The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the determinants of cabinet termination in parliamentary systems. A preliminary study will raise a fundamental question: do voters punish incumbents for calling anticipated elections? The scarce evidence available reached contradictory conclusions. For the first time in the literature I will link cabinet termination with valence theories of party competition, and I will individuate the determinants of this popularity cost. My valece theory will provide a solution to the existing debate, showing that all the findings provided up to now represent specific cases of a more general phenomenon. The core of my thesis is represented by a coalition bargaining model. In each stage of the game, incumbents observe their electoral expectations and choose between negotiating on public policies, forming a new cabinet with the opposition, and calling elections. My game will show a series of improvements: first, it will introduce time and account for its effects on the outcome of the negotiation; second, it will introduce spatial considerations, such as the ideological location of the players and their coalition opportunities; third, it will encompass a theoretical account of the popularity cost of opportunistic election calling. Its fundamental assumptions will then be tested. Its asumptions will be tested using voting intention trends from four European democracies, covering more than fifty years of parliamentary politics. Results will show that variations in the exit option for the governing parties efficiently explain the likelihood of cabinet termination. On consensual democracies, this kind of test had never been conducted before. A corollary research concludes the dissertation: if voting intention data can be used to explain cabinet termination, then the same data can be used to account for ministerial tenure. The dismissal of ministers, or alterations in their prerogatives, can be described as a currency in the power game among coalition partners. Such an hypothesis had never been tested before. Using duration analysis I will show how imbalances in incumbent parties' popularity are associated with more frequent redistributions of power withing the goverment coalition. Even in this case, my empirical models will include time-varying covariates, producing an empirical contribution to the literature.

ELECTION TIMING IN CONSENSUAL SYSTEMS. LINKING COALITION BARGAINING AND VALENCE THEORY OF PARTY COMPETITION / I. Bongiorni ; supervisor: F. Zucchini. - : . DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE SOCIALI E POLITICHE, 2018 May 09. ((29. ciclo, Anno Accademico 2016. [10.13130/bongiorni-ivan_phd2018-05-09].

ELECTION TIMING IN CONSENSUAL SYSTEMS. LINKING COALITION BARGAINING AND VALENCE THEORY OF PARTY COMPETITION

I. Bongiorni
2018

Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the determinants of cabinet termination in parliamentary systems. A preliminary study will raise a fundamental question: do voters punish incumbents for calling anticipated elections? The scarce evidence available reached contradictory conclusions. For the first time in the literature I will link cabinet termination with valence theories of party competition, and I will individuate the determinants of this popularity cost. My valece theory will provide a solution to the existing debate, showing that all the findings provided up to now represent specific cases of a more general phenomenon. The core of my thesis is represented by a coalition bargaining model. In each stage of the game, incumbents observe their electoral expectations and choose between negotiating on public policies, forming a new cabinet with the opposition, and calling elections. My game will show a series of improvements: first, it will introduce time and account for its effects on the outcome of the negotiation; second, it will introduce spatial considerations, such as the ideological location of the players and their coalition opportunities; third, it will encompass a theoretical account of the popularity cost of opportunistic election calling. Its fundamental assumptions will then be tested. Its asumptions will be tested using voting intention trends from four European democracies, covering more than fifty years of parliamentary politics. Results will show that variations in the exit option for the governing parties efficiently explain the likelihood of cabinet termination. On consensual democracies, this kind of test had never been conducted before. A corollary research concludes the dissertation: if voting intention data can be used to explain cabinet termination, then the same data can be used to account for ministerial tenure. The dismissal of ministers, or alterations in their prerogatives, can be described as a currency in the power game among coalition partners. Such an hypothesis had never been tested before. Using duration analysis I will show how imbalances in incumbent parties' popularity are associated with more frequent redistributions of power withing the goverment coalition. Even in this case, my empirical models will include time-varying covariates, producing an empirical contribution to the literature.
ZUCCHINI, FRANCESCO
comparative politics; parliamentary systems; election timing; rational choice theory; quantitative methodology; game theory; survival analysis; voting intentions
Settore SPS/04 - Scienza Politica
ELECTION TIMING IN CONSENSUAL SYSTEMS. LINKING COALITION BARGAINING AND VALENCE THEORY OF PARTY COMPETITION / I. Bongiorni ; supervisor: F. Zucchini. - : . DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE SOCIALI E POLITICHE, 2018 May 09. ((29. ciclo, Anno Accademico 2016. [10.13130/bongiorni-ivan_phd2018-05-09].
Doctoral Thesis
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
phd_unimi_R10648.pdf

accesso aperto

Tipologia: Tesi di dottorato completa
Dimensione 667.95 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
667.95 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri
Pubblicazioni consigliate

Caricamento pubblicazioni consigliate

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/571338
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact