The “weak regulation”: the case of the Italian electricity sector. From a “nationalization in the dark” to a regulation “that is switching off the light” The concept of “regulatory failure” is less common and widespread than that of “market failure”. Nonetheless the literature on regulation often refers to regulatory failures. Such situations are characterized by failed objectives expected as a result of the specific regulatory interventions. Sometimes state intervention experiences the same limits (for example lack of information and externalities) that prevent the market from achieving efficient results. The “impasse” in the Italian electricity system shows that the current regulatory framework has not achieved the results expected taking into account both the degree of liberalization and the definition of an institutional design consistent with the foreseen objectives. Indeed in the Italian electricity market, the regulatory design is the result of the dynamical relations between the regulator, the “Autorità per l’energia elettrica e il gas” (Aeeg), whose independence represents a guarantee against blackmailing by the regulated electrical industry, on the one side, and the legislator and the government, on the other. Over time, in the decade following the bill in 1995 establishing the Aeeg’s structure and competences, the design of an independent regulator with significant powers has been repeatedly attacked by the legislator as well as by the government which is still the majority shareholder of the incumbent. On the one hand the regulator’s powers were downsized in favour of the government, on the other the regulator was unable to withstand the pressures of both the government and the economic interests. Moreover the difficulties resulting from the constitutional reform (2001) in balancing the requirements of unity, decentralization and participation of the local governments highlight the ongoing increase in the complexity of institutional relations.

La regolazione debole : il caso del settore elettrico italiano : da una "nazionalizzazione al buio" ad una regolazione che "spegne la luce" / L. Ammannati - In: El derecho de la energia / [a cura di] A. Perez Moreno. - Sevilla : IAAP, 2006. - ISBN 84-8333-312-0. - pp. 277-298 (( Intervento presentato al 15. convegno El derecho de la energia (15. congreso italo-espanol de profesores de derecho administrativo tenutosi a Siviglia nel 2004.

La regolazione debole : il caso del settore elettrico italiano : da una "nazionalizzazione al buio" ad una regolazione che "spegne la luce"

L. Ammannati
Primo
2006

Abstract

The “weak regulation”: the case of the Italian electricity sector. From a “nationalization in the dark” to a regulation “that is switching off the light” The concept of “regulatory failure” is less common and widespread than that of “market failure”. Nonetheless the literature on regulation often refers to regulatory failures. Such situations are characterized by failed objectives expected as a result of the specific regulatory interventions. Sometimes state intervention experiences the same limits (for example lack of information and externalities) that prevent the market from achieving efficient results. The “impasse” in the Italian electricity system shows that the current regulatory framework has not achieved the results expected taking into account both the degree of liberalization and the definition of an institutional design consistent with the foreseen objectives. Indeed in the Italian electricity market, the regulatory design is the result of the dynamical relations between the regulator, the “Autorità per l’energia elettrica e il gas” (Aeeg), whose independence represents a guarantee against blackmailing by the regulated electrical industry, on the one side, and the legislator and the government, on the other. Over time, in the decade following the bill in 1995 establishing the Aeeg’s structure and competences, the design of an independent regulator with significant powers has been repeatedly attacked by the legislator as well as by the government which is still the majority shareholder of the incumbent. On the one hand the regulator’s powers were downsized in favour of the government, on the other the regulator was unable to withstand the pressures of both the government and the economic interests. Moreover the difficulties resulting from the constitutional reform (2001) in balancing the requirements of unity, decentralization and participation of the local governments highlight the ongoing increase in the complexity of institutional relations.
regolazione ; concorrenza ; energia elettrica
2006
Instituto Andaluz de Administraciòn Pùblica
Book Part (author)
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/28127
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