresse determinat quod omnis potentia Dei est ordinata, et inconueniens sit dicere de potentia absoluta. Quod fundat hac ratione, scilicet quia nichil potest Deus quod non possit ordinate. Posse enim inordinate facere est non posse, sicut posse peccare et posse mentiri, cum posse peccare sit impotentie ex hoc quod ponit inordinationem ad actum.

3<sup>o</sup>, in prefata solutione magister meus concludit quod virtus activa creandi creature communicata non est gloria Dei formaliter, nec primo nec 2<sup>o</sup> modo. Nec ratio mea unquam supposuit potentiam activam creandi fore gloriam Dei, sed assumpsit creationem vergere in gloriam Dei, ex hoc scilicet quod creatio pullulat et exoritur ex sola omnipotentia. Modo solus Deus omnipotens a Christi fidelibus affirmatur, et in hoc ab eisdem glorificatur et laudatur.

Ad 2<sup>am</sup> rationem meam, que est Bonaventure circa principium <sup>2i</sup> *Sententiarum*, que erat ista: “quia creatio est inter non esse et esse, inter que est infinita distantia, ad quam actio /153v/ creature se non exten-

191 actum] quid sit potentia *add. mg.* 196 sua] *iter. s.l.* 200 non] n *add. sed del.* 202 penitus] divinam *add. sed del.* 203 probo] quod non sit ponenda potentia Dei absoluta *add. mg.* 219 Bottom margin] causa est animi impulsio ad aliquid agendum. Officium (ecclesiasticum; civile) est congruens actus unius cuiusque secundum morem (ecclesie; patre)

190–191 cum – actum: ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica*, IX, c. 2, 1046b–1048a. 205 omnis – ordinata: BONAVENTURA, *Commentaria in IV libros Sententiarum*, I, dist. 43, dubia circa litteram Magistri, du. 7, col. 1, l. 26–31. 218–219 quia – distantia: BONAVENTURA, *Commentaria in IV libros Sententiarum*, II, dist. 1, pars 1, art. 2, q. 2, p. 28, col. 2, l. 34.

dit, cum quolibet creatura sit virtutis finite, non infinite. Nulla igitur  
creatura creabit” — 220

Respondet magister meus primo quod hec ratio innitatur falso fun-  
damento, illo videlicet, quod creans incipiat suam actionem a termino  
a quo et pertingat ad terminum ad quem, inter quos terminos est di-  
stantia infinita, qui termini sunt non esse vel nichil et esse sive aliquid, 225  
termini contradictorii, quod falsum dicit esse, secundum strictitudinem  
veri sermonis loquendo.

Sed revera, cum omni reverentia et humilitate magistri mei, ratio fac-  
ta innititur verissimo et solidissimo fundamento, huic videlicet, quod  
idem esse et non esse est impossibile. Quod quidem fundamentum, teste 230  
etiam Aristotele in *Prima philosophia* sua, semen est omnis doctrine.  
Unde et repugnantia inter non esse et esse est maxima, ad quam etiam  
Aristoteles ultimate omne inconueniens reducit in suis argumentationi-  
bus contra adversarios, dicens: tunc idem esset et non esset, velud ibi sit  
status omnis inconuenientis. Secundum igitur strictitudinem veri sermo- 235  
nis, inter non esse et esse est infinitissima distantia, et per consequens  
si omnino nichil debet reduci ad aliquid, et surgere in esse hoc solum  
erit ab agente infinite virtutis, cuiusmodi est Deus, quia et impossibile  
est creaturam, que limitata et artata est, agere per potentiam infinitam.  
Nec, cum reverentia magistri mei, fundamentum rationis facte est sicut 240  
ipse ponit, videlicet quod creans incipiat suam actionem a termino a  
quo et pertingat ad terminum ad quem, quia terminus a quo in creatio-  
ne est met creans, scilicet Deus, in quem non cadit inceptio, Jacobi 1<sup>o</sup>  
<17>: *Apud quem non est transmutatio, nec vicissitudinis obumbratio.*  
Unde creatio dicitur esse de nichilo, creatio etiam nichilominus dicitur 245  
esse a Deo. Ideo creatio habitudinem dicit ad non esse precedens, et ad  
summum esse producens, de ratione sui nominis, et sic creatio significat  
exitum de non esse in esse.

2<sup>o</sup> decipit magister meus semetipsum false arguendo, semper tamen  
cum reverentia magistri mei, cum sic dicit: /154r/ “Creatio etiam secun- 250  
dum antiquos doctores, qui sunt de via magistri mei, vere et realiter non  
habet nisi unum terminum, puta terminum ad quem. Unde cum non  
esse nichil sit in rerum natura, tunc ab eo vere et realiter non incipitur  
motus, nec attingitur ab agente, et ex consequente non vere et realiter

235 status] s\* *add. sed del.* 237 surgere] *iter. s.l.*

247–248 creatio – in esse: BONAVENTURA, *Commentaria in IV libros Sententiarum*,  
II, dist. 1, pars 1, art. 3, q. 2, p. 34, col. 2, l. 11–17.

255 est distantia inter non esse et esse.” Nam ipse arguit acsi creatio esset  
 motus, qui est endelechia, sive actus entis, qui quidem motus partim est  
 in termino a quo et partim in termino ad quem — quod falsum est, cum  
 motus sit mutatio temporalis in esse, sed creatio est sine tempore muta-  
 260 tio ad esse, nichil aliud ponens quam nunc primo esse. Et ideo non ponit  
 aliquid aliud quam esse secundum rem. Et sic creatio in comparatione  
 ad non esse dicit medium non diversum per essentiam, sed secundum  
 rationem.

Magister meus etiam subsumit falsum. Dicit enim quod distantia pro-  
 prie solum sit inter existentia, sicut et differentia. Nam si magister meus  
 265 bene inspexisset Aristotelem, V<sup>o</sup> *Metaphysice*, de distinctionibus nomi-  
 num, ipse reperisset quod illa proprie dicuntur differentia quecumque  
 diversa sunt idem aliquid entia, id est quecumque sunt diversa et conve-  
 niunt in aliquo eodem. Et si considerate pervidisset decimo *Metaphysice*,  
 ipse reperisset in qualibet oppositione fore distantiam. Constat autem  
 270 contradictionem que est inter ens et non ens esse maximam oppositio-  
 num, igitur in contradictione erit distantia.

Ulterius insufficienter dicit magister meus quando dicit: “Ex motivo  
 magistri mei, sequitur quod nulla natura possit subito producere aliquid  
 vel generare aliquid simpliciter, Eo quod inter tales terminos productio-  
 275 nis vel generationis est distantia infinita, quia terminus a quo est non  
 esse, terminus ad quem est esse, sicut in creatione, ut patet ex communi  
 philosophia.” Certe ego nego consequens illatum. Cuius causa est quia  
 generatio simpliciter dicta, ut patet per Philosophum primo *De genera-*  
*tione*, est ex potestate substantia. Et sic terminus a quo generationis  
 280 substantie non est omnino non ens, ymmo est potestate ens. Ideo etiam  
 dicitur generatio ab Aristotele “transmutatio huius totius in hoc totum,”  
 nullo subiecto ut sensibili manente eodem. Secus autem est de creatione,  
 in qua simpliciter non ens exit in esse. Nec, ut magister meus assumit,  
 illa est communis philosophia, cum communis philosophia solum sit illo-  
 285 rum /154v/ qui insequuntur Aristotelem, principem Perypatheticorum.

Similiter deficit magister meus in allegatione dicti Dinandi, cum assu-  
 mit formam et privationem se habere sicut ens et nichil, quorum distan-

**268** considerate] perf\* *add. sed del.* **273** natura] p *add. sed del.* **276** terminus] terminus *s.l.* est] *s.l.* **280** est] *iter. sed del.* **282** nullo subiecto] nulla substantia *a.c. s.l.*; in sp *add. sed del.* eodem] eadem *a.c. s.l.* secus] a\*\* *add. sed del.* **286** allegatione] dicte *del.*

**259–260** et ideo – rem: BONAVENTURA, *Commentaria in IV libros Sententiarum*, II, dist. 1, pars 1, art. 3, q. 2, p. 34, col. 2, l. 22–28. **260–262** creatio – rationem: BONAVENTURA, *Commentaria in IV libros Sententiarum*, II, dist. 1, pars 1, art. 3, q. 2, p. 34, col. 2, l. 36–38. **266–267** dicuntur – entia: ARISTOTELES, *Metaphysica*, V, c. 9, 1018a12–13.



tiam absolvit agens naturale. Nam privatio non est purum nichil, cum Aristoteles primo *Physicorum*, probando privationem esse unum principium rerum naturalium de tribus principiis, et esse principium per se fieri rei, dicit ipse: Omne quod fit, fit per se ex opposito. Et exemplificat: musicum fit ex non musico, non ex quolibet non musico, sed ex in musico. 290

De duplici autem consideratione distantie inter ens et non ens, quam ponit, ut dicit magister meus, Sanctus Thomas in *Scripto* quarti, illa non sit ad propositum. Et ego non multum debeam gaudere de ea, assignans causam, “eo quod creatio, que est mutatio, non respicit distantiam ex parte non entis, sed ex parte entis, que distantia est finita.” Salva reverentia magistri mei, bene credo quod distinctio sua de consideratione duplici ipsius distantie inter ens et non ens non sit ad propositum, ut per se fatetur. Nego tamen sibi quod creatio penitus non respiciat distantiam ex parte non entis. Inymaginabile enim est et inintelligibile quod distantia inter ens et non ens non respiceret utrumque, cum medium respiciat extrema. Nec sequitur, ut magister meus videtur pretendere, ‘Ens finitum est, igitur ens non distat a non ente infinite’, cum distantia importet respectum intermedium inter ens et non ens et non respectum ad unum extremum tantum. 295 300 305

Ad tertiam rationem meam, qua sic arguebam: “creatura creatione esset producta et effecta; si igitur ipsa creatura crearet, efficeret creationem, et per creationem esset effecta; igitur idem esset efficiens et effectum, et idem gigneret se, quod non capit intellectus” — 310

Respondet magister meus concedendo quod creatura creationem efficeret, loquendo de creatione passiva, que est quid creatum. Et negat ultimum illatum, scilicet quod ergo idem gigneret se. Et dat simile de generato per generationem effecto, quod ulterius etiam generationem efficit. 315

Cum reverentia magistri mei, consequentia est optima, quia ex quo in rebus est ordo fluens a primo in medium, capiam igitur primam creationem /155r/ et sit A. De illo A arguam sic: A est prima rerum creatarum, igitur A est maxime potentie et virtutis, et maioris quam quodcumque 2<sup>m</sup> creatum, ut suppono. Et ergo si creatura creationem efficiat, maxime A habebit posse creare ex se, quantum est ex parte producti, ut 320

**291** ipse] aristoteles *a.c. s.l.* **292** ex] *iter. sed del.*

**292–293** musicum – in musico: ARISTOTELES, *Physica*, I, c. 7. **297–298** non respicit – entis: THOMAS DE AQUINO, *In IV Sententiarum*, dist. 5, q. 1, art. 3, quaestiuicula 3, resp. ad argum. 5, l. 48–50, ed. M.F. MOOS, t. 4, Paris 1947, p. 210.

dicit positio magistri mei, secluso omni alio. Ponatur igitur illud posse  
 325 in esse, et cum iam seclusus sit Deus et omne creatum, ex casu posito,  
 A creat; et non nisi se, quia non Deum, nec aliud creatum, cum per  
 casum nullum aliud creatum sit; ergo A creabit et gignet semetipsum,  
 quod erat consequens illatum.

Et tantum de primo puncto quo magister meus rationes per me factas  
 nitebatur dissolvere, sed, ut clare deductum est, minime solute sunt.

330 Sed quoad 2<sup>m</sup>, ubi magister meus nititur ostendere quod non satis fe-  
 cerim motivis suis, dicens quod creare creature communicatum dicat  
 limitationem et habeat dependentiam ab ipso primo, quod necessario  
 presupponit ex parte producentis.

335 Sed mirabile est valde de magistro meo quod limitationem ponit in  
 creante creatura ex parte producentis, cum omnis artatio et limita-  
 tio creature sit per susceptaculum creature sive subsistentiam creature,  
 quod in spiritualibus a Boetio in libro *De hebdomadibus* dicitur ‘quod  
 est’, et in materialibus dicitur ‘materia’.

340 Item si creare isto modo dicit limitationem in suo dorso, ut refert ma-  
 gister meus, tunc ex se habet limitationem, non ex parte producentis.  
 Et per consequens erit finite virtutis, non infinite virtutis sive omnipot-  
 entie, cum soli Deo conveniat omnipotentia. Quod et fidei symbolum  
 ipsorum Apostolorum innuere videtur, cum omnipotentie illico annectit  
 345 creationem, dicens: *Credo in Deum Patrem omnipotentem, creatorem  
 celi et terre*, quasi in creatione velut in effectu reluceat omnipotentia.

Magister meus ulterius tangit, et valde difficulter, cum dicit: “Item de  
 facto sic est quod agens naturale producit aliquem effectum cum con-  
 cursu materie, sed totam causalitatem, tam agentis naturalis, quam ma-  
 350 terie, cum sit finita, Deus potest unire in uno simplici agente, quo facto,  
 tale plenarie causaliter effectum illum continens poterit ipsum produ-  
 cere, nullo principio materiali concurrente, ita quod ab ipso fluat sicut  
 gutta de fonte.”

Dico quod utique Deus posset, sed non faciet, nec fiet. Primo, non  
 faciet, quia ex quo Deus operatur secundum sapientiam et distinctio-  
 355 nem, tunc considerat congruitatem agendi et convenientiam, non autem

**336** susceptaculum: PROCLUS, *Elementatio theologica translata a Guillelmo de Mor-  
 becca*, prop. 205–210, ed. H. BOESE, Leiden 1987, pp. 100–102. **337–338** quod est:  
 BOETHIUS, *De hebdomadibus*, ed. C. MORESCHINI, Lipsia 2000, p. 187, l. 26–28.  
**344–345** credo – omnipotentia: CONCILIA OECUMENICA ET GENERALIA ECCLESIAE  
 CATHOLICAE, *Concilium Nicaenum I* a. 325, expositio fidei, p. 5, l. 2.

conueniens est Deo condiciones rerum auferre. Nec fiet, quia tante activitatis creata creatura non est capax, ymmo impossibile est /155v/ totam Dei activitatem recipi a creatura.

Verum, quia secundum Commentatorem, impossibile est admittendum dummodo ex eo non arguatur, admissio illo quod Deus totam causalitatem, tam agentis naturalis, quam materie, uniat in uno simplici agente, adhuc effectus ab eodem simplici agente non flueret sicut gutta de fonte. Et causa est quia cum illud simplex agens non esset Deus, tunc non esset sua actio seu sua causalitas, ergo in productione effectus servaret condicionem causalitatis agentis naturalis et materie, que est semper in materia. Et tamen ex casu posito non esset in materia, et sic esset in materia et non esset in materia, ergo casus implicat. Et causalitas etiam illa esset secundum modum materie et tamen non secundum modum materie, ex quo, secundum Boetium: "Omne quod recipitur, recipitur per modum recipientis, et non recepti."

Ulterius magister meus impugnat aliam solutionem meam de repugnantia. Dico quod magister meus non aspexit causam repugnantie quam posui, videlicet limitationem nature create sive artationem, que non attingit distantiam inter non esse et esse. Nec sequitur: 'Est repugnantia ex parte producti, ergo producto simpliciter repugnat ex nichilo produci', ut arguit magister meus. Et causa quare non sequatur hec est: quia Deus productum produxit ex nichilo et non ipsa creatura producti produxit productum.

Et quando ulterius dicit magister meus, probando quod ratione productionis non est repugnantia, quia tali productione potest a Deo produci — illam nego, saltem ut posse refertur ad produci. Secus esset si referretur ad producere.

De tertio, in quo magister meus adversatur michi in duobus — primo in hoc quod dicebam theologiam esse specialem scientiam et esse de omnibus, sive sint res, sive signa, in quantum induunt rationem credibilis, et secundo quod dicebam theologiam esse scientiam affectivam — hoc requireret magnam tractationem propter multa subtilia puncta que te-

**377** et] *s.l.* **381** posse] revertur *add. sed del.* produci] *iter. sed del.* **383** in] tribus *add. sed del.* duobus] *mg.* **386** theologiam] theoloyam

**369–370** omne – recepti: AUCTORITATES ARISTOTELIS, opus 11 (*Liber de causis*), ed. J. HAMESSE, Louvain - Paris 1974, p. 232, l. 94, n. 12. BONAVENTURA, *Commentaria in IV libros Sententiarum*, II, dist. 14, pars 2, a. 2, q. 2, concl., p. 361, col. 2, l. 11–12. **384–385** de omnibus – credibilis: BONAVENTURA, *Commentaria in IV libros Sententiarum*, I, *prooemii quaestiones*, q. 1, concl., p. 8, col. 1, l. 20–26.

tigit magister meus in suo principio. Ideo ne generem fastidium vestris paternitatibus et reverentiis, ad presens supersedeo.

390 Et converto me ad gratiarum actiones.

Regratior ergo in primis omnipotenti Deo trino et uno, beate Dei genitrici Marie Virgini totique curie supercelesti, qui donis suis et intercessionibus me hucusque preservaverunt.

395 Deinde vobis, magistris meis et dominis et omnibus benefactoribus vivis et defunctis, vobis et ipsis optando requiem ac beatitudinem eternam, cuius nos participes efficiat qui sine fine vivit et regnat.

Amen.

## Appendix no. II

Bartolomaeus de Traiecto

*Brocardae duae ad secundum librum Sententiarum*

Tübingen, Universitätsbibliothek, Mc. 31, f. 137r

Duo dicta posui brocardica. Primum, quod creatio est creature communicabilis de potentia Dei absoluta, prout scilicet creatio dicit productionem alicuius ex nichilo, id est nullo presupposito quantum est ex parte producti, licet non sit alicui creature communicata nec in futurum communicabilibus de potentia ordinata.

5

Secundam partem declaravi per multa dicta sanctorum qui loquuntur ad hoc quod creatio non sit creature communicabilis, quos omnes traxi ad sensum.

Secunde partis conclusionis primam partem probavi multipliciter. Primo, quia nulla apparet contradictio vel repugnantia in hoc quod Deus per suam infinitam potentiam et immensam bonitatem vellet active aliquid fieri a creatura sine passo, ita quod innixionem actionis creature ad passum vel terminum a quo et eius habitudinem suppleret Deus, et aliunde secum produceret actionem suam sine passo sicut prius cum passo.

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Et confirmatur, nam si repugnantiam aliquam in se clauderet, maxime esset illa, quia per creationem talem creature attributam argueretur creatura talis creans infinita vel esse extra limites creature posita. Sed nullum illorum. Maior est adversariorum. Minor patet. Non primum, quia si argueretur infinita, vel hoc esset ratione termini producti, aut ratione productionis passive, aut ratione distantie inter terminum a quo et terminum ad quem, <aut> ratione modi producendi. Non primum, eo quod omnis terminus productus creationis est finitus. Similiter declaratur 2<sup>m</sup>. Nec 3<sup>m</sup>, videlicet ratione distantie, quia nulla est distantia ibi, quoniam taxanda sit secundum quantitatem termini positivi, qui est finitus. Unde non videtur ibi esse potius distantia infinita que impedit quam in productione qua producitur forma modo naturali de non esse ad esse in materia.

20

25

Nec potest dici 2<sup>m</sup>, videlicet quod ponit creaturam extra limites creature, nam cum creare illo modo non excludit dependentiam in ipsa crea-

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1 brocardica] borcardica *ms.*

**10–12** quia – passo: ADAM WODEHAM, *Lectura super quartum Sententiarum*, Bruges, BM, Ms. 172, 2va, l. 26–27, HENRICUS TOTTING DE OYTA, *Abbreuiatio Lecturae Oxoniensis Adae de Wodeham*, Mainz, Wissenschaftliche Stadtbibliothek, Hs. I 53a, f. 72v, l. 23–24.

tura creature, nec excludit dependentiam ipsius in creando ab alio creature secum cui concreat, sed solum innixum ipsius cause 2<sup>e</sup> super subiectum sive materiam, qua sustentatur actio cuius vicem potest supplere Deus in tali productione seu creatione, non ut Deus sit materia, sed ut vi  
 35 sua sustentante actionem active, actio sic sustentata fluat ab agente sibi concreante, ita, videtur, non oporteat talem actionem inniti materie.

Secundum dictum posui in conclusione tertia eiusdem articuli, quod quamvis mundum vel aliam rem creatam fuisse ab eterno pro nunc est impossibile, adhuc tamen tale fuisse ab eterno non includit repugnantiam per se et absolute.  
 40

Prima pars patet, quia eius opponitur est pro nunc necessarium eo quod transivit in preteritum.

Secundam partem declaravi sicut declarat eam magister Henricus de Euta in *Questionibus*, et fundatur declaratio super illo, quia de ratione creature tria sunt, scilicet quod sit ens, et quod sit producta ab alio, et quod sit de nichilo, saltem quantum ultimam resolutionem etc.  
 45

Variis occupatus, non scribo probationem ulteriorem, quia non credo quod sit necesse. Et sicut dixi vobis, M. Henricus de Euta omnia argumenta quodammodo antiquorum, que in ista materia consueverunt, adduci, multa et difficilia. Etiam Holkot et aliorum modernorum ipse ad oppositum adducit, tam primi dicti quam etiam 2<sup>i</sup>. Si placuerit videre, invenietis ibi bene difficiles rationes intricatas, multe valde etiam in numero. Et non oportebit multum vos occupare si non habueritis eum in Helpronna. Postquam venietis ad Heydelbergum in una nocte colligetis  
 50 contra me tot rationes possetis. Ad duas habeas igitur replicare, etiam in difficilibus argumentis que varias difficultates tangunt.  
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**135–42** quamvis – preteritum: HENRICUS TOTTING DE OYTA, *Questiones s. II Sent.*, q. 11, a. 2, München, BS, Clm 17468, f. 184rb, l. 35–39. **44–46** quia – resolutionem: HENRICUS TOTTING DE OYTA, *Questiones s. II Sent.*, q. 11, a. 2, München, BS, Clm 17468, f. 184va, l. 2–6.

## Appendix II

## Scheme of the debate between Bartholomew of Maastricht and John Wenck

Bartolomaeus de Traiecto <i>Brocardae duae ad II S.</i>	Johannes Wenck <i>ad I Sententiarum</i>	Bartolomaeus de Traiecto <i>Principium</i> (deperditum)	Johannes Wenck <i>ad II Sententiarum</i>
Brocardus I, pars A (positio) f. 137r, l. 1–19 “Creatio est creature communicabilis... nullum illorum”	Brocardus I, A f. 141r, l. 38–f. 141v, l. 35 “Creatio est creature communicabilis... nullum illorum”.		
Brocardus II (positio) f. 137, l. 20–26 “Secundum dictum ... dereliquit”	Repl. W contr. II f. 141v, l. 36–f. 142r, l. 7 “Secundum dictum ... dereliquit”		
	Repl. W contr. I – II f. 142r, l. 8–15 “Insuper et ambo dicta illa... dictum eiusdem”		
	Repl.1 W contr. I A f. 142r, l. 15–23 “per nullam potentiam... creationem creature non communicabit”		Repl.1 W contr. I A f. 152v, l. 1–7 “per nullam potentiam... creationem creature non communicabit”
		Repl. 1 B contr. Rep. 1 W ? “gloria Dei uno modo... secundo modo dictam”	Repl. 1 B contr. Rep. 1 W f. 152v, l. 8–15 “gloria Dei uno modo... secundo modo dictam”

Bartolomaeus de Traiecto <i>Brocardae duae ad II S.</i>	Johannes Wenck <i>ad I Sententiarum</i>	Bartolomaeus de Traiecto <i>Principium</i> (deperditum)	Johannes Wenck <i>ad II Sententiarum</i>
			Repl. 1 W2 contr. Repl. 1 B f. 152v, l. 15–f. 153r, l. 30 ⟨a⟩ f. 152v, l. 17–30 ⟨b⟩ f. 153r, l. 1–24 ⟨c⟩ f. 153r, l. 24–30 “Sed salva reverentia... laudatur”
	Repl. 2 W contr. I A f. 142r, l. 23–27 “quia creatio est inter non esse et esse... nulla igitur creatura creabit”		Repl. 2 W contr. I A f. 153r, l. 30–153v, l. 2 “quia creatio est inter non esse et esse... nulla igitur creatura creabit”
		Repl 2 B contr. 2 W ? “primo, quod hec ratio... sermonis loquendo”	Repl 2 B contr. 2 W f. 153v, l. 2–7 “primo, quod hec ratio... sermonis loquendo”
			Repl. 2 W2 contr. Repl. 2 B f. 153v, l. 7–154r, l. 12 ⟨a⟩ f. 153v, l. 7–28 ⟨b⟩ f. 153v, l. 28–154r, l. 12 “Sed reversa... sed secundum rationem
		Repl 2 B2 contr. 2 W ? “distantia proprie... sicut et differentia”.	Repl 2 B contr. 2 W f. 153v, l. 13 “distantia proprie... sicut et differentia”.



<p>Bartolomaeus de Traiecto <i>Brocardae duae ad II S.</i></p>	<p>Johannes Wenck <i>ad I Sententiarum</i></p>	<p>Bartolomaeus Traiecto <i>Principium</i> (deperditum)</p>	<p>Johannes Wenck <i>ad II Sententiarum</i></p>
			<p>Repl 2 W3 contr. 2 B2 f. 153v, l. 13–20 “nam si magister meus...erit distantia”.</p>
		<p>Repl. 2 B3 contr. 2 W ? “nulla natura pos- sit...ex communi philosophia”</p>	<p>Repl. 2 B3 contr. 2 W f. 153v, l. 21–24 “nulla natura pos- sit...ex communi philosophia” Repl 2 W 4 contr. 2 B3 f. 153v, l. 24–154v, l. 22 ⟨a⟩ f. 154r, l. 24–154v, l. 1 ⟨b⟩ f. 154v, l. 1–9 ⟨c⟩ f. 154v, l. 9–22 “Certe ego nego... extremum tantum”</p>
	<p>Repl. 3 W contr. I A f. 142r, l. 27–30 “creatura creatio- ne... quod non capit intellectus”</p>		<p>Repl. 3 W contr. A f. 154v, l. 22–25 “creatura creatio- ne... quod non capit intellectus”</p>
		<p>Repl. 3 B contr. 3 W ? “creatura creatio- nem... generatio- nem efficit”</p>	<p>Repl. 3 B contr. 3 W f. 154v, l. 26–29 “creatura creatio- nem... generatio- nem efficit”</p>

Bartolomaeus de Traiecto <i>Brocardae duae ad II S.</i>	Johannes Wenck <i>ad I Sententiarum</i>	Bartolomaeus de Traiecto <i>Principium</i> (deperditum)	Johannes Wenck <i>ad II Sententiarum</i>
			Repl. 3 W contr. 3 B f. 154v, l. 29–155r, l. 9 “consequencia est optima... minime solvere”
Brocardus I, pars B (ratio) f. 137r, l. 5–6 “nulla apparet contradictio vel repugnantia ... passo”.	Brocardus I B f. 142r, l. 33–36 “nulla apparet contradictio vel repugnantia ... passo”.		
	Repl. 4 W contr. B f. 142r, l. 36–142v, l. 13 “illam declino... id quod subicitur”.		
Brocardus I, pars C (ratio) f. 137r, l. 15–16 “creare illo modo non excludit dependentiam... secum”		Arg. 1 in B–C ? “creare creature communicatum... ex parte producentis”.	Arg. in B–C f. 155r, l. 11–12 “creare creature communicatum... ex parte producentis”. Repl. W 1 contr Arg. 1 in C f. 155r, l. 12–22 “Sed mirabile... relucet omnipotentia”

Bartolomaeus de Traiecto <i>Brocardae duae ad II S.</i>	Johannes Wenck <i>ad I Sententiarum</i>	Bartolomaeus de Traiecto <i>Principium</i> (deperditum)	Johannes Wenck <i>ad II Sententiarum</i>
		Arg. 2 in B–C ?	Arg. 2 in B–C f. 155r, l. 23–27
		“Item de facto... gutta de fonte”	“agens naturale... cum sit finita” Repl. W2 contr Arg. 2 in C f. 155r, l. 28–155v, l. 11 “Dico quod... non recepti”
		Arg 3 in B–C ?	Arg. 3 in B–C f. 155v, l. 12
		“de repugnantia”	“de repugnantia” Repl. W3 contr. Arg. 3 in C f. 155v, l. 12–18 “dico quod... productum”
		Arg. 4 in B–C “ratione productionis... produci”	Arg. 4 in B–C f. 155, l. 18–20 “ratione productionis... produci” Repl. 4 in B–C f. 155, l. 20–21 “illam nego.. producere”
		Arg. 5 in B–C “theologiam esse spiritualem... affectivam”	Arg. 5 in B–C f. 155v, l. 23–25 “theologiam esse spiritualem... affectivam”