This paper studies whether incentivizing performance with competition and cooperation-based incentive schemes, rather than individual compensation, affects peer effects on subsequent risk behaviour. We run a laboratory experiment in which we introduce three different compensation schemes—piece rate, the equal-split-sharing-rule and a tournament—associated with a real effort task and we measure risk behaviour both before and after the effort task. We find that competition more than halves peer influence on risk behaviour compared with piece-rate compensation and in some specifications produces negative peer effects. Competition also significantly reduces an individual’s feeling of attachment to their peers and self-reported peer influence.

Incentive schemes and peer effects on risk behaviour : an experiment / F. Gioia. - In: THEORY AND DECISION. - ISSN 0040-5833. - 87:4(2019), pp. 473-495.

Incentive schemes and peer effects on risk behaviour : an experiment

F. Gioia
2019

Abstract

This paper studies whether incentivizing performance with competition and cooperation-based incentive schemes, rather than individual compensation, affects peer effects on subsequent risk behaviour. We run a laboratory experiment in which we introduce three different compensation schemes—piece rate, the equal-split-sharing-rule and a tournament—associated with a real effort task and we measure risk behaviour both before and after the effort task. We find that competition more than halves peer influence on risk behaviour compared with piece-rate compensation and in some specifications produces negative peer effects. Competition also significantly reduces an individual’s feeling of attachment to their peers and self-reported peer influence.
Competition; Equal-split-sharing-rule; Incentive schemes; Peer effects; Risk behaviour
Settore SECS-P/01 - Economia Politica
2019
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/725804
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