The impact of corruption charges on the electoral performance of parties is conditioned by specific institutional factors. This article shows the extent to which the effects of political corruption depend on the control that party leaders exercise over the ballot. It is argued that voters might abstain or support other lists if they cannot select individual candidates to revitalize the reputation of the political party. Employing data on judicial investigations in Italy from 1983 to 2013, we provide evidence of the role of electoral rules and intra-party xcandidate selection in shaping the relationship between corruption and voters’ behaviour. Parties implicated in corruption or related crimes experience a loss of votes when they compete under a closed list formula or when the candidate selection process is strongly centralized.

When rotten apples spoil the ballot : The conditional effect of corruption charges on parties vote shares / A. Ceron, M. Mainenti. - In: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW. - ISSN 0192-5121. - (2016 Nov 22). [Epub ahead of print] [10.1177/0192512116668858]

When rotten apples spoil the ballot : The conditional effect of corruption charges on parties vote shares

A. Ceron
Primo
;
M. Mainenti
2016

Abstract

The impact of corruption charges on the electoral performance of parties is conditioned by specific institutional factors. This article shows the extent to which the effects of political corruption depend on the control that party leaders exercise over the ballot. It is argued that voters might abstain or support other lists if they cannot select individual candidates to revitalize the reputation of the political party. Employing data on judicial investigations in Italy from 1983 to 2013, we provide evidence of the role of electoral rules and intra-party xcandidate selection in shaping the relationship between corruption and voters’ behaviour. Parties implicated in corruption or related crimes experience a loss of votes when they compete under a closed list formula or when the candidate selection process is strongly centralized.
accountability; corruption; electoral rules; intra-party democracy; Italy
Settore SPS/04 - Scienza Politica
22-nov-2016
22-nov-2016
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/457538
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