This article examines the complete-concept theory central to Leibniz's Discourse on Metaphysics of 1686. It argues that this doctrine lies at the intersection of three great layers of thought: his reflections on individual history and destiny, his ontological intuition of what is considered a “complete being,” and his logically minded unified theory of concepts and truth. It considers the relevance of the doctrine of complete concepts to Leibniz's concerns about theodicy, and argues that the complete-concept doctrine was never abandoned, even though it was sidelined after 1686 in favor of other approaches to the theory of substance.
The complete concept of an individual substance / S. Di Bella - In: The Oxford Hanbooks of Leibniz / [a cura di] M.R. Antognazza. - Prima edizione. - Oxford : Oxford University Press - Oxford Handbooks on line, 2014. - ISBN 9780199744725. - pp. 1-14 [10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199744725.013.009]
The complete concept of an individual substance
S. Di Bella
2014
Abstract
This article examines the complete-concept theory central to Leibniz's Discourse on Metaphysics of 1686. It argues that this doctrine lies at the intersection of three great layers of thought: his reflections on individual history and destiny, his ontological intuition of what is considered a “complete being,” and his logically minded unified theory of concepts and truth. It considers the relevance of the doctrine of complete concepts to Leibniz's concerns about theodicy, and argues that the complete-concept doctrine was never abandoned, even though it was sidelined after 1686 in favor of other approaches to the theory of substance.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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