A Logical framework for reasoning about access control models

The increased awareness of the importance of data protection has made access control a relevant component of current data management systems. Moreover, emerging applications and data models call for flexible and expressive access control models. This has led to an extensive research activity that has resulted in the definition of a variety of access control models that differ greatly with respect to the access control policies they support. Thus, the need arises for developing tools for reasoning about the characteristics of these models. These tools should support users in the tasks of model specification, analysis of model properties, and authorization management. For example, they must be able to identify inconsistencies in the model specification and must support the administrator in comparing the expressive power of different models. In this paper, we make a first step in this direction by proposing a formal framework for reasoning about access control models. The framework we propose is based on a logical formalism and is general enough to model discretionary, mandatory, and role-based access control models. Each instance of the proposed framework corresponds to a C-Datalog program, interpreted according to a stable model semantics. In the paper, besides giving the syntax and the formal semantics of our framework, we show some examples of its application. Additionally, we present a number of dimensions along which access control models can be analyzed and compared. For each dimension, we show decidability results and we present some examples of its application.