Biased Ministers, Inefficiency and Control in Distributive Policies: An Application to the EC Fisheries Policy

The literature asserts that legislators are unlikely to adopt inefficient policies unanimously. But, the systematic and unanimous increase in quantities of Total Allowable Catch, under the auspices of the Common Fisheries Policy, are inefficient by internationally recognised standards. This article develops a game of distributive politics to explain this puzzle. The game is based on the assumption that specialised council formations are composed of preference outliers and behave like ‘runaway institutions’. The article shows how, over a sixteen year period, ministers are significantly less concerned with environmental protection, more supportive of (agri-)fishery issues and more right wing than their governments are. The article also tests the conservationist preferences of the European Commission. Finally, we map these preferences into the policy output of the CFP and show how the Council deals with problems created by its own decisions and by national implementation through the restraining of national authorities and delegation to the Commission