

Land Lost, Land Redistributed: Citizenship and Property between Stability and Change in the Archaic and Classical Greek World

Donatella Erdas

Università degli Studi di Milano

ORCID: 0000-0002-4137-3685

DOI: 10.54103/milanoup.292.c751

ABSTRACT:

Under what circumstances did a *polis* decide to expropriate the land of all or part of its citizens and redistribute it, and to what extent could popular pressure influence these decisions? Or were these instead purely political and practical choices, linked to changes in the *polis*' demographic structure? Through three selected case studies (late Archaic Cyrene, and fifth-century BC Leontinoi and Samos), this paper proposes some hypotheses addressing these questions. Particular attention is given to the historical and political context, while also considering the ideological factors that, from a certain point onwards, shaped the relationship between authoritarian governments and land redistribution.

KEYWORDS: *gēs anadasmus*; land redistribution; citizenship and land; demographic crisis.

One of the earliest attestations of the term *gēs anadasmus* occurs in the law of Himera in Sicily, inscribed on a bronze tablet datable to the early years of the fifth century BCE. The only other known attestation—slightly earlier in date—appears in the well-known Locrian law preserved on the so-called Pappadakis bronze.¹ The Himeran document raises several noteworthy issues. In particular, the involvement of the phratries mentioned in l. 4 suggests that the measure presupposed the admission of new citizens into the *apoikia*. It is plausible that these newly admitted *politai* were the intended recipients of the house plots (*oikopedai*) referred to at the beginning of the text (l. 1).

1 *IG IX 1^{2.3} 609*. The law is dated to the late sixth or early fifth century BCE on palaeographic grounds. Among the numerous contributions on the meaning of *δαιθμὸν ... γαδαισίας* (ll. 10-11), see in particular Maffi 1987 and Zurbach 2017, II, 547-56; for a synthesis of the various interpretations, as well as further considerations on land redistribution in this text, see Erdas forthcoming. For a comprehensive overview of the phenomenon of *gēs anadasmus*, see Appendix, s.n.

In this light, the Himeran law seems to envisage a redistribution or fresh allocation of land within the urban area, coordinated through civic and kinship structures. The document thus provides rare and valuable evidence not only for the use of the term *gēs anadasmōs*, but also for the mechanisms through which a community incorporated new members and reorganised its urban space accordingly. We can only surmise that extra-urban land may also have been distributed. This is due in part to the poor preservation of the tablet, which had been folded after the law was repealed; however, a possible reference to this may be found in lines 10-12 (“whether he assigns or divides bad or good land”, according to the interpretation of O. Tribulato).²

What remains far from certain, however, is whether these allocations were the result of a redistribution of land previously owned by the *politai*. While it is true that the term γέεξ ἀναδαίθυμῳ appears in the inscription, it is found within a penal clause directed against those who might damage the bronze tablet or violate its provisions, in lines 12-15 (“such a person shall be in the same position as one who... mentions a land redistribution”, following Tribulato’s translation).³ It remains unclear whether this clause refers to an actual situation or serves as an ideological reference—that is, whether the mention of *gēs anadasmōs* implies a hypothetical, non-actual scenario, which nevertheless represented the gravest of penalties.⁴

We are therefore dealing with a case of urban land allocation in a context of probable expansion of the citizen body. A different situation emerges, however, when a *polis* loses a certain number of *politai*—as a result of various circumstances—and land and houses consequently become available for new citizens. It is in this context that the conditions arise for a new distribution of private land.

In 1966, David Asheri devoted an entire chapter of his book on land distribution in ancient Greece to *gēs anadasmōs*, successfully identifying the legal features regulating the phenomenon as well as its ideological significance in ancient sources.⁵ Building on the conclusions he reached, I would now like to shift the focus toward the loss or acquisition of land ownership in connection with the loss or acquisition of citizenship rights, and attempt to offer some

2 SEG 47.1427, ll. 10-12; Tribulato 2021, 180-81. On the interpretation of the document see also De Vido 2023; Faraguna 2024, 126-27; Erdas forthcoming.

3 SEG 47.1427, ll. 12-15: τοῖ αὐτῷ αὐτὸν ἔχε[σθαι] ἐν ἡούπερ ἡ[ὸς μὲ] λ[ἀχθῶ]ν γέεξ ἀναδαίθυμῳ|15 μνέσεται. Tribulato 2021, 185-186; 188 (“Sia costui nella stessa posizione di colui che [...] menzioni una divisione della terra”).

4 The clause may serve as a sanction or a deterrent, exactly like *arai* and imprecations in Greek laws. Seen in this perspective, the closest example is the ratification clause in the so-called Law of Kadys (Delphi, *FD* III 1.294, col. vii, ll. 4-6, between the end of the fifth and the beginning of the fourth century BCE: ἐν ταῖ ἀρά[ι] ἔστ[ω] ὥς κ' αἱ τις [τὰν γὰρ ἀνα]δαστὸν ποιῶι ἢ χρ[εῶν] | ἀπο[κοπᾶν]. For similar implications in the Pappadakis bronze (*IG* IX 1² 3 609, ll. 9-14), see Rubinstein 2007, 273 n. 8. A possibility that remains open for both the law of Himera and the Pappadakis bronze is that the clause not only entails a sanction for those who fail to comply with the law, but also aims to prevent the occurrence of an actual redistribution.

5 Asheri 1966, 43-60.

hypotheses that might address the question posed above. In this sense, it may be useful to investigate not only the causes that lead to the loss or acquisition of land and citizenship, but also the strategies adopted by the *poleis* to manage such situations, especially when they result in a partial or complete revision of private properties. It is clear, in fact, that when a redistribution of private land is carried out, the state undertaking such an action bears specific responsibilities.

This paper aims particularly to explore some of the circumstances that lead to the decision to redistribute land when an imbalance arises between the composition of the citizen body and the territory of the *polis*: the suppression or exile of parts of the citizen body due to social or political conflicts, the loss of male citizens as a result of war, a conspicuous growth in population, the need to increase the number of new *politai*, or, finally, the social pressure created by economic disparity. Such imbalances inevitably give rise to the need to allocate vacant land or, at least in part, to redistribute private property when the increase in the number of citizens exceeds the available resources.

As the three case studies chosen for this inquiry (Cyrene in the late sixth century BCE, Leontini after 424 BCE, and Samos in 412 BCE) show, the dynamics vary greatly, as do the outcomes, although—as we shall see—some general patterns can be identified, even in those cases (two out of three) in which the agrarian redistribution plan was ultimately not carried out. What remains consistently central is the relationship between citizenship and landownership:⁶ in the cases examined, the granting of citizenship is never a purely formal act. Since it is not merely formal but substantive, it is always accompanied by the allocation of a plot of land and a house. In fact, in at least one case, it seems that the prospect of a new allocation of land within a *polis* served as the very stimulus for the admission of new citizens, rather than the other way around.

1. Cyrene, Arcesilaus III, new citizens and *gēs anadasmōs*

The first case study we will examine is quite well known: it is reported by Herodotus and concerns late Archaic Cyrene. The history of Cyrene, like that of many colonial foundations, was marked by deep instability from the very beginning, particularly with regard to the management of agrarian property. Shortly after the foundation, the land was divided in such a way as to leave a portion unassigned (*γᾶς τὰς ἀδεσπότης*), to be held in reserve for future allocations to *epoikoi* who would become Cyrenaean *politai*, as stated in the famous oath of the founders.⁷

6 On the centrality of the link between citizen status and landownership from the Archaic period onward, see especially Faraguna 2024; for a more cautious view regarding the strength of this connection in emerging societies, see Duplouy 2018b, 18–23.

7 *IG Cyrenaica*² 011000, ll. 32–33: [καὶ π]ο[λιτείας] καὶ τιμὰμ πεδέχ[εν] | καὶ γᾶς τὰς ἀδεσπότης [ἀπολαγ]χάνεν. “[and to] grant [citizenship] and honours | and allot a share of the unassigned land”. This territory was probably marginal and should be located in the Libyan area.

Shortly thereafter, however, the situation changed significantly, even in a *polis* depicted as *oligandros*, such as Cyrene.⁸ Herodotus reports that the first programme of *gēs anadasmōs* was requested as early as the sixth century BCE, when the Cyrenaeans appealed to King Battus “Eudaimon” (Battus II). On that occasion, Battus planned to summon new colonists to Cyrene with a twofold aim: on the one hand, to curb the economic dominance of the Theran aristocracy, and on the other, to expand Cyrenean territory at the expense of neighbouring populations (Hdt. 4.159.5).⁹ On this occasion, in fact, the territory of the *polis* proved insufficient to accommodate the massive population increase. As a consequence, it became necessary to appropriate part of the adjacent Libyan *chōra*, a measure that, unsurprisingly, entailed significant repercussions.¹⁰ The new distribution carried out, however, did not in practice alter the existing agrarian structure of the *apoikia*; rather, it resulted in the occupation of land that had not yet been allotted (*erēmos chōra*) as well as of Libyan territory. In effect, Herodotus’ narrative appears to reproduce the framework already prescribed in the founders’ oath.¹¹

As Asheri already noted, this episode plays on the double meaning of the term *anadasmōs* and related forms (*andaithmos*, *dasmōs*, *daithmos*), which in ancient sources, both literary and epigraphic, may be used in either an iterative or a distributive sense. While in some cases variations in the use of these terms within the same context point to different meanings, in others a single term may carry two distinct nuances. An example of the former is provided by the Pappadakis bronze mentioned above, where both *andaithmos* (l. 1), denoting an

For a new edition with Italian translation, see Rosamilia 2023b, no. 1, 229–32, with updated bibliography; cf. Boffa 2021. I do not address here the question of the oath’s authenticity, which is summarised in Rosamilia 2023b, 52–53. For further discussion of the allocation of land, see Erdas 2025a, 150–51; on the role of property in the formation of the citizen body see Mackil 2017, 76.

8 For the number of 200 household units, which remained stable for 50 years after its foundation, see Hdt. 4.159.1 with Asheri 1966, 25ff. However, the figure of 7,000 hoplites killed at the Battle of Leucon suggests—and Herodotus himself was aware of it—a much larger population (Hdt. 4.160.3, ca. 560 BCE). Laronde indeed estimates a larger population, but his figures refer to chronological phases that are better documented from an urbanistic perspective (Laronde 1999). See Schaus 2024, 92–93.

9 For a full treatment of the episode see Jähne 1988, 154ff.

10 Asheri 1966, 29. The involvement of Egypt, where the Libyan *perioikoi* expelled by Battus sought refuge, was undoubtedly one of the most serious consequences (Hdt. 4.159.4: συλλεχθέντος δὲ ὁμίλου πολλοῦ ἐς τὴν Κυρήνην περιταμνόμενοι γῆν πολλήν οἱ περίοικοι Λίβυες καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν, τῷ οὐνόμα ἦν Ἀδικράν, οἷα τῆς τε χώρας στερισκόμενοι καὶ περὺβριζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Κυρηναίων, πέμψαντες ἐς Αἴγυπτον ἔδοσαν σφέας αὐτοὺς Ἀπρίη τῷ Αἰγύπτου βασιλεῖ).

11 The recurrence of the same model—namely, the use of uncultivated land from Libyan territory for new allotments—across two different chronological phases may provide grounds for reconsidering both the authenticity of the founders’ oath and its connection with the Herodotean account of the foundation of Cyrene.

allotment rather than a redistribution of land (and thus used in a distributive sense), and *daithmos* (l. 10), referring instead to a new division (and therefore possibly to a redistribution), are employed. By contrast, in the case of Battus II *anadasmōs* carries a distributive meaning,¹² whereas the *gēs anadasmōs* proposed shortly thereafter by Arcesilaus III—which will be discussed below—clearly denotes a genuine redistribution of land. This semantic variation is not without significance: a *distribution* in the sense of a land allocation to a specific group of individuals does not entail, for those who already possess land, the loss and re-assignment of their property—as it happens when *anadasmōs* refers to a proper redistribution.

The second programme of *gēs anadasmōs*, which is more directly relevant to the issue of the balance between citizenship and land under discussion here, took shape a few decades later in the form of a promise made by the exiled king Arcesilaus III. In an attempt to regain power, he pledged to grant land to anyone willing to support his return (Hdt. 4.163.2).¹³ He had connections with Polycrates and Euclithon, the tyrants of Samos and Salamis of Cyprus respectively, and this suggests that this episode belongs to a broader pattern characteristic of tyrannical politics, namely the search for support beyond one's own citizen body—a strategy that recurs as a well-established *topos* in the literary tradition.¹⁴

By gathering individuals both from among the Samians, with whom he had taken refuge (4.162.2), and from the Cyreneans who had been exiled along with him, Arcesilaus III aimed not only to reconquer Cyrene by force, but also to exact revenge on those Cyreneans who had remained at home and who had driven him out (4.164.1). These citizens had benefited from the reforms introduced by Demonax of Mantinea, who reserved sacred areas and priesthoods for the king and made all the other privileges that had belonged to the kings available to everyone (4.161.3).¹⁵ Through their capture, death, or flight, it would have been possible to plan a redistribution of land as promised to Arcesilaus' mixed army—an operation which, in turn, would have secured the *politeia* for the members of that army. The redistribution, however, was never carried out, as

12 Asheri 1966, 28–29. For the importance of not overlooking the significance of this distinction in the meaning of *anadasmōs* see Lepore 1973, 22–23. Notably, in Hdt. 4.159.2 the Cyrenaeans are said to have appealed for a *gēs anadasmōs*, ἐπὶ γῆς ἀναδασμῶ (Hdt. 4.159.2), while the oracle's response employs the variant γᾶς ἀναδαιομένης (Hdt. 4.159.3).

13 On this episode and on the Persian aid given to Pheretima, mother of Arcesilaus III, to avenge the killing of her son, see Jähne 1988, 165ff., and especially Giangiulio 2011, 705ff. and 2023.

14 The political and economic networks established among tyrants likewise formed a typical *topos* of archaic Greek tyranny well known to Herodotus (Corcella *et al.* 1993, 354; Asheri *et al.* 2007, 690–91). A clear demonstration of this is the identical manner in which he describes the deaths of Arcesilaus and Polycrates in 4.164.4 and 3.142.3 respectively (Giangiulio 2023, 7 n. 9).

15 On Demonax, see Cohen-Skalli 2014 and De Vido 2021, the latter focusing in particular on the nature of the Cyrenaean *perioikoi*.

the king was killed by his opponents, some of whom were the very Cyreneans who had previously fled after he regained power (Hdt. 4.164.4).

The Herodotean narrative is rich in anecdotal and, to some extent, fictitious elements. Its source is likely to be sought among members of the Cyrenaean elite hostile both to the Battiad dynasty and to the Persians, who conquered Cyrene shortly after this episode, with the collaboration of Arcesilaus III himself and his mother Pheretime.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the account allows us to glimpse the political context that led to the proposal of a *gēs anadasmus* (here in its iterative sense), namely the outbreak of a *stasis* and a transformation in the form of government, involving a transition from the aristocratic regime promoted by Demonax of Mantinea to the tyrannical monarchy of Arcesilaus III. In this context, it is also worth noting a further association that would later become a defining feature of the negative connotation attached to land redistribution, namely its connection with tyrannical forms of government. Whether this association already formed a conscious part of the Herodotean narrative, or whether its recurrence in Herodotus contributed to making it prototypical in Greek political thought—especially from the late fifth century BCE onward—cannot be determined.¹⁷ In any case, this motif likewise appears to derive from anti-Persian Cyrenaean circles and undoubtedly contributes to weakening the historical credibility of the events described. At the same time, it suggests that Greek political thought was, to some extent, aware that resorting to land redistribution was regarded as an extreme measure, adopted in response to the large-scale incorporation of new citizens.¹⁸

2. Land and the citizen body in Leontinoi after the Congress of Gela

Another planned but unrealized agrarian redistribution was that involving the Chalcidian *apoikia* of Leontinoi between 424 and 422 BCE, as recounted by Thucydides in Book 5 in reference to the aftermath of the Congress of Gela.

16 Giangiulio 2023, 6–7. The episodes involving Pheretime and Arcesilaus occupy a relatively large section within the Libyan *logos*, especially in comparison with the space devoted to the other Battiads. Herodotus structures the narrative framework around a composite oracular story that was already circulating in prose, as Giangiulio (2023) has shown.

17 The association between land redistribution and tyrannical regimes, together with the related notion of land redistribution as a radical act with negative connotations, developed—as is well known—within fourth-century BCE political and philosophical thought, and included among the measures condemned as characteristic of tyrannical behaviour the abolition of debts as well. For a discussion with examples, see Asheri 1966, pp. 74–84; Erdas 2025a, esp. 118–19; Gehrke 2006.

18 The operation attempted by Arcesilaus III is described by Malkin 2023, 149 as a “clean slate of society”, insofar as it functioned as a true restart of the community, involving a return to the original equality of the foundation.

The episode is presented rather succinctly: after the Athenians withdrew from Sicily, the Leontinians registered a significant number of new citizens, and the *dēmos* was contemplating a redistribution of land.¹⁹ The *polis* had been severely weakened by the war with Syracuse, had suffered heavy losses in terms of its citizen body and was therefore compelled to increase the number of those holding *politeia*, bringing in outsiders and registering them as citizens.²⁰ This was likely also intended as a measure to prepare for potential renewed conflict with Syracuse, which could have easily occurred despite the peace agreements made at Gela in 424.²¹ Incidentally, the origin of the new citizens is not specified, though they likely came from other Sicilian *poleis* that had fared poorly in the confrontation with Syracuse. Two opposing forces, therefore, converged toward a new agrarian redistribution: on the one hand, the loss of many citizens who had served as hoplites (and who, from a political perspective, may be regarded as part of the *dēmos*); on the other hand, the arrival of a conspicuously larger number of new individuals seeking to obtain civic status and, consequently, land within the newly structured civic community. In any case, it clearly involved a significant increase in the number of new citizens, supported by all political factions (both the *dēmos* and the *dynatoi*). As Martin Dreher has noted, the *dēmos* took advantage of the need to provide land for the new citizens in order to propose a redistribution of private land.²² That the *dēmos* had advocated for the *gēs anadasmus* also for its own interests is suggested by the verb *ἐπινόεω*: “to have in mind”, “to envisage”.²³

The implementation of a land redistribution plan would, however, have worked entirely to the detriment of the *dynatoi*, who therefore decided to seek help from Syracuse and expelled the *dēmos*. As we learn from Thucydides in

19 Thuc. 5.4.2: Λεοντῖνοι γὰρ ἀπελθόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐκ Σικελίας μετὰ τὴν ξύμβασιν πολίτας τε ἐπεγράψαντο πολλοὺς καὶ ὁ δῆμος τὴν γῆν ἐπενόει ἀναδάσασθαι. See Berger 1991. On *stasis* and the Peloponnesian war, with specific reference to Leontinoi, see Simonton 2017, 28–30; 163–64.

20 The verb *ἐπιγράφω* clearly refers to a registration of citizens. On this point, see Amendola’s essay in this volume.

21 Dreher 1986, 641–42.

22 Dreher 1986, 644f.

23 Thuc. 5.4.2: ὁ δῆμος τὴν γῆν ἐπενόει ἀναδάσασθαι. A comparable episode is found in the case of Solon at Athens, described in similar terms in Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 11.2 (ὁ μὲν γὰρ δῆμος ὥτεο πάντ’ ἀνάδαστα ποιήσειν αὐτόν, οἱ δὲ γνώριμοι πάλιν εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ἀποδώσειν, ἢ μικρὸν παραλλάξειν). The association between the two episodes is not uncommon. However, there are significant differences. First and most importantly, at Athens we are not dealing with an increase in the number of citizens as the cause of the demand, as is instead the case at Leontinoi. Second, there is the issue of the chronological proximity of the sources to the events described: in the case of the land redistribution requested but never implemented by Solon, our sources do not predate the fourth century BCE (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 12.2–3; Plut. *Sol.* 16.1), and in the famous fragment 34 West of Solon, cited or alluded to by both authors, there is no explicit reference to a reform of this kind, as has already been observed by Rosivach (1992).

the following passages, and from Diodorus—who provides a slightly different but broadly consistent account of the events²⁴—the redistribution was never implemented. In fact, the entire *polis* was depopulated, and Leontinoi underwent a series of demographic fluctuations, including partial, though precarious, repopulations, until its final conquest by Syracuse under Dionysius I after 403 BCE. What is particularly interesting in this respect, and with regard to the relationship between landed property and citizenship, is that in the immediate aftermath of the *stasis* the *dynatoi*, having moved to Syracuse and become Syracusan citizens,²⁵ deprived the few remaining representatives of the *dēmos* in the city of their land. That land, in fact, had passed into the hands of the *dynatoi* themselves, now *politai* of Syracuse. It should be noted, moreover, that probably even earlier, during the war against Syracuse, a substantial portion of the private lands had already been acquired by the *dynatoi*. Thus, although after the *stasis* of 424 Leontinoi remained partially inhabited, it effectively no longer had any *politai*, since they no longer had any rights to the land, which now formed part of the Syracusan *chōra* (and belonged to its new citizens, the *dynatoi* who had left Leontinoi).²⁶

Turning to the *gēs anadasmus*, it should be noted that here the request for redistribution was not, in itself, a revolutionary act, although it was proposed in a context of *stasis*; rather, it was primarily driven by institutional needs. The new *politai* had to gain access to property in order to be formally recognized as such, and many plots of land had become available as a result of the losses suffered during the war. At the same time, economic and social factors played a significant role: members of the *dēmos* possessed only limited agricultural resources, which had evidently been further reduced by a prolonged period of impoverishment following the war with Syracuse. Although our knowledge of

24 Diod. Sic. 12.54.7; 12.83.1. For a discussion of the relationship between Thucydides' narrative and Diodorus' account, cf. Dreher 1986, 637–660; see also Simonton 2017, 153–54.

25 Thuc. 5.4.3: οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ ὁμολογήσαντες Συρακοσίοις καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐκλιπόντες καὶ ἐρημώσαντες Συρακούσας ἐπὶ πολιτείᾳ ὥκησαν. Thucydides' formulation here likewise appears to imply, as in the case of the new citizens of Leontinoi in 5.4.1, the existence of a formal legal act granting citizenship (cf. Dreher 2007, 75).

26 This point is particularly relevant when considering the eventual incorporation of the Leontinian *chōra* into that of Syracuse under Dionysius I. The agricultural resources—particularly grain—of the Chalcidian *polis* were essential to the economic provisioning of Syracuse. Diodorus reports that Dionysius undertook the fortification of the *polis* and made use of *phrouria* in the *chōra* in order to facilitate the storage of grain, underscoring the strategic importance of Leontinoi's agricultural resources within the Syracusan sphere (14.58.1). He also records that Dionysius granted the fertile Leontinian territory to his mercenaries in lieu of pay, an arrangement they readily accepted on account of the fertility of the land (διὰ τὸ κάλλος τῆς χώρας: 14.78.3). For general discussion of the relationship between Siceliotic tyrannies and the use of mercenaries in the repopulation of cities with new *politai*, see Dreher 2007, 63ff.

the *chōra* of Leontinoi—its extent and its availability after the war—is limited,²⁷ the need for land, combined with the opportunity for all those entitled to request it (namely, the old and new *politai*) to gain access to private property,²⁸ must have influenced the decision to undertake the planning of a new agrarian distribution.²⁹ In this case, as in that of Cyrene, the fact that the proposal to implement a *gēs anadasmus* originated with the *dēmos* does not seem to carry political or revolutionary connotations; rather, it appears to have been a practical response to an economic and/or social problem.

3. The *dēmos* of Samos and land division in 412 BCE

The account of the land redistribution that took place in Samos in 412 BCE, also reported by Thucydides, displays similar features to the case of Leontinoi, but within a completely different political context. This episode is referred to as the date from which the presence of a democratic government in Samos is certain, as well as its independence from Athens. Thucydides indeed writes that the Samians were made autonomous by the Athenians because they were considered loyal allies. Thanks to the presence and support of the Athenians, who were on the island with three ships, the *dēmos* was able to rebel against the *dynatoi* in power, putting about 200 to death and exiling 400.³⁰ It should be noted that here too Thucydides contrasts the *dynatoi* and the *dēmos*, as in the case of Leontinoi, following a recurring pattern both in vocabulary and in substance. There is no reason to suppose that he is applying the same narrative scheme to two different episodes, that is, engaging in a form of narrative standardisation; rather, it is more likely that, when faced with two similar socio-historical contexts, he pragmatically adopted analogous terminology to describe them.

Despite the treatment suffered by the *dynatoi*, some *geōmoroi* remained on Samos. The *geōmoroi* represented the island's agrarian elite—its large landowners—who evidently belonged to the same segment of that elite as the *dynatoi*

27 A tentative reconstruction of the extent of the Leontinian territory is offered by Frasca 2020b, especially 278–79 regarding the *stasis* following the Congress.

28 For the substantial agrarian resources likely available to Leontinoi, see De Angelis 2016, 295, 304.

29 A further factor that may have influenced the greater mobility in access to citizenship is the relative availability of land in the Siceliote *poleis* compared to mainland Greece, as suggested by Dreher and Banfi 2007, 80–81.

30 Thuc. 8.21: ἐγένετο δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐν Σάμῳ ἐπανάστασις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς μετὰ Ἀθηναίων, οἱ ἔτυχον ἐν τρισὶ ναυσὶ παρόντες. καὶ ὁ δῆμος ὁ Σαμίων ἐς διακοσίους μὲν τινὰς τοὺς πάντας τῶν δυνατωτάτων ἀπέκτεινε, τετρακοσίους δὲ φυγῇ ζημιώσαντες καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν καὶ οἰκίας νειμάμενοι, Ἀθηναίων τε σφίσιν αὐτονομίαν μετὰ ταῦτα ὡς βεβαίοις ἤδη ψηφισαμένων, τὰ λοιπὰ διόκουν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τοῖς γεωμόροις μετεδίδοσαν οὔτε ἄλλου οὔδε νὸς οὔτε ἐκδοῦναι οὐδ' ἀγαγέσθαι παρ' ἐκείνων οὐδ' ἐς ἐκείνους οὔδε νὸς ἔτι τοῦ δήμου ἐξῆν.

excluded from government. Their status as a distinct social group is confirmed outside Samos by the existence of a group bearing the same name, the *geōmoroi*/*gamoroi*, at Syracuse during the Archaic period and the early Classical era. Our principal sources are Herodotus (7.155.2)³¹ and the Aristotelian *Politeia of the Syracusans* (fr. 586 Rose, 603.1 Gigon),³² where they are contrasted with the very numerous group of dependent-status men known as the *killyrioi* (according to Herodotus), or *kallikyrioi*/*killikyrioi* (as attested in the *Politeia*), supported by the *dēmos*.³³ Syracusan *gamoroi* are also mentioned in a late Archaic short inscription which, among other things, may provide one of the earliest attestations of the right of *enktesis* (rendered as *enpasis* in the text).³⁴ The origin of their name, *gamoroi*/*geōmoroi*, “having shares (*moroi*) in the land”, as noted by Irad Malkin, refers back to an initial equality among all in terms of land assigned, as well as a sense of collective superiority over the rest.³⁵

Turning to Samos, Thucydides informs us that, although some *geōmoroi* remained in place, they were not granted any share in the island’s private property, nor could the *dēmos* merge their estates with those of the *geōmoroi*, since marriages between the two social classes were forbidden. The lands and houses—that is, the private property—that became available through the death and exile of the *dynatoi* were distributed among the people. Thucydides does not explicitly mention a *gēs anadasmus*, but he uses *nemein* (καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν καὶ οἰκίας νειμάμενοι), which still indicates an orderly division, referring to the lands and

31 Hdt. 7.115.2: μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ εὔρημα τοὺς γαμόρους καλεομένους τῶν Συρηκοσίων ἐκπεσόντας ὑπὸ τε τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῶν σφετέρων δούλων, καλεομένων δὲ Κυλλυρίων, ὁ Γέλων καταγαγὼν τούτους ἐκ Κασμένης πόλιος ἐς τὰς Συρηκούσας ἔσχε καὶ ταύτας· ὁ γὰρ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Συρηκοσίων ἐπιόντι Γέλωνι παραδιδόει τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἐωυτόν.

32 Fr. 586 Rose, 603, 1 Gigon, *apud* Phot. κ 119 *s.n.* καλλικύριοι: οἱ ἀντὶ τῶν γεωμόρων ἐν Συρακούσας γενόμενοι, πολλοὶ τινες τὸ πλῆθος. δοῦλοι δ’ ἦσαν οὗτοι τῶν φυγάδων, ὡς Τίμαιος ἐν ε’· ὅθεν τοὺς ὑπερβολῇ πολλοὺς καλλικυρίους ἔλεγον. ὠνομάσθησαν δ’ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰς ταῦτ’ ἀνελθεῖν παντοδαποὶ ὄντες, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν Συρακουσίων πολιτείᾳ, ὅμοιοι τοῖς παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίους εἴλωσι καὶ παρὰ Θεσσαλοῖς πενέσταις καὶ παρὰ Κρησὶ κλαρώταις. The same information is reported in Zenob. 4.54.

33 For a discussion of this episode in the history of Syracuse, almost certainly also alluded to in Arist. *Pol.* 5.1302b 31 ff., see Bravo 1992; Luraghi 1998; Erdas 2006; 2010a. During the Syracusan *stasis*, the *dēmos* supported the *killyrioi* against the city’s elite, who held the *arche* and were likely the main landholders (the *gamoroi*). It is worth mentioning Bravo’s (1992) hypothesis, which, taking this interpretation to an extreme, maintains that the *gamoroi* alone held the right of citizenship, precisely because they were the only ones to own land. For a discussion of the meaning of *dēmos* as a social and political subject, see above and Simonton in this volume.

34 On the inscription, see especially Mignosa 2021, with earlier bibliography and new readings. The text is given here according to Mignosa’s edition: [θεός, τύχα ἀγαθὰ. οἱ Συρακόσι]οι ἐψαφίσαν|[το c.17 καὶ ἀτ]έλειαν καὶ [ἀτ]ῆν|[πασιν γᾶς καὶ οἰκίας c.7] αἶ κα γαμόρων | [ἐσγόνους εἰμεν καὶ τὰν πασᾶν ἀ]ρχὰν πεδεῖμ|[εν αὐτοῖς πλάν c.7-8 καὶ] ἡπάρχου καὶ 5| [---] *vacat*.

35 Malkin in Malkin, Blok 2024, 224 with n. 175. On the *geōmoroi* in Pl. *Leg.* 737e see now Faraguna 2024, 129 n. 27.

houses that were confiscated and passed into the control of the *dēmos*.³⁶ This was certainly a revolution: politically, it was a genuine *stasis* and, consequently—since it was characterized by two of the distinctive features of *stasis*, exile and land confiscation, as Gehrke notes—it was also a revolution from the point of view of property distribution.³⁷

To better understand the role of the *geōmoroi* in the events of Archaic Samos, it is useful to consider the account reported by Plutarch in the *Moralia*,³⁸ which describes a *stasis* preceding the one commonly associated with the rise of Polycrates, in which the *geōmoroi* were also involved. According to this account, the *geōmoroi* governed Samos following the fall of the king (or tyrant?) Demoteles, but they were eventually deposed and killed as the result of a conspiracy orchestrated by the Samian fleet, with assistance from the Megarians.³⁹ However, using this narrative to frame the *geōmoroi* as a clearly defined social or political group can be misleading. The historicity of the account is questionable. Two points support this caution: first, the account contains elements likely influenced by Thucydides' narrative, in which the *dēmos* is represented by the traditionally democratic Samian fleet; second, the account may reflect the impact of well-known events such as the restoration of democracy in Athens in 411 BCE, where the fleet similarly acted as the *polis*' "liberator".⁴⁰

Let us now return to the *stasis* of 412 BCE as reported by Thucydides. One question that will likely remain unanswered is whether the *dynatoi* should be regarded as a social or also a political group; and, in the latter case, what form of government was actually held by the *dynatoi* who were overthrown by the *dēmos*. Scholars remain divided as to whether the previous Samian regime was an oligarchy, as a straightforward reading of the passage might suggest, or rather a democracy effectively controlled by a small group of influential individuals.

36 The use of *nemein* in this context seems to point quite clearly toward a distribution of land. According to Mackil 2021, 185–87, however, even though Thucydides makes no reference to it, the confiscated property was not redistributed but instead incorporated into public land and subsequently acquired by the new citizens through auction. Persuasive though this interpretation may be, and supported by other, albeit perhaps less pervasive, cases of confiscation and reallocation (see below in the conclusions), it does not take into account—or rather, it adopts a different perspective, one that takes as its starting point the advantage of the state rather than that of its *politai*—the driving force that the prospect of an equitable redistribution of land had exerted on the *dēmos* in encouraging the outbreak of the *stasis*.

37 Gehrke 1985, 142ff. A point on which one might nuance Gehrke's position is the relative minimization of the importance of the phenomenon exemplified by the Samian events. According to him, the Samian settlement of 412 BCE was exceptional. Given the radical manner in which matters were handled there under particular circumstances, he argues that caution is required before deriving from this a general rule (Gehrke 1985, 323–24).

38 *Mor.* 303c–304c = *Quaestiones Graecae* 57.

39 On the episode see Barron 1964; Ryan 2006.

40 It is particularly noteworthy that Plutarch (*Mor.* 304c), in reference to the Samian fleet, speaks of οὗτω δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἐλευθερωθείσης.

The latter interpretation has gained support in recent years, chiefly on the grounds that a democracy at Samos is already attested in 439 BCE as a result of Athenian intervention, as Thucydides himself reports in Book 1 (1.115.3).⁴¹ However, Thucydides also notes that the Samians rose up against the democrats and defeated most of them, which raises the possibility that the democracy established in 439 by the Athenians was short-lived. Moreover, after Pericles' intervention and the suppression of the Samian revolt, the restoration of democracy is not listed among the terms of surrender imposed by the Athenians on the Samians.⁴² In any case, regardless of the form of government represented by the *dynatoi*, it is clear that the *stasis*, the disruption, and above all the political alternation, led to the loss of the *dynatoi's* lands and their subsequent distribution among the democrats.

Focusing again on the terminology, Thucydides uses the verb *metadidonai* when he writes that the *geōmoroi* remaining in Samos had no right to any property (τοῖς γεωμόροις μετεδίδοσαν οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενός). More generally, with reference to participation in citizenship, as Jakub Filonik has shown on several occasions, both *metechein* and *metadidonai* carry the sense of “having a share in” or “partaking of”.⁴³ The same usage is also attested with reference to land, and especially to the *klēros*, both in the sense of division or distribution and in that of participation. This can be observed as early as Hesiod. In a fragment of the *Eboiai*, the verb *metadidonai* denotes a shared allocation in the context of acquiring a parcel of land through marriage (in the case of the seer Melampus and of his brother) and the consequent acquisition of kingship (*basileia*).⁴⁴ This passage is particularly relevant for understanding the relationship between *polites* status and landholding, as well as the broader idea of equal and shared allocation among members of the community. The same story of Melampus is used by Herodotus as a point of comparison in the case of the seer Tisamenus, who requested citizenship and land from Sparta for himself and his brother. The link between landownership and marriage is significant both in Samos and in the Hesiodic fragment. In the Samian case, the inability of the *geōmoroi* to hold property and to contract marriages with the *dēmos* implies a loss of *politeia*, that is, of political rights⁴⁵—an interpretation indirectly reinforced by Herodotus'

41 Thus Hornblower 1996, 192-193; *Id.* 2008, 808-809; Lintott 1982; Rubinstein in Hansen, Nielsen 2004, 1096. Oswald 1993, on the other hand, considers it to have been an oligarchy. Shipley 1987, 120-121, explores both possibilities, leaving the question open.

42 The terms of surrender are detailed by Thucydides (Thuc. 1.118.3). They consisted of the demolition of the walls, the handing over of hostages and ships, and the reimbursement of war expenses.

43 See especially Filonik 2024; forthcoming (c); and the author's contribution in this volume.

44 Hes. *Cat. fr.* 37 Merkelbach-West (*PSI* 1301), vv. 10-12: ἐνθά σφιν μετέδωκε[ε] / ἦφθ[ι]μος Προῖτος κλῆρον, on which see Erdas 1997.

45 Swoboda 1898 and Gehrke 1985, 142.

reference to Tisamenus' request for citizenship in comparison with the Hesiodic story of Melampus. This, then, is the broader interpretative framework.

Coming back to 412 BCE Samos, it may be concluded that even the property of those who had not been exiled—namely, the *geōmoroi* who had remained on the island—was confiscated and reassigned to the *dēmos*. But this was not the only moment in Samian history when land and houses were confiscated and then redistributed. The same occurred, in equally revolutionary terms, when Lysander restored Samos and its property to the former *politai*—that is, the *dynatoi* expelled by the *dēmos* in 412—confiscating it in turn from the democrats, who were themselves driven into exile. In this case, however, Xenophon is less explicit about the solution adopted by the *polis* with regard to the confiscated land.⁴⁶

The distribution of land to the *dēmos* in 412 can therefore be understood as a broad reorganisation—if not of all properties, at least of a substantial portion of them. In this respect, alongside the already discussed case of Leontinoi, it is comparable to developments that affected the Siceliot *poleis* on several occasions during the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. This inevitably leads back to the observations and case studies discussed by David Asheri in his essay on the repatriation of exiles in the Sicilian *poleis*, and in particular regarding Selinous in a separate contribution: here, concerning the inscription dealing with the repatriation of exiles (*IO* V 22), the very critical issue is raised of the recovery of properties confiscated by exiles returning to their homeland.⁴⁷

4. Towards a conclusion

Beyond these examples, it is well known that throughout the Greek world there were cases in which privately owned land, once expropriated, was not assigned or redistributed, but rather reacquired by the state and subsequently sold.⁴⁸ In such instances, the transition from confiscated land to new ownership was not direct—although always managed by the *polis*—but mediated through procedures of public adjudication and sale. It follows, therefore, that redistribution was not the only means of reallocating private property, but merely one of several possible solutions, and certainly the least commonly practiced.

46 For the entire episode, see Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.6-7; Plut. *Lys.* 14.1; Diod. Sic. 14.3.4-5. The passage concerning the restitution of confiscated property is Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.7: Λύσανδρος δὲ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις πολίταις παραδοῦς τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα πάντα. Mackil (2018, 331-32, and 2021, 185-86) argue that here too the state proceeded with the reallocation of the confiscated property.

47 Asheri 1979 and 1980. On the inscription, see also Dimartino 2019; De Vido 2015, 61f. For further Siceliot case studies, see Amendola in this volume, Asheri 1980. On the inscription see also Dimartino 2019; De Vido 2015, 61f.

48 The idea that this solution, despite the many problems it entailed in terms of economic risk and citizens' confidence in the security of their property rights, was preferable in cases of confiscated property is well argued by Mackil 2021.

In particular, the enactment of a *gēs anadasmōs* becomes more likely in the case of a traumatic regime change, brought about either by a *stasis* or by strong external pressure. By contrast, when the political regime remains stable, even in the presence of substantial expropriations, confiscated properties were normally reacquired by the *polis* and then sold by the designated magistrates to citizens who requested them. This is the case, for example, with lands confiscated from state debtors and sold in Halicarnassus between 425 and 350 BCE,⁴⁹ as well as the well-known Athenian confiscations following the profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries and the Herms *affair* in 415 BCE,⁵⁰ and many others. On a practical level, it may be said that when exile and confiscation are not followed by the replacement of the affected citizens, there is no real need for redistribution.⁵¹ By contrast, when the citizen body changes significantly—both in terms of the number of *politai* and its civic composition—the likelihood of implementing a land redistribution plan increases accordingly.

It is important to emphasise that in the cases discussed so far—as well as in others that cannot be addressed here for reasons of space—the recourse to *gēs anadasmōs* stems from a concrete motive, whether political, social, or a combination of both. The sources do not express value judgments regarding the appropriateness of initiatives that were, without doubt, of a radical nature. Indeed, both epigraphic and literary evidence attests to the existence of rules preventing the redistribution of land in the Greek *poleis* as early as the late Archaic period, as exemplified, for instance, by the Pappadakis bronze mentioned above. However, these rules appear to have been motivated primarily by practical considerations—chiefly the desire to preserve a preexisting and carefully planned agrarian layout—rather than by a concern to prevent civil strife or the rise of an authoritarian regime. This suggests that, at this stage, there was no ideological objection to land redistribution, even though the *polis* resorted to it only in serious and exceptional circumstances. Above all, land redistribution was employed as a means to restore balance between citizenship and land ownership.

49 SEG 43.713, ll. 1–4 (ed. Blümel 1993): Θε[οί] | [Ο]ἷδε ἐπρίαντο παρὰ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ τῆς | Ἀθηναίης καὶ Παρθένου γέας καὶ οἰκίας [τῶν] | ὀφειλόντων τοῖς θεοῖς τούτοις. “Gods. These men purchased from Apollo, Athena, and the Parthenos the land and houses of those who were indebted to these gods”. What follows is a list of the properties sold, including the name of the debtor and former owner, the name of the buyer, and the sale price. On the inscription see Delrieux 2013; Faraguna (in Boffo, Faraguna 2021, 358f.) mentions it among the documents listing goods confiscated and auctioned by the city.

50 IG I³ 421–430, on which see Hallof 1990, and now Marginesu 2024 and 2025.

51 A further aspect that deserves attention, but cannot be fully explored here, concerns the position of the state vis-à-vis privately owned land: the management (and allocation) of agricultural property, especially in the archaic period, must always rest in the hands of the *polis*, while private initiative in the appropriation of land is consistently discouraged; cf. Ruzé 1998 for examples and discussion. Mackil (2021, 201) makes a similar observation for the Classical period, noting that in the fifth century BCE, property was largely dependent on political participation. This, of course, does not conflict with the right of full enjoyment that each individual has over his own property (on this point, see Harris 2016, 118ff.).

Moreover, another point anticipated at the beginning of this paper deserves further consideration. In the texts discussed above, where land redistribution is consistently associated with the integration of new citizens in the community, the initiative of both repopulating the civic body (after a significant loss of citizens) and of redistributing land always lays with the *polis*. It is the *polis* that establishes specific rules addressing this process. In the Herodotean account of the two-stage redistribution of land in Cyrene, the king himself could intervene directly in this process, acting effectively as a representative of the *polis*, even though his efforts were ultimately unsuccessful and he did not have the support of the *dēmos*.

Recovering factual and historical data becomes more difficult, however, when dealing with sources dating after the fifth century BCE. Indeed, the interpretation of *gēs anadasmus* provided by later sources is shaped by fourth-century rhetorical and philosophical reflections on radical democracy and tyranny.⁵² This context introduced a conceptual shift in how the idea of land redistribution as a political choice was perceived.

Several examples could be mentioned and I will limit myself to briefly noting two representative case studies: the unrealized land redistribution demanded by the *dēmos* in Solonian Athens mentioned above,⁵³ and Dionysius of Halicarnassus' account of the *gēs anadasmus* promised by the tyrant Aristodemus of Cumae in the sixth century BCE—described, together with debt cancellation, as the worst of all evils.⁵⁴ These sources present demands for redistribution

52 This is a much-debated issue (for a brief synthesis, see Gehrke 2006). It is worth citing two well-known passages from Aristotle and Plato. The first (Arist. *Pol.* 1305a ff.) notes that, in some cases, in order to gain the favor of the people, demagogues act against the elites, for instance by redistributing their property. Moreover, when the same individual combined the roles of demagogue and *stratēgos*, constitutions could easily slide into tyranny (ὅτε μὲν γάρ, ἵνα χαρίζωνται, ἀδικοῦντες τοὺς γνωρίμους συνιστᾷσιν, ἢ τὰς οὐσίας ἀναδάστους ποιοῦντες ἢ τὰς προσόδους ταῖς λειτουργίαις, ὅτε δὲ διαβάλλοντες, ἵν' ἔχῃσι δημεύειν τὰ κτήματα τῶν πλουσίων· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχαίων, ὅτε γένοιτο ὁ αὐτὸς δημαγωγὸς καὶ στρατηγός, εἰς τυραννίδα μετέβαλλον). A similar idea appears in Plato (*Resp.* 565e–566a), who observes that when a leader of the people banishes and kills, and hints at the cancellation of debts and the redistribution of land, he inevitably either is killed by his enemies or becomes a tyrant (ἀρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ ὃς ἂν δήμου προεστὼς ... ἀποκτεινύη καὶ ὑποσημαίνῃ χρεῶν τε ἀποκοπὰς καὶ γῆς ἀναδασμόν, ἄρα τῷ τοιούτῳ ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ εἴμαρται ἢ ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἢ τυραννεῖν καὶ λύκῳ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου γενέσθαι).

53 It is noteworthy that, in Solon's case, the demand for land redistribution is associated with a demand for the cancellation of debts (and, as is well known, only the latter was ultimately granted by Solon). The connection with the *chreōn apokopē*, that is, the *seisachtheia* as interpreted in *Ath. Pol.* 12.4 and by Plutarch, who here follows Aristotle, was probably established by Aristotle himself, reflecting the conservative view of *gēs anadasmus* and *chreōn apokopē* as symptoms of an illiberal regime (Rosivach 1992). This is confirmed by *Ath. Pol.* 11.2, where it is stated that by avoiding a redistribution of land Solon would not be acting like a tyrant (τυραννεῖν). In this context, therefore, *gēs anadasmus* functions as a rhetorical argument in connection with tyrannis (Brandt 1989).

54 Dion. Hal. 7.8: δύο τὰ κάκιστα τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις καθίσταται πολιτευμάτων, οἷς ἅπανα χρήται προοιμίους τυραννίς, γῆς ἀναδασμόν καὶ χρεῶν ἄφεσις. For the short-lived

as arising from situations of economic crisis and marked or growing inequality. At the same time, land redistribution is associated with individuals invested with extraordinary powers, and the accounts themselves appear to be shaped by the fourth-century BCE negative conception of *gēs anadasmōs*. In a similar vein, the oath sworn by the *politai* of Itanos in Crete never to carry out a redistribution of land (or debt cancellation) shows that, by the third century BCE, *gēs anadasmōs* had become a widely recognized measure to be avoided in democratic regimes.⁵⁵ What had originally been a need arising from real and concrete, albeit exceptional, circumstances, with particular attention to the relationship between citizen status and landownership in the cases of Cyrene, and especially of Leontinoi, and Samos, gradually became a slogan at a growing distance from historical reality and charged with strong ideological overtones.

To fully appreciate the scope and pervasiveness of this phenomenon, it may be illuminating to conclude by citing Polybius' highly effective—though culturally conditioned—summary of events at Sparta after Leuctra. Here, historical facts merge with what had by then become an established and negative judgment on *stasis*, *gēs anadasmōs*, and tyranny. From this perspective, even such factual elements as exile and the depopulation of the city become part of the rhetorical argument.

(The Spartans) finally had more experience than any other people of civic trouble and discord. No other nation was so harassed by banishment of citizens and confiscations of property, none had to submit to more cruel servitude culminating in the tyranny of Nabis, although formerly they could not even bear to hear the word “tyrant” mentioned. However, the ancient history of Sparta and still more these events have been recounted by many writers, who have stressed both aspects. The progress of the latter is most conspicuous since the entire subversion of the ancient constitution by Cleomenes. (transl. W.R. Paton)⁵⁶

tyrannical experience at Cumae, see now Saldutti 2024.

55 *IC* III iv 8, ll. 21–24: οὐ[δὲ γὰρ] ἀναδασμὸν οὐδὲ οἰκίαν | [οὐδὲ] οἰκοπέδων, οὐδὲ χρεῶν ἀ[ποκ]ορᾶν ποιησέω. On this clause in the inscription, and on the general meaning of land redistribution in Itanos, see Erdas 2025a and forthcoming.

56 Polyb. 4.81.13–14: τέλος πλείστον μὲν πόνων καὶ στάσεων ἐμφυλίων πείραν εἶχον, πλείστοις δ' ἐπάλαισαν ἀναδασμοῖς καὶ φυγαῖς, πικροτάτης δὲ δουλείας πείραν ἔλαβον ἕως τῆς Νάβιδος τυραννίδος, οἱ τὸ πρὶν οὐδὲ τοῦνομα δυνηθέντες ἀνασχέσθαι ῥαδίως αὐτῆς. τὰ μὲν οὖν πάλαι καὶ τὰ πλείω περὶ Λακεδαιμονίων εἰς ἐκάτερον μέρος ὑπὸ πολλῶν εἶρηται τάδε. ἐναργέστατα δ' ἐστὶν ἅφ' οὗ Κλεομένης ὀλοσχερῶς κατέλυσε τὸ πάτριον πολίτευμα (see Walbank 1957, 534–535). For Cleomenes as a “tyrant” in Polybius' conception, see Gruen 1972, 619; Walbank 2002, 216; for the land redistribution planned by the Spartan king, see Marasco 2004; for the social tensions at Sparta between the period of Cleomenes III and that following the reforms of Nabis, see Thornton 2012.