In this paper we provide a direct test of the inequality aversion hypothesis based on aggregate outcomes using the Patron Game, a version of a Public Good Game that mandates that only one member of a group contributes to the public good. We find evidence that inequality aversion does not play any role, as the average contribution does not increase when the distribution of endowments is manipulated to generate a situation of favorable inequality for the patron, compared to the case in which there is no inequality ex ante.

The Patron Game with Heterogeneous Endowments : A Case Against Inequality Aversion / A. Filippin, M. Raimondi. - In: ECONOMIST-NETHERLANDS. - ISSN 0013-063X. - 164:1(2016), pp. 69-81. [10.1007/s10645-015-9268-6]

The Patron Game with Heterogeneous Endowments : A Case Against Inequality Aversion

A. Filippin
;
M. Raimondi
Ultimo
2016

Abstract

In this paper we provide a direct test of the inequality aversion hypothesis based on aggregate outcomes using the Patron Game, a version of a Public Good Game that mandates that only one member of a group contributes to the public good. We find evidence that inequality aversion does not play any role, as the average contribution does not increase when the distribution of endowments is manipulated to generate a situation of favorable inequality for the patron, compared to the case in which there is no inequality ex ante.
altruism; inequality aversion; public good; economics and econometrics
Settore SECS-P/01 - Economia Politica
Settore SECS-P/02 - Politica Economica
2016
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/450216
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