Abstract. In the Homeric poems – although the notion that material and causal responsibility should be separated from moral responsibility begins to emerge – the principle of strict liability predomi-nates. This is moreover true as far as homicide is concerned; when a man is killed, whether the kill-ing is intentional or not, the victim’s relatives react with vengeance. With his law on homicide, to-wards the end of the VII century BC, the Athenian legislator Drakon was the first to consider mens rea as a criterion to differentiate the penalties. The debate on criminal and, more generally, moral responsibility becomes urgent in the last years of the fifth century, when in the end the idea prevails that a merely material and causal agent can be considered neither responsible nor, consequently, guilty.

Some Remarks on Homicide and Criminal Responsibility in Ancient Greece / L. Pepe. - In: MÈTIS. - ISSN 1105-2201. - 13:(2015 Dec), pp. 45-67. ((Intervento presentato al convegno Aitia juridique, aitia philosophique. Accusation, responsabilité, cause tenutosi a Paris nel 2012.

Some Remarks on Homicide and Criminal Responsibility in Ancient Greece

L. Pepe
Primo
2015

Abstract

Abstract. In the Homeric poems – although the notion that material and causal responsibility should be separated from moral responsibility begins to emerge – the principle of strict liability predomi-nates. This is moreover true as far as homicide is concerned; when a man is killed, whether the kill-ing is intentional or not, the victim’s relatives react with vengeance. With his law on homicide, to-wards the end of the VII century BC, the Athenian legislator Drakon was the first to consider mens rea as a criterion to differentiate the penalties. The debate on criminal and, more generally, moral responsibility becomes urgent in the last years of the fifth century, when in the end the idea prevails that a merely material and causal agent can be considered neither responsible nor, consequently, guilty.
Résumé. Dans les poèmes homériques – où commence à émerger la notion que la responsabilité ma-térielle et causale ne peut pas être séparée de la responsabilité morale – prédomine l’idée d’une res-ponsabilité de type objectif. Cela est vrai aussi en ce qui concerne le meurtre: quand un homme est tué, indépendamment du fait que le meurtre soit volontaire ou non, la famille de la victime réagit en se vengeant. Avec sa loi sur le meurtre, vers la fin du VIIe siècle, le législateur athénien Dracon est le premier à envisager l’élément subjectif comme critère pour différencier la peine. Le débat sur la responsabilité pénale et, plus généralement, morale, devient pressant au cours des dernières années du Ve siècle, quand prévaut l’idée que l’agent matériel et purement causal ne peut pas être tenu res-ponsable, ni, donc, coupable.
Criminal Responsibility; Aitios; Aitia; Homicide; Drakon; Homer
Settore IUS/18 - Diritto Romano e Diritti dell'Antichita'
dic-2015
Ecole des hautes etudes
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/343315
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