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"At the Water's Edge?": Italian Political Parties and Military Operations Abroad

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Introduction

Aim of the research

For over four decades, between the end World War II and 1989, Italy's security policy was first and foremost characterized by passiveness. Arguably, one might have wondered if such a thing existed altogether. In the context of the Cold War, Italian armed forces were trained to defend the country from an attack from east that never actually materialized and crossed the border very rarely to participate in peacekeeping operations. However, in the last thirty years, Italy dramatically transformed the way in which it projects its military force, turning from a "security consumer" to a "security provider" (Walston 2007). Notably, Italian armed forces actively participated in a multitude of Military Operations Abroad (MOA), often promoted by multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Union (EU). In particular, Italy provided a significant contribution in all the major areas of crisis in the last years. Italian armed forces conducted air strikes in Kosovo and Libya, fought the Talibans in Afghanistan, guaranteed security and delivered assistance to Iraqi people after the end of the Saddam Hussein's regime, contributed to the respect of a ceasefire at the border between Lebanon and Israel. The numbers of this commitment to MOAs are glaring. For example, in 2006, Italy has become the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping missions in Europe in terms of personnel deployed, providing a higher share than wealthier states such as United Kingdom, France and Germany (Carati and Locatelli 2017).

Considering how Italian strategic culture was permeated by pacifism, such development is particularly puzzling. From different perspectives, various scholars attempted to explain why successive Italian governments decided to send troops abroad as part of multilateral interventions (Brighi 2013; Carati and Locatelli 2017; Cladi and Locatelli 2018; Davidson 2014). These studies enumerated a list of drivers including the protection of national interest, compliance with the humanitarian principles of the operations, and the attempt to raise the country's profile. Most of these works emphasized this latter factor as the key explanatory variable. Davidson (2014) found that the importance attached by Italy's policymakers to the alliance with the United States is fundamental to understand contributions to operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. He also stressed that the decision not to participate in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 but only providing troops in a successive

phase was not driven by a questioning of the transatlantic ties but rather grounded on electoral concerns deriving from substantial public contestation of the war. Furthermore, Carati and Locatelli (2017) confirmed that "fellowship", i.e. the tendency to follow allies and partners in order to be considered as a key actor within the international community, is the most crucial element to explain Italian participation in the intervention in Kosovo and Libya. Cladi and Locatelli (2018) underlined that, among other factors, a strong emphasis on multilateralism pushed the Italian government to deploy an outstanding number of soldiers for the reinforcement of UN peacekeeping operation in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 2006.

However, such change in Italian security and defence policy was also surely fostered by an emerging consensus among Italian political parties. Through a qualitative analysis of parliamentary debates and votes, a few studies highlighted the presence of a widespread party support for MOAs, bringing on the same side the main centre-left and centre-right parties (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). Such bipartisan support was based on a shared discourse emphasizing the humanitarian aims and multilateral legitimation of the missions and, simultaneously, removing any sort of military dimension. As Ignazi et al. (2012) argued, the implicit agreement among Italy's main parties was: "just don't call it war". Such message sometimes conflicted with the operational reality on the ground in which Italian troops were involved in complex and perilous tasks such as counterinsurgency. Other than genuinely originating in the beliefs of Italy's political elites, this narrative was also designed to avoid potential audience costs from a traditionally pacifist public opinion. A few studies demonstrated that when policymakers adopted a different rhetorical framework or the consensus on the humanitarian and multilateral nature of the mission was contested, public support significantly decreased (Coticchia 2014; 2015; Coticchia and De Simone 2016; Olmastroni 2014a). Such consensus did not extend to some extreme left and right parties who were, in most cases, pivotal coalition partners. However, Coticchia and Davidson (2018) emphasized how these extreme parties never seriously threatened to defect on such issue as they did not consider it as sufficiently salient and feared of being blamed by their own voters for making the cabinet collapse.

The aim of my dissertation is further exploring how Italian parties positioned and interacted on MOAs during the so-called "Second Republic", i.e. between 1994 and 2013. Therefore, this doctoral thesis will address the following questions: "why did Italian parties support MOAs?", "Why did they vote in favour of MOAs?", and, finally, "Why did not extreme coalition partners leave the cabinet in spite of the decision to participate in a MOAs?". As suggested, a few studies have already addressed these issues (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Coticchia 2011; Coticchia and Davidson 2018; Ignazi et al. 2012).

However, a systematic and comprehensive investigation of how Italian parties behaved with regards to MOAs is currently missing. In some cases, this depends on the fact that existing works tackled this issue within the broader examination of Italy's post-Cold War increasing activism in peace and security operations (Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). Furthermore, due to the timing of publication, some works did not manage to take into account relevant MOAs such as the one in Libya (2011) (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Ignazi et al. 2012). Notably, none of these works has employed quantitative methods and statistical analyses. To sum up, there is substantial margin for updating and improving this research agenda. Therefore, the main goal of my dissertation is providing an innovative and original contribution to the understanding of the role of political parties in Italy's troop deployments for multilateral interventions after the end of the Cold War.

By doing so, this dissertation will contribute to three scholarly debates. The first concerns the dynamics of party competition in Italy during the Second Republic. Some studies highlighted how, due to the presence of an alternation in government between two rival coalitions, Italian political system has gained more majoritarian and competitive traits, for example in the legislative arena (Cotta and Verzichelli 2016; Pedrazzani 2017). Secondly, this dissertations feeds into the debate over Italian post-Cold War foreign and security policy and dimensions of change. While some scholars claimed that centre-left and centre-right governments had more or less diverging ideas about how Italy should behave externally (Andreatta 2008; Carbone 2007), other ones found overall continuity in Italian foreign policy (Croci 2008: Walston 2007). In addition to these "domestic" debates, this doctoral thesis also speaks to the emerging international research agenda on the party politics of foreign policy, and, military interventions especially. The following section provides a brief overview on such debate and how my work can contribute on it.

The state of the art and contribution to the literature

For various decades, scholars in the field of International Relations (IR) and the sub-field of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) have consistently underestimated the role of political parties in shaping states' foreign policy and international politics (Alden and Aran 2017). The lack of attention for parties within IR literature is quite understandable after all. During the Cold War, this field of research was characterized by the ascendance of (neo) realist theories attributing little, if any, relevance to domestic-level variables in the explanation of phenomena occurring in global politics (Donnelly 2000). It is more surprising that FPA equally failed to include parties in its list of key elements affecting foreign policy-making process within states. In fact, this sub-field was born out of the need

to challenge three fundamental assumptions of the realist paradigm: the unitary nature of the state, its rationality and, foremost, the focus on broad changes in the distribution of power among countries rather than, to use a quotation from Waltz (1979, 121), "why state X made a certain move last Tuesday", i.e. foreign policy behaviour (Hudson 2005; 2014; 2016). Nevertheless, while investigating the impact of domestic-level variables such as bureaucracies (Allison 1971) and dynamics of group decision-making (Janis 1972), FPA has consistently neglected to explore how parties, through their elaboration of policy agendas and their pervasive presence in the executives of democratic and non-democratic regimes alike, affect foreign policy.

In recent years, interest in political parties as crucial actors in foreign policy has significantly grown, giving life to a lively and flourishing research agenda. A substantial impulse in this development came from "a domestic turn" (Kaarbo 2015) in the field in IR, exemplified in the well-known democratic peace theory, positing a dyadic relationship between democracy and lack of conflict among states (Bremer 1993; Maoz and Russett 1993). Successive studies attempted to unpack the category of democracies analysing which factors decreased the states' propensity to be involved in a military dispute (Ireland and Gartner 2001; Palmer et al. 2004; Reiter and Tillman 2002). By doing so, these works paved the way for studies on the impact of political parties on peace and conflict in the world, arguably the most fundamental and explored issue in IR. For instance, in their often-mentioned study, Palmer et al. (2004) found right-wing parties to be significantly more hawkish than left-wing parties. In addition, Prins and Spreecher (1999) indicated that coalition cabinets, i.e. those executives formed by more than one party, are more war-prone than single party governments.

Synthetically, three different research agendas touched on the relevance on political parties in shaping states' foreign policy and, in particular, propensity to be involved in military conflicts. First, various studies focused on the impact of partisanship on a number of foreign policy issues such as troop deployments (Rathbun 2004; Wagner et al. 2017; 2018), foreign aid (Thérien and Noël 2000), and support for multilateral organizations (Hofmann 2017; Hooghe et al. 2002). Interestingly for this dissertation, the aforementioned divide between doves on the left and hawks on the right was further tested with regards to support for military interventions (Mello 2014; Schuster and Maier 2006; Wagner et al. 2017; 2018). Second, more recent works on the impact of coalition politics and foreign policy delved into the composition of multiparty cabinets, inevitably stumbling in dynamics of party politics (Clare 2010; Kaarbo and Beasley 2008; Oktay 2014). In particular, the capacity of smaller coalition parties (junior partners) to shape foreign policy outcomes by hijacking larger coalition parties (senior partners) was emphasized (Oppermann and Brummer 2014; Ozkececi-Taner 2005).

Finally, some scholars had to take into account party preferences in order to fully explain national parliaments' extent of control and oversight on troops deployments (Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010; Raunio and Wagner 2017). Ideological distance and incentives to cooperate between government and opposition parties were found to have a significant impact on legislative empowerment vis-à-vis the executive (Lagassé and Saideman 2017; Oktay 2018).

This dissertation locates within this emerging academic debate on the party politics of military interventions. Moreover, it seeks to contribute to its development by tackling familiar research questions and formulating new ones. First, the crucial question of why party support military intervention will be addressed. I will test the validity of hypotheses concerning the impact of ideology, presence in government and, innovatively, how the specific characteristics of the mission and partisanship interacts with each other. Secondly, establishing a bridge between the literature on partisanship and troop deployments and the one on parliamentary war powers, the effect of law-making procedures on party contestation will be scrutinized. To my knowledge, this is the first study in which such element is taken into account in the explanation of party support for peace and security operations. Finally, in contrast with studies on coalition politics and foreign policy, I will assess the impact of a foreign policy decision (participating in a military operation) on a coalition cabinet rather than vice versa. In particular, junior partners' decision to stay in the cabinet in the face of contested troop deployments will be explained.

Case selection: Italian parties and MOAs during the Second Republic

The decision to select Italy in the period between 1994 and 2013 as a case study to investigate the party politics of military interventions require a series of justifications. First of all, the choice of focusing on a single country needs a thorough discussion. In fact, the vast majority of the studies on the party politics of military intervention have a comparative perspective. They tend to focus on two or more countries, often belonging to the category of Western democracies. For instance, in his seminal book on the role of partisanship in military interventions, Rathbun (2004) examined how parties in the three major European powers – United Kingdom, France and Germany – positioned on the Balkan crises, namely Bosnia and Kosovo. In order to comprehensively describe party contestation in Europe, Wagner et al. (2017) gathered data from 28 different states. Undoubtedly, comparative works conduce to empirical findings with stronger external validity with respect to single-country studies. In other words, conclusions are more generalizable. However, single-country studies enable the researcher to control for potentially troublesome intervening variables. For

instance, with regards to the issue of the party politics of military interventions, variation in national strategic culture (more or less militarist) and party system (two-party system or multiparty system) can arguably decisively increase the complexity of the analysis. In this sense, the comparison with Great Britain, a country marked by a militarist strategic culture and a two-party system, and Germany, a viscerally pacifist nation after WW2 with a multiparty system, may create some issues in terms of research design. To sum up, limiting the scope of this dissertation to one country has a clear disadvantage in terms of external validity of the findings, but, concurrently, an advantage in terms of parsimony in the number of intervening variables.

Secondly, the choice of Italy as a country of interest has to be discussed. Three element makes of this state a particularly relevant case: its position as a middle power in global politics, the remarkable number of MOAs in which armed forces participated since the end of the Cold War, and, finally the peculiar characteristics of the party system. First, as a middle power (Giacomello and Verbeek 2011; Santoro 1991), Italy is a worthwhile case study to be examined with regards to military interventions. Middle powers find themselves in a peculiar position when it comes to provide a contribution to peace and security operations. Due to the significant size of their armed forces, they are a target for great powers interested in burden-sharing. Moreover, they are also willing to do contribute to increase their status and their reputation vis-à-vis Great Powers. Italy could be considered as a representative example in this sense, similarly to the Netherlands and Canada for instance. In addition, due to the aforementioned post-Cold War activism in guaranteeing global security, the Italian case has the potential to offer fruitful insights in the exploration of parties' behaviour. In fact, party positioning and interaction could be observed across a number of different missions with diverging scope, international framework and domestic salience. Thirdly, and finally, fragmentation and the polarization in the party system makes the Italian case particularly promising for the scope of this work. In fact, a considerable number of parties belonging to all families can be taken into account as observations, from social democrats to conservatives, form the extreme-left to the far-right.

Thirdly, the choice of restricting the time span of the dissertation from 1994 to 2013, deserves some attention. Such decision mainly depends on the necessity to keep the unit of analysis, i.e. political parties, as constant as possible. 1994 parliamentary elections in Italy marked the shift from the "First" to the "Second Republic". While the institutional structure of the political system remained the same, the party system underwent a radical change. Citing the title of Verzichelli and Cotta's (2000) seminal book chapter, Italy gradually moved from a party system characterized by "constrained coalitions" to one of "alternating governments". The post-war competition between Christian Democrat party

(*Democrazia Cristiana*) and the communist party *(Partito Comunista Italiano)*, was replaced by an alternation of centre-left and centre-right coalitions (Bardi 2007; Bartolini et al. 2004). Social democrats (*Partito Democratico della Sinistra* and later *Democratici di Sinistra)*, the successor of the communist party, were always the largest party within the centre-left coalition. The entrepreneur and media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi emerged as the leader of the centre-right coalition. In a context of a passage from a polarized multi-party system *(multipartitismo polarizzato)* (Sartori 1970) to a limited bipolarism (*bipolarismo limitato)* (D'Alimonte and Chiaramonte 2010), some parties disappeared, like the Christian democrats, other ones transformed, such as the post-fascist *Movimento Sociale Italiano* turning into the more moderate *Alleanza Nazionale* and, finally new ones emerged, like the populist and regionalist *Lega Nord.* Choosing a time span encompassing this fundamental watershed in Italian politics would therefore produce considerable issues in terms of stability of the unit of analysis. For this reason, fixing 1994 as a starting point arguably constitutes an appropriate decision.

According to some scholars (Calossi and Cicchi 2018; Pasquino and Bull 2018), 2013 elections coincided instead with the beginning of the end for the Second Republic. The polls certified the rise of *Movimento 5 Stelle* (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013; Conti and Memoli 2015), a new populist party that attracted roughly a quarter of all the voters. Both social democrats (*Partito Democratico*) and Berlusconi's party *Forza Italia* lost considerable ground in term of vote share and were forced form a coalition government together. Five years later, at the following parliamentary election, for the first time since 1994, these two parties were simultaneously at the opposition. Notably, various party families experienced transformations in these years. Extreme-left parties almost disappeared in terms of parliamentary representation. Centrist and Christian Democrat parties changed denominations and experienced significant electoral losses too. In a nutshell, it is clear how Italy's party system has recently undergone another seismic change. Therefore, the choice of setting 2013 as the end of the time span considered in this dissertation should sound also reasonable in terms of continuity of the unit of analysis.

Furthermore, from 2011, Italy's activism in MOAs slightly declined in terms of number of financial resources and military units. Two factors probably contributed to provoke this slight decline in Italian presence in peace and security operations. First, the negative externalities of the 2011 intervention in Libya had a deep effect on Italy's willingness to embark in successive military interventions. Aimed at protecting civilians from the regime's brutal repression of public protest, the NATO-led operation led to even more stability in a neighbouring country, which in turn, increased the arrival of illegal

migrants on Italian shores. For this reason, this operation is still widely contested among Italy's policymakers and considered as a failure in the protection of national interest and security. Secondly, the 2011 debt crisis forced successive Italian governments to cut public expenditure in various sectors, including defence. The reduction of funds had also obvious repercussions on troop deployments outside national borders, that had to undergo a substantial strategic re-thinking.

Data and methods

This dissertation employs various sources of data and methods, both quantitative and qualitative, in order to address the different research questions[1]. In the second chapter, the first "empirical" chapter, in order to explain party support for MOAs in Italy, I use the unsupervised scaling algorithm *Wordfish* (Slapin and Proksch 2008) to extract party position from 12 parliamentary debates on the six most relevant missions during the so-called "Second Republic". In a second step, these measures represent the dependent variable in two OLS regression models. Independent variables in this dataset are either taken from the Chappell Hill Expert Survey (CHES) or attributed on the basis on the author's knowledge. The use of a technique of automated content analysis constitutes an absolute novelty in the measurement of party support for peace and security operations, the Italian and the international context as well. Cross-national comparative studies relied on proxies contained in existing projects such as CHES (Wagner et al. 2017) or interpretation of various bibliographical sources, including parliamentary debates, statements, and interviews (Rathbun 2004). Works focusing on the case of Italy also adopted mainly qualitative methodologies, at best complemented with a coding of the most recurrent words in parliamentary speeches (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Coticchia and Giacomello 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012)[2]. Therefore, chapter 2 provides a significant methodological sophistication to the research agenda on party contestation of military interventions, in Italy and Europe.

In the successive chapter, I further assess party support for MOAs but on a different dataset and through different regression models. This time the dependent variable is constructed on the basis of the party voting patterns in all parliamentary votes occurred at the Chamber of Deputies during the so-called "Second Republic". In total 62 single parliamentary votes and 483 party-vote observations are taken into account. Yes votes and abstentions are considered as supportive votes and no votes as against. Independent variables are again taken either from CHES or attributed through author's

[1] A section on data and methods could be find in each of the empirical chapters: chapter 2, chapter 3 and chapter 4.

[2] For an example of a mixed method approach to the analysis of how and Italian elites and media framed the Iraq War in Italy and its consequences on public approval of military force see Olmastroni (2014a).

knowledge. Given the dichotomic structure of the dependent variable, hypotheses are tested through Probit models. To my knowledge, only a couple of works have collected and quantitatively analysed parliamentary votes on troop deployments (Ostermann et al. forthcoming; Wagner et al. 2018). Therefore, to some extent, Chapter 3 could also be considered as innovative in terms of data and method employed with respect to the current literature on party politics of military interventions.

Finally, chapter 4 adopts a qualitative methodology to explain extreme junior partners' permanence in the government despite the decision to participate in MOAs. Among the various operations in which Italy took part, I select two cases of contested troop deployments: the one for Operation Allied Force in Kosovo (1999) and the one for Operation Unified Protector in Libya (2011). In order to uncover reasons underlying junior partners' decision not to defect, I conducted a series of interviews with relevant policymakers and collected a number of bibliographical materials, including parliamentary debates, parliamentary questions, newspaper articles and memoirs. These sources are qualitatively analysed to provide possible explanations of the phenomenon.

Structure of the thesis

This thesis is divided in four chapters, plus a conclusion. In the first chapter, I provide an overview of the academic debates on the party politics of military interventions in Italy and abroad, locating this dissertation. I extensively discuss existing literature on these issues and how this dissertation contributes to its development. I also present original data resuming Italy's involvement in MOAs during the Second Republic to provide a comprehensive assessment of the phenomenon. In the second chapter, as said, I investigate and explain party support for the six most relevant troop deployments occurred during the time span considered in this dissertation: Albania, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya. I test the impact of ideological leaning on both the left-right axis and the GAL/TAN dimension, membership in the government coalition, and the interaction between features of the specific mission (international legitimation and presence of national interest at stake) and party position on the left/right axis.

In the third chapter, I explore again the drivers of party support for military operations through the analysis of all parliamentary votes casted on the issue in this period. In addition to the previous chapter, I also assess the effect of law-making procedures (law decrees) on party propensity to vote in favour of MOAs and scrutinize how presence in the coalition governments affect party support on the basis of their ideological leaning. Furthermore, taking into account all peace and security

operations and not only the most salient ones, this chapter provides a more accurate description of party contestation on troop deployments in Italy. As suggested, in the fourth chapter, I explain why extreme partners have never made a government collapse on these issues, cases from the intervention in Kosovo (199) and Libya (2011). Two factors are hypothesized to lead to such outcome: the lack of salience attributed to opposition to the military interventions and the fear of being blamed by voters to make the government collapse. By analysing extreme parties with completely different ideological leaning, the results also shed light on different types of party contestation among extreme Italian political parties. Finally, in the conclusions, I resume the main findings of this work. Furthermore, I describe how they contribute to the debates on the party politics of military interventions and Italy's post-Cold war foreign and security policy. I then indicate how this work may be useful to interpret the role of political parties in Italy's troop deployments in the near future, under a radically changed party system.

Chapter 1:
Political parties, foreign policy and Italy's involvement in Military Operations Abroad

Introduction

"Politics stops at the water's edge" famously asserted the United States Senator Arthur Vandenberg in 1947, leading the isolationist Republican Party to support President Harry Truman's internationalist agenda at the outset of the Cold War. From that moment on, American policymakers and commentators employed this sentence as a mantra to affirm that, when it comes to foreign policy, the national interest should prevail on partisan fights. However, especially since the end of the Vietnam War, (party) politics has increasingly permeated U.S. foreign policy and its decision-making process. Republican harsh opposition in Congress to the agreement on nuclear proliferation with Iran promoted by democratic President Barack Obama is just one of the latest examples of such a mounting confrontation among the two main American parties on this policy area. However, the penetration of partisan politics into foreign policy has crossed the Atlantic, reaching Western Europe. For instance, in August 2014, party politics dynamics led to defeat of British Prime Minister David Cameron on a vote concerning a potential intervention in the Syrian civil war (Kaarbo and Kenealey 2016; Strong 2015).

While Zürn (2014) talked of a "politicization of world politics", referring to the growing involvement of societal actors in decision-making process at the international level, IR scholars has consistently underestimated the importance of political parties as key actors in states' foreign policy. However, in recent years, parties seemed to have finally entered into the debate, either from the front door or from the backdoor. Works that somehow incorporated them into the analysis of international politics could be divided in three main categories: 1) studies on the impact of government's ideology on foreign policy, 2) studies on coalition politics and its effect on foreign policy, 3) studies on parliament's role in security policy. Notably, most of these works concentrated on states' propensity to be involved in military conflicts. This dissertation locates within this research agenda, investigating Italy's party support for military operations abroad (MOAs) during the so-called "Second Republic" (1994-2013). This case study is particularly interesting given the high extent of fragmentation and polarization in

the party system and Italian extraordinary commitment to military interventions in this period (Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). Moreover, existing literature on security and defence policy in Italy has paid limited attention to the role of political parties (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; D'Amore 2001).

In this chapter, I will place this dissertation within the broader debates on the role of domestic variables in international politics and foreign policy, the party politics of military interventions and, the post-cold War developments in Italy's foreign and security policy. In particular, as far as the literature on parties and foreign policy is concerned, a comprehensive overview of the state of the art is currently missing[3]. Therefore, this chapter offers a considerable contribution to the debate, by systematizing works on this issue. Moreover, while various studies analysed Italy's remarkable involvement in MOAs after the end of the Cold War (Carati and Locatelli 2017; Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012), few provided extensive quantitative data to describe the size and the evolution of this phenomenon[4]. In this chapter, I will collect and analyse various existing data including the number of MOAs in which Italy was involved, their division by institutional framework and region, and the number of personnel and funds committed between 1994 and 2013.

The structure of this theoretical chapter is the following. In the first section, I will emphasize how International Relations has taken "a domestic turn" after the end of the Cold War. Secondly, I will provide an overview of the work on parties and foreign policy. Thirdly, I will discuss the debate on Italian foreign policy and the MOAs, emphasizing the role of political parties. Finally, in the conclusion, I will resume how the thesis contributes to the development of each of these academic debates.

The domestic turn in International Relations

For decades, IR as a discipline has consistently neglected domestic factors as key explanatory variables of phenomena of world politics. Much of the blame is to be attributed to the longstanding dominance of realism. Originating in the thought of Thucydides, Macchiavelli and Hobbes, realism established as a point of theoretical reference in IR after the end of the Second World War,

[3] Overviews of the single debates on partisanship and foreign policy, coalition politics and foreign policy and parliamentary war power instead exist. See respectively Wagner et al. (2017); Opperman et al. (2017); Raunio and Wagner (2017).

[4] Two exceptions are Carati and Locatelli (2017); Rosa (2014).

contributing to the departure of the discipline from the broader field of Political Science[5]. Therefore, it is not surprising that one of the core realist assumptions was that international politics fundamentally differs from domestic politics. However, while emphasizing the inherent egoism in human nature as an inherent source of conflict among states, classical realists (Morgenthau 1948) entailed some similarities between domestic and international politics, giving primacy to the anarchic nature of the international relations, neorealists successively (Gilpin 1981; Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1979) widened the gap between the two spheres. According to neorealism, the distribution of capabilities in the system dictates to states' rational strategies to survive and thrive in world politics. In this theoretical and analytical framework, domestic variables such as the type of government or public opinion had little space, at least in influencing broad patterns of behaviour.

Neoliberalism (Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 1977), a theory considered as rival to realism, managed to incorporate these elements while, simultaneously, not questioning the premise of the unitary dimension of the state. Robert Putnam's seminal article on two-level game theory (1988) instead marked the first significant attempt to establish a theoretical bridge between international politics and domestic politics, by shedding light on the interplay between the two. Employing a rationalistic perspective, he suggested that during states' negotiations, the national political leader lies at the intersection of two spheres, the domestic one and the international one, and attempts to maximize his gains by playing on both. For instance, by restricting his own margin of manoeuvre on the domestic sphere, the leader may increase its negotiating power on the international sphere by forcing the other state to accept a less favourable deal.

However, a few years later, the end of the Cold War boosted what Kaarbo (2015) appropriately defined as a "domestic turn in IR theory"[6]. As Hudson claimed (2016, 30), scholars suddenly realized that "it is impossible to explain or predict system change on the basis of system-level variables alone". This transformation mostly depended on the development of the so-called "democratic peace" theory[7]. The proposition at the basis of this theory is that democratic regimes are more peaceful than non-democratic regimes. Following this assumption, the spreading of democracy will automatically lead to the eradication of war from international politics. Originally developed by the philosopher Immanuel Kant, the democratic peace theory emerged from the ashes when the collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States as the only global hegemon in international politics and led to

[5] For an overview on Realism see Donnelly (2000). For a critical account see Guzzini (2004).

[6] For an overview of domestic explanations of international relations see Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2012).

[7] For an overview on democratic peace theory see Chan (1997); Ray (1998).

democratization in a number of states around the world. Employing increasingly sophisticated statistical methods and different time spans, several quantitative studies tested the effect of democracy on states' propensity to go to war (Doyle 1983; Bremer 1993; Maoz & Russett 1993; Rummel 1983). They found that while democracies are not in general more dovish than non-democracies, they "almost never fight against one another with the exception of a few questionable cases" (Chan 1997, 62). Levy (1998, 662) asserted that this pattern is "as close as anything we have to an empirical law in International Relations". The causal mechanisms underlying the correlation between democracy and peace turned out to be much less clear-cut. From different perspectives, a number of scholars have attempted to provide theoretical foundations for the democratic peace theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Maoz and Russett 1993; Owen 1994; Risse-Kappen 1995; Weart 1994). Two main explanations have initially confronted: a structural one, taking into account the higher number of veto player in democracies than in non-democracies, and a normative one, emphasizing the role of shared norms and values among democracies. While empirical evidence favoured the latter over the former (Maoz and Russett 1993; Risse-Kappen 1995; Weart 1994), rationalist approaches based on divergence in domestic incentives and audience costs between democratic and authoritarian leaders have also provided insightful explanations (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 1999; Fearon 1994).

However, as Kaarbo noted (2015), IR attempt to finally take into account domestic factors was not limited to democratic peace and invested all three main contemporary theoretical approaches: (neo)realism, liberalism, and constructivism. As far as realism is concerned, "neoclassical realism"(NCR) successfully managed to fill this gap (Lobell et al. 2009; Rose 1998). While sharing with realist approaches an emphasis on power and its distribution in an anarchic international system, NCR scholars claimed that external incentives do not dictate a state's foreign policy but rather define the boundaries of it. In fact, their impact is mediated by the perception and calculations of political leaders that are in turned influenced by a wide range of domestic factors like interest groups and public opinion. This interaction between exogenous independent variables and endogenous intervening variables accounts for the variation in foreign policy. In the camp of liberalism, Utilitarian Liberalism (UL) is a case in point (Moravcsik 1997). Moravcsik (1997) advocated the primacy of rational societal groups such as transnational companies or NGOs that, through their interest and their values, capture the state and determine its foreign policy preferences. However, the external environment also has an impact on states' preferences, as domestic actors have an increasingly transnational dimension. These preferences determine state behaviour and, eventually, international relations. Finally, the rise of constructivism highlighted the crucial role of norms as an important independent variable to explain international politics and individual state's foreign policy (Checkel

1998; Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1992). Norms are value-based and intersubjective expectations regarding the appropriate behaviour a state should perform in the international environment. Their sources are both external and domestic as they are generated in the constant process of socialization that occurs outside the border of the state through interactions with other states, and within the border of the state as part of national culture and identity.

Such development has brought IR closer to the sub-discipline of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA)[8]. Alden and Aran (2017, 3) defined FPA as "the study of the conduct and practice of relations between different actors, primarily states, in the international system", having at its heart "an investigation into decision-making, the individual decision-makers, processes and conditions that affect foreign policy and the outcomes of these decisions". This definition emphasizes the nature of both the dependent and independent variables of the field: foreign policy behaviour and political, social, cultural and even psychological factors influencing decision-makers and decision-making process, respectively. In its evolution, FPA has taken three main directions (Hudson 2005; 2014). The first route consisted in investigating foreign policy decision-making process in a narrow sense, by highlighting the role of group and bureaucratic dynamics (Allison 1971; Janis 1972; Snyder et al. 1954). The second route, taken by Rosenau (1968), attempted to balance the tendency of the discipline to pursue actor-specific theories with the need for widely applicable systemic theories. Finally, the third route examined psychological and cognitive factors affecting political leaders (Jervis 1976; Sprout and Sprout 1957). Also due to its interdisciplinary approach, creating links with other fields such as comparative politics and even psychology (Hudson 2005), FPA has established itself as a distinct discipline within the broad umbrella of IR.

Therefore, as said, in the last years IR and FPA have consistently looked at domestic variables to explain international politics and state's foreign policy. For instance, the impact of factors such as leader's personality and public opinion has been extensively scrutinized (Chan and Safran 2006; Dyson 2006). Less attention has been paid instead to political parties, that have gone under the spotlight at best accidentally in studies on the role of government's ideology (Palmer et al. 2004; Thérien and Noël 2000), coalition politics (Clare 2010; Kaarbo and Beasley 2008), and parliaments (Raunio and Wagner 2017) on foreign policy. This dissertation contributes to fill this literature gap in IR and FPA, by exploring the behaviour of Italian political parties on troop deployments between 1994 and 2013.

[8] For an overview on the evolution and latest development in FPA see Smith et al. (2016); Alden and Aran (2017).

Political parties and foreign policy

As just said, notwithstanding a growing interest for the influence of domestic elements on foreign policy and international politics, both FPA and IR scholars have consistently neglected the relevance of political parties. Given FPA's longstanding focus on within-state variables, such neglect is even more surprising. In this sense, Kesgin and Kaarbo (2010, 33) argued that foreign policy analysts "have paid limited attention to political parties in parliamentary systems' foreign policymaking". In this regard, Alden and Aran (2017, 80) described parties as a "neglected element" in FPA. To raise the attention on the relevance of this element, Schuster and Maier (2006, 237) urged to "bring parties in" the debate as they "offer a promising field of research, especially for the study of foreign policy formulation in parliamentary systems".

This lack of interest is noteworthy as parties "can be seen as the key site of a number of activities attributed in FPA to domestic actors in foreign policy" (Alden and Aran 2017, 80). Among their various functions, political parties formulate distinct foreign policy agendas to be implemented once they will be in government. These agendas are based on the beliefs of the part of the society that they represent. Therefore, parties bring ideas from (segments of) public opinion to the state. Furthermore, it has to be acknowledged that foreign policy decisions are often taken at the party level rather than at the government level (Alden and Aran 2017). This is true for democratic regimes and especially for parliamentary systems, in which executives depend on party support to survive. The role of parties is supposed to be even stronger in countries such as China, in which a single party controls all the aspects of political life.

Studies acknowledging (more or less directly) the role of political parties in foreign policy can be distinguished in three broad categories. First, a number of works investigated the impact of government ideological leaning on the left-right axis and state's behaviour in a number of policies from involvement into military conflicts to foreign aid. These studies established a link between partisanship and foreign policy, empirically demonstrating that parties do articulate different positions and implement them when they are in government. They also paved the way for more recent works specifically focusing on exploring party contestation. Secondly, other works assessed the effect of coalition politics on foreign policy. This research agenda inevitably stumbled in political parties which are the fundamental components of coalition cabinets. In particular, they found that, under certain conditions, small coalition (junior) partners may have a disproportional influence on foreign policy. Third, a recent literature on parliamentary war powers has emerged. Rather than homogeneous

institutions, legislatives could be seen as aggregations of parties. Party strategies decisively parliament's capacity and willingness to scrutinize the government over military deployments.

Ideology and foreign policy

The idea that party ideology has an impact on foreign policy rests on two assumptions (Rathbun 2004). First, different beliefs regarding the way a state should be organized domestically lead to diverging positions on the way a state should behave at the international level. As Rathbun (2004) argued, different parties present dissimilar positions on foreign policy. Various studies have underlined how party ideology fundamentally structures contestation on foreign policy. McCormick and Wittkopf (1992) showed that, since the Vietnam war, United States Congress has voted in an increasingly partisan way, reflecting a mounting gap between Democrats and Republicans. Hofmann (2017) highlighted consistent divergencies among French parties regarding the relationship with NATO. Bjereld and Demker (2000) identified in ideological divisions the main source of disagreement in foreign policy in Sweden. Second, political parties are committed to these positions and try to implement them when they are in government. Borrowing a definition from comparative politics, parties behave as policy seekers on foreign policy issues, rather than vote-seekers or office-seekers. A policy-seeking party is primarily concerned about attempts to maximize its effect on public policy (Strøm 1990). Klingemann et al. (1994) empirically confirmed this hypothesis, suggesting that foreign policy is a domain with a comparatively high level of correspondence between party manifestoes and actual policies. Heffington (2018) also found strong congruence between hawkish and dovish position expressed in parties manifestoes and government's propensity to involve the country in a military conflict.

In terms of ideology, in Western democracies, the division between left and right has defined the sphere of politics. According to Bobbio (1995, 80), "the relevant criterion to distinguish between left and right is the different approach towards the concept of equality" [9]. On the one hand, the left strives for greater equality among individuals within a society, to be achieved through the promotion of the welfare state and the right to higher education. On the other hand, the right legitimizes inequality as a condition in the society and defends freedom in terms of minimal state regulation, free enterprise, free-market economy. A further distinction between left and right concerns attitudes towards civil and social rights. On the one hand, left promotes a more progressive and inclusive idea of society,

[9] See also a discussion of Bobbio's distinction between left and right and its empirical application in Jahn (2011).

paying attention to minorities and disadvantaged groups. On the other hand, right is more traditionalist and conservative, protecting the existing community and the dominant groups.

This division concerning the way domestic society should be organized reflects in different worldviews and approaches to foreign policy. With regards to conflict resolution, arguably the most relevant issue in international politics, as Rathbun (2004) claimed, leftists are expected to be more dovish and rightist to be more hawkish. Bringing their inclusive idea of domestic political community into international politics, left-wing people are concerned about the negative impact of a war for the whole system. Furthermore, rejecting the use of coercive means to obtain political goals, leftists are also inherently anti-militarist[10]. To the contrary, the emphasis on self-reliance and an excluding idea of society lead rightist to consider the use of force as a way to promote national interest. Moreover, conceiving hierarchy as a value, right-wing people tend to be more militarist as well. Predictably left-wing and right-wing parties reflect these diverging opinions among the electorate. In fact, analysing several party manifestoes across a number West European countries, Klingemann et al. (1994) has found that right-wing parties are more militarist than left-wing parties.

A number of quantitative studies demonstrated that such divergence between left and right policy have an impact on states' conflict behaviour (Arena and Palmer 2009; Koch 2009; Koch and Sullivan 2010; Mello 2014; Palmer et al. 2004; Schuster and Maier 2006). Palmer et al. (2004) found that countries led by right-wing governments are more likely to be involved in a military dispute than left-wing governments. Arena and Palmer (2009) suggested that right-wing executives are more likely to initiate military disputes. Koch (2009) discovered that right-wing cabinets also engage in longer conflicts than left-wing cabinets. Koch and Sullivan (2010) demonstrated that right-wing government are less likely to terminate wars when their public support decrease than left-wing government. A few qualitative works further indicated such a cleavage. Shuster and Maier (2006) observed how, in Western Europe, with the notable exception of Great Britain and France, countries led by right-wing governments participated in the Iraq War while countries led by left-wing governments did not. Comparing the cases of military interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, Mello (2014, 187) concluded that the impact of partisanship across this cleavage is "dissimilar across cases" but "some evidence suggests that right governments are, in general terms, more willing to engage militarily than their left counterparts". Notably, Clare (2014) took this division so much for granted to the point of equating left-wing and right-wing parties with dovish and hawkish attitudes respectively.

[10] For an extensive discussion of leftist ideology and foreign policy see also Walzer (2018).

Against this background, in the last decades, the increasing number of military interventions other than war such as peacekeeping operations (Wheeler 2000) and the emergence of a new transnational cleavage between parties in West European countries (Hooghe et al. 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2018), called for a questioning of the neat-left/right divide. In particular, a couple of seminal studies theoretically and empirically challenged the distinction between left-wing dovish parties and right-wing hawkish parties (Rathbun 2004; Wagner et al. 2017). Taking into account the involvement of three European countries – United Kingdom, France and Germany – in Bosnia and Kosovo, Rathbun (2004) pointed out that humanitarian operations pose a double dilemma for political parties. On the one hand, left-wing parties have to choose between protecting human rights and confirming their anti-militarism. On the other hand, right-wing parties have to decide between preserving state's international prestige and deploying troops to "save strangers". Given these premises, left-wing party may support military interventions, while right-wing counterparts may oppose them. For instance, Haesebrouck (2017) found that countries led by left-wing governments were more inclined to provide a contribution to the 2011 military intervention in Libya than their right-wing counterparts. In their recent quantitative study, Wagner et al. (2017) questioned even more convincingly the left-right divide. In fact, analysing the positions of over 237 political parties across 28 European countries, they described a curvilinear model over the left-right axis for peace and security operations. In other words, partisan support is minimum at the extreme left, increases towards the centre, and then decreases further moving to the far right.

Various studies demonstrated the impact of partisanship as measured on the left-right axis across other foreign policy issues other than states' military behaviour. Thérien and Noël (2000) showed that the cumulative presence of left-wing parties in power leads to an increase in the amount of money spent in foreign aid. Milner and Tingley (2013) observed that, in the United States, representatives of left-wing constituencies are more favourable to economic aid and colleagues in right-wing districts prefers foreign aid. Shifting to trade policy, Milner and Judkins (2004) demonstrated that left-wing parties are consistently more protectionist than right-wing parties. Frid-Nielsen (2018) found that left-wing parties in the European Parliament adopted a more inclusive approach on immigration policy.

However, in this dissertation, I focus on security and defence policy, and, specifically Military Operations Abroad (MOAs). The literature on the party politics of peace and security operations has mainly pursued comparative agenda. While providing findings with stronger external validity, comparison among countries may miss peculiarities of the single cases linked to factors such as military culture and party system features. Limiting the focus to Italy's parties during the so-called

"Second Republic" and their support for the MOAs in which the country participated in, this dissertation is able to provide an original contribution. In fact, such a case selection allows to control for intervening variables and limit the variation in terms of party systems. Furthermore, advancing the research on party politics of military interventions, this dissertation scrutinizes how the impact of partisanship is mediated by other factors. In their successive article, Wagner et al. (2018) found that the presence at the government is a decisive variable to explain party support for peace and security operations in Europe. In chapter 2 and 3, not only I test the impact of this factor on Italy's parties, but I also explore how its effects changes according to the position in the left-right axis. The same authors also called for disaggregating to military operations, as to understand which features prompt parties to support a specific mission. Following this recommendation, in chapter 2, I investigate how legitimacy of the mission and its linkages with national interest interact with party support on the left-right axis.

Coalition politics and foreign policy

At the beginning of the new century, a number of studies investigated the impact of party composition of the cabinet on states' propensity to be involved in a military conflict, distinguishing between single-party governments and coalition cabinets. However, expectations on the direction of the effect were contradictory. On the one hand, according to a structural interpretation of the democratic peace (Maoz and Russett 1993) and veto player theory (Tsebelis 2002), coalitions cabinets are supposed to be more dovish than single-party governments. The increase in the number of political actors involved in the decision-making process should produce higher constraints for the executive in pursuing an aggressive conduct of foreign policy. On the other hand, following the diffusion of responsibility approach (Powel and Whitten 1993), coalitions cabinets are presumed to be more hawkish than single-party governments. This is because they are better able to distribute the electoral audience costs of such an often-unpopular policy among parties[11]. Unsurprisingly, these studies produced inconclusive empirical findings. Most of the quantitative works did not find any statistically significant distinction between single party executives and coalition cabinets (Ireland & Gartner 2001; Leblang and Chan 2003; Reiter and Tillman 2002). To put it bluntly, Leblang and Chan (2003, 397) concluded that there is no evidence that "rule by a single party or by a coalition of parties makes a discernible difference in war involvement". However, Prins and Spreecher (1999) found that that coalition cabinets are actually more hawkish than single-party governments. For instance, they argued

[11] For an overview of the two competing images of coalition governments in foreign policy see Kaarbo (2012); Oktay (2014).

that "coalition governments are more likely to reciprocate disputes in general, and particularly more likely to reciprocate with the actual use of military force" (285). To the contrary, complementary qualitative studies suggested that coalition cabinets are more dovish than single-party governments (Auerswald 1999; Elman 2000). Comparing four different cases, Auerwsald (1999, 498) suggested that "majority democracies (i.e. those usually led by single-party cabinets like UK) are more likely to use force than coalition parliamentary governments".

Subsequently, studies on coalition politics and foreign policy moved in two directions: exploring a wider range of foreign policy events other than war and delving into the category of coalitions in terms of number of parties, ideological fractionalization, parliamentary strength[12]. Kaarbo and Beasley (2008, 77) discovered that coalition cabinets are neither more peaceful nor more aggressive but more extreme in their foreign policy behaviour. Furthermore, they pointed out that in general "institutional and political dynamics of the coalitions affect the character of their foreign policy". Clare (2010) found that, while cohesive coalitions are as aggressive as single-party governments, ideologically fractionalized coalitions present a different propensity to initiate a military dispute according to the position of the outlier party on the left-right axis. Confirming the aforementioned left-right divide, extreme left-wing parties push the coalition to be more dovish and extreme right-wing parties drive the coalition to be more hawkish. Beasley and Kaarbo (2014) highlighted that the number of parties, cabinets' parliamentary strength, and the presence of critical small parties are crucial variables to coalitions' foreign policy behaviour in terms of commitment, engagement and propensity to conflict. For example, in contradiction with the structural interpretation of democratic peace, they found that an increase in the number of parties lead to a more conflictual foreign policy. Taking into account similar independent variables, Oktay (2014) found that coalitions are more or less committed according to their arithmetic and ideological fragmentation.

Most of these studies emphasized the relevance of junior partners, i.e. those coalition parties holding a smaller number of seats in parliament and cabinet posts. Clare (2010, 966) argued that junior partners "can exercise powerful, even disproportionate, influence on foreign policy". However, scholars considerably disagree about which factors increase junior partner's influence on coalition foreign policymaking. Comparing cases in Israel and Germany, Kaarbo (1996) identified the arena in which decisions are taken, cohesion within coalition partners and junior partner strategy of influence as crucial variables to explain junior partner. Analysing a number of cases of disagreement

[12] For an overview of the existing quantitative studies on coalition politics and foreign policy and their division between a first and a second wave see Oktay and Beasley (2017).

between coalition partners in Turkey, Ozkececi-Taner (2005) emphasized that junior partners have to perceive an issue as salient and develop a distinct position in order to play a constraining role on foreign policymaking. Moreover, juxtaposing United Kingdom and Germany foreign policy-making, Oppermann and Brummer (2014) highlighted that control of key ministries like foreign affairs and defence and departmental autonomy are crucial to explain junior partner's influence. Greene (2019) and Brommeson and Ekengren (2019) also pointed out how that the margin of manoeuvre conceded by the senior partner have a decisive explanatory power in increasing or decreasing junior partner's influence.

However, junior partners' influence should not be overestimated. In fact, in most cases it ends up being the loser in the conflict within the coalition. Kaarbo (2012) highlighted a few surprising cases of lack influence considering the above-mentioned criteria. For instance, in the Netherlands, the small but pivotal *Democrats 66* was able to delay but not prevent the government's much-contested decision to deploy troops in an extremely dangerous area of Afghanistan in 2006. In a very similar way, notwithstanding the fact that the coalition was ruled by one of their representatives, the Japanese *Socialist Party* let the stronger *Liberal Democrats* to prevail in the decision to make a military contribution to the UN peacekeeping missions in the Golan Heights in 1995. Analysing the Swedish case, Brommeson and Ekengren (2019, 14) concluded that junior partner's influence was present "but only to a limited extent" and was more related to symbolic issues than real policy outcomes. Investigating junior partner's behaviour, Coticchia and Davidson (2018) made the same point.

In this dissertation, I will contribute to the study of coalition politics in two ways. First, I will shed light to the little-explored case of radical coalition partners in Italy and MOAs. In fact, as seen, while countries such as Germany, Israel, Netherlands and Turkey received substantial coverage in the literature, to my knowledge, Coticchia and Davidson (2018) represents the only study on coalition politics and foreign policymaking in Italy. Therefore, by extending this work in Chapter 4, I will contribute to the enlargement of the whole research agenda. Secondly, while putting a lot of attention on the foreign policy outcomes, this literature has completely neglected to consider how conflicts between coalition partners on foreign policy affect the survival of the government. There are some evidences that coalition disagreements over foreign policy seldom lead to government's termination. For example, out of the aforementioned twelve cases of conflict in Kaarbo's volume (2012), only once a junior partner decided to defect, thereby causing the collapse of the entire cabinet[13]. The

[13] In 1995, the Turkish Republican People's Party decided to abandon the coalition government in which it was the junior partner as a consequence of the signing of a custom union treaty with the EU.

reasons underlying junior partner's permanence in the cabinet in spite of an adverse foreign policy outcome can shed light on their different approach to foreign policy. Italy is an interesting case as disagreement within coalitions on military operations was substantial but never provoked the fall of a cabinet during the Second Republic.

Parliament and war

A normative debate about the desirability of providing the parliament with considerable power to constrain and monitor the executive on security policy exists. On the one hand, the involvement of the legislature in the decision-process may jeopardize the effectiveness of a military strategy, often based on rapidity and secrecy. Furthermore, debates in parliament may expose potential disagreements within the political elites on the issue, affecting a country's credibility vis-à-vis its international partners. On the other hand, providing parliament with strong war powers increases transparency and accountability in an area which is particularly relevant for the daily lives of citizens. Proponents of this argument also suggest distinguishing between reactions to outside attacks and so-called "war of choice", that should be put under stronger parliamentary scrutiny[14].

Historically speaking, executive-legislative relations on security policy has often been highly unbalanced in favour of the former over the latter. In fact, national constitutions and other legal provisions often grant to governments a significant margin of manoeuvre on this issue. In United Kingdom, the Monarch is given a "royal prerogative" over parliament when it comes to declaring war (Strong 2015). In France, foreign policy is an exclusive domain of the president (Ostermann 2017). Furthermore, in parliamentary democracies, the executive often controls a majority of seats in the parliament, strongly affecting the result of votes on these matters. However, changes in the law-making process to approve military deployments and other recent events highlighted a presumedly increasing relevance of parliament in security policy. Approved after the end of Vietnam War, the War Power Resolution is arguably the most famous attempt to find a balance in the executive-legislative relationship on the issue. Over the years, it eased collective action problems in the Congress and constrained Presidents in the use of force (Auerswald and Cowhey 1997). In 2003, Turkish parliament voted against the executive's decision to allow U.S. to use its military bases for the Iraq War (Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010). More famously, in 2014, as said, the House of Commons

[14] For an overview of these this nromative debate see Peters and Wagner (2011); Raunio (2014).

prevented the British government from deciding to participate in a potential military intervention in the Syrian civil war (Kaarbo and Kenealey 2016; Strong 2015).

As a consequence, a number of studies began to explore parliamentary war powers in a comparative perspective (Borns and Hanggi 2005; Dietrich et al. 2015; Peters and Wagner 2011). Dietrich et al. (2010) distinguished between four types of parliamentary war powers: legislative and budgetary, control, communication-related and dismissal. Arguably, the veto power on the executive's decision to use military force and the capacity to make the government collapse are the strongest ones. On the basis of these powers, they categorized parliaments as more or less powerful on security issues. Other studies found considerable and increasing variation in the extent of parliamentary war powers across countries (Bono 2005; Born and Hanggi 2005; Dietrich et al. 2010; Peters and Wagner 2011). It is also worth underlining how, beside formal powers, parliaments can exercise scrutiny over troop deployments in more informal ways. In their analysis, Peters and Wagner (2011) argued that the lack of an external threat, an history of military failure and a constitutional tradition of civil law are explanatory factors for stronger parliaments. Moreover, in contrast to anecdotal evidence, in strictly legal terms, studies found no evidence of a generalized trend towards a "parliamentarization" of security policy (Peters and Wagner 2011; Raunio and Wagner 2017). In other words, parliaments are not becoming more assertive in their relationship with the executive on war matters overall.

According to a structural interpretation of the democratic peace (Maoz and Russett 1993), the substantive involvement of the legislative in the decision-making process should discourage the executive from bringing the country into a military conflict. Therefore, countries in which parliamentary war powers are stronger are presumed to be more peaceful than those in which parliaments are weaker. At the empirical level, a number of studies found mixed empirical support for the "parliamentary peace" hypothesis. (Auerswald 1999; Dieterich et al. 2011; 2015; Haesebrouck 2018; Mello 2014; Wagner 2018). Examining democratic states' contributions to the Iraq war, Dietrich et al. (2015) demonstrated a significant correlation between countries with strong parliamentary war powers and less involvement in the conflict. Haesebrouck (2018) underlined that the absence of a legislative veto was a crucial variable to explain national contributions in the bombings against the self-proclaimed Islamic State. To the contrary, studies take into account a larger sample of missions questioned this argument. Analysing five recent military operations, Wagner (2018) found that the negative correlation between parliamentary veto powers and state's participation is statistically significant in only three of them. In its aforementioned work, Mello (2014) concluded that its findings "shed doubts" on the parliamentary peace proposition.

By exploring their formal war powers and the impact of this power on foreign policy, parliaments are treated as unitary actors. However, parliaments are fundamentally composed by political parties. As Wagner and Raunio (2017, 7) argued, parliament can be conceptualized as "party-political institutions where political parties and individual MPs have different motives and opportunities for influencing foreign policy". In other words, in order to appropriately investigate legislative-executive relationship in security policy, parties' ideological leaning, strategies and incentives have to be taken into account. Oktay (2018, 105) argued that such an approach to the study of legislatures in security policy "elucidate the ways in which executive-legislative relationship take place".

Various studies empirically demonstrated the decisive role of parties in empowering (or depowering) parliament in the decision-making process over the use of force. Kesgin and Kaarbo (2010) showed that divisions within the cabinet were at the basis of Turkish parliament rejection to concede military bases for the Iraq War. In order to explain the aforementioned House of Commons' veto on Syria, Kaarbo and Kenealey (2016) mentioned factionalism within Conservatives and Labour party's strategy as decisive factors. Analysing cases from four different countries, Raunio and Wagner (2017) highlighted that left-wing parties are more supportive of stronger parliamentary war powers than right-wing counterparts. Lagassé and Saideman (2017) showed that variation in the extent of parliamentary scrutiny in Canada about the military operation in Afghanistan was driven by the incentives provided to the opposition parties by the political system. Questioning the idea of a stronger involvement of parliament in security policy, Lagassé and Mello (2018) found that Canadian and German parties' collusion on the intervention in Afghanistan led to less responsiveness towards the public opinion. Comparing three different cases, Oktay (2018) highlighted how agreements between weak coalition governments and opposition parties may lead a decrease in the parliament's role in the decision-making process.

As much as the research on partisanship and foreign policy, the literature on parliamentary war powers had a strongly comparative dimension. Single case studies are rare and tend to focus on specific decisions rather than exploring legislative-executive relations across time. This is also due to the fact that, as found by Peters and Wagner (2011), the high extent of variation among countries contrasts to little cross-time variation within countries. Italy is an interesting case study in this sense as law-making procedures to approve and fund military operations changed considerably during the so-called "Second Republic" as the parliament attempted to increase its powers vis-à-vis the executives, which circumvented constitutional restriction to deploy troops abroad. Providing a much-

needed clarification in the scholarly debate, in chapter 3, I will attempt to reconstruct the process of approval and (re) funding of MOAs in Italy and describe whether and how parliament managed to improve its position. This contorted process provoked the coexistence of different law-making procedures to approve MOAs (Bono 2005). The legal value of the vote produced incentives or disincentives for parties to support troops deployment. Chapter 4 will also evaluate the impact of this factor, by itself and in interaction with party ideological position, breaking new ground for the study of party politics of military interventions.

Political parties and military operations abroad in Italy during the Second Republic

Exploring the behaviour of Italian political parties on Military Operations Abroad (MOA) between 1994 and 2013 represents a fruitful way to provide insights on the role of parties in foreign and security policy. The reasons are twofold. First, Italian party system has always been characterized by a relatively high extent of fragmentation and polarization. After 1994, in the shift from the so-called "First Republic" to the "Second Republic", the cleavage between Christian Democrats and communists was replaced by a bipolar competition between centre-left and centre-right coalitions that alternated in power. Despite such development, fragmentation and polarization continued to characterize Italian party system (Bardi 2007). These elements are presumed to offer variation in terms of party positions and preferences. Secondly, since the end of the Cold War, Italy participated in a vast number of MOAs across the world, radically transforming its own foreign and security policy. Italian militaries have been deployed in all major areas of crisis, including Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. However, literature on how political parties behaved on this issue is still limited.

Italian political parties: from the First to the Second Republic

After the end of World War II, the party system of the nascent Italian Republic rapidly structured along the international cleavage between communism and anti-communism[15]. The latter camp was represented by the *Democrazia Cristiana* (DC). From 1946 to 1994, DC has been the most voted party in each general election. Its exponents were present in all cabinets that alternated in power and the Prime Minister was often affiliated to this party (Curini and Pinto 2015; Verzichelli and Cotta 2000). However, in order to go govern, in most cases, DC had to form coalition cabinets with smaller

[15] Between the 1946 and 1948, a coalition of all parties that were involved in the transitional government during the war (*Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale* in Italian), including the communist party, was in power.

centrist and centre-left parties[16]. The other camp was instead represented by *Partito Comunista Italiano* (PCI). Throughout these decades, PCI was always the second most voted party reaching up to 34 per cent of the vote share in 1978. Furthermore, it had a deep penetration in the Italian society, especially in its strongholds in the centre and centre-north of the country (Diamanti 2009). However, due to their ties with the Soviet Union, communists were perceived by the majority of the Italian electorate and political elites as a threat for the stability of the country. For this reason, they were invariably excluded from power[17]. It has to be noted that PCI was not the only party that was consistently banned from the government. In fact, the post-fascist *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (MSI) was also damaged by the so-called "*conventio ad excludendum"* (from Latin, "agreement to exclude")[18].

Historians and political scientists have employed several definitions to describe the post-war Italian party system. Galli (1966) coined the term of *bipartitismo imperfetto* (imperfect two-party system). In a similar way to traditional two-party systems such as United Kingdom, in Italy two parties, DC and PCI, collected a vast majority of votes. However, the imperfectness of the system consisted in the aforementioned exclusion of one of these two parties from power. Ten years later, in a more sophisticated way, Sartori (1976) described Italy as a case of *pluralismo polarizzato* (polarized pluralism). Through this term, he emphasized the high extent of fragmentation (number of parties) and ideological polarization (distance among the most extreme parties) in the party system. Combined with the anti-system nature of PCI and MSI, this polarization prevented any alternation in government that in turn provoked a centrifugal competition and lack of responsibility among government and opposition parties alike[19].

At the beginning of the nineties, due to three major events, this party system rapidly crumbled (Bardi 1996; Cotta and Isernia 1996). First, the fall of the Berlin Wall had major repercussions on PCI (Bull 1991). In fact, in February 1991, the party definitively abandoned the communist ideology, embracing social democracy and changing its name in *Partito Democratico della Sinistra* (PDS) (Ignazi 1992).

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[16] During the First Republic, DC governed formed 13 minority cabinets out of the total 54 cabinets (Curini and Pinto 2015). According to the composition of the cabinet in government, various phases can be distinguished in this period: *Centrismo, Centro-sinistra, Pentapartito* in chronological order. For an overview of cabinets in this period see Cotta and Verzichelli (2016); Curini and Pinto (2015).

[17] Between 1976 and 1979, PCI provided external support in Parliament for two Christian Democrat executives in the period of *Solidarietà Nazionale* (National Unity) against frequent terrorist attacks in the country.

[18] MSI was member of a coalition government only once (Tambroni cabinet), between March and July 1960.

[19]Questioning the hypothesized ideological polarization, Di Palma (1978) underlined the presence of a high extent of bipartisanship in the approval of laws in Parliament.

The most radical fraction did not accept this development and decided to form a new extreme-left party called *Rifondazione Comunista* (RC). Such development also affected DC that lost its role as a protector against the communist threat (Cotta and Verzichelli 2016). Secondly, political elites were shaken by a massive judiciary investigation regarding corruption called *tangentopoli* (Waters 1994). This scandal drastically decreased the electorate's trust in parties. Unsurprisingly, 1992 national elections saw the sharp decline of Christian Democrats (Morlino 1996). After the election, the party split in two factions: *Partito Popolare Italiano* (PPI) and *Centro Cristiano Democratico* (CCD). The socialist *Partito Socialista Italiano* (PSI), a key governing party in the previous decades, was the most affected by the scandal and entered in an endless crisis. This election also marked the rise of *Lega Nord* (LN). This regionalist and populist party advocated stronger fiscal autonomy for the northern part of the country (Passarelli and Tuorto 2012). Its success was rooted in the erosion of DC's electoral hegemony in the north-east of Italy, riding a wave of anti-establishment sentiments (Biorcio 1999). Thirdly, in 1994 the media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi entered into Italian politics with his liberal-conservative party *Forza Italia* (FI). Berlusconi portrayed himself as an anti-communist champion and appealed to the moderate voters, promising to reduce burdensome taxes and bureaucracy (Ignazi 2014). He joined forces with LN and *Alleanza Nazionale* (AN), MSI's successor. In 1994 elections, the first ones competed with the new quasi-majoritarian electoral system (D'Alimonte and Chiaramonte 1993), this coalition surprisingly obtained the majority in parliament and Berlusconi became Prime Minister (Bartolini and D'Alimonte 1995).

This result marked the beginning of a transition towards a new party system, based on the competition between centre-right and centre-left coalitions that almost perfectly alternated in power (Verzichelli and Cotta 2000; Bartolini et al. 2004; D'Alimonte and Bartolini 2007)[20]. The centre-right coalition pivoted around Berlusconi and its "personal party" *Forza Italia*[21]. The two aforementioned parties, LN and AN, were always in the coalition with FI. In 1994, these parties were also joined by the conservative Christian democrats (CCD), that in 2002 merged with *Cristiani Democratici Uniti* (CDU) to form *Unione di Centro* (UDC)[22]. In March 2008, FI and AN merged in *Popolo delle Libertà* (PdL). Such development led to a victory in 2008 elections and to the fourth (and last) Berlusconi government but ultimately revealed as a failure and the party returned to the previous denomination in 2013. In the centre-left coalition, PDS, which in 1998 shortened its name in *Democratici di Sinistra*

[20] For an overview of the cabinets alternating in power during the Second Republic and their composition see the Appendix. Data are taken from the Parlgov database (Döring and Manow 2016).

[21] On personal parties in Italy and Forza Italia as a personal party see Calise (2015).

[22] For an overview of the splits and merges in the post-DC parties see Pizzimenti (2007).

(DS) was the main actor. In order to go to power, the Social Democrats were forced to find agreements with a fragmented group of parties. Centre-left coalitions were also extremely heterogeneous in terms of ideological distance, bringing together communists and Christian democrats. In particular, the communist *Rifondazione Comunista* proved to be a troublesome coalition partner, making the first Prodi cabinet (1996-1998) collapse. A split within this party over the support for the centre-left coalition government, in October 1998, led to the establishment of *Partito dei Comunisti Italiani* (PdCI)[23]. The green party *Federazione dei Verdi* (FdV) was also always part of the centre-left coalition cabinets. Finally, PPI, the more leftist Christian Democrats, decided to join this camp. In 2002, this party contributed to the establishment of *La Margherita* (Mar). The merge of this latter party with the DS gave life in 2009 to a broad centre-left platform called *Partito Democratico* (PD).

Commentators defined the transition as a shift from a "First Republic" to a "Second Republic". In narrow terms, such distinction is erroneous. In fact, there was not any substantial alteration in Italy's institutional structure and the type of government (D'Alimonte and Bartolini 1997). However, this definition has been extremely successful in the political, public and even academic debate[24]. As suggested, what surely changed was the party system. D'Alimonte and Chiaramonte (2010) coined the definition of *Bipolarismo Limitato* ("limited bipolarism") to describe the new landscape. This definition underlines the bipolar tendency but also stress how the fluidity of the actors prevented a completely dichotomous competition between two parties. Bardi (2007) argued that two different party systems coexisted during the "Second Republic": one with a centripetal competition during elections and another one with a centrifugal in inter-electoral periods. Bartolini et al. (2004) identified in this peculiar overlapping between parties and coalitions and the fragmentation of the system the limits of Italian bipolarism during these years.

In fact, in spite of the implementation of a quasi-majoritarian electoral law (Pasquino 2007), the number of parties even increased with respect to the already fragmented party system of the "first republic" (Bardi 2007). This trend inverted only between 2006 and 2008, when parties in the centre-left and centre-right coalitions aggregated in broad platforms, PD and PdL respectively. Furthermore, analysing the distance between the two most extreme parties in the system, the ideological polarization also remained fairly high, with only a slight decrease with respect to the "First Republic" (Morlino 1996). However, such decrease is less pronounced if we consider as opposite poles of the party systems the centre-left and centre-right coalitions (Bardi 2007; Pappalardo 1996). Against the

[23] On RC and PdCI see Calossi (2007).

[24] A number of academic studies on Italian politics refer explicitly to the First or the Second Republic. Only in the realm of the analysis of Italy's foreign and security policy see Varsori (2015); Walston (2007).

background of a certain extent of continuity, the new party system had a substantial impact on various aspects of Italian politics. For instance, the presence of pre-electoral coalitions led to a significant increase in the duration of the cabinets (Curini and Pinto 2015; Pritoni 2012). Moreover, confrontation in the legislative arena slightly increased as executives had stronger incentives to implement their own agenda (Giuliani 2008; Pedrazzani 2017). The end of the contraposition between Christian Democrats and the shift towards this new party system also arguably affected foreign and security policy (Brighi 2013; Carbone 2007), that is the policy area under investigation in this work.

In the recent years, this weak bipolar system entered in crisis (Bull and Pasquino 2018; Pasquino and Valbruzzi 2015). 2013 elections saw the rise of a third force in the system, the populist *Movimento 5 Stelle* (M5S). At its debut, M5S became the most voted party for the Chamber of Deputies (Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013; Tronconi 2015). Five years later, this party managed to even increase its share of votes and formed a new government with *Lega Nord* (Pritoni and Vignati 2018), which in the meantime had underwent a radical transformation, transforming into a typical far-right populist party (Albertazzi et al. 2018). Therefore, to keep consistency in the unit of analysis, i.e. parties, this dissertation restricts its timespan to 2013. It is also worth pointing out that, while the "Second Republic" party system has surely disappeared, it is still too early to guess which party system will replace it. Describing the new party system and its impact on Italy's foreign policy will require time and further research.

Italian foreign policy in the Second Republic: between continuity and change

For over four decades, from the end of the Second World War to the fall of the Berlin Wall, Italian foreign policy has been marked by low-profile and even passiveness (Brighi 2013; Mammarella and Cacace 2006; Santoro 1991). A combination of external and domestic factors produced such a cautious approach. On the one hand, the Cold War dynamics, i.e. the bipolar competition between United States and Soviet Union, were crucial in constraining Italy's margin of manoeuvre the international arena (Romano 2002; Santoro 1992). In comparison with other West European countries such as France or United Kingdom, the strength of this constraint was amplified by Italian geographic position, in the middle between the two blocs. In this sense, Santoro (1991, 198) identified the dynamics of the global contexts "as the key independent variable in deciding Italian foreign policy". On the other hand, the aforementioned high extent of ideological polarization in the political system, provoked by the presence of such a successful and penetrating communist party, pushed Italy's policymakers to be very prudent such area of policy (Panebianco 1977). In fact, controversial and divisive decisions could have led to the de-stabilization of the already fragile Italian republic. In this

sense, Panebianco (1977, 863) talked of a fundamental "Incompatibleness between domestic goals (protection of the political equilibria) and external goals (enhancement of national status)".

Against this background, Italy managed to locate itself in the middle of three circles (Mammarella and Cacace 2006; Santoro 1991). The first circle consisted in the relationship with the United States (Nuti 2003). Such relationship was based on mutual interests. On the one hand, the alliance with the U.S. guaranteed to Italian governments security and funds for the economic recovery, through the adhesion to NATO and the Marshall Plan respectively. On the other hand, Washington was keen on keeping a country with such a strategic position and the presence of the largest communist party in Western Europe under control. The second circle corresponded to Europe (Bindi 2011; Matarazzo 2011). In fact, joining the process of European integration was perceived by Italian policymakers as an opportunity to quietly enhance the international status of the country in the world and, simultaneously, cooperate with more industrialized economies such as (Western) Germany and France. Atlanticism and Europeanism conflicted at times, with Italian foreign policymakers called to reconcile tensions between these two guidelines of foreign policy. Notably, PCI was initially critical of both choices. However, by the end of the seventies, through the so-called *Compromesso Storico,* communists accepted Italy's membership in the NATO and became solid supporters of the European integration project. Therefore, a solid consensus came to underpin these two pillars of Italy's foreign policy. The third circle consisted in the Mediterranean (Coticchia et al. 2011; Croci and Valigi 2013). From the sixties, Italy tried to impose itself as a bridge between Europe and the West and Northern Africa and Middle East, by establishing strong ties with a number of countries in the region. Such efforts were mainly motivated by the need to secure oil and gas supplies, through the investments of the Italian state-owned energetic company, *Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi* (ENI).

At the beginning of the nineties, two events opened unprecedented opportunities for a change in Italian foreign policy. First, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War came to an end. Such development lessened the American grip on West European countries that could in turn develop more autonomously their own external relations, attempting to raise their status. This is what Italy did, increasing its own assertiveness in the international stage (Brighi 2013; Carbone 2011; Giacomello and Verbeek 2011). Secondly, as said, only a few years later, the existing party system, based on the competition between Christian democrats and communists, was gradually replaced by an alternation in power between centre-left and centre-right coalitions. In theory, such change in domestic politics could have provoked two opposing effects on foreign policy. On the one hand, a less ideologically polarized party system was supposed to cause an even more consensual and

consistent approach. On the other hand, alternation in power of different coalitions with the presence of extreme parties was expected to bring to the fore divergencies and new priorities.

Among scholars and commentators, a vivid and unsettled debate on continuity and change in Italian foreign policy exists[25]. As argued by Croci and Valigi (2013, 52), "most of the recent articles on Italian foreign policy take a position on this debate on continuity and change". On the one hand, some scholars highlighted differences in the foreign policy approaches of the two coalitions. In their view, while the centre-left favoured a multilateral approach, reflected especially in an enthusiastic commitment to the EU, the centre-right preferred bilateral relationships, with United States but also with other countries such as Russia, Israel and Libya (Andreatta 2008; Carbone 2007; Cladi and Webber 2011; Menotti 2007; Quaglia and Radaelli 2007). As argued by Carbone (2007, 917), "for the centre-right coalition national interest is promoted through a pragmatic bilateralism and reinforced Atlanticism, whereas for the centre-left through active multilateralism and reinforce Europeanism". Some commentators even claimed that Berlusconi has brought a radical change in Italian foreign policy (Aliboni 2003; Ignazi 2004; Romano 2006). For example, according to Ignazi (2004, 268), the second centre-right government (2001-2006) has "redefined Italy's traditional priorities". Such arguments are mainly driven by the unwavering support provided by Berlusconi to U.S. President George W. Bush in his controversial "Global War on Terror" that, together with other squabbles, created substantial rifts with Italy's European partners. Moreover, these scholars often mentioned the enormous efforts made to bring the country in the single currency in the first wave made by the first centre-left government as an evidence of its commitment to Europe.

Other analysts instead saw continuity in Italian foreign policy guidelines between the "First" and the "Second Republic" and similarities in the approaches of the two coalitions, with differences limited to Berlusconi's flamboyant style rather than substance (Croci 2003; 2005; 2008; Walston 2004; 2007; Ratti 2012)[26]. As claimed by Croci (2008, 153), "Post war Italian governments have viewed Atlanticism and Europeanism substantially in the same manner and pursued similar policies". For example, this argument is based on the fact that centre-right governments never jeopardized engagement in the European integration process and centre-left executives never questioned loyalty to United States and NATO, as shown by the participation in the intervention in Kosovo in 1999.

[25] For a more extensive account of this debate see Brighi (2013); Isernia and Longo (2017).

[26] Within this debate, interestingly, through the metaphor of pendulum, Brighi (2007; 2013) took a middle-ground position with Italy alternatively emphasizing commitment to Europe and loyalty to United States.

Further evidence is provided by a substantial bipartisanship regarding Italy's contributions to Military Operations Abroad (MOA) (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012).

Italy and Military Operations Abroad

During the Cold War, material and cultural factors consistently prevented Italy from making use of force outside the national borders. On the one hand, as suggested, Italian governments did not need to engage in military conflicts with other states as national security was guaranteed by United States. On the other hand, the disastrous legacy of World War II and shared dovish attitudes within Christian and Marxist thought paved the way for the spreading of a pacifist strategic culture, among political elites and public opinion alike (Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012; Rosa 2014). As a consequence, Italian army developed as an exclusively defensive force preparing to protect the country from a rather unlikely attack from the Eastern border (Coticchia and Moro 2015; D'Amore 2001). Troop deployments in foreign countries only occurred in the form of contributions to UN peacekeeping operations[27].

As already suggested, things changed completely afterwards. In fact, participation in MOAs arguably constitute the most remarkable development in Italian post-Cold war foreign policy and the most evident manifestation of a more assertive posture in the international arena (Brighi 2013; Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012; Menotti 2007). In this sense, Ignazi et al. (2012, 2) defined troop deployments in peace and security operation outside national borders as "the domain the most represent Italy's dynamism" in its external relations and "the most novel trait of Italian foreign policy". Employing Walston's (2007, 91) often-quoted metaphor, from the beginning of the nineties, Italy turned from being a "security consumer" into being a "security provider".

In order to analyse the magnitude of such change, some quantitative data are useful. From 1994 to 2013, the period under consideration in this dissertation, Italy contributed to around 60 MOAs[28]. As

[27] For example, during the Cold War, Italy took part in peacekeeping operations in Lebanon, at the border between India and Pakistan, and in Congo. In terms of number of troops deployed and political salience, the involvement in 1982 operation in Lebanon was particularly important for the post-Cold War evolution of Italian Security and Defence policy. For a more detailed account of this event see Coticchia (2011); Mammarella and Cacace (2006).

[28] This number and Figures 1 and 2 are based on authors' elaborations from the website of the Minister of Defence and a report on MOAs released by the Chamber of Deputies on February 2017 (Camera dei Deputati 2017). Data are surely indicative but could not be completely accurate for two reasons. First, especially for MOAs in which very limited personnel was involved, the website of the Minister of Defence provides sometimes incomplete information regarding

shown by figure 1, the number of military operations in which Italian troops were deployed considerably increased in the nineties and reached its peak of 29 in 2005. Subsequently, it stabilized across the years. The figure also shows how the involvement of new multilateral actors in peace and security operations is crucial to explain this increase. In fact, in addition to the UN, NATO and the European Union started to make a contribution to regional and global security in these years. Italy's troop deployments took place all around the world, but especially in (Northern and Sub-Saharan) Africa, the Balkans and the Middle East. These three regions account for over 80% of the MOAs in which Italian personnel participated, with a smaller portion being located in Asia and other regions. To sum up, as Coticchia (2011, 9) acknowledged, Italian troops have been deployed "basically in any regional crisis in which the international community or multilateral organizations activated".

Figure 1: Number of Italy's MOAs divided by institutional framework (1994-2013)[29]



the beginning and the end of the operations. Secondly, some MOAs were aggregated differently across the two sources. For a complete overview of all the missions included in the dataset see the Appendix.

[29] In the category "other" are included those operations conducted by so-called "coalitions of the willing" (see for instance Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan) and those based on bilateral agreements with the other state (see those aimed to tackle illegal immigration from Albania for instance).

Figure 2: Number of Italy's MOAs divided by region (1994-2013)



Looked from a comparative perspective, the Italian participation in these missions is extraordinary as well. From 2006, the year in which the peacekeeping operation UNIFIL in Lebanon was substantially enlarged by the UN, Italy has become the largest contributor to UN Peacekeeping Operations in Europe[30]. In a recent article, Carati and Locatelli (2017) calculated that in 2014 Italian ratio of troops deployed in MOAs on the total of active forces overcame those of United Kingdom, France and Germany. They stated that, "in comparative terms, Italy seems to have contributed to military operations abroad more than other European countries like France, Germany and the United Kingdom, indeed many of them preferred not to get involved in some operations" (Carati and Locatelli 2017, 88). This record is even more striking considering that Italy had a consistently lower level of military expenditure with respect to all of these three countries in absolute terms (see Figure 3) and less than France and UK as share of GDP. Between 1994 and 2013, Italian funds for the defence never met the 2% minimum threshold recommended by NATO (See Figure 4)[31].

[30] It currently still is. In 2018, Italy ranked 21st among all UN member countries for personnel contribution to peacekeeping operations. See the website of UN Peacekeeping Operations for the complete ranking.

[31] These figures cover expenses that are not strictly linked to military operations, such as salaries and pensions of militaries. However, they clearly highlight the resource gap between Italy and its major European partners.

Figure 3: Italy's military expenditure in billions of dollars (1994-2013)[32]



Figure 4: Italy's military expenditure as share of GDP (1994-2013)[33]



As Figure 5 shows, funds allocated to MOAs steadily grew between 1994 and 2013. In 1998, when conflict in the Balkans was intensifying, Italy spent less than a hundred million of euros in troop deployments outside national borders. Only five years later, in 2003, the year marked by the

[32] Author's elaboration on data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) military expenditure database. The figures are expressed at constant prices for the year 2017.

[33] Author's elaboration on data from SIPRI military expenditure database. GDP is expressed at current market prices (nominal values).

beginning of the Iraq War, that figure has become more than ten times higher, breaking one billion of euros in total. Albeit with some oscillations, Italian expenditure for MOAs continued to increase until 2010, reaching more than 1,5 billion of euros. This figure constituted a rather small fraction of the overall defence budget. Nevertheless, the skyrocketing increase of expenditure for military missions in Italy in absolute terms has to be considered as a remarkable phenomenon.

However, Figure 5 also suggests a declining trend in funds allocated to military operations in the last years of the Second Republic. Following the 2010 peak, expenses for troop deployments were cut of almost a third in the following three years, returning to 1 billion of euros. Afterwards, in a period not covered by this dissertation, funds stabilized. In 2018, they were 1,137 billion (Camera dei Deputati/Senato della Repubblica 2018). However, it must be acknowledged that this level of expenditure is similar to the one recorded at the beginning of the century, a period in which Italy embarked in two very relevant operations: Afghanistan and Iraq. Analysing the number of personnel deployed in MOAs, Italy's decreasing engagement in MOAs becomes more evident. As demonstrated by Figure 6, from 2005 to 2013, the number of military units abroad diminished of around 40%, from over ten thousand units to little more than six thousand units. Following a similar pattern, in the following years this figure stabilized. In 2018, the number of personnel deployed were a little more than 6,5 thousand (Senato della Repubblica/Camera dei Deputati 2018a). Nevertheless, as already suggested, Italy is still a leading contributor to multilateral operation across the world, both in absolute and relative terms, compared to other European countries. Italian soldiers are involved in manifold MOAs including the UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon and the international coalition against the self-proclaimed Islamic State.

To sum up, the latest trends in Italian engagement in MOAs present a fuzzy picture. On the one hand, it is evident how the amount of human and financial resources has significantly shrunk in the last years of the period under consideration in this dissertation and stabilized in the following years. The 2011 debt crisis is surely one of the main causes of this development. Italian policymakers were forced to cut the defence budget and, concurrently, the funds for the missions. Furthermore, the end of Operation Antica Babilonia in Iraq and the progressive disengagement from Afghanistan had a substantial impact on the reduction of the overall number of troops. In addition, the disastrous legacy of the 2011 intervention in Libya, leading to yet unresolved violence and unrest in a very proximate country, arguably negatively affected how political elites and public perceived Italian involvement in MOAs. The government's decision not to participate in the air strikes in the operation against Daesh can be considered as a consequence of the previous failure in Libya (Coticchia and Davidson 2019). On the other hand, Italy has undoubtedly remained a major security actor in the world until 2013 and

beyond. While slightly declining, the amount of resources committed to MOAs have stayed fairly high compared to that of other European states.

Figure 5: Italy's expenditure for MOAs in millions of Euros (1994-2013)[34]



Figure 6: number of personnel deployed by Italy in MOAs (2004-2013)[35]



[34] Author's elaboration on two Chamber of Deputies report (Camera dei Deputati 2010; 2017). The figures are expressed at current prices (nominal values). For a quantitative assessment of Italy's involvement in MOAs see also Olmastroni (2014b).

[35] Author's elaboration on a Chamber of Deputies report (Camera dei Deputati 2017). Unfortunately, consistent and reliable data covering all the period under scrutiny in this dissertation do not exist.

As just suggested, among all the MOAs in which Italy embarked between 1994 and 2013, variation in terms of resources, political debate and tasks is considerable. In some missions, thousands and thousands of units were at work. For example, operations Enduring Freedom and ISAF/Nibbio in Afghanistan (2001-2014), Antica Babilonia in Iraq (2003-2006), and UNIFIL II/Leonte in Lebanon (2006-) involved a vast number of troops along various years. In a much shorter amount of time, thousands of militaries took part in operations Alba in Albania (1997), Allied Force and Allied Harbour during the conflict in Kosovo (1999), in Operation Unified Protector in Libya (2011)[36]. Due to the relevance for the equilibria in international relations and the size of the Italian contribution, these operations also attracted considerable attention from political parties, media and public opinion. In some cases, the debate was particularly vivid and confrontational. For instance, the operation Antica Babilonia, aimed at restoring security and peace in Iraq in the aftermath of the war, was highly criticized by opposition parties and a majority of the public opinion as linked with Berlusconi's support for the controversial U.S. intervention (Davidson 2008; Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Olmastroni 2014a). To the contrary, the remarkable contribution to UNIFIL found little dissent among political elites and the electorate alike. Furthermore, across these MOAs (and even more so taking into account all the smaller ones), Italian troops performed a wide array of tasks and duties, ranging from the more "humanitarian" ones such as delivering shelter, food and medical assistance to civilians, to the more "combat" ones such as conducting air strikes on a target and guaranteeing the security of an area from an external threat. For instance, in the case of the war in Kosovo both these dimensions were visible: while Allied Force basically constituted a bombing campaign against Serbian armed forces, Allied Harbour was aimed at assisting the refugees escaping from Kosovo to the near Albania and Macedonia.

Such a transformation in Italian security and defence policy stimulated a considerable debate among scholars and academics (Carati and Locatelli 2017; Cladi and Locatelli 2018; Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012;). First and foremost, various works sought to provide convincing explanations of the

[36] The name of the multilateral operation precedes the name of the Italian contributions to it, when existing. In parenthesis, it is indicated the name of the country in which the MOA took place, and the year of beginning and, if existing, end. Employing 1000 unit as a threshold, Italy participated in further two key missions before 1994 – Desert Storm (Iraq 1991) and UNSOM II/Ibis (Somalia, 1992-1994) – and further two after 2013 – Prima Parthica (Iraq, 2014-2016) and EUNAVFOR Med – Sophia (Mediterranean Sea, 2015-). On Desert Storm and Ibis see Coticchia (2011); Ignazi et al. (2012), and the websites of the Air Forces (Desert Storm) and the army (Ibis). On Prima Parthica see the website of the Italian Army. On the Italian participation to EUNAVFOR Med – Sophia see Ceccorulli and Coticchia (2017) and the website of the Ministry of Defence.

remarkable Italian contributions to MOAs across the world (Carati and Locatelli 2017; Ceccorulli and Coticchia 2017; Cladi and Locatelli 2018). Quest for international prestige and status is widely considered as the main explanatory variable for Italy's outstanding involvement in multilateral operations after the end of the Cold War. In fact, successive Italian governments saw in the participation in MOAs a foreign policy instrument to show the country's commitment to multilateral institutions and loyalty towards the United States (Davidson 2011; Carati and Locatelli 2017; Cladi and Locatelli 2018). In addition, humanitarian concerns and the interests of the military-industrial complex were also crucial variables to explain this phenomenon. On the one hand, as Rosa suggested (2014), the humanitarian aims covering the vast majority of post-Cold War military interventions fed into Italy's deeply rooted pacifist culture. On the other hand, Ceccorulli and Coticchia (2017) demonstrated how interests within the military-industrial complex were sufficient conditions to explain Italy's projection of force abroad[37].

Various studies attributed to political parties composing the new party system a central role in shaping Italy's participation in MOAs and the public debate around it (Brighi 2013; Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Coticchia 2011; 2015; Ignazi et al. 2012; Olmastroni 2014a; Verbeek and Zaslove 2015). In fact, starting from the missions in the Balkans (Albania and Kosovo), i.e. the first missions occurring during the Second Republic, a bipartisan consensus among the main parties emerged on the issue. The main centre left-party, the Social democrats, and the main centre-right party, Berlusconi's *Forza Italia*, substantially agreed on troops deployment outside national borders as part of multilateral interventions, albeit occasionally voting against while being at the opposition for strategic reasons (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). Party consensus on MOAs included also centrist parties and post-DC parties affiliated to both coalitions, such as *La Margherita* and UDC, and even the far-right AN. However, confirming a slightly different approach to foreign policy, it must be noted how centre-left parties were keener on emphasizing the multilateral dimension of the missions, while centre-right parties stressed the centrality of the alliance with the United States and regarded the use of military forces as a source of national pride. Extreme-left parties like RC and the autonomist LN were the only consistently dissenting voices, for diverging reasons (Calossi et al. 2013; Verbeek and Zaslove 2015). Such widespread support for MOAs was grounded on a shared humanitarian narrative, justifying the use of force (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). Successive governing parties, notwithstanding their colour, repeatedly pointed out

[37] Employing Italy's participation in MOAs as an independent rather than dependent variable, Coticchia and Moro (2015) underlined its crucial role in the transformation of the armed forces, by providing invaluable learning on the ground in civil-military and counterinsurgency missions and obtaining funds in a period of declining public expenditure for defence.

how these missions were aimed at helping the local populations, thereby removing the military dimension and the presence of any sort of enemy. In other words, these missions were never depicted as acts of aggression against another state or armed group but invariably as peace operations to protect and support civilians.

Together with a low-profile approach and the occasional use of caveats at the operational level, this discourse was crucial to lower the intensity of the political and public debate around MOAs. As Brighi (2013, 139) argued, "in the use of force abroad, Italy's conduct was not only influenced by international factors but also by domestic concerns". In fact, the humanitarian narrative was useful to convince reluctant extreme parties to support specific MOAs (Brighi 2013; Coticchia and Davidson 2018). Furthermore, it enabled policymakers to obtain the support of a traditionally pacifist public opinion[38]. For instance, Coticchia (2014; 2015) demonstrated how bipartisanship regarding the narrative covering a mission decisively increased the extent of public support for a specific MOA. To the contrary, when the justification of troops deployment deviated from humanitarian concerns, public contestation increased. As Coticchia and De Simone (2016) showed, this was the case for the ISAF operation in Afghanistan during the last Berlusconi's government. To further the point, Olmastroni (2014a) demonstrated that the ambiguous framing adopted by Berlusconi during the earlier phase of the Iraq War affected public support for successive Italian humanitarian mission.

The dissertation builds upon this research agenda on the role of political parties in Italy's participation in MOAs during the Second Republic. However, it aims to provide an original contribution to it, by comprehensively explaining party support for this issue. In other words, this work addresses the following questions: "Why did parties support MOAs?", "How did variables like ideology, party competition, law-making procedures, international legitimization for the mission affect party support for MOAs?". Even the fourth chapter, investigating why extreme junior partners decided not to leave the government in spite of Italy's participation in a mission, sheds light on why they did not support MOAs in principle. By using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, the findings of this work may confirm, question or clarify results obtained by previous works on this issue.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I provided an overview of three debates that are extremely relevant for my dissertation. First, I described how IR as a field of research have not regarded variables at the domestic level such

[38] On Italian public opinion, its foreign policy beliefs and its attitudes towards the use of force see Isernia (2000); Coticchia (2014).

as regime type as fundamental to analyse international politics and how, from the beginning of the nineties, scholars in this field of research have paid more attention, thereby closing the gap with the sub-field of FPA. In this process, the development of the democratic peace theory and, in particular, empirical tests of the structural explanation laid the foundation for successive studies exploring the role of parties in states' propensity to go to war. Secondly, I reviewed the state of the art on the party politics of foreign and security policy, by dividing the works in three categories. Such works have been rarely, if ever, employed as an explicit point of departure for analysing the role of Italian parties in foreign policy. Conversely, the investigation of this case study may benefit to the development of this flourishing academic debate. Thirdly, I contextualized this dissertation by briefly discussing the evolution of the party system and foreign policy in Italy between the first and the second republic. In particular, I shed light on Italian remarkable involvement in MOAs during the Second Republic, discussing the size of this phenomenon, its drivers and the role of political parties.

The main aim of this chapter was to locate the dissertation within existing academic debates. In the successive empirical chapters, I will instead provide a substantial contribution to these research agendas. In particular, the dissertation addresses the research agenda of party politics of military interventions by trying to explain party support on such issue in a single country over time. As said, such a perspective is currently missing, as most of works adopts a cross-national approach. This is particularly true for studies on the impact of partisanship and coalition politics on foreign policy. Furthermore, chapter 2 and 3 will make an advancement in the explanation of party support for peace and security operations, by scrutinizing the interaction between ideology (on both the left-right axis and the GAL/TAN dimension) and a series of factors linked to domestic politics (presence in government and law-making procedure) and the specific operation's characteristics (extent of international legitimation and presence of a strong interest at stake). In addition, chapter 4 will extend the research on coalition politics on foreign policy by examining the impact why junior coalition partners remained in the government, despite a much disliked the decision to participate in a military operation.

Chapter 2
Explaining party support for Military Operations Abroad: evidence from the quantitative analysis of parliamentary speeches[39]

Introduction

On the morning of 15 April 2003, Franco Frattini, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the centre-right coalition government, announced before the Chamber of Deputies, the lower chamber of Italian parliament, the decision to deploy around 3000 soldiers in Iraq for the mission Antica Babilonia, in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein's regime fall[40]. During his speech, Frattini repeatedly emphasized the humanitarian dimension of the operation, aimed at delivering food, medical assistance and security to the Iraqi people. "The Italian mission significantly differs from the ones undertaken in Afghanistan and in Kosovo" as it aims at "improving the living conditions and guaranteeing the security of the civilians", he remarked at a point. Frattini also said that the armed forces would have to merely "provide a security framework" in which a "serious and effective help" to the local people could unfold, with no specific combat tasks required[41].

Despite the apparently commendable scope of the operation, the centre-left opposition vigorously criticized the stance of the executive on the issue, making the parliamentary debate particularly heated. Part of the reason is that, the then Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, was a staunch supporter of the extremely controversial United States' intervention in Iraq from the very beginning. According to Davidson (2008), only considerable public opinion's scepticism towards the war

[39] A previous version of this chapter was published as a research article on the journal *West European Politics* with the title "Where are the doves? Explaining party support for Military Operations Abroad in Italy".

[40] For an overview of the operation Antica Babilonia with a description of the aims, troops committed, and casualties among Italian militaries see the Supreme Command of Defence's report (Stato Maggiore della Difesa 2006). To read the entire debate see the report (Camera dei Deputati 2003). For a general overview of the political debate around this operation see Calossi and Coticchia (2009); Coticchia (2011); Ignazi et al. (2012).

[41] All these quotations are drawn from the report of the parliamentary debate and translated in English by the author. The pages are in parentheses.

convinced the government not to provide a contribution in the earlier phase of the invasion[42]. To the contrary, centre-left parties always described the invasion of Iraq as a serious mistake that would worsen rather than solving the threat of Islamic terrorism. They also criticized the government's ambiguous stance on the Italian participation in the conflict[43]. Even the decision to eventually provide a contribution in the post-conflict phase did not please them at all. During the debate in parliament, the main opposition party, *Democratici di Sinistra* (DS), demanded a stronger effort to situate the Italian contribution within a multilateral framework, instead of the "coalition of the willing". Piero Fassino, the leader of DS parliamentary group at the Chamber of Deputies, described the war as "illegitimate" and, while supporting a mission to help the civilians, he demanded the executive to "act with determination to push for a multilateral action in Iraq". The extreme-left *Rifondazione Comunista* went further, accusing the government of acting slavishly to please the United States and violating the constitution. "The government does not manage to distinguish itself from its big ally but only to bring Italy to the banquet of war", a communist MP said. Centre-right coalition parties eventually managed to see their own resolution approved, even without the votes from the centre-left coalition.

This debate clearly underlines the presence of party contestation on Military Operations Abroad (MOA) in Italy between 1994 and 2013. As a starting point in the analysis of how Italian parties behaved on this important but yet overlooked issue, this first chapter aims to explain the extent of party support for MOAs, assessing the role of a series of factors, related to ideology, domestic politics and specific features of the operations. In other words, it addresses the following question: "why did Italian parties support troop deployments?" and "which factors increased (or decreased) party support for MOAs in Italy?". As said, various studies have already explored how Italian parties positioned on this issue, qualitatively analysing their narratives and discourses (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). In this chapter, I will employ a different methodology. In order

[42] According to a survey conducted in June 2002, only 10% of Italian public opinion was in favour of a potential American unilateral intervention in Iraq (German Marshall Fund, quoted in Coticchia 2014) and only 17% supported the participation of the country in such a military operation (ISPO, quoted in Coticchia 2014). In May 23, after the end of the US invasion, 83% of the Italian public opinion stated that the choice of not participating was right (Pew Research Centre, quoted in Coticchia 2014). Massive public protests were also organized against the war in the country in 2003 (Il Corriere della Sera, February 16, 2003).

[43] On January 25, Luciano Violante, former president of the Chamber of Deputies and prominent DS exponentsclaimed that "there were no reasons to invade Iraq" (La Repubblica, 25 January 2003). A few days later, the leader of the party, Massimo D'Alema, stated that the intervention would lead to "a hundred years of terrorism" (La Repubblica, 31 January 2003).

to extract party positions, I will analyse a selection of twelve parliamentary debates on the six most relevant MOAs occurred during the Second Republic (1994-2013) through the scaling algorithm *Wordfish* (Slapin and Proksch 2008). This unsupervised automated content analysis technique enables the researcher to locate political actors on a one-dimensional space through the assessment of the word frequencies across texts. Wordfish has been employed extensively in the field of political science, especially to scale party positions on the left-right axis (Ceron 2015; 2016; Frid-Nielsen 2018; Proksch and Slapin 2009; Proksch et al. 2011; Slapin and Proksch 2008). However, as far as I know, it has never been used so far to measure party positions on military interventions, in Italy as well as in other countries. Successively, these positions are included in an original dataset and considered as dependent variables in a couple of OLS linear regression models. This final step enables me to test the impact of a series of factors on party support for MOAs in Italy. All in all, as suggested in the introduction, this chapter represents a methodological advancement for the emerging research agenda on party politics of military interventions, in Italy and beyond.

The chapter is organized as follows. First, on the basis of the existing literature of the party politics and military intervention and the debate around Italian foreign policy during the Second Republic, I will formulate a series of hypotheses concerning the factors explaining party support for MOAs. Secondly, I will explain how I selected and collected the parliamentary speeches and how I extracted party positions on this issue through *Wordfish.* Thirdly, I will provide a brief explanation of the variables included in the dataset. Fourthly, I will analyse the regression models and discuss the results. Finally, in the conclusion, I will briefly resume my findings and discuss them in the light of the broader literature on the party politics of military interventions.

Hypotheses

As suggested in the previous chapter, there is a lack of consensus concerning the impact of positioning on the left-right axis on support for military interventions. Scholars have provided theoretical and empirical support for two different models of party competition on MOAs across this ideological cleavage. The first one predicts a linear and positive relationship between the position of a party in the left-right axis and support for involvement in military conflicts (Palmer et al. 2004). In a nutshell, right-wing parties are more hawkish than left-wing party. The second one instead hypothesizes a curvilinear and bell-shaped relationship (Wagner et al. 2017). According to this model, centrist parties are presumed to be prone to view the involvement of the country in military interventions more favourably.

The linear model seems more intuitive as left-wing parties are commonly regarded as more dovish than right-wing parties. As argued, translating domestic preferences in the realm of foreign policy, Rathbun (2004) motivated leftist antimilitarism with their resistance to the use of coercive means to achieve political goals and their emphasis on egalitarianism. He claimed that "leftists are more reluctant to use force in international relations as a means of resolving conflicts" (Rathbun 2004, 21). To the contrary, right-wing parties' domestic emphasis on order and hierarchy turn into a more hawkish stance on foreign policy. As Rathbun stated (2004, 21), "International hard-liners are domestic hard-liners as well".

However, the curvilinear model could be more appropriate to describe party of contestations over post-Cold War multilateral interventions such as those in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya. The use of force in peace and security operation is often not justified on the basis of national and territorial defence from an external threat but rather as aimed at protecting foreign people. Acknowledging such difference, Rathbun suggested a potential deviation from the left-right divide. Due to their inclusive conception of national interest, left-wing parties may give primacy to the goal of saving lives over the use of military means to achieve such objective. This creates a broad party consensus for peace and security operations: left-wing parties support them as they have a humanitarian dimension; right-wing parties because support them as troop deployments are a source of pride for the country. In such a context, opposition to these missions is confined to the extreme sides of the left-right ideological axis, where parties with strong antimilitarist and nationalist ideologies are placed respectively. On the one hand, in contrast to moderate left-wing parties, extreme left parties may not be willing to compromise their scepticism towards the use of force even with the need to save the lives of foreign peoples. In addition, as opposed to moderate right-wing parties, far right parties may place the tangible domestic security over an intangible sense of pride deriving from the deployment of national troops. To sum up, while centre-left and centre-right parties resolve their values-based tensions on the issue by supporting peace operations, extreme left and extreme right parties do the same by opposing them.

This divide has therefore ideological roots, but it is also spurred by the structure and the incentives of the political competition, opposing "establishment" or "mainstream partners" on the one hand, and "challenger", "niche" or even anti-system parties on the other hand (Meguid 2005; Hobolt and Tilley 2016; Wagner 2011; Zulianello 2018). Path dependency stemming from previous experiences in government may constrain mainstream parties to take a supportive position on this issue (Hooghe and

Marks 2018). For instance, the decision to deny the support for a military intervention at the opposition would appear inconsistent if they also promoted other ones when they were in government. To the contrary, extreme partners are unconstrained to take more radical positions on the issue, acting as issue entrepreneurs and politicizing it (Hobolt and De Vries 2015). In this case, this would mean opposing a military operation on the basis either of the use of military force or its lack of connection with the protection of national security. Extreme parties are further incentivized to take a more radical position when it is closer to that of the median voter. In such sense, after the end of World War II, pacifism became a widespread sentiment among Italian public opinion (Coticchia 2014; Isernia 2000). Therefore, in principle, opposition to MOAs has to be considered as a position closer to the median voter in Italy.

All in all, I expect to find stronger empirical evidence for the curvilinear model rather than the linear one. Furthermore, as suggested in chapter 1, qualitative research has indicated a centrist and bipartisan consensus on this issue in Italy (Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012).

H1a: Right-wing parties are more supportive of MOAs than left-wing parties

H1b: Centre-left and centre-right parties are more supportive of MOAs than extreme-left and far-right parties

In recent years, the GAL/TAN scale has emerged as an innovative dimension to measure party competition in Europe (Bakker et al. 2015; Hooghe and Marks 2018; Hooghe et al. 2002). It captures the cleavage between parties emphasizing post-materialist and environmental concerns (Green/Alternative/Libertarian) and those stressing traditional and nationalist values (Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalism). Parties with low values on this scale are associated with the GAL pole, while party with higher scores are associated with the TAN pole. Therefore, while the left-right axis also measures position on economic issues, the GAL/TAN dimension specifically reflects a cleavage emerged on social issues in recent decades. To sum up, it captures a conflict between two starkly diverging vision of politics: one liberal and internationalist, based on principles such as direct democracy and environmentalism, and the other one, conservative and nationalist, aiming to protect national sovereignty.

Following Rathbun's (2004) aforementioned theoretical argument, parties closer to the GAL pole are presumed to be more favourable to peace and security operation because they are more concerned

about the lives and rights of foreign people. To the contrary, parties closer to the TAN pole are expected to be more sceptical because of their narrow focus on the protection of the domestic community. Furthermore, location of parties across this dimension seems crucial to distinguish their support of the European Union, with liberal parties viewing further integration more positively than authoritarian and nationalist parties (Hooghe and Marks 2018; Hooghe et al. 2002; Marks et al. 2006). Support for multilateralism is expected to translate also into support for military interventions since most of them are conducted by international organizations such as the United Nations, NATO and the EU itself. In fact, in their recent cross-national study on parliamentary votes, Wagner et al. (2018) found that parties scoring high on the GAL pole to be more supportive of peace and security operations than parties scoring high on the TAN pole. I expect positioning on this dimension to be a predictor of party support in for MOAs in Italy as well.

H2: Parties with low values on the GAL/TAN scale are more supportive of MOAs than those with high values

Whether a party controls the executive, individually or in coalition with other parties, is presumed to decisively affects its extent of support for MOAs. In a few words, parties in government are expected to be more supportive of troops deployment in peace and security operations than those that are at the opposition. Incentives for governing parties to support MOAs comes from both the international and the domestic environment. At the international level, governing parties are heavily concerned about the reputation costs for the country deriving from not participating in multilateral interventions. In the context of the NATO operation in Afghanistan, Kreps (2010) demonstrated how political parties in a number of countries were particularly sensitive to these reputational costs. However, as Wagner et al (2018, 6) argued, "such pressures are primarily felt in government […], whereas parties in opposition remain less constrained from such considerations". In fact, national governments are directly accountable to the international community for taking the decision to deploy troops in multilateral operations. Therefore, being part of the government entails stronger pressures from the external environment than being at the opposition.

At the domestic level, incentives for governing parties to support MOAs are linked to the fundamental relationship between parties and government in modern democracies (Katz 1987; Gallagher et al. 2011). According to the model of party government (Katz 1987), all the main decisions are taken by the parties composing the cabinet and members of the cabinet are responsible of their actions in front of the parties that have elected them. Therefore, in the first place, it is presumable that the decision

to participate in a multilateral intervention is taken only after the agreement of the only governing party in single-party government or a negotiation between the various governing parties in a coalition cabinet. In parliamentary democracies, where the survival of the government depends on the support of parties forming a legislative majority and the head of state is not directly elected, the involvement of parties in the decision-making process is supposed to be even stronger[44]. Furthermore, in such countries, governing parties are further discouraged to take an *ex-post* position against a MOA promoted by the government as it would undermine the stability of the executive itself, questioning their permanence in power. For example, voting against a mission in parliament, they would seriously put the life of the government at risk. To the contrary, opposition parties are often pressured to confront in order to defeat the cabinet in parliament and present themselves as alternative at the eyes of the electorate. Therefore, they may instrumentally use troops deployment to signal their opposition to the executive, especially if the intervention is unpopular among the electorate (Williams 2014).

Wagner et al. (2018) empirically showed that the presence in the government significantly increases the extent of party support for peace and security operation. I expect this variable to have the same effect in the Italian case. In addition, it is worth underlining that Italy is a parliamentary democracy in which parties have always played a fundamental role in the decision-making process and the stability of the government (Cotta and Verzichelli 2016). Furthermore, Italian governing coalitions have been relatively cohesive on this issue in parliament. In fact, from the end of the Cold War, only once an executive was defeated in a parliamentary vote on a matter of foreign and security policy[45]. Therefore, I hypothesize that parties being member of the governing coalition are more supportive than parties at the opposition.

H3: Parties in government are more supportive of MOAs than opposition parties

Moreover, features of specific mission are expected to have a varying impact on the extent of party support across the left-right axis. As Rathbun (2004) suggested, left-wing parties strongly uphold the principle of multilateralism to justify the use of force. This depends on their general preference for coordinated efforts among countries to tackle common issues over the pursuit of free-for-all strategies. In the words of Rathbun (2004, 23), "left-wing parties are more likely to consider national

[44] For a distinction between parliamentary and presidential democracies see Lijphart (2012).

[45] On 21 February 2007 the second Prodi government was defeated at the Senate in a vote on the renewal of Italian commitment to NATO Operation ISAF in Afghanistan and the expansion of a U.S. military base in Italy due to the defection of a couple of MPs from the extreme left. For a more detailed account of this event see Carbone (2007).

needs to be similar to those of the international community and consequently are more comfortable limiting discretion over policy". Following such an approach, multilateral military interventions can be considered as legitimate since they are the product of a collective decision-making process rather than the initiative of a single state to attack another one. To the contrary, because of their excluding interpretation of national interest, right-wing parties are more sceptical of multilateral institutions to achieve political goals. As Rathbun (2004, 23) argued, they instead "view unilateralism as an end in itself". Therefore, they are less concerned about the multilateral dimension of a military operation. Analysing the Italian case, as said in the previous chapter, several authors have stressed that centre-left governments have adopted a more multilateral approach to foreign policy than centre-right counterparts (Andreatta 2008; Brighi 2013; Carbone 2007; Cladi and Webber 2011; Quaglia 2007). As Carbone (2007, 917) argued, "for the centre-right coalition national interest is promoted through a pragmatic bilateralism and a reinforced Atlanticism, whereas for the centre-left through active multilateralism and reinforced Europeanism"[46]. The United Nations (UN) is arguably the most emblematic example of a multilateral organization. Through resolutions approved by the Security Council, the body in charge of guaranteeing peace and security among its members, UN provides the ultimate source of juridical legitimacy for a military intervention. The relevance of UN legitimation within the Italian political is evident from the aforementioned debate on the Iraq War (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Ratti 2011). To sum up, given their stronger emphasis on multilateralism, I expect Italian left-wing parties to be more supportive of those MOAs that have received such multilateral legitimation than right-wing parties.

H4: Left-wing parties are more supportive of those MOAs with a strong multilateral legitimacy than right-wing parties

To the contrary, right-wing parties are more inclined to justify the use of military force when it is required to guarantee the well-being of the national community, in security and economic terms. As suggested, despite being more militarist, right-wing parties are not particularly in favour of troops deployment in foreign countries for humanitarian aims. However, their extent of support is expected to increase if the intervention provides substantial security, political and economic benefits for their own country or, quoting Rathbun (2004, 26), if it "affects tangible national interests". This is often the case when the military operation occurs in a geographically proximate country for two reasons.

[46] As underlined in the previous chapter, the academic debate on this issue is not settled. Other scholars do not find any significant difference between centre-left and centre right coalition governments on foreign policy in Italy. For studies formulating such argument see Croci (2003; 2005; 2008); Walston (2004; 2007).

First, contributing to the mission is a manner to bring stability in the area and avoid spreading of the conflict at home (Gleditsch 2007). Second, intervening is a way to preserve or increase influence on the post-conflict political and economic affairs of the country in which the operation takes place. Unsurprisingly, Bove and Elia (2011) have found that geographic proximity is a strong predictor of a country's probability to provide a contribution to peace and security operations. Therefore, as they are interested in the protection of the national community in their foreign policy approach, right-wing parties are expected to be particularly concerned about the geographical location of the MOAs. In line with this conception, in Italy, centre-right governments arguably distinguished themselves for a "nationalist" approach foreign policy (Brighi 2013). Therefore, I hypothesize that Italian right-wing parties are more likely to support those MOAs having among their goals the clear protection of national security and economic interests.

H5: Right-wing parties are more supportive of those MOAs in which national interests are at stake than left-wing parties

Measuring party support for MOAs through Wordfish

In order to measure party support for MOAs, this paper employs the unsupervised scaling algorithm *Wordfish* (Slapin and Proksch 2008). This automated content analysis method is specifically designed to extract and scale positions of political actors on a one-dimensional ideological space, from the assessment of word frequencies across texts. In brief, *Wordfish* assigns words a value of *beta*, the discriminating parameter, according to their frequencies. Those with low frequencies are assigned either positive or negative values, locating political actors at the extremes of the dimension, while those with high frequencies are assigned values close to zero, not contributing to the distinction among political actors to the same extent.

A number of studies have employed this algorithm to scale party positions on the left-right axis (Proksch and Slapin 2009; Proksch et al. 2011; Slapin and Proksch 2008). However, *Wordfish* can be also used to locate parties and other political actors on different issues as well. For instance, employing this method, Frid-Nielsen (2018) estimated the positions of individual Members of European Parliament (MEPs) on asylum policy. In fact, as an unsupervised method, *Wordfish* is able to extract positions only through the distribution of words across texts, without an *ex ante* definition of the dimension under investigation. This is contrast with *Wordscores,* a supervised scaling technique which requires the identification of the dimension beforehand through the use of reference

texts[47]. When consisting information regarding appropriate reference texts is available, *Wordscores* is even more accurate than *Wordfish* in estimating positions (Hjort et al. 2015). For example, due to the wide range of existing sources of measurement, reference texts for scaling parties in the left-right axis are very reliable. However, when such a priori information is missing or scant, *Wordfish* is a more adequate method (Hjort et al. 2015). This is the case for very specific and understudied policy issues such as military interventions. Therefore, this paper employs *Wordfish* to explore variation of party support for MOAs in Italy due to its capacity of scaling political actors without *a-priori* definition of the dimension under investigation and consistent information regarding appropriate reference texts.

In order to scale party positions through *Wordfish*, scholars have used either party manifestoes or party representatives' speeches as sources[48]. This paper extracts Italian parties' positions on MOAs from a selection of parliamentary speeches for two reasons. First, references to security and defence issues in Italy's party manifestoes are extremely rare and, when they occur, are often vague. Given that, it is unsurprising that the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), arguably the most quoted and accurate project estimating party positions on the basis of manifestoes, has mostly labelled Italian parties during this period as missing values for the variables "war participants: positive", "military: positive", "international peace"[49]. Second, during the Second Republic, parties that were member of the same coalition often presented common manifestoes at the elections, making distinctions between them through these documents impossible. For example, for the 2001 general elections, centre-left and centre-right coalitions presented two common manifestoes, agreed by all the parties being members of the two coalitions. Given this, the choice of employing parliamentary speeches is the only viable.

Therefore, as a first step to measure party positions, I collected the speeches of Italian main parties' MPs and government representatives during twelve key parliamentary debates at the Chamber of

[47] For an extensive overview of unsupervised and supervised scaling methods see Grimmer and Stewart (2013).

[48] For applications of Wordfish on party manifestoes see Proksch et al. (2013); Slapin and Proksch (2008). For applications on parliamentary speeches see Frid-Nielsen (2018); Proksch and Slapin (2009). However, some scholars raised concerns about the application of Wordfish on parliamentary speeches (Lauderdale and Herzog 2016: Lowe and Benoit 2013). In particular, in contrast to manifestoes, parliamentary speeches are strongly conditioned by government-opposition dynamics.

[49] For examples of descriptions and applications of CMP see Budge et al. (2001); Klingemann et al. (2006).

Deputies on six extremely important MOAs, between 1994 and 2013[50]. These operations were relevant in terms of resources committed and significantly contributed to the evolution of Italian security policy after the end of the Cold War (Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). Furthermore, due to the extent of the contribution and the high domestic salience, parliament devoted individual debates for these operations. This element makes it possible to extract party positions on each of the specific mission. In some cases, debates occurred before the beginning troop deployment while in other ones occurred afterwards. However, they could be interpreted as crucial for the approval and prosecution of the operation. To be precise, the military operations considered are: Alba (Albania, 1997), Allied Force and Allied Harbour (Kosovo, 1999), Enduring Freedom/Nibbio (Afghanistan, 2001-2002), Iraqi Freedom/Antica Babilonia (Iraq, 2003-2004), Operation UNIFIL/Leonte (Lebanon, 2006), Operation Unified Protector (Libya, 2011)[51]. The division of debates per mission is the following: one for Alba, three for Allied Harbour, three for Enduring Freedom, three for Iraqi Freedom, one for UNIFIL, and one for Unified Protector.

The decision to focus exclusively on debates occurred at the Chamber of Deputies and overlooking the ones taking place in the Senate, the upper chamber of Italian Parliament is based on two criteria. First, MPs of the same party in the two chambers coordinate among themselves and have no incentives to do otherwise. Positions and narratives are presumed to be identical across parties in the two Chambers. Therefore, not considering debates in the Senate is a strategy to avoid uninformative repetitions in the analysis. Moreover, in the case of the participation in the MOAs in Kosovo, debates at the Chamber of Deputies were not consistently followed by similar debates at the Senate.

With the exception of the single debate on UNIFIL, all the other ones always revolved on the government's communications to the Chamber of Deputies. Despite not being constitutionally necessary, this parliamentary step was usually followed for important MOAs. UNIFIL debate concerned instead the conversion of a law decree into a proper law. Law decree is a temporary act issued by the executive, which must be converted into law within sixty days. These acts were only

[50] All the speeches have been collected from reports of the debates available on the digital archive of the Chamber of Deputies.

[51] The names of the operations refer to both the international denomination and the Italian contributions to them. The years in the parentheses correspond to the ones in which the debates took place and not the beginning and the end of the missions. Contributions to related operations Allied Force and Allied Harbour in Kosovo were discussed in the same debates.

occasionally employed to approve specific military operations[52]. To the contrary, they were extensively used for a general re-funding of all the ongoing operations[53]. During all these debates MPs affiliated to the various parties employed a rather politically polarized vocabulary to express their consent or dissent for the deployment of troops in the military operations. As Hjort et al. (2015) argued, this element increases the validity of positions extracted through *Wordfish.*

As it was suggested in the previous chapter, Italy had a remarkably fragmented party system in these years (Bardi 2007; Bartolini et al. 2004; D'Alimonte and Bartolini 1997). Therefore, I decided to select only some of the parties among the several holding seats in the Chamber of Deputies. In order to choose them, I followed two criteria: political relevance and presence of a distinct point of view on military operations. First, during this period, all the parties taken into account either held enough seats to form their own parliamentary group or were crucial for the survival of the governing coalition[54]. Secondly, as shown by Calossi and Coticchia (2009) these parties contributed to the parliamentary debates in a meaningful way, articulating substantially different stances on MOAs. For example, this meant proposing different motions on government's communications to the Chamber. In alphabetic order the selected parties are: *Alleanza Nazionale* (AN), *Centro Cristiano Democratico* and *Crisitani Democratici Uniti* (CCD-CDU, considered jointly), *Democratici di Sinistra/ Partito dei Democratici di Sinistra* (PDS) (PDS/DS), *Federazione dei Verdi* (FdV), *Forza Italia/Popolo delle Libertà* (FI/PdL, considered jointly), *Italia dei Valori* (IdV), *Lega Nord per l'Indipendenza della Padania* (LN), *La Margherita* (Mar), *Partito dei Comunisti Italiani* (PdCI), *Partito Democratico* (PD, *Partito Popolare Italiano* and *I Democratici* (PPI-Dem, considered jointly), *Partito della Rifondazione Comunista* (PRC), *Unione di Centro* (UDC)[55].

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[52] The mission Iraqi Freedom is another example of a mission formally approved through a legal decree, even though government referred on it in Parliament before. Other ones are: UNMIBH (Bosnia), Allied Harmony (Macedonia), and UNSMIS (Syria).

[53] The conversion of law decrees was also an opportunity to debate other smaller MOAs not taken into account in this chapter. The next chapter will provide a more extensive discussion on the evolution of law-making procedures to approve and fund MOAs in Italy.

[54] According to the Italian law, the minimum number of seats to form a parliamentary group is 20. In order to give more homogeneity to the data, I continued to take into account a pivotal junior coalition partner moving to the opposition after election, even though it did not hold enough seats.

[55] For a distribution of the debates, missions and parties see the Appendix. DS is how PDS was renamed after 1998 and, consequently, the two parties are considered as one. FI and PdL are considered as a unique party because PdL was how the party was re-named after the merging with AN in 2008. CCD and CDU were considered as a unique party because they shared the same party family (Christian democrat), collocation in coalition governments or opposition, and parliamentary group before finally merging in 2002 to form UDC. PPI and I Democratici were considered as a single

In addition to the MPs affiliated to these parties, I also collected the speeches made by government representatives during these debates. As suggested in the introduction, prominent members of the executive – Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministers of Defence and even the Prime Ministers – spoke at length, announcing the decision to take part in the military operations, describing the terms of Italian involvement and occasionally replying to MPs' speeches. In total, summing together speeches from MPs and government representatives, I collected 296 single speeches. As a second step in the process, I aggregated all the speeches made by individual MPs during each debate in single text documents according to their party affiliation. This is a necessary step as parties are my units of analysis[56]. The speeches made by government representatives were also aggregated separately in other text documents. Eventually, I ended up with 116 text documents with an average length of around 3000 words. As more parties participated in the same debate, documents containing speeches made by MPs were the vast majority (104). Documents containing speeches made by government representatives were instead one for each debate (12). Thirdly, I analysed these documents. After removing stopwords (articles and prepositions) and punctuation, which can potentially bias the scaling process, I ran separate analysis for each debate using *Wordfish*[57]. In such a way, I obtained party positions on all the specific MOAs with respect to the government. In fact, the documents containing the speeches made by government representatives were considered as parameters for party support for MOAs. For instance, in the case of the debate mentioned in the introduction on Antica Babilonia, the text document containing the speech made by Minister of Foreign Affairs was chosen.

This procedure is unconventional given that *Wordfish* is designed to scale political actors without the requirement of reference texts. However, through their speeches, government representatives significantly set the topics and the tone of the debates. As previously suggested, these debates specifically pivoted around the government's stance and conduct on a specific MOA. Therefore, parties expressed their point of views by either supporting or opposing the executive. Furthermore,

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party as they also were part of the same centre-left coalition at the end of the nineties and they merged to form La Margherita.

[56] This procedure admittedly neglects potential intra-party disagreements.

[57] Separate analyses for each of the debate were made to control for the variation of the language across the single debates and missions. The algorithm was also run on all parties' text documents. As expected, results were strongly biased. Moreover, Wordfish was also run after the document frequency matrix was trimmed to keep only those words that are present in all text documents. As to confirm the high extent of variation in the language used across missions and debates, all the texts shared only two words in common, those usually employed by MPs to address the President of the Chamber and their colleagues. Any application of Wordfish on this sample was consequently meaningless.

various studies showed how successive Italian government employed humanitarian narratives to justify troop deployments in MOAs (Coticchia 2011; 2015; Ignazi et al. 2012). Stressing the humanitarian aspects of a mission, members of the executive were able to shape the parliamentary debate on this issue. The inclusion of a text representing the government's position can be considered as a strategy to control for this potential bias, thereby improving the validity of the measures[58].

For example, Figure 1 shows the scaled positions for the aforementioned debate on the Italian contribution to the military operation in Iraq. The positive values are associated with support for the mission, while the negative ones correspond to opposition. Predictably, the position of the government (Gov) is the most supportive of all. As expected, three parties included in the centre-right coalition government, *Unione di Centro* (UDC), *Forza Italia* (FI) and *Lega Nord* (LN), present a significantly positive degree of support. *Alleanza Nazionale* (AN) is the only outlier within the coalition government, having a slightly negative score. The slightly positive score of *Democratici di Sinistra* (DS), the main party of the centre-left opposition, might look surprising as well. However, as suggested in the introduction, DS were substantially in favour of the humanitarian side of operation and only criticized the lack of a multilateral framework for it. The centrist *La Margherita* (Mar) shared the same position and, in fact, has a similar score. The greens (Verdi) and the extreme left parties *Rifondazione Comunista* (RC) and *Partito dei Comunisti Italiani* (PdCI) were more vocal in criticizing Italy's involvement in the operation Iraqi freedom. In fact, they present the most negative scores, with RC and PdCI placed in a very distant position from all the other parties.

[58] As a robustness check, party positions were also extracted excluding the texts containing the speeches made by members of the government. However, positions extracted including these texts were slightly more in line with those underlined by previous qualitative studies (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Coticchia 2011). Correlations between the two measures is nevertheless high ($r = 0{,}7166$) and statistically significant ($p<0{,}01$). See the Appendix.

Figure 7: Party positions extracted from the debate on the mission Antica Babilonia, 15/4/2003[59]



In order to assess their reliability, party positions extracted through *Wordfish* need to undergo a careful process of validation (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). I qualitatively validated the positions by investigating both the discriminating (lowest and highest values of beta) and the non-discriminating (values of beta close to 0) words across texts in each debate. The analysis was elaborated on positions extracted including the texts containing the speeches made by government representatives[60].

Among the words with the highest values of beta, indicating strong support for a MOA, two patterns emerge. First, there is a high presence of technical words regarding the military operations such as "task force" and "rules of engagement" reflecting that representatives of the government had to provide details of the operations[61]. Second, the density of references to humanitarian concerns is higher, confirming the employment of a "pacifist" narrative among supportive parties. Among the words with the lowest values of beta, indicating opposition to MOAs, I identified three patterns. First,

[59] For the "Eiffel Tower" regarding this debate, with values of betas and psi for each of the words in the text documents, see the Appendix.

[60] The author can provide a complete list of these words on request. The validation process has been repeated with the positions extracted not including texts containing the speeches made by government representatives. The results are very similar.

[61] The words are translated from Italian by the author.

there is a constant presence of words with a negative connotation like "brutal", "horrible", "hypocrisy", signalling harsh criticism towards the specific MOA. Second, words like "legitimacy" or its contrary "illegitimacy" occur frequently, pointing out how parties opposing MOAs often question the legitimacy of the mission. Third, some words concerning the core beliefs or identity of specific parties like "socialism" for the extreme left *Rifondazione Comunista* or "Padania" for the regionalist *Lega Nord* appear in the list. A few studies have identified both parties as sceptical of military interventions (Calossi et al. 2013; Verbeek and Zaslove 2015). The analysis of words with high frequency instead concretely demonstrates that the debates actually pivoted around the MOAs under scrutiny. I observed three groups of meaningful words. First, as expected, the presence of key words like "mission" and "war" is pervasive. Secondly, names of the countries in which missions took place such as "Kosovo" and "Iraq" appear very frequently. Thirdly, words related to the specific context like "terrorism" for the operation in Afghanistan are also very common. To sum up, words with high frequency across texts show that the algorithm successfully managed to capture party contestation of MOAs as dimension and not general positions on the left-right axis.

Description of the dataset

The extracted positions are used as dependent variables in my dataset[62]. However, since my goal is explaining party support for MOAs, I only considered those associated to parties, removing the ones associated with the government. To sum up, the dependent variable *(Support)* is composed by 104 observations in total. The positions range from a minimum of -1,7581 to a maximum of 1,6989, with a mean of -0,165.

The measures for the independent variables are instead either collected from existing datasets or attributed on the basis of author's knowledge. Party positions on the right-left axis and the GAL/TAN scale are based on the variables *lrgen* and *galtan* in Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES) longitudinal dataset[63]. These surveys were conducted periodically from 1999 to 2014, covering almost perfectly the timespan of the debates[64]. The values of these variables (*Rile*) and *(Gal/Tan)* range from 0 to 10, from left to right and from GAL to TAN poles respectively. Interestingly, within the dataset, these two variables are highly ($r = 0,894$) and significantly ($p < 0,01$) correlated. Furthermore, minimum and maximum values, means and standard deviation also present similar values. Therefore, during

[62] The author can provide the full dataset on request.

[63] For the complete survey see Bakker et al. (2015); Polk et al. (2017).

[64] The scores were attributed on the basis of the closest survey in term of timing.

the "Second Republic", Italian left-wing parties also had more liberal and alternative values, while right-wing parties had more conservative and authoritarian ones. This correlation reflects a broader pattern across West European countries across roughly the same years (Marks et al. 2006).

The presence of a party at the government is measured through a dummy (*Gov*). It takes value 1 when the party is a member of the coalition government and 0 when it is at the opposition. I considered as governing parties also those parties that provided parliamentary support for the cabinet but did not hold cabinet posts. In Italy, such situations occurred during the so-called "technocratic governments" *("governi tecnici").* With this term are defined all those governments composed by experts not affiliated to parties and aimed at providing political stability required in period of economic turbulence or key decisions concerning the integration process within the EU (McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014)[65]. These cabinets had to rely on the external support of existing parties in parliament. During the Second Republic (1994-2013), two technocratic governments formed: Dini (1995-1996) and Monti (2011-2013). Furthermore, as far as the other governments are concerned, between 1996 and 1998, the communist party *Rifondazione Comunista* provided its external support to the centre-left coalition government.

UN legitimation for a MOA is also calculated through a dummy (*UN*). It takes value 1 when the UN Security Council (UNSC) approved a resolution authorizing the operation and 0 in the other cases. With the exception of missions in Kosovo and Iraq, all the other operations taken into account in this chapter have been authorized by explicit UNSC resolutions[66]. As a proxy for the presence of a strong national interest at stake, I employed the proximity of the country in which the operation took place to Italian borders. This variable (*Interest*) is also a dummy taking value 1 for MOAs occurred in the Balkans (Albania and Kosovo) and Northern Africa (Libya) and 0 for the other ones occurred in not contiguous countries. For a more detailed description of the variables see Table 1.

[65] It is worth distinguishing technocratic governments from caretaker governments. In fact, while caretaker governments are led by politicians, technocratic governments are (at least partially) made of non-affiliated experts.

[66] After the end of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, on June 10, 1999, UNSC approved Resolution 1244, authorising the international security presence in the region to use "all necessary means" to fulfil its responsibility to provide security and peace (UNSCR 1244). However, according to Chinkin (1999), this resolution does not provide an ex-post legal basis for the air strikes. The Italian contribution to the Operation Iraqi Freedom followed the approval of UNSC resolution 1483 on May 22, 2003, encouraging states to assist the "people of Iraq to reform their institutions and rebuild their country" (UNSCR 1483). However, the US intervention in Iraq is considered as illegitimate by scholars and experts in international law, with UNSC resolution 1441 not providing coverage for such an act (Schmitt 2004).

Table 1: Description of the variables

Variable	**Obs.**	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min**	**Max**
Support for MOA (Support)	104	-0,165	0,851	-1,7581	1,6989
Position on the left-right axis (Rile)	104	4,7041	2,444	0,6	8,71
Position on the GAL/TAN Scale (Gal/Tan)	104	5,074	2,7	0,63	8,88
Presence in government (Gov)	104	0,4615	0,501	0	1
UN legitimation (UN)	104	0,4808	0,502	0	1
National interest (Interest)	104	0,3846	0,4889	0	1

Empirical findings

On this dataset, I test my hypotheses through two OLS linear regression models with clustered standard error for parties[67]. The results are shown in Table 2. Model 1 only tests the hypotheses concerning the impact of ideology. The negative sign of the squared term indicates that support for

[67] I conducted five robustness checks on these models. First, I used as dependent variables the positions extracted not including the texts containing speeches made by government representatives. In such models, the statistical significance of the dependent term *Rile* squared drops considerably, while the effect of being in government is still strong and significant. This difference may be due to the increased accuracy in the measures obtained including the speeches made by the government representatives. Secondly, I replicated the same models with random effects for parties. Thirdly, I replicated the models with random effects for debates. In both cases, the differences with the models presented in the text are negligible. Fourthly, I ran two analysis replications dividing the debates occurred under the centre-left and centre-right cabinets. The fact that the impact of the term *Rile* squared is negative and significant in both these models provides further validity in favour of the curvilinear model. Interestingly, the effect of the presence of the government becomes non-significant when the centre-right is in power. This might suggest that relevant MOAs approved under these cabinets were less contested by opposition parties. Given the anecdote described in the introduction of this chapter, this result is rather surprising. Finally, in order to confirm the conflict between moderate and extreme parties, I included in the model a variable measuring extremism as the squared distance from a hypothetical party collocated at the centre of the dimension (Marks et al. 2006). As expected, the impact is negative and significant ($p<0,05$ and $p<0,01$) in both models. For all the replication models see the Appendix.

MOAs on the left-right axis increases and then decreases again. The effect is also statistically significant ($p<0,01$). Therefore, as expected, in the Italian case party support for military interventions conforms to the curvilinear model (H1b) rather than the linear model (H1a). As expected in *H2,* support for MOAs decreases over the GAL/TAN scale. In other words, liberal parties tend to be more in favour of military interventions than nationalist parties. However, the correlation with the dependent variable is not statistically significant. Therefore, the effect of positioning on the left-right axis is stronger than that on the GAL/TAN scale.

Other than the impact of ideology, Model 2 tests the other hypotheses concerning the presence of a party at the government and the impact of operations features on parties across the left-right dimension. Even with the addition of new independent variables, findings obtained in Model 1 are substantially confirmed. Furthermore, as expected, parties at the government are more supportive of MOAs than those ones at the opposition *(H3)*. The size of the coefficient is large, suggesting that presence in the executive is a very strong predictor of support for MOAs. Confirming *H4,* UN legitimation significantly ($p<0,05$) pushes left-wing parties to support a military operation. The negative sign in the first interaction terms also means that this factor negatively affects right-wing parties' extent of support. In contradiction with *H5,* concerns for national security, measured as closeness of the military operation to Italian borders, do not provide incentives for right-wing parties to increase their extent of support. To the contrary, as the negative sign of the interaction term suggests, left-wing parties seem to be more sensitive to this variable. However, the effect is not statistically significant.

Comparing the two models, it is worth underlining the remarkable increase in the R-squared. This indicator shifts from 0,108 in Model 1 to 0,493 in Model 2. It is true that the mere inclusion of further independent variables is supposed to increase the explanatory power of the models. However, such increase suggests that ideological positioning alone does not satisfactorily explain party support for MOAs in Italy. In order to better account for variation in the dependent variable, other factors, namely presence in the coalition government and features of the specific operation, have to be taken into account. This finding also underlines a certain contingency in party support for MOAs in Italy. Changing according to government-opposition dynamics and specific features of the operation rather than placement on ideological dimensions, party positions are rather unstable and context-dependent.

Table 2: Linear regression models with clustered standard error for parties

IV	Model 1 DV: Support	Model 2 DV: Support
Rile	0.515***	0.602***
	(0.131)	(0.164)
Rile x Rile	-0.048**	-0.049***
	(0.017)	(0.015)
GAL/TAN	-0.010	-0.037
	(0.071)	(0.061)
Gov		0.958***
		(0.163)
UN		0.544*
		(0.270)
UN x Rile		-0.129**
		(0.050)
Interest		0.330
		(0.372)
Interest x Rile		-0.070
		(0.079)
Constant	-1.188***	-1.833***
	(0.199)	(0.271)
Observations	104	104
R-squared	0.108	0.493

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

On the basis of Model 2, Figure 8 shows the predicted distribution of support on the left-right axis. The extent of support is minimum at the extreme left, increases moving towards the centre, reaching its maximum at the median position, and then declines towards the right, forming an inverted U. Therefore, the graph describes the presence of a centrist consensus in Italy on MOAs. In the dataset, *Democratici di Sinistra* and *Forza Italia*, have scores approximately ranging around 3 and 7

respectively. The fact that in the plot parties with those scores have similar levels of support indicates that there is also bipartisanship on the issue. However, the width of the confidence intervals shows that level of support may vary considerably and even overlap between parties with close positions on the left/right axis. The graph on the left in Figure 9 instead describes the average marginal effect of position on the left-right axis. The effect is positive or negative according to whether the blue dots fall below the red line, placed on the 0 in the y axis. When the blue whiskers overlap with the line, the size of the effect is not significant; then they do not vice versa. Predictably, the effect is positive for left-wing parties and negative for right-wing parties. The effect of positioning on the left-right axis is significant ($p < 0,1$) at the extremes of the spectrum (values between 0 and 4 and between 8 and 10) not significant for centrist parties (values between 5 and 7). This means that party positioning is a strong explanatory variable for extreme parties and instead has a non-significant impact on centrist parties. The graph on the right instead displays the frequency distribution of the variable Rile, through a histogram. As suggested, the peaks around 3 and 7 corresponds to the two main coalition parties. Moderate and centrist parties (PPI-*La margherita* and UDC) occupies the values between 4 and 6. Extreme-left parties (RC and PdCI) gravitate close to 1, while far right parties (AN and LN) present values close to 8. Therefore, the effect of the variable *Rile* at the values 9 and 10 is not based on actual data but on the construction of the model. Besides this caveat, further evidence for the curvilinear model is provided by this figure.

Figure 8: predictive margins of position on the left-right axis



Figure 9: average marginal effects of position on the left-right axis (left) and distribution of the variable "Rile" (right)



Figure 10 shows the impact of the presence in the executive on party support for MOAs. As said, governing parties are much more supportive than opposition parties. To be precise, being a member of the coalition government on average increases support of around 0,96 points. In other words, parties at the government present a twice and half higher extent of support than parties at the opposition. Therefore, the size of the effect is considerable. The graph also suggests that opposition parties were against MOAs. Such finding would contradict existing studies highlighting a generally high level of consensus among Italian parties on this issue (Coticchia and Giacomello 2011; Coticchia 2012). However, the selection of the military missions analysed in this chapter probably affected the opposition party's extent of support. In fact, as said, these MOAs were the most salient also in terms of domestic debate, producing a high extent of polarization among parties. Therefore, they are not completely representative of the level of party contestation on this issue in Italy.

Figure 10: Predictive margins for presence at the government



Finally, Figure 11 shows how UN legitimation affects the extent of party support across the left-right axis. The plot on the left presents the effect of position on the left-right axis on those operation not covered by a UN Security Council resolution (UN=0). The plot on the right does the same thing for those who had such a source of institutional authorization (UN=1). In the plot on the left, the blue line steadily increases from 0 to 6 and then only slightly decreases. This means that support for missions without UN legitimation is very weak at the extreme left, considerably increases for centre-left parties and it is maximum for centre-right parties. The plot on the right resembles a more balanced curvilinear model. Support for missions receiving UN legitimation therefore is again low at both extremes of the left-right axis and higher at the centre. However, contrasting the two graphs, UN legitimation acted as an incentive for extreme-left and left-wing parties to positively view the mission. To the contrary, this variable lowered right and especially far right's extent of support. Figure 12 describes instead the average marginal effect of party position on the left-right axis on party support for MOAs conditioned on the presence of UN authorization for the mission. Again, the plot on the left shows the effect for operations not covered by a UNSCR (UN=0) and the plot on the right for the other ones (UN=1). Both these blue lines follow the same direction going downwards. However, the one on the left starts from a higher point and terminates also to a higher point. This confirms the previous findings as UN authorized missions find more support from left-wing parties than centre-right counterparts. It is worth stressing that the effect of this interaction is again significant ($p<0,1$) only for the extreme values on the left-right axis (0 to 4 and 9 to 10) and non-significant for centrist

values. Furthermore, this finding may depend on the nature of the mission promoted by a party when in government. For instance, the centre-right coalition promoted the highly controversial mission Antica Babilonia, accounting for three out of the twelve debates in the dataset.

Figure 11: predictive margins for UN legitimation of the mission conditioned to position on the left-right axis



Figure 12: average marginal effects (with 90% CIs) for UN legitimation of the mission conditioned to position on the left-right axis



Conclusions

In this chapter, I explained party support for the six most relevant military operations abroad in Italy during the so-called "Second Republic" (1994-2013). In order to measure party positions on this issue, I analysed a selection of twelve parliamentary debates through the unsupervised scaling algorithm Wordfish. This automated content analysis method allows to locate political actors across a one-dimensional ideological space only through the assessment of word frequency across texts (Grimmer et al. 2013; Hjort et al. 2015; Slapin and Proksch 2008). Wordfish has been successfully employed in comparative politics to measure party positions, in particular across the left-right axis (Proksch et al. 2013; Slapin and Proksch 2008). However, to my knowledge, studies that successfully use this scaling algorithm to extract and scale party positions on military interventions do not exist. Works on this issue have relied either on a qualitative analysis of discourse (Rathbun 2004) or roll-call votes (Wagner et al. 2018). In this sense, this chapter provides a significant methodological advancement to the flourishing research on the party politics of military interventions, in the Italian context and comparative perspective.

In order to test my hypotheses, I employed these measures as dependent variables in two linear regression models. The quantitative analysis produces interesting findings about the factors that increased (and decreased) party support for MOAs in Italy, with considerable implications for the comparative and cross-national perspective on the issue. First, ideological leaning had a significant impact on how Italian parties' position themselves on this issue. In particular, location on the left/right dimension is a good predictor of party support for military operations. On this dimension, party support follows a curvilinear distribution: increasing from the left towards the centre, reaching its maximum at the centre and then decreasing again towards the right. In line with a number of studies on the issue (Calossi and Coticchia 2007; Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012), this finding confirms the presence of a bipartisan and centrist consensus among Italian parties on MOAs. Moreover, it provides further evidence in favour of the presence of a curvilinear and bell-shaped model of support across the left-right axis for peace and security operations in West European countries (Wagner et al. 2017). To the contrary, placement on the GAL/TAN scale did not strongly affect party support for MOAs. Previous comparative studies also found position on the cleavage between liberal and authoritarian parties to be a less satisfactory explanatory variable than position on the traditional left-right axis (Wagner et al. 2017; 2018). The results contained in this chapter provide further support for such a conclusion.

Secondly, government-opposition competition was a crucial element to understand party support for MOAs in Italy between 1994 and 2013. As expected, parties at the government were much more supportive than the ones at the opposition. Considering that in most parliamentary systems the executive depends on a majority in parliament to be elected and stay in power, this finding is not surprising. Parties in government have very little incentives to side against a military operation promoted by the executive as this may undermine the stability of the cabinet. The relative lack of salience of foreign and security issues further reduce the incentive to oppose the cabinet's decision. Across a number of West European countries, Wagner et al. (2018) showed that presence in government is a key variable to explain party support for peace and security operations. In the Italian case, this factor had probably an even stronger impact for two reasons. First, several studies have emphasized how domestic politics persistently conditioned foreign policy in Italy (Andreatta 2008; Carbone 2007). Secondly, anecdotal evidence showed that coalition cabinet have been extremely cohesive on this issue.

Finally, specific features of the mission may have a different impact on party positions across the left-right axis. For example, international legitimation in the form of UN authorization drove Italian left-wing parties to be more supportive and right-wing parties to be less supportive. This finding has a very powerful implication within the debate on Italian foreign and security policy during the "Second Republic". In fact, some scholars have argued that centre-left and centre-right government have adopted two substantially different approaches to foreign policy: while the former pursued a multilateral paradigm, placing stronger emphasis on integration within the European Union, the latter focused on bilateral relationships, standing shoulder to shoulder with United States and developing closer ties with other countries such as Russia and Israel (Brighi 2007; 2013 Quaglia 2007). This differentiated impact of UN authorization for military operations on support for MOAs provides empirical evidence for this argument. More broadly, this finding is in line with theories arguing that left-wing parties are more likely to pursue a multilateral way to solve international disputes. This depends on a more inclusive approach to international politics than right-wing parties (Rathbun 2004).

This analysis of party support for MOAs in Italy suffers of two main limitations. The first one regards a selection bias in the missions analysed. As noted, the high extent of domestic salience of the operation spurred an overestimation of the level of party contestation in Italy. The negative mean of the dependent variable may suggest a high level of contestation, defying the results of existing studies on the issue (Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). However, as suggested, such conclusion is

misleading. It must also be pointed out that assessing of the general level of party contestation on troop deployments was not among the aims of this chapter. Secondly, voting patterns in parliament may not totally reflect the position articulated by their affiliated MPs. It goes without saying that votes have a more substantive effect than mere words. In the next chapter, I will therefore re-examine party support for MOAs through the analysis of all the parliamentary votes occurred in the second republic, also assessing the impact of law-making procedure in parties' behaviour.

Chapter 3
Explaining party support for military operations abroad: evidence from the analysis of roll-call votes[68]

Introduction

On September 26, 2006, the Chamber of Deputies, was called to formally approve the deployment of around 2500 soldiers in Lebanon for the Operation "Leonte". This represented Italy's contribution to the broader peacekeeping mission led by United Nations, UNIFIL, which had been in place in the area since the end of the seventies. According to the UN Security Council Resolution 1701, after the resurfacing of tensions at the southern border between the armed group Hezbollah and the Israeli Defence Forces during summer 2006, the mission was expanded to monitor the end of the hostilities between the two sides involved in the conflict, support the local population in the process of reconstruction and assist the Lebanese regular forces[69].

The parliamentary debate in Italy to approve operation Leonte was not particularly intense but different positions among the parties emerged anyway. Centre-left governing coalition parties generally praised UNIFIL, underlining its evident peacekeeping dimension and undisputable multilateral legitimation. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Massimo D'Alema, affiliated to the senior coalition partner *Democratici di Sinistra*, claimed that it "could represent a breakaway not only for Lebanon and Iraq but for the whole Middle East" (44). The extreme left junior partner, *Rifondazione Comunista*, also emphasized the stark differences with the Iraq War, supported a few years before by the centre-right cabinet. Opposition parties were broadly supportive but raised some notable remarks. The centre-right *Forza Italia* (FI), the main opposition party, was concerned about the risks for the soldiers involved in the mission and criticized the lack of an effort from the United Nation to disarm

[68] A previous version of this chapter, with a different dataset and analysis, has been published as a research article on the journal *Government and Opposition*, with the title "Italian Political Parties and Military Operations Abroad: An Empirical Analysis of Voting Patterns".

[69] For an analysis of the conflict in Lebanon see Giunchi (2007). For an overview concerning the developments and current activities of UNIFIL see the website of the international operation. For the Italian contribution to UNIFIL see the reports in the websites of the Ministry of Defence and the Army. In this sense, see also Coticchia (2011); Ignazi et al. (2012). For an explanation of Italy's participation to the mission see Cladi and Locatelli (2018).

Hezbollah. Furthermore, the leader of the parliamentary group at the Chamber, Fabrizio Cicchitto, stated that its party had a different vision of multilateralism with respect to the government, grounded on the unity among western countries against the Islamic terrorism rather than on pitting Europe and United States against each other. Nevertheless, FI cohesively voted in favour of the deployment of Italian troops in Lebanon in the Operation Leonte. The far right and regionalist party *Lega Nord* was more consistent in opposing the mission and decided to vote against it. In order to justify FI's seemingly contradictory behaviour, Cicchitto made two arguments. First, he emphasized that the party wanted to demonstrate its support for the United States, Israel and the other moderate Arab countries. Second, he claimed that they felt the responsibility of not letting down Italian soldiers, by denying the required funds to participate in the operation[70].

This anecdote highlights how the presence of potential divergencies between the positions articulated by Italian parties on troops deployment and their parliamentary votes on the same issue. In the previous chapter, I explained party support for MOAs through the quantitative analysis of parliamentary speeches. In this chapter, I will attempt to re-explain party support for military deployments outside national borders in Italy through another original dataset, based on all parliamentary votes occurred in the Chamber of Deputies during the so-called "Second Republic". In other words, I will assess how a series of factors increase (or decrease) the probability for a party to vote in favour of MOAs in Italy.

In the previous chapter, I found that ideological leaning along the left-right axis and presence in the government did have a significant impact on party support for Italian participation in military interventions. In this chapter, I test the effect of a further variable: the law-making procedure. Literature exploring party support for military operations and the role of parliament in security policy has completely overlooked this factor (Dieterich et al. 2010; Peters and Wagner 2011; Raunio and Wagner 2018). This is probably due the high extent of cross-national variation (Peters and Wagner 2011) and, simultaneously, the low extent of within-country variation on law-making procedures to approve troops deployments. However, as the present work focuses only on Italy, variation among countries is non-existent. Furthermore, during the time span taken into account, the attempt to fill a juridical gap concerning the approval of military operations other than war and the necessity to keep up with the steady increase in Italian involvement in such missions has paved the way for an ambiguous set of law-making procedures.

[70] To read the entire debate on Operation Leonte/UNIFIL see the report of the debate at the Chamber of Deputies (Camera dei Deputati 2006). All the quotations are drawn from the report and translated in English by the author.

Furthermore, the effort of re-addressing the same research question of the previous chapter on this different dataset is worthwhile for two reasons. First, as the aforementioned anecdote suggest, there may be considerable divergence between the way a party articulates its position on MOAs and the way it votes on it. In contrast to unconstrained speeches, during which MPs can freely express their point of view on the issue, parliamentary votes may have substantive effects on troop deployments and the struggle between parties for the political power. It is therefore particularly interesting to investigate how incentives affect different parties according to their presence in the government: Do government parties are even more cohesive in supporting MOAs when it comes to voting? Do opposition parties feel a stronger pressure to side with the government? Secondly, this dataset includes votes on a number of smaller and less salient MOAs that were excluded from the analysis in the previous chapter. As noted, on the basis of the findings contained in the previous chapter, conclusions concerning the general extent of party contestation should be taken with the extreme caution. In fact, the high salience of the operations analysed arguably produced an overestimation of the overall extent of disagreement among parties. Adding a number of less salient MOAs to the analysis, this chapter may provide a more accurate description of the general level of party contestation on this issue in Italy.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, I will explain why it is useful to analyse party position on military operations abroad through the employment of roll-call votes in parliament. Secondly, I will review the evolution of law-making procedures to approve and re-fund MOAs in Italy. Thirdly, I will sketch out the new hypothesis concerning the impact of law-making procedure on party support for military operations abroad. Fourthly, I will describe how I collected the votes and how I coded all the variables. Fifthly, I will test my hypotheses with both descriptive statistics and the use of Probit regression models. Finally, I will sum up the main findings of the chapter.

Mapping party positions on military operations through roll-call votes

Parliamentary votes are the most commonly used source of data to measure policy positions of individual legislators in the United States. In particular, in order to locate Congressmen and Senators on a policy space, a few studies have relied on roll-call votes, i.e. those recorded votes in which all legislators have to publicly vote in favour or against a bill (Poole 2005; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). This method for scaling individual position in the US Congress through the analysis of roll-call votes has been called NOMINATE.

However, parliamentary votes have been rarely employed to map the position of legislators in other contexts for two reasons. First, roll-call votes are sometimes not recorded, preventing the researcher to map individual legislators' positions through this source (Benoit and Laver 2006). For instance, as Benoit and Laver (2006) reported, in some countries such as Ireland and Hungary roll-call votes are simply unavailable. Secondly, in West European democracies, high intra-party discipline and the collective cabinet responsibility in parliament makes voting patterns of little information to locate individual legislators. The way in which a legislator votes is heavily driven by his affiliation to a specific party to the point that the object of the measure would become the position of the party rather than that of the legislator. As Laver (2014, 219) argued, in these cases, "NOMINATE mostly tells us which party each legislator belongs to and does not distinguish policy positions of legislators within the same party". In turn, in parliamentary democracies, parties that are member of the cabinet are likely to vote in favour of bill promoted by the cabinet. Conversely, opposition parties have strong incentives to vote against the executive to present themselves as alternative to governing parties and undermine the stability of the government. In this respect, Benoit and Laver (2006, 70) claimed that "high levels of party discipline combine with the parliamentary government system to undermine quite fundamentally the potential of roll-call analysis to give us useful information about the policy positions of either individual legislators or legislative parties". To sum up, in parliamentary democracies, individual legislator's behaviour in roll-call votes basically reflects the presence of his own party at the government rather than his/her own policy position.

Beside the US Congress, the European Parliament (EP) is the other prominent case in which the NOMINATE system has been employed to locate individual legislator's in a policy space and explain their positions (Hix 2002; Hix et al. 2005). This depends on the availability of roll-call votes, the absence of such a strong discipline within European groups and the lack of a strong government-opposition dynamic. Hix (2002) underlined how national party policies are the strongest predictors of individual voting behaviour in the EP. Hix et al. (2005) identified in the classic left-right cleavage the strongest dimension of conflict within this legislative arena. However, it has to be underlined that roll-call votes are used selectively in the EP on the basis of groups' strategic considerations. This produces a selection bias in a comprehensive analysis of individual MEPs positions through such data (Carrubba et al. 2006). The issue can emerge in other cases of countries in which roll-call votes represent just a fraction of the total votes issued by parliament[71].

[71] For a more extensive debate on advantages and drawbacks of measuring policy positions through roll-call votes see Benoit and Laver (2006); Laver (2014); Spirling and McLean (2006).

Against this background, roll-call votes may still constitute a valuable tool to measure party positions on issues of foreign and security policy. Unlike any other policy area, foreign and security policy is supposed to cut across partisan divisions, overcoming ideological divergencies and incentives related to the political competition for power. Involving issues of national security and reputation within the international community, foreign policy is expected to be an area protected from substantial party contestation. Therefore, roll-call votes may be indicative of party positions on this issue. Furthermore, executives have been historically dominated the legislative on issues of national security. The need for secrecy and effectiveness in the decision-making process has provided a normative argument against the involvement of parliament (Peters and Wagner 2011). However, recent literature has increasingly investigated parliamentary powers over the approval and scrutiny of military operations (Bono 2005; Dieterich et al. 2010; 2015; Fonck and Reykers 2018; Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010; Lagassé and Mello 2018; Peters and Wagner 2011; Raunio 2014; Raunio and Wagner 2017; Wagner 2018). Moreover, notwithstanding the lack of a trend towards the "parliamentarization" of security policy (Peters and Wagner 2011; Raunio and Wagner 2017), events such as the House of Commons vote to halt the British government decision to military intervene in the Syrian civil war suggests the need to take into account the role of parliament on security policy (Kaarbo and Kenealy 2016; Strong 2015). Therefore, the analysis of roll-call votes is also a way to explore such legislative-executive relations on this issue.

Following such premises, the project Deployment Vote Watch was established to create a database of roll-call votes on military deployments occurred in Western democracies after the end of the Cold War. A first version of the project included only four countries: United Kingdom, Germany, France and Spain (Wagner et al. 2018). Recently the data were extended to cover further seven countries, including the United States and Italy (Ostermann et al. 2019). In particular, the Italian case seems particularly promising to investigate party positions on peace and security operations through roll-call votes for three reasons. First, as Figure 13 suggests, the number of roll-call votes in Italy is very high in comparison with the other countries, providing a larger universe of cases. Secondly, within the dataset, as Figure 14, shows, Italy presents one of the highest level of party contestation of military interventions, with an average of 69% of votes in favour. This may seem to contrast with the presence of a centrist and bipartisan consensus, empirically found in the previous chapter. However, a relatively high of contestation with respect to other countries may be due to the fragmentation of Italian party system and the constant presence of extreme and anti-system parties in parliament Finally, these votes regarded bills with different legal value and content, enabling the researcher to investigate the impact of different law-making procedures.

Figure 13: percentage of votes occurred by country in the Development Vote Watch dataset (from Ostermann et al. 2019)



Figure 14: average agreement index on votes by country in the Deployment Vote Watch dataset (from Ostermann et al. 2019)[72]



[72] The Agreement Index is calculated with the formula developed by Hix et al. (2005). Values range from 0 to 1, representing minimum and maximum parliamentary cohesion in each vote respectively.

The evolution of the role of parliament and law-making procedures on MOAs in Italy

The role of Italian parliament in the approval and scrutiny of military deployments abroad are very controversial. On the one hand, some studies have suggested that parliamentary war powers in Italy are strong or, at least, significant. Dieterich et al. (2010) included the Italian legislative among those with "very strong powers". Moreover, Mello (2014) considered it as a parliament with *ex ante* veto powers, i.e. the capacity to block military operations before they begin. On the other hand, other studies had a very different view. For example, Wagner (2018) placed Italian legislature in the category of parliaments with no *ex ante* veto power. All in all, the case is debatable to the point that Wagner et al. (2010, 63) admitted that Italian parliament competences on military operations abroad are "far from clear cut" and categorised the case as "inconclusive". The reasons for such a lack of consensus are mainly two. First, the executive has been able to circumvent constitutional rules guaranteeing the parliament strong power on war by stressing the humanitarian and multilateral dimension of military operations (Bono 2005). Secondly, in the last decades, several procedures and practices have been adopted to fill this gap (Di Camillo and Tessari 2013; Ronzitti 2017).

Approved in 1947, in the aftermath of the Second World War and the collapse of the fascist regime, Italian constitution solemnly rejects war as a mean of resolution of disputes among states and heavily discourages executives from bringing Italy in a conflict with other countries (Elia 2003; Panebianco 1997). First of all, war is considered as a violation of the international law and the well-being of the foreign people. The often-quoted article 11 of the Constitution says that "Italy condemns war as a mean to offend the freedom of other people and to solve international disputes"[73]. Such a statement is only partially moderated by the following sentence, suggesting a "limitation of sovereignty required by an international order that ensures peace among nations". Furthermore, any attempt to declare war is subjected to the approval of the parliament. In fact, article 78 instead states that the "the two chambers must approve the state of war and give the executive the powers to implement it"[74]. To sum up, according to the Constitution, Italy must not go to war unless it is strictly necessary for guaranteeing national security in an act of self-defence or recommended by international institutions and should only do it after the approval of the parliament.

As seen, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the number of multilateral interventions steadily grew, providing Italy an outstanding opportunity to radically transform is own foreign security policy, by

[73] Article 11, Constitution of the Italian Republic (Senato della Repubblica 2012). Quotations were translated by the authors from Italian.

[74] Article 78, Constitution of the Italian Republic (Senato della Repubblica 2012).

deploying its troops in the major areas of conflict around the world. However, when it came to approve the use of military force abroad, successive Italian governments had to overcome the aforementioned binding constitutional limitations. The rhetorical and juridical strategy adopted by policymakers was twofold. On the one hand, they articulated a humanitarian discourse, emphasizing how such military operations were aimed at bringing peace and stability to foreign people. On the other hand, they stressed the multilateral dimension of these operations (whether it came from the UN, NATO, EU or even *ad hoc* coalitions) as it constituted a legitimization for the use of force, accordingly to the caveat contained in art. 11. To sum up, when contributing to these multilateral operations, Italy was not declaring war to any country but rather participating in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, with a more or less substantive international coverage. The political debate surrounding Italian contribution to Operation Desert Storm in Iraq in 1991 set a precedent in this sense. The then Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti underlined how the embargo against Saddam Hussein was "not an act of war" (68875). He also repeatedly pointed out how the operation was authorized by the UN Security Council Resolution 661.[75] Such a narrative underpinned other successive troops deployment as well. In 1999, the then Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema explicitly argued that the NATO-led bombing campaign in Kosovo "was not a war against Serbia" [76]. Four years later, the approval bill for a troop deployment in Iraq in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein's fall was titled "urgent assistance to the Iraqi people". Overall, as said, various studies highlighted the employment of a discourse based on solidarity and multilateralism concerning Italy's involvement in military operation (Coticchia 2011; 2015; Coticchia and De Simone 2016; Ignazi et al. 2012).

If these military operations were not considered as acts of war, then the government was not forced to consult parliament beforehand to seek approval as the constitution would require. In other words, the executive was able to circumvent parliamentary veto and avoid being scrutinized on military deployments. Governments were therefore capable of avoiding audience costs and the attribution of responsibility, deriving from the decision to deploy military troops (Coticchia and Moro 2017). As part of a comprehensive restructuring of competences within the Ministry of Defence, law 25/1997 tried to address this problem. It stated that the Minister of Defence had to illustrate once a year to the parliament "the evolution of the military commitments"[77]. However, the law did not prescribe whether and how parliament should express on such reports. The steady increase in the amount of

[75] To read the entire debate on Operation Desert Storm see the report of the Chamber of Deputies (Camera dei Deputati 1991).

[76] To read the entire debate on Operation Allied Force see the report of the Chamber of Deputies (Camera dei Deputati 1999).

[77] For the complete text of the law see the website of the Chamber of Deputies.

missions in which Italy was involved encouraged legislators to fill the normative gap for the approval of MOAs. The "Ruffino Resolution", approved in 2001, introduced the practice of fund or re-fund all the ongoing troop deployments through law decrees issued once or twice a year by the executive. Such a development markedly increased the number of votes on MOAs but did little to alter the unbalanced legislative-executive relationship for three reasons. First, the law decrees often did not contain precise information regarding the details of the missions and how funds were divided among them. Secondly, by issuing a single vote on a number of operations, the law decrees forced parties to support missions on which they disagreed in order to keep in place the ones they favoured. Third, as the executive controls the majority in parliament, most of the amendments to the law decree presented by opposition parties were inevitably defeated[78]. With the adoption of the "comprehensive law" (*Legge Quadro)* at the end of 2016, Italy finally established an *ad hoc* law-making procedure for the approval of MOAs that guarantees the legislative a real veto power. According to the new law, at the beginning of each year, the executive has to provide detailed information regarding the allocation of funds and tasks of all the ongoing missions to the parliament. Furthermore, the missions are voted individually or grouped according to similar scopes, allowing political parties to discriminate between them in their votes[79]. In theory, this procedure should drastically improve the law-making process to approve MOAs in terms of transparency and accountability. However, the cases in which it was applied are currently not enough to assess its effects on parliamentary scrutiny party contestations over troops deployment[80].

Overall, law-making procedures for the approval of MOAs in Italy were erratic and ambiguous. As suggested, especially after the approval of the Ruffino Resolution, a number of military operations were approved all together through law decrees. However, law decrees were also occasionally employed to approve specific military operations. For example, the aforementioned Operation Leonte in Lebanon (2006) was approved in such a manner. Furthermore, as hinted in the previous chapter, seeking further legitimacy for their decisions, prominent members of the executive occasionally referred to parliament on the involvement in relevant MOAs. For instance, this was the case for Operations Allied Harbour and Allied Force (Kosovo, 1999), Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan, 2001) and Antica Babilonia (Iraq, 2003). The timing of votes with respect to the troop deployment also varied. In some cases, such as the Operation Alba (Albania, 1997), the vote took place before the

[78] For the complete text of the Ruffino Resolution see the website of the Chamber of Deputies.

[79] For the complete text of the comprehensive law see the website of the Official Gazette.

[80] In practice, the new law was applied three times, in the years 2017, 2018, 2019. Due to the timespan considered in this dissertation (1994-2013), these votes are not taken into account. Notably, a considerable delay in the law-making process occurred in 2019, with the final votes in the two Chambers staged in July, rather than at the beginning of the year.

beginning of the operations. In other ones, such as Unified Protector (Libya 2011), it took place afterwards[81].

Hypotheses

As said, in this chapter, I will test again some of the hypotheses which have already been already formulated in the previous chapter to explain party support for MOAs. In particular, I will look for further empirical support concerning the role of ideology, both in terms of positions on the left-right axis and the GAL/TAN scale, and the impact of presence in government[82].

Furthermore, as said, I will investigate the impact of law decrees on party support for MOAs. In theory, votes to convert law decrees into proper laws are presumed to provoke higher confrontation in parliament with respect to the other bills. Law decrees are thought to be powerful tools in the hands of the government that formulate them without consulting the parliament. Therefore, their conversion through a parliamentary vote is expected to bring to the fore contestation from opposition parties and even from dissenting members of the coalition government. However, various studies have discovered that law decrees do not empower the government vis-à-vis the parliament in such a way. In the phase of their formulation, the government usually is forced to concede something to at least all the parties composing the coalition cabinet and, in case of conflict within the coalition, even to opposition parties that are willing to exploit divisions within the executive (Della Sala and Kreppel 1998; Giuliani 2008). In other words, the government takes into account the position of other actors already in the phase of the drafting of the law decree. As Cox et al. (2008) underlined, the Italian executives own substantial agenda setting power to avoid potential defeats and being rolled. Therefore, law decrees are not as contested as they are presumed to be. Confirming such expectations, Giuliani (2008) showed that cohesion of Italian parliament decreases for law decrees only very slightly compared to ordinary laws, remaining at a substantially high level.

Following the discussion in the previous section, I expect law decrees on MOAs to be even less contested than resolutions on government's communications. In other words, I hypothesize that law decrees encourage individual parties to increase their extent of parliamentary support for MOAs. This

[81] For an exhaustive discussion of the law-making process for the approval of MOAs in Italy and the relationship between legislative and executive see Di Camillo and Tessari (2011); Ronzitti (2017).

[82] The presence of a number of law decrees on multiple operations does not allow to test the other two hypotheses contained in the second chapter regarding how specific features of the missions have affect party support for MOAs according to party position on the left-right axis.

depends on three reasons. First, the peculiar law-making procedure for the re-funding of all the ongoing missions posed high constraints on parties to express a positive vote. In fact, parties were asked to cast a single vote to fund a number of very different operations with tasks ranging from the distribution of humanitarian aid to the fight against terrorism. Voting "no" meant terminating not only the MOAs on which the party disagreed on, but also the ones that it supported. Therefore, the procedure incentivized all parties to cast a positive vote. Second, the votes to convert law decrees were in most cases less salient than votes on the government's communications in the Chamber. As noted, while government representatives usually referred the Chamber about significant troops deployments, law decrees were often employed to re-fund all existing operations, including very small ones in terms of number of personnel and resources involved[83]. For this reason, these votes received less media and public opinion attention. This produced an incentive for opposition parties to vote in favour of the government as they were more protected from potential domestic audience costs. Thirdly, the votes to convert law decrees were often issued after the funds for military operations were already allocated and troops were deployed. This obviously discouraged parties to vote against the military operations. In fact, the missing conversion of a law decree would have left military without funds while they are asked to fulfil their tasks and provoked a reputational damage for the country at international level. All in all, due to the peculiar structure of the voting procedure, the lower extent of domestic salience and their *ex-post* timing with respect to the troop deployment, I expect law decrees to be less contested than votes on government's resolutions.

H6: MOAs voted through law decrees receive more parliamentary support than those voted through resolutions

Moreover, in this chapter, I will also assess if and to what extent incentives deriving from competition within the domestic political system and law-making procedure differently shaped parties' voting pattern, according to their position across the left-right axis. Given the findings of the previous chapter and the previous discussion, we expect presence in government and votes on law decrees to increase parties' likelihood to vote in favour of MOAs. However, the size of the effect can vary on the basis of party ideological position on this issue and the salience that they attribute to it. On the one hand, it is presumable that these two variables will have a larger impact on parties that are more sceptical of military deployments for peace and security interventions than those that are supportive. In fact, the latter do not need any incentive to vote in favour of MOAs. On the other hand, among the non-interventionist parties, it is to expect that these two variables have a more substantive effect on

[83] For the consequences of this process on MOAs promoted by the European Union see Bono (2005).

parties that attribute lower salience to this issue than those that higher salience. Parties attributing relatively high salience to their opposition against involvement in military operations outside borders are expected to keep a rather consistent behaviour, irrespective of incentives deriving from being part of the government or the type of law-making procedure chosen for the vote. For instance, champions of anti-militarism may even vote against to a mission proposed by an executive in which they are involved as the electoral costs of backtracking could be higher than those of defying the whip. To the contrary, parties attributing relatively little salience to their opposition against MOAs are supposed to be much more subjected to changes of voting patterns, given the presence of the aforementioned incentives. For instance, not considering opposition to MOAs as a salient policy issues, they may be willing to renege on it when they are in government. In Italy, during the Second Republic, extreme left and post-marxist parties have a long history of pacifism (Calossi et al. 2013). To the contrary, far right parties had a diverging approach on this issue (Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012; Tarchi 2007;). While *Alleanza Nazionale* considered security and defence policy a salient issue and see involvement of Italian militaries in peace and security operations as a source of national pride, the autonomist *Lega Nord* has demonstrated to be sceptical of MOAs albeit not regarding security policy as a salient issue in their agenda. Given this discussion, I expect position in government and votes through law decrees to have a stronger impact on (extreme) right-wing parties in Italy than extreme left-parties.

H7: The effect of the presence in government on support for MOAs is stronger for (extreme) right-wing parties than (extreme) left-wing parties

H8: The effect of voting through law decrees on support for MOAs is stronger for (extreme) right-wing parties than (extreme) left-wing parties

Description of the dataset

In order to confirm these hypotheses, I constructed a second dataset on the basis of all votes on this issue casted at the Chamber of Deputies during the so-called “second republic”, i.e. between 1994 and 2013.

Italian parliament has a bicameral structure, composed by the Chamber of Deputies, the lower and larger chamber and the Senate, the upper and smaller chamber (Cotta and Verzichelli 2016). The two chambers have exact equal powers and each legislative bill needs to be approved by both chambers in order to pass. This is obviously true also regarding bills on foreign policy issues and, in particular,

the approval or the re-funding of troops deployments (Wagner et al. 2010). However, I decided to focus only on the votes that took place in the Chamber of Deputies for three main reasons. First, I sought to maintain consistency with the previous empirical chapter, in which only debates in this chamber were taken into account. Secondly, Senate votes are often a replication of the ones in the Chamber of Deputies, with parties voting in the exact same manner[84]. Thirdly, due to the lack of data availability, I was not able to code how each party voted on several resolutions and law decrees votes occurring at the Senate, especially prior to 2002.

The dataset includes final votes on law decrees for the re-funding of all the ongoing MOAs and governing parties' resolutions on communication given by members of the cabinets. Votes on amendments for law decrees were excluded for two reasons. First, they covered a wide range of specific issues regarding the individual operations. In some cases, amendments also concerned technicalities concerning the text of the bills or issues not strictly related to troop deployments. The inclusion of these amendments would lead to a stark increase in the heterogeneity of the observations. To the contrary, as suggested, the final votes narrowly focused on the approval of MOAs and were easily comparable with one another. Secondly, amendments alternatively expressed positive or negative views about the operations themselves. For instance, hypothetically, while an opposition party may propose an amendment to stop the involvement in the air strikes in Kosovo, another one may demand a stronger effort. Voting in favour to the first one is an evidence of opposition to MOAs while saying yes to the second means the contrary. In contrast, voting yes in the final votes unequivocally meant supporting the "package" of missions. This is basically the same reason why opposition parties' resolutions on government communications were excluded as well. For instance, while voting yes to a resolution against the operation Antica Babilonia has the meaning of not supporting it, voting yes to a resolution approving the mission has the opposite meaning.

In total the votes included in the dataset are 62[85]. 47 are (final) votes on law decrees and only 15 are (governing parties') resolutions (see Figure 15). On the one hand, this distribution reflects the extensive use of law decrees for both the re-funding of all the ongoing missions and, more rarely, the approval of new ones. On the other hand, it highlights that governments seldom referred to parliament on military operations abroad. In fact, as noted, this procedure was adopted only for extremely salient and contested MOAs.

[84] Following this criterion, previous studies on law-making in Italy similarly focused exclusively on the Chamber of Deputies and neglected the Senate (Curini and Zucchini 2010; Pedrazzani 2014; 2017).

[85] For a summary of all the votes and details regarding date, cabinet, mission, type of act and parties see the Appendix.

Figure 15: Distribution of votes by legislative procedure



The distribution of votes (law decrees and resolutions) by cabinet is instead summed up in Figure 16. The second Berlusconi government (2001-2005) is by far the executive under which most votes took place (19). The highest number of resolutions (7) also were cast during this cabinet. This should not come as a surprise given that it was the most long-lasting government in post-war Italian history and that highly salient contributions to military interventions such as Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF in Afghanistan and Iraq were approved in those years. As said, the relevance of these operations required government representatives to refer before the parliament about their approval and the subsequent developments. Under the fourth Berlusconi government (2008-2011) several votes (12) occurred as well: 8 law decrees and 4 resolutions were approved. This cabinet also had a long duration compared to the other ones and it promoted Italy's contribution to the military intervention Operation Unified Protector in Libya. Prodi and D'Alema governments covering years between 1996 and 1999 were the ones in which more votes occurred, 9 and 7 respectively. Under these governments, contributions to significant MOAs in the Balkans were approved. The three debates on the intervention in Kosovo in spring 1999 accounts for all the resolutions.

Figure 16: Distribution of votes by cabinet, divided by resolutions and decrees



Grouping the distribution for the colour of the cabinets, there is a slight prevalence of votes taking place under centre-right governments (34) with respect to votes occurred under centre-left governments (23). The remaining votes (5) took place when so-called "technical governments" (see Figure 17). While the distribution of votes in general is quite even between centre-left and centre-right cabinets, there is a considerable unbalance in the proportion between laws decrees and resolutions. While resolutions make up for 11 of the 34 casted under centre-right cabinets (32%), only 4 resolutions in the dataset occurred under centre-left cabinets (17%).

Figure 17: Distribution of votes by colour of the coalition in government, divided by resolutions and decrees



In order to maintain consistency with the previous chapter, I took into account the exact same parties of the other dataset. In alphabetic order the selected parties are: *Alleanza Nazionale* (AN), *Centro Cristiano Democratico and Crisitani Democratici Uniti* (CCD-CDU, considered jointly), *Democratici di Sinistra* and *Partito dei Democratici di Sinistra* (DS/PDS, considered jointly), *Federazione dei Verdi* (FdV), *Forza Italia* and *Popolo delle Libertà* (FI/PdL, considered jointly), *Italia dei Valori* (IdV), *Lega Nord per l'Indipendenza della Padania* (LN), *La Margherita* (Mar), *Partito dei Comunisti Italiani* (PdCI), *Partito Democratico* (PD), *Partito Popolare Italiano* and *I Democratici* (PPI-Dem, considered jointly), *Partito della Rifondazione Comunista* (PRC), *Unione di Centro* (UDC)[86].

Taking into account as the unit of analysis the vote of each party in each of the 62 votes, I ended up with a total of 483 observations in my final dataset. The dependent variable is the party whip in each vote. For party whip, I meant the official line of the party, as expressed by the voting patterns of its representatives in the Chamber. In other words, if a relative majority of the party voted in favour and a minority against, I considered the party line as in favour and vice versa. When all MPs belonging to the same parties completely deserted the vote, I considered the party whip as against. Other than voting yes or no, MPs can also abstain. Abstention may be interpreted as an evidence of disagreement and contestation. They are sometimes employed by parties to signal that they are not completely convinced but, simultaneously, they do not want to alter significantly the result of the vote. In fact,

[86] For an explanation of the selection criteria for these parties and the underlying reasons for the merges see the chapter 2.

according to the rules of the Chamber of Deputies, abstentions are counted for the validity of the votes but not for the majority of votes to pass a bill or resolution. Therefore, abstentions are essentially an instrument to align with the majority of the Chamber, whether this is against or in favour of the bill. Since my dataset do not contain any rejected bill, I consequently counted all abstentions as if they were positive votes[87]. Consequently, I coded 1 when a party voted yes or abstained and, conversely, 0 when it voted against. As much as the aggregation of speeches in the previous chapter, this procedure admittedly neglects any intra-party disagreement. However, Sieberer (2006) has shown that party cohesion in roll-call votes across European parliamentary democracies rarely fall below 95%. Furthermore, focusing only on votes for military deployments, Ostermann et al. (2019) also found extremely high intra-party cohesion.

The dataset includes a series of independent variables. As much as in the previous chapter, ideological positions on the right-left axis (*Rile*) and the GAL/TAN scale (*Gal/Tan*) are taken from the variables *lrgen* and *Galtan* respectively in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) trend dataset. They both range between 0 and 10, taking minimum values for parties on the left or associated with liberal values and maximum values for parties on the right or associated with authoritarian values respectively. In the same manner as the previous chapter, parties in government are coded 1, while parties at the opposition take value 0 (*Gov)*. As discussed previously, parties are considered as part of the cabinet even when the provide external support for it. Finally, a dummy variable captures the distinction among law-making procedures among the various votes *(Decree)*. It takes value 1 for law decrees and 0 for resolutions on government's communication. This variable is fundamental to test the impact of law-making procedures on the overall level of support and party contestation for MOAs. For a complete summary of the variables see Table 3.

The mean of the dependent variable *(Support)* already provides some evidences for the extent of parliamentary support for MOAs in Italy during the so-called "Second republic", as measured through votes. In a nutshell, this value indicates that parties voted in favour of troops deployment in 74% of observations taken into account. In other words, a party was much more likely to support MOAs than not. As expected, this finding contrasts with the one obtained in the previous chapter. In fact, the mean of support as extracted by parliamentary speeches was slightly negative (-0,165). Therefore, in

[87] Applying the same criterion, other studies on legislative politics in Italy also count abstentions as a positive vote. See for instance Curini and Zucchini (2010), Pedrazzani (2014; 2017). Abstentions were also very few in my dataset. Out of 483 observations, there were just 26 cases of observations, a little more than the five percent of the total.

line with the expectations, the inclusion of less salient MOAs, approved through law decrees, increases the extent of party support for military operations.

Table 3: Description of the variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Support (Yes and abstentions)	483	0,7391304	0,4395642	0	1
Rile (Position on the left/right axis)	483	4,843101	2,472137	0,6	8,71
Gal/Tan (Position on the GAL/TAN scale)	483	5,105718	2,76974	0,63	8,88
Gov (Presence at the government)	483	0,4575569	0,4987119	0	1
Decree (law-making procedure)	483	0,7556936	0,4301207	0	1

Empirical findings

The hypotheses concerning the impact of ideology on party voting on MOAs could be answered individually through descriptive statistics[88]. Figure 18 shows the percentages of supporting votes by party ordered by their position on the left/right axis. Communist parties have been the staunchest opponents of military interventions: PRC scores 29 per cent of votes in favour and PdCI 42 per cent. The green party (FdV) has been only slightly keener to support these operations, scoring 54% of votes in favour. The main social-democratic party (PDS/DS/PD), which changed names two times during this time span, has been much more supportive of MOAs in parliament. In fact, it voted in favour of them in 80% of the cases. Christian Democrat parties have also provided strong support for troops deployment outside Italian borders, with the more leftist one (PPI/Dem) being a little less supportive than the more conservative one (CCD/CDU) (79 to 91 per cent). The liberal IdV is the outlier in the model, recording an extent of support similar to that of extreme left parties. This populist party, founded by the former prosecutor Antonio Di Pietro in 1998, has expressed strongly pacifist positions

[88] To the contrary, the variation in the number of parties voting in each vote may produce biases in testing the other hypotheses through descriptive statistics.

across the years. Support further increases in the case of FI, Berlusconi's conservative political platform. This party voted in favour in 96% of the cases observed. The far-right AN presents a similar score (93%). Lastly, support slightly drops at the extreme right of the spectrum with the populist and autonomist LN voting in favour of MOAs in less than 80% of the cases. In broad terms, confirming *H1a,* right-wing parties have provided more parliamentary support for troops deployment than left-wing parties. However, the fact that the most extreme right-wing party opposed MOAs more frequently than other right-wing parties suggests that the curvilinear model is more appropriate to describe the Italian case than the linear one. Therefore, confirming the findings of the previous chapter, there is a stronger empirical support for *H1b.*

More generally, this bar chart also indicates a generally high level of support for MOAs in Italy. In fact, seven out of the ten parties displayed have voted more than 50 per cent of the times in favour of military operations abroad. Five of them have supported military operations in more than 80 per cent of the votes analysed. As seen, the average of supporting votes is over 70%. In order to ascertain the extent of consensus, these two results must be compared with votes on the same issue in other countries and on other issues in Italy. As already noted, Ostermann et al. (forthcoming) ranked Italy among the countries in which deployment votes are more contested after the end of the Cold War. On average, Italian parliament is slightly less cohesive on this issue, than, for instance, German and French counterparts. Furthermore, as suggested in Chapter 1, various studies highlighted the generally high extent of bipartisanship and consensus among parties in the legislative arena, across various timespans and through different indicators (Di Palma 1977; Giuliani 2008; Giuliani and Capano 2001; Pedrazzani 2017). In particular, analysing the law-making process in the Second Republic, Pedrazzani (2017) showed that on average bills were approved with 85% of supporting votes in the Chamber of Deputies. Due to the presence of votes on government's communication and divergencies in measurement, it is impossible to compare this figure with the one concerning only MOAs. Nevertheless, arguably, the extent of party support for troop deployments in Italy was substantial. To sum up, parties clearly provided a widespread parliamentary support for MOAs during the Second Republic.

Figure 18: Percentage of supportive votes by party ordered on the left-right axis (1994-2013)[89]



Figure 19 instead describes how parties distributed on the GAL/TAN scale has voted on MOAs. This graph shows an inherent issue with the measurement of GAL/TAN positions in Italy during the time span considered. In fact, with only small exceptions, positions closely resembled those in the left-right scale: left-wing parties are closely associated with liberal and alternative values and right-wing parties are related to conservative and authoritarian tendencies. Again, also in this dataset, these two dimensions are highly (r=0,9064) and significantly (p<0,01) correlated. Contradicting *H2* and in contrast with the empirical evidence contained in the previous chapter, parties with high scores in the GAL/TAN scale have provided stronger and more consistent parliamentary support for MOAs than parties with low scores.

[89] The location of parties on the left/right axis is based on the 2006 CHES Dataset (Hooghe et al. 2010). Parties changing names are considered as single ones PDS/DS/PD, PPI/Mar, CCD/UDC, FI/Pdl to maximize the number of observations per party. There is variation among observations between parties: PRC (47), PdCI (35), FdV (44), PDS/DS/PD (62), PPI/Mar (43), IdV (19), CCD/UDC (62), FI/PdL (62), AN (47), LN (62).

Figure 19: Percentage of supportive votes by party ordered on the GAL/TAN scale (1994-2013)[90]



In order to compare the effect of all the independent variables and test the other hypotheses, I ran three different Probit models with clustered standard error for parties (see Table 4)[91]. In Model 1, only hypotheses concerning the role of ideology on party support for MOAs are empirically tested. In Model 2, hypotheses regarding the impact of presence at the government and law-making procedures are also taken into account. In Model 3, the interactive effect of these two variables with ideological positions on the left-right axis is analysed.

[90] The location of the party on the GAL/TAN scale is based on the 2006 CHES Dataset (Hooghe et al. 2010). The choice of this particular dataset is the presence of all parties taken into account. Parties changing names are considered as single ones PDS/DS/PD, PPI/Mar, CCD/UDC, FI/Pdl to maximize the number of observations per party. There is variation among observations between parties: PRC (47), PdCI (35), FdV (44), PDS/DS/PD (62), PPI/Mar (43), IdV (19), CCD/UDC (62), FI/PdL (62), AN (47), LN (62).

[91] As robustness checks, I conducted six replications of these models. First, I used a Logit model instead of a Probit model. The results of the analysis are almost exactly the same. Secondly, I used random effects for parties. In this replication, ideological position loses much of its significance in Model 2 and it is totally non-significant in Model 3. The interaction between the content of the vote and the position on the left-right axis also loses much of its significance in Model 3. The other findings are substantially confirmed. Third, I replicated the model with both clustered standard error and random effects for votes separately. In these replications, there are no substantial differences with respect to the three models contained in the chapter. Fourth, in order to corroborate the curvilinear model, I included a further independent variable capturing party extremism. Its coefficients are negative and significant in all models. Finally, I ran a multinomial model with a dependent variable constructed in the following way: no votes coded as 0, abstentions coded as 1 and yes votes coded as 2. Due to the limited amount of abstentions in the dataset, changes were marginal. No votes were used as base outcome. The effects of position on the left-right axis and presence in government were confirmed. For all the replication models see the Appendix.

Model 1 partially questions the result the findings obtained in the previous chapter regarding the impact of ideology on party support for MOAs. First, there is less empirical evidence of a curvilinear distribution across the left-right axis. In fact, the squared term *Rile x Rile* is not significant at any level. Secondly, parties with low values in the GAL/TAN scale are significantly less likely to vote in favour of MOAs and, conversely, parties with high values are more likely to do so. The effect of this independent variable is positive and statistically significant ($p<0,10$). This is contrast with the result obtained in the previous chapter. As noted, the fact that positioning on the left-right axis much resemble that on the GAL/TAN scale in the Italian case may provide an explanation for such a result. Overall, the contradictory findings suggest that the GAL/TAN dimension is not an accurate predictor for party support for military interventions in Italy.

In Model 2, controlling for the other variables, the curvilinear model on the left-right is again corroborated. In fact, the squared term is negative and statistically significant ($p<0,01$). In line with the findings of the previous chapter, presence at the government increases the probability of a party voting in favour of a military operations. Furthermore, this independent variable confirms to have a highly significant ($p<0,01$) and very strong effect on support for MOAs. To sum up, being member of the government constitutes a remarkable incentive for parties to vote in favour of military missions outside national borders. As expected, approving a mission through a law decree significantly increases ($p<0,01$) general party support for MOAs in parliament. Therefore, in line with *H6* parties are more likely to vote in favour of military interventions if approved in such a way.

Model 3 highlights how both presence at the government and law-making procedure have a different effect on parties according to their position in the left-right axis. As expected in *H7*, being member of the government has a stronger impact on right-wing parties than left-wing parties. In fact, the interaction effect is positive and statistically significant ($p< 0,10$). In other words, moving from the opposition to the government, right-wing parties increase more their extent of support than left-wing parties. The distribution of the effect of law-making procedures on support across this ideological follows the same pattern. In line with *H8*, right-wing parties are significantly ($p<0,10$) more likely to vote in favour of MOAs when they are approved through law decrees. Left-wing parties are not as sensitive to different law-making procedures instead.

Through the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), it is possible to assess the specification of the three models. The values for AIC and BIC consistently decrease moving from Model 1 and Model 2. Therefore, as expected, the addition of further

independent variables linked to the presence in government and the law-making approval procedure considerably improves the specification for the model. While the AIC value slightly diminish from Model 2 to Model 3, the BIC value marginally increases. This means that the two interactions model does not significantly contribute to the increase of model fit.

Table 4: Probit models with clustered standard error

IV	Model 1 DV = Support	Model 2 DV = Support	Model 3 DV = Support
Rile	0.347**	0.583***	0.349**
	(0.172)	(0.142)	(0.150)
Rile x Rile	-0.025	-0.060***	-0.053**
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Gal/Tan	0.129*	0.258***	0.300***
	(0.075)	(0.083)	(0.091)
Gov		2.319***	1.586**
		(0.276)	(0.626)
Gov x Rile			0.416*
			(0.249)
Decree		0.798***	0.239*
		(0.157)	(0.133)
Decree x Rile			0.142***
			(0.048)
Constant	-0.830***	-2.772***	-2.160***
	(0.282)	(0.339)	(0.287)
Observations	483	483	483
AIC	464,044	306,579	304,624
BIC	480,764	331,659	338,064

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 20 describes the distribution of probability to vote in favour of MOAs on the left-right axis. In a similar way to previous chapter, as the blue line suggests, party support for MOAs in parliament follows a curvilinear and bell-shaped distribution on this dimension. Probability to vote in favour of MOAs is lower at the extreme-left side of the spectrum, increases towards the centre and then decreases towards the right. In other words, during the so-called second republic in Italy, centre-left and centre-right parties were more likely to vote in favour of MOAs than extreme-left and extreme-right parties. The width in the intervals of confidence imposes caution regarding parties with small differences with positions on the left-right axis. However, the difference between parties located at the centre and those at the extremes of the spectrum is considerable. For instance, parties with values close to zero are around 57% likely to vote in favour of MOAs, while those at the centre are almost 80% likely. Figure 21 instead shows the average marginal effect of position on the left-right axis on probability to cast a supportive vote. As in the previous chapter, the blue dots in the figure on the left describe the positive or negative effect. When the whiskers of the blue dots overlap the with the red line placed on zero in the y-axis, the effect is not significant. It is worth pointing out that the effect is again significant (p<0,10) only for extreme values (from 0 to 2 and from 8 to 10) and not for central values. As in the correspondent figure of the previous chapter, the graph on the right shows the distribution of the variable *Rile.* The distribution is similar to the one contained in Chapter 2, with a higher proportion of values around 1 and 8, reflecting a more consistent presence of extreme left-wing and right-wing parties respectively. Despite the fact that the effect is not significant in most values, the plot provided further evidence in favour of the curvilinear model.

Figure 20: Predictive margins for position on the left-right axis



Figure 21: Average marginal effects of position on the left-right axis (left) and distribution of the variable Rile (right)



Figure 22 shows instead the distribution of party support for MOAs in the Chamber of Deputies on the GAL/TAN scale. The blue line describes an increase in the probability of voting in favour from the GAL pole to the TAN pole. In other words, in contrast to the expectations, more authoritarian parties are more likely to vote in favour of MOAs. The likelihood of supporting military deployments increases from 49 to 96 per cent across all the scale. Figure 23 describes instead the average marginal effect of position on the GAL/TAN dimension on support for troops deployments. It shows how the positive effect is stronger for lower values and then reduces going towards the TAN pole. It has to be noted that the effect is always significant ($p<0,01$). The histogram on the right side of figure 23 reports the absolute frequency distribution of the observation for the variable *Gal/Tan.* As expected, beside a gap between values 4 and 5, resemblances with the distribution on the left-right axis are remarkable.

Figure 22: Predictive margins for position on the GAL/TAN scale



Figure 23: Average marginal effects for position on the GAL/TAN scale (left) and frequency distribution of the variable Gal/Tan



Figure 24 describes the impact of presence in the governing majority on the probability to vote in favour of MOAs in parliament. Parties at the opposition are 56% likely to provide parliamentary support for military deployments. In other words, they are more likely vote in favour than not. This

remarks the generalized degree of consensus on this issue among Italian political elites. However, probability to vote in favour of MOAs jumps to 96% for parties being member of the governing coalitions. To sum up, parties in government almost always support the mission promoted by their own executive. This result underlines the remarkable cohesiveness of governing coalitions on this issue.

Figure 24: Predictive margins for presence in government



Interestingly, figure 25 shows the magnitude of this effect across parties distributed on the left-right axis. The red line describes the probability of voting in favour being at the government, while the blue line the probability of voting in favour being at the opposition. The red line is basically flat around the 100 per cent of the probability and only slightly bends for parties with low values on the left-right axis. The blue line is placed below and resembles the aforementioned curvilinear model. Two conclusions can be drawn from this plot. First, as just shown, presence in government has an overall consistent and positive effect on party likelihood to vote in favour of MOAs. Second, as expected, the effect of being at the government is stronger for extreme-right parties, which have the widest gap between the lines. At the opposition, these parties might be critical of MOAs but when they come to power, they always vote in favour. The difference is remarkable as these parties becomes twice or four times more likely to support MOAs. This pattern is in marked contrast with that of extreme left parties. Although their probability to vote in favour of a mission increases going at the government, these parties may still oppose it. Differences in secessionist and far right *Lega Nord* and communist parties' approach to the issue account for this result. While the former had an instrumental

opposition to MOAs, dissolving when being into power, the former rooted its criticism in an anti-militarist and pacifist culture, occasionally defying the governing whip.

Figure 25: predictive margins for presence in government conditioned to their position on the left-right axis



Figure 26 presents the positive and significant effect of law decrees on party support for MOAs. Probability of parties to vote in favour of a troop deployment increases from 61 to 77 per cent under this law-making procedure. As explained, this may be due to the peculiar nature of the bill that approves a decision already taken by the executive. If military troops are already deployed, political costs of voting against a military operation are presumed to increase. Furthermore, often concerning the re-funding of a number of small military operations, these debates on law decrees have received far less media attention in comparison to government's communications of key troops deployment. Therefore, parties feel less constraint by potential electoral costs of voting in favour deriving from a pacifist public opinion.

Figure 26: Predictive margins for votes through law decree



Finally, Figure 27 shows the impact of this effect across the left-right axis. The red line describes parliamentary support for law decrees, while the blue line describes parliamentary support for resolutions on government's communication. The red line is constantly above the blue line, albeit the confidence intervals often overlap. This means that, as demonstrated by the previous plot, probability of voting in favour of MOAs approved through law decrees is generally higher. Moreover, the gap between the lines is very small at the extreme-left side of the axis then it widens moving towards the centre and reaches the maximum around values between 7 and 8. As said, these values correspond to the most extreme right-wing parties in the dataset. This means that, as expected, the effect of law-making procedures is stronger for right-wing parties than for left-wing parties. However, the gap is not as wide as in the case of the impact of presence in the government. In fact, parties increase between 6 and 19 per cent their likelihood to vote in favour depending on the law-making procedure. Furthermore, as suggested, the confidence intervals overlap between 0 and 3 and again, between 8 and 10. Nevertheless, this could be interpreted as further evidence of divergency in the approach towards military operations between left-wing and right-wing parties. The fact that right-wing parties are more likely to vote in favour of MOAs when incentives are stronger and potential audience costs are lower may point out to an opportunistic contestation of troops deployments.

Figure 27: Predictive margins for law decree conditioned to the position on the left-right axis



Conclusions

In this chapter, employing a dataset based on all parliamentary votes occurred at the Chamber of Deputies between 1994 and 2013, I re-tested the hypotheses concerning the impact of ideological leaning and position in the government on party support for MOAs drafted in the previous chapter. Furthermore, I explored the role of different law-making procedures on the probability for parties to vote in favour of military operations in Italy. In addition, I assessed how incentives related to presence in government and law-making procedures differently affect parties' extent of supportiveness for MOAs, according to their location in the left-right axis.

The results obtained in the previous chapter are substantially confirmed. First, ideological leaning on the left-right axis had a significant impact on support for MOAs. In particular, in line with the curvilinear model found across various West European countries (Wagner et al. 2017), during the "Second Republic" centre-left and centre-right parties in Italy were significantly more likely to vote in favour of peace and security operations than extreme-left and extreme-right parties. However, parliamentary support was not the same at the two extremes of the axis: while extreme left-wing parties such as *Partito della Rifondazione Comunista* and *Partito dei Comunisti Italiani* present much lower levels of support with respect to centrist parties, the far right *Alleanza Nazionale* has almost

always voted in favour of MOAs and the populist *Lega Nord* was only slightly more critical[92]. Moreover, it is worth noting that parliamentary support for troop deployments was generally high. Most of the parties considered in this period have voted in favour of MOAs more times than those ones they voted against. In particular, *Democratici di Sinistra* (and its successive denominations) and *Forza Italia* (and *Popolo delle Libertà* in the last year of the time span of this work), the two main parties in the centre-left and centre-right coalitions respectively, present remarkable levels of support. These findings provide further empirical evidence in favour of an emerging broad and bipartisan consensus on MOAs in Italy after the end of the Cold War (Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). Secondly, as found by other cross-national studies (Wagner et al. 2017; 2018), position on the GAL/TAN scale is not as satisfactory as a predictor of support for MOAs. While in the previous chapter the effect of this dependent variable was negligibly small and not significant, in this chapter is positive and statistically significant. This contradiction suggests that positioning on the GAL/TAN scale is not a reliable explanatory variable for party support for MOAs in Italy. As also noted by Wagner et al. (2018), this depends on its high level of correlation with the left/right axis in West European countries. Thirdly, as found by Wagner et al. (2017; 2018) the presence of a party in the government is a very strong predictor of party support for MOAs. In Italy parties at the government cohesively supported the military operation promoted by the executive in parliament through their votes.

Importantly, this chapter has also shown that law-making procedures matter in explaining party support for MOAs. Literature on party politics of military interventions has consistently neglected the impact of this variable due to the high extent of variation between countries and the lack of variation within the same country. The fuzzy and ambiguous set of law-making procedures concerning MOAs in Italy allows to assess it. As expected, troops deployment approved or renewed through law decrees have garnered a generally higher extent of party support. In other words, this law-making procedure produced a series of incentives that increased the propensity of parties to vote in favour of troops deployments for peace and security operations. Establishing separate votes for (groups) of missions, the newly introduced law-making procedure should bring more contested and partisan votes in parliament, decreasing the overall level of support for MOAs in Italy. However, with just three occurrences of voting under this new procedure (2017, 2018, 2019), there is not enough evidence to provide empirical foundations for this argument. Further research should evaluate the impact of this new law-making procedure on party support for troop deployments.

[92] For an analysis of the differences in the foreign policy approach of these two far right parties see Tarchi (2007).

Finally, this chapter has tested whether incentives deriving from presence in the government and the law-making procedure have a different impact on parties' support for MOAs, according to their ideological leaning. As expected, presence at the government and votes through law decrees had a stronger impact on (extreme) right parties' probability to vote in favour of MOAs than on (extreme) left-wing parties' probability to vote in favour. This finding suggests how party contestation of military interventions may have both an ideological and instrumental dimension. Strongly pacifist parties were not as likely to change their voting behaviour, moving from opposition to government. To the contrary, not consider this issue as particularly salient, extreme right-wing parties placed the stability of the executive before their disagreement on military operations, dramatically changing their voting patterns. Previous studies have already emphasized the deep presence of a pacifist ideology among Italian post-Marxist parties such as RC and PdCI (Calossi et al. 2013) and, conversely, *Lega Nord*'s relative lack of interest for military interventions (Verbeek and Zaslove 2013). In the next chapter, I will further demonstrate divergencies in the approach to military deployments among extreme parties, by comparing the behaviour of pacifist left-wing parties *Partito dei Comunisti Italiani* and *Federazione dei Verdi* and *Lega Nord* as junior coalition partners during Kosovo and Libyan crises respectively.

Chapter 4
Junior coalition partners, Military Operations Abroad and government stability: The cases of Kosovo and Libya

Introduction

In the previous chapters, through the quantitative analysis of parliamentary speeches and votes, I have empirically demonstrated that, during the so-called "Second Republic", party support for MOAs followed a curvilinear distribution across the left-right axis. In other words, centre-left and centre-right parties were more in favour of troops deployments outside national borders than extreme left and right parties.

As said, between 1994 and 2013, centre-left and centre-right coalitions alternated in power in Italy (Bardi 2007; D'Alimonte and Bartolini 2007; Verzichelli and Cotta 2000). Therefore, parties with substantially different positions on MOAs found themselves always in government together as coalition partners. Looking back at the analysis of parliamentary votes (Figure 18), divergences in the centre-left coalition were considerable. While the social democrats (PDS-DS-PD) and the leftist Christian democrats (*PPI-La Margherita*) generally favoured Italy's participation in peace and security operations, the Greens (*Federazione dei Verdi)* and the two communist parties (*Partito della Rifondazione Comunista e Partito dei Comunisti Italiani*) showed the highest level of contestation among all parties taken into account. Positions were not as distant within the centre-right coalition, but fundamental disagreements existed anyway. While Berlusconi's conservative party *Forza Italia,* the rightist Christian democrats *Unione di Centro*, and the post-fascist *Alleanza Nazionale* were the more consistent supporters of Italian contribution to military interventions, *Lega Nord* adopted a more sceptical position.

Given these markedly divergent points of views and the number of military operations in which successive Italian executives had to decide whether participating or not, it is surprising that a government never collapsed on this issue[93]. This chapter aims to explain this outcome (or lack

[93] This is more so considered that Italy is often quoted as a paradigmatic case of government instability. During its history as a Republic, it scored the highest rate of government change in Western Europe. The average duration of a cabinet is

thereof), taking the perspective of extreme coalition partners that are sceptical of military interventions. In other words, it addresses the question: why did extreme junior partners remain in government despite the decision to participate in a military operation? As underlined in Chapter 1, literature on coalition politics has mostly focused on the effects of coalition politics on foreign policymaking and foreign policy outcomes rather than the effect of foreign policy decisions on cabinets' stability (Kaarbo and Beasley 2008; Oktay 2014; Oppermann and Brummer 2014). Existing empirical evidence suggest that cabinets seldom fall on foreign policy. However, mechanisms to explain junior partner's loyalty to the government in such situations have never been thoroughly grasped. Kaarbo (2012) claimed that loyalty towards the coalition government depends on junior partner's generic political calculations related to office-seeking and vote-seeking objectives (Strøm 1990; Muller and Strøm 1999). Analysing the case of pacifist extreme left parties and military operations in Italy, Coticchia and Davidson (2019) underlined, among other factors, the crucial role of (the lack of) salience attributed to the issue[94].

Extending this work, I decided to qualitatively analyse and compare two cases of disagreements within Italian cabinets on relevant MOAs that did not trigger the end of the cabinet: Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011). The multilateral bombing campaign in Kosovo, aimed at stopping the violence perpetrated by Serbian armed forces and forcing Slobodan Milosevic to come back on the negotiating table, was heavily contested by extreme-left and pacifist parties within the centre-left coalition, *Partito dei Comunisti Italiani* (PdCI) and *Federazione dei Verdi* (FdV)[95]. The decision to participate in the air strikes against Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, who had brutally repressed public protest against him, angered instead the far-right and autonomist *Lega Nord* (LN), at the time junior partner within the centre-right coalition[96]. In both cases, extreme junior partners stayed in government,

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also well below the average (Curini and Pinto 2017; Müller and Strøm 2003). Coalition conflicts have been a prominent source of government termination (Damgaard 2008).

[94] To the contrary, studies on government termination have demonstrated that salient economic events such as rising inflation and unemployment decrease the cabinet's likelihood to survive (Saalfeld 2008; Warwick 1994). These elements were also crucial in Italy during the Second Republic (Curini and Pinto 2017). For a review on government termination see Laver (2003).

[95] On the NATO's intervention in Kosovo see Daalder and O'Hanlon (2000); Kuperman (2008). For the Italian military participation and the political debate on it see Coticchia (2011); Davidson (2011); Gasparini (2000); Greco (2000); Ignazi et al. (2012).

[96] On the intervention in Libya see Colombo and Varvelli (2012); Engelbrekt et al. (2014); Kuperman (2013). For the Italian military participation and the political debate on it see Coticchia (2011); Ignazi et al. (2012); Croci and Valigi (2013).

despite Italy's substantial involvement in the respective military interventions. In other words, the two cases present themselves as similar in terms of mission's features and outcome for the cabinet's stability. The element of variation consists in the diverging ideological leaning of the two junior partners: PdCI and Greens are located at the extreme-left side of the left-right axis, while LN is placed at the extreme right. Analysing the reasons underlying the permanence in government of these junior partners can potentially shed light on different approaches to contestation of MOAs among extreme parties. In particular, salience attributed to foreign and security policy and fear of being blamed as irresponsible coalition partner are expected to have a prominent role in shaping party behaviour.

This chapter is structured as follows. First, I sketch out two hypotheses concerning potential mechanisms pushing extreme junior partners to remain in government, in spite of a disliked foreign policy outcome. Secondly, I outline the research design, highlighting the criteria employed for the case selection. Thirdly, I describe the qualitative data collected for the analysis. Fourthly, I analyse the empirical material, explaining junior partner's loyalty to the government. Finally, in the conclusions, I discuss my main findings and their implications for the study of the party politics of military interventions in Italy and abroad.

Hypotheses

In line with the literature on coalition politics and foreign policy reviewed in Chapter 1, I hypothesize two elements underlying junior partner's decision to stay in government despite a disliked foreign policy outcome, and in the specific case, the decision to participate in a MOA: low salience attributed to the issue and fear of being blamed by voters for the collapse of the cabinet. These two explanations are neither exclusive nor exhaustive: they may verify in conjunction and be complemented by other factors. However, they represent useful insights in explaining the phenomenon under investigation.

Salience refers to the importance attributed by a political actor such as parties, individual legislators or even voters to a specific policy issue. In particular, parties can consider a policy issue as more or less relevant, responding to a series of factors such as the preferences of their own voters or the more general electorate, their domestic organization or their position in the party system (Ezrow et al. 2010; Kluver and Spoon 2016; Wagner and Meyer 2014). Various studies on coalition politics and foreign policy hypothesized salience to have a decisive an impact on junior partner influence in the decision-making process and the final policy outcome (Coticchia and Davidson 2018; Greene 2019; Kaarbo 1996; Ozkececi-Taner 2005). In these works, salience has often been conceptualized in relative rather

than absolute sense. In other words, junior and senior partner were compared in terms of how much importance they attribute to a specific policy issue. Kaarbo (1996, 513) argued that "how salient is an issue to both the junior and senior party policy objectives may affect junior party influence". If the junior partner considers a certain foreign policy issue as more salient than the senior partner does, it is expected to exercise more influence in the decision-making process than not.

The mechanisms underlying this hypothesis is that in such a situation the junior partner will engage in stronger and more consistent efforts to affect the decision-making process if they consider a foreign policy issue as salient (Kaarbo 1996). To put it bluntly, higher salience leads to more aggressive strategies of influence, including the threat to leave the cabinet. This is also because an extreme junior partner perceives that their own voters may punish it at the elections if it does not respond to their priorities when in government. To the contrary, in cases in which the salience is lower, a junior partner is not presumed to be as committed to influence the foreign policy outcome. With regards to the behaviour of extreme-left junior partners in Italy on MOAs, Coticchia and Davidson (2018, 5) claimed that "when military operations are a low salience issue relative to other issues for the critical radical party, we expect the party to refrain from threatening collapse even when it is opposed to the coalition's policy". This also depends on the fact that little electoral costs are attached to such policy.

Given this discussion, the salience hypothesis has obvious implications for junior partner's decision to remain in government, in spite of a disliked foreign policy outcome. Low salience attributed to a foreign policy issue is presumed to increase extreme junior partner's likelihood to stay in power. With regards to the object of this research, Italian political parties and MOAs, such scenario is even more likely. In fact, several studies have demonstrated how security and defence policy has been marginalized in the political and public debate, thereby decreasing its salience (Coticchia 2011; 2014; Ignazi et al. 2012).

H9: low salience attributed to the MOAs increase junior partner's propensity to stay in government

In the previous discussion, it is assumed that voters could punish junior partners on the basis of the implementation of certain foreign policy, according to its salience. However, voters may highly value the stability of the government *per se*. More durable governments are thought to have more time to implement their policies and, consequently, being more effective than less durable governments. Instability in government is also perceived negatively with regards to the capacity to produce solid economic performance (Alesina et al. 1996). This may lead the median voter to punish a junior partner

for making the government collapse due to a disliked foreign policy decision. In bipolar and highly ideologically polarized party system, even extreme parties' voters may prefer stability over a foreign policy outcome in line with their views. In fact, the collapse of the cabinet may lead to the rise to power of a new cabinet which is very distant from their ideological preferences. As Coticchia and Davidson (2018, 5) with respect to the Italian case, "In a bipolar political system (one with alternating left/right governments) it is likely to expect a centre-left government collapse to result in a subsequent election victory for the centre-right". In fact, as said, centre-left and centre-right coalition cabinets alternated in power during the "Second Republic" (Cotta and Verzichelli 2016; D'Alimonte and Bartolini 2007). Therefore, extreme junior partners are expected to be concerned about taking the blame for making the government fall and paving the way for the coming to power of the rival coalition. This mechanism acts as an incentive for not leaving the cabinet.

H10: fear of being blamed as irresponsible by the electorate increase junior partner's propensity to stay in government

The two mechanisms are presumed to manifest in various ways. The (lack of) salience hypothesis (H9) is expected to emerge through scarce interest in the specific foreign policy or inconsistent efforts to steer foreign policy towards a different direction. Junior partners showing less commitment in their opposition to the specific MOA are presumed to consider the whole issue as not very salient. Furthermore, the manner in which junior partner frame their contestation may be revealing about the extent salience they attribute to military interventions. Instrumental criticism concerning side effects of the foreign policy may also be revealing of a low extent of salience. The blame hypothesis (H10) regarding the perception of being labelled as unreliable government partners by voters is supposed to emerge by statements justifying their decision not to defect on the basis of such reasoning. It may also emerge from the lack of willingness to leave the cabinet, disregarding the issue of conflict with the senior partner.

Case selection: military operations in Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011)

With the exception of Coticchia and Davidson (2019), there are no studies on the role of junior partners on MOAs in Italy[97]. Analysing the behaviour of extreme left parties on military operation in Albania, Kosovo and Afghanistan, they found that the two aforementioned mechanism are crucial to

[97] Verbeek and Zaslove (2015) analysed the *Lega Nord's* foreign policy approach. This party was invariably the junior coalition partner in the centre-right coalition governments during the Second Republic.

explain their reluctance to bring the government down. This chapter aims at extending this research by comparing two cases of coalition conflicts on military operations abroad during the so-called "Second Republic": the disagreement between *Partito dei Comunisti Italiani* (PdCI) and *Federazione dei Verdi* (FdV or Greens) and the rest of the cabinet concerning the operation Allied Force in Kosovo (1999) and *Lega Nord's* (LN) contestation of Italian government participation in the operation Unified Protector in Libya (2011)[98].

The choice of these two cases is based on three criteria. First, the two military interventions present remarkable similarities in terms of scopes, (partially) chain of command and means. Both Operation Allied Force (OAF) and Operation Unified Protector (OUP) had as their official goal the protection of civilians from acts of violence committed perpetrated by two authoritarian regimes. In Kosovo, in the context of a civil war for the independence of the region, Serbian armed forces were responsible for thousands of deliberate killings among the Albanian ethnic minority[99]. In Libya, militaries repressed public protest against the regime in a brutal way and successively engaged in an armed conflict against rebels in the country[100]. Therefore, the so-called doctrine of "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) was employed to justify the use of force in these two interventions[101]. As Bellamy (2009b) argued, the debate over the legitimacy of OAF paved the way for the development of this doctrine. OUP is instead widely considered an example of application of R2P in practice (Patrick 2011). Both interventions were also conducted under the supervision of NATO. However, it must be noted that initially, the intervention in Libya was led by a coalition of states including United States, France and United Kingdom. Following the approval of a United Nation Security Council Resolution 1973, on March 18, 2011, various countries deployed their military forces to implement a no-fly zone in Libya against the Gaddafi regime, in a mission called "Odyssey Dawn". A few days later, the command of the operation shifted to NATO, taking the name of "Unified Protector". Finally, both these missions consisted in air strikes. In a little more than three months, over 10000 strikes sorties were done for OAF, while in seven months 9700 were done for OUP[102]. Italy actively participated in the bombings in both cases (Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). According to Coticchia (2011), the national contribution to OAF was second only to the American one. In total, 50 Italian warplanes

[98] Various studies on Italian foreign policy compared the cases of Kosovo and Libya. See for instance Carati and Locatelli (2017); Miranda (2011).

[99] For a description of the massacres committed by the Serbian forces see Roberts (1999). For a critical discussion of the moral hazard entailed in the intervention see Kuperman (2008).

[100] For a critical account of the Libyan regime's acts of violence and the effects of the interventions see Kuperman (2013).

[101] For an overview on the development and the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect see Bellamy (2009a).

[102] For more information on OAF and OUP see the reports of the missions on the NATO website.

were involved in the air strikes in Kosovo, for 1300 sorties (Coticchia 2011). Italy's contribution in OUP was significant as well. Italian air forces flied on the Libyan skies for up to 7300 hours in total, conducting almost 500 bombing mission. Only United States, United Kingdom and France were more involved in the NATO operation in Libya.

Secondly, as suggested, junior coalition partners with completely different ideological leanings contested these two interventions. In the case of OAF, the communist *Partito dei Comunisti Italiani* (PdCI) and the Green *Federazione dei Verdi* (FdV) were strongly against the military intervention and, consequently, Italy's contribution to it. Both these parties shared a broadly pacifist approach to foreign and security policy. PdCI also rooted its scepticism towards the intervention in its anti-American attitude, and, conversely, a close relationship with the Serbian leadership. In the case of OUP, the far right and autonomist *Lega Nord* (LN) heavily criticized the decision to meddle in the Libyan civil war. Such criticism was mainly based on the fear that the collapse of the Gaddafi regime would have led to an increase in the influx of illegal migrants to Italy.

These parties were junior partners in the two coalitions that alternated in in government in Italy during this period. Participation in OAF was in fact promoted by a centre-left cabinet led by Massimo D'Alema, a prominent figure inside the senior partner *Democratici di Sinistra*, and composed by up to eight parties in total, bringing together former Christian democrat and communists. Contribution to OUP was instead decided by a centre-right coalition government, led by Silvio Berlusconi, and composed only of two parties: the conservative *Popolo della Libertà* (PdL) and *Lega Nord* indeed[103]. Notably, in both cases, junior partners were pivotal for the survival of the cabinet. Without the combined support of both PdCI and FdV, D'Alema centre-left cabinet would have lost its parliamentary majority in the Chamber of Deputies. LN could exercise an equally strong hijacking power on Berlusconi's centre-right cabinet. It is also worth noting that none of these junior partners held key cabinet portfolios, namely foreign affairs and defence, in both cases. During the Kosovo crisis, the liberal Lamberto Dini and the Christian democrat Carlo Scognamiglio were minister of foreign affairs and defence respectively. During the Libyan crisis, both the ministers of foreign affairs and defence, Franco Frattini and Ignazio La Russa, were affiliated to the senior partner PdL. As noted in Chapter 1, in institutional settings in which the model of ministerial government (Laver and Shepsle 2004) prevails, holding a relevant portfolio may increase junior partner's influence on foreign policy (Oppermann and Brummer 2014). Given this, the lack of influence should not come as a

[103] For a description of the composition of these two cabinets see the Appendix.

surprise. At the lower level of undersecretaries, among the three junior partners in the two cases considered, only PdCI owned a post at the defence during the Kosovo crisis.

Finally, as already suggested, the cases present similar developments in the conflict within Italian coalition governments and an identical outcome for the survival of the two cabinets. In fact, junior partners did not eventually defect, making the government collapse. After the end of OAF in Kosovo in June 1999, the first centre-left D'Alema government survived for a few more months and, eventually, had to resign because of the defection of a couple of small centrist parties, *Cristiani Democratici Uniti* and *Unione Democratica per la Repubblica*[104]. Little after the end of OUP, in November 2011, the fourth centre-right Berlusconi's coalition government collapsed in the face of a dramatic debt crisis (Jones 2012). To sum up, the coalition conflicts over participation in multilateral interventions in Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011 did not provoke the termination of the government, as extreme parties decided to contest this policy but remained in the cabinet.

Therefore, this case selection is based on the criteria of most similar cases in terms of dependent variable (Seawright and Gerring 2008). In fact, as explained, the two cases present a similar outcome in the sense that the junior partner decided not to leave the government. However, at the same time, the two cases differ completely in terms of junior partner's ideological leaning. This element allows to see how our hypothesized independent variable – salience attributed to military interventions and fear of being blamed as an irresponsible coalition partner – had a varying impact on the decision to remain in government, according to the position on the left-right axis of the junior partner involved.

Data and methods

In order to investigate dynamics leading to the permanence at the government, I rely on qualitative data such as interviews with relevant policymakers, memoirs of members of the cabinet, relevant debates in parliament and newspaper articles. Interviews deserve particular attention as they are an original source of data[105]. In total, I conducted thirteen interviews, seven for the case of Kosovo and six for the case of Libya. I tried to interview representatives within the cabinet and the parliament belonging to both the senior partners and the junior partners to better triangulate the answers. For example, in the case of Kosovo, I interviewed three representatives of PdCI, further three of the greens

[104] "Finisce il D'Alema I", *La Repubblica,* 19/12/1999.

[105] For an overview of how to conduct interviews in social science see Della Porta (2014). Aberbach and Rockman (2002) also provide insights about the use of elite interviews in political science.

and one for *Democratici di Sinistra*, the senior partner. Instead in the case of Libya, I interviewed three representatives of LN and three for *Forza Italia,* the senior partner[106]. Interviews with junior partners' policymakers were useful to uncover the beliefs and perceptions within the parties. In fact, to some extent, both the hypotheses are linked to perceptions about the salience of the issue and the potential electoral costs deriving from leaving the government. Interviews with senior partner's policymakers were employed also as a mean to triangulate and assess if they shared the same impressions. Newspaper articles and parliamentary debates complemented the interviews, providing further empirical material for the reconstruction of the events and the analysis. Newspaper articles were retrieved through the platform *Lexis Nexis.* Newspaper articles come from the three most-read Italian newspapers: *La Repubblica, La Stampa* e *Il Corriere della Sera.* Parliamentary debates were retrieved from the websites of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.

Empirical findings

Through the employment of interviews, reports of the parliamentary debates and other sources, it is possible to provide an explanation of why junior coalition partners in these two cases stayed in the coalition government, despite the decision to participate in military interventions. As noted, two dynamics are expected to emerge, providing incentives for junior partners not to defect: low salience with respect to other issues *(H9)* and fear of being blamed as responsible by voters for the end of the government and the return to power of a more ideologically distant cabinet *(H10).*

Kosovo

Participation in MOAs proved a contentious issue within the centre-left coalition even before the beginning of the Kosovo began. In fact, only a couple of years before, on April 9, 1997 the communist party *Partito della Rifondazione Comunista* (PRC), providing essential external support for the survival of the centre-left cabinet, led at the time by Romano Prodi, voted against Operation Alba, a mission aimed at restoring security and holding free elections in the near Albania. The mission was approved only thanks to the support of the centre-right opposition parties with the exception of *Lega Nord*[107]. However, a couple of days later, PRC returned to the ranks, guaranteeing its votes for the cabinet in a confidence vote. This event is relevant for the explanation of why extreme left and pacifist

[106] The interviewees preferred to stay anonymous. For this reason, I referred to them by party affiliation in the text and number in the notes. For an overview of all the interviews see the Appendix.

[107] Resoconto Stenografico n.177, Camera dei Deputati, 9/4/1997.

parties did not leave the cabinet despite the decision to participate in the air strikes in Kosovo in 1999 for two reasons. First, it shows the high extent of salience attributed by communists to the issue. Second, it highlights the emergence of a bipartisan consensus and cooperation between the main centre-left and centre-right parties, fostering extreme-left parties to remain to be able of shifting Italy towards a more dovish position.

The split within PRC provoking the collapse of the Prodi cabinet and the formation of a new centre-left cabinet is also a crucial event to understand why junior coalition partners stayed in the government despite the decision to contribute to the intervention in Kosovo. In Autumn 1998, a rift within PRC opened between the two main exponents of the party, secretary Fausto Bertinotti and president Armando Cossutta. Disagreeing with the budgetary law proposed by the executive, Bertinotti wanted to withdraw the party's parliamentary support. Cossutta was instead strongly against such move. On October 9, this division resulted in a crucial parliamentary defeat for the centre-left cabinet, which definitively terminated[108]. Cossutta resigned as PRC president and with his followers founded a new party called *Partito dei Comunisti Italiani* (PdCI). A few days later, the newly born PdCI joined a new centre-left government led by Massimo D'Alema, together with a number of other small parties, including the green *Federazione dei Verdi* (FdV). Taking part in the new cabinet, PdCI and FdV demonstrated to highly value permanence in power of a centre-left cabinet in a context of a bipolar competition against Berlusconi's centre-right. Therefore, these parties were highly motivated to act as responsible junior partners. The communists felt this moral obligation more deeply as they had split from the rest of PRC in order to keep on supporting the government. "The government had been in power not for long and we made a split from PRC to form it. Therefore, the willingness to look as responsible actors prevailed"[109], a PdCI MP adimtted. "I never had the feeling that they would leave the government. Not because they cared about the offices. But due to a matter of credibility and political culture"[110], a DS MP said. This does not mean that the Greens were not concerned about the stability of the government *per se*. "Leaving the government would have led to new elections that the centre-left would have risked losing", the same MP continued[111].

It is worth pointing out how these two parties were both in principle against the NATO military intervention in Kosovo and heavily contested Italian contribution to it, thereby demonstrating to

[108] "E Prodi scopre di aver perso soltanto all'ultimo voto", *La Repubblica,* 10/10/1998.

[109] Interviewee 2.

[110] Interviewee 7.

[111] Interviewee 6.

attach a high extent of salience to the issue. Junior partners' contestation started even before OAF had begun. In fact, both PdCI and FdV immediately criticized the Prodi government decision to sign the NATO activation order on October 12, 1998, supporting the use of force to solve the crisis and granting the use of Italian military bases to the allies[112]. Cossutta defined it as "a mistake"[113]. In the following months, as the situation in the area significantly worsened[114], the hypothesis of a NATO military intervention to protect the civilians became increasingly concrete, further exposing frictions in the new centre-left cabinet. In fact, while Prime Minister D'Alema reaffirmed Italy's loyalty to NATO[115], Cossutta claimed that its party "was against the use of Italian military bases and a military intervention in Kosovo"[116]. At the eve of the intervention, FdV leader and senator Luigi Manconi argued that divergencies existed within the cabinet and that its party disagreed with the prevailing "blind obedience towards the Atlantic alliance"[117]. Predictably, the beginning of the air strikes on 24 March 1999 and the Italian decision to provide a substantial contribution further augmented junior partners' extent of dissent. A few days later, Cossutta and Manconi released a joint statement asking the executive to "publicly condemn" the bombing campaign[118]. Furthermore, Oliviero Diliberto, a key PdCI exponent and Minister of Justice in the cabinet, viewed in the intervention an American attack against the acceleration in the European integration process[119]. Notably, while PdCI cohesively opposed the NATO operation, FdV was more divided. In fact, following a humanitarian approach to foreign policy and the interventionist stance of its German counterpart, a fraction of the party supported the Operation Allied Force as it aimed to protect the lives of civilians in Kosovo. "Some of the party activists were not against the NATO intervention"[120], a Green MP affirmed. "Within the party, some argued that when a humanitarian disaster occurs, just watching is not the right thing to do", another one added[121]. Lack of cohesion on the issue further decreased this party's propensity to defect.

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[112] "L'Italia concede l'uso delle basi Nato", *La Repubblica,* 12/10/1998.

[113] "Dal Governo sì all'uso delle basi. Cossutta e Verdi non ci stanno", *La Repubblica,* 13/10/1998.

[114] "Kosovo, esecuzione di massa", La Repubblica, 17/1/1999.

[115] "D'Alema: L'Italia a fianco della NATO", *La Repubblica,* 19/1/1999.

[116] "Diciamo no alle bombe: Cossutta frena D'Alema", *La Repubblica*, 20/1/1999.

[117] "Voglio fermare gli aerei, non l'azione di governo", *La Repubblica,* 24/3/1999.

[118] "Cossutta: subito tregua. D'Alema: fedeli alla NATO", *La Repubblica,* 1/4/1999.

[119] "Clinton ha voluto le bombe per fermare l'Europa", *La Repubblica,* 6/4/1999.

[120] Interviewee 6.

[121] Interviewee 5.

As a further evidence of the high extent of salience attributed to this issue, during three-months of air strikes, PdCI and FdV were sincerely determined to steer the position of Italy towards a dovish direction. "Our goal was to push the Italian government to find a negotiated peace to the conflict and not let it end with a military victory. This what we lobbied for[122]", a PdCI MP said. "We insisted that the Italian government had to work for a restart of negotiations between the two parties", another PdCI MP confirmed[123]. "We decided to stay in the government and try to make an effort to push the government to give priority to a diplomatic solution within the international community" a Green MP stated[124]. Rumours regarding a possible "war cabinet" between the centre-left and centre-right further encouraged junior partners not to defect[125]. They were afraid that such development would have pushed Italy towards a more hawkish position as centre-right parties were even ready to support a ground invasion[126]. "If we had left, a new government supported by centre-right parties would have formed. We all thought that a war cabinet would have followed"[127], a PdCI MP said. "Cossutta was in two minds between the belief that a new government with the centre-right could have formed and consistency with its ideological beliefs" the then Minister of Defence Scognamiglio wrote in his memoirs[128]. "Within the party several positions coexisted about whether to stay in the government. In my opinion, the strongest argument for staying was that that the fall of the government would provoke a shift towards an even more aggressive stance", a green MP said[129].

In order to steer the position of the cabinet towards a more dovish direction, thereby demonstrating to attach salience to the opposition to intervention, these parties employed two instruments. First, they made use of parliament's monitoring and scrutinizing powers. For example, right after the beginning of the mission, PdCI and FdV called for a parliamentary debate on the issue[130]. The more pacifist positions in the cabinet strongly affected the tone of Prime Minister's speech and the wording of the governing parties' common resolution. On April 26, referring before the Chamber of Deputies, D'Alema emphasized that the military forces' duties would be restricted to "the integrated defence" (Camera dei Deputati 1999, 9), meaning that Italian jets would not target Serbian cities. The

[122] Interviewee 1.

[123] Interviewee 3

[124] Interviewee 4.

[125] "Governo per la guerra? D'Alema non lo esclude", *La Repubblica*, 22/4/1999.

[126] "Troppi dubbi sul ruolo USA: dal governo altolà a Dini", *La Repubblica*, 22/4/1999.

[127] Interviewee 1.

[128] Scognamiglio (2002, 128).

[129] Interviewee 5.

[130] "D'Alema: non temo la crisi, l'Italia farà la sua parte", *La Repubblica*, 24/1/1999

resolution "committed the executive to push NATO allies to stop the bombings and restart the diplomatic activities"[131]. On April 13, the Parliament debated the issue once again while also approving the participation of Italy in the humanitarian mission Allied Harbour, aimed at providing aid and shelter to the refugees from Kosovo. Partly thanks to the efforts of PdCI and FdV, the shared motion explicitly denied any intervention on the ground[132]. In the last key parliamentary debate, on May 19, under the pressure of the most pacifist parties, D'Alema indicated a road map for the suspension of the bombings[133]. Furthermore, junior partners extensively employed parliamentary questions to monitor the cabinet on the issue. For example, on May 4, Tullio Grimaldi, a PdCI MP, urged the executive to rule out that "the presence of Italian troops on the ground means a future deployment in an armed attack"[134]. With a marked environmentalist connotation, the greens also used this instrument. In particular, they repeatedly expressed concerns about the environmental damage of bombs discharged by warplanes on the Mediterranean Sea. They also once called the government to "commit for a suspension of the bombings"[135]

Secondly, manifesting salience for the issue, junior partners increased their pressure on the government through threats and symbolic actions. For instance, PdCI threatened to withdraw its minister if the Italian government did not insist for a ceasefire in the region during Easter[136]. In addition, both parties engaged in autonomous diplomatic missions to talk with the parties involved in the conflict. Cossutta's travel in the beginning of April received a lot of media attention. Using its contacts with other communist countries embarked in a diplomatic mission, the PdCI leader visited first Moscow and then Belgrade, concluding that "Milosevic was ready for a compromise"[137]. "We were in favour of the peace. We suggested that the government should keep an open channel with Milosevic. Cossutta's travel to convince Milosevic to stop its actions was also very symbolic in this sense", a PdCI MP argued[138]. A few FdV exponents also went to the area to mediate as well. "Other members of the parliamentary group and I went to Serbia and Albania to convince the two parties in conflict", a Green MP stated[139].

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[131] Resoconto Stenografico n.513, Camera dei Deputati, 26/3/1999.

[132] Resoconto Stenografico n.518, Camera dei Deputati, 13/4/1999.

[133] Resoconto Stenografico n. 537, Camera dei Deputati, 19/5/1999.

[134] Resoconto Stenografico n.531, Camera dei Deputati, 4/5/1999.

[135] Resoconto Stenografico n.533, Camera dei Deputati, 6/5/1999.

[136] "Dimissioni senza crisi. Cossutta ritira i ministri", La Repubblica, 2/4/1999

[137]"Cossutta: Milosevic pronto a trattare", *La Repubblica*, 10/4/1999

[138] Interviewee 2.

[139] Interviewee 4.

Libya

The events unfolding in Italian politics in the second half of 2010 are extremely relevant to analyse *Lega Nord*'s decision to remain in the cabinet. At July 30, the tension between Silvio Berlusconi and Gianfranco Fini, the leaders of the two parties that merged to form *Popolo della Libertà*, the senior coalition partner, erupted in the departure of the latter, who established its own parliamentary group, called *Futuro e Libertà* (Fli)[140]. Consequently, the centre-right cabinet, led by Berlusconi, lost its parliamentary majority and had to rely on Fli's support in order to survive. Despite passing a key confidence vote at the end of September[141], the collapse of the government seemed very near. LN was particularly pessimistic concerning the capacity of such a cabinet to approve relevant bill such as the one concerning the devolution of more autonomy to Italian regions and started to call for new elections. On October 17, LN's picturesque leader, Umberto Bossi, said that "if bills sometimes fail to pass, we have to go to ballots"[142]. Following the withdrawal from the cabinet of five ministers affiliated to Fli in November[143], Bossi added that "If you cannot govern, you have to go to polls. And you cannot govern with a margin of only one vote in parliament"[144]. A senior partner MP confirmed that LN was not very concerned about the termination of the cabinet. "Lega Nord had already asked to go to new elections in the end of 2010, when Fini decided to defect from the government", he said. This can be interpreted as an evidence that they did not care much about the stability of the cabinet. At a point, Berlusconi even suggested that LN was ready to take the responsibility to make the government collapse[145]. Therefore, it seems that they did not fear to take the blame from their voters for bringing the government down in a situation in which they could not deliver on their key policies.

The Libyan crisis, prompted by brutal repression of public protest by the Gaddafi regime in February 2011, presented as a significantly thorny issue for the Italian government. Only a couple of years before, culminating a long strategy of rapprochement with the former colony, Berlusconi had signed a treaty of friendship with Libya. The treaty with Gaddafi concerned Italian investments in the energetic sector and measures to contain the influx of illegal migrants from Libyan coasts to Italy. Given this, Berlusconi's reaction to the crisis was extremely cautious"[146]. However, as attacks against

[140] "Fini: Berlusconi illiberale. Alla Camera nasce Futuro e Libertà", *La Repubblica*, 30/7/2010.

[141] "Il cavaliere non vuole farsi sfibrare. Ormai le elezioni sono inevitabili", *La Repubblica*, 30/9/2010.

[142] "Bossi rilancia sul voto. Sono scettico sul vertice a tre", *La Repubblica*, 17/10/2010.

[143] "Via i finiani dal governo. È crisi", *La Repubblica*, 16/11/2010.

[144] "Bossi già punta a tornare al voto", *La Repubblica*, 13/12/2010.

[145] "Il cavaliere e il diktat di Bossi: O si vota o staccherà lui la spina", *La Repubblica*, 26/11/2010.

[146] "Libia: la repressione fa più di cento morti. Berlusconi: "Non disturbo Gheddafi", *La Repubblica*, 19/2/2011.

civilians intensified and international pressure mounted, the Italian government was forced to take a more critical position, adhering to sanctions against the regime. Notwithstanding Italy's diplomatic efforts, a Western military intervention in Libya became more likely day after day. As much as Berlusconi, LN disliked such prospect. On March 8, Roberto Maroni, prominent LN exponent and Minister of Home Affairs, warned about "not leaving the country in the hand of terrorists like Afghanistan" and asked for help from other European countries to share the burden of migrants according to a quota system[147]. It is worth noting how the opposition to the possible intervention in Libya was coupled with concerns regarding the increase in illegal immigration towards Italy. Therefore, LN attributed salience to the issue as it was linked to another key issue in their agenda, i.e. border controls. The interviews make this contradiction emerge clearly. On the one hand, an isolationist foreign policy approach comes up. "If you send a bomb, then it comes back at you. The terrorism that we experience is caused by our own past interventions. I would like to see no military interventions at all. Unless they occur under well-defined circumstances", a LN MP stated[148]. "It is evident that military interventions are an enormous waste of human and economic resources", another one added[149]. On the other hand, another MP claimed that "We had the issue of migrants and it was important to solve it"[150]. "They were concerned about the consequences of the interventions. They thought that Gaddafi would open the tap of migrants", a senior partner exponent said.[151]

Completing its half-hearted turnaround, Italy decided to support the no fly-zone on Libya and provided the use of its strategic military bases for the military operation. A rift emerged within the cabinet as LN openly criticized the mission and Italian government's position. Three days later, Bossi defined the intervention as an "Anglo-French plot to steal the oil and gas from Italy and let our country be invaded by millions of migrants, escaping from the war"[152]. It is evident that condemnation for the military operation went hand in hand with the issue of migration and the competition for the control of energetic resources in Libya. The cabinet's decision to actively participate in a new NATO-led operation called "Unified Protector" on April 25 further raised the tone of LN's contestation. Bossi argued that "Italy was going to be invaded by millions of migrants"[153] and pointed out also that the

[147] "Obama e la NATO verso opzione militare. Al Jazeera: Gheddafi ha offerto dimissioni", *La Repubblica*, 7/3/2011.

[148] Interviewee 12.

[149] Interviewee 13.

[150] Interviewee 11.

[151] Interviewee 10.

[152]"Bossi", *La Repubblica*, 20/3/2011.

[153] "Berlusconi, colpiremo solo obbiettivi militari. L'ira di Bossi: Siamo una colonia francese", *La Repubblica*, 26/4/2011.

Italian contribution was too expensive and that it would have led to an increase in taxes. Salience was again placed on the domestic consequences of the intervention, rather than the intervention itself. The limited relevance attributed to opposition to intervention in Libya could also be inferred by the fact that, after been given a hypothetical date of the end of Italian contribution in May, LN stopped contesting it. However, the air strikes continued until the end of October, when Gaddafi was killed by rebels on the ground. A LN MP summed very well the lack of salience for such issues: "The party was absent in foreign policy. Our leader rarely spoke about it"[154].

LN instead made considerable efforts to steer the government's decision towards a more dovish direction, through the use of parliamentary instruments, threats and symbolic cations. On March 19, the junior partner deserted the meeting of the parliament's foreign affairs committee in which Franco Minister of Foreign Affairs Frattini announced the decision to concede the military bases to the allies[155]. A LN interviewee (n.12) confirmed that it represented a sign of protest that would not question the stability of the cabinet anyway. Moreover, right after the decision to implement a no-fly zone, LN demanded a parliamentary debate on Italy's participation in the multilateral intervention against Gaddafi. The government conceded it on March 24. The resolution drafted by the coalition parties was strongly influenced by LN's demands as it advocated sea patrolling against human trafficking in the Mediterranean Sea and the concept of burden sharing among European countries on the issue of migration[156]. Furthermore, on May 3, the junior partner presented its own motion in Parliament on the intervention in Libya. In the document, other than stressing their concerns regarding the costs of the air strikes and the potential increase in the migration flows, they asked the government to communicate a precise date in Italy's involvement in the conflict would end[157]. Bossi said that Berlusconi and his party had to sign it "if he wanted the government to stay in power"[158]. On May 3, the motion passed in parliament thanks to the votes of both the junior and the senior partners.

However, such efforts seemed more directed to appease their own voters rather than based on a genuine interest for the issue. "The absence in the vote in the committees was a strategy to please their electorate", a PdL representative argued[159]. Another PdL exponent had the same impression,

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[154] Interviewee 11.

[155] "Frattini: 'Daremo le basi, possibili nostri raid'. Parlamento: ok all'impegno. Lega assente", *La Repubblica,* 18/3/2011.

[156] Resoconto Stenografico n.452, Camera dei Deputati, 24/3/2011.

[157] "Ecco le sei condizioni della Lega: Data certa per fine intervento", *La Repubblica*, 19/4/2011.

[158] "Da Bossi ultimatum a Berlusconi: se non vota la mozione salta il governo", *La Repubblica*, 1/5/2011.

[159] Interviewee 8.

labelling LN's opposition as "propaganda"[160]. "The resolutions in parliament were balancing acts not to let the government fall. Because we did not want this to happen"[161], a LN MP admitted. Moreover, in contrast to extreme junior partners' role in Kosovo, they did not monitor and scrutinize the conduct of the operation by formulating parliamentary questions. In fact, no LN MP used this instrument to check how the operation was conducted.

Discussion and conclusions

In the previous chapters, I empirically demonstrated that extreme parties, at both sides of the left-right axis, were considerably less supportive of MOAs than centrist parties. However, during the "Second Republic", centre-left and centre-right coalitions alternated in power with extreme parties always involved as junior partners. Considering such a divergence, the fact that a cabinet never fell due to a disagreement on MOAs among coalition partners is rather puzzling. In this chapter, I explained this outcome from the point of view of junior partner, examining the behaviour of extreme left parties, *Partito dei Comunisti Italiani* and *Federazione dei Verdi*, on Operation Allied Force in Kosovo and of the far-right and autonomist *Lega Nord* concerning Operation Unified Protector in Libya. In both cases, junior partners heavily contested Italian involvement in military interventions. Nevertheless, they decided to remain in the government. Through the use of interviews, parliamentary reports, key policymakers' memoirs and newspaper articles, I investigated the reasons underlying such decisions.

In line with Coticchia and Davidson (2018), I argue that two main elements convinced these extreme parties not to leave the cabinet: fear of being labelled as irresponsible coalition partners by their own voters and lack of salience attributed to military interventions. On the one hand, as expected (H9), not attributing salience to security and defence policy issues, junior partners are less incentivized to renounce to the advantages of staying in government, both in terms of office and policies. Various studies have highlighted the crucial role of salience in determining junior partner's influence in shaping foreign policy outcomes (Coticchia and Davidson 2018; Greene 2019; Kaarbo and Lantis 2003; Ozkececi-Taner 2005). Notwithstanding Italy's growing involvement in multilateral peace and security operation since the end of the Cold War, security and defence policy issues remained at the margins of the political and public debate (Coticchia 2011; 2014; Ignazi et al. 2012). This decreased junior partners' incentives to leave the government in a conflict over MOAs. On the other hand, as

[160] Interviewee 9.

[161] Interviewee 12.

hypothesized (*H10*), perceiving that they would be blamed by their own electorate for the collapse of the government, junior partners have less incentives to defect, even in face of a disliked decision on foreign policy. This is more the case when the political system is characterized by strong ideological polarization and bipolar competition, with two rival coalitions facing each other. In such situations, the extreme parties' voters may highly value government's stability over a foreign policy decision in line with their preferences. As said, in Italy, during the "Second Republic", centre-left and centre-right coalition constantly faced each other in a strongly polarized competition.

Interestingly, these factors played out differently according to the ideological connotation of the junior partner involved in the decision-making process. In the case of Kosovo, as expected, the communist PdCI and the greens were particularly concerned of being blamed as irresponsible by their own voters for paving the way for the centre-right's return to power. In particular, this mechanism was even more decisive in explaining PdCI's permanence as the survival of a centre-left government constituted its own *raison d'être.* In contrast, both parties considered Italian participation in NATO-led bombing campaign as a highly salient issue as demonstrated by symbolic actions, repeated efforts to monitor the cabinet in the implementation of the operation and lacerating internal debates. The vigorous attempts to moderate the government's position could also be interpreted as a demonstration of the salience attributed to this issue. In the case of Libya, the far right and autonomist *Lega Nord* certainly did not regard the participation in the intervention as a salient issue *per se* as it was concerned by rather its domestic effects on immigration and taxation. Confirming the hypothesis, this variable was the main driver behind the decision to remain in the government, with little evidence for other mechanisms. For instance, fear of being labelled as an irresponsible coalition partner was totally absent as evidence suggests that LN threatened to make the government collapse at a previous stage. Table 5 resumes the empirical findings in the two cases.

Table 5: Summary of the empirical findings

	PdCI and FdV (Operation Allied Force, Kosovo 1999)	**LN (Operation Unified Protector, Libya 2011)**
Salience attributed to military interventions	High	Low
Fear of being blamed as irresponsible coalition partner	High (especially for PdCI)	Low
Other factors	Internal divisions within FdV	None

In Chapter 3, I found that incentives deriving from position in government and law-making procedures had a stronger impact on extreme right parties' probability to vote in favour of MOAs than extreme left-wing parties. I explained this finding by suggesting that contestation of MOAs was driven by different drivers among extreme parties. On the one hand, deeply entrenched pacifism and antimilitarism underpin extreme-left parties' opposition to Italy's participation in MOAs (Calossi et al. 2013). On the other hand, beside an isolationist approach to foreign policy, political opportunism is at the roots of contestation by the far right and autonomist LN (Tarchi 2007; Verbeek and Zaslove 2015). The findings of this chapter strengthen this argument, highlighting how lack of salience was crucial to explain LN's decision to remain in government notwithstanding Italy's participation in the NATO-led Operation Unified Protector. However, the fact that PdCI and Greens perceived the electoral costs of being blamed as an irresponsible coalition partner as higher than reneging on their own antimilitarist tradition further points out the primacy of domestic politics over security and defence policy among Italian parties.

In broader terms, this chapter contains implications for the comparative research agenda on the impact of coalition politics and foreign policy, by posing an innovative research puzzle: "why do junior partners stay in the government in spite of an undesired foreign policy outcome?". Addressing this question is extremely relevant to explore junior partner's patterns of influence. In fact, a credible threat of leaving the government increases junior partner's hijacking power on the senior partner, and, by the same token, its impact on foreign policy outcomes (Kaarbo 1996). Furthermore, it provides interesting insights concerning the impact of coalition conflicts on governments termination, in Italy and abroad. Literature on government termination has mostly quantitatively identified variables making a cabinet more likely to collapse (Laver 2003). Such studies may be complemented

by an increasing number of qualitative works investigating reason underlying junior partners' permanence in the cabinet. Saalfeld (2008, 362) argued that "a considerable proportion of cabinets get terminated as the result of discretionary decisions made by the relevant actors". Exploring reasons underlying junior partner's decision is therefore relevant to explain why cabinets fall.

Conclusions

Main findings

In this dissertation, through different data and methodologies, I explored how Italian parties behaved on Military Operations Abroad (MOA) during the so-called "Second Republic"[162]. I scrutinized their rhetoric, voting patterns and behaviour as coalition partners. The key question I addressed in this dissertation is: "Why did parties support MOAs in Italy?". In Chapter 2 and 3, through a quantitative analysis of parliamentary speeches and votes respectively, I identified a number of factors explaining party support for MOAs. In these chapter, I found strong support for the presence of a centrist and bipartisan consensus on this issue, between centre-left and centre-right parties. In the fourth and last empirical chapter, qualitatively examining the cases of Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011), I demonstrated how extreme parties as junior coalition partners may also support controversial troop deployments because of the lack of salience attributed to the issue or the unwillingness to undermine the stability of the cabinet.

In the following paragraphs, I will resume the main findings of this doctoral thesis, chapter by chapter. In Chapter 2, extracting a measure of support from a quantitative analysis of parliamentary debates on the six most relevant Italian MOAs and using it as a dependent variable in regression models, I highlighted a number of factors driving party support. I demonstrated that position on the left-right axis had a significant impact on this variable. The extent of support for MOAs on this dimension followed a curvilinear distribution. In other words, it was smaller at the extremes and higher at the centre. This meant that in Italy centrist and moderate parties viewed troops deployment in a considerably more positive way than extreme (left and right) and radical parties. Moreover, I showed that presence of the party at the government was a powerful explanatory factor. Predictably, considering that executives are in charge of the decision to deploy troops abroad, those parties who were member of the cabinet tended to be significantly more supportive than those who were at the opposition. Finally, I suggested that specific features of the operation had a different impact on the extent of supportiveness according to party positioning on the left-right axis. In particular, MOAs legitimized by the UN through a Security Council resolution received significantly more support from left-wing parties than from right-wing counterparts.

[162] Not all parties were considered in this dissertation. For the selection criteria see Chapter 2.

In Chapter 3, through a quantitative analysis of all parliamentary votes issued in the "Second Republic" with Probit models[163], I confirmed these findings, found new drivers of party support for MOAs and provided a more accurate picture of party contestation on this issue. The hypothesis of a bell-shaped distribution of support across the left-right axis was reinforced, as centrist parties were discovered to be more likely to vote in favour of MOAs than extreme parties. However, a descriptive analysis of supporting votes (yes and abstention) suggested that contestation is more pronounced at the extreme-left side of the spectrum than at the extreme right one. In fact, communist parties, *Rifondazione Comunista* and *Partito dei Comunisti Italiani* and the green *Federazione dei Verdi* were the ones that opposed MOAs in the most consistent way. Communists voting against troop deployments in the majority of cases. To the contrary, at the opposite side of the spectrum, the far-right *Alleanza Nazionale* was a very solid supporter of participation in military interventions, while the autonomist and populist *Lega Nord* showed only a slightly lower extent of support. Notably, support for MOAs was slightly higher among main parties in the centre-right coalition, such as *Forza Italia-Popolo delle Libertà* and *Unione di Centro,* than in the centre-left coalition, *PDS-DS-PD* and *Popolari-La Margherita.* In line with the results of the previous chapter, presence at the government significantly increased propensity to vote in favour of MOAs. This variable was also found to have a varying effect according to the position in government: minimum for centrist parties and maximum for extreme-right parties. This could be explained with *Lega Nord* instrumental changes of behaviour according to whether it was at the government or not. Furthermore, in this chapter, the impact of law-making procedures on party support was tested. MOAs approved and/or funded through law decrees drew significantly more consensus than those voted through resolution on government representatives' communications to the Chamber of Deputies. The peculiar voting procedure, the presence of smaller and less salient troop deployments, and the *ex post* nature of the vote contributed to create incentives for parties to be more supportive in law decrees. Again, such variable had a stronger effect on right-wing parties than on left-wing parties. Finally, taking into account votes on all the MOAs occurred in this period and not just the most relevant ones, this chapter gave a more comprehensive picture of party contestation on MOAs. Supporting votes were on average over seventy percent of the total, demonstrating a widespread consensus on the issue. However, it has to be noted that party contestation over troop deployments in Italy is slightly higher than in other Western countries (Ostermann et al. 2019) and that the extent of consensus in Italian parliament was considerable on bills covering all issues during the "Second Republic" (Giuliani 2008; Pedrazzani 2017).

[163] Both the debates and votes took place at the Chamber of Deputies, the lower chamber in Italian parliament. For the reasons why debates and votes occurred as the senate on this issue see Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.

Given the significantly different extent of party support between centrist and extreme parties, it might look surprising that an intra-coalition conflict on this issue never produced the collapse of a government. In chapter 4, analysing the cases of Italy's participation in Operation Allied Force (OAF) (Kosovo, 1999) and Operation Unified Protector (OUP) (Libya, 2011), I identified two potential mechanisms leading extreme junior partners not to defect, while opposing the troop deployment: 1) lack of salience attributed to the opposition to the specific mission and, more generally, security and defence policy, and 2) fear of being blamed and punished in the elections by their own voters for making the government collapse. While the second mechanism proved crucial to explain extreme left-wing parties' decision to stay despite Italy's active participation in OAF, the first one was instead fundamental to make sense of *Lega Nord's* permanence in the last Berlusconi's government, that consented to the contribution to OUP. Together with the findings on the varying impact of the presence of the government, this provides evidence in favour of a diverging approach to contestation to MOAs among extreme parties: based on instinctive pacifism and anti-militarism for the extreme left and more instrumental for LN.

To sum up, these are the main findings of this dissertation:

- Considerably high extent of party support for MOAs
- Bipartisan and centrist consensus for MOAs between the main centre-left and centre-right parties
- Higher extent of contestation by extreme parties, more pronounced on the left than on the right side of the axis
- Presence at the government strongly increased party support for MOAs, especially for extreme right-wing parties
- International legitimation for the specific MOA increased left-wing parties' extent of support
- Law-making procedure increased the overall extent of party support and especially that of right-wing parties
- Diverging type of contestation among extreme parties, more instrumental for *Lega Nord,* more "ideological" for extreme left parties
- Lack of salience and fear of being blamed by voters are explanatory mechanism for extreme junior partner's decisions to stay in government in spite of the approval of MOAs

Implications for the debate on the party politics of foreign policy

As suggested in Chapter 1, for decades IR and FPA have consistently underestimated the relevance of political parties in explaining states' foreign policy. This neglect is regrettable. In fact, as Rathbun (2004) argued, on the basis on their own conceptions of national interest, parties articulate distinct views of how the state should conduct its external relations. Since parties are crucial components of executives in democracies and non-democracies alike, these ideas are bound to transform into concrete behaviour. Following such reasoning, in the last years, a number of articles and books emphasized the importance of investigating the impact of parties in shaping states' foreign and security policy (Auerswald and Saideman 2014; Hofmann 2013; Mello 2014; Rathbun 2004; Schuster and Maier 2006). In other words, answering to Schuster and Maier's (2006, 229) rhetorical question, these studies demonstrated that "parties do matter". This doctoral thesis took such argument as a point of departure to analyse how Italian parties positioned themselves and interacted on the issue of MOAs, during the so-called "Second Republic" (1994-2013). In this sense, among the various findings highlighted in the previous section, it is worth emphasizing the presence of a solid bipartisan consensus on this issue among centre-right and centre-left parties. As Coticchia (2011) claimed, together with other external and domestic variables, such widespread consensus was a key to understand Italy's extraordinary commitment to peace and security operations after the end of the Cold War. Therefore, this dissertation points out that political parties do have an impact on foreign policy and, consequently, should be considered as crucial domestic variables in IR and FPA scholarship.

Given that for granted, this dissertation brings four major contributions to the academic debate on the party politics of military interventions (Wagner et al. 2017; 2018) and foreign policy in general. First, it sheds further doubts on the much theorized and empirically tested divide between dovish left-wing party and hawkish right-wing parties (Koch and Sullivan 2010; Palmer et al. 2004; Schuster and Maier 2006) as far as contemporary peace and security operations are concerned. Such distinction could have been valid during the Cold War when military interventions were not always strictly justified under humanitarian principles and the cleavage between capital and labour over the expansion of the welfare state (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) still fundamentally structured the division between left and right. To the contrary, after the end of the Cold War, the increasing number of troops deployment aimed at protecting and saving foreign people (see for instance the concept of R2P) combined with a growing consensus between mainstream parties on supranationalism (Hooghe and Marks 2018) have eroded the validity of this neat distinction between left and right. Currently, in

Western democracies, as demonstrated by Wagner et al. (2017), support for troops deployments is more likely to structure in a curvilinear rather than linear way on the left-right axis. While mainstream and establishment centrist parties (on the left and the right) tend to provide support for peace and security operations, challenger and niche extreme parties tend to contest them. Besides that, this new divide is also based on incentives related to the party competition, with challenger parties that are pushed to take more radical positions that resonate with the median voter in order to distinguish themselves and gain votes (Hobolt and De Vries 2015). This dissertation provided evidence of such conflict between "hawkish" centrist parties and "dovish" extreme parties in Italy with regards to MOAs. Future studies should conduct further tests of the emerging curvilinear model of support on peace and security operations in other countries as well. adopting a comparative perspective. The current state of the art could also benefit from innovative theoretical explanations of the causal mechanisms underlying such divide.

Secondly, and relatedly, this dissertation points to the importance of disaggregating the category of peace and security operations in order to better describe party contestation. Wagner et al. (2018, 21) claimed that "disaggregating deployments in terms of purpose, justification under international law, risks for troops, international organization in charge etc. is a promising way to gain additional insights into patterns and drivers of contestation of military missions". Böller and Müller (2018) showed the validity of this intuition, observing that after 9/11 US Congress' assertiveness augmented for operations that are not perceived as serving national interests, also due to Republican party's opposition. The fact that MOAs covered by a specific UNSC Resolution drew more support from the left-wing parties than from right-wing parties in Italy confirm the importance of unpacking troops deployments. Such findings could be explained through Rathbun's (2004) contraposition between leftist inclusive and rightist excluding conceptions of national interests, that was explained in Chapter 1 and 2. Future works investigating party contestation on peace and security operations across democratic countries should make further efforts in this direction. Again, the interaction between these two independent variables should be accompanied with sound and thoughtful theoretical accounts.

Thirdly, this doctoral thesis is a call for more single-country studies. As underlined in Chapter 1, the majority of the studies investigating the role of parties in foreign policy are comparative, encompassing various countries in the analysis. While not denying the benefits of comparing different countries, especially in terms of external validity of the results, I would like to point out that the exclusive focus on one country enables the researcher to control for a number of important intervening

variables such as type of government, party system and the national culture of foreign policy. All these factors may significantly constrain how parties position themselves on foreign policy. For instance, Rathbun (2006) acknowledged that a past history of military victories pushed left-wing parties in Britain to be more interventionist in the Balkans. Lagassé and Saideman (2017) found that Canada's "winner takes all" electoral law deeply affected legislative oversight on the operation in Afghanistan. The crux of the matter could be resumed as follows: comparison is an asset, but a multitude of intervening variables are a problem. Furthermore, keeping constant these variables allows to better focus on changes over time and across foreign policy events. Overall, a single-country and cross time analysis constitutes a promising research strategy to investigate the impact of parties on foreign and security policy.

Fourthly, this doctoral thesis encourages the research agenda on party politics of foreign policy to keep on employing a pluralistic and eclectic methodological perspective. The current use of a plurality of data and methodologies across studies on parties is worth praising. Various quantitative studies have been published on the impact of coalition politics and foreign policy (Beasley and Kaarbo 2014; Clare 2010; Kaarbo and Beasley 2008; Oktay 2014) and on the effect of partisanship on foreign policy (Milner and Judkins 2004; Palmer et al. 2004; Thérien and Nöel 2000; Wagner et al. 2017; 2018). Single and small-n qualitative works have abounded in all the three segments of literature reviewed in Chapter 1: partisanship and foreign policy (Bjereld and Demker 2000; Hofmann 2017; Rathbun 2004), coalition politics and foreign policy (Ozkececi-Taner 2005; Oppermann and Brummer 2014), parliamentary war powers (Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010; Wagner and Raunio 2017). Interestingly, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) also turned out to be a useful methodological tool to test the impact of partisanship and legislative-executive relations on states' participation in peace and security operation (Haesebrouck 2017; 2018; Mello 2014; Wagner 2018). However, techniques of automated test analysis have never been employed before. Chapter 2 has demonstrated the potential of the algorithm *Wordfish* (Slapin and Proksch 2008) in measuring party support for military operations. *Wordscores* is another possible technique to achieve the same result (Laver et al. 2003). Moreover, topic modelling methods may be used to analyse how parties speak about foreign policy and how their rhetoric change over time. To sum up, automated content analysis methods have the potential to provide new ground for the study of party politics of foreign policy.

Implications for the debate on Italian politics and foreign policy

This dissertation has also three important implications for the more circumscribed but nonetheless interesting debate on Italian politics and foreign policy during the Second Republic (1994-2013). The first regards the issue of change in Italy's foreign policy in this period. Notably, such debate also intertwines with the one on the degree of polarization in the Second Republic's party system (Bardi 2007; Morlino 1996). As said, while some scholars highlighted variation in the approaches of centre-left and centre-right cabinets (Andreatta 2008; Carbone 2007), other ones stressed similarities (Croci 2003; Walston 2004). The findings contained in this doctoral thesis could be interpreted as evidences in favour of both these arguments. On the one hand, left-wing parties' preference for MOAs with a solid multilateral legitimacy could be read as a confirm of a different approach between the two coalitions. In fact, advocates of the "change argument" juxtaposed centre-left's multilateralism and Europeanism to centre-right's bilateralism and Atlanticism. On the other hand, it is worth pointing out that the bipartisan and generally widespread consensus on troops deployments across parties give credit to scholars supporting the claim of continuity in Italian foreign and security policy during the "Second Republic". In fact, this element was already employed to highlight similarities in the foreign policies of the two coalitions in government (Croci 2003; Croci and Valigi 2014). Therefore, this doctoral dissertation does not contribute to settle this controversial debate. Rather, it underlines how much it is grounded on interpretations of facts through the lenses of different theoretical expectations.

Secondly, and more conclusively, this thesis emphasizes the continuing primacy of domestic politics over foreign policy in Italy. Various studies demonstrated that domestic dynamics fundamentally shaped Italy's external behaviour before and after the Cold War (Brighi 2013; Panebianco 1977). A couple of empirical findings in this dissertation show that political parties gave priority to consideration related to competition for office and votes in their positioning and interactions on MOAs. First, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 identified in presence at the government the most powerful independent variable to explain party support for MOAs. While government parties are more exposed to international pressures to participate in peace and security interventions (Wagner et al. 2018), the relationship between executive and legislative in parliamentary systems probably better accounts for this result. When a military operation is discussed in parliament, government parties are incentivized to support it as they already agreed on that. If not, the prospect of leaving office discourage them to do otherwise anyway. To the contrary, opposition parties are pushed to oppose MOAs by the necessity to distinguish themselves and question the stability of the cabinet (Williams 2014). Second, Chapter 4 demonstrated how extreme left-parties placed the fear of being blamed by their own voters

as responsible for the collapse of a leftist government and the return in power of the centre-right before their deep opposition to the participation in the Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. This is another evidence of how parties' behaviour on this issue was more driven by concerns related to domestic politics than international policy. Paraphrasing the famous Senator Vandenberg's quotation, "politics does not seem to stop at the water's edge in Italy".

Thirdly, through its findings, this thesis complements the existing studies on parties and MOAs in Italy (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Coticchia 2011; 2014; 2015; Coticchia and Davidson 2018; Coticchia and Giacomello 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). Above all, it provides the first comprehensive quantitative test of the emerging bipartisan consensus on troops deployments in the "Second Republic". A few works indicated how the main centre-left and centre-right parties in Italy converged on this issue, on the basis of a shared humanitarian narrative to justify the use of military force (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Coticchia 2011; Ignazi et al. 2012). Through different datasets and measures of support, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 quantitatively confirmed this finding. Moreover, Chapter 4 extended the work of Coticchia and Davidson (2018), by comparing the behaviour of extreme-left wing parties and the far-right *Lega Nord* as junior coalition partner. The salience and blame hypotheses were confirmed. However, while the blame hypothesis was more fruitful to explain PdCI and FdV's willingness to remain in power, the (lack of) salience hypothesis was a more convincing mechanism to make sense of LN's decision not to defect. In addition, the words discriminating between pro and anti-MOAs attitudes in the validation process in Chapter 2 reflected familiar patterns of contestations. For instance, they underlined that the international legitimacy of the operation was one of the most contentious issue in the political debate around operation Antica Babilonia in Iraq (Calossi and Coticchia 2009; Coticchia 2011).

This does not mean that research on party politics around troops deployment in Italy during the Second Republic has exhausted its potential research questions and findings. For instance, a still rather unexplored puzzle is the extent of influence of junior coalition partner on operational caveats of the mission. Did this party contestation affect the operational dimension of the mission? If so, to what extent? Other potential research questions concern parliamentary oversight of the troop deployments. As noted, in some cases member of government gave their communications before the parliament before the beginning of the operation, in other ones afterwards. How to explain this variation in legislative-executive relationship? Did disagreements within coalition partners played a role? In this sense, data regarding the number of parliamentary questions have not been collected yet. Which factors explain their variation across missions? Finally, in Chapter 3, I showed how various

changes to the law-making procedures for the approval of MOAs were made across the years, attempting to rebalance legislative-executive relations. Which parties favoured such development and which ones instead oppose it? Future studies should address these questions to provide an even more complete description of this phenomenon.

Beyond the Second Republic: the future of the party politics MOAs in Italy

As explained in the Introduction and in Chapter 1, the end of the time span considered in this doctoral thesis was not randomly chosen. A couple of events would make particularly troublesome to extend it after 2013. First, reflecting a general trend among Western countries, the Italian involvement in peace and security operations outside national borders seemed to have slightly waned over the years. As showed, the number of personnel civil and military personnel deployed in other countries peace decreased from 2005 to 2005 and then stabilized until the present day (Senato della Repubblica/Camera dei Deputati 2017). After reaching a maximum of 1,5 billion of euros in 2010, funds committed per year to MOAs were reduced to stagnate around one billion (Senato della Repubblica/Camera dei Deputati 2017). The financial constraint linked to 2011 debt crisis and the disastrous legacy of the Operation Unified Protector in Libya, currently considered by a considerable part of the political elite as a mistake[164], are arguably the main driving factors underlying such development. In summer 2014, the Italian government's decision not to give a contribution to the air strikes against the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, as part of the operation Inherent Resolve, may be interpreted as an evidence of a disillusion concerning military interventions (Coticchia and Davidson 2019). Against this background, as suggested by the latest Minister of Defence's White Paper (2015), Italian security and defence policy underwent a re-direction towards the Mediterranean and the North African (MENA) region. In fact, in the last years, military forces were deployed in a number of operations such as the EU-led EUNAVFOR Med-Sophia that aimed at tackling human trafficking and illegal immigration (Ceccorulli and Coticchia 2017). However, it has to be pointed out that Italy is still involved in a number of operations across the world with over five thousand soldiers deployed in total. It is also the largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operation countries. To sum up, Italian security and defence policy has been affected by a forced budget reduction and redirection but is still very active.

[164] In 2018, Berlusconi blamed former President of the Republic Giorgio Napolitano for the decision to participate in the air strikes in Libya (Il Giornale 2018)

Secondly, as said, the 2013 elections marked the beginning of a radical transformation in the party system, with the emergence of the populist *Movimento Cinque Stelle* (M5S) as the most voted party in the Chamber of Deputies and the formation of a government composed between the social democrat PD and Berlusconi's PdL (D'Alimonte 2013). While sharing a significant decrease in terms of popularity among the electorate, the two main rivals of the Second Republic experienced two profoundly different trajectories. While PD stayed in power, although with a change of Prime Ministers, from Enrico Letta to Matteo Renzi, and finally to Paolo Gentiloni, PdL split among those who remained loyal to the government who formed a new party *(Nuovo Centrodestra)* and those that, following Berlusconi, wanted to return to the opposition. Five years later, at 2018 elections, the existing party system was definitively shaken upside down (Bull and Pasquino 2018; Chiaramonte et al. 2018). M5S further increased its vote share and formed a coalition government with *Lega Nord,* that, meanwhile, under the leadership of Matteo Salvini, had become a stereotypical far-right party (Albertazzi et al. 2018; Passarelli and Tuorto 2018). However, this full populist cabinet lasted a little more than a year, being replaced by a coalition between *Movimento 5 Stelle* and *Partito Democratico.* From this brief description of the latest development in Italian politics, it could be easily inferred that the party system characterizing the Second Republic is dead and gone. Considering the volatility in Italian electorate's preferences and the continuous alterations in the party system supply, it is instead almost impossible to predict how the new party system will structure.

In addition, as described in Chapter 3, at the end of 2016, the parliament has finally passed a new comprehensive law (*Legge Quadro*) to specifically regulate the approval and (re)funding of troops deployment in international peace and security operations (Ronzitti 2017). According to this law, at the beginning of each year, the executive must provide the legislative with extensive and detailed information regarding all the existing MOAs to be re-funded and the new ones to be initiated. Parliament is then asked to vote on these missions, singularly or by small groups, as requested by opposition parties. Therefore, in theory, this law should increase parliamentary oversight of troops deployment, by guaranteeing more transparency and avoiding ex-post legitimations. At the moment, we have seen three applications of this new procedure. While in 2017 and 2018 the timeline was respected, in 2019 a long delay marked the approval process of MOAs, provoking considerable issues for the personnel on the ground[165].

[165] For an overview of the MOAs approved in these years see the parliamentary reports (Senato della Repubblica 2017; Senato della Repubblica/Camera dei Deputati 2018; 2019).

Predicting how all these changes will affect the party politics of military intervention requires a crystal ball. However, there are two reasons to believe that contestation on this issue among Italian parties will increase in the future. First, by its system of vote, this new law has augmented the incentives for opposition parties to vote against MOAs promoted by the government. Opposition parties now can vote against missions in a selective way, without negative implications on missions they support. Secondly, and more generally, the increasing focus on operations related to immigration from the Mediterranean combined with a growing polarization between liberal and nationalist parties is likely to radically alter the debate on troops deployments. While liberal parties may favour operations oriented at rescuing migrants, nationalist parties may view more positively those focused on border patrolling. Such division may produce far-reaching repercussions on the continuity of Italy's foreign policy in the next years. To sum up, it seems likely that party politics will have an even stronger role in Italy's foreign and security policy in the near future.

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Appendix

Chapter 1

Table A1: Composition of Italy's cabinets during the "Second Republic" (footnote 18).

Date of assignment	**Name**	**Coalition**	**Parties**
11/05/94	Berlusconi I	Centre-right	LN, AN, FI, CCD, UdC
17/01/95	Dini	Technocratic	Technocratic
18/05/96	Prodi I	Centre-left	PDS, PPI, RI, FdV
21/10/98	D'Alema I	Centre-left	DS, PPI, UDR, PdCI, FdV, RI, SDI
21/12/99	D'Alema II	Centre-left	DS, PPI, UDEUR, PdCI, FdV, RI, Dem,
28/04/00	Amato II	Centre-left	DS, PPI, Dem, UDEUR, PdCI, FdV, RI, SDI, Dem
11/06/01	Berlusconi II	Centre-right	FI, AN, CCD, CDU, LN
28/05/05	Berlusconi III	Centre-right	FI, AN, UDC, LN, NPSI, PRI
17/05/06	Prodi II	Centre-left	DS, Mar, PRC, RI, PdCI, IdV, FdV, UDEUR,
08/05/08	Berlusconi IV	Centre-right	LN, FI, MpA
16/11/11	Monti	Technocratic	Technocratic

Table A2: overview of all the MOAs in which Italian troops were involved during the so-called "Second Republic" (Alphabetic order). The years of the beginning and the end refer to the beginning and the end of Italy's contribution to the mission that, for multilateral operations, may diverge from the dates in which the operation started and terminated (Footnote 28).

Mission	**Beginning**	**End**	**Institutional Framework**	**Region**
28esimo gruppo navale	1997	2008	Other (Bilateral)	Balkans
Active Endeavour-Sea Guardian	2001	Ongoing	NATO	Other (Europe)
Alba	1997	1997	Other (Minilateral)	Balkans
Albit	2000	2000	Other (Bilateral)	Balkans
Allied Force	1999	1999	NATO	Balkans
Allied Harbour	1999	1999	NATO	Balkans
Allied Harmony	2002	2003	NATO	Balkans
Althea	2005	Ongoing	EU	Balkans
Antica Babilonia	2003	2006	Other (Minilateral)	Middle East
Cyrene	2011	2012	Other (Bilateral)	Africa
DIE Albania	1997	2012	Other (Bilateral)	Balkans
Enduring Freedom	2001	2006	Other (Minilateral)	Asia
EU AMIS II Sudan	2002	2007	EU	Africa
EU Concordia/Proxima Fyrom	2003	2005	EU	Balkans
EUBAM Libya	2013	2015	EU	Africa
EUBAM Rafah	2006	Ongoing	EU	Middle East
EUCAP Nestor	2011	Ongoing	EU	Africa
EUCAP Sahel	2012	Ongoing	EU	Africa
EUFOR Chad	2008	2008	EU	Africa
EUFOR RDC	2006	2006	EU	Africa
EULEX Kosovo	2010	Ongoing	EU	Balkans
EUMM Bosnia	2001	2006	EU	Balkans
EUMM Georgia	2008	2015	EU	Other (Europe)
EUPM Bosnia	2003	2009	EU	Balkans
EUPOL Afghanistan	2007	2012	EU	Asia
EUPOL Kinshasa	2005	2010	EU	Africa
EUSEC RDC	2007	2008	EU	Africa
EUTM Mali	2013	Ongoing	EU	Africa
EUTM Somalia	2010	Ongoing	EU	Africa
ISAF-Resolute support	2001	Ongoing	NATO	Asia
Joint Forge	1998	2004	NATO	Balkans
Kfor - Joint Enterprise	1999	Ongoing	NATO	Balkans
MFO	1981	Ongoing	Other (Minilateral)	Africa

MIATTM/MIACCD Malta	1973	Ongoing	Other (Bilateral)	Other (Europe)
MINURSO	1991	Ongoing	UN	Africa
MINUSMA	2013	Ongoing	UN	Africa
NATO HQ Sarajevo	2005	Ongoing	NATO	Balkans
NATO HQ Skopje	2003	Ongoing	NATO	Balkans
NATO HQ Tirana	2003	Ongoing	NATO	Balkans
NTM Iraq	2005	2010	NATO	Middle East
Ocean Shield/Atalanta	2008	Ongoing	EU	Asia
Support to EAU	2010	Ongoing	Other (Bilateral)	Asia
TIPH	1995	2019	Other (Minilateral)	Middle East
UNAMID	2008	2013	UN	Africa
UNFICYP	1974	Ongoing	UN	Other (Europe)
Unified Protector	2011	2011	NATO	Africa
UNIFIL	1978	Ongoing	UN	Middle East
UNIKOM	1991	2003	UN	Middle East
UNMEE	2000	2008	UN	Africa
UNMIBH	1995	2002	UN	Balkans
UNMIK	1999	2008	UN	Balkans
UNMIS/UNMISS	2005	2005	UN	Africa
UNMOGIP	1972	Ongoing	UN	Asia
UNOWA	2005	2005	UN	Africa
UNSMIS	2012	2012	UN	Middle East
UNTSO	1957	2006	UN	Middle East

Chapter 2

Table A3: Distribution of debates, missions and parties (footnote 55).

Dates of the debates	**Missions**	**Parties**
02/04/97	Alba (Albania)	AN, CCD-CDU, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PDS/DS, PPI, PRC
26/03/99	Allied Force/Allied Harbour (Kosovo)	AN, CCD-CDU, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PPI-Dem, PdCI, PRC
13/04/99	Allied Force/Allied Harbour (Kosovo)	AN, CCD-CDU, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PPI-Dem, PdCI, PRC
19/05/99	Allied Force/Allied Harbour (Kosovo)	AN, CCD-CDU, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PPI-Dem, PdCI, PRC
09/10/01	Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC
07/11/01	Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC
03/10/02	Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC
19/03/03	Iraqi Freedom (Iraq)	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC
15/04/03	Iraqi Freedom (Iraq)	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC
20/05/04	Iraqi Freedom (Iraq)	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC
26/09/06	UNIFIL (Lebanon)	AN, PDS/DS, IdV, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC
24/03/11	Unified Protector (Libya)	IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC

*Table A4: Correlation between the two measures of party support obtained through Wordfish. Support_Gov is extracted including the texts containing speeches made by government representatives. Support_Nogov is extracted without these texts. Observations: 104. ***: p<0,01 (footnote 58).*

	Support_gov	**Support_nogov**
Support_gov	1,00	
Support_nogov	0,7166***	1,00

Figure A1: Scatterplot of the correlation between Support_Gov and Support_Nogov. (footnote 58).



Figure A2: "Eiffel Tower" for the debate on the Operation Antica Babilonia, 15/4/2003. Words expected to occur frequently – "guerra" ("war"), "pace" ("peace"), "umanitaria" ("humanitarian"), "sicurezza" ("security"), "democrazia" ("democracy") – are coloured in red. (footnote: 59)



Table A5: Replication of Model 1 and Model 2 with positions extracted not including the texts containing the speeches made by government representatives as dependent variable (Support_Nogov) (footnote 67).

IV	Model 1 DV: Support_nogov	Model 2 DV: Support_nogov
Rile	0.377**	0.250
	(0.138)	(0.175)
Rile x Rile	-0.036*	-0.033*
	(0.019)	(0.017)
Gal/Tan	0.062	0.083
	(0.075)	(0.076)
Gov		0.848***
		(0.240)
UN		0.048
		(0.234)
UN x Rile		-0.024
		(0.051)
Interest		-0.634
		(0.610)
Interest x Rile		0.133
		(0.101)
Constant	-1.079***	-1.037**
	(0.244)	(0.354)
Observations	104	104
R-squared	0.109	0.257

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A6: Replication of Model 1 and Model 2 with random effect for parties and the position extracted including the texts containing speeches made by government representatives as a dependent variable (Support_gov) (footnote 67).

IV	Model 1 DV: Support_gov	Model 2 DV: Support_gov
Rile	0.515***	0.575***
	(0.159)	(0.152)
Rile x Rile	-0.048***	-0.046***
	(0.017)	(0.015)
Gal/Tan	-0.010	-0.039
	(0.069)	(0.062)
Gov		0.960***
		(0.150)
UN		0.531*
		(0.291)
UN x Rile		-0.126**
		(0.054)
Interest		0.307
		(0.358)
Interest x Rile		-0.068
		(0.068)
Constant	-1.188***	-1.769***
	(0.325)	(0.351)
Observations	104	104
Number of party_cat	13	13

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A7: replication of Model 1 and Model 2 with random effects for debates and the position extracted including the texts containing speeches made by government representatives as a dependent variable (Support_gov) (footnote 67).

IV	Model 1 DV: Support_gov	Model 2 DV: Support_gov
Rile	0.515***	0.602***
	(0.159)	(0.143)
Rile x Rile	-0.048***	-0.049***
	(0.017)	(0.014)
Gal/Tan	-0.010	-0.037
	(0.069)	(0.056)
Gov		0.958***
		(0.152)
UN		0.544*
		(0.296)
UN x Rile		-0.129**
		(0.055)
Interest		0.330
		(0.361)
Interest x Rile		-0.070
		(0.069)
Constant	-1.188***	-1.833***
	(0.325)	(0.332)
Observations	104	104
Number of deb_cat	12	12

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A8: replication of Model 1 and Model 2 only on debates in which the centre-right was in government and the position extracted including the texts containing speeches made by government representatives as a dependent variable (Support_gov) (footnote 67).

IV	Model 1 DV: Support_gov	Model 2 DV: Support_gov
Rile	1.034***	0.969***
	(0.221)	(0.254)
Rile x Rile	-0.060**	-0.054**
	(0.023)	(0.020)
Gal/Tan	-0.214***	-0.220***
	(0.062)	(0.069)
Gov		0.501
		(0.357)
UN		0.485**
		(0.184)
UN x Rile		-0.112***
		(0.031)
Interest		0.719
		(0.745)
Interest x Rile		-0.173
		(0.147)
Constant	-2.340***	-2.311***
	(0.345)	(0.358)
Observations	59	59
R-squared	0.444	0.523

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A9: replication of Model 1 and Model 2 only on debates in which the centre-left was in government and the position extracted including the texts containing speeches made by government representatives as a dependent variable (Support_gov) (footnote 67).

IV	Model 1 DV: Support_gov	Model 2 DV: Support_gov
Rile	0.701***	0.308
	(0.178)	(0.296)
Rile x Rile	-0.093***	-0.062**
	(0.027)	(0.027)
Gal/Tan	-0.000	0.105
	(0.085)	(0.082)
Gov		0.887**
		(0.383)
UN		-0.089
		(0.462)
UN x Rile		-0.009
		(0.082)
Interest		-1.080
		(0.605)
Interest x Rile		0.200
		(0.130)
Constant	-0.801**	-0.645
	(0.268)	(0.672)
Observations	45	45
R-squared	0.473	0.634

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A10: replication of Model 1 and Model 2 with the addition of the variable measuring for party extremism (Extreme) and the position extracted including the texts containing speeches made by government representatives as a dependent variable (Support_gov) (footnote 67).

IV	Model 1 DV:Support_gov	Model 2 DV: Support_gov
Rile	0.033	0.109
	(0.088)	(0.099)
Gov		0.958***
		(0.163)
Gal/Tan	-0.010	-0.037
	(0.071)	(0.061)
Extreme	-0.048**	-0.049***
	(0.017)	(0.015)
UN		0.544*
		(0.270)
UN x Rile		-0.129**
		(0.050)
1.Interest		0.330
		(0.372)
0b.Interest#co.Rile		0.000
		(0.000)
1.Interest#c.Rile		-0.070
		(0.079)
Constant	0.017	-0.601*
	(0.305)	(0.277)
Observations	104	104
R-squared	0.108	0.493

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Chapter 3

Table A11: summary of all the votes and parties included in the dataset (footnote 85).

Date	**Cabinet**	**Parties**	**Mission**	**Act**
29/09/94	Berlusconi I	AN, PDS/DS CCD-CDU, FI/PdL, LN, PPI-Dem, PRC	Multiple	Decree
16/05/95	Dini	AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FI/PdL, LN, PPI-Dem, PRC	UNMIBH	Decree
11/07/95	Dini	AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FI/PdL, LN, PPI-Dem, PRC	UNOSOM	Decree
02/08/96	Prodi I	AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PPI-Dem, PRC	UNMIBH	Decree
18/03/97	Prodi I	AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PPI-Dem, PRC	Multiple	Decree
09/04/97	Prodi I	AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PPI-Dem, PRC	Alba	Resolution
17/06/97	Prodi I	AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PPI-Dem, PRC	Alba	Decree
01/07/97	Prodi I	AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PPI-Dem, PRC	UNMIBH	Decree
30/07/97	Prodi I	AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PPI-Dem, PRC	Alba	Decree
04/12/97	Prodi I	AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PPI-Dem, PRC	Alba	Decree
10/03/98	Prodi I	AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PPI, PRC	Joint Forge	Decree
30/07/98	Prodi I	AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PPI-Dem, PRC	Multiple	Decree
02/03/99	D'Alema I	AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PdCI, PPI-Dem, PRC	Multiple	Decree
26/03/99	D'Alema I	AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PdCI, PPI-Dem, PRC	Allied Force/Allied Harbour	Resolution
13/04/99	D'Alema I	AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PdCI, PPI-Dem, PRC	Allied Force/Allied Harbour	Resolution

19/05/99	D'Alema I	AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PdCI, PPI-Dem, PRC	Allied Force/Allied Harbour	Resolution
16/06/99	D'Alema I	AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PdCI, PPI-Dem, PRC	Multiple	Decree
13/07/99	D'Alema I	AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PdCI, PPI-Dem, PRC	Multiple	Decree
25/11/99	D'Alema I	AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PdCI, PPI-Dem, PRC	Multiple	Decree
06/03/00	D'Alema II	AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PdCI, PPI-Dem, PRC	Multiple	Decree
26/07/00	Amato II	AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PdCI, PPI-Dem, PRC	Multiple	Decree
07/02/01	Amato II	AN, PDS/DS, CCD-CDU, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, PdCI, PPI-Dem, PRC	Multiple	Decree
02/08/01	Berlusconi II	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Multiple	Decree
09/10/01	Berlusconi II	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Enduring Freedom	Resolution
17/10/01	Berlusconi II	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Allied Harmony	Decree
07/11/01	Berlusconi II	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Enduring Freedom	Resolution
29/01/02	Berlusconi II	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Enduring Freedom	Decree
14/02/02	Berlusconi II	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Multiple	Decree
04/06/02	Berlusconi II	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Multiple	Decree
03/10/02	Berlusconi II	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Enduring Freedom	Resolution
20/02/03	Berlusconi II	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Multiple	Decree
19/03/03	Berlusconi II	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Iraqi Freedom	Resolution

15/04/03	Berlusconi II	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Iraqi Freedom	Resolution
24/07/03	Berlusconi II	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Iraqi Freedom	Decree
10/03/04	Berlusconi II	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Multiple	Decree
20/05/04	Berlusconi II	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Iraqi Freedom	Resolution
13/07/04	Berlusconi II	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Multiple	Decree
14/07/04	Berlusconi II	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Multiple	Decree
27/10/04	Berlusconi II	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Iraqi Freedom	Resolution
15/03/05	Berlusconi II	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Iraqi Freedom	Decree
16/03/05	Berlusconi II	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Multiple	Decree
12/07/05	Berlusconi III	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Multiple	Decree
21/07/05	Berlusconi III	AN, PDS/DS, FdV, FI/PdL, LN, Mar, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Iraqi Freedom	Decree
19/07/06	Prodi II	AN, FI/PdL, FdV, IdV, LN, PD, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Multiple	Decree
26/09/06	Prodi II	AN, FI/PdL, FdV, IdV, LN, PD, PdCI, PRC, UDC	UNIFIL	Decree
08/03/07	Prodi II	AN, FI/PdL, FdV, IdV, LN, PD, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Multiple	Decree
21/02/08	Prodi II	AN, FI/PdL, FdV, IdV, LN, PD, PdCI, PRC, UDC	Multiple	Decree
19/11/08	Berlusconi IV	IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC	EUMM Georgia	Decree
21/01/09	Berlusconi IV	IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC	Multiple	Decree

17/12/09	Berlusconi IV	IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC	Multiple	Decree
20/01/10	Berlusconi IV	IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC	ISAF	Resolution
03/03/10	Berlusconi IV	IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC	Multiple	Decree
21/07/10	Berlusconi IV	IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC	Multiple	Decree
28/07/09	Berlusconi IV	IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC	Multiple	Decree
25/01/11	Berlusconi IV	IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC	Multiple	Decree
15/02/11	Berlusconi IV	IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC	ISAF	Resolution
24/03/11	Berlusconi IV	IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC	Unified Protector	Resolution
04/05/11	Berlusconi IV	IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC	Unified Protector	Resolution
02/08/11	Berlusconi IV	IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC	Unified Protector	Decree
01/02/12	Monti	IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC	Multiple	Decree
04/07/12	Monti	IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC	UNSMIS	Decree
22/01/13	Monti	IdV, LN, PD, FI/PdL, UDC	Multiple	Decree

Table A12: Replication of logit models with clustered standard error for parties (footnote 91).

IV	Model 1 DV: Support	Model 2 DV: Support	Model 3 DV: Support
Rile	0.549*	1.026***	0.593**
	(0.303)	(0.268)	(0.277)
Rile x Rile	-0.037	-0.106***	-0.089**
	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.042)
Gal/Tan	0.205	0.436***	0.497***
	(0.132)	(0.163)	(0.164)
Gov		4.150***	2.518**
		(0.600)	(1.114)
Gov x Rile			0.917**
			(0.448)
Decree		1.396***	0.405*
		(0.286)	(0.246)
Decree x Rile			0.235***
			(0.090)
Constant	-1.333***	-4.812***	-3.611***
	(0.508)	(0.630)	(0.542)
Observations	483	483	483

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A13: Replication of the probit models with random effect for parties (footnote 91).

IV	Model 1 DV = Support	Model 2 DV = Support	Model 3 DV = Support
Rile	0.074	0.402*	0.081
	(0.211)	(0.229)	(0.267)
Rile x Rile	0.001	-0.048*	-0.040
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.027)
Gal/Tan	0.217*	0.339***	0.422***
	(0.111)	(0.123)	(0.137)
Gov		2.395***	1.406**
		(0.277)	(0.548)
Gov x Rile			0.599*
			(0.353)
Decree		0.873***	0.261
		(0.202)	(0.411)
Decree x Rile			0.163*
			(0.089)
Constant	-0.627	-2.626***	-1.872***
	(0.470)	(0.536)	(0.634)
Observations	483	483	483
Number of parties	13	13	13

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A14: Replication of the models with clustered standard error for votes (footnote 91).

IV	Model 1 DV: Support	Model 2 DV: Support	Model 3 DV: Support
Rile	0.347***	0.583***	0.349*
	(0.108)	(0.164)	(0.209)
Rile x Rile	-0.025*	-0.060***	-0.053**
	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.021)
Gal/Tan	0.129***	0.258***	0.300***
	(0.043)	(0.072)	(0.073)
Gov		2.319***	1.586***
		(0.324)	(0.488)
Gov x Rile			0.416**
			(0.198)
Decree		0.798***	0.239
		(0.228)	(0.505)
Decree x Rile			0.142
			(0.114)
Constant	-0.830***	-2.772***	-2.160***
	(0.251)	(0.376)	(0.518)
Observations	483	483	483

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A15: replication of the Probit models with random effects for votes (footnote 91).

IV	Model 1 DV: Support	Model 2 DV: Support	Model 3 DV: Support
Rile	0.452***	0.788***	0.553**
	(0.132)	(0.191)	(0.220)
Rile x Rile	-0.036**	-0.081***	-0.079***
	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.024)
Gal/Tan	0.147**	0.301***	0.350***
	(0.062)	(0.093)	(0.100)
Gov		2.827***	2.006***
		(0.372)	(0.606)
Gov x Rile			0.448
			(0.326)
Decree		1.005***	0.301
		(0.337)	(0.528)
Decree x Rile			0.194*
			(0.100)
Constant	-1.016***	-3.503***	-2.840***
	(0.262)	(0.563)	(0.632)
Observations	483	483	483
Number of votes	62	62	62

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A16: replication of the Probit models with the addition of the variable measuring for party extremism (Extreme) (footnote 91).

IV	Model 1 DV: Support	Model 2 DV: Support	Model 3 DV: Support
Rile	0.093	-0.015	-0.180
	(0.118)	(0.120)	(0.117)
Extreme	-0.025	-0.060***	-0.053**
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Gal/Tan	0.129*	0.258***	0.300***
	(0.075)	(0.083)	(0.091)
Gov		2.319***	1.586**
		(0.276)	(0.626)
Gov x Rile			0.416*
			(0.249)
Decree		0.798***	0.239*
		(0.157)	(0.133)
Decree x Rile			0.000
			(0.000)
Decree x Rile			0.142***
			(0.048)
Constant	-0.194	-1.276***	-0.839*
	(0.385)	(0.424)	(0.475)
Observations	483	483	483

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A17: multinomial logit models with opposition votes as a base outcome (footnote 91).

IV	Model 1 Abstentions	Model 1 Yes	Model 2 Abstentions	Model 2 Yes	Model 3 Abstentions	Model 3 Yes
Rile	0.239	0.585*	0.404	1.219***	0.592	0.547*
	(0.695)	(0.333)	(0.584)	(0.405)	(0.613)	(0.310)
Rile x Rile	-0.007	-0.040	-0.035	-0.127***	-0.047	-0.105**
	(0.061)	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.055)	(0.045)
Gal/Tan	0.139	0.210	0.246	0.489**	0.237	0.576***
	(0.189)	(0.156)	(0.242)	(0.230)	(0.260)	(0.218)
Gov			1.465***	4.663***	2.129**	2.690***
			(0.504)	(0.590)	(0.859)	(1.041)
Decree			0.265	1.765***	0.309	0.262
			(0.376)	(0.379)	(0.949)	(0.194)
Gov x Rile					0.169	0.986**
					(0.332)	(0.429)
Decree x Rile					-0.002	0.373***
					(0.140)	(0.066)
Constant	-2.944***	-1.519**	-3.705***	-5.962***	-4.267***	-4.001***
	(1.075)	(0.610)	(0.929)	(0.914)	(1.077)	(0.564)
Observations	483	483	483	483	483	483

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Chapter 4

Table A18: Composition of D'Alema I cabinet at the beginning of the legislature (1998) (footnote 103).

Party	Share of Total Seats (Chamber of Deputies	Share of Total Seats (Senate)	Share of majority (Chamber of Deputies)	Share of Majority (Senate)	Share of Cabinet Posts (Ministers)
DS	26,83% (169)	32,31% (105)	49,71% (169)	51,98% (105)	28,00% (7)
PPI	10,63% (67)	9,54% (31)	19,71% (67)	15,35% (31)	20,00% (5)
UDR	4,13% (26)	6,15% (20)	7,65% (26)	9,90% (20)	12,00% (3)
PdCI	3,33% (21)	1,85% (6)	6,18% (21)	2,97% (6)	8,00% (2)
FdV	2,38% (15)	4,31% (14)	4,41% (15)	6,93% (14)	8,00% (2)
RI	3,65% (23)	2,15% (7)	6,76% (23)	3,47% (7)	8,00% (2)
SDI	1,27% (8)	0,92% (3)	2,35% (8)	1,49% (3)	4,00% (1)
Others	1,75% (11)	2,46% (8)	3,24% (11)	3,96% (8)	12,00% (3)
Total	53,97% (340)	62,15% (202)	100% (340)	100% (202)	100% (25)

Table A19: Composition of Berlusconi IV cabinet at the beginning of the legislature (2008) (footnote 103).

Party	Share of Total Seats (Chamber of Deputies)	Share of Total Seats (Senate)	Share of majority (Chamber of Deputies)	Share of majority (Senate)	Share of cabinet posts (ministers)
PdL	43,65% (275)	45,34% (146)	80,17% (275)	83,91% (146)	80,95% (17)
LN	9,52% (60)	8,07% (26)	17,49% (60)	14,94% (26)	19,05% (4)
Others	1,27% (8)	0,62% (2)	2,33% (8)	1,15% (2)	0
Total	54,44% (343)	54,03% (174)	100% (343)	100% (174)	100 % (21)

Table A20: Overview of the interviews (footnote 106)

Interviewee	**Case**	**Party**	**Date**
1	Kosovo	PdCI	27/02/19
2	Kosovo	PdCI	13/03/19
3	Kosovo	PdCI	12/04/19
4	Kosovo	FdV	07/05/19
5	Kosovo	FdV	16/04/19
6	Kosovo	FdV	07/05/19
7	Kosovo	DS	18/03/19
8	Libya	PdL	12/03/18
9	Libya	PdL	20/04/18
10	Libya	PdL	30/04/19
11	Libya	LN	29/03/18
12	Libya	LN	08/05/19
13	Libya	LN	28/05/19