The paper analyzes the effects of different equity principles on the decision of developing countries to join a world coalition whose aim is to control greenhouse gas emissions. A game-theoretic framework is proposed to assess the incentives for different countries to sign an international treaty on climate change control. Then, the effects of different equity rules on these incentives are evaluated by using a dynamic integrated growth and climate model. Policy proposals based on transfers from developed to developing countries are also analyzed.
EQUITY, DEVELOPMENT, AND CLIMATE CHANGE CONTROL / F. Bosello, b. Buchner, C. Carraro. - In: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION. - ISSN 1542-4766. - 1:2-3(2003 Apr), pp. 601-611.
EQUITY, DEVELOPMENT, AND CLIMATE CHANGE CONTROL
F. BoselloPrimo
;
2003
Abstract
The paper analyzes the effects of different equity principles on the decision of developing countries to join a world coalition whose aim is to control greenhouse gas emissions. A game-theoretic framework is proposed to assess the incentives for different countries to sign an international treaty on climate change control. Then, the effects of different equity rules on these incentives are evaluated by using a dynamic integrated growth and climate model. Policy proposals based on transfers from developed to developing countries are also analyzed.
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