This paper sheds light on Kant’s notion of autonomy by considering Kant’s critique of the rationalist theories of morality that he discussed in his lectures on practical philosophy from the 1760s to the time of the Groundwork. The paper first explains Kant’s taxonomy of moral theories and his perspective on the history of ethics. Second, it considers Kant's arguments against the two main variants of ‘rationalism’ as he construes it, that is, perfectionism and theological voluntarism, pointing out the similarities to previous criticisms. Third, the paper argues that Kant’s discussion of the 'rationalist' views does not amount to an unqualified dismissal, but to an attempt at working out a novel rationalist position. Kant’s criticisms of rationalist views suggest that his project emerges from the failures of previous rationalism, with the aim to work out a rationalist view that can account for moral obligation by integrating insights from the theological conception. The combination of perfectionism and theological views yields the basic outline of the idea of autonomy, consisting in the lawgiving function of a rational will as a key to the legislation of a necessary law.

Autonomy and Moral Rationalism : Kant’s Criticisms of ‘Rationalist’ Moral Principles (1762-1785) / S. Bacin - In: The Emergence of Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Philosophy / [a cura di] S. Bacin, O. Sensen. - Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2019 Jan. - ISBN 9781107182851. - pp. 48-66 [10.1017/9781316863435.004]

Autonomy and Moral Rationalism : Kant’s Criticisms of ‘Rationalist’ Moral Principles (1762-1785)

S. Bacin
2019

Abstract

This paper sheds light on Kant’s notion of autonomy by considering Kant’s critique of the rationalist theories of morality that he discussed in his lectures on practical philosophy from the 1760s to the time of the Groundwork. The paper first explains Kant’s taxonomy of moral theories and his perspective on the history of ethics. Second, it considers Kant's arguments against the two main variants of ‘rationalism’ as he construes it, that is, perfectionism and theological voluntarism, pointing out the similarities to previous criticisms. Third, the paper argues that Kant’s discussion of the 'rationalist' views does not amount to an unqualified dismissal, but to an attempt at working out a novel rationalist position. Kant’s criticisms of rationalist views suggest that his project emerges from the failures of previous rationalism, with the aim to work out a rationalist view that can account for moral obligation by integrating insights from the theological conception. The combination of perfectionism and theological views yields the basic outline of the idea of autonomy, consisting in the lawgiving function of a rational will as a key to the legislation of a necessary law.
autonomy; moral rationalism; moral voluntarism; perfectionism
Settore M-FIL/06 - Storia della Filosofia
Settore M-FIL/03 - Filosofia Morale
   Dipartimenti di Eccellenza 2018-2022 - Dipartimento di FILOSOFIA
   MINISTERO DELL'ISTRUZIONE E DEL MERITO
gen-2019
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/595509
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