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Social Movement Participation and Social Protests in Georgia

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Abstract

There is a long-lasting debate on reasons and causes of social movement participation. Scholars suggest different explanations from the perspective of one or another theory. However, the theoretical and empirical fact is that there is a dearth of sociological literature on systematic, integrated approach covering multiple factors from different levels of movement participation. To address this problem and contribute to the multifactored approach, the objective of this paper is to develop a Model of movement participation, which is based on and derived from the theoretical and empirical analysis. The Model is developed which further is examined in case study of Georgian social protests. In this way the generated and further developed Model is not only analyzed in context of the corresponding literature but also examined in a practical setting. Due to novelty of the study, qualitative approach has been applied. Overall, research proved theoretical and empirical application of the two Models. The first one is a General Model where external and internal factors are given in hierarchy. As for the second Model, it is a continuation of the General Model. Specifically, it focuses on one of the stages of the General Model – framing process. The later is the major focus of the paper. The study is an important contribution to the sociological literature on social movements' participation.

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1. Introduction

There is a long-lasting debate on reasons and causes of social movement participation. Scholars suggest different explanations from the perspective of one or another theory. Proponents of political opportunity paradigm (Tarrow 1998, Meyer 2004, Finkel&Muller 1998) argue that major instigator of social movement emergence is political context and its features. Scholars of resource mobilization theory (McCarthy et al. 2001; Zald&McCarthy, 1979, 1980; Buechler 1999) focus on resources and rational calculations as the key determinants in joining social protests. At the same time the new experiences of protesting demonstrated the narrow focus and biased approach to the issue. This is when the new Models have brought the wave back to the other side of the range. Nowadays, an increasing number of studies not only pay attention to the role of cultural factors in social mobilization but also there are attempts to consider variables from different theories in one conceptual and/or analytical framework. Advocates for cultural factors, specifically proponents of frame theory (Benford 2000, Benford&Snow 2000), while describing the construction of new meanings and ideas clearly ignore context of the mobilization. To add to this, analytical concepts of frame theory at much extant is limited to theoretical analysis (Scheufele 2004). A number of components in the theory are seen problematic when it comes to practical application. On the other hand, political process theory suggests one of the most systematic and consistent approaches where three different components - political opportunities, indigenous organization and cognitive liberation - constitute to one outcome (McAdam et al. 2001, McAdam 1982). However, even among its advocates, one can find strong preferences to the one or the other components, which bring us, back to the same single-paradigm approach. The theoretical and empirical fact is that there is a dearth of sociological literature on systematic, integrated approach covering multiple factors from different levels of movement participation. To address this problem and contribute to the multifactored approach, the objective of this paper is to develop a theoretical and empirical Model which integrates important variables from the mentioned theories.

The Model(s)[1] of movement participation is developed which further is examined in Georgian social protests. The Model(s) was initially generated based on the Model and findings of my previous paper on another set of social protests in Georgia. The Initial Model,

[1] In the framework of the given paper two Models were built where one is a General Model and the second one is the part and continuation of the General Model. This is clarified further in the chapter.

which was focused only on interpretations from the frame theory, has been used as a basis of the new Model(s) in this paper. In particular, in the first part of the paper Initial Model with the other findings was put into context of the literature review and was analyzed and revised accordingly. As a result of this, two Models (General Model and a Model of hierarchical scheme of frames) have been developed which further was examined in different cases of social protests.

Georgian social protests made a convenient case for examining the Models (particular focus is on the second Model – hierarchical scheme of frames) as they all provided a similar context for social mobilization. The case study on six social protests had one major thing in common – they all took place under the rule of the second President of Georgia - Eduard Shevardnadze. Georgian people were experiencing the same bad living conditions nothing to say about corruption, political crisis and other evils of the government during Shevadnadze's presidency which was from 1995 to 2003. But it was only in 2003 when a mass mobilization happened against the President and the government. There have been a plethora of political interpretations on the issue but none has covered sociological explanations on both external and internal reasons of the mass mobilization as well as small mobilizations in the earlier period of Shevardnadze's presidency. Based on revised and further developed Model(s) I argue that confluence of macro and micro mobilizations lead to a large-scale social mobilization. Namely, the second part of the study, based on the Models, sets out hypothesis regarding the importance of the certain factors in people's participation in the mobilization. According to the Models large-scale social mobilization occur under the following necessary conditions:

a) *A type of political system* should allow civil activism and protest rally
b) Political, social or economic change or a situation should be perceived as a *public concern* and as a problem needing *urgent actions for solution*
c) Potential participants should perceive their struggle for problem solution as a worthwhile action: success is possible
d) Potential participants should perceive that *their contribution* in collective action *does matter* (as a large-scale mobilization matter)
e) Potential participants should perceive that it is their *moral obligation* to participate for better developments of their country
f) The ideas and messages that are conveyed by movement campaign should *resonate* beliefs and values of a target group
g) Promoted messages and ideas should reach as many people as possible: *diffusion*

Taking into consideration the fact that there is no sociological research done so far on social protests under Shevardnadze's rule, the part two covers qualitative research on the issue. The primary data collection was done through Georgian TV and printed media and in-depth interviews with representatives of the government, independent experts, and organizers of the protests, including opposition and NGO leaders, protesters as well as those who abstained from participation. By focusing on political, social and economic situation of protest rallies, key events and changes were identified. Moreover, messages and underlying reasons of the actions that were used in movement campaign were revealed. At the same time, comparison of highlighted frames of six cases (protests 2000-2003[2]) in sample media also detected salient sentiments for the each mobilization as well as the key factors responsible for action. Based on an in-depth analysis, a prominence of all the frames of the Model on hierarchical scheme of frames were revealed. Considering the novelty of the study and the specificity of the methodology, new trends concerning external stimuli and variables from meso mobilization identified and included in the paper.

This study is important for two reasons: firstly, no literature analysis has been undertaken on comprehensive and at the same time concrete multifactored approach. Most of the theory-driven Models are either too vague or are limited to one-dimensional explanations. Moreover, when it comes to cultural factors, the existing Models and theoretical or conceptual frameworks are usually hard to apply to actual cases. In this paper a systematic approach of qualitative research on the issue is demonstrated. Secondly, considering the second part of the paper there is no sociological research conducted on the given social protests in Georgia. Hence, this empirical study will form a starting point of in-depth understanding of this phenomenon and a base for future research on the topic. Overall, this paper aims to be a starting point of theoretical and empirical work on multifactored approach, in the framework of which the Models will be further revised through future research.

[2] As it is mentioned in previous section Shevardnadze's presidency was from 1995 to 2003. There have been no protest mobilizations against the regime till 2000. Hence, starting year of social protests under Shegvardnadze's rule is 2000. Herafter, social protests 2000-2003 is used.

PART I

2. Model of Movement Participation

This chapter outlines the development of schematic Model of social movement participation (hereafter *the Model*). The Model is based on the Model (hereafter *Initial Model*) revealed from the empirical study on November mobilization in Georgia. This was a research paper undertaken in the framework of my graduate course in 2009. As the literature on social movements demonstrated (see the following sections), there is a considerable dearth of theoretical and empirical evidence on multifactored approach in understanding movement participation. In order to overcome this trend the objective of this chapter is to take the Initial Model as a starting point and review it in context of the corresponding literature. As a result of a detailed literature review the Model was analyzed, revised and further developed. Eventually, based on Initial Model two Models were built which are more integrated and comprehensive. The two Models aim to be a considerable addition to the scholarship of cultural paradigm as well as of multifactored approach in social movement's literature. The first Model (General Model) provides a scheme of the factors covering political opportunity theory and framing theory. As for the second one (Model of hierarchical scheme of frames), it is a continuation of the General Model. In particular it focuses only on framing process which as it is mentioned is one of the constituent part of the General Model.

The chapter consists from three sections - 2.1 Initial Model: Movement Participation Scheme (based on previous study on November Mobilization), 2.2 Literature Review, 2.3 Model(s) of Movement Participation, 2.4 Revised Model(s) of Movement Participation

2.1 Initial Model: Movement Participation Scheme (November Mobilization)

The study on November mobilization is about social protests of particular period in Georgia. Namely, the research aimed at understanding November mobilization which took place in Tbilisi in 2007. This was the largest mobilization under the rule of the third President of Georgia – Mikheil Saaksashvili. It was on the 2nd of November 2007, when citizens of the Republic of Georgia mobilized on the streets of Tbilisi to express their discontent and grievances against the government. It was the first mass mobilization against the government which came into power with almost absolute support of the Georgian population after the Rose Revolution in 2003. In Georgia as well as in the international arena everybody was

surprised to see more than twenty thousand aggrieved protesters demanding early Parliamentary election in order to change the regime; it was unexpected that following the success of the Rose Revolution when the Georgian as well as the international community witnessed the victory of popular will, people could again be discontented. The idea to overthrow a government does not surface suddenly, especially taking into account the fact that people had been living in the same economic, political and social conditions in previous years under the same government. There had been a number of attempts at mobilization; however, they always ended up with just a small number of people protesting on the streets. So, what exactly happened in November of 2007? Why did so many people mobilize in November rather than earlier? These were the questions that were addressed in the paper.

To answer the questions, based on literature review, the paper argued that in comparison to previous attempts of mobilization, an elevation of certain sentiments and beliefs made the November mobilization so special in terms of its size. Namely, the study set out three hypotheses regarding the importance of *overcoming fear, the prospects for success and the perception of individual injustice as a problem of everyone (social problem)* that determined popular participation in the mobilization. It was assumed that the November mobilization was so massive due to the articulation and amplification of the mentioned sentiments. To test the hypothesis and identify additional trends comparative analysis of all social protests (in total nine cases) under the rule of Saakashvili was explored in detail. The data was collected from printed media and interviews with protesters as well as members of diverse political parties. The focus was on frame alignment in the movement campaign as well as messages embedded in the events held outside the campaign. The data proved the propositions expressed in the hypotheses and revealed additional three frames as well as identified two conditions that determined the Model to work. As a result of this it became possible to build the schematic Model of the November Mobilization Participation. Basically, research demonstrated that the simultaneous emergence of the frames *of overcoming fear, Social Problem, Prospects for Success, injustice, Image of Enemy and Agitation on Participation along with the compatibility with the mission of collective action and diffusion factor were the factors that resulted in massive mobilization.*

Scheme 2.a: Model of Movement Participation

Based on the case study this Model works if
a) the frames are diffused and spread across the population
b) The choice of tactics and means are positively resonated by the majority of society

As we could see in the scheme the identified frames are listed hierarchically. The data revealed that, in general, grievances were the base for frame alignment in all the cases of the mobilizations. However, research showed that in protests of the early period grievances framed as injustice had only limited and sporadic coverage, in the later appearing with the frames of Image of Enemy and Agitation on Participation. The organizers of the protests made attempts, at first, to interpret the changes as unfair, intolerable decisions towards certain group of people following the establishment of causal links between the unjust situation and the government who should be blamed for. Despite crucial role of two frames, they did not guarantee the massiveness of the protests. Agitation on Participation frame appearing in the later period obviously also did not yield any feedback in terms of the size of the protest. The reasons are traced in their attachment to individual and personal disadvantages, rather than problems (frames) being discussed broadly in context of civil consciousness. On the contrary, in the movement campaign for the November mobilization, three additional frames were emerged: Overcoming Fear, Prospect for Success and Social Problem. In other words, contrary to the previous social protests under Saakashvili rule, organizers of the November mobilization in 2007 realized that the idea of injustice and its alignment to the cause was not enough for massive mobilization. Therefore, for the November campaign, together with individual injustice, the problem was shown from the perspective and in context of the community and the country. Precedence of injustice was no more seen as a problem of concrete people but as a concern of the whole country.

Organizers' rational was based on the principle that ignoring individual/minor injustices leads to the injustice that becomes rule of life in every family or community of the country. This was stressed and agitated regularly. Apart from this, a number of actions as well as catchphrases were also used continuously to amplify the potential for success and at the same time help people to overcome fear of punishment. Supported by the scholarship, it was assumed that people would not join protest if there is no hope for success or if one is afraid of punishment.

Apart from identified frames, the factors of the two conditions should also be taken into consideration. Interviews with protesters revealed that even if they agreed with the existence of the problem if the tactics and final goal was unacceptable for them the decision on joining the protest would not have been made. Although such compatibility was not deliberately agitated in the format of the frames, but it was regularly articulated and undeniably it had a positive feedback from certain number of people. As for the diffusing factor, its presence was critical. Without spreading an information and reaching potential and actual target group no mobilization could occur. Hence, it was the unity of the frames and the revealed two conditions that led to massive collective action in November, 2007, in Tbilisi, Georgia.

To sum up, the Model above showed that the revealed data allowed concluding that omission of any of the listed frame in the scheme would not result in the mass mobilization as it happened in the earlier protests. The addition of three more frames, which was revealed during analysis, was a logical and inevitable continuation and completion for already existent frames of Image of Prospects for Success, overcoming fear and Social Problem. As the Model depicts the unity of all the frames was the factor that caused massive mobilization. Hence, the hypotheses that were presented in the paper was supported by the overall data and together with other revealed trends gave good understanding of the November mobilization participation.

Despite the fact that literature on frame alignment gave a strong base for the Model discussed above, the paper had its possible limitations of the analysis that has to be acknowledged. Firstly, from empirical perspective the measure of movement participation, at larger extant, is restricted to the data obtained from the key players of the November Mobilization. So far, no relevant quantitative data based on protesters' responses exists. Secondly, from the theoretical perspective the paper omits the analysis of such factors as political opportunities, recourse mobilization as well as research on diffusion tools such as TV media and social

networks. In fact all these factors are considered per se. This makes the Model insufficiently integrated in the relevant scholarship.

To address the first problem, it is noteworthy mentioning that even without quantitative data of the protesters' opinion on the importance of the argued sentiments in the mobilization, the fact that the mobilization was massive in November, 2007 is already an indicator that those sentiments were somehow influential. Moreover, the assumptions are supported by the interviews from twenty protesters which spoke in favour of the frames' significant role in participation. Nonetheless, in order to further test the impact of the Model it is important to include more perspectives from the participants as well as those who abstained from joining the collective actions.

As for the second problem, despite the fact that the effectiveness of those alternative approaches are proved by certain studies (D'Anieri 2006, McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977, (MacAdam and Paulsen 1993, etc.), it is still argued that e.g. political context or emergence of resources solely could not explain social mobilization if not to consider relevant messages and ideas around which people actually mobilized. Furthermore, the political opportunities as an external stimulus without building relevant perception on it or without amplification of prospects for success could not result in collective action. Even though some explored events might raise political opportunities, the massive mobilization was, eventually, due to the messages carried by those events but not the opportunities itself. The same could be applied to resource mobilization as well as social networks: funding always makes sense when there is an appropriate strategy and networks or other tools for diffusion would not be effective if the diffused messages are not compatible with the recruits' ideology (McAdam, Paulsen 1993). It is needless to say that the media as a source of diffusion could have an enormous influence on people's decision, however, the frame resonance in target society is much contingent on how the situation is framed. If the content of the movement campaign or protests itself is not congruent and responsive to the needs of population no mobilization would ever occur (McAdam 1996, Morris and Mansbridge 2001).

Based on this rational, we could easily see that despite considering frames as the major instigators of collective action, factoring out the other variables would still be misleading. As further literature review demonstrates, while only social networks, funding or political opportunity could not result in collective action, solely well elaborated frame scheme could not do much without rest of the factors. Considering Initial Model in context of social movements major theories/approaches once again illustrates this. In fact, the Initial Model

revealed from the case study on November mobilization could serve as a baseline for further revision and development of the major factors that matter in social mobilization. Therefore, in order to see a detailed interaction among important factors from different theories as well as further examine the scheme of Initial Model, a thorough analysis of the relevant literature is provided in the next section.

2.2 Literature Review

This chapter outlines a literature review that captures major theories on social movements' participation. In particular, concepts from three approaches - recourse mobilization theory (Lipsky 1970; Jenkins 1983), political opportunity (Tarrow 1993; Birnbaum 1993; dellaPorta, Diani 1999) and framing theory (Snow et al., 1986; Snow and Benford, 1988, 1992) – are discussed and analyzed below. In addition to this the last section is devoted to multifactored approach (Tilly 1978, McAdam 1982) where is provided review of the scholarship on analysis of confluence of different variables from different theories in one explanation.

Each reviewed theory/approach below, focuses on a set of factors influencing emergence, development and outcome of social movements. Despite considerable amount of social protests, riots, political rallies analyzed through one or another theory, the scholarship also suggests much criticism on structural and conceptual level. It is claimed that scholars supporting one or another school of thought often utilize broad definitions as to what constitute e.g. political opportunity or what is specifically meant in resources. The same applies to cultural explanations which elements sometimes are perceived as ambiguous and vague for empirical measurements. Apart from this, in some studies, there is a narrow usage of factors within the theories resulting in overlooking other important determinants. For instance, scholars interested in political structure and opportunities never looked into cultural factors which might have equal or more important role in a particular case. Similarly, when applying cultural explanations external factors were completely excluded as if political context or emergence of variety of resources were not important at all. This, in turn, created a tradition to focus solely on a set of variables in one theory (Foran 1993; Klandermans, Kriesi and Tarrow 1988; Morris and Mueller 1992) which leaded to completely ignoring role of the factors from other theories. Nowadays this trend has been fading away as there are already steps made forward in favour of multifactored approach implying different factors within and among different theories (Melucci 2001; Bossi 2006; Obershall 1996, Kruzman 1996, Tocqueville 1955, McAdam 1982, Tilly 1978, Goldstone 1991). According to

this logic, by considering both internal and external factors in analysis, explanation becomes more sufficient and problem of narrow focus of the dominated paradigms is solved. Undeniably, the multifactored approach provides a good example of how, for example, political stimuli and collective behavior are mediated by cultural process. At the same time, in their later work some of the same scholars (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) recognize importance of all three but do not see confluence of them as a must condition. This again questions the perspective on whether the focus of explanations of social movements should be on single (one dimension of factors) theory or maltifuctored approach. To move further on the issue, I would like to draw attention to the cognitive liberation (McAdam 1982) which is also labeled as framing process (Benford&Snow 1988) or a perception of opportunity (Tocqueville 1955, Kruzman 1996). This mediated process between structure and collective action has limited understanding in the scholarship. To be more specific, the scholarship clearly demonstrates two major drawbacks: 1. there is no indication on specific system of meanings which effect lies in agitation all together at the same time 2. there is no detailed research done on interactions between external and internal processes which allows viewing cognitive liberation or as I would suggest more concrete process of construction of system of meanings in a wider context. In particular, the literature not only overlooks the importance of a Model that entails positions and interactions of political context, cultural processes, resources and collective action but also does not see those factors and processes as constituent parts of one scheme.

Obviously, scholarship on social movements is not limited to only the mentioned four but there are also other approaches that deserve equal attention. In this regard I would distinguish emotion-oriented explanation as well as New Social Movements (NSM) theory. These two are not the primary focus of the review as they are meant to be essential components of the already mentioned theories. To start with emotions, though previously rejected and seen as irrational, nowadays they are recognized as one of the important dimensions of cultural processes in analysis of social movements. As Jasper (1998) puts it any type of emotion has roots of cognitive beliefs that *are stable and predictable*. As he further elabourates *"Emotions are as much a part of culture as cognitive understandings and moral visions are, and all social life occurs in and through culture. We are socialized into feelings in the same way we learn our local culture's beliefs and values"*. This is why emotions are seen as prods to action and has the ability to readaptation or change depending on experience. This is very well illustrated in Petersen's work (2002) on ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe. He explains how emotions such as fear, hatred, rage and resentment motivate a group or community to commit collective violence against ethnic others. Jasper in his later work,

along with his colleagues (Goodwin, Polletta 2001) also distinguishes the role of such emotions as anger, indignation, fear, disgust, joy, and love. At individual level, Castells (2012) also views social movements as emotional movements. He argues that insurgency always starts with emotions rather than with planned tactics or strategy. However, just having an emotion of outrage may not be enough for decision to join protest rally. Here, Castells distinguishes positive and negative emotions that foster or hinder collective action. These are emotions that as a result of subsequent actions of SMOs either cause enthusiasm and hope or fear of punishment in the potential participants. Castells outlines immediate emotions that in order them to be translated into action SMOs have to provoke emotions on another level. The later is what leads individuals to act. In case of social movements we have emotion as either direct reaction to the change or as a deliberate act of causing one or another emotion that would motivate an individual to join a protest. Goodwin et al. (2001) uses a term of socially constructed emotion. He argues that *"some emotions are more socially constructed than others, involving more cognitive processes".* In their view, emotions that are politically relevant have more weight in social construction than other emotions. For these emotions, cultural and historical factors play an important role in the interpretation of the state of affairs by which they are generated. Therefore, as far as emotions are treated as an emerging "product" of movement campaign in target society it should be linked to the process of framing. The later, as a cultural mechanism and as one of the major focuses of the paper, is used by SM agents in order to alleviate certain sentiments, feelings and ideas in potential adherents and constituents on the way of goal accomplishment. As it is argued in the following chapter a certain frame not only corresponds to cognitive processes but also to certain emotion which eventually is translated into action. Having no special focus on emotions, but at the same time not ignoring their role, the paper focuses on construction of meanings which success does not go without causing relevant emotions. This makes them an important component of cultural paradigm.

Similar to other theories NSM theory is also a reflection of the period when it was emerged. It represents social upheavals of the late 60s onwards (Melucci, 1989; McAdam et al, 1988; Larana et al, 1994; Scott, 1995). By its composition, focus and strategy, NSM differs from social movements of the earlier period. While it has more focus on cultural and social issues as well as quality of life and self-determination in more global context, protest rallies before late 60s were more about local economic issues. Themes of new social movements are more global covering universal ideas that could easily be adopted by different societies. Apart from this, proponents of NSM theory label social movements as networked social movements of

the digital age. As Castells (2009, 2012) elabourates historically social movements depend on mechanisms of communication which determine organization and structure of collective action. In our time, development of new technologies completely changed communication process. This resulted in new forms of social movements in a sense of new types of organizational means. Although there is much debate on the role of social media and new technologies in Arab Spring, it still remains as a clear example of how facebook, Twitter and YouTube were used as a tool for online participation. Analysis of the MENA region (Waechter 2014) showed that online social networks were the major tool in not only organizing people in the streets but also building community of like-minded people online. Furthermore, online social networks and social media were critical in information diffusion locally as well as getting news out of the country. Undeniably, global themes and new opportunities of manifestation and information diffusion open new possibilities for social movement organizers. However, this does not make NSM theory much distinct in a sense of providing different explanation among other mentioned theories. In particular, the theory more accounts to the type of social movement that could simply be analyzed by each of the mentioned approach. For instance, explaining diffusion of particular social protests in framework of broader and general themes obviously coincides with the idea of master and organization-specific frames which is discussed in detail in the following sub-chapters. Another example is that special emphasis on the new means of organization calls out RMT which major focus lies on recourses and obviously implies tools of new social movements as well. Therefore, in this review NSM theory is not discussed separately but in relation to other theories that entail the concepts of it.

2.2.1 Resource Mobilization

1960s and 1970s cycle of protests in the USA raised many questions which made the existing theories – collective behavior theory, relative deprivation, mass society theory – irrelevant. Many scholars were involved in Civil Rights Movements in the USA and the attempts to explain social upheavals showed a clear mismatch between the theories of irrationality and the observed practice. RMT, in its traditional form, views social movements as *normal, rational, institutionally-rooted, political challenges that are initiated by aggrieved groups* (Buechler 1990). Defining collective action as an ordinary social phenomenon is completely determined by the aspect of rationality. RMT, taking its roots from Rational Choice Theory, considers potential participants and adherents as rational actors who make decision on joining protest based on cost-benefit calculations (McCarthy&Zald 1977; Buechler 1993).

Strategy and tactics evolving from rationality concept and by this being central aspects in the theory, are related to the choice of resources that further influence success or failure of social movements (Brannan 2009). When we speak about availability and right utility of resources there are three major points that has to be outlined.

- *Firstly*, proponents of RMT do not, except mild references, mention about the importance of the context where certain recourses are utilized for social mobilization. In particular, choices of goals, strategies or tactics are not meant to be contingent upon certain political environment. In fact, in its extreme form, this implies that decisions, on the best possible tactics or actions, are made into *vacuum* (Meyer 2004).

- *Secondly*, literature shows that scholars are not consolidated about key resources that are influential. There are a wide variety of classificatory schemes and categories of those that matter. For example, Rogers (1974) mentions about instrumental and infra-resources; and Freeman (1979) elaborate on tangible and intangible resources. This type of classificatory schemes allows multiple interpretations on what exactly recourses are. Clearly, a problem of multiple usage arises. Therefore, some analysts just list the concrete assets – such as facilities, money, labour and legitimacy (McCarthy & Zald's 1977); land, capital, labor, and technical expertise (Tilly 1978). In fact it is hard to draw a line of the idea of recourses in the literature. It could imply anything and its definition and interpretation depend on certain cases.

- *Thirdly*, interpretation of strategic choices never entails the messages that are conveyed by them. This shows that there is obvious bias in understanding tactics and strategy. Ideas that the tactical choices imply or messages the strategic choices may convey never had a deserved attention in the theory. In particular, strategic tools to achieve the goal and their content are not considered as two components of one interpretive packages that may vary according to different target groups. Scholars of cultural paradigm have already proved that the cultural dimension is not less if not more important in understanding social movement participation. In fact, construction of new system of meanings is part of strategy and largely depends on the given social, political and economic environment.

Similar to political context as well as subjective factors, analysts looking at the processes of generating mobilization factored out much of the stuff that comprises activist grievances and emotions that accompanied them (Jenkins and Perrow 1977). In its extreme form, grievances

neither represent a milestone in resource mobilization theory (RMT) nor is considered as an important element in collective action. Instead, they are seen as relatively constant which is derived from structural conflicts of interest built into social institutions (Tilly 1978, Jenkins & Perrow1977 and Oberschall 1978). While this makes social protest similar to politics and political struggle but through other means, it completely rejects the idea of social meaning construction. Naturally, especially in earlier version, the perspective of rationality completely disregards the notions such as ideology, identity, solidarity, etc. and makes social movements a product of the purposive application of resources to a social problem. This stance is typically defended by reference to many groups who have longstanding grievances but never are able to mount any collective challenge to the social arrangements which produce those grievances. This is the major reason why RMT proponents believed that control over actual and potential resources is a more important determinant of the emergence as well as the likely success of collective action. This, clearly indicates that the dearth of empirical studies on such cases when there are reasons for aggravation and more than enough resources but people still could not find enough reasons for protesting.

RMT completely ignores elements of emotions in social mobilization. As RMT emerged as a remedy of "flawed approach" implying that collective action represented a bunch of irrational people who acted based on their instincts, it was logical that emotions as such did not have place in the theory. However, in recent literature on social movements there is a growing interest in emotions. This is caused partly due to sensitiveness to emotional aspects of collective action in feminist scholarship (Taylor, Whittier, Kleinman, and Robnett) as well as reconceptualization of the role of emotions (Goodwin et al. 2000). Undeniably, emotions are part of social life and their role cannot be replaceable or reducible by cognitive factors. Instead they have its role in cognitive processes as well as in mediation between cognition and actions.

This is refuted by some of the scholars of cultural paradigm, arguing that the social construction of grievances and emotions may be the critical step which allows members of socially dispersed groups to begin to mobilize for action. The formulation of grievances and the articulation of ideology are inseparable from cultural processes of framing, meaning and signification which are prior to any utilitarian calculation of costs and benefits. As Melucci (1989) argues costs and benefits can only be calculated meaningfully after a sense of collective identity is established. For many mobilizations, the most central process is the social construction of a collective identity that is symbolically meaningful to participants and

that logically precedes any meaningful calculation of the costs and benefits of joining in collective action. As Buechler (2000) points rightly the rational actor is "fictive" precisely because this concept detaches social beings from their cultural contexts of values, norms, meanings and significations. This is very well illustrated in case of women's liberation movements (Buechler 1990). Members of the women's liberation movement tended to be younger women with relatively less exposure to systematic gender discrimination until their activist careers in other movements. This is why the women's liberation sector of the contemporary women's movement did appear to formulate its grievances largely in the context of women's participation in parent movements which treated them unequally. Hence, the movement which has most radically challenged patriarchal power developed its grievances through interactive dynamics in parent movements which subsequently prompted the independent mobilization of women. This suggests that in some cases, grievances can be at least as important as access to resources in explaining the emergence of social movements.

McCarthy and Zald (1977) slightly expand their scope of understanding within the theory and see grievances as structurally given or "manufactured" by mobilizing effort of social movement agents. Although authors recognize construction of grievances, development of this line does not go further. Deviating from traditional framework, some analysts linked rationality of participation to improvements in the status of aggrieved groups as these changes reduced the costs of mobilization and improved the likelihood of success (Wilson 1973, Piven & Cloward 1977, Morris 1980, McAdam 1982, Ragin 1979). Without extra elaboration these authors pointed to the perceived expectation of success that makes an action worthwhile as everyone wants to be in a winning position. However, prospect for success as non-material incentive, which emerges as a result of cultural processes, was never a focus of RMT. In fact without clear references, issue of social meaning construction still emerges in the work of the proponents of RMT. This once again demonstrates that importance of cultural processes makes them hard to ignore.

Another central issue in the theory is organization. This entails structure, cadres and networks of SMOs as well as any type of entity aiming at collective action. To start from the structure, as it was mentioned above RMT views social mobilization as institutionally-rooted meaning that it has formal structure that puts it in the framework of organizational dynamic. It implies that social movements are formed because of long-term changes in not only group resources but also organization, and opportunities for collective action (Meyer 1993; Jenkins

1983). Type of organization is a very important element in the theory. Formal structure in opposition to informal one of a group creates proneness to more effective and efficient activities in seizing window of political and social opportunities on the way to final goal. This claim has been refuted by political process scholars when research revealed that in some cases of recruitment, informal networks and weak ties matter the most. In particular, they have found that the networks that form among diverse SMOs often can facilitate participation in movements (Diani 1995; Rosenthal, Fingrutd, Ethier, Karant, and McDonald 1985). Naturally, this becomes possible by linking individuals and collective action (Diani and McAdam 2004). Coalitions are also formed when dense tie exist among SMOs (Diani 2004; Rucht 1996) and when members of these organizations perceive strategic benefits in cooperating (Hathaway and Meyer 1993). While many alliances form within nations, network ties between SMOs also facilitate cooperation across national borders (Bandy and Smith 2005; Caniglia 2001; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Reimann 2001; Smith 1997). Here, critical role of transmitters and mediators are taken into consideration.

The issue of mediators and key agents is once again emphasized in the entrepreneurial Model of McCarthy & Zald (1977) where the scholars discuss one of the major roles of cadres in formation and development of social movements. As it is elaborated in their paper on partial theory, if the movement is effectively organized, has good support base and has access to media as well as relevant social networks, there can always be found enough discontent in society to supply grass-roots and instigate collective action. In other words, groups with minor resources could organize mass actions by help of institutions and corporations that do not have primary connection or interest to/in the ideas of aggrieved groups. The authors' discussion goes beyond direct beneficiaries and stress external resources that are represented by individuals or entities. This perspective stands closer to the understanding of the role of external recourses in the form of connections and informal allies through which relevant messages are diffused in target communities. Strategically recruited cadres not only play a crucial role in information diffusion but also the provide contacts of relevant people who have capacity to act as a srource of different type of support for the movement. Erikson (1997) in his work on of US-Central America Peace Movements describes how micro- and mezo- mobilization create context for collective action. What Erikson calls context I formulate it as a platform for framing and action. Erikson (1997) outlines the importance of inside and outside network, organization and institution leaders who act as a source of spreading relevant ideas and messages for mobilization. "*Preexisting, non-movement groups-such as churches, unions, or informal friendship networks-can provide the context in which*

this collective process occurs. Terming these groups "micro-mobilizing contexts" (McAdam, McCarthy, Zald 1988). The same applies to meso mobilization where connections are not within groups and communities but among them.

2.2.2 Political Opportunity

As we saw above, RMT analysts were less concerned with the political context in which movements operated and it was more focused on rationality and organizational resources. This obvious bias was solved by new experiences of social protesting in 60s, 70s and 80s in the USA. Similar to RMT, political opportunity theory emerged as a corrective explanatory mechanism which meant to fill the gaps that previous theories had. As Diani (1995) had defined it, the political opportunity theory implies 'the set of social and institutional variables that are likely to affect the development of collective action'. The connections between political structures and movements affect not only emergence (Oberschall 1996) but it also determine its process, development and outcome (Kitschelt 1986). It explicitly considers the available means for a constituency to lodge claims against authorities. The theory, similar to RMT, completely shares the idea of rational actor. On the contrary, in comparison to RMT, political opportunity approach focus on political context. It views choice of strategy and tactics as something completely dependent on given political environment.

To summarize empirical work on political opportunity theory I would follow a categorization done by Meyer and Imig (1993). The scholars organized literature on political opportunity theory in two major categories: a) the work done on political context as a function of static institution which fosters or hinders social movements and b) work on political context as a changing environment where sudden and/or single political initiatives and changes have immediate effect on social mobilization. The work of Eisinger (1973, 1974) and Tilly (1978) give a good example of the former. Both scholars develop a structure on open and closed systems where government is more or less reluctant to repress or tolerate certain protest. Kitschelt (1986) drawing on their work also explained both movement forms and policy influence with reference to formal state structures. He gives example of antinuclear activists which strategy and tactics were completely dependent on type of a state. As he argues, in France, which was characterized as a relatively closed state, activists used more confrontational tactics. On the contrary, insurgent groups in the USA chose "assimilative" approaches" because of a comparatively open political system. Behind every

open and close system there are legislation and the distribution of public benefits which encourage or discourage political activism (Pharr 2003). Political system can be categorized as an authoritarianism and democracy. Each determines the way the government exercises power and the way citizens practice their rights. Work of Della Porta and her colleagues (1998) on policing protests is a good illustration how type of political system eventually shapes response of protesters. They describe how political opportunity structure determines actions of institutional features such as police organizations. Police action, in tern, influence strategic choices and actions of protesters. Therefore, type of political system creates conducive ("open") or hindering ("close") environment for civil activism (Kitschelt 1986, Pharr 2003, Tarrow 1994). However, it does not mean that when aggrieved group of people are exposed to semi-authoritative, semi-democratic or democratic countries, civil activism and social movements would be common thing to observe. Open system is a must for emergence and maintenance of street protests but is not enough. Examples of it are the Western countries (the Westerns democracies) which existence implies the notion of active citizen having right to protest for own and the country's well-being. In other words, in this case political environment not only facilitates but also guides political or any other activism that entails defending one's rights, demanding better conditions or disputing given reality. As it is discussed in the literature review there are a wide variety of examples how civil activism promoted the development and social change (e.g. Coelho & Lieres 2010; Fominaya 2014). On the contrary, there is a "close" or authoritative system where there are no or low chances for civil activism (e.g. Mitchell 2012, Gerlach 2014). Some of the good examples of such countries are Russia, Belorus and Azerbaijan. The three countries, demonstrate how even mild sparks of street protest are diminished immediately so that in the future nobody would even think to be part of a demonstration. This was a well-tested tactic in recent history of the countries.

Tarrow's (1994) version of conducive political context for social movements also includes the degree of openness in a political system. He argues that the theory can explain why "even groups with mild grievances and few internal resources may appear in movement, while those with deep grievances and dense resources but lacking opportunities may not." This emphasis clearly counters that of collective behavior theory on grievances caused by abrupt structural change (Smelser 1962) and of resource mobilization theory on resources and organizational leadership (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Tarrow do not limit his theory to only one indicator but he suggests another four factors that imply interplay and intermediation between the state and insurgent groups as well as role of elites. This more applies to the

second category of the political opportunity theory where political context is understood as an interaction between state actions and insurgent groups. In particular, those indicators - such as stability or instability of political alignments, presence or absence of allies and support groups, divisions within the elite or its tolerance for protest, and the policymaking capacity of the government – could be subject of not only a constant feature but also a sudden change of the given environment. Both categories of political opportunity could be easily detected in the literature on the Colour Revolution. For instance, D'Anieri (2006) in his paper on the success and failure of post-communist revolutions argues that social mobilization, in particular, revolutions become possible only if influential figures in society as well as government have interest in it. He also mentions the role of security forces which ambivalence or defection considerably increases the chances of revolution. These features are usually given in case of semi-authoritarian regimes. D'Anieri draws on McFaul (2005) and Hale (2005) who, while reviewing revolutions and transition from post-communism, posit that the reactions that those regimes have "in order to avoid the fate of Kuchma and Milosevic are likely to take them out of the semi-authoritarian realm and into full authoritarianism". In other words, a country could not turn into another political system or regime in a moment. Once authoritarian regime or any other political system is established, its existence is long-lasting. Hence, it could be viewed as a constant feature. On the contrary, in case of semi-authoritative countries an even slight shift of forces could serve as a triggering event for mobilization. While examining reasons and causes of Colour Revolutions, Beissinger (2007) in his paper on the diffusion of the Colour Revolutions underlines major features of the cases where one of them was fraudulent elections. Rigged elections served as an instant stimuli for leaders of the opposition to call for action and for people to mobilize. Examples of sudden changes that instigated protesting actions are widespread in the literature. Social protests on nuclear power, environmental issues and abortion rights illustrate how sudden changes in certain political circumstances play a decisive role (Meyers 1993). To illustrate this, McAdam explains how decrease in lynching resulted in strengthening black political organizations. McAdam with other scholars (McAdam and Sewell 2001, Morris 2004, Moyer, McAllister, Finley, and Soifer 2001) also distinguish role of triggering event or as he defines it transformative event in civil rights movement. According to the scholars the events that shifted the power of movements were the Montgomery bus boycott and the Greensboro sit-ins. Freeman (1975) emphasized the important role of public policy played in the choice of tactics of the women's rights activists. The same explanatory power was given to farmers' success and failure in mobilizing challenging movements (Hansem 1985). In Iranian Revolution, Rasler (1996) points to the

cluster of events that further determined the outcome of the movements. This kind of relationship between political context and social movements was explained by the easily observable fact that political system advantaged certain constituencies and problems more than others (Bacharach and Baratz 1970; Schattschneider 1960). McAdam and Sewell (2001) also note that transformative events could not only result in the success of social movements but it also could have a demobilizing effect.

Elite role also takes one of the central places in political opportunity theory (della Porta and Diani 1999). Depending on case it may be viewed as a stable variable or as a constantly changing phenomenon which sudden presence or absence may lead to certain outcome of social movements. The useful contacts could be different in terms of goals of the activists. Tarrow's perspective on political opportunity structure has a particular stress *on access, division within elites and elite allies*. Scholars such as Walker (1983, 1991) Jenkins and Perrow (1977) distinguish role of elite support which is viewed as critical to group emergence. This is shared by Berry (1977) and McFarland (1984) who emphasize essential role of elite support for groups that pursued various visions of the public interest. To add to these I would like also to stress the role of elite defection which is also widely explored in the literature of the Colour Revolutions. In terms of elite access, it allows access to the power and manipulation with political system (Eisinger 1973). The same could be said about division within elites and elite allies. On the other hand, while elaborating on impact of elite support in social mobilization, Walker (1991) considered not only elite sponsorship but also its participation and its decision on tolerance or repression of social protests. Specifically, he emphasized how through elite support insurgent groups can achieve success in mobilizing people. This in turn created political opportunity to grasp for movement challengers and much resonated alliance structures mentioned above. As for elite defection, scholars of Colour Revolution (Bessinger 2007, D'Anieri 2006, Mitchell 2012) argue that, in the first place, it formed the capacity for preventing repressions (e.g. defection of the police, army and defense system). It also enhanced participation of those who refrained from actions due to tenure in the government or membership in certain political party. To be more specific, after elite defection of representatives of corresponding political parties it became possible for those, who just formally supported the government but in reality were very much discontent with the regime to declare their position by joining collective action.

As we see scholarship on political opportunity is quite rich and covers a wide range of political and institutional factors. Similar to RMT, POT scholars also complain on its

ambiguity on conceptual as well as empirical level (Suh 2001). Gamson and Meyer (1996) see the problem in the way it is applied. By encompassing all the conditions and circumstances in forming context for social movements the theory becomes vague in identifying specific elements of political nature. This, as the scholars posit, puts theory under the risk of explaining "*nothing at all*". Despite this, political context solely or in combination to other theories still remain one of the catalysts in social mobilization. Undeniably, it has one of the central roles in social mobilization. Many groups use collective action exactly because they are excluded and thus communicate with the decision-makers indirectly through collective action (Taylor and van Dyke 2004). Even when social movements make demands to the state, collective action often communicates primarily with society and the media. The ways how it is done is determined by the political system. However, when it comes to identifying direct causal relationship between political context and collective action it becomes unclear what are the reasons of seizing given political opportunities. As it was illustrated above, there is ample of research showing that e.g. in one country social mobilization was possible because of open system or somewhere collective action emerged right after certain political stimuli. These explanations are true though incomplete.

Social mobilization not only requires structural conditions but it also calls for the majority to perceive it as such. Even in case of triggering event or as McAdam puts it transformative events, it could not only affect success of collective action but also it could have a demobilizing effect. McAdam and Sewell, argue that the effect of transformative events depend on the way it is perceived and defined by (potential) participants of social mobilization. This reality construction process which entails, among other things, the employment of framing activity and the development of vocabularies of movement motives, micromobilization processes to which I turn in the following section.

In many studies, though without declaration, convergence among the factors of different approaches could be found. This, especially, applies to RMT and political opportunity theory. At first glance the first one focuses on resources and the second one on political structure which emphasizes the difference of two explanations. However, as soon as we go into detail, we see that none can ignore the role of the other. Therefore, in attempt to provide better explanations scholars from the two approaches started to include overlapping variables that was considered under the category of secondary importance. Apart from this, for the same reason, scholars have used broad terms and labels for the variables. Due to their definitional ambiguity, it became possible to apply the same variables but from different theories equally in the single case. In particular, scholars who base their arguments exceptionally on one or another approach unintentionally consider factors that entail the common meaning in both theories.

Both approaches recognize the role of resources. While, similar to RMT, political opportunity paradigm recognizes the role of resources, organization and strategy, it makes special emphasis on characteristics of political environment. The later is also considered in RMT, but with no additional stress. This applies especially to the later works of proponents of the theory. The role of elite groups and political allies is also another subject for common interest. As Tarrow (1991, 1994), defines, social movements represent collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, opponents and authorities. Although he specifically distinguishes social movements from political parties and advocacy groups, it is clear that role of interaction with different allies is considered as a part of political process as well as opportunity. Even in his four categories of political opportunity; Tarrow, following Jenkins and Perrow, elabourates on presence or absence of allies or support groups. On the other hand we have RMT, where among resources are understood not only knowledge, money, media, labor, solidarity and legitimacy but also internal and external support from different agencies including elite groups. The later fits the larger category of social networks which imply useful connections and relationship with people, groups or communities. The theory argues, where relevant, that social movements become possible when individuals with grievances are able to mobilize sufficient resources to take action. The emphasis on relevant contacts within social networks offers an explanation why some groups of individuals are able to influence the government

while others cannot. Here, we see that role of elite groups have political as well as resource-oriented meanings.

2.2.3 Cultural Dimension: Frame Theory

Frame theory is one of the useful works on cultural dimensions of social movements. It is principally concerned with revealing how an issue is defined and problematised, and the effect that this has on the broader discussion and subsequent actions. As Cohen (1985) puts it "collective actors consciously struggle over the power to socially construct new identities, to create democratic spaces for autonomous social action and to reinterpret norms and reshape institutions." Habermas (1987) also interprets the emergence of social protest as an outcome of conflicts arising from "system of imperatives" of modern political and economic institutions. As Billig (1995) states resource mobilization and political opportunity theories provide only narrow understanding of rational actor as it never includes the process of rethinking and revaluation of the reality (from the perspective of organizers or participants) in a way to instigate collective action. In other words not only structural conditions should be favourable but the same conditions should be perceived and defined as such. This is reality construction that entails framing activity and relevant vocabulary in order to appeal as much people as possible. Alberto Melucci in his book – Challenging Codes: Collective Age in the Information Age – along with importance of pre-existing networks emphasizes a role of subjective attitudes and interpretations in movement participation. According to him there are structural conditions providing the requisites for common motivational structure with which particular individuals can identify and recognize each other. To be more specific, the emergence of social movements depend much on how one interprets its conditions (Turner 1969, Piven & Cloward 1977, Gamson 1982, Moore 1978). Grievances or discontent are subject to differential interpretation which forms a basis for mobilization.

Despite recognition of subjective factors in social mobilization, frames as such were originally proposed by sociologist Erving Goffman (1975) in his book Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. Goffman's work was further developed by David Snow and his colleagues (Snow et al., 1986; Snow and Benford, 1987, 1988, 1992) who referred to linkages of individuals' and Social Movement Organizations' (SMOs) interpretative orientations, such as some set of individual interests, values and beliefs that are compatible to SMO activities, goals and ideology. In particular, frames provide with

interpretative packages that sees reality in a certain way which further serves as a guide for a subsequent action.

Hence, in order to cause collective action much depends on themes that are entailed by the proffered frames. In this sense frames are distinguished into two major categories. The first one is known under the name of master frame. It is broader with its scope and works at general level of analysis which allows multiple usages among diverse cases (Taylor 2000). Scholars have identified many types of master frames such as injustice frames (Carroll & Ratner 1996, Gamson et al 1982); human rights frames (Karagiannis 2009, Valocchi 1996, Williams & Williams 1995); environmental justice frames (Cable & Shriver 1995, Capek 1993); the political-economy frame, the identity politics frame, and the liberal frame (Ratner 1996); Democracy frame (Noonan 1995), etc. The second type of frames is more specific and is contingent upon given conditions and/or context. Scholars have used different labels for it: movement-specific frames (Benford and Snow 2000), organizational frames (Evans 1997) or subframes (Moussa 2014). This type of frames always imply a master frame which serves as an umbrella uniting similar issues under one general theme. However, if the connection is not made between master frame and organization-specific frame then the later would remain very much localized and specific. For this reason, in comparison to master frame movement-specific frames do not usually work in other cases and are determined by specific problems concerning certain community.

The nature of the theme of the frame is evident in the development (e.g. size and duration) of collective action. By characterizing single or series of social protests much could be said about the agitated themes and their effect. In this regard, the two categories of frames are analogous to new/modern and old/traditional repertoires of social movements. As Tilly argues, in comparison to new social movements, old ones were "parochial, bifurcated and particular". In other words in old repertoires social protest initiators' and organizers' interests were only relevant for a single community, the actions were direct without involvement of third parties or any other mediators and the actions varied greatly from one group to another. This, in its extreme form, characterizes the organization-specific frames. On the contrary, Tilly views new repertoires as "cosmopolitan, modular, and autonomous in character", as are master frames. To be more specific, as it was mentioned above, master frames integrate the issues that are relevant for many and not only neighboring societies. This makes it easily transferable from one setting to another. To add to this Tarrow's version of traditional and modular repertoires are also in line with Tilly's version of old and new repertoires which makes them congruent with the two categories of frames. In other words,

while organization-specific frames correspond to direct specific and rigid movements (traditional repertoires); master frames could be characterized as indirect, general and flexible (modular repertoires). Both Tilly and Tarrow blame type of repertoire for the size and duration of social protests. However, their argument is based on the two type of political system (in 18th and 19th century Europe) that further determined shift from corporations into associations. Despite this it is clear that their perspective is not only relevant for specific time period in history but they easily could be adopted in contemporary social movements. Even nowadays, we not only witness a well organized social protest but also a very immediate and spontaneous collective action which usually without clear strategy diminish quickly.

Both master themes and organization-specific themes could be represented in frames as well as counterframes. This means that while there are wide diversity of meanings of different aspects of reality in any society, proponents and opponents of certain issues are generated, further reconfirmed or rejected. In a similar way, in process of adhering to pro- or against themes, the major role has framing and counerframing processes. As Chong and Druckman (2011) point out counter-frame is a frame that "opposes an earlier effective frame". At the same time, Benford argues that frames do not emerge in isolation but they are interdependent with the themes and stances that were before. It is called contested processes where the stronger wins over the weaker one. There is a good study on stigma of dementia where absence of counter frames/framing confirmed negative image of the disease (Van Gorp and Vercruysse 2012). Authors revealed that more deployment of counter frames in communication about dementia increased the likelihood of preventing the stigma that surrounded dementia. In context of social movements Benford refers to contested processes that facilitate competitive environment for different meanings which victory or lose is directly linked to the certain outcome (e.g. size of collective action, regime change) of social protest.

Frames are not only about the themes but they entail strategy and tactics that further determine actions. These are essential components of framing or counterframing activities. In fact those activities completely determine the size of social protest or any other goal that is set by SMOs.

2.2.3.1 Frame Alignment Processes

Among framing activities in social movements literature the most empirical attention was drawn to strategic framing. By strategic processes, the scholars mean deliberative and goal directed process that are developed and deployed to achieve a specific purpose. Strategic efforts that imply linking SMO interests, values and beliefs with those of potential constituents is known under the name of frame alignment. As scholars put it, frame alignment refers to "the process of linking the individual's interpretive framework with that of the social movement's". There are four frame alignment processes: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension and frame transformation. The four kinds of processes took its roots from Goffman's framing theory which was reconciled with the scholars' research on four different movements: Nichiren Shoshu, Hare Krishna, nuclear disarmament, urban neighborhood NIMBY mobilization. In particular, each frame alignment process was derived from the concrete situation and become the major focus of the strategy of SMOs. For instance, in order to increase the pool of participants, SMOs integrated two ideologically similar but on structural level different frames which was labeled as frame bridging (Taylor 2000, McCallion & Maines 1999, Gerhards & Rucht 1992). The second frame alignment process is frame amplification. This is used in order to make a proffered interpretive framework clearer, more certain and stronger for a target group. This is also one of the major components in discursive processes. Focus of frame amplification is either on beliefs or values (Goffman, 1974; D. A. Snow et al. 1986; Rokeach, 1973; Williams, 1970, Benford and Snow 2000, Moussa 2013). As for the other two, the one – frame extension – occurred when SMOs started to target those communities which normally were not their target group. They broadened movements' interpretive work to entail interests that were not directly relevant to their main objectives but were primary concern of new target groups. On the other hand frame transformation implied replacement of one system of meaning with a completely new one (Pratiwi 2007).

The success or potency of framing strategies depends on their internal coherence, empirical credibility and experiential commensurability, the later referring to the actual intrusion of a situation into the lives of potential movement participants. Another factor affecting frame resonance concerns the alignment between the goals and values of the movement and the life world and culture of the intended audience (Morgan 2013). This will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.

2.2.3.2 Diagnostic and Prognostic Framing Tasks

As Benford and Snow put it, the first core framing task refers to problem identification and attributions (2000). In particular, diagnostic framing task implies not only diagnosis of some situation as troublesome but also entails identification of victims and attribution of blame or causality. Snow referring to Gamson (Gamson et.al 1982, 1992) mostly talks about injustice frames or "grievances" that create readiness for collective action. This is about recasting once tolerable situation as unacceptable and unbearable (Nadeem 2008). In diagnosing given situation injustice frame is applied in wide variety of studies and is even meant to be crucial part of every collective action (Gamson et al. 1982, 1992). Though this is criticized by Snow and Benford (2000) claiming that social movements such as religious one does not contain injustice component, almost all the protests targeting the government usually imply injustice (Anheier et al 1998, Cable&Shriver 1995, Capek 1993, Carroll&Ratner 1996, Klandermans & Goslinga 1996, Klandermans et al 1999). Literature also demonstrates how such movements also make special emphasis on the victims of promoted injustice (Benford&Hunt 1992, Best 1987, Capek 1993, Hunt et al 1994, Jasper & Poulsen 1995, Jenness 1995, Weed 1997, White 1999).

As for attribution component of diagnostic framing task, it is about finding the blamer of the problem or issue. When the problem and the victim are identified it is crucial to name an agent who holds responsibility. By this social movement organizers identify responsible agents and divert people's action to a target. It is noteworthy mentioning that consensus regarding the framed problem does not necessarily mean agreement with the source of the problem. As Benford (1987, 1993) demonstrated in his study on the 1980s nuclear disarmament movement this attribution component was a subject for dispute among different SMOs. In the same way the antagonistic groups may distinguish themselves from one another based on who blames who for the same problem. So as we see, while in the most cases the issue of a victim and victimization are implied in injustice frame, component of a blamer needs individual articulation and amplification in order to make ones argument more persuasive than those of opponents.

The next core framing task is prognosis. This task addresses solutions to diagnosed problem (Snow and Byrd 2012) and includes the specification of strategies, tactics and targets (Benford 1993). In this task SMOs focus either on a specific solution or make a special stress on strategy and plan of action or the both are equally important in process of framing. At the

same time the same solution or tactic could be viewed as one or another depending objectives and goals of SMO. For instance, in protest rallies that aim at changing regime, solution would be regime change and the means would be non-violent collective action. This is well illustrated in the most cases of Colour Revolutions in post-Soviet countries. Similarly, depending on how the situation is labeled and interpreted, collective action can serve as a solution or part of a strategy. Such variations in interpretation depend on the situation needs that is defined by SMO members. Although there is no indication on particular prognostic task frames, the scholarship allows seeing importance of frames on solutions. Some studies (--) show that success of social movements may depend on whether target society is ready or not for proffered solutions and tactics. If the solution seems unrealistic or unacceptable none will follow the SM organizers. Similar to the attributional component of injustice frame, prognostic dimension could also be a reason of dispute between different SMOs or other agents who hold responsibility for organizing social protests (Haines 1996). Moreover, it could be also a subject of "competition" between different agents on the way of appealing more people (Zuo and Benfrod 1995). Despite mentioned studies on the issue, there is an obvious lack of attention on examining solution in a form of a specific frame. Existing literature is limited to considering solution as a dimension or a factor but not as a frame which has its own components and ways of exploration.

Both the diagnosis and prognosis represent consensus mobilization (Klandermans 1984) meaning that rationalization of the issue is done. In other words identified problems, blamers and solutions are put into logical chain of reasoning. This creates the content based on which action should be driven. Therefore, in the first place, it is important to achieve compatibility of all the components of the two framing tasks in order to have desired results. Although existing scholarship do not directly consider frames from framing tasks in format of different stages, tasks themselves demonstrate that they could work only in a consequential way. As we see frames of prognostic framing task provides a solution to the problem, posed by diagnostic framing (Benford 2005). Naturally, if the situation is not "diagnosed" it is impossible to seek for remedy. In many ways the two tasks function in a complementary manner within a single social movement and this is why some scholars (e.g. Benford 2005) argue that presence of only one of these two general types of frames puts planned protest rally under the risk of failing. Snow and Corrigall-Brown (2005) also claim that when there is strong emphasis on only one framing task it is most likely that SMOs would not be successful in motivating potential participants in joining protest. From this stems that in order to achieve the final goal it is crucial to have diagnostic and prognostic tasks for the beginning.

These two tasks serve as a basis for further activities –action mobilization - of SMOs. To add to this, the success of frames from consensus mobilization, in particular frame on problem identification (e.g. injustice) completely depends on if and how they are articulated and amplified.

2.2.3.3 Motivation

The next and last core framing task is motivational one which is about action mobilization. This entails persuading supporters to participate in movement activities. After defining their situation and developing a strategy, organizers are faced with the task of convincing movement members that the cause they are fighting for is worthy of action. This framing task heavily relies on organizers ability to construct "vocabularies of motive" (Mills 1940). Motivational vocabulary is crucial in order to transform ideas into actions. According to Benford (1993) there are *four generic vocabularies of motive*: *severity, urgency, efficacy and propriety.* These are socially constructed vocabularies that provide potential participants with compelling accounts for engaging in collective action and for sustaining their participation. These vocabularies are used in slogans, catchphrases or speeches which represent a set of motivational frames. Although Benford does not mention specific frames that could be categorized in a motivational dimension the scholarship allows distinguishing a number of frames that convey and represent 'vocabularies of motive'. Vocabulary of motives are either considered as a constituent part of a certain frame (Della Porta 2014) or they are just explored as general sentiments or factors that affect social mobilization. In fact Snow and Benford who develop the rational on vocabularies of motive never define them strictly in the framework of frames or strictly in the form of motives. To add to this there are also studies on frames which without declaring convey the same concepts as are outlined in the four motives.

To start with the four already identified vocabularies of motives (or motivational vocabulary), I will refer to the Benford's study on disarmament activists. The study clearly illustrates framing activities and their effects on individuals' actions. The first motive, *severity*, requires distinguishing two sides of one concept: a problem as a concern of everyone and a problem as the most troublesome issue that needs urgent action. As Benford shows in his study, when the majority agreed with the seriousness of the "the immensity of the nuclear dangers" in the survey, a very small number of the same people joined actual protests. This was explained by a public apathy and lack of understanding. Hence, one thing

is knowledge about the existence of the problem and the other thing is to realize that the given problem is the most troublesome. Injustice frame, which is viewed as a frame of diagnostic task, could also entail the motive of severity and urgency. It depends on how injustice frame is framed. In particular, if SMO target a particular group where it aims at simply recasting once tolerable condition as intolerable then it does not go beyond diagnostic frame. In this case the severity is the part of framing activity which would imply severity of that concrete problem. On the contrary, if SMO refers to wider audience with the claims that the injustice is not the problem of single community or a group but it is an issue for the whole population then the goal is to emphasize and amplify social nature of the problem and its urgent solution. Here, again SMOs either just give the description of the problem or they constantly emphasize the most troublesome nature of the issue which is concern of the whole group/community/country. In Initial Model we have frame of social problem which stresses not only social nature of the problem, in a sense that the issue is not a concern of one individual or two, but it also implies amplifying the alarming nature of the issue. Considering the motive of severity as a frame is not only demonstrated in my previous study but it is also supported by other empirical evidence reviewed in this chapter above.

Sense of urgency is another motive conveyed in framing activities that has to be taken into account and without which the severity of the problem would not lead to action. As Benford elaborates further, even if the pool of supporters understand seriousness of the problem they still may not be ready for action. The main reason for this is seen in lack of awareness in the fact that without *immediate* actions undesirable consequences would emerge straight away. Hence, framing activity should be developed in a way to clearly show that if urgent action would be delayed, devastating results would occur. This motive has to be linked to the frame of solution from prognostic task. As it was mentioned above, prognostic task entails not only solution but also strategy and tactics that logically cover urgency of actions. In other wards as the severity can be linked to the diagnostic frames such as injustice frame or any other master frame or organizational frame urgency is completely compatible with the frame of solution. Without making a solution urgent it might not result in collective action in that specific period. From this stems, that it is more logical to define urgency as a separate frame and not just a motive. Urgency as a frame has its own rational on what? and why? questions.

As it is demonstrated in studies on African Americans, people with disabilities, sexually harassed women and Chicago workers (Mansbridge 2001, Morris and Braine 2001), inequality was not a concern of only those who experienced it but it was the major threat for building a democracy (McAdam 1996, Morris and Mansbridge 2001). Hence, not only the

issue was frames as the most serious but also urgency of actions was also emphasized. Scott refers to the feminist movements where SMOs' prime objective was to show to housewives that they were not the only ones who were leading passive house life and their lifestyle was not a personal disadvantage or failure but it was a social problem which needed to be addressed. In the same way a strategy of feminist movement step by step entailed imeddiate actions without which the final goal would not have been achieved. Equality-based special issue movements as well as social responsibility movements, discussed by Morris and Mansbridge, also give evidence of how problems like environmental damage, reproductive health issues, protest against drunk driving, etc., can become very popular movements among people who yet have not personally experienced them. This type of movements' participation is the outcome of relevant frame promotion about the social importance and severity of once perceived problem as an individual one. Hence, though not formulated in such way, severity of injustice and urgency of action is crucial to challenge those who were not personally affected. Although motive of severity does not directly imply such definition but its rationale allows framing it in the same terms.

The next framing activity is about *efficacy of taking action*. In what is elaborated by Benford two aspects of this motive could be distinguished. The first is about the belief that the action would yield planned goals. In other words potential supporter should believe in success and hope that situation would turn out in the best possible way (Klandermans 1984, Snow 2006). Some studies also elaborate on *prospects for success* that corresponds to the aspects of the motive of efficacy of taking action. Prospect for success stresses that goal is easy to obtain and worthy of action. Implicit inferences on the frame are evident in case of RMT scholars (Wilson 1993, Piven&Cloward 1977, Morris 1980, McAdam 1982, Ragin 1979) as well. Castells who focuses on networked society, develops "approach system" that entails individuals enthusiasm for action that aims at social change. Enthusiasm eventually leads to another positive emotion: hope. With relevant activities the later is further translated into action. Klandermans (1984) and Biggs (2006) call this prospect for success. They argue that odds of joining protest is very low unless one does not think it worth doing so (Klandermans, 1984). Biggs (2006) in his work about Southern Black Students in early 1960s, with other supporting evidence, also confirmed that instilling hope for success in potential adherents had one of the decisive roles in joining or not joining protests. As Diani and Della Porta (2006) put it *"For a protest to emerge, activists must believe that an opportunity exists, that they have the power to bring about change ...."*. The second aspect of the motive refers to potential effect individual can have on achieving goal, Benford calls this - sense of personal

efficacy. As he argues, an individual should perceive himself as an agent for change otherwise he would not join protest (Abramson and Aldrich 1982, Camilleri and Mcmahon 1975, Campbell et. al 1964, Verba and Nie 1972).

The last motive is about *propriety of taking action*. This is also demonstrated in Benford's work on nuclear activism. The scholar shares his puzzling observation about those people who had very low sense of personal efficacy but they not only remained members of SMO but also agitated people to join them. As Benford figured out this was due to moral obligation to own beliefs as well as moral duty to next generation and country. For this reason this motive related to overcoming "free-rider" problem (Olson's 1965). It is also interesting to note that scholars who consider impact of collective identities in social movements resonate vocabulary on propriety. The importance of collective identities is emphasized by many scholars (Melucci 1989, 1995; Touraine 1985; Polletta, Francesca and Jasper 2001). However, none consider the linkage between propriety and collective identities. Although the connection between the two is not evident in Snow's and Benford's work, the meaning they imply allows claiming that collective identity by considering shared sense of belonging and obligation to a group completely coincides with the idea of propriety. To motivate potential adherents it is crucial to promote the sentiments of citizenship and duty. In other wards the image of active, involved and responsible citizens who have duty and responsibility to change their lives and destiny of their country, should be maintained throughout the campaign. Adherents are persuaded that they can act as agents of their history (Gamson in Johnston & Klandermans, 1995).

Elevation of sentiments corresponding to the four motives, not only work in a complementary manner but sometimes they are quite contradictory. Benford explains this by again giving example of nuclear activists where *severity* and *urgency* of nuclear threat diminished sense of *efficacy* among frame articulators. In particular, the problem was depicted as so serious and urgent that solution was seemed to be impossible or unrealistic. However, this was overcome by development of vocabularies of *propriety* and *duty*. Benford notes that there is obvious lack of empirical evidence of the impact and role of the four on social movements. However, they have theoretical grounding and some of the scholars (Johnson 1997, Silver 1997) discuss their empirical application, as well.

Scholars who related enthusiasm and expectation of success to positive emotions unintentionally overcome "cognitive bent" of framing scholarship. The term "cognitive bent"

was used by Goodwin and his colleagues (Goodwin et. al 2000) in order to explain cognitive and rhetorical processes that are used in recruitment of potential constituents and adherents. As we see framing theory is not an exception in ignoring emotions as important elements in cultural dimension. Although in early works of Snow and Benford there is apparent bias, the recent literature shows that emotions are brought back again. Framing is no more considered as solely cognitive or intellectual process but its emotional part is also recognized. Scholars, such as Gamson, Goodwin, Jasper, Poletta, Hercus, Harrington, Flint find anger as a central emotion in social mobilization. According to Gamson (1995), sense of injustice, which is crucial component in most of the social movements, does not entail only cognitive processes but it necessarily imply strong emotional condition - anger, which is directed to the responsible agent of injustice. Goodwin and his colleagues, on the other hand, make it more concrete and emphasize emotional character of the frames of action mobilization – motivational framing. Emotional aspects of the later are also illustrated in Harrington's and Flint's (1997) analysis on class passivity. They argue that anger is essential component of efficacy which is one of the elements of motivational framings. In order to have a belief in success one should not only have knowledge about it but also he should feel that it is possible. Otherwise action would not take place.

While elaborating on emotions in social mobilization, it is crucial to admit the role of fear as well as framing activities that are composed in a way to overcome fear in a target society. Along to the proponents of emotions in the scholarship, Castells (2012) emphasizes importance of negative emotions in collective action. He argues that individuals should overcome the negative emotion resulting from the "avoidance motivational system". The later is represented in anxiety which causes fear which in turn has paralyzing effect on action. It is important to note that, in social movements literature issue of fear is always contingent on type of ruling in the given community or the country. This means that relevant framing activities emerge only when given context requires it (e.g. authoritarian regime where there is high likelihood of repression).

2.2.3.4 Resonance

Despite a variety of framing characteristic features, in this paper I would focus only on *resonance* of collective action frames. The other features such as problem identification and direction or locus of attribution, flexibility and rigidity, inclusivity and exclusivity,

interpretive scope and influence (Benford, Snow 2000) raise such content that is also given in other framing concepts. Moreover, the definition of each, also overlap one another. For instance, when we speak about problem identification and attribution it is related to diagnostic framing task. Flexibility/rigidity or inclusivity/exclusivity also imply characterization of frames that is already given in frames of framing tasks. Hence, without special emphasis, the presence or absence of these features is obvious in the further data analysis. On the other hand, resonance provides reasons on success or failure of the frame with its characteristics. For example, resonance explains why a frame with wider interpretive scope or a flexible and inclusive frame can result in more people in the streets. In fact resonance evaluates impact of proffered set of frames with all its features and characteristics. Only rationalization, justification and motivation are not enough to drive people for action. Apart from developing a good argument on what, why, who and how questions it is important that constructed frames strike a responsive chord in a target society. If not that even logically well developed frame package will not work. In other words not all frames have equal chances to be successful. It depends on resonance of the frame whether it would evoke cultural themes, which are culturally resonant (Snow, Benford 1988). In cultural resonance both cognitive as well as emotional match is meant. And here again emotions are at hand. In other words when we say that frame works it means that they not only have cognitive/intellectual but also emotional impact on people (Goodwin et. al --). In particular, while there is an interest in reasons of agreement or disagreement with certain frames, there should be an equal interest in reasons of those frames resulting in actions.

According to Benford and Snow, resonance is measured through credibility and salience. Credibility entails three elements: consistency, empirical credibility and frame articulators' credibility. *Consistency* shows whether ideas, tactics and actions are consistent with one another. Hypothetically inconsistency among those three or related frames would not achieve interest of the majority of potential participants. Obviously, this evokes cognitive process. In the study on 1989 Chinese democracy movement Zuo & Benford (1995) found that the consistency between student activists' assertions in their public framing and their actions at Tiananmen Square was one of the major factors that caused rapid mass mobilization. This was especially pronounced when the government, which represented a counter force to the students' movements, was completely contradictory with what they declared and what their actual policies were. The another study on antiabortion rights also demonstrated that conflicting nature of framings on non-violent actions and their tactical choices which abused non-violent philosophy was viewed as a crucial factor in muting mass

mobilization (Johnson 1997). From these examples we can see that consistency adds more credibility in the eyes of potential supporters.

Another element of credibility is *empirical credibility* which deals with verifiable claims. This means that the provided interpretations could be read along the same lines of the world experience. Diagnostic and prognostic frames should be referenced or supported in/by other real experiences that took place in other country or in other time. To illustrate empirical credibility Benford again uses example of Chinese democracy movement where student activists point to the political reforms in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev as evidence that calls for similar reforms in the People's Republic were *within the realm of possibility* (Zuo & Benford 1995). As Benford argues due to absence of empirical credibility some movements experience difficulties in expanding their ranks. The last element affecting resonance is *frame articulators' credibility*. This is about whether social movement organizers have trust and popularity in eyes of potential adherents. Social movement theorists agree that within collective action, the success of the frame depends largely on the credibility of the makers of the frame, their authority and their professional credentials and status (Benford and Snow 2000; Gamson 1992; Noakes and Johnston 2005; Wathen and Burkell 2002). Identifying frame entrepreneurs is an integral part of frame analysis because "diagnosing a problem always entails identifying the actors who are entitled to have [an] opinion on it.... It is through symbolic conflict that certain actors succeed in being recognized as entitled to speak in the name of certain interests and tendencies" (Della Porta and Diani 2006, 75). In the same vein, Benford and Snow (2000) claim that "it is a well-established fact in the social psychology of communication that speakers who are regarded as more credible are generally more persuasive". Similarly, Wathen and Burkell (2002) maintain that the factors influencing credibility at the level of the source are the authors' and sources' expertise and knowledge, in addition to their trustworthiness, credentials, attractiveness and homogeneity with the receiver's beliefs and context.

Credibility with its elements is much criticized by Jasper and Paulsen (1995). They argue that the attempt to show an objective way to examine effect of frames is very much debatable. The claim that for example "empirical credibility is in the eyes of the beholder shows that frame understanding and perception depends on socially constructed worldwide views of potential recruits. In other words, frames affect potential supporters because those supporters already have certain beliefs, values and visions on different fields of life. The scholars explain that frames and new themes are not created from nowhere but they are drawn on already

existing ones. This critique is more clearly seen in case of salience and its three elements: *experiential commensurability, centrality and narrative fidelity*. The first one is about whether the issue is part of daily experience. In order to make frame resonant it is important that the proffered frame is somehow reflected in daily life of target group. This way people easily see connection between their problems and the ones agitated by SMOs. As scholars argue, it is difficult to influence people with abstract frames that are distant from everyday life (Alinsky 1971, Babb 1996, Erwin 1993, Zuo & Benford 1995, Heitlinger 1996). The next element is centrality which is about how important are the beliefs, values, and ideas of the proffered issue to the target society. As Benford notes, every person has a hierarchy of belief/value system. Hence, if the frame builds on the most important one in hierarchical system, it has more chances to be successful (Carroll & Ratner 1996, Donovan 1995, Evans 1997). As for narrative fidelity it is about whether the issue is resonated with the targets' cultural narration. The later refers to a perspective or ideology that is dominant in certain culture or society. Similar to other factors, narrative fidelity is not well explored in social movements' literature. Exception could be found in the studies of the following authors: Park 1998; Berbrier 1998; McCallion & Maines 1999; Kubal 1998; D'Anjou & Van Male 1998; Noonan 1995; Zuo & Benford 1995. So, as we see in all three elements of salience Benford and Snow imply existence of already given meaning systems. Hence, the task of framing is about to explore in closer detail interests, concerns, values and beliefs of target group and then build such movement campaign which would articulate and amplify congruence of those of SMOs and the target group. The other shortcoming, which is obvious in the literature, is that there is no indication on the relative importance within the elements of credibility and salience in the literature. Therefore, it is hard to predict those resonance features that are more or less important in frame success.

2.2.4 Multifactored Approach

As we can see there is an ample of research on how various frames could affect participation in collective action. Similar to RMT and political opportunity, framing has also been considered to have a single, independent effect which was not related to factors from other theories. To overcome this trend and to refute the dominated single approach paradigm, some authors made attempts to explain social movements' emergence and development through wide variety of factors from various approaches. A good example of this is a political process theory. Among all the work on interlinked factors from different approaches Tilly (1978) and then McAdam (1982) suggested the most precise and structured perspective. Tilly

was one who recognized the importance of confluence of the three elements and labeled them as opportunity, organization and interests. Opportunity represented the amount of political power, the likelihood of repression, and the vulnerability of the target; organization implied social identity as well as networks and interests entailed the potential benefits from participation. Later on drawing on critique of single theories and building on Tilly's work McAdam analyzed the rise and decline of the US Civil Rights Movement as a direct result of three factors: political opportunities, indigenous organizational strength and cognitive liberation.

In comparison to Tilly, McAdam's version of political opportunities implied political or social events such as industrialization, unemployment, wars, demographic changes and international political realignments. All these events were viewed relevant because they had potential to change power relations and by this create political opportunities for challenging groups. In fact, this understanding of political opportunity was broader and in most part reflected Tilly's idea on political power. The major focus was on power relations in which any other factor was possible to be entailed. The second element represented pre-existing political organizations that existed among the aggrieved community. These groups and individual ties were source of human as well as material resources and played critical role in identity formation. However, as McAdam argues being part of a group or community or having contacts with relevant people is not enough to have collective action. Moreover, even presence of political opportunity with necessary networks do not automatically translate into protest. The former provides conducive or hindering context for protesting and the later serves as a channel for idea sharing and diffusion to target communities as well as people. In particular, networks serve as a tool to reach potential participants. It facilitates a platform for agitation and appeal. Hence, political opportunity and networks both need content based on which potential adherents will build relevant perceptions and then use their contacts to spread out the "perceived reality" to the rest of the society. McAdam believed that objective political environment and emergence of social mobilization are mediated by "cognitive liberation". Here perceived opportunities are expanded in "cognitive liberation" that serves as a mediator between structural conditions and people's actions. It implies ability of oppressed people to break out of the hopeless and disadvantaged position and start struggle for better conditions. "Cognitive liberation" denotes three-stage transformation in consciousness: first, *individuals no longer perceive the system just; second, those who once saw the system as inevitable begin to demand change and third, those who normally considered themselves powerless come to believe that they can alter their lot in life* (Piven and Cloward 1977).

When individuals have moved through all three stages this is when change is instigated (McAdam 1982). Similar to McAdam, Diani and Della Porta outlined confluence of the three stages in a slightly different way. They started from the belief that opportunity exists which corresponds to the McAdam's the second stage. This also coincides with the frame on prospect for success in the literature. Then comes the belief that one has the power to bring the change. This also resonates McAdams's third stage and raises the same issue as it is given in the frame on collective action. And the last one is about identifying system as a blamer. This corresponds to the frame from diagnostic framing task. As for McAdam's first stage, it is completely congruent with the frame of injustice in the framing literature. There are also other scholars who draw attention to the problem of causality between political process and collective protest. Suh and Kruzman argued that change in political structure becomes an opportunity only if it is perceived as such. Klandermans (1997) shares the same argument by positing that opportunities would not have any impact unless they are seized. This means that the effect of political process not only could not be understood without cultural framing but the later can have more credit than the former one. Tocquelle's (1955) Model also analyzes combination of subjective and objective factor. As he argues the French Revolution became possible because of coincidence of structural weakness and corresponding subjective sentiments. While explaining early modern revolutions of the 17th and 18th, Goldstone (1991) also looks into combination of the following: state breakdown, ideology and cultural framework.

As for the link between cultural processes and social networks this also has been much discussed in the scholarship. In their paper Jasper and Poulsen (1995) mention about workers during industrialization (Shorter and Tilly 1974), African Americans during urbanization (McAdam 1982), and students in their "youth ghetto" (Lofland 1969) where physical concentration of the group with shared grievances was a prerequisite for an action. Oberschall (1973) argued that this concentration must be accompanied by social organization before recruitment can succeed. Morris (1984) also found that not only cultural factors but also financial resources and personal networks of African American churches mattered in the emergence of the civil rights movement. Even Snow whose work, in larger part, is devoted to frame analysis recognizes importance of strong and weak ties in frame sharing and diffusion.

Scholars who related enthusiasm and expectation of success to positive emotions unintentionally overcome "cognitive bent" of framing scholarship. The term "cognitive bent" was used by Goodwin and his colleagues (Goodwin et. al 2000) in order to explain cognitive

and rhetorical processes that are used in recruitment of potential constituents and adherents. As we see framing theory is not an exception in ignoring emotions as important elements in cultural dimension. Although in early works of Snow and Benford there is apparent bias, the recent literature shows that emotions are brought back again. Framing is no more considered as solely cognitive or intellectual process but its emotional part is also recognized. Scholars, such as Gamson, Goodwin, Jasper, Poletta, Hercus, Harrington, Flint find anger as a central emotion in social mobilization. According to Gamson (1995), sense of injustice, which is crucial component in most of the social movements, does not entail only cognitive processes but it necessarily imply strong emotional condition - anger, which is directed to the responsible agent of injustice. Goodwin and his colleagues, on the other hand, make it more concrete and emphasize emotional character of the frames of action mobilization – motivational framing. Emotional aspects of the later are also illustrated in Harrington's and Flint's (1997) analysis on class passivity. They argue that anger is essential component of efficacy which is one of the elements of motivational framings. In order to have a belief in success one should not only have knowledge about it but also he should feel that it is possible. Otherwise action would not take place.

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The Model of three structural elements did not preserve the argument that the three are casually necessary. In his later work, McAdam with Tarrow and Tilly (2001) shifted his attention to more dynamic Model where he refers to environmental, relational and cognitive factors. In comparison to the previous elements, these three are broader concepts allowing revealing specific mechanisms and exploring single, independent impact within each. Caren (2007) in his review on political process theory, deriving from McAdam Model, considers three factors crucial in understanding social movements. According to the author political

opportunities, mobilizing structures and framing processes, along with protest cycles and contentious repertoires (Tilly 1995), create a solid foundation for multifactored approach.

2.3 Model of Movement Participation

This section discusses two movement participation Models. The Models take their roots from the Initial Model (see section 2.1). As we saw in the sections 2.1 and 2.2, the Model has been put into context of the major theories and based on their review the two Models have been generated, further developed and revised. The first Model (see scheme 2.b) is a *General Model* that integrates variables from the major theories and approaches on social movements' literature. It entails both macro and micro context in hierarchy. It differentiates objective (e.g. political structure, political change) and subjective indicators/variables (e.g. perceived opportunity, sentiments, etc.). The Model shows the role of framing (micromobilization) and its relationship to other factors. The second Model (see scheme 2.c: *Hierarchical scheme of frames*), is a detailed elaboration of the third stage – framing process - of the General Model. In particular, it is focused on micro mobilization and is depicted in a set of frames which confluence in hierarchy is viewed as mandatory in achieving a large-scale mobilization. The proffered two Models, which are initially data driven but then at larger extant are revised and further developed based on literature review, demonstrate that only with the confluence of all the factors in the Models it is possible to have a large-scale social mobilization.

2.3.1 General model on movement participation

The General Model integrates macro and micro context and illustrates their role and effect on a large-scale social mobilization. While macro context represents external condition and stimuli, micro context is about internal processes. To start with the former one, there are two factors that have to be taken into consideration: 1.type of political system and 2. triggering event. These two categories are derived and further developed from the perspective of Meyer and Imig (1993), previously discussed in the literature review. As scholars show these two are qualitatively different as they imply different processes.

Scheme 2.b: General Model of Movement Participation



Political context influences and determines different dimensions and levels of governance, which in turn create corresponding structure of interaction among government, civil society and people. It implies practices and regulations which either foster (open system) or repress (close system) any attempt of social protest or civil activism (Della Porta et. al 2006, Kitschelt 1986, Pharr 2003, Tarrow 1994). From this stems that, in the first place if the system does not tolerate protest rallies, all the discussions on citizens' protesting reaction to sudden changes in political structure (e.g. elite support, new policies/initiatives, etc.) or resource mobilization or framing processes does not make any sense. Hence, as political system determines a framework in which citizens should communicate with the government or other agencies, it is placed on top of all levels in the General Model.

However, it does not mean that when aggrieved group of people are exposed to (semi) authoritative or (semi) democratic countries, civil activism and social protests would be common thing to observe. Open system is viewed as a must for emergence and maintenance of street protests but is not enough. This is why political systems represent stable (or constant) environment which do not have a direct causal relationship with social

mobilization. To be more specific, political system variable represents a constant state creating conducive or obstructive environment for action but it does not imply direct stimuli for collective action. This means that a country which maintains one type of system for years could not suddenly generate collective action without any mediation. In case, someone would claim the opposite, a legitimate question would arise: e.g. in the county where democracy (open system) had been practiced for decades, why did social mobilization suddenly emerge in the given time period and not earlier? There should be something else that promoted the sudden emergence or rapid development of social mobilization. Proponents of political opportunity theory would argue that the answer to the stated question should be traced in recent given political events. Although this is what the next level implies in the Model, literature review revealed that there is no mandatory direct relationship between sudden changes and collective action. Benford and Snow (2000) in their later work argue that despite hindering or facilitating nature of political opportunity, it is hard to grasp a degree or extant of political opportunity. Therefore, understanding political context or political changes as an objective reality is subject for debate. The scholars claim that the extent to which it either constrains or facilitates collective action is contingent on how they are framed by SMOs and how they are perceived by potential participants.

The next level, which entails political, social or economic changes, forms immediate incentives or a convenient "material" for the next level - framing. In comparison to Meyer and Imig, the sudden changing environment is not viewed in strictly political terms but it also may imply social or economic changes. This was supported by my previous work on November mobilization where in some cases the immediate stimuli of collective action were not only political but also social and economic. The other examples from the literature, especially those categorized as modular and particular/specific social protests also show that not only political sudden changes but also those with social and economic themes could suddenly transform accumulated grievances into actions. Another issue of Imig and Meyer perspective that needs correction is that political system and triggering event are not viewed as only horizontal categories but also they could be considered in hierarchy, as well.

Based on the literature, triggering event could have three possible consequences:

1. Triggering event can act as a direct cause for immediate mobilization. Contradicting to the Benford's and Snow's argument, direct effect of a triggering event is very much evident in social movements with traditional repertoires. As it was shown in the literature, Tilly and

Tarrow (1971) develop an argument on a type of social movements that correspond to a specific period of time in a history. The more developed is a state and institutions within it the more indirect, broad and manual is a planned social protest. On the contrary social movements with traditional repertoires, which were quite common in 18th- century Europe; are *direct, local and narrow* reactions to immediate grievances, attacking opponents and almost never seeking allies among other groups or political elites. Due to direct relationship those protest actions were usually sporadic and never led to large-scale mobilizations. Although the scholars were considering direct/indirect protests and traditional/manual repertoires in terms of developing stages of the period where they took place, the experiences of collective protesting demonstrate that those types of protests also are quite common in these days. In particular, whether social protests are direct or indirect it is not necessarily dependent on a certain stage of development in history. But it is contingent upon the capacity and level of advancement of a particular SMO or any other organizing group. This means that degree of social movement organization does not only coincide with different periods in history but also speaks for its level of advancement in any period. The background data on the case studies prove this. Specifically, those social upheavals that had the least period of preparation for the street protests were very small in size and did not last long.

2. Triggering event mediated by framing process that causes a mass mobilization. Conversely, when a triggering event is followed by proper cultural processes it is most likely that social mobilization with significant number of people would emerge. This according to Tilly's and Tarrow's approach corresponds to social movements that are cosmopolitan, modular and autonomous or indirect, general and flexible. These features of social movement or social protest, I argue, could not emerge in itself but through cultural processes. Namely, when framing process acts as a mediator between a triggering event and collective action, a purposeful planning on strategy and tactics take place. This, obviously, is done to reach and appeal as many people as possible. Hence, a careful choice of tactics imply creation of such system of meanings that would be the most resonating in the target group. Moreover, indirect channels of modular repertoires make personal interactions and speeches promptly accessible to wide audience. For this reason, when (proper) mediation process takes place, there is high expectation that large-scale social mobilization would occur.

3. Emergence of triggering event does not go beyond grievances. As for the latter case, in the history of social movements there is enough evidence demonstrating that sometimes even the most alarming changes or events do not lead to movement participation. One of the good

examples of these are the Colour Revolutions in post-Soviet countries. These were a series of social protests that eventually resulted in overthrowing regime in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. If we take Georgian case and consider the time period from 2000 to 2006 we can see that among three elections (presidential/Parliamentary) that were framed as fraud elections only in 2003 people seized the opportunity and made the largest mobilization in history of Georgia since 90s. Similarly, political context only 2003 became influential in terms of social protesting, the question is why people were passive in previous years? The answer to this question again leads to the framing process. Unlike other years, in 2003 there was a very systematic cultural processes performed by emerging leaders. From this stems that framing is a crucial element in mediation between external stimuli and collective action. In fact, in the most cases whether triggering event is there or not, framing process should take place, before large-scale collective action is accomplished. It should be also noted that presence of a triggering event is not mandatory to proceed to the next level of framing process. As some scholars (Mansbridge&Morris 2001, McAdam 1988) show civil activism can emerge without a triggering event but just form a long-lasting bad situation where emerging leaders take over cultural processes and reshape existing meanings and experiences in completely different way.

The next stage after triggering event, framing process entails agitation and promotion of certain frames which are crucial for appealing large number of people. Based on McAdam's Model, in order to make people join protests it is crucial for SMOs to translate political structure opportunities, whether it would be certain type of political system or a triggering event, into actions. This mediating process was initially labeled under the name of cognitive liberation. The role of conscious processes in collective action was also shared by Diani and Della Porta as well as other scholars who focused on only one or two another sentiment, emotion or cognitive process.

As we see General Model contains maximum three stages before the large-scale protest rally would be achieved. It does not matter whether there would be only conducive political system or triggering event or both of them. The crucial element is that any type of external stimuli needs mediation process that would help potential protester perceive the reality in a way SMOs see it. In comparison to the proponents of political process theory, in this Model no component of organization has been included. Firstly, variables from organization scheme represent qualitatively different categories. They could not be put in stages as they are more about the tools and ways of reaching a goal and less about the situation that has to be grasped and realized. Secondly, as far as they imply strategy, tactics, networks or any other recourses

that major objective is to diffuse relevant information they should be linked to the framing process. For this reason, these type of recourses are discussed in the next section where the second Model on framing is described in detail. As for the other type of organizational recourses such as funding or facilities they, obviously could not be ignored but they are not focus of none of the Models.

It addition to the constituent parts of the General Model, it is important to note the role of recourses in social mobilization. As a literature review demonstrated despite biased focus of RMT, undeniably its features have an effect on collective action. Not including rationality concept or ignoring tactical choices on spreading information or role of funding would clearly repeat the same approach for which those theories were criticized. However, not having RMT features in the General Model have its reason. Namely, as we see political context, triggering event and framing process create a logical chain of hierarchy. It demonstrates how one can determine the other. As for resources their place is not among those factors in horizontal row as it is related to the tools and methods of articulation and amplification of frames. Resources represent the forms and ways of how one factor from each category in the Model would lead to the other. It is especially critical within the process of framing. Hence, more will be said about it in the following section. As rationality deals with the reality construction and perceptions of the potential adherents, is also is the part of the process of framing activities.

2.3.3 The Model on Hierarchical Scheme of Frames

Cognitive liberation is a crucial finding in social movement theory. It represents powerful elements that intervene between structure and action (Gamson and Meyer 1996, Diani 1996). However, as further framing theory showed, the transformation in consciousness implies more comprehensive process than cognitive liberation suggestions. Moreover, as it was mentioned in the section of literature review there is a cognitive bias which completely overlooks emotional elements in the process of transforming ideas into actions. Moreover, there is not only insufficient attention devoted to empirical examination of cognitive liberation as such but also no research has analyzed them specifically in the framework of frame theory. The same could be said about the Diani's and Della Porta's perspective on the issue. Although the work of McAdam, Mansbridge, Morris, Brain etc. does not provide direct references on pacific mediation processes; indirectly they imply the same ideas on cognitive/intellectual processes in the empirical studies. However, instead considering a pool

of sentiments which interdependence affect the mobilization, scholars focus only on particular social mobilizations and reveal one or two frames or categories of the Model as a major determinants of social mobilization (e.g..Biggs 2006). As literature shows when it comes to frames there is no work done in exploring confluence of a set of frames which effect depends on their integrity in one scheme. In other words, it is hard to find research which examines influence of a number of frames altogether.

The scheme 2.c illustrates a set of frames in hierarchical scheme which is much advanced from the Initial Model. To follow the sequence of the framing tasks, we can see that the first stage represents frames from diagnostic task which is compatible with the first stage of cognitive liberation as well as Initial Model. The frame of injustice with its blamers and victims gives a complete picture on the problem. In Initial Model blamer was labeled under the Image of Enemy. This way it explicitly indicated that frame was about building face of enemy of the responsible agent for injustice. In the Model would rather follow the scholars' concepts and would use the same label – blamer - which is simpler, broader and entails the same meaning as it is given in frame on Image of Enemy. The frame of victim was not included in the Initial Model and it is not given in the revised Model as well. Despite some exceptions, identification and amplification of victim's image is always indispensable component of the injustice frame. The frame on blamer is also implied in injustice frame. However, the difference between the two is distinct. In particular, injustice is not an abstract notion it requires a subject. In other words, it always happens to someone. When the frame is articulated it always implies an agent who experiences it. Conversely, frame of blamer may vary according to the sponsors of the frame packages and may not be clear without clarification. Although blamer is also a crucial component in injustice frame, it needs additional cognitive process of making links between the problem and agents who hold responsibility. In fact it requires logical chain of arguments that demonstrate one's fault in the occurring problem. On the first stage presence of the two frames are important in order to have complete picture on given problem or situation. This stage answers questions: what is problem? who is a blamer?

Without diagnosis no treatment would occur. Hence, the next column demonstrates the frame of solution that is derived from prognostic task. It should be noted that solution as a frame or just an important factor in social mobilization is not given in the scholarship. Neither McAdam nor Diani and Della Porta elaborate on importance of construction of solution to a given problem. Even Benford and Snow who admit the important role of prognostic task do not specifically develop an idea on the frames of solutions. However,

without additional stress, background narrative on framing of every social mobilization entails it. The choice and content of solution may play a key role in people's decision to join protests. Even when potential adherents completely share the injustice frame, social mobilization would not occur if there is no agreement with the proposed solutions. This was very much evident in cases on the Colour Revolutions where along with the only solution which was the resignation of the President, non-violent tactics had a huge resonance in public. In fact these cases demonstrated that, after long-lasting bad situation in the country there was no hope that the existent President and the government have the capacity and willingness to make any improvements. Consequently, changing the government was the only way for the better future. The other issue was that peaceful movements which was an alternative to civil confrontation that had devastating consequences in the recent history of such countries as Ukraine and Georgia. Therefore, if the solution would not seem reasonable and acceptable in the eyes of potential adherents, task of motivating people to join protests would become harder.

Scheme 2.c: Hierarchical scheme of frames (Model 2)



The third level of agitation entails frames from motivation task. The given frames are social problem, urgency, prospects for success, self-efficacy and propriety. The five of the frames are continuation/addition to the frames from diagnostic and prognostic tasks. Namely, they serve as a guide on how to perceive already elaborated problem and solution. Frames from

motivational task correspond to the vocabularies of motive. To start from motives of severity, it characterizes the diagnostic frame. As it was already discussed above, injustice frames are about interpreting once "normal" situation as unacceptable and intolerable. However, in order to cause action, as the literature on framing activities suggest, it is important that potential participants not only understand the problem as the most troublesome but also consider it as the most troublesome issue for every citizen, notwithstanding they were personally affected or not. Frame on *social problem*, in Initial Model, conveys exactly the same sentiments. Just to give a brief clarification the frame is not labeled as a social problem in existing literature. It was formulated as such in the Initial Model of movement participation. Hence, frame on social problem focus on stressing social nature of the issue in order to challenge those who were not personally affected. Analysis of a number of studies showed that injustice and social problem frames may work solely as well as in a complementary way. Research on the Civil Rights Movements illustrate that organizers at first started from black people. They were convincing them that their discrimination was not a normal issue. Activists were explaining that black people have equal rights to white people and opposition to this as well as advocating for inequality was nothing more than injustice. Following this, activists shifted their attention to white people as well. They persuaded both Blacks and Whites that racism was not only the black people's concern but it was the major threat for building a democracy (McAdam 1996, Morris and Mansbridge 2001; Morris and Brain 2001). Scott refers to the feminist movements where SMOs' prime objective was to show to housewives that they were not the only ones who were leading passive house life and their lifestyle was not a personal disadvantage or failure but it was a social problem which needed to be addressed. Equality-based special issue movements as well as social responsibility movements, discussed by Morris and Mansbridge, also give evidence of how problems like environmental damage, reproductive health issues, protest against drunk driving, etc., can become very popular movements among people who yet have not personally experienced them. This type of movements' participation is the outcome of relevant frame promotion about the social importance and acuteness of once perceived problem as an individual one.

Urgency is the next motive which is presented as a frame in the Model. Urgency also characterizes not only diagnostic frame but also solution frame. After the problem is perceived as the most troublesome for the whole country or target community, it is important to amplify its urgency. As Snow and Benford demonstrated empirically there are cases when people agree that the issue is extremely concerning but they do not see that the

solution should be urgently addressed. Consequently, without amplification of urgency of actions people would not see the necessity to join protest. The next frame – *prospects for success* - stresses that goal is easy to obtain and worthy of action. This is also revealed in the previous Model and is once again justified in the framework of this paper. Implicit inferences on the frame are evident in case of RMT scholars (Wilson 1993, Piven&Cloward 1977, Morris 1980, McAdam 1982, Ragin 1979) as well. Castells who focuses on networked society, develops "approach system" that entails individuals enthusiasm for action that aims at social change. Enthusiasm eventually leads to another positive emotion: hope. Klandermans (1984) and Biggs (2006) call this prospects for success. They argue that framing the issue in a way to instill optimism for success should be taken into consideration. Odds of joining protest is very low unless one does not think it worth doing so (Klandermans, 1984). Biggs (2006) in his work about Southern Black Students in early 1960s, with other supporting evidence, also confirmed that instilling hope for success in potential adherents had one of the decisive roles in joining or not joining protests. As Diani and Della Porta (2006) put it *"For a protest to emerge, activists must believe that an opportunity exists, that they have the power to bring about change; and they must blame the system for the problem"*

The last and not less important vocabulary of motive – propriety – stresses sense of obligation and duty of potential participants to be part of the social and political processes. This indicator is also reflected in collective action frame. This is about convincing the target group in indispensable role of collective action on the way of reaching final goal. It implies overcoming "free-rider" problem (Olson's 1965). It is also interesting to note that scholars who consider impact of collective identities in social movements speak along the same lines as vocabulary on propriety imply. The importance of collective identities is emphasized by many scholars (Melucci 1989, 1995; Touraine 1985; Polletta, Francesca and Jasper 2001). However, none consider the linkage between propriety and collective identities. Although the connection between the two is not evident in Snow's and Benford's work, the meaning they imply allows claiming that collective identity by considering shared sense of belonging and obligation to a group completely resonate the idea of propriety. To motivate potential adherents it is crucial to promote the sentiments of citizenship and duty. In other wards the image of active, involved and responsible citizens who have duty and responcibility to change their lives and destiny of their country should be maintained throughout the campaign. Adherents are persuaded that they can act as agents of their history (Gamson in Johnston & Klandermans, 1995). Propriety is also related to the frame of social problem. As it is already mentioned social problem is about explaining that when today injustice

experienced by one person is left without appropriate reaction, sooner or later the same injustice would affect others as well. From this rational the frame calls on action of those who were not personally affected. It links "victims" and bystanders by means of ideas related to national, group or any other identity that are based on shared meanings. It is about holding responsibility on own community or a country.

Although Benford considers only these five vocabularies that were further reviewed in the form of frames of collective action, based on literature review I would like to add one more frame. My previous work as well as existing literature reveals that motivational structure operates on incentives for potential adherents' actions (Johnson & Klandermans, 1995). One of these incentives in the frame of overcoming fear. The former one implies risk assessment of participation. The frame was also revealed in my previous Model but considering the explored cases the frame was characterized as case-sensitive. This means that this frame emerges only when given context requires it (e.g. regimes when there is high likelihood of repression). Castells (2012) also emphasizes importance of negative emotions in collective action. He argues that individuals should overcome the negative emotion resulting from the "avoidance motivational system". The later is represented in anxiety which causes fear which in turn has paralyzing effect on action. In the Model elaborated in this paper I will leave the frame as case-sensitive and will not include in the Model as a must (master) frame.

Overall the hierarchical scheme of the frames provides a set of frames that assumed to work in unity. Three different framing tasks imply frames that face corresponding cultural challenges in society. However, as it was demonstrated in the scholarship these frames are not enough in order to cause large-scale social mobilization. It is important to explore how diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames are promoted by the organizers. Consequently, the set of frames work under two conditions: resonance and diffusion.

After framing process is accomplished it is crucial to evaluate cultural characteristics of given frames. This is possible through resonance indicators. Resonance is an important characteristic as it allows evaluating relevance of set of master frames in the target society. As literature shows resonance is measured through credibility and salience. In particular, a set of frames and the tools of articulation and amplification should not be in conflict with ideas, beliefs and values of potential adherents and participants. The proffered frames should convey messages that reflect not only the needs and concerns but also hopes and beliefs of the target group. As for diffusion, it has a critical role in social mobilization. Without proper

coverage of the frames no one would ever be aware of social mobilization. It should be noted that choice of diffusion mechanisms is also a subject of examination in the framework of resonance. Unacceptable methods of spreading information or amplifying certain sentiments could undermine collective action.

2.4 Revised Model of Movement Participation

The literature reviewed in this chapter helped to further revise and develop the Initial Model. As we see in Figure 1 there is a considerable addition to the Initial Model. In particular, the literature review demonstrated that on the one hand ignoring contextual variables would give incomplete and biased explanation on the issue and on the other hand framing process entails much more than Initial Model implies. To start from General Model, where the framing process in embedded, we can see the hierarchy that does not exactly work as such. Political context and triggering event could determine each other or could have independent effect on social mobilization. But as a review of some of the empirical studies showed their impact is contingent upon framing process. As framing process, it definitely covers many more aspects than it was presented in Initial Model. However, application of all the features of frame theory in a Model, would make it too general and vague. Hence, the revised Model entails those aspects that are meant to be important for the social protests that target the regimes.

In comparison to Initial Model, in scheme B.3b we can see that the frames are put according to the framing tasks. Frames from diagnostic and prognostic tasks are important but they could not result in collective action if not frames from motivational task. From the listed motivational frames, empirical papers demonstrated that it is not necessary to agitate all together. One can compensate the other or the one can be the strongest incentive for a person to take action. Although Snow and Benford give such interpretation of motivational task, I would argue that all five frames are compulsory sentiments that require to be used in order to cause mass mobilization.

Figure 1: Scheme of the Model Advancement (from Initial Model to General Model and then to Model 2)



PART II

3. Participation in Social Protests in Georgia

This chapter presents analysis of social protests in Georgia. In particular, the chapter covers protest rallies under the rule of the second President in Georgia – Eduard Shevardnadze. There have been six protest gatherings from 1995 to 2003 which all except the last one were insignificant in terms of size. The last one which culminated in the largest size of series of social mobilizations was ended with overthrowing the regime and became known as the Rose Revolution in Georgia. The idea to overthrow a government does not surface suddenly, especially taking into account the fact that people had been living in the same economic, political and social conditions for over nine years. The previous attempts of mobilization against the government always ended up with just a small number of people protesting on the streets. So, what exactly happened in November of 2003? Why did so many people mobilize in 2003 and not earlier? These are the questions that will be addressed in this chapter.

There has been much written on the issue of the Rose Revolution in Georgia. Most of the analysis is performed either exclusively from political stance or the major focus lies on the outcome of the demonstrations. In particular, international as well as local experts have been focusing on variables such as role of electoral fraud, international organizations, presence of strong civil society, factor of media, emergence of youth movement, elite defection, non-violent/peaceful movement campaign etc. These and many other factors are usually analyzed in the framework of the final outcome which was the regime change. Grievances or injustice are also taken into account as the major driving force of the struggle against the corrupt government. Many more analysis has been undertaken on the case in the framework of the Colour Revolutions, especially, in the foreign literature. The trend is the same, major focus goes to political interoperations of the overthrowing the regime or to put it in another way – the victory of public will. While explaining the Rose Revolutions the Westerns scholars also refer to the emulative character of the event. In particular, they stress the similarity of a number of Colour Revolutions where almost exactly the same tactics were adopted. Despite the attempts to address the question it seems that a sociologically satisfactory answer to the above stated puzzle regarding the massiveness of protest rallies in November, 2003 is more complicated. Firstly and most importantly, since people were living under the same conditions for over nine years, the idea that the mass mobilization was induced by

unbearable conditions where electoral fraud had catalyzing effect does not explain why large-scale social protests did not take place earlier. Furthermore, putting much stress on the presence of organizations, media, youth movement, certain tactics or whatever it would be does not specifically show the direct connections to reasons of the mobilization. As I would argue further in this chapter presence or absence of such factors are crucial but not enough to explain depth reasons of participation. Sociologically, role of those factors in some cases explain the timing of the protests, especially if it is discussed in context of political opportunities. However, without understanding the sentiments carried by external or internal factors that play role in movement participation (Hewitt and McCammon 2005, Morris and Brain 2001, McAdam 1996), the explanation on timing of the social protest might not be thorough.

To solve the puzzle, I would argue that in comparison to other cases the size of the protest rallies in November, 2003 were the largest because there was confluence of external and internal factors. In particular, there was a conducive political context for social protest, where organizers drew on the electoral fraud and developed the campaign which was focused on the characteristics of the Georgia society. *Namely, it is argued that schematic articulation and then amplification of injustice in way to demonstrate that a) the problem is the concern of the whole nation (social problem frame), b) action is needed immediately (urgency frame), c) success is possible (prospects for success), d) every citizens' participation matters (self-efficacy frame) and e) moral and civil obligation of participation (propriety frame) were the major determinants of participation.* The organizations' role, choice of tactics and other factors served as tools to elevate these sentiments. Additionally, it is argued that the rest of the cases which took place in 2000, 2001 and in earlier months of 2003 were limited with short number of people because of the absence of the mentioned frames.

The chapter gives a detailed review on background of Georgian social protests which is followed by the methodology section. The latter demonstrates the methods used in data collection on the different cases of protest rallies under the targeted period. The next section is about results and the chapter is finalized by the section on discussion.

3.1 Background Information on Social Protests (1995-2003) in Georgia

For the period of the second President – Eduard Shevardnadze - coming into power, Georgia started a period of recovery from the Soviet legacy and civil confrontation at the same time. A brief review on the social protests in Soviet Georgia and well as the post-Soviet period is important in order to understand the context and the challenges the organizers of the protest rallies (were supposed to) face in each case under the Shevardnadze's rule.

3.1.1 Social Protests under the Soviet Rule

Georgia located at the crossroads of Western Asia and Eastern Europe was part of the Soviet Union. Dictatorship, censorship, corruption, human rights abuse and others alike were instilled in existing culture for more than sixty years. People were not allowed to travel beyond the Soviet Union and even the Western products were banned in the territory. Personal freedom did not have any value and attempts of civil resistance were diminished immediately. Different and alternative opinions, complaints and discontent to the regime were condemned by example. Although the ideology of communism was based exceptionally on collective work and goods, collective action targeting change was publicly and severely punished. The superior power resources of the regime did not give any opportunity to protesters to succeed in attaining their demands. In the environment where grievances did not have a chance to burst, even sparks of social protests appeared to be a power struggle between individuals/people and the regime. No third parties were involved (Kowalewski&Schumaker 1981).

Like in other member countries, in Georgia as well there were still rare cases when a group of people dared to express their protest. There were four uprisings and almost all of them were dispersed at once. In 1924, there was the so called August uprising that proved to be one of the last major rebellions against the early Soviet rule, and its defeat marked the final establishment of the Soviet rule in Georgia (Benidze 1991). The uprising was led by the Committee for Independence of Georgia, a bloc of anti-Soviet political organizations chaired by the Georgian Social Democratic (Menshevik) Party. It was the culmination of the three-year struggle against the Bolshevik regime established by the Red Army of Soviet Russia during a military campaign against the Democratic Republic of Georgia in early 1921.

The insurrection was suppressed by the Red Army and Cheka[3] troops under orders of Joseph Stalin and Sergo Ordzhonikidze[4] and was followed by a wave of mass repressions in which several thousand citizens of Georgia were purged.

It took thirty two years until next public protest took place. This was after Stalin's death, in 1956 when rebellion was caused by the Khrushchev[5] administration's denigrating Stalin and barring an annual memorial service held in (then) Georgian national hero's honor. This was the period of political reform, known as de-Stalinization, in the Soviet Union. The reform implied end of large-scale forced labour in the economy and "destruction" of key institutions that were associated with Stalin, his cult of personality as well as his power. Public protests was quite contradictory reaction to the initial negative attitude towards the leader of the Soviet rule as well as the regime. As it was argued (Goddard 2011) defense of oppressive Stalinism and fear of what changes in politics Khrushchev would bring may seem odd to anyone familiar with Stalin's crimes. But, on the other hand, as Blauvelt explains the demonstrations were motivated by the shift in the perception instigated by young generation receiving their education in Stalinist doctrine and enjoying the pride that came with being part of the nation that birthed the most pivotal leader of the Soviet Union. From this perspective these perceptions were in turn the driving force of the protests – the USSR's leader was attempting to invalidate a symbol of their national pride.

Although little is known about the exact organization of the protests, there is enough evidence showing that demonstrations lasted from 4th to 10th March. The protests unleashed gradually, attracting more and more people in the capital and in the regions as well (Kozlov 2002). Some sources point to 50 000 people in the streets and an informal group of students leading the protests in the capital (Blauvelt 2009). Eventually, as the local government was losing control over the situation, on 9th March the troops deployed in the city opened fire upon the students picketing the government buildings. There were attempts of resuming protest rallies on the next day. However, street demonstrations were dispersed violently. Unfortunately, historical records do not suggest facts exactly how the uprising was put down. As no official report exists, various estimates put the number of casualties from 106 (Marshall

[3] Emergency Commission which was the first of a succession of Soviet state security organizations.

[4] Sergo Orjonikidze was a Georgian Bolshevik, later member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and close associate of Joseph Stalin.

[5] Nikita Khrushchev was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

1962) to 800 (Berets 2006). Allegedly, hundreds were wounded and injured. Over 200 were arrested and many were subsequently deported to labour camps in Siberia (Kozlov 2002, Suny 1994, Marshal 1962). Such violent reaction was explained as a self defense to brutal actions of aggressive crowd. There was minor coverage of the events. Even the media did not report on the issue which was not a surprise in the period. The sparks of revolts were noted with unimportant stance or merely not mentioned at all.

The events of March 1956 led to emergence of nationalistic organizations and foreshadowed the future attempts of protests. It is interesting to note that the first President – Zviad Gamsakhurdia - of post-Soviet Georgia was involved in the uprising Tbilisi against the Soviet policy of de-Stalinization. Later with like-minded people he became an active dissident and was put in jail for anti-Soviet propaganda.

In 1978 there was the next major demonstration instigated by the approval of changing constitutional state language from Georgian into Russian language. This was a radical move by the Soviet Party to diminish the rise of nationalism in the region. In this case a person who was in charge of implementation of new policy was the First Party Secretary of the Georgian SSR, Eduard Shevardnadze. Later on he became the second President of Georgia and the period of his ruling is the focus of the paper. Before the new law was launched it seemed that Shevardnadze was preparing a platform for this. At first in 1973 he made Russian language compulsory class in schools and later in 1975 use of Russian language was mandated to textbooks in Universities (Suny 1993). Obviously this was the will of the central authority which obedience promised advancements in Shevadnadze's career. However, the development of the events showed that it would result in major grievances in his native country. Therefore, the Georgian language maintained its constitutional status. This was an unusual concession which made partially restored Shevadnadze's reputation and resolved the crisis peacefully (Cornell&Suny 1994). As the New York Times (Whitney 1978) reported around twenty thousand people plus five hundred students were involved in the protest. However, official records by USSR claim that only five thousand people (majority of them students) participated. Considering media censorship of the period it could be assumed that importance of the event was downgraded on purpose in order to prevent other member countries from doing the same. It should be noted that the uprising strengthened Georgian nationalism which came into play in the next collective action.

The next and the last uprising in the Soviet Georgia was in 1989. Initially, it started from contagious regions – Abkhazia and South Ossetia - officially demanding independence from the rest of Georgia. The petition was sent to Moscow requesting permission to cede from Soviet Georgia, in expectation of becoming an Autonomous Union Republics within the USSR (Cornell 1994). Naturally, Georgia opposed this initiative staging hunger strikes in front of the Supreme Soviet of Georgia's residence. The hunger strikes were organized by the anti-Soviet movement that was developing over years and where, as previously mentioned, one of the key players was Zviad Gamsakhurdia. The protest spread throughout Georgia and demanded punishing secessionist movements in rebellious regions and restoring sovereniety of Georgia. On the other side the central authority aimed at stopping the protest rallies at all costs. The Soviet troops were armed and ready to disperse the protest violently (Suny 1994). As a result people were killed and injured as well as suffocated from the panicked crowds. The Soviet reports blamed the aggressive crowds for the tragic consequences of the demonstration, citing that protesters attacked first with rocks, sticks, and knives. Whereas the protest began peacefully and became more aggressive, Soviet forces were mobilized to end the protest entirely. Mikhail Gorbachev[6] blamed Georgian First Secretary Jumber Patiashvili for poor decision-making in mobilizing the Soviet military. Shevadnadze as it was reported kept in secret the incidence and blamed Soviet army. The General of the army was found guilty in the deaths of innocent civilians and was discharged from his position. The Ministry of Defense was also fired from his position. After this incidence Soviet troops were reluctant to use force against the civilians (Bogert 1990).

3.1.2 Independent Georgia: Social, Political and Economic Situation

In 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union like the other member countries Georgia found itself without a patronage of a powerful neighbor meaning that the country had to continue existing on its own. A long-awaited independence was met with burst of emotions and exaltation. Though not realizing it, this was a great challenge for the society politically, socially and economically dependent on the Soviet Union for over sixty years. Immediately after elections of the first President – Zviad Gamsakhurdia - Georgia witnessed a number of severe political and social upheavals. Civil confrontation developed on the grounds of grave

[6] Mikhail Gorbachev was the last leader of the Soviet Union, having served as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1985 until 1991, and as the country's head of state from 1988 until its dissolution in 1991.

economic situation and strong sense of nationalism. Very soon after the new government came into power a group of people discontented with new policies and initiatives formed a fraction of opposition that gradually leaded to civil unrest and then coup d'etat. The later made the President and his supporters to flee to the neighboring countries where they were in exile for over eighteen months. In the meanwhile there was civil confrontation between the President's supporters and the interim government and their adherents. On top of that the situation in two contentious regions of Georgia aggravated on the basis of strong nationalistic sense that leaded to civil war. Eventually, the fate of the first President was tragic. In 1993 he died in circumstances that are still unclear.

The three-year civil war produced a decade of political instability, permanent financial, economic and social crises. The situation began to stabilize in 1995 when the second President – Eduard Shevardnadze - was elected in 1995 and was in power till 2003. In the early period of his leadership country managed to find way back from chaos, instability and lawlessness. However, this period did not last long. In late 1990s Shevardnadze's pluses began to vanish: state became unable to provide basic services such as water, electricity and gas. Corruption became one of the major problems and poverty was increasing rapidly. To add to this lack of capacity to control borders was more and more pronounced.

In the period Georgia scored moderately low on democracy scale (Polity IV; Nation in Transit 2012; World Bank 2012). It was categorized as an anocracy (Polity IV) where lack of public institutions and existing fragile agencies lead to constant struggle of elite groups for power. As reported by another International organization (Nation in Transit 2012), Georgia was interpreted as transitional or hybrid regime. This meant country in mid way between a democracy and an autocracy with a high risk of instability and changes. Below the Figure#1 gives an overview on the indicators of the governance over 1996-2003 period. To start with *political stability*, it can be seen that degree of stability and likelihood of peaceful government change was comparatively low in comparison to other variables. As the beginning of the period was marked with recovery from civil war it is not a surprise that the political stability in those years was extremely low. In 2000 there was a considerable improvement, though still being very low on an overall scale. And then we see again a considerable decrease leading to 2003 when there was a high probability that the government would be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means. *Government effectiveness* also scored low and *rule of law* even lower. The poor public policy was felt in every sector and civil service was ill-functioned. Basic state institutions never acted according to rules but it was based on informal agreements and bribes. There was a

huge difference between assigned duties and regulations and practice. On the other hand, on overall scale *corruption*, with insignificant improvements in 1998 and then 2003, was one of the acute problems. In 2001, USAID depicted the Caucasus Republic "simultaneously as the single most corrupt and reform-prone country in the post-Soviet space" (Christophe 2005). Public power was exercised for private gain, including both pretty and grand forms of corruption. This resulted in a weak central authority accounting on elite groups which undermined the government's ability to address the most significant challenges facing the country. *Voice and accountability* and *regulatory quality* falling under the same category of freedom of expression scored relatively high in comparison to other variables. This mostly applies to the former as its development was above all other indicators over the period. The country had made some progress in guaranteeing the rights of political parties, civic and private organizations, and the media to function relatively freely. However, the fairness of elections was widely questioned. Electoral violations and infringements on civic freedoms used to be higher outside the capital city.

Figure#2: Governance Indicators . Georgia,1996-2003



Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators

Poor governance was reflected in economic life of Georgia. The early 1990s were marked by a nearly triple decline in production coupled with hyperinflation of almost 70 percent per month at the peak of the crisis (Papava 2006). Poverty was unequally distributed throughout the country. Structural causes of poverty included a high rate of unemployment (ILO 2008; The World Bank 2012) and obstacles to the growth of the agricultural sector, which employs more than 50% of the physically active population but contributes only 21% to the GDP (BTI 2006). The disruption of established trade patterns in the country, deterioration of infrastructure, high inflation and energy crises were only some of the country's economic

woes. Despite new institutional framework and Washington-consensus style economic liberalization, including further deregulation and reduction of the budget deficit, Shevardnadze's administration hardly changed the de-facto institutions and social patterns inherited from the Soviet Union (UNECE 2011).

In fact Georgia experienced a mix of institutional characteristics that often constrained or facilitated democratic processes. Despite downfall of all the sectors, low capacity of the governance and grievances in the population, Shevardnadze managed to secure a second term in April 2000 in an election that was marred by widespread claims of vote rigging. In such environment where inconsistency in the system was a common thing it was hard to predict the turnout of collective action. Even then there was a verbal protest in certain groups of society and political specter. However, existing discontent and observed opportunity for collective action did not occur to be enough to make people mobilize. Until November 2003 discontent with the regime never went beyond single occasions of no more than 10 000 persons protesting in the streets.

3.1.3 Shevardnadze's Rule: Daily Life and Social Protests

Naturally, when country is in such a crisis in every sphere common people not only notice this occasionally but also feel this in everyday life. As it was mentioned above, one of the major problems that was experienced by people daily was insufficient supply of basic utilities. Electricity, water and gas were supplied according to schedule. Some districts and regions were left without one or another for few hours or even days in a row. Power supply was the biggest concern in Georgian population, especially in 2001. Almost every apartment dweller in Tbilisi had the experience of being confined in a dark lift, waiting for the electricity to be restored or for a passer-by to come to their rescue. In most of the families in the capital and regions it was a common practice for children to do homework with lit candles. Even hospitals did not operate properly. Besides the disruption of daily tasks, blackouts became an ideal opportunity for thieves and burglars. The most common crime was the theft of petrol from parked cars causing constant frustration for motorists. Burglars also took advantage of the opportunities offered by immobilized security devices. Moreover, in dark streets car accidents were on rise. Blaming on old energy supply stations, corruption and non-payment of bills; the government introduced special schedule. The later implied electricity supply twice a day, for two hours in the morning and four hours at night. However, the timetable of electricity was changing over time and much varied according to districts and regions. Apart from this most householders kept kerosene-burning heaters in their homes. And power cuts often heralded water cuts as municipal water pumps required electricity to function.

On the other hand, corruption was so much instilled in Georgian culture that any type of work or deal was not possible without bribing or nepotism. Nothing to say about judiciary system or business, even the education was one of the corrupt systems in the country. Everyone was observing that officials with official salaries of less than $1,000 were building luxurious mansions in prime locations outside Tbilisi. As a result of this distribution of wealth was extremely uneven and, as it was outlined in the previous section, by 2002 54% percent of the population lived below the poverty line and approximately 15-17% were extremely poor (IMF, UNDP 2002). Unemployment was a huge problem.

In response to unbearable living conditions, people referred to survival instinct and were living their lives by cheating the government. A good example of this is that vast majority of Georgians in the period were not paying bills. People were making up different mechanisms to pay less than they consume and it was very common thing to do. Those who lived near government buildings were very lucky as they were using the same amount of utilities for a small fee. Though it was also temporal as the authorities were raiding those neighborhoods and cutting the restored illegal connections.

In this extreme environment people were not much about protesting. However, there were still few held. In the period of 2000-Nov/2003 a number of social protests took place (see Table#2). The issues that instigated collective action were insufficient electricity supply, support of the TV media and fair elections. Unbearable living conditions prompted mild protests in Nov/2000 and Nov/2001 (Table#1: cases#1&3). People mobilized in the streets of the capital to protest insufficient supply of electricity. These were one-time actions with insignificant number of people. In the former case one-day and the latter case two-day social protests resulted in blacked-out streets in the central avenues of Tbilisi. People in the streets were referring to AES TELASI – American Investor Company as a responsible agent for energy supply – behind which the government was implied. In comparison to 2000 when people staged protest rally in the streets, in 2001 citizens blocked streets and central avenues of Tbilisi asking for increased supplies of electricity for last two days. Parliamentarians feared that the street protests might grow into serious destabilization. In both cases there were limited number of aggravated people demanding electricity supply and government, who by expressing discontent with insufficient resources, was asking for patience and understanding. Eventually, the districts were supplied with electricity just for solving the “immediate” crisis. The problem of electricity still remained as a one of the severe problems throughout Shevardadze’s ruling period.

The fall of 2001 was marked with social mobilizations on the grounds of the tax raid against independent broadcasting company Rustavi 2. Rustavi2 was an independent company which had extremely oppositional stance. It was first time when Georgian TV channel was highly critical of the regime, and openly supported the opposition. The station had 24 hour coverage throughout Georgia. Rustavi2 was partially financially supported, trained, and sometimes protected by USAID and the Eurasia Foundation. The TV company played crucial role in the Rose Revolution. It should be also noted that TV company was not received exceptionally positively. There were some controversies regarding the bold claims the company made on officials as well as other facts. But overall the concept of pressure on the media was met with aggravation. Disbandment of the company meant that people were taken away daily opportunity to receive oppositional perspective of the facts.

The protest action was held in support of the company, office of which was intruded by the employees of the Ministry of State Security. The protests lasted over seven days and it peaked at around 10 000 people. It was obvious that the collective gathering moved beyond the Rustavi2 case per se. It took on an anti-government character with calls for the resignations of key security officials and the President. To be more specific seven-day social protests in Oct-Nov were instigated by entering the independent broadcasting company Rustavi2 to inspect its financial documentation on the basis of sanction of the district court of the same day. The sanction implied that there was suspicion that the company had not paid 1,5 million Lari (approximately USD 750,000) in taxes. Director General of Rustavi 2 replied that these allegations were groundless, since the company did not have such incomes from advertising through the month and regarded action of the State Security Ministry as a political pressure. It should be noted that by then Rustavi2 was the first broadcasting company which was uncompromising and extremely critical towards government and therefore, had high rating and validity in society. In fact the company was viewed as an agent ambushing government for their mistakes and misdeeds which, as reported, was shared by the majority in Georgia. Social protests started immediately after media broadcasted about intruding the company. Common people, parliamentarians and students joined social gatherings which fluctuated from 200 to 10 000 protesters over seven days. The social mobilization was about condemning governmental action and at the same time supporting the independent media. Closer to the last days of protesting collective action went beyond the expression of protests on attack of independent media. Protesters started demanding resignation of high-profile officials and then the demand grew into resignation of the President. Shevardnadze attempted to protect the Minister of Interior and the Prosecutor General announcing that

their removal would trigger his own resignation. Thus, the President tried to play on internal divisions within parliament, as many MPs were not prepared to endorse an absolute political victory by Zhvania, who would have assumed the powers of the President ad interim if Shevardnadze resigned. Zhvania countered by announcing his own resignation on November 1. Eventually social protests leaded to dismissing all the Ministers which was followed by the resignations of the Parliamentary Chairman. A special session was held for new composition of the State cabinet. Although after this people still demanded Shevadnadze's resignation, the sponsors sent people home in order to avoid escalation of the situation. Even without this it was obvious that there was a decrease in size of social mobilization. Although demands on resignation were not satisfied, Rustavi2 to was on air again. The demonstrations have given people a taste of the power of popular action. Many in Georgia now have renewed belief in the possibility for democratic development - a concept that they thought had already been squandered, consumed by a period of protracted stagnation.

Later on in 2003 which was a year of Parliamentary elections social gatherings were devoted to protest "unfair" composition of elections commission and inaccuracies in the voter lists. This was part of oppositional campaign for fair elections. November, 2003 was marked with Parliamentary elections in Georgia. As the experience of recent years of presidential and legislative elections was related to fraud, this time relatively stronger opposition and civil society were actively working on fair outcome of the forthcoming elections. The forthcoming Parliamentary elections were seen as a precondition of the presidential election in 2005 when the President was to step down. In fact the distribution of votes among political parties would determine the future candidate of the presidency. According to oppositional parties democratic outcome of the Parliamentary elections would prove that Georgian population was no longer in favour of the government and will further pave the way of new political force to come into power. Relations between the pro-presidential election alliance For New Georgia and the radical opposition parties were too tense and some observers do not rule out that these tensions might lead to destabilization in the country. The opinion polls also showed that opposition parties had a good chance to succeed in November 2 elections; however because of fierce race it was still hard to give exact predictions. The Western agencies were very much interested in fair elections and were actively involved in the pre-election period. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) set up one of the largest and longest-running observation missions ever deployed to an OSCE country in September to monitor election process before, during, and after the election day in Georgia. Despite all these efforts prediction of fraud prevailed in TV and printed media in

Georgia. Both the opposition and the government accused each other of aggravating situation on the eve of elections. There was a kind of expectation built that even this time government would act dishonestly. In June people came out in the streets to protest biased composition of election committee. Later in October another social mobilization was held to ambush Central Election Commission in inaccurate voter lists and pressure to solve the problem. Reasons of both cases were also amplified by the reported violence during the political campaign. Despite the fact that protest rallies explicitly aimed at fixing all the problems hindering fair elections, there were discussions and analysis made about anticipated fraud elections again.

Although demonstrations of the period of 2000-Oct/2003 seemed promising their small size and duration suggested that the appeal of popular mobilization had limits. Eventually the campaign for fair elections did not succeed as in few months when the elections were held people went out in the streets to protest vote rigging. The discontent grow immediately and resulted in series of social protests that peaked at over 40 000 people. Since Shevadnadze came to power this was the first precedence when a long-lasting collective action with the highest number of people took place in the period.

Table#1: Social Protests, Tbilisi, Georgia 1996 -2003

Case #	Date	Reason	N. of Protesters	Duration (days)
1	Nov/2000	Absence of electricity	100	1
2	Oct-Nov/2001	Pressure on independent media	10 000	7
3	Nov/2001	Absence of electricity	500	2
4	Jun/2003	Promotion of fair election: composition of election commission	5000	6
5	Oct/2003	Promotion of fair elections: incomplete voter list	1000	1
6	Nov/2003	Fraud Parliamentary elections	40000	15

Source: civil. ge

The social protests unleashed gradually in November, 2003. According to statistics released by the Georgian Election Commission (GEC), the elections on 2nd November, 2003 were won by a combination of parties supporting President Eduard Shevardnadze. However, the results were annulled by the Georgia Supreme Court after the Rose Revolution on 25 November, following allegations of widespread electoral fraud and large public protests which led to the resignation of Shevardnadze.

Parliamentary elections on 2nd November, 2003 were crucial for the further developments in the country. The elections were seen as a precondition of the presidential election in 2005 when the President was to step down. In fact the distribution of votes among political parties

would determine the future candidate of the presidency. According to oppositional parties democratic outcome of the Parliamentary elections would prove that Georgian population was no longer in favour of the government and would further pave the way of new political force to come into power. Relations between the pro-presidential election alliance For New Georgia and the radical opposition parties were too tense and some observers do not rule out that these tensions might lead to destabilization in the country. The opinion polls also showed that opposition parties had a good chance to succeed in November 2 elections; however because of fierce race it was still hard to give exact predictions. The Western agencies were very much interested in fair elections and were actively involved in the pre-election period as well as during elections. Around 600 foreign and 3,000 local observers monitored elections. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) set up one of the largest and longest-running observation missions ever deployed to an OSCE country in September to monitor election process before, during, and after the election day in Georgia. Moreover, the local election observer watchdog NGO International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) recruited up to 3,000 volunteers to monitor elections. ISFED also conducted the parallel vote tabulation, which was believed to increase transparency and decrease chances for manipulation of the election results. Apart from this sixty observers were present from the regional organization Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which unites post-Soviet countries. Despite all these efforts prediction of fraud prevailed in TV and printed media in Georgia. Both the opposition and the government accused each other of aggravating situation on the eve of elections. Major criticism was about inaccuracies in voter lists and violence during political campaign.

The period until official results were announced lasted over 22 days: 2nd– 22nd November. During this time regular updates on election results and information on general performance at polling station were available on the Internet and via media. Preliminary results were provided by GEC and also exit polls which were conducted by American company, Global Strategy7. The preliminary results announced by GEC were in favour of the electoral bloc "For a New Georgia" that was supported by President Shevardnadze and the Revival Party that was an ally of the President. Conversely, results provided by exit polls demonstrated that opposition was winning by a large margin, with the National Movement coming first. Apart from this there were regular reports on voter intimidation, ballot box stuffing and

[7] The U.S. polling firm Global Strategy Group, contracted by the Rustavi 2 broadcasting company with financial support of the Eurasia Foundation, the British Council and Open Society Georgia Foundation.

inaccurate voter lists - names of many across the country, was missing from the voter list. Simultaneously, day by day assessments of the process was made by people from international as well as local community. An international mission from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had around 450 international observers from forty-three countries monitoring the polls. As it was declared by special co-coordinator of the OSCE chairman-in-office elections did not meet international standards. The statements of US Embassy, European Commission and a number of international organizations were also in line with the mentioned. There was much controversy on opposition side where no unanimity was achieved. The National Movement and Burjanadze-Democrats were the strongest wing which shared the position of the international community and results of exit polls. This was the alliance along with civil society that called for public action in order to annul fraudulent elections and bring back their right to vote. This initial demand was the main reason of street protests on the first days after polling station was closed. However, later on when there were no signs of government giving up its position the demand became more extreme and opposition parties were agitating people to join protests in order to end Schevardnadze's regime. The other wing of opposition parties were either supporting the government or admitting the fraud but refraining from social protests.

Realizing that social mobilization in the streets was the only tool to demonstrate people's will and mood about the elections and the government, part of the opposition actively promoted the importance of street protest and collective action. Especially, when the demand became the resignation of the President it was obvious that without public mobilization the demand was not legitimate. On the other hand there was government and and its allies that had obvious interest to maintain the power and end street protests as soon as possible. Therefore, there were different forces through media interacting with society. Various interpretation of given situation was proposed by the government, opposition parties, international institutions and local civil society. The positions varied from pro-rally, promoting unfair election, to against the rally, amplifying the frame of fair elections.

3.2 Methodology

For testing the Model, a qualitative approach has been used. It was chosen, firstly, due to the novelty of the study. Non-existence of any related sociological research on the topic makes the chosen method relevant as well as a good start for further research. Secondly, the question addressed in the paper requires very detailed information on the movement campaign, and qualitative approach can give thorough and in-depth understanding of the case (Creswell 1994). Data was obtained from the following sources: TV and printed media, relevant documents, in-depth interviews.

3.2.1 Size of Social Protests

The dependent variable is the size of social protest (see Table#). There are many sources indicating different figures in each case of social protest. The figures provided by the government are obviously suspect. Advocates for protest rallies also stated their own figures, though these may be also suspected of exaggeration. The original data was compiled from the daily news online service – civil.ge. The online media was chosen because unlike several other media outlets and newspapers it was comparatively neutral. The figures obtained from civil.ge was compared with others in the Table#2. The principle behind correlation is to crosscheck data from civil.ge with data from other sources and see how reliable the measure is. The other sources listed in the Table are the major outlets that provided a systematic data on all the cases. The listed sources also are not homogenous in terms of political stance. Resonansi and Alia are printed newspapers that were reported as relatively oppositional. Rustavi2 was extremely oppositional and Public Broadcaster was one of the major pro-governmental TV channels. As for listed two experts they are international experts whose evaluation is meant to be relatively objective. It is also noteworthy mentioning that the trend of increase and decrease of the figures in each case of protest rally are completely compatible with each other.

Table shows that the figures from civil.ge are highly correlated with the data from other sources. There is even high correlation with the figures provided from the State TV channel. High correlation with all the sources increases the confidence in their reliability.

Table#2: Measures of Size of Social Protest 2000-2003

Source	Correlation
civil.ge	1.00
Resonansi	.997**
Alia	.991**
Rustavi2	1.00
Public Broadcaster	.991**
Expert1	.998**
Expert2	.999**

3.2.2 Models of Movement Participation

The independent variables are the variables from the categories of the two Models discussed in the part one of the paper. In particular, the major focus is on the frames of the second Model. This is because there is already secondary data on political system and political stimuli during the period of 1995-2003. Many international organizations have analytical papers on the issue which provide ready figures on the indicators of governance and political system over the years. Those sources include Polity IV, Nation in Transit 2012, World Bank, etc. Thus, in characterization of the political context reliable sources are cited. In addition to this during data collection from the media, data on general context and rhetoric on the issue was taken into consideration and further used in the analysis. Furthermore, data on triggering events over the period was also double-checked in the printed media. Such instance was the issue of electoral fraud which has been practiced in earlier years of Shevardnadze's presidency. So, while nature of actual triggering events is analyzed qualitatively, the similar events that took place in earlier years were also discussed in order to understand why in one case there was a mobilization and in the other cases there was not.

As for frames which are seen as the major instigators of mass mobilization are identified and further analyzed in detail. In particular, frames of injustice, blamer, solution, social problem, urgency, prospects for success, self-efficacy and propriety are explored in detail.

3.2.3 Method

To examine the Models, a qualitative approach has been used. It was chosen, firstly, due to the novelty of the study. Non-existence of any related research on the topic makes the chosen method relevant as well as a good start for further research. Secondly, the question addressed in the paper requires very detailed information on the movement campaign, and qualitative approach can give thorough and in-depth understanding of the case (Creswell 1994). Data was obtained from two sources: printed and TV media, in-depth interviews, documents.

3.2.3.1 Media

TV and printed media was used to collect data on the context of sample social protests and identify key frames in the discourse of the articles (Olzak 1989; Earl, Martin, McCarthy, Soule 2004). Moreover, obtained data was very useful for elaborating specific questions for the follow-up interviews. It also assisted interviewees in rooting their memories in social, temporal and geographical context.

On the way of frame identification, signature matrix was built revealing master themes with their reasoning and justification (Beckett 1999). The matrix consists of rows, representing the interpretive packages; and columns, representing symbolic (framing) devices. Each Interpretive package carries one theme that is represented in different symbolic devices: exemplars, catchphrases, roots and principles which define and explain the rationale of a certain a certain theme (Gamson and Lasch 1983). The interpretation that were mentioned only once and did not represent one of the elements in a long line of ideas carrying the same message was not labeled as a frame.

Sample. Videos on special broadcasts on protests rallies in November, 2003 were obtained from Rustavi2. In total, videos on five days were analyzed. TV videos on other cases were not possible to obtain from Rustavi2 or any other company. Additional videos were searched and identified on youtube. In particular, talk shows and live broadcasts were available only on the cases of Rustavi2 intrusion and series of protests in November, 2003. In total 10 talk shows and 20 live broadcasts were available. Part of the video data was obtained on CDs from Rustavi2.

Three Georgian daily newspapers were used: Resonnansi – independent newspaper (criticizing the government), Alia (comparatively neutral) and online newspaper Civil.ge (comparatively neutral). According to the reports of the sales department of the Newspaper companies, all three newspapers were the most popular and had a high rate of sales in Georgia. Overall, 197 articles on protests were identified and all of them were reviewed for the purpose of this study. Where necessary the data was cross-checked through other media sources.

3.2.3.2 In-depth Interviews

For the purpose of enriching the research and validating the information collected from the the media, in-depth interviews were used. This technique allowed face-to-face communication and aimed at asking questions to explain the underlying reasons of the events, the movement campaign and protesters' action in context of all protest actions.

Questions for semi-structured interview guides were elaborated based on media data. All the questions were designed to be open-ended, allowing the respondent to develop answers to unprompted questions, before asking more specific prompted questions. Namely, respondents were asked about the motivation and internal dynamics of social mobilizations. During the preparation of the guide, two pilot interviews were conducted in order to test the validity of the questions. The duration of each interview varied from one to two hours. Considering the different role of each respondent, interview guides slightly varied according to the interviewees. Prior to the interviews, all the interviewees were introduced to the goals and objectives of the research and they were asked permission for tape recording. In some cases tape recording was replaced by note writing.

Sample. Respondents for the interviews were recruited in two ways. While examining printed media data names of key players of the protests turned up constantly. These were the initial individuals contacted for the interviews. Once the interview process was underway, respondents mentioned friends and colleagues who were not in the centre of media attention but had relevant information. Thus, subsequent interviews were arranged as a result of the snow ball effect. In total, 26 people were interviewed. The role of two gate-keepers was central in providing telephone numbers of the interviewees or directly planning meetings. The interviewed respondents included members of different parties, activists, civil society and media representatives. Among interviewed respondents there were the members of

Shevardnadze's government which did not wish to disclose their names. Due to political situation in Georgia, it was not possible to interview the key leaders of the Rose Revolution. In 2012 a new government was elected which has taken legislative measures against the former President and the government members. Because of this a large majority of them has left the country without declaring their present location. Before 2012, there were attempts made to schedule the interview with the President Saakashvili who was one of the distinguished leaders in the pre-Revolution protests. However, the interview was postponed for several times and then because of political circumstances it was not possible to contact him. To complete data, interviews and speeches were searched online and in TV and printed media which were then used in the data analysis. The movie on the Rose Revolution was also very helpful in this sense as the perspectives of the key opposition members as well as the government members were shown. In the Table# you can find detailed list of the interview participants.

Table# 3: Sample of Interviewees

#	Interviewees	Positions held before 2003
1	Gia Khukhashvili	Independent Georgian Expert
2	Ramaz Sakvarelidze	Political Scientist
3	Kakha Kukava	Leader of the Conservative Party
4	George Gugava	Member of the Labour Party
5	George Mosidze	Memeber of the New Rights Party
6	Levan Gachechiladze	Memeber of the New Rights Party
7	Koka Gunzadse	Activist
8	Goga Khaindrava	Activist
9	David Kikalishvili	Rustavi2 journalist
10	Toma Chagelishvili	Rustavi2 journalist
11	Nikoloz Rurua	Founder the daily-newspaper *24 Hours*
12	Tina Khidasheli	Chair of Georgian Young Lawyers Association
13	Davit Zurabishvili	co-Founder of the Liberty Institute
14	Kakha Lomaia	Executive Director of the Open Society Georgia Foundation
The rest 12 respondents did not wish to disclose their names. Among the respondents are former members of the government		

As for the interviews with protesters, in total sixty people were interviewed. They were asked in detail about the reasons of joining the protest. The sample is balanced according to the participation in social protests), age and gender. See below a detailed Table.

Table#4: Sample of the Respondents who Participated in the Social Protests

		# of Respondents
Age	30-40	18
	40-50	12
	50-60	17
	60-70	13
Gender	male	23
	female	37
Participation	case#1	4
	case#2	23
	case#3	7
	case#4	10
	case#5	
	case#6	16
Total		60

Data was organized and analyzed on the basis of detailed transcription. An inductive approach was used for coding. Once the data has been processed, a detailed analysis has been undertaken.

3.2.4 Research Bias and its Solution

Interviews: Recall Bias. In the case of interview data, it is always crucial to overcome recall bias as well as measurement errors, especially when the study case is not in the near past and there is a high probability that people will hold subjective views about the issue. In order to minimize recall bias, questions in the guide were chronological (Schuman and Presser 1996). Moreover, on specific events respondents were reminded based on the obtained data from printed media. Overall, interview data was checked and completed through data obtained from TV and printed media.

Media Bias. Triangulation (Earl, Martin, McCarthy, Soule 2004) of multiple sources was used to ensure a broader range of coverage, which is likely both to capture more events and to provide multiple accounts of each event.

3.3 Results

The given section provides analysis on six cases of the protest rallies which took place under Shevardnadze's rule in the period of 1995-2003. The section covers six sub-sections. The first section is about general context of all six cases. Specifically, features of political system and presence of triggering events are reviewed. There is detailed information given in the background information the political, social and economic situation during Shevardnadze's presidency. However, the same data was also obtained from the printed media as well as interviews. The later was especially interesting in order to see how those years were perceived by people. The next sub-section is about objective and subjective factors of social protests. This provides more detailed data on objective circumstances (except but not excluding political context and triggering event) and subjective factors of social protests. Then follows the analysis of political frames and counter frames which is based on data obtained from the media. The subsequent two sub-sections suggest organizers' and participants' perspectives on the movement campaign and more concrete subjective reasons of participation. This allowed revealing two sides of one coin: understanding of what was agitated and how it was perceived by the target group. The final section is devoted to the frame resonance which measures the success of the themes from relatively objective stance.

3.3.1 Political System and Triggering Events

To follow the logic of the General Model (see scheme 2.b), in the first place the context of the social protests should be examined. Overall, as it has been already mentioned in the previous sections in the chapter the political, social and economic context was relatively the same over nine years. Even triggering events were reiterated during the period. On democracy scale the country scored the same over nine years. As it was already mentioned Georgia was considered as in transition from authoritarian to democratic political system. The descriptive data analysis from a number of leading international data agencies (Polity IV, Nation in Transit 2012, The World Bank 2012, CIA 2012) demonstrated that the country had structural disposition to changes. In particular, with low democracy score but with the labels of anocracy, transitional country or hybrid regime; Georgia showed low levels of governance (WGI 2014), institutional culture, political rights and civil liberties. This made the country experiencing a constant power struggle among elites and raised high risk of instability and change. In such political context there have been many events that could have been served as triggering events or turning points for mobilization. However, only few of them became

primary stimuli for mobilization. As Table#1 *(see sub-section 3.1.3)* shows insufficient supply of electricity, attack to independent TV media as well as rigged elections were the major and only reasons for aggrieved people or opposition to rally against the government during nine years.

To start from the first reason – insufficient supply of electricity – we can see that this was not a political but a social call for the government. The experts explained that considering the prevailed nature and seriousness of the issue, it could have been a reason for mobilization in every single year over nine years. However, as they mentioned those cases were marked with the last drops in already extreme conditions that communities were experiencing over months. It was also recalled by the respondents that in comparison to 2000, which was marked with a usual insufficient supply of basic utilities, 2001 was extremely severe. So, based on this it was claimed that November, 2001 - when the second social protest on the no supply of electricity took place was, *apparently,* the most troublesome and unbearable for certain districts. The printed media also covered the social protests as reactions to the worsened conditions - blacked-out districts. Nonetheless, the problem of electricity supply was a one of the major concerns in society, it is hard to detect if particularly blacked-out districts were common in other months of the same or other year. Reportedly, Georgian population, especially in the regions, was even left without gas or water for few days or even weeks.

The second triggering event that instigated social mobilization was about intrusion into the independent TV media. It was the first precedence of publicly attacking the media company. As it was mentioned by the respondents there were always minor cases of bullying or warning the administration of Rustavi2. However, those attempts to intrude and derange TV channel operation never went beyond verbal expression. The TV company was very critical of the government and officials and was extremely popular among some of the opposition political parties as well as public with oppositional stance. In contrast to social protests on the basis of electricity supply (which were initiated by common people), in this case call for street protests were done by the representatives of the media and the opposition leaders supporting the media company. As it was stated by the respondents the event of attacking the independent media was important because of the associating ideas. The issue was about the problem of freedom of speech, freedom of expression.

The next events that served as triggering events for social mobilization were on theme of rigged elections. The cases#4 and 5 were part of pre-election campaign – fair elections. The instant reasons were biased composition of election commission and inaccuracies in voter list and in the last case (case#6) people mobilized because of fraud elections. It is noteworthy mentioning that Georgian population witnessed the same situation in previous years as well but it was only in 2003 when these events served as instigator factors for social protests. In particular, in 1999 there were Parliamentary elections which were marked as unsatisfactory by the OSCE-IDIHR. This applies to pre- and after election examination. In the following year, in 2000, the presidential elections took place which, according the same sources were evaluated, as rigged elections. International agencies reported on electoral violence and systematic inaccuracies in pre-election campaign as well. Despite this no public protest took place in none of the cases.

3.3.2 Objective and Subjective Reasons and Causes

Political experts and organizers of social protests were asked about reasons and causes of small and large social protests under the Shevardnadze's rule. In particular, the respondents made comparisons between the largest mobilization of 2003 and rest of the social protests that took place before it. The experts have distinguished between external ("contextual") and internal ("subjective") factors. In case of large mobilization of 2003, respondents have highlighted conducive factors such as support of international and local organizations, government's fragile state and its vulnerabilities, presence of strong opposition and a distinguished leader. The experts also elaborated on subjective reasons of participation which, according to them, were much determined by the given context in the period. As for the other cases of protest rallies, the reasons of small size were mostly seen in absence of the factors that mattered in the large mobilization in 2003.

In general all the experts agreed that under Shevardnadze's rule social protests were possible. In particular, political system which was neither authoritative nor democratic would have tolerated many more protest rallies. At the same time respondents admitted that despite "non-repressive regime" there were always talks about possible repressions in case of street mobilizations. One of the experts referred to the presence of Rustavi2 which, as it was mentioned many times in this paper, was radical in criticizing the President, government and their proponents. As he further explained, although TV company was periodically bullied and even attacked in 2001, the fact that it was still on air over years was a good

evidence that the President and his team were reluctant with radical measures in dealing with oppositional stance. Despite this, as the some of the respondents mentioned, it was only in 2003 when there was an "institutional readiness" for successful collective protests. In successful, size is meant. There are few more factors listed below that were considered as important elements in creating conducive environment for a large mobilization.

International Organizations. The impact of international community on the social protests of the Rose Revolution was quite debatable among the respondents. It is noteworthy mentioning that, many analytical reports/papers on the issue also followed the same trend. Some state that the role of the Western agencies was exaggerated in the Rose Revolution and some claim that their role was decisive. As one of the journalists from Rustavi2 explained, international organizations have started implementing their programs since 1997. Western agencies not only were involved in developmental projects but they were preparing educational and practical trainings for professionals from many fields. In the framework of international programs a new generation of politicians, lawyers, journalists, etc. were brought up. In 2003, when people witnessed the largest mobilization, it was obvious that not only part of an oppositional political parties but there were a significant mobilization and consolidation of those local agencies which were funded by the Western organizations over years. Hence, the United Opposition including local civil society had a good knowledge of how and what to do in order to pressure the government and cause sympathy in society.

Initially, international agencies had a close collaboration with Shevardnadze and had declared expectation that battle with corruption would yield tangible results. As it was mentioned in previous chapters corruption was one of the severe problems during his presidency. Adequate actions to cope with the problem were very much based on words. There were no radical measures taken. Even the most corrupt Ministers kept their position. The broken promises concerning coping with corruption formed negative attitude regarding Shevardnadze gradually over years. This is why, in previous years when elections were held international community was not so radical in its evaluation. Closer to 2003 the international community was already quite critical about Shevardnadze and this became very much obvious during Parliamentary elections in 2003. The Western organizations were reporting on significant inaccuracies in elections and was calling for fair elections. The underlying message of this, as one of the respondents stated, was that the government should recognize its defeat in the elections or organize another round.

None of the US or any other foreign agents made public proclamations regarding joining protest rally. US agents were reluctant to support any decisive acts on part of the Opposition publicly. Despite this it was obvious that their rhetoric completely coincided with what was agitated by the opposition and civil society. Moreover, most of those who were distinguished leaders of the process on different levels were either Western-educated or backed up by international organizations. Based on this, it was concluded that the West had an indirect effect on social mobilization. Apart from indirect financial input the West was highly popular in Georgian population. As it was claimed the West was associated with "everything good and progressive". Hence, what was articulated and amplified by the organizers of protest rally was more trustworthy when it was congruent with the statements from International organizations.

Local Civil Society. As it is elaborated above, Georgian civil society was a "product" of international programs that were developed specifically for different targets within it. The respondent listed the following beneficiaries: NGOs that were providing evidence-based reports on political economic and social situation in Georgia, Young Lawyers Association who were quite efficient and persistent with legal parts of diverse processes, media - Rustavi2 who was completely westernized technologically and intellectually, Kmara who was a youth movement Modeled on the Serbian non-governmental organization (which had crucial role in overthrowing Milosevic's regime in 2000) and Opposition leaders sharing western ideas and values. As it was stated many times during the interviews, the listed agents were all instrumental in achieving the Rose Revolution. However, most of the respondents distinguished the role of the Rustavi2 which was the only oppositional TV in terms of being extremely radical in criticizing the government. As the journalists from the company stated, their vision was completely different and was aligned with the Western beliefs, values and style. One of the Rustavi2 journalists also mentioned that their radicalism, at some point, clearly won into the opposition's side. According to him it would have been a crime and people would never forgive them if they did not support opposition.

Obviously, the same could not be said about the State TV companies who were broadcasting completely different reality with contrasting methods. In fact, as respondents stated, all those agencies all together formed a new culture opposition who were equipped with skills and knowledge that are efficient and effective in Western cultures.

The Government. According to the respondents, the government was seen as the most unpopular especially in the closer period to the 2003. This was, obviously, because of political, economic and social *collapse* in the country. Apart from this as some of the respondents said the government was losing its unity within the system. This was especially pronounced in 2003. Due to poor civil service and coordination among different ministries as well as regional bodies there was low trust among high and low level officials. This, logically facilitated forming allies between opposition and the government members. When asked about particular examples of forming allies *elite defection* was mentioned. The later started in 2001 when a few political leaders have resigned from their positions and formed new opposition parties *(see section 3.1 on background information).* Elite defection became very much pronounced during pre-revolution protest rallies. The respondents claimed that the later became possible because the government was weak; at least this is how it was seen for an outsider.

Respondents were asked about the reasons of absence of a large protest mobilizations back in 2001, when for example Mikheil Saakashvili has resigned from the position of Minister of Justice. One of the Respondents said that context was still different. Defection of single political figures and disclosure of the Ministers in corruption was not enough. Especially, when there was not any call on public action. The later was even harder to achieve in case of the apathy and no/low culture of civil activism in Georgian population.

Generational Gap. Some of the respondents, while speaking about government features and then characterizing the Western-educated political leaders and professionals also pointed to the generational gap that also fostered to achieve the large-scale mobilization. On the one side there was a generation of progressive young people possessing radically different ideology, education, experience, skills etc. They had completely different vision which was not compatible with the government. On the other side there was a government who could not keep the pace of the time. It was represented with the old generation whose way of thinking was still in Soviet Union. So, the gap between the two contrasting groups was growing year by year and culminated in 2003. One of the respondents also stressed the fact that Saakashvili and his team were very well equipped with marketing skills and had good expertise with new technologies. While this made them more efficient in communication with society, the government was referring to the same old tactics. So, “the contrast was huge”.

Electoral Fraud. Respondents interpreted electoral fraud as a very convenient theme for public mobilization. Without an extra elaboration the theme itself implied concern of the whole country. The issue was not about who was whose supporter or who voted for the government or opposition but the issue was about the fact that elections were rigged. This in a "normal" country, as one of the respondents said, would cause massive grievances in society despite their political preferences. As it was noted previously, it was a good objective reality that was grasped by the opposition in a timely manner. Electoral fraud in previous years did not have such resonance as there was not such mobilization and consolidation of forces as it was in November, 2003.

Factor of a Leader. Respondents also mentioned about the factor of the leader that did not occur until 2003. Despite the fact that the organizer of the protest rallies was the United Opposition, for the respondents it was obvious that Saakashvili's leadership skills and his charisma made him the most distinguished among other opposition leaders. As one of the respondents stated, Saakashvili had everything what people were looking for. He was Western-educated progressive thinker, who with his bold actions while being in the government and afterwards achieved credibility from people. In addition to this in pre-revolution protests Saakashvili was showing determination and power that served as a good motivator for people to be part of the process. His confidence made people believe in success and better changes. It was also reported that in previous years the leaders were only distinguished with their speeches in criticizing the government. The opposition leaders, who were among most credible and likeable politicians were not organizing protests or promoting any relevant messages regarding protest rallies or social movements.

Soviet Legacy. The respondents from both sides – opposition and the government – were unanimous in mentioning about the Soviet legacy when asked about the absence of oppositional movements or single mass protest rallies from 1995 to November, 2003. Respondents explained that the Soviet rule completely destroyed oppositional consciousness and culture in Georgia. Moreover, with no culture of social movements Georgian people still managed to mobilize in the streets after the collapse of the Soviet Union *(see section 3.1 Background Information).* However, it ended up with bloodshed confrontation which left a painful spot in recent history of Georgia. As respondents further explained this was an important factor in explaining absence of social protests in the early period of Shevardnadze's presidency. The refrained attitude towards street protests was especially pronounced in the older generation who witnessed civil confrontation. In general social protests were not seen as something that

would yield tangible results. Hence, people did not see point in participating collective action.

3.3.3 Identified Political Frames and Counter Frames

Three core framing tasks were measured through Signature Matrices. In the first five cases both pro-rally and against-rally (counter-frame) theme packages were detected one for each. As for the sixth case, considering the length of duration of the movement campaign and protests, overall four (6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4) theme packages (including counter frames) were identified. In addition to this, in the sixth case two additional issue packages were also revealed that did not have primary task of promoting participation in social protests. Their primary target did not imply common people but the government. However, with their content and messages they are considered to add extra potency to the presented pro- and against-rally themes and entailing frames. Hence, they are included in the analysis. Following the data on three framing tasks, diffusion of the frames of the same six cases were examined.

3.3.2.1 Cases#1&3

Signature Matrix 1 provides data on signature matrices of two cases where along with pro-rally themes against-rally (counter) themes are also presented. Nonetheless two cases took place in two different time periods and had different duration in days (one day and two days), they share the same issue frames on both sides (pro-/against-rally). Moreover, the sponsors are also the same - common people who were personally affected by the situation. These similarities allow building one matrix for both cases.

- *Consensus mobilization (diagnostic and prognostic frames)*

To start with pro-rally theme package we can see that it evolved under the issue of lack of electricity. It was an immediate response to the blacked-out districts lasting for a few days. Aggravated from years of stagnated bad situation, issue of electricity became an instant incentive for collective protest specifically for those who experienced no electricity in those days. The protesters believed that it was possible to ease their conditions at some extant.

From the Table we could see that the issue evolves from the problem of lack of electricity in which is blamed the government and AES TEALASI company. The sponsors (organizers) of the protest rally are victims of the given situation. The problem, victim and target

identification is well elaborated. Especially if we look through the categories of frame, position, roots and consequences; it is clear that along with labeling the problem itself, its reasons and causes are given. The problem of insufficient supply of electricity has its roots in recent history of Georgia. In particular, the issue did not emerge suddenly but it was a prevailed problem since Shevadnadze came into power. In the context where the supply of electricity as well as other basic utilities was contingent upon certain schedule, it was too extreme to experience complete absence of electricity for a whole one or two days.nAs for the prognostic task we could see from the category of Position that the protesters do not have any particular repertoire of action but the belief that problem should be solved somehow. There was no plan or strategy proposed in case the government ignored the protesters' demand. In fact, the protesters were waiting for the government to supply them with electricity immediately. However, there was no indication from side of aggrieved population how – through collective action - to pressure the government in order to achieve the desired end.

Signature Matrix 1: Issue Package on Protest Rallies held in Nov/2000&Nov/2001

	Pro-Rally	Against-Rally
Sponsor	People	Government, AES TEALASI company
Package	Lack of Electricity	Economic Crisis
Frame	How to pressure government to provide electricity to the population	How to convince protesters and society that country is facing serious problems that should be solved soon
Position	There should be some way to avoid blackout lasting for few weeks in the districts	The government is putting much effort for well-being of the country
Roots	Lack of supply of basic utility means such as electricity, water and gas lasting for years	Insufficient resources
Consequences	n/a	High risk of civil confrontation
Principles	n/a	n/a
Catchphrases	"We deserve better conditions", "It is impossible to live in the conditions when there has not been electricity for few days", "We deserve better life"	----

In response to the pro-rally theme, the government reacted immediately by shifting to the different stance of the component of blamer of the same problem. In particular, the articulated problem by the protesters was completely shared by the government. However, the difference was in attribution of the blamer of the issue. As it was expected, although the government did not deny that it was its responsibility to solve the problem, it did not blame itself in the given worsened situation. Instead the government explained that insufficient resources in the country were the major cause. Hence, the protesters were asked for patience and understanding as the government with AES TEALASI was in process of easing the citizens' conditions. Similar to the pro-rally frame sponsors, there were no concrete solutions proffered.

- *Action Mobilization (frames from motivational task)*

Despite the issue was quite severe, acute and widespread to the whole population there were no alignments made to the problem as the concern of the society or the country. In other words people in the streets were complaining about their district situation with very mild references to the whole population. Of course in a country where an electricity supply is a "common thing" over years it might not need a special stress on social nature of the issue. But the fact is that *severity* in a sense of attribution of an issue from individual district to the whole country was not done. In case of *urgency* we could see that there is no suggestion on alternative developing scenario *(see consequences in the signature matrix)* if the protesters' demands would not be met. Although in the catchphrases one can detect vocabulary on how unbearable was existing living conditions, the urgency is still not amplified as protesters did not point to the possible consequences of long-lasting the blacked-out districts.

The last two frames of the motivational task – *efficacy* and *propriety* of collective action – were absent. In general, there was no call for action; at least none was covered by the media. Frames on prospects for success, importance of collective action or propriety of action were not articulated by the aggrieved people.

Motivational task of against-rally theme package was proffered in a slightly different way. Although the government shared the problem and expressed its discontent regarding it, it completely condemned the protest rally. The officials explained that there was no point in collective protest as they were trying to solve the problem and such actions would only worsen the situation. In case street protests would continue the officials even stressed the risk of civil confrontation. Hence*, urgency* was amplified in as sense to stop collective action. Propriety of stopping street protests was also evident in the speeches of the officials who were stressing duty and obligation of each citizen to be patient with aggravated economic situation which as it was further claimed would be improved soon.

- *Frame Diffusion*

In cases#1&3 we could see that they had no distinct sponsors or leaders *(see signature matrix 1)* except people themselves. Dwellers, who were from those districts that were blacked out, gathered their neighborhood and initiated social protest. This means that no one acted as a transmitter in or outside the capital. At least this was not covered by the media. Consequently, there was no distinguished person or a group who intentionally distributed frames from one place into another and consequently, no special effort was put into agitation

and calls for action. There was no information on protest rally was in the media even a day before. However, population became aware of the incident on the same day when certain number of people went out in the streets. As for counter framing, it was a direct and immediate reaction to staged rally and its frames were limited to a day in the first and two days in the second case. The diffusion period corresponded to the days when protests took place and both printed and TV media covered it fully.

3.3.2.1 Case#2

The obtained data on case#2 revealed only pro-rally theme. During seven days, which was duration of street protests, there was no coherent data on against-rally theme presented in printed media. Their response was limited to contradicting evaluation that varied from expressing the need of further investigation of the financial situation of the company to approval of the attack as a lawful action. Officials' statements were changing day by day. However, the President, the Ministers, Ex-Prosecutor General, Head of State TV, head of National Democratic, State TV journalists were all unanimous condemning street protests as a threat to civil confrontation. The statements were mostly focused on the way out of the crisis (that is how the situation was formulated) but not on the interpretation or any consistent response on identified the pro-rally frames.

- *Consensus mobilization (diagnostic and prognostic frames)*

Signature Matrix on protest rally held on Oct-Nov/2001 shows that, in comparison to cases 1&3, a specific case of pressuring the media company became a basis for development of a broad pro-rally issue – attack to freedom of speech. Reasoning devices of frame package is presented fully which makes diagnostic and prognostic tasks of framing accomplished. The intrusion to the TV company was interpreted as a threat to one of the milestones of democracy – freedom of speech. The sponsors of the package were the "victim" media company and opposition whose major task was to appeal support and empathy through amplifying the issue of abuse of civil rights and evil essence of the government. As the company needed supporters' presence in the streets to show their force against the government - the frame aimed at targeting wider community than those who directly experienced the pressure and attack. Street mobilization had a signaling effect saying that they were not alone in struggle with unjust, "undemocratic" actions performed by the government. Part of the opposition was on the side of the company and actively participated in delivering the same messages to society.

Signature Matrix 2: Issue Package on Protest Rally held on Oct-Nov/2001

	Pro-Rally
Sponsor	Rustavi2, Opposition (representatives of the 'reformers' team wing of "Citizens' Union", the "New Right" and "Socialist" factions)
Package	Attack to Freedom of Speech
Frame	How to stop government intrusion through appealing the sympathy and support of people
Position	The President is responsible for launching pressure on mass media and therefore, prosecutor's office takes part in lawlessness and has no credibility to make conclusions on the issue. The company mistrusted the Georgian law enforcement agencies
Roots	Rustavi2 had evidence on illegal actions of the government
Consequences	If collective efforts do not pressure government's illegal action on mass media, its demonstration of force would be even severe in the future
Principles	Freedom of speech is a millstone of democracy
Catchphrases	"Free media in free society" "We shall stay in Georgia, Shevardnadze must leave the country"
Depictions	People burned President Shevardnadze and Internal Affairs Minister's cartoon pictures

The sponsors of the pro-rally frame package presenting the given reality as an attack to freedom of speech justified their position through journalistic investigations run under the rule of the company. Rustavi2, as it was reported, possessed important evidence proving crime and illegal actions of the government: a) murderer of a high-profile journalist a year ago was related to the government. Under this version, the journalist possessed information about participation of high-level officials of the Ministry in drug business in Pankisi valley[8] and this information became a reason of murder of the journalist b) in recent months, an investigation by Rustavi 2 provided details on the financial machinations of the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Internal affairs. The reports said that the government agencies engaged in racketeering and mismanagement of state property. As the logic of the presented frame package developed sponsors interpreted the government's action as a punishment and political pressure for their independent journalistic activities uncovering true "face" of the regime. Possible consequences of lack of social mobilization were seen as permanent terror undermining free expression democratic transition. Call for support was mainly perceived as a tool to address a solution – withdrawal of the accusations – and avoiding future attacks and pressure on media. As for symbolic devices only catchphrases and depictions were detected. The protests were noteworthy also due to their demands which started from protection of free media and ended up with demands on resignation of Minister of Internal Affairs, General Prosecutor and the President.

[8] The Pankisi Gorge is a valley region in Georgia, in the northeastern corner of the country, bordering the Chechnyan republic of the Russian Federation. Administratively, it is included in the Akhmeta municipality of the Kakheti region in Georgia. An ethnic group called Kists of Chechen roots form the majority (75%) in the area.

- *Action Mobilization (frames from motivational task)*

The way the issue was framed the severity was clearly articulated and further amplified. As it was already mentioned above, the issue was interpreted as an attack to freedom of speech and not just attack to the independent media company. The former implied the concern of everyone and not just the issue of one company. Therefore, severity of the issue was promoted. The frame of social problem was present in debates, speeches and appeals on media throughout the period. Similarly, urgency of problem solution was evident in the same sources. As it can be seen in reasoning devices, the solution to the problem was not subject to delay. The issue was critical as it was about the future of the Rustavi2: whether it would continuous operation or not. This, in turn, was linked to the further democratic development of the country (reference to social problem frame). People were urged that if not pressuring the government now, its illegal action on mass media, its demonstration of force would be even severe in the future. Prospects for success were agitated in a sense of self-efficacy. In comparison to other cases there was a tight interdependence of the two frames. People were called for action and were reminded that only with their support they were able to stop pressure of the government. The sponsors were not amplifying the fact that the participation mattered for the further outcome but also they were making a special emphasis on moral obligation of every citizen to be the guard of democratic development of the country..

- *Frame Diffusion.*

In comparison to cases#1&3, case#2 gives different picture. Although, on the first day mobilization was immediate and spontaneous; agitation on joining rally and updates were given in printed and TV media throughout seven days (when protests took place). Eventually protests culminated in 5000 people in the streets. Against-rally frames were also articulated through the same means. As Rustavi2 was still able to broadcast there was a maximum coverage of oppositional perspective against the government.

3.3.2.2 Cases #4&5

The two cases coming from two specific causes – composition of election commission and incomplete voter list – made one general theme package which evolved under the issue of anticipation of unfair election. Similar to case#1, in this case we also have two events of social mobilization located in different timeframe. However, a common theme made possible to build one signature matrix for both cases.

Signature Matrix 3: Issue Package on Protest Rallies held in Jun/2003&Oct/2003

	Pro-Rally	Against-Rally
Sponsor	Opposition (Coordination Council for Fair Elections: National Movement and United Democrats, New Rights, Traditionalists and People's Party)	Government
Package	Anticipation of Unfair Elections	Anticipation of Fair Elections
Frame	How to avoid another fraud election	How to convince people that all is done to run fair elections
Position	Unbalanced composition of election commission and problems with voter lists	All the problems are fixed by the due date
Roots	Past experience of fraud elections	Enough preparatory work was done by international and local community to meet international standards
Consequences	If the government will not be changed this time Georgia will witness another nine years of stagnation and poverty	If opposition does not stop provocations on the issue destabilization will be possible
Principles	Fair elections milestone of democracy	Fair elections milestone of democracy
Catchphrases	"This unity of opposition should be the precondition for the end of this government," "Georgia without Shevardnadze" "If we see that the ballot is rigged, we give up race for Parliamentary seats and start mass protest rallies," "Enough Ballot Forge" "Let's stand together and in order to give the people chance for fair elections," "Street protests "an attempt to create a guided chaos in the country" "The protest rally remains the only way to force the government to conduct fair and democratic Parliamentary elections scheduled for November 2" "We should be together to defeat this government," "If we see that the ballot is rigged, we give up race for Parliamentary seats and start mass protest rallies,"	"This is [protest rally] a violation of law, as they have no permission to hold the rally" "We have the preliminary information that some forces might use this protest to destabilize situation in the country, that is why I am hear observing the situation" This unity of opposition should be the precondition for the end of this government" "Georgia without Shevardnadze" "I am interested in holding democratic Parliamentary elections" "the country will face chaos and destabilization" "street protest is illegal as they have no permission to hold the rally" President Shevardnadze called the street protests "an attempt to create a guided chaos in the country"

- *Consensus mobilization (diagnostic and prognostic frames)*

As it can be seen pro-rally issue package develop under the theme of high likelihood of rigging forthcoming elections. Justification of the frame comes from the given inaccuracies in pre-election preparatory process and past experience of fraud elections. Possible consequences present the idea that the government achieves victory only with rigged elections. Therefore, in order not to repeat history and to ensure fair elections people were called for action. In this way we can see that both diagnosis and prognosis are fully presented.

- *Action Mobilization (frames from motivational task)*

Signature Matrix 3 shows that all five motivational pro-rally frames are given in cases#4&5. *Severity* of the problem is very much emphasized by the sponsors. Planned elections were interpreted as the only chance to change the government and therefore, have a chance for better life. But because of past experience of fraud elections and given inaccuracies in pre-election period people were called to prevent rigging elections again. On the basis of

promotion of anticipation of unfair elections sponsors were agitating *urgency* of fixing all the issues that may lead to unfair outcome. Participation in a collective action was seen as a vital contribution and as a duty of very citizen in order to ensure better future in the next years.

The government in response to the opposition made attempts to build opposing anticipation of fair elections. In support to their claim they referred to the work done on part of international and local actors for fair elections. Although the named problems with election commission and voter lists were admitted only partially officials stated that they work on problems and all will be fixed by election day. Along with these statements government was explicitly expressing their fear for confrontation resulted from protest rallies and opposition readiness for action. It is interesting to see that two different frame packages hold on principle democracy. Counter framing also shared the severity of the issue and attempted to get the hopes up for expected fair outcome of elections. As it was evident urgency was not an issue for the government because on all the accusations of biased election commission as well as voter lists the rhetoric was the same: *all will be solved by the due date*. Conversely, efficacy and propriety of collective action was undermined by the threat of destabilization. According to the government the only duty of every citizen was not to be involved in civil confrontation and maintain peace and order. This meant that true citizens should refrain from collective action.

- *Frame Diffusion*

Both media and transmitters were involved in cases#4&5. Protests were planned and announced through printed and TV media in advance. At the same time transmitters were travelling in the regions and agitating people to make them follow their version of reality. Protest rallies were held in different towns (Zugdidi, Sagarejo, Gurjaani, Marneuli and Kutaisi, Gori) of Georgia. Although both media and transmitters were also present in case of against-rally frames. The number of people on the streets of the regions as well as Tbilisi were from 10-30 people (reported by civil.ge).

3.3.2.3 Case #6

Series of social protests in November, 2003 were completely different from the previous cases. There were six major issue packages that were covered by TV and printed media. The sponsors of the packages varied within and among opposition parties, the government, local as well as international civil society. The major topic of dispute between protagonists of the social protests and those who were against was fairness of the Parliamentary elections.

Correspondingly, those who condemned protest rallies were pro fair elections and those who agitated electoral fraud were organizers of social protests. The data analysis below follows the same logic. Signature Matrices, for each case is presented under the categories of pro-rally orientation and against-rally orientation issue package. As a result of Signature Matrices diagnostic, prognostic and motivational tasks of the issue packages are identified. This is followed by frame resonance and frame diffusion of all the cases.

Case 6.1. To start with pro-rally issue packages the signature matrix 4 shows the issue package of unfair election. This is the only issue package that directly worked on mobilization of potential adherents and supporters. The call for collective action was an immediate response to the announcement of preliminary results of the Parliamentary elections. The announcement was made in favour of the government and its allies. The rhetoric of the sponsors of the issue package became more pronounced and persistent when straight after elections the President "proudly" stated in the interview with one of the newspapers *Rezonansi* that the elections ensured new, multi-party parliament which would be the beginning of new era in Georgian politics. Straight after this speech opposition parties started campaign for fair elections which by all means meant victory of opposition, in particular United National Movement, and defeat of the government and pro-government fractions.

The sponsors, initially, consisted from three oppositional parties, civil society leaders and independent experts which formed the alliance and developed the frame on the first days after election was held. After few days one of the political parties – Ertoba - left the coalition and the struggle was continued by rest of the actors. Allegedly, the reason of leaving the United Opposition was disillusion regarding the objectives of the street protests. As the leader of the Unity declared, they joined the opposition because of abusing dignity and rights of the citizens. As elections were not only rigged but also sufficient number of people had not opportunity to vote the party believed that it was necessary to abolish the results and organize new elections. The demand of the United Opposition to acknowledge victory of United National Movement was inappropriate for the party - Unity. Among civil society most active were Liberty Institute, Kmara and TV channel Rustavi2. Allegedly the source of funding was Soros foundation in Georgia.

- *Consensus mobilization (diagnostic and prognostic frames)*

The issue package demonstrates that both diagnosis and prognosis tasks of the election situation is well presented. The rationale behind the issue package was to show that elections were rigged. The sponsors claimed that preliminary results on the victory of governmental fraction, was based on electoral fraud. As they further explained, the government with its inability and unwillingness to improve the situation in the country did not have a chance to win in the elections. Apart from diagnosing the situation, sponsors also put much effort to amplify the image of the blamer – the President and the government. This was revealed in symbolic (framing) devices of the signature matrix. The used metaphor was TV cartoon: Dardbubala that was on air since a while. It was series of short videos that created caricature of the President and the members of the government. It was a mockery of the officials and events that were held under their responsibility. Each video had a humorous scenario based on the given social and political situation in the country. Although the TV cartoon was not created specifically for the protesting electoral fraud, images and texts from it were widely used not only by the organizers of the protests but also public figures who supported the protest rally. As for depictions they were mostly about providing images of the leaders of despotic regimes that were associated with Shevardnadze. He was associated with the President Slobodan Milošević who was arrested by Yugoslav federal authorities on suspicion of corruption, abuse of power, and embezzlement. Shevadnadze was also depicted as Nicolae Ceaușescu who was a Romanian last Communist leader. His ruling was characterized by an increasingly brutal and repressive regime. Although these depictions were radical in a sense that those political figures were extremely authoritative and violent reference to them allowed amplifying the image of the government as an evil agent.

As the announcement of preliminary results was supported by the President and his fraction, the only way for sponsors to dispute election results was to organize street protests and demand fair elections. The demand per se implied that in case of fair elections the government would be defeated and the most of the votes would go to the major opposition party United National Movement. Hence, in the framework of agitated collective action the sponsors chose peaceful struggle for "people's rights". This was declared, reiterated and further practiced. Non-violent means of struggle was the major philosophy of actions. The sponsors' message was that the only way to pressure the government and make it accountable was not to give up and express collective protest against injustice done to Georgian population. Without public activity, the sponsors claimed that another five years of stagnation, injustice, poverty and corruption was awaited. Although this was a version of

reality that was shared with certain number of people, it had its roots in recent election history of Georgia. In previous years, as it was mentioned before, Shevardnadze maintained power through rigged presidential and Parliamentary elections. As a consequence of this the idea of fraudulent elections was not new to society which provided an "easy" platform for construction of the package. The frame packages on *anticipation of unfair election* in cases#4&5 also served as a good preparation of the mood in society that elections were about to be rigged. This interpretation was based on the democracy principle - right to vote. When the principle was abused this leaded to the reaction of peaceful struggle for citizens' rights.

Signature Matrix 4: Issue Package with Pro-Rally Orientation of case 6.1

SPONSOR	Opposition: National Movement, Burjanadze-Democrats, Unity (Ertoba), representatives of civil society
PACKAGE	Unfair elections I
FRAME	The issue is how to prevent election fraud and make people's choice to win
POSITION	Government reports its victory based on fraud elections. Georgian people should mobilize and fight peacefully for their rights and better future
ROOTS	Unjust, corrupt, evil government that has practiced fraudulent elections in previous years now wants to maintain regime by any cost
CONSEQUENCES	If public will accept rigged election results the nation will witness another five years of stagnation, poverty, corruption and overall failed State
PRINCIPLS	Milestone of democracy is that every citizen has a fundamental right to vote
METAPHORS	TV cartoons: Dardubala
EXEMPLARS	a) The Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia b) Indian Independence Movement led by Mahatma Gandi c) Civil Rights Movement led by Marthin Luther King
Catchphrases	*"We should protest against ballot fraud and Shevardnadze's regime", "We should protect voters' rights and the country's dignity", "to push Shevardnadze out of the Georgian [political] system", "Our fight will be peaceful, but uncompromising", "Go, Resign", "Now or never", "If the demands are not met Georgian people will make the President to resign"*
DEPICTIONS	a) Shevardnadze as a Serbian President Slobodan Milošević b) Shevardnadze as Nicolae Ceaușescu who was a Romanian last Communist leader

- *Action Mobilization (frames from motivational task)*

Motivational frames are evident in the framing devices of the signature matrix. *Severity* of the problem was clearly illustrated through sponsors' speeches and interviews that together formed a frame on social problem. The issue of vote rigging was amplified as a problem of the whole nation rather than the issue of small group of people. The votes were stolen and this was proved by a number of preliminary polls conducted by different agencies. In fact the sponsors permanently emphasized unjust action of the government which tried to maintain the power by all means. It was agitated that the issue was not about just rigging the election but it was about dignity and violation of civil rights of citizens. The sponsors were stressing that if people would not perceive the issue as the most troublesome not only for individuals but for the whole society the same injustice would take place in the following years. Hence,

while agitating social problem frame, sponsors were showing that if not standing up for injustices experienced by others, next time "they will knock on their doors as well". The principle which is given in the signature matrix also supports the idea of universality of the proffered problem which is injustice.

The *urgency* of action is evident in sponsors' speeches, interviews, catchphrases as well as in the category of consequences in the signature matrix 4. The sponsors were constantly emphasizing that *this was the very moment when action was needed*. One of the catchphrases - "now or never" – very well illustrates the urgency of solving the problem. The organizers of the protests were expressing concern that if people would not support them now a chance would be missed. The risk of small- size mobilization had its roots in the recent election history of Georgia. As it was already mentioned above, in previous years under the rule of Shevardnadze, there were two election held. Both of them were evaluated as unsatisfactory. Despite electoral fraud nobody expressed their discontent in the streets. Moreover, since civil confrontation in 1990s, it was hard to mobilize large number of people for the common goal. The previous social protests as well as absence of them resonated the need of the urgency frame and the sponsors latched on to it immediately.

As for the *efficacy of action*, the data also showed a wide range of expression of the motive. To start from prospects for success, exemplars included examples of successful similar cases of how public won over the authoritarian and corrupt regime. Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia, in 2000 was associated with the same context as it was in Georgia. The post-Soviet country that was under the rule of authoritative and corrupt regime of Milocevic was defeated by people's will. Electoral fraud was instigator of public action as well. These examples were showing that though people's mobilization change was possible. As sponsors outlined it was crucial to give examples where the neighboring countries achieved success through collective action. The risk of low trust in social protests and apathy was again traced in the same consequences which were illustrated in the previous motivational frames. The other component of efficacy which is transformed in the frame of personal efficacy was also illustrated in sponsors activities. They were emphasizing the fact that without every individual's participation, a large-scale collective action was not possible. Cases of civil disobedience and collective actions that brought change in the Western countries and Asia were also widely discussed. Major references were made to Gandhi's non-violent struggle for freedom in India and Civil Rights Movement led by Marthin Luther King. These exemplars not only were told but many of their tactics were "copy-pasted" in Georgian reality. On the

other hand, *propriety* was also widely articulated and amplified by the sponsors. Collective action was not only seen as the only relevant measure to address the given situation but also a duty of every citizen to be part of it. Image of active and responsible citizen was constantly reminded by the sponsors. It was mentioned in many speeches that every citizen has a moral obligation to ensure the better life for the future generations. Documentaries and movies on civil activism and social movements were broadcasted during the period when social protests were taking place. Those films were stressing the importance of all five frames of motivational task.

In support of issue package on fair elections with pro-rally orientation, another issue package was identified. However, in this case the issue entailed only diagnostic and prognostic tasks. It did not cover any explicit messages on supporting protest rallies. But its interpretation of the election situation was read along the same lines as the issue package in case of 6.1. Collective protest was also acceptable unless it went beyond democratic framework. The sponsors were international agencies such as US Embassy, Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE)[9], International Republican Institute (IRI)[10] and representatives of foreign affairs office. The primary target of the issue package was the President and the government and not the people. As we can see in the signature matrix 4.1 the mission of the frame was how to prevent election fraud and ensure fair outcome of final results. It was reiterated regularly that the way elections were held did not meet the international standards. According to sponsors the reasons of this was traced in lack of political will to make elections reflect people's votes. As it was further claim unwillingness of the government to admit opposition's victory was caused by unavoidable failure in the Presidentiary elections in the next year. To ensure democratic development in the country, sponsors referred to the only solution which was the government taking responsibility of electoral fraud. In case the government would not take any measures to fix the problem of rigged elections, the sponsors ensured that the West would quit cooperation with Georgia.

[9] OSCE is the world's largest regional security organization which offers a forum for political negotiations and decision-making in the fields of conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. It had started work in Georgia in 1992.
[10]IRI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization that enhances advances freedom and democracy worldwide by developing political parties, civic institutions, open elections, democratic governance and the rule of law.

Signature Matrix 4.1: Issue Package Supporting Case 6.1

SPONSOR	Western Agencies (US Embassy, OSCE, IRI and representatives of foreign affairs office)
PACKAGE	Unfair elections III
FRAME	How to provide fair outcome of elections
POSITION	Elections were held insufficiently for maintaining democracy and it is important to resolve current crisis peacefully
ROOTS	Lack of political will due to disorganized work of polling system
CONSEQUENCES	If the government does not take into consideration people's will and will not do objective investigation to reveal all the problems then the West will question pro-democratic orientation of Georgia. The later will be reflected in cooperation of two countries
PRINCIPLS	Milestone of democracy is that every citizen has a fundamental right to vote
CATCHPHRASES	*"Irregularities and delays in the voting process on polling day and in the subsequent counting and tabulation process reflected a lack of political will and administrative capacity for the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections" The OSCE Chairman; "…massive vote fraud in some regions of Georgia undercut efforts to hold free and fair elections" Bruce Connuck, Political Counselor at the U.S. Mission to the OSCE; "2 November Parliamentary elections in Georgia fell short of a number of OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections" International Election Observation Mission (Parliamentary Assemblies of the OSCE and the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR))*

As there was no explicit call on street protest on behalf of international community it is not possible to evaluate *motivational task* of the frame package. Motivational task also cannot be examined in regard to the target of the frame as one cannot motivate the government to act against itself. In other words international agents called on recognizing fraud elections which automatically put the government in "loser" position. The issue package was also interesting in a way that sponsors of case 6.1 were constantly referring to the evaluations of international community as the most valuable and trustworthy source.

- *Frame Diffusion*

Over twenty days pro-rally frame package – unfair elections - was distributed through printed and TV media in the capital and in the regions. In between the twenty-day campaign protests took place over 15 days and pre-announcement time fluctuated from 1 to 3 days. Among TV channels the most prominent and distinguished in its oppositional stance was Rustavi2. The representatives of the government, opposition, international community, independent experts and the company itself almost unanimously declare its crucial role in people's mobilization.

In addition to this transmitters were regularly travelling in different regions of Georgia in order to meet people and deliver messages directly without mediators. Almost all parts of Georgia were covered. Transmitters usually organized social gatherings in big cities (e.g. Zugdidi, Zestaponi,Poti, Gori). Locals were informed, through social networks or media, few days in advance. There were also situations when the members of the opposition were travelling to pressure the commission during vote calculation in order avoid vote rigging at

local polling place. Their presence usually made local supporter to join them. The same reasoning and symbolic devices for interpretation of the given situation and call on collective action.

Case 6.2. This is the major issue package with against-rally orientation. The sponsors were the President and the government members. The issue package was identified straight away after the issue package from case 6.1 was articulated in the media. In comparison to the later the objective of the given one was the contrary - to convince public that the elections were fair.

- *Consensus mobilization (diagnostic and prognostic frames)*

As we could see in the signature matrix 5, diagnosis and prognosis tasks of the raised issue package is completely satisfied. The issue package suggests that the elections were completely fair and just. Hence, to justify claims of the opposition, the sponsors were pointing to the "obvious fact" that the opposition parties were not guided by true intentions but their only interest was to satisfy their ambition to come into power. According to this logic interpretation of elections as unfair was made up in order to make people mobilize and through this pave the way to their (opposition) victory. As the sponsors claimed, the root of the behavior of opposition parties was their disadvantaged positions which lasted since the last presidential and Parliamentary elections. In other words, those who could not gain enough votes in previous years became embittered and resentful and now the time came for their revenge. At the same time emphasis was made on support of the western agencies that made those political parties more resourceful and stronger to fulfill their longstanding ambitions. While articulating and amplifying image of opposition as a blamer for the *crisis* in the country, the main target was the United Opposition. The political party was depicted as an extremist movement and Nazism. To further amplify the evil image of the opposition the parallels with the world's violent dictators were done. While giving examples and metaphors from the history, the sponsors were also specifically referring to Mikheil Saakashvili - the leader of the National Movement. As they were depicting, the characteristics of an image related to him, was an insane, uncontrollable man who acted based on his instincts and not common sense.

It is noteworthy mentioning that the rhetoric of the President and the government memebrs was becoming more radical with the opposition becoming more active in terms of social protest campaign. Especially it was notable regarding the statements on Western agencies. In the beginning the President was thankful to the International organizations in helping to

ensure "democratic elections" but as soon as foreign agencies criticized the elections Shevadnadze started blaming them in interfering in internal affairs of the country. Unlike opposition proclamation on joining street protests, the President and government called on dialogue. The street protests were associated with the threat of civil confrontation and instability in the country. Therefore, instead of street protest, application of legal mechanisms such as filing a complaint in the court was suggested and agitated. An overall fundamental principle behind the suggested reality interpretation was a citizens' moral obligation to keep peace and order in the country.

Signature Matrix 5: Issue Frame with Against –Rally Orientation of Case 6.2

SPONSOR	The President, Government, pro-governmental fraction (New Georgia, The Revival)
PACKAGE	Fair elections I
FRAME	How to convince people that elections were the most democratic ever held in Georgia
POSITION	a) [11] Opposition protest is groundless as there were only minor inaccuracies but overall elections met international standards. b) Every political party should respect the government and accept the reality even though it does not favour them
ROOTS	a) Much effort was put into pre-election preparatory period and all was done to run elections in a democratic environment b) With the interference of Western agencies opposition is using people's grievances to take revenge and come into power illegally
CONSEQUENCES	If the opposition and public will not accept election results it is most likely that street protests will be escalated into civil war/civil confrontation
PRINCIPLS	The greatest obligation to be fulfilled by a person is to keep peace and order in the country
METAPHORS	--
EXAMPLARS	Civil standoff similar to early 90s. In 1991 the first President of Georgia was ousted in the military coup that was preceded by the opposition protests. People died in the civil confrontation
Catchphrases	*"Since the independence of Georgia the elections were the most objective, democratic and transparent""Maintenance of the stability is our primary goal." We must not sacrifice stability for the interests of several political parties", "National Movement's demands are nothing more but expression of Nazism and extremism"*
DEPICTIONS	National Movement as Nazis

- *Action Mobilization (frames from motivational task)*

Motivational task in discouraging people to join street protests was applied through all five frames. *Severity* of the issue was referred to the possible unfortunate development of the situation if protest rallies would not stop. In order to prevent people joining protests and promote dialogue the examples were made from the recent past of Georgia when street protests were developed into a bloodshed and civil war. It was in 1992 when the opposition attempted to force the government of the first President, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, out of the

[11] "a)Position" corresponds to "a) root". The same applies to "b)Position" and "b) root".

Parliament. The statements on threat of instability were evident in examples as well as catchphrases where importance of stability was emphasized all the time. In this sense street protests were framed as an instigator of civil confrontation which would have devastating consequences for the whole country. The sponsors were emphasizing the *urgency* of shifting the focus from streets into the court. This was based on the motives from prognostic task where only peaceful resolution to the problem was seen. Hence, *ineffectiveness* of collective action was emphasized which proved to have high risk of escalation in the recent past of Georgia. As for *propriety* of the frame, it was linked to the citizens' duty to maintain peace and order in the country. Overall discouragement of collective action was also read in depiction and examplars that on the one hand underlined evil nature of one of the opposition leaders – Mikheil Saakashvili – and on the other hand provided parallels from the recent tragic experience of Georgian people.

- *Frame Diffusion*

Against-rally frames were covered by both printed and TV media. Along with pro-rally frames Rustavi2 was also actively broadcasting the governmental stance and immediate responses to the oppositional frames. However, as the Rustavi2 was exceptionally oppositional TV channel it was obvious that all the information was framed in a way to favour street protest organizers. In other words more emphasis was put on "rightness" of pro-rally frames. Two pro-governmental television channels that did not sided the opposition were Imedi, sponsored by oligarch Badri Patarkatsishvili, and Mze, associated with regime backers but which had some links to the New Rights Party. Initially those TV channels were broadcasting only results that were announced by Central Election Committee and there was minor coverage of street protests. However, as the protest unfolded in size they started regular coverage of the demonstrations and publicizing the exit polls and parallel vote tabulation results. In other words in terms of coverage the frame package was equally distributed via TV media as in case of pro-rally frames. There was the same situation in printed media. Although the most of the sample newspapers were either oppositional or neutral the coverage of statements of pro- and against street protests were equal.

In contrast to protest organizers the role of transmitters in distributing *unfair election frame* was minor. It was limited to immediate response activities to the local oppositional mobilizations. At one point the President acted as one when visited the city in western Georgia and gave a speech in front of the social gathering in support of the government. The later was organized by the local governor who with its political party (Revival Union) was a

strong ally to the President and his team. As it was covered by the media the size of the mobilization of supporters was insignificant. The President and the governor conveyed their line of framing. In the next few days the visit was followed by the mobilization of government adherents organized by the Revival Union in the capital. By nature the social mobilization represented expression of protest to pro-rally frames and agitation and promotion of their interpretations of the situation. Information about the gatherings was distributed by media a day before and they lasted four days in a row. As it was covered by the oppositional channels the size of social mobilizations was quite small and most of the participants were paid money or forced to join the demonstration. All those street gatherings were more a demonstration of presence of the government's supporters than a platform for transmitters.

Case 6.3. The next against-rally issue package was also emerged in response to the pro-rally orientation one. However, in this case there was slightly different interpretation of the situation which was sponsored by certain opposition parties as well as pro-governmental party. The sponsors comprised from two opposition parties (Labour party and Industrialists) and one pro-government party (Revival party)

- *Consensus mobilization (diagnostic and prognostic frames)*

The sponsors, here as well, supported the diagnosis of the given situation as fair elections. Although with slightly different focus, most of the categories are similar to the case 6.2. However, apart from blaming opposition in escalating the situation, the sponsors objective was to show public that the situation is managed and manipulated by third parties such as the US agencies and TV channel Rustavi2. Hence, while in case of 6.2 the blamer of the crisis was the United Opposition and few times the Western agencies were also mentioned, in this case along with the international community the independent TV company Rustavi 2 was also viewed as a responsible agent for intentionally giving people wrong impression about the election situation. According to the sponsors, Rustavi2 through its financed "agencies" such as exit polls deluded people on rigging the elections. The motive behind this served also the private interests and not public well-being. Solution as such was not articulated in this case. The sponsors were giving proclamation that the social protests should be stopped immediately. Otherwise, the history of bloodshed confrontation would be repeated.

Signature Matrix 6: Issue Frame with Against –Rally Orientation of Case 6.3

SPONSOR	Two opposition parties (Labour party and Industrialists) and one pro-government party (Revival party)
PACKAGE	Fair elections
FRAME	How to convince people that process (street protests) is managed by external forces (the US, Rustavi 2) and not pure intentions of oppositional groups
POSITION	There is a coalition of forces which is leaded by TV channel Rustavi 2 which works for private interests and intends to aggravate situation in the country
ROOTS	Protest wave is a result of falsified exit polls commissioned by the Rustavi2 and conducted by the US polling from Global Strategy Group
CONSEQUENCES	If TV channel Rustavi 2 will not stop broadcasting, destabilization and civil confrontation is unavoidable
PRINCIPLS	The greatest obligation to be fulfilled by a person is to keep peace and order in the country
EXAMPLARS	Civil standoff similar to early 90s. In 1991 the first President of Georgia was ousted in the military coup that was preceded by the opposition protests. People died in the civil confrontation
CATCHPHRASES	*"Situation is heading in direction of civil war similar to 1991" Aslan Abashidze (the leader of the Ajarian Autonomous Republic in western Georgia, leader of Revival Party); "If civil war bursts we will close borders in Adjara to maintain order"Aslan Abashidze; "Revival Party in only political group who is interested in peace in the country" Supporters of Revival Party;*
DEPICTIONS	Opposition as Nazis and extremists

- *Action Mobilization (frames from motivational task)*

Similar to the case 6.1 examples of bloodshed experience of early 90s was also used to underline *severity, urgency, efficacy and propriety* of not recognizing election results. Anticipation of civil war/conformation was reiterated over and over again in the sponsors' speeches and statements, in order to discourage people to join protests. The possibility of opposition to take advantage of street protests and eventually win over the government was interpreted as a huge problem. Street rallies were putting common people under the risk of civil confrontation, therefore, it was crucial to solve the crisis and send people to their homes. Ineffectiveness of collective action was also based on the same rational. First of all collective action was not appropriate as it was instigated by delusion of unfair elections. Secondly, collective action had high risk to end up in destabilization in the country and this was against the State interests. In the frame as the propriety was related to peace and legal mechanisms in problem solving, the role of collective action was again completely undermined in a sense of citizens' duties.

The signature matrix#7 gives information on frame package developed by the single members of the pro-governmental bloc who were blaming their party in inability to prevent and diminish social protests in the streets. This rationale was developed under the same theme of fair elections with a slight shift of focus in reasoning devices. In this case the main task was how to convince people that opposition was bargaining with the government through people to organize a coup. The frame also had a character of ultimatum, which

implied that if government would compromise and would not stop street protests the sponsors would defect from the party. The position, roots and consequences of the frame are in line with those in the matrix#6.2. Namely, according to the sponsors the elections were held fair and it was the duty of political parties to obey the rule. Similar to previous frame package only concern of the opposition was to come into power and people's grievances and poor condition were used to blame the government in all misdeeds. Although the principle of the frame is not evident in the data, the sponsors supported importance of constructive dialogue and cooperation with street protest organizers. The difference between the themes of the President and pro-governmental fraction lies in the feature of roots where weakness of the government is blamed in low capacity of managing the situation – street protests. The sponsors also expressed doubts that because of fear of civil confrontation the government is ready to make a deal with the opposition at the extant of the votes supporting the government. In this way the opposition would enter the new parliament with more votes leading to more power. If this was true it was completely unacceptable for the sponsors. This is why they expressed readiness for defections from the pro-governmental fraction.

Despite the warning nature of the position, in terms of political opportunities this statement favoured the pro-rally frame reaffirming the position that the government is weak to solve the crisis in one or another way. Although it was denied by the rest of the members, the frame provoked rumors that there was conflict among members of the government which put the party under the risk of dissolution.

Signature Matrix 7: Issue Frame with Against –Rally Orientation of Cases 6.3 and 6.3

SPONSOR	Pro-governmental fraction members (VakhtdangRcheulishvili, Irina Sarishvili)
PACKAGE	Fair elections
FRAME	How to make people convince that all opposition does is blackmailing government to achieve revolution.
POSITION	People's sincerity is used by the opposition who wants to come into power by any cost.
ROOTS	Government is weak to tackle with the crisis in the streets
CONSEQUENCES	If the government will not yield blackmailing and maintain order, civil confrontation is unavoidable in the future
EXAMPLARS	Civil standoff similar to early 90s. In 1991 the first President of Georgia was ousted in the military coup that was preceded by the opposition protests. People died in the civil confrontation.
Catchphrases	• *"CEC should announce the election results as soon as possible in order to convene the new legislative body and restore constitutional order in the country,"* Irina Sarishvili-Chanturia • *"…not to compromise with the opposition."* VakhtangRcheulishvili • *"Saakashvili, Burjanadze and Zhvania [leaders of the National Movement and the Burjanadze-Democrats] know that they will fail to come to power. Therefore, they started protest rallies to make the authorities to compromise. If the President compromises now, our ways will separate,"* Rcheulishvili • *"I am ready to leave the bloc in case the government yields to opposition's pressure."* Irina Sarishvili

As for the symbolic devices, we can see that only exemplars and catchphrases were used. References were made from recent past when as a result of civil confrontation the President was ousted from the country and many Georgians died. Catchphrases raised issues of urgency of announcement of election results, establishment of constitutional order and insincere intentions of opposition. It is also noteworthy mentioning that the frame had implicit reference to the government on immediate crisis resolution. In this it was meant coping street protests and announcement of their victory. Motivational task in regard to discouraging people join protests is not explicitly developed. All five motives of the issue were expressed in terms of possible civil confrontation, which was vital to avoid for the best interests of the country.

- *Frame Diffusion*

The given theme had one-time coverage and it was never amplified through different actions and tactics.

Case 6.4. The next Matrix also has against-rally orientation but the frame package is about unfair elections. The matrix is not complete as the sponsor only developed theme justification without framing devices. The rationale in some aspects is similar to the Matrix #1. The street protests were understood but condemned as the threat of conflict escalation. The main belief that drove the motive of the package was that the issues related to fraud elections should be solved in the court and not in the streets. The same legal mechanisms and consequences were agitated as it was in the Matrix#1. *Motivational task* is not accomplished as there are no symbolic devices and there was no call on refraining from joining protests. The frame is limited to interpretation of given situation.

Signature Matrix 8: Issue Frame with Against –Rally Orientation of Case 6.4

SPONSOR	Opposition: New Rights
PACKAGE	Unfair elections
FRAME	How to convince people that street protests are not the way for boycotting elections
POSITION	The street protests initiated by opposition parties are just a struggle for power. Every vote should be defended at electoral offices or in the court
ROOTS	Unjust, corrupt, evil government. People are desperate with poor living conditions, they have agency to act and therefore trustfully follow politicians who articulate their needs
CONSEQUENCES	The rallies might lead to unrest and revolution
PRINCIPLS	Issues should be solved in a civilized way around the Table and not in the streets
METAPHORS	n/a
EXAMPLARS	n/a
Catchphrases	*"Instead of protests we should think about our role in the parliament which is the hope of our supporters" David Gamkhrelidze (leader of New Rights Party)*
DEPICTIONS	n/a

3.3.4 Pro-/Against Movement Campaign (Organizers' Perspective)

The data obtained from the interviews supported the identified frames that were continuously reoccurring in the sample of articles. From the interviews the following was revealed: 1) features of the political environment that facilitated a large-scale social protests 2) sentiments that were agitated by pro- and against-rally campaign 3) the patterns of decision-making process regarding joining a protest.

On social protest in November, 2003

Based on interview data, the identified frames were not only articulated and amplified by the events and catchphrases but also through the tactics and actions adopted by the organizers. The major objectives of the organizers were to a) to convince common people that elections were rigged and this was the concern of the whole country b) to convince common people that it was the time when urgent actions were needed c) to convince common people that it was people's duty and obligation to contribute to the development of their country d) to convince common people that without their participation change was not possible. Moreover, the organizers of the pre-revolution social protests had two target groups in mind: 1. common people with oppositional stance that their right to vote was abused and violently taken away 2. supporters of the government that rigging the elections is their problem too.

Table 5: Tactics used in the series of protests in November, 2003

Tactics	Description	
United Opposition	Three opposition parties and civil society formed an oppositional movement campaign	
Local Mobilizations	a) "Colons"	Driving cars in a row from one of the most oppositional regions - Samegrelo[12]
	b) Face-to-face communication	Stopping cars on the road and talking with local people: 1.Introduction of the UNM goals and objectives 2. Listening to the problems and needs of local population
	c) One planned demonstration	Before arrival the whole region was informed about the time and place of a demonstration
Meetings	Meeting with popular singers, musicians, artists, writers, etc. in order to involve them in the campaign	
TV Media	Speeches by protest organizers	Discussions on existing situation in the country, expressing their discontent and grievance towards the government, calling for joining collective protest
	Speeches by celebrities	
	TV Videos	Promotional videos criticizing the President and the government. Stressing unjust and corrupt nature of the President/the government members. Stressing the fact that the moment came when people should act

[12] Samegrelo is the western part of Georgia

As it was mentioned by the organizers of the series of protests in November, 2003 Georgian society was in apathy. People were highly accustomed to the existing situation and there was not only hopeless attitude but also disbelief in street protests. This, as some of the respondents explained, was caused due to no culture of civil resistance and recent unfortunate history. The only attempts of street protests, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, ended up with bloodshed civil confrontation. Hence, there was a very cautious attitude towards civil activism, as such. On the other hand some of the respondents also mentioned about the incidence on intrusion in Rustavi2. The consequences of this were very much unfavourable for the government. So, as it was further stated this was the first victory of civil society activism which presumably created a good foundation for social protests in 2003. People saw that it is possible to pressure the government which meant that some sparks of hope for success of further actions against the government was evident. Drawing on the context and the culture of Georgian society, the listed tactics and actions (see Table#3) mostly demonstrated that there was a *strong and progressive opposition who had the power to lead the country, with the help of peoples support the change was possible and success was achievable, it was the time for action and the opportunity should not be missed.* Organizers of the mobilization mentioned that despite the issues related to injustice and corrupt nature of the government which was assumed to be shared by the majority of the population; it was still a problem to appeal bystanders as there was apathy and low hope in collective action. As a result of this and due to fear of civil confrontation and low trust in opposition parties' capacity, all the earlier mobilizations were very small. *United opposition* with it proponents from international and local civil society was assumed to be associated with strength and potency for achieving its ends. Local mobilizations were meant to be much promising and increased the probability that large number of people would join protests. This in turn again increased likelihood of success in the eyes of potential participants and motivated potential adherents to join street protests. Local mobilizations took place in various regions of Georgia. It was presumed to be an incentive for the future participation. Local mobilization in different locations of Georgia, conveyed the message that emerging social protests were becoming nation-wide social protests which was meant to encourage more participation.

Apart from putting much effort in highlighting certain sentiments, it seemed that organizers also much cared for the diffusion of the relevant messages across the different regions of Georgia. Even in Tbilisi, meetings were organized at different locations. Those meetings were leaded by public figures who were popular and favourite celebrities. The dates of the meetings were diffused through social networks a day before the event. The meetings were

about demonstration of the "absurdity" of the President, the government and the period of Shevardnadze's ruling and the importance of public participation and civil activism in the process were stressed. It was meant that diffusing the messages of the frames through public figures would put more credibility to the whole campaign and this would make more people to join the protest. It was also mentioned that involving public figures and famous celebrities was meant to create an example for others to lead. Apart from people acting as messengers media played a vital role. There was sufficient coverage of local mobilizations on TV (Rustavi2) as well as printed media. The organizers of the street protests had a full-fledged platform on Rustavi2 which was ensuring that all the important information, messages or event would be broadcasted in the most extreme way for the government and in the most convenient way for the opposition. Similarly, to triggering event, actions and persons were used to amplify the frames.

As the government representatives stated, counter framing of the government, was not as son"active and aggressive" as the campaign of the United Opposition. However, there were speeches, interviews as well as counter protests held in order to discourage people from participation. The members of the government and pro-governmental fraction were framing the United Opposition as the enemy of the country. Especially, Saakashvili as a perceived leader of the whole process was viewed as the most uncontrollable and dishonest person who is manipulating with people. Apart from this Saakashvili was not the only one who was seen as the enemy of the country and Georgian people but also those agencies who were active supporters of the street protests. International organizations and Rustavi2 were blamed in encouraging opposition in actions that could lead to devastating consequences. Here as the respondents mentioned they feared that the recent history of civil confrontation would be repeated. Hence, the President and the officials were urging people to use legal mechanisms and not street mobilizations to appeal election results. Hence, the major rhetoric of the President and the government was based on the following*: elections were fair, people have right to protests but not in the streets, street protests would lead to civil confrontation, people's should keep peace and order in the country – it is their obligation, from this rational street protests should be stopped urgently.* The counter mobilization also took place. It was held by the governmental allies and aimed at showing that the government also had supporters who believed that elections were unfair.

3.3.5 Participation in Social Protests (Participants Perspectives)

Based on the interviews with the protesters, the factors that influenced the decision-making process in joining the pre-revolution protest rallies were revealed. In particular, participants

of protest rallies listed such factors as presence of United Opposition (including civil society), factor of a strong leader, role of international community, demonstration of mass discontent, inadequacy of the government, etc. These external stimuli were interpreted as a presence of a strong force which ideology was completely congruent with the demands and ideas of those who joined protest. In particular, it was demonstrated that change could be possible if people would be active and claim their rights. On the other hand there were respondents who did not share the same passion about collective protest and the leader opposition in the process. They were fearful and reluctant on the consequences of street protests. Those who still decided to join said that they believed and trusted Saakashvili more than the President. As for small size social mobilizations, one of the major reasons was named the absence of the external stimuli that took place in case of series of social protests in November, 2003.

On social protest in November, 2003

According to the protesters' interviews, electoral fraud only *detonated what was remained the bitter under-the-carpet crisis* of the Georgian government during the most of Shevardnadze's ruling period. The respondents explained that it was not only the issue of the Parliamentary elections but it was the issue of being "fed up" with the same bad situation which did not promise any improvements at all. They were angry or even furious (as some of them said) and insulted by the existing system whose "abusive and offensive actions" had no limits and in 2003 this attitude was proved once again. Parliamentary elections in 2003, were viewed as the most offensive and unjust as after nine years there was still a little hope that change was possible but with rigging elections this opportunity was once again taken away. So, the only alternative to elections was street protests.

When respondents mentioned about street protests as the only alternative to restore justice, they were once again reminded about the same social, political and economic conditions over the Shevardnadze's period. So, the question was why electoral fraud became reason for street protests this time and not earlier? On this question some of the respondents mentioned about the power of movements. Namely, they explained that in comparison to other cases of electoral fraud, in this case people from all walks of life were involved in the process. Apart from United Opposition, which was the first precedence in Georgia; Rustavi2, youth movement - Kmara, civil society, international organizations, writers, musicians, artists, etc. all created context for participation. In particular, such public movement was associated to a strong power which *instilled a hope that change could be possible*. As it was mentioned

anticipation of success became a powerful incentive for participation. At the same time some of the respondents admitted that the issue was about the members of the "strong force" who made them decide to join protests. Respondents distinguished the role of the leaders. Especially, Saakashvili and then Burjandaze were singled out. Saakashvili was seen as the Western-educated, strong, progressive, energetic, charismatic young leader who was very determined and confident in his claims and bold actions. He and his team were very different from Shevardnadze. While the President and his proponents were mostly associated with the Soviet mentality, Saakashvili with his team and supporters was a young force with fresh ideas based on the western values and beliefs. During the interviews some of the participants of November protests in 2003 said that, for them it was important who was calling for action. Saakashvili with his biography and the way he acted was very promising in terms of new future and better life. On the other hand, those who singled out Burjanadaze as a leader to follow they emphasized her diplomatic manner, which was a contrast to Saakashvili, of dealing with a situation. For some participants the balance between two leaders where one was energetic young politician and the other one was more experienced and balanced in her actions was a good combination for the new political movement. While according to some respondents the reason of participation was Saakashvili, others were saying that it was all about the ideas. They explained that if other political parties would agitate the same ideas of democracy and western values they would follow them too. However, when the respondents were given names of other political parties and asked if they would follow them too in case they would have the similar rhetoric they were reluctant to answer positively.

Few respondents also mentioned about the role of international organizations. From their perspective the fact that the rhetoric of international organizations coincided with the statements of the United Opposition added more credibility to the latter. Furthermore, they added that support from the international community meant that local leaders were not alone in their struggle and *"success had more chances".* The West was seen as a powerful ally as it preached completely different ideology than the Russia did. As the respondents said they had experience with "Russian way of living" which did not lead to anything good. The West was seen as progressive, human rights oriented, just system which had much more to suggest for Georgian people than pro-Russian allies could. Although it was Shevardnadze who started international programs in Georgia, few respondents spoke about him as the part of the Soviet system. Among interviewees there were also few who were indifferent with the statements of the international community. They said that it does not matter whether there was support from the western agencies or not, the issue was that they *"were tired and*

wanted change, immediately". So, when the United Opposition emerged with their proponents from civil society they understood that the opportunity was about to be seized. Some of the interlocutors also emphasized *the fact of seizing the moment*. As they further elaborated, in 2003 many factors coincided with one another which altogether facilitated social mobilization and created a good opportunity for accomplishing the goal. In particular, they listed the following: a) strong leaders b) support from international community c) support from other local agencies (NGOs) d) government's inadequacy that was read as its weakness (vulnerability) e) fractured government which was read as weakness (vulnerability) as well. The latter was especially evident in contradictory messages that members of the government were sending to society and opposition. It seemed that the government was not consolidated on fundamental issues inside the team which created a perception of a good timing for collective action in order to pressure the President and the government. The good timing needed urgent actions that were agitated by the movement organizers. Hence, from this rational the respondents saw their participation as an important contribution as well as an obligation to improve things for the better.

The respondents also underlined *their instrumental role and duty as the citizens* of Georgia to contribute to the better future of the country. Those respondents even noted that protest rally participants were asking their family members, relatives, friends to join them as success could be achieved with only large number of people. Clearly, they themselves understood the importance of their participation and chose going out over sitting in front of the TVs. Some of the interlocutors mentioned that on some days they preferred to be at home as they were more informed by watching Rustavi2 than standing in the streets. In any case respondents underlined importance of realization of the fact that there was someone whom they could follow which automatically made the participation worthwhile. When the respondents were asked to provide more details, they explained that with seeing that the actions could yield success *their participation* became much more valuable contribution. The respondents were further asked on what exactly made them think that actions could lead to desired ends. Some of them said that the size of the protest was growing which made an impression that nothing could stop public will. Other group of participants again referred to Saakashvili's factor. They explained that Saakashvili as a leader was very convincing and made them confident as well. They further elaborated that his speeches were stressing the vital role of every citizen's contribution as well as people's civil obligation to be part of the process. They also mentioned that from his speeches it was always clear that without public support nothing could happen and it was important for them. Namely, these messages were

interpreted as it was people's movement and not the movement of politicians. Some of the respondents also said that when they were watching protest rallies on TV, they felt that time came for actions. Hence, it was impossible for them to sit and wait what would happen they themselves felt *urgency* and *need* to be part of the process. It is interesting to add that there were few respondents who elaborated on *emotional aspect* of the process. They admitted that with feeling of urgency and their own value in collective protest they were very much excited with the expected results. It was like being happy about future changes. They described themselves as very anxious about the whole process and the pleasure of being part of it.

Among respondents there were also people who did not join protests in 2003. Based on their perspectives they could be categorized in three groups: a) People who were Shevardnadze's supporters b) people who did not like neither Shevardnadze nor Saakashvili c) people who were just negative about street protests. The respondents in the first group admitted Sehvardnadze's evils. However, they said that he still did not have an alternative. Regarding the opposition, they said that they were a bunch of crazy, emotional and impulsive politicians who would rule the country in the worst direction. At the same time when they were asked if they agreed with what was agitated by the United Opposition, they said answered positively. But, at the same time, they admitted that they did not believe in those good words. They had low trust in Saakashvili. They said that they just did not like him as a person and as leader. The respondents in the second group said that Sehvardnadze was useless but Saakashvili was too radical and this was what they did not like. The major reason in disliking him was his "crazy" speeches, blames and demands about the President and his team. Some of them even referred to his "uncontrollable" manner of speaking and acting which made them fearful about him coming into power. It should be stressed once again that while for some Saakashvili was a major obstacle in deciding to follow the protest, for others his factor was crucial. As they said Saakashvili's "crazy" way of dealing with things was the most appropriate and relevant in the given context. In fact, this was the major reason for supporting him. The interviewees also recalled their concern regarding the protest. They were waiting for repressions every time police and security guards were mobilized nearby the protest rallies. They did not hide that they were very much affected by their experience of such street collective actions. The fear for repressions and confrontation between people and the officials was more pronounced when they were listening to the government members pointing to dramatic consequences of the street protests.

On protests before November, 2003

When the same respondents were asked if they felt the same in the previous social protests, it was revealed that some of them were just adapted to the situation. Corruption, insufficient supply of basic utilities, unemployment, and other evils became a part of common everyday life. People were realizing their bad conditions were upset, angry about it but they knew that they could not do anything about it. Unfortunately, those respondents who in the very moment were not affected by the blacked–out districts could not remember those particular social protests in 2000 and 2001. Mostly the interlocutors were mentioning that protest on the basis of insufficient supply of electricity were all the time in Georgia throughout the period. They were saying that it was obvious as this was the major issue. However, when they were given evidence that only two protests in Tbilisi was detected, they said that "maybe because people (including them) did not have any hope that with street protest they could achieve anything". It was further elaborated that mostly (including them) people were sitting in their candle-lit houses and were waiting when the electricity would be on again. This was the very existence of the period. The country was in crisis in every way, some of them mentioned, so it did not have any point demanding the issue that was impossible to provide.

As for the case of intrusion into Rustavi2, respondents recalled and interpreted it as another attempt of the government "to discredit democracy in the country". One of them even noted that the government's such action was similar to the Soviet tactic to bully and frighten those who oppose them. Among those who joined protest in front of the Rustavi2, explained that they were filled with indignation about the situation and wanted to make a statement with their participation. Others said they were angry and wanted to stop government's unjust action. To add to this as a reason of participation few respondents also stated that their support was not necessarily linked to pressuring the government. They explained that no matter what was the outcome they wanted to express their discontent and protest regarding the government's action. The same respondents were asked about whether they would had joined the protest if the media representatives and opposition would not ask them about it. There was only one respondent who answered that he and his friends would still go to Rustavi2 and would stand there in order to support the company. As for the others they were unanimous in saying that they would not go out by their initiative. Instead they would be alarmed on the subsequent actions of both the government and the company. These respondents further explained that they joined the protest as they were called for it. For them it was important to know that their actions were effort to stop injustice and help

survive the Rustavi2. Some of them also stressed the fact that it was important for them to see such opposition leaders as Saakashvili supporting the protest rally.

There was also a group of few people who said that they did not see any sense in collective protest in front of the parliament. Their participation would not lead to anything. Hence, although they were angry with the situation it was more reasonable not to waste time and watch the situation from home. There were also few respondents who were very negative about the Rustavi2 and, naturally, evaluated the protest rally as something irrelevant. They interpreted the government actions as a just intrusion. According to them Rustavi2 with its aggressive claims was crossing the line. Most of the respondents did not participate in pre-election social protests. They even did not remember them as such. They just recalled about inaccuracies in election lists and the problems with election committee.

The cases 4&5 were interesting as in terms of agitation of themes and frames it was very much similar to the case#6. So, the respondents were asked about reasons of not joining the pre-election protests when inaccuracies and problems with electoral committee were declared. Participants of the interviews explained that they were not ready to join protests on the issue which did not entail a final outcome. As they further elaborated, there were a huge number of international agencies involved in the process and despite the fact that the government was showing some signs of electoral fraud; they still believed that elections would be held in a comparatively just setting. This belief was determined in the larger part by the presence of international community and civil society activism.

3.3.6 Frame Resonance

Following up the interviews on movement campaign and participation, respondents were also asked about the resonance features of the sentiments which were on the one hand agitated and the on the other hand perceived in a certain way. The data was also completed by the corresponding data from the media. Five indicators of frame resonance were analyzed from agitator/receiver perspectives.

Case1&3. To start with *consistency* indicator, research showed that both pro- and against-rally frames were developed according to their reasoning line. There were no contradicting themes/issues detected among frame agitators. Moreover, there was no inconsistency between articulated ideas and actions. The sponsors of the frame "lack of electricity" represented one group of aggravated population who went in the streets with a very concrete goal – to get supply of electricity in the districts, immediately. The people were consistent

with their beliefs, demands and actions. They had strong belief that they have right to have access to basic utilities and therefore, their position was that there should be a way to provide people with electricity at least for few hours in a day. Their actions were nothing more than just a civil activism in order to pressure the government. The same could be said about governmental frame – "economic crisis". The officials were unanimous in their explanations and appeals (sig. matrix#1).

Empirical credibility is not much resonated in the data. As lack of electricity supply was a fact, all the elements, except the position, in the frame package had its references in the given reality. The position, which was reflecting a belief that the government had the capacity to improve their conditions, was not so much realistic. At the same time the frame issue provided by the government had a bit of controversy. The against-rally orientation frame – economic crisis – had an empirical grounding which implied that there was lack of resources in every sphere and utility supply was not an exception. Despite the well-known fact that country was in crisis the reasons of it much determined the credibility of the statements. According to opposing sources the issue frame proffered by the government was not backed up by enough evidence. International as well as local analysts provided data where the reasons of unbearable conditions were in fact inability or unwillingness of the government to cope with corruption. The argument that resources were enough was based on the fact that in the period Georgia was selling electricity to Turkey (Closson 2009). Therefore, while governmental frame had a true interpretation of crisis in the country, reason of lack of resources was caused by inadequate distribution and mobilization of the state funds. In other words, according to this stance, crisis implied elite corruption because of which there was not possible adequate distribution of the resources. Consequently, claim of sponsors of pro-rally frames regarding the capacity to meet their demands was clearly problematic. In conditions of sufficient supply of electricity there was apparent inability and ignorance to cope with the problem of electricity power stations, which was out of order almost once in a month and was fixed regularly. From this stems that overall frame packages of both orientation categories did not have empirical credibility.

As for *frame articulators' credibility*, it was obvious that people had more credibility than the government. However, low trust in the capacity of the government to solve the problem did not make this feature of resonance of pro-rally frame to work. President Shevardnadze was re-elected in April, 2000. In the environment of no serious opposition he got more than 80% of the vote. The fairness of these results was widely debated as the conduct of polling on

election day demonstrated that the will is deficient to conduct elections in full accordance with the law (OSCE 2000). Moreover, it was obvious that Georgians were fed up with their tiny wages, poor public services, erratic energy supplies and rapacious bureaucrats. However, absence of no alternative political force and newly emerged young reformers' group backing up the President sowed the seeds of the belief that no other politician can match him. Although there was still some hope for improvements the major issue was not that Shevardnadze was popular and widely trusted but he was perceived as the only choice in the political specter. Therefore, it is hard to say whether election results reflected people's true positive attitude and high credibility to the President and his team. Furthermore, in the same year shortly after elections grievance started to escalate again and closer to the end of the year it was much more pronounced. This period exactly matches the time when social protests were held. So, speaking about credibility of the government as a sponsor of the frame in the period of one-day social protest it could be said that there was more of a distrustful attitude than seeing the government as a reliable and competent agent and an expert in its claims. The same holds for the second case, which was a year later. It is noteworthy mentioning that the popularity of the government was even more lower in 2001.

Experiential commensurability is more than evident, as data shows a clear link between both frames and daily experience of Georgian people. As it was mentioned before, insufficient supply of electricity was one of the severe problems since Shevardnadze was in power. People did not have electricity during few hours in a day. Sometimes, when there was an accident with power supply plants, there was a blackout for several hours or days. This was happening all the time during nine years. So, the frame directly reflected people's everyday concern. Counter framing of this was not also far from ordinary life. Every complaint on insufficient supply of basic utilities was followed by familiar rhetoric of economic crisis and transition period in the country. However, this explanation did not have much value among people who were coping with those problems on daily basis. Inability and ignorance of the government was instilled in the culture of those years and was accepted as a fact.

As the features of centrality/narrative fidelity are about the values and beliefs, which are usually reflected in principle of sig. matrix, instilled in society they are inappropriate in these cases. Both pro-rally and against-rally frames are very specific and does not address wider concepts that has to be read in overall framework of the given culture. Therefore, it is not possible to discuss the frames in context of the cultural values or meanings.

Case2. The case#2 showed *consistency* in frame "attack to freedom of speech". The sig. matrix#2 demonstrates that there is a logical link among all reasoning devices. Beliefs were based on democracy principle which leaded to the claims that pressure on free media could have devastating implications on the further development of the country. Actions were again civil activism which was consistent to the idea of freedom of expression. Sponsors were interpreting situation in strictly democratic terms and actions were respective.

Case#2 shows that justifications of pro-rally orientation theme prove to be *empirically credible* in each dimension of the package. The case differs from the previous two cases by its specificity and broader essence. The first one indicates direct connection of stimuli reaction meaning that intrusion on independent media was a fact which unjustness later on was well-justified by the part of opposition wing including the journalists and civil society. The broader part of the package is related to how the event was framed. In comparison to the cases1&3 here the specific cause – intrusion on independent media – was attached to more general concept of attack to freedom of speech. The later was put in a way that it evolved from idea of democracy. This shows that framing went beyond concrete case and challenged universal meanings of free media, freedom of speech representing the foundation of the democracy. This had its share of empirical credibility as after justifying the position of illegal action it became easier to link it to unquestionable democracy ideas that would resonate wider audience.

Frame articulators' credibility was in favour of pro-rally fame sponsors. To start with Rustavi2, as it was mentioned previously, the independent TV channel served as an ally for the opposition movement for years under Shevadnadze's rule. It was highly critical of the regime, and openly supported the opposition. Despite its popularity, naturally it also caused negative reactions in people who supported the government. According to statistical data of 2002 (IPS 2002, 2003), the most watchable TV channels were named the State television Channel1 (70%) and Rusatvi2 (67%). As for the most trustable TV companies, the majority named Rustavi2 (52%). Based on the same data the party leaders who were also sponsors of the frame had the following ratings: Mikheil Saakashvili – National Movement (29%), David Gamkrelidze – New Rights (20%). Although there is not such data for the year of 2001, people's reaction to the event and overall situation in the country indicates that the same trend was a year earlier as well. This was also supported by the interviews. A severe and sustained economic crisis, combined with persistent and rampant corruption, had worked to steadily erode popular confidence in the government. Without indication a source one of the

online media – civil.ge – announced that a record low 6 percent of the population expressed support for the government in one opinion survey in September, 2001. According to the same media outlet elections in October also proved that popular support for reform-minded forces was on the rise. Saakashvili won a landslide victory in Tbilisi's most prestigious district. Zhvania's political credibility was greatly enhanced by his behavior during the crisis. Conversely, Shevardnadze's ratings sunk to near-zero support because of his backing for the much-resented law enforcement agencies.

Although Georgia had no such history of democracy, the western ideas of freedom were very much popular even in the Soviet era. Without any experience, democracy was perceived as a way to better and fair life. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the borders were open and there were new opportunities to find out more about other leaders, countries and their systems. Therefore, what once was familiarized and aspired from second-hand stories later it was seen, read and visited from the first-hand experience. Consequently, the idea of democracy (whether it was fully comprehended or not) had one of the central meanings in society and it was seen as a future of the country. This made the given frame so popular especially in comparison to previous cases. Based on panel data (Sumbadze 2003) the majority (77%) of the respondents rely on USA. Much less supporters (50%) have the second most chosen country – Russia. At the same time, when respondents were forced to choose between USA and Russia as a focus of foreign orientation, the difference between the supporters of these two countries significantly decreased. The majority - 52.9% (43.9% in 2002) made their choice in favour of the USA, while the remaining 47.1% (56.1% in 2002) chose Russia. Despite some inconsistency in the attitudes the *centrality/narrative fidelity* of pro-democracy orientation was still at present.

Cases#4&5. The cases show that there was *consistency* in pro-rally frames. In other words "anticipation of unfair elections" was read in the same lines as its beliefs, claims and actions. All the reasoning devices evolved from the same democracy principle which leaded to legitimate demands to fix all the inaccuracies in pre-election procedures. Similar to other cases the applied measures were peaceful manifestation which was embedded in democracy concept. On the contrary governmental frame – anticipation of fair elections – had much contradiction within it. Although the response to the pro-rally frame was unanimous there was not clear remedies addressed to overcome problems with voter lists and elections commission. While all the verbal claims were about fixing the problems, the actions were contradictory. Media along with the opposition were constantly reporting just the opposite

than what was said to be done by the government. This naturally caused decreasing credibility of the governmental frames.

Both cases4&5 indicate *credibility* on part of pro-rally themes. All the detected reasoning devices were based on materials which were not only articulated and provided by the opposition but also by international and local observers. The later made governmental frames suspicious as their claims were only based on party members. The theme of opposition of the first case was based on composition of election commission. To support the claim opposition suggested new draft of electoral code considering Central Election Commission with the representatives of the political parties. This would provide equal opportunity for all parties to be presented. The proposal was rejected by the pro-governmental faction on the grounds that there was no legal base for discussion of the document at the Parliamentary session. Instead the Revivial Union (governmental ally) proposed the new rule according to which those who cleared 7% barrier during the 1999 Parliamentary elections would be appointed three members in the CEC. President will nominate one, as well as the authorities of the Autonomous Republics of Abkhazia (in exile) and Adjara. The rest of the members would be composed the representatives of the parties, which cleared 4% barrier in the 2002 local elections. This proposal was favouring the same dominance of pro-governmental fractions in the commission. The dispute over the issue lasted for a while without any compromise by the government. The same trend was apparent in the case#5. The issue of dispute of incomplete voter lists prevailed not only before elections but also during and after the elections. Naturally, despite the government's effort to falsify the opposition's claims the evidence was speaking the just the contrary. Therefore, counter framing had no empirical credibility.

To compare the ratings of the sponsors of the two frame packages the data shows that leaders of those parties who agitated pro-rally frames have obviously more *credibility* than representatives of the government. Based on the data (IPS, June 2003) the most liked leaders among the sponsors were Nino Burjanadze – United Democrats (61%), Mikheil Saakashvili – National Movement (36%), David Gamkrelidze – New Rights (25%). Those were in top ten most liked leaders of the parties with Nino Burjanadze the highest percentage (among twenty three named politicians). Other members of Coordination Council for Fair Elections - Traditionalists and People's Party - were not so popular. However, although with less numbers but they did contribute with their electorate to the movement. On the other hand the rating of the President was very low. While only 14% said that they liked Shevadnadze, 58% expressed their dislike and 29% remained indifferent to the question. It is also

noteworthy mentioning that among those twenty three politicians the prominent government representatives got support of bellow 20% and some even less than 10 %. From this stems that compared to the government the mentioned opposition had undeniable advantage in terms of being liked.

The issue of fraud elections was far from novelty. As it was explained in previous chapters since Shevardnadze came into power all the elections were characterized as rigged. Therefore, the experience of running elections was necessarily connected to fraud and dishonesty. Even representatives of the government mildly but still admitted inaccuracies and problems during previous elections. As a result of this persuasion on rigged votes was not a difficult task to achieve. In fact the claims of both sides had a history which repeated over years. In this case the issue completely resonated *experiential commensurability* as well as *centrality/narrative fidelity*. However, in case of against-rally frame here should be made a distinction between the amplification of central and familiar issues to the society and their evaluation. Undeniably both features were in line with central narrations but as there was low trust and credibility in sponsors the proffered frame was not "believable", except by those who had direct interest or benefit in governmental fraction.

Case 6.1. The case#6.1 demonstrated *consistency* among beliefs, tactics and actions. From the beginning the major emphasis of the sponsors was to support people in realizing their fundamental right to vote. As the frame articulators framed it only way to make this possible was a peaceful, non-violent struggle against the "unjust" government. So, the main principle developed in between the promotion of democratic values. What was said it was put into practice with minor discrepancies that were condemned by the sponsors, in the first place.

The data reveled also evidence on *empirical credibility*, which was easy goal to achieve. As it was mentioned above a number of polls conducted by the international agencies were completely in line with the claims sponsors did. The issue package of unfair elections was possible to verify anytime through independent observers and exit polls. This put much credibility to the overall issue package. Frame articulators credibility was also in favour of sponsors. Nino Burjanadze - one of the leaders of the United Opposition - was the first in the list of most liked politicians in June, 2003 (Sumbadze 2003). Saakashvili who was coming the fourth in the list became more popular during the movement campaign in November, 2003. Based on another survey (Gorbi, Gallup International 2004) conducted in August, 2003; National Movement – Democrats (this was the initial title of Saakashvili's political party)

were the second in the political party ratings. Although there is no actual research done on politicians' preferences in the period of street protests, observers and the media report that Saakashvili's leadership skills inhibited high trust and hope for better changes. Salience of the frame package was also very much noticeable. Given the fact that fuss on rigging the elections was always present during Shevardnadze's ruling the issue of unfair elections was not novel for Georgian society. Apart from this all the elements of the issue package had its share of resonance in the experiences of citizens in recent years. The blamer of the unfair elections was the government which popularity was significantly decreasing over the period (Sumbadze 2003). Those in opposition blamed the ruling party in all bad conditions that was experienced by Georgians on a daily basis over years. The reference to non-violent struggle was also very much resonated in Georgian society as it had tragic experience of civil contention, revolts and uprisings. The principle of democratic development became also quite popular as it represented an alternative to what was before. In fact the West was seen as a practice for a better and just life that was longed so many years. All this at the same time underlined the centrality of the issue frame that had important role in recent narrations of alternative (better) development of the country.

Case 6.2 Data analysis revealed *inconsistency* among statements, tactics and actions. The fairness of elections was daily (in the period) put under the suspicion as many more problems, inaccuracies and violation of law was revealed. On the one hand there were statements made on the most democratically held elections and on the other hand the allegations of independent observers proved just the contrary. This shows that what was reported was not congruent to what was practiced. *Empirical credibility* is also supported by the same point. The evidence for fair elections was vague and contradictory. The reports of independent observers were completely in opposition to what was announced by Central Election Committee and the government. The critique of third parties (that was meant to be objective) also made less credible the government's position. *Credibility of frame articulators* was also very low. Based on panel data on political profiles of Georgian electorate (Sumbadze 2003), the President and political leaders from pro-governmental fraction did not represent the top most likeable politicians. Even though this data is true for June, 2003 the pre- and during election observations show that the politicians' ratings did not change in term of positive/negative attitude. Allegedly, a twenty-day period of movement campaign drastically increased the score of the leaders of the opposition that left the President and its bloc significantly behind.

As for empirical commensurability and salience (centrality and narrative fidelity), they are well presented in the argumentation of the theme. Positions and Roots of "a)" resonate election history of previous years. During Shevardnadze's ruling there were one presidential and one Parliamentary elections. In both cases Shevardnadze won which was followed by the same narrative of fraud elections. The government had the same response as it is put in the Table#3. The Position "b)" also resonated the statements made in previous years. The same cannot be said about the Roots "b)". If not mentioning the Western support it could have been read along the same lines of the previous cases. Sehvardnadze's political team did explain all the criticism and protest of the won elections by attempts of "looser" politicians to come into power. However, Western agencies were never theme in previous cases. As we could see above International community had high credibility in the period, therefore referring to their support in a negative way reportedly was not received positively by Georgian society. On the contrary, consequences and principle also had a central meaning in the history of social protests in Georgia. It aimed at instilling fear of civil confrontation that acted as obstacle for joining protest rallies. Peace that was highly valued after tragic events in 1991 was constantly reminded by the sponsors.

***6.3 Case*.** The third against-rally frame was completely *consistent* in its articulated belief system, tactics and actions. As it was put into frame the party was against collective action and favoured legal means in the struggle. The major reason for using street protests as a tool to win over the government was the risk of civil unrest and revolution that could result in tragic consequences. They believed in defending people's interests in the parliament and not in the streets. The claim that people in the streets were used for private interests of opposition who longed to come into power was difficult to verify. There was no evidence that would disclose sponsors of organizers. In terms of ratings, David Gamkrelidze (the leader of New Rights) was liked by 25%, disliked by 30.2% and 45.1% were indifferent. He come the 9th in the list that put him behind Burjanadze, Saakashvili, Natelashvili, Topadze, Abashidze who were sponsors of previous frames. The frame was based on the principle of "civilized ways" of struggle.

6.4 Case. As the case 6.4 was limited to only articulation of the theme package it was hard to examine its resonance. There was no agitation or promotion of the frames.

3.4 Reasons and Causes of Small and Large Social Protests in Georgia, 2000-2003

Overall, the data supports the hypothesis that the major determinant, after presence of conducive political environment and triggering event, is perception of the situation in frames

of injustice, Image of Enemy, Social Problem, urgency, Prospects for Success, Self-Efficacy and Propriety. In particular, results showed that relevant political system for civil activism and triggering event become powerful in social mobilization, only if they are perceived in the frames of motivational framework. Diagnostic and prognostic tasks are important but without motivational frames they cannot cause mass collective action. Furthermore, the research showed that in order to cause mass participation in protest rally, the master themes as well as corresponding frames that are articulated and amplified by the organizers should be congruent with experiences, beliefs and values of potential adherents and participants. All seven frames, in comparison to the earlier protests (2000 – 10/2003), were not only actively articulated but also amplified through media and different actions and events. Diffusion of the frames and messages within it were not less important. In fact, construction of reality was one thing but diffusion of corresponding messages is a determining factor of the former. Along with cognitive processes, emotions also revealed as important instigators of the action.

To start from *external factors* the interviews once again showed that in terms of civil activism there was not a real threat from the regime. Despite the fact that there were some talks on repressing the oppositional stance, reality was different. Even if there were single cases of repression it was not a widespread issue and there is enough evidence of this. Moreover, reports from the interviews completely correspond to the democracy indicators over the years of Shevardnaze's ruling. Despite "friendly" environment for protesting, the fact was that people were not exposed to collective street protests. This would not raise any questions if the situation in the country would have been very good. However, people's silence became puzzling with the knowledge that Georgia was experiencing high levels of corruption and extreme hardship in every field nothing to say about severe problems on supply of basic utilities. As data showed such passivity was due to the Soviet past and civil confrontation that happened before Shevardnadze's presidency. Hence, on the one hand there was *no oppositional culture* in Georgia and on the other hand street protests were associated with *violence and confrontation*. Apart from this, as interview data revealed despite grievances from early period of Shevardnadze's ruling it was unlikely to expect *accumulation of grievances* which usually needs time. Apart from this, from 1995 till 2003 there was no *potent force* that would have been perceived as an alternative to Shevardnadze and his team. It is also important to mention the *weakness of the government* which became more pronounced, at least this is how it was perceived, in 2001 when few members of the government resigned from their positions and publically blamed officials in corruption. The results show that combination of all these factors served as a hindrance not only for organizers to appeal a large number of people but also for common people to initiate

themselves to claim their rights. Moreover, data analysis also showed that knowledge of all these factors created a context for movement campaign in November, 2003. In particular, organizers were using verbal and visual tactics to reframe negative expertise of street protests into positive one (e.g. movies on power of people in social change). Organizers were also reframing the fact of no alternative force with the fact that there was a strong force that had ability to lead the country for the better changes. Furthermore, lack oppositional consciousness was systematically developed in society.

Apart from this, political, social and economic changes trigger street protests. There were also a number of similar stimuli which did not serve as a triggering event for mobilization. *Triggering events* of all six cases implied concern of the majority. However, mass mobilization was possible only in November, 2003. No electricity was the major problem of those years, intrusion into the Rustavi2 was alarming for those who were proponents of the opposition as well as TV company and pre-election inaccuracies could have been in the same way intimidating as the unfair elections. However, none of those themes became reason for massive collective action. Even electoral fraud, which served as a triggering event for the large mobilization in 2003, did not have the same effect in previous years when elections were rigged. This once again leads to the question: what makes a certain change to be a triggering event? The results clearly show that if an event is framed in a way that resonate people's concerns and ideas then it may be addressed as a triggering event. Framing is the next level in the General Model and as we see it could completely determine the triggering nature of the event.

The data analysis revealed the features of framing and counter framing in each case of social protest. In particular, results on framing tasks demonstrated that diagnostic and prognostic frames represent a baseline for framing activities. In most cases these two tasks are satisfied. However, although it is important to make resonant diagnostic and prognostic frames, it would not lead to collective action if motivational frames are not articulated and amplified. Street protests in cases of 1&3 are good examples how framing activities did not go beyond diagnosis and prognosis. The cases illustrate an immediate reactions to worsened situation (of only those who were personally affected) which did not imply any references to general themes (master frames) that usually serve as motivators for joining protest. The articulated problem was localized and it was not considered in the framework of urgent concern for the whole population. There is no plan or strategy how to act further in order to pressure the government and there were no references made to the frames of motivational task. It is also noteworthy mentioning that the street protests themselves were very short-termed which

also left the issue behind the spotlight. The fact that the respondents had trouble to recall those particular cases also shows that the issue was immediate and spontaneous that there was not time left for special announcements or agitation. This type of street protests are very much similar to what Tarrow and Tilly called reactive and traditional collective action or repertoire. Counter framing in these case are also important as their framing, as well, resonated the problems of those days. Namely, despite the fact that protesters were angry and desperate with the government, from whom they were expecting the problem solution, it was also an obvious fact that country was in a crisis. Whether it was a crisis on the way of transitional process or was it an inability/unwillingness of the government, as respondents mentioned, in any case there was low trust in officials that they "would suddenly provide a non-stop electricity supply". Hence, there were not only absence of motivational frames demonstrating a prospect for success, self-efficacy or obligation to participate in street protests but also in terms of resonance both sides featured comparatively low.

The case#2 shows slightly different situation. The articulated and amplified theme was injustice which was linked to the attack of freedom of speech. This was an important theme as Georgian society was in process of reevaluating Soviet legacy and favouring the Western way of life. Hence, as democracy was the goal of the development, abusing one of the fundamental components of it was perceived as extremely alarming for the whole society. Motivational frames were all articulated and amplified through speeches and interviews. It was not possible to build a consistent counter theme as the President and the government were changing their positions on each day during the seven days of protesting. This, of course, made the oppositional framing more portent. Eventually, the protest was called off by Saakashvili, so it is hard to predict whether it would had been transformed into mass mobilization or not. The fact is that it was the second largest mobilization after pre-revolution social protests.

As for the cases 4&5, the data showed that in pro-rally theme resonance featured high and all the frames were amplified in motivational task. But the mobilizations were small. As the data revealed, the reasons of this could be the following: insufficient amplification of the sentiments concerning the severity of the issue and urgency of its solution, belief that elections would still be held in "normally". Anticipation was that there would be problems and inaccuracies but due to involvement of many competent agencies, it would not be rigged massively. Interviews, especially interviews with actual and potential participant, revealed that the most focus of the themes was on political statements and interpretations. Overall, on

these cases could be concluded that belief of relatively fair elections were still boosted by the presence of civil society and especially, international organizations.

In the last case which massive size was the part of the puzzle of the given research, the data analysis revealed that there was not only conducive environment for social mobilization but there were a number of important tactical choices which conveyed messages were part of articulated and amplified frames of the organizers. Although counter framing implied narratives on the negative experience of street protests, apparently the desire for change was a stronger sentiment. The later, became the most central to the majority due to confluence of all motivational frames that were amplified through different events. Nothing to say about highly resonant content of the theme and low resonance of the counter-themes.

In earlier protests, the specific changes were immediate causes and at the same time triggering events for only certain number of people to protest. The data also identified role of emotions in immediate actions of the common people in cases1&3. Respondents explained that those people were angry, frustrated and humiliated. They were desperate with the situation and this is what made them protest in the streets. In case of mass mobilization in November the triggering event covered a wide range of aggrieved people and appealed bystanders. Triggering event which was electoral fraud was not a new theme in Georgian society. As analysis of previous years demonstrated there have been two elections held under Shevardnadze's rule. Both of them went under the same critique of unfair elections. However, this did not cause even a small mobilization. In this case as well both participants as well as organizers stressed the fact that people were angry. One of the respondents even used a word *furious*. It was also mentioned that people's emotions and organizers rationality were put together for the common goal.

Diffusion of frames also played a crucial role. Those protests in which both media and people were involved in spreading information as well as articulating and amplifying relevant sentiments had more people than those which had very insignificant coverage.

PART III

5. Model of Movement Participation: Theoretical and Empirical Application

Overall, in the framework of this paper two Models were developed. As a result of adopting mulifactored approach, the both Models are generated from initial model and further revised based on literature analysis. The first model is a General Model which is compatible with the political process theory. It follows the same logic, according to which, political context/stimuli is mediated by the conscious processes. McAdam called it cognitive liberation and argued that with this process, it becomes possible to transform ideas into actions. In this paper instead of cognitive liberation I use term framing process and suggest more advanced and detailed perspective on the process of meaning construction. The second model which presents the hierarchical scheme of frames, is a constituent part of the General Model. It entails a complex process of framing tasks and set of corresponding frames. Although the Models did not include diffusion tools, their impact is reviewed in the literature (e.g. Biggs 2006, Kalyango&Adu-Kumi 2013, Moussa 2013, McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly 2001) as well as explored in the cases of Georgian social protests. Apart from this, the findings also support bringing emotions back into the study of social movements.

The first part of the thesis which is comprised from theoretical analysis demonstrated that Initial Model which was built on the basis of empirical findings of my previous study did not pay sufficient attention to certain aspects of social mobilization. While the study was focusing on the factors of micro mobilization, the role of other variables was taken for granted. Hence, in the framework of the given paper, the Initial Model was analyzed in context of social movement literature. This allowed focusing not only on frame alignment but also on variables from the theories of political opportunity and resource mobilization. Literature demonstrated that political context or a system is an important indicator in understanding emergence or absence of social movements as well as a particular social protest. Viewing political system as a conducive or obstructive environment for social mobilization reveals additional relationships and interactions with other factors such as specific political stimuli (e.g. electoral fraud, political reform) and micro mobilization (e.g. amplification of certain sentiments/frames).

Political system is understood as an existing context which regulations and culture allow street protests to happen. This means that, for instance in democratic setting, its effect on

emergence and development of social mobilization is directly linked to the idea of freedom of expression. This is widely practiced in the Western countries where political and social environment serves as not only facilitating platform for mobilization (Eisinger 1973, 1974; Tilly 1978, Kitschelt 1986, Pharr 2003, Tarrow 1994) but also as a guide to social mobilization. Empirical cases on Georgian social protests in the Part II completely support the role of the favouring political environment. Georgia was not considered as a democracy, but its status of transitional country made social protests and oppositional stance acceptable by the government. Peaceful social mobilization was radically different experience from what was practiced in the Soviet and post-Soviet period before Shevardnadze came into power. Although system and form of government provide a general context for collective action, its presence does not always lead to protest actions, even if social and economic situation is extremely bad. This is completely in line with the findings of the empirical part of the given paper. The research demonstrated that while the political (democracy/autocracy), social and economic context was relatively the same over nine years during Shevardadze's presidency, mass mobilization happened only in November, 2003. Hence, while general context is important for mobilization to emerge it does not have direct causal relationship with collective action.

As literature on political theory (Morlino 2011, Campbell 2008, Munck 2009) suggest political context comes in many shapes and revealed many indicators. While it is viewed as a general setting where a certain action is allowed or not, it also imply single variables that presence lead to perceptions concerning weak or strong state. Empirical analysis of Georgian social protests revealed that *vulnerabilities* of the state not only put oppositional forces in a favourable position but its role is qualitatively different from form of government. When political system is weakening, its vulnerabilities are on rise and this usually creates a good opportunity for SMOs (Jasper&Poulsen 1993, Bell 2007). There are many flows inside the system which usually are not visible for common people. SMOs or organizers are there to make people see things in a way that they not normally see them. It is also noteworthy mentioning that vulnerabilities of the state or a weak state are not necessarily seen as suddenly happened phenomenon but they may be given over long period and only grasped at a certain moment. This is usually related to emergence of potent oppositional force or a leader. As the comparative analysis of Georgian social protests demonstrated the mass mobilization in 2003 was the result of confluence of weak state and a strong opposition. In previous years where there was either absence of protest rallies or only small mobilizations took place, one of the problems was that there was no alternative to the President, at least

this was the perception of people. Weak state also does not happen in one night but it is a gradual process which at some point culminates and this is when the action is the most beneficial for those who are against the government. Even in this case vulnerabilities do not directly cause a large-scale mobilization but the mediating process of framing activities instigates massive mobilization. This is in line with Giugni's, McAdam's and Tilly's (1999) argument on government's vulnerabilities and the framing process. They give example of social movements in Switzerland where insufficient state autonomy made the alternative system to develop. This made a convenient platform for framing democratic movement.

Empirical part of the paper also demonstrated that a context created by certain political system is not the only factor that determines the success of further actions of the SMOs or activists. Consideration of *cultural context* by SM organizers can be equally instrumental for a large-scale mobilization. Cultural context determine SMO strategy and the reactions of government while protest rally take place. Organizers of the series of social protests in November, 2003 were very well informed about the characteristics of the Georgian population. They knew that Georgian people had no belief or trust in collective action. Hence, special stress in movement campaign was on amplifying prospects for success and self efficacy. Impact of a good awareness of cultural context is illustrated by Mansbridge, Morris and Braine (2001). They gave a detailed perspective on how oppositional consciousness is built in a culture where subordination was a "normal" phenomenon for those oppressed and those who exercised the power. The scholars elaborate on how once tolerable and normal situation was recast as unbearable. As authors argue this through movement campaign culture of subordination was replaced by oppositional consciousness. Although the counter frames of the government were highlighting the issue of negative consequences of the collective action to discourage people from participation, obviously the motivational frames of organizers of social protests were more powerful. It is also noteworthy mentioning that making references to the civil confrontation by the President and the government, worked in earlier cases of social protest. This was, as it was reported, because of fresher memory on casualties of the first attempts of collective street protests after collapse of the Soviet Union. As interviews further revealed presumably the reasons of civil inactivity was also the fact that Shevardnadze's government did not have potent alternative before November, 2003. However, from the data it is not clear if a large-scale mobilization would have occurred in a similar situation (e.g. presence of a strong leader and opposition) as it was in November, 2003. Low likelihood of repressions also served as additional stimuli for protesting. The devastating consequences of civil confrontation back in 90s made the government reluctant

to use force against the civilians. This served as an additional encouragement for social protest organizers to agitate participation[13].

To move to the next level of the General Model and further illustrate the features of political environment, the theoretical review also allowed distinguishing between political environment as a constant variable and political change that serve as a triggering event or turning point for SMOs to mobilize people (Meyer and Imig 1993). In the General Model, triggering event comes after political system. However, as it was illustrated in discussing the Model its presence is not mandatory. On the other hand, in comparison to political system triggering event has to be articulated and then amplified in order to appeal large number of people. This is clearly shown in the analysis of Georgian social protests. The event of electoral fraud became a turning point with emergence of strong opposition and a leader(s) who framed it in a corresponding way. As there was made parallels to Tarrow and Tilly's work on repertoires social protest, when collective protest is an immediate reaction to a sudden change it is usually short lived and does not transform in mass mobilization. On the other hand when sudden changes and people's grievances are mediated by SMOs there is high likelihood that street protests would become massive. The earlier protests under the Shevardnadze's rule also proved this. For instance, social protests demanding supply of electricity were insignificant with its size and duration and it completely fit the type social protests that, as Tilly argued are parochial, bifurcated and particular. According to the literature those themes which are linked to general ideas and principles have more chances to cause massive protest than those which interpretation does not go beyond concrete problems.

The special focus of the framing process in the paper leaded to building the separate Model that illustrates the important frames that make difference in social movement emergence and development. The revised Model of set of frames is much more advanced than Initial Model. A detailed review of the literature on frame alignment demonstrated that important frames are more extensive than Initial Model suggested. However, as the Initial Model is derived from the empirical study it could be argued that not all frames (that were derived from literature review) that are illustrated in the revised Model are mandatory. In fact this is also supported by Snow and Benford who empirically proved that among 'vocabularies of

[13] There are examples (Morris 1984) where violence and repressions in protest rallies lead to more people in the streets. However, this is not relevant in the given paper, those cases are not further elaborated.

motives' one or two may act as the most or only important reason for joining the protest. In case analysis of Georgian protests this was not supported. In the mass mobilization all motivational frames were regularly amplified.

The Model on hierarchical scheme of frames is developed in context of framing tasks. The literature review clearly showed that the success of a frame partly depends on framing tasks. Consensus mobilization which is comprised from diagnostic and prognostic frames represents a consensus on ideational part of the constructed theme. In other words the two tasks only label a situation without any references to action. As for the motivational task it transforms ideas into actions. In particular, motivational frames frame diagnosis and prognosis in a way that it motivates target group for action. In the analysis of Georgian protests it was revealed that amplification of diagnostic and prognostic frames in light of social problem, urgency, prospects for success, self-efficacy and propriety were instrumental in appealing large number of people. Namely, in cases of protesting inaccuracies in pre-election period there were no calls for action. Leaders of those mobilizations did not refer to public with the speeches on the value, importance and moral obligation of their participation. Neither was references made on the success of the social mobilization. The same can be said about protests on insufficient electricity supply. Conversely, in the mass mobilization the frames were not only amplified by speeches, slogans and catchphrases but there were events and tactical choices which were completely congruent with the messages promoted verbally. Apart from decisive role of motivational task in causing collective action literature review and then comparative analysis of the cases demonstrated that resonance is an important characteristic of the promoted theme and frames within it. As the research revealed motivational frames and resonance features work in a complementary way. The both have to be promoted at the same time otherwise the theme or a frame would not work. Among resonance components articulators' credibility was revealed as one of the powerful. Respondents who shared the sentiments on negative experience of social protests given in counter framing were still in favour of street protests as the speeches from opposition, especially from Saakshvili sounded much more credible than in case of the President and the government.

Diffusion of information or messages is critical in social mobilization. As literature (e.g. McAdam et al. 1996, Tarrow 1998) and empirical evidence strongly support, without "mobilizing structures" no mobilization would occur. Tarrow argues "mobilizing structures" are crucial as it shapes social movements institutionally. The major principle of the concept is derived from the idea of bringing people together which per se implies information and idea diffusion. McAdam also underlines the impact of "dense networks and connective structures" which represent those who are the core agitators of the mobilization. Weak ties are also instrumental in reaching wide variety of audiences and creating alliances and coalitions. This is especially important when the goal is to appeal people from different groups or communities. As we see "mobilizing structures" is an important component but it did not specifically imply how formed coalitions, alliances or groups agitate movement participation across different locations. Andrews and Biggs (2006) in their paper on struggle of racial equality in 60s, argue that while social networks make difference in mobilization on local level, it does not have the same effect in cases of protest diffusion across different locations, districts or countries. In the later case, the scholars stress the impact of the media that make information diffusion fast and convenient. Scholars such as Myers (2000), Koopmans and Olzak (2004), Roscigno and Danahar (2000) also support the argument on the importance of different types of media in social mobilization. In fact the media makes impact in size of collective action in two ways: reaching wide variety of people in the shortest time period and the version (interpretation) of the information as well as its coverage may determine people's participation in protest rally. Breuer (2012) in her paper on Tunisian Revolution also shows how social media promoted popular mobilization. As she explains social media "facilitated the formation of a national collective identity which was supportive of protest action and transcended geographical and socio-economic disparities by providing a shared, mobilizing element of emotional grievance." In the same vein Snow and Benford (1999, 2000) outline the role of transmitters in social mobilization. They define frame diffusion not as a simple process of information spreading throughout the target locations but as process of recast and reinterpret the given problem in a way to entail more general and multifarious aspect. This increases the likelihood of interesting as many people as possible. Hence, transmitters are instrumental in terms of how well they construct the agitated ideas. This process is similar to frame alignment process such as frame extension or frame bridging. Here, I would extend the idea of a transmitter and refer to the impact of a face-to-face agitation. This was a common practice in the series of social protests in November, 2003. Organizers of protest rallies not only used media for their speeches but also travelled personally to different regions of Georgia and agitated protest participation in the capital. As we see theoretical and empirical

evidence does not allow overlooking the effect of diffusion tools. The same sources also show that while the factors in the Models give answers to the question what? , diffusion raises the issues that give answers to question how?. This is the major reason why diffusion was not included in the Models.

The last point is on emotions which role cannot be overlooked. The theoretical as well as data analysis revealed that emotions can have an equal role to the cognitive processes. Scholarship on emotions is even radical while providing analysis of emotions in social mobilization. According to a number of scholars (Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001, 2000; Jasper 1998) emotions could even be more powerful than cognitive processes Peteresen (2002). As scholarship suggests emotions are the mechanisms that make our desires more or less willing. In other words, emotions change the level of desire that impacts the action to be performed. It is assumed that almost all individuals strongly and commonly desire the three basic things: safety, wealth and status or self-esteem. So, as soon as a person feels a threat to one of those states, certain emotion occurs that leads to specific action. Emotions, clearly, shift in motivation and mediate between cognition and desire. As Petersen (2002) notes, in this context the main driver for emotion is structural change. Structural change is that instant incentive that makes people reacts in different ways that usually are stipulated by the beliefs about the phenomenon (change). As the result of this in the act of violence we have situation (structural change), conceptualization (belief-forming) and emotion (which challenge the action in certain direction). Hence, to review emotions in the framework of the Model(s), it could be argued that the identified set of frames cause not only cognitive but also emotional sentiments. Interviews with the participants revealed that primary reactions to the triggering events were anger, humiliation, insult, etc. These emotions, for some respondents, were followed by cognitive processes when making decision on joining protest rally.

6. Conclusion

The goal of the paper was to develop an advanced multifactored Model for understanding movement participation. This was achieved through accomplishing following objectives:

a) Based on thorough literature review, the Models for movement participation were developed
b) The Models were empirically tested in the cases of Georgian protests in the period of 1995-2003
c) As a result, the Models were further revised and finalized

The data proved the interdependence of the factors from different theoretical paradigms. Based on Initial Model, which was empirically driven, was possible to revise and further develop in a way to integrate not only different frames but also demonstrated relationship among factors from macro, meso and mico mobilization. Research on particular cases of social protests in Georgia once again proved the logic of how the Models work. Additional variables, which were put into context of the factors from the suggested Models, were also revealed. Overall, the major findings on the determinants of movement participation show a systematic and concrete framework of the analysis of those variables which either were explored solely or were defined in a general way on theoretical and empirical level.

Before we start to elaborate how those findings could be reconciled with and generalized over the existed literature on social movements, possible limitations of the analysis will be acknowledged. Firstly, the measure of movement participation is restricted to the data obtained from the key players of the November Mobilization as well as sixty respondents who gave their own perspectives on reasons of joining protest rallies. So far, no relevant quantitative data based on protesters' responses exists. Secondly, unfortunately due to political circumstances it was not possible to interview some of the key leaders of protest rally especially in case of the mass mobilization in 2003. Thirdly, empirical examination of certain theoretical concepts such as narrative fidelity and centrality clearly showed that there is a need for both qualitative and quantitative approach in exploration of their effect. Fourthly, overall, as a limitation of any approach multifactored approach (the Models) could not entail everything what is given in the literature as well as in study case.

To address the first problem, it is noteworthy mentioning that even without quantitative data of the protesters' opinion on the importance of the argued sentiments in the

mobilization, the fact that the mobilization was massive in November, 2003 is already an indicator that those sentiments were somehow influential. Moreover, the assumptions are supported by the interviews from sixty protesters which speak in favour of the frames' significant role in participation. The data from the interviews are irreplaceable by quantitative opinion surveys as it gives an in-depth analysis of the decision-making process of those who joined and who did not join protest rally. The sentiments that were revealed by the qualitative research could not have been dealt by quantitative methods solely. As for the second problem, as it was mentioned in the methodology section, method of triangulation was used. Those respondents who were not part of the interviewing process were identified through Rustavi2 videos, documentaries and printed media where they made speeches and gave interviews. There were also additional documents (e.g. political reports) identified in order to reveal the perspectives of those people. The third problem was solved by more intense and detailed questions on centrality and narrative fidelity. Although a detailed questioning on the themes, only revealed the central values and beliefs of only interviewed sixty people, it still shows a pattern and trend of congruence of agitated and perceived meanings. The fourth problem, if it is viewed as such, has no solution. Any type of explanation cannot entail everything. Hence, in the framework of this paper, it was argued and then proved that multifactored approach in a sense of including the major factors could be possible. Moreover, with building the Model(s) it was argued that factors from different theories does not stand alone but they have interdependency with one another. This is an important finding that this paper holds.

The literature on social movements gives a strong base for the Model discussed above. The importance of all those factors from political opportunity theory, RMT and frame theory are thoroughly elaborated in the work of Snow, McAdam, Tilly, Tarrow, Mansbridge, Morris, Brain etc. Even the scholarship on multifactored approach (della Porta and Diani 1999, Tocqueville 1955, Kruzman 1992) is completely resonated by the logic of the Model(s), in particular, General Model. Kruzman's and Tocqueville's perspectives regarding perception of political opportunity are completely in line with what was argued and then empirically tested in the paper. Apart from acknowledging the role of open and close system the concepts of weak (vulnerabilities) and strong state were also detected. The cultural factors such as absence of oppositional consciousness were also strong determinants. As for the hierarchical scheme of frames this is a valuable addition to the literature on framing activities. Proponents of political process theory clearly demonstrated the necessity for mediating process between political context and collective action. However, the there is

insufficient attention paid to the concrete process of reality construction where certain sentiments are instrumental. For instance, Snow sets out five main beliefs that occur in social movement literature: injustice, "locus of causality or blame", negative deeds of the target groups of influence, probability of change and importance of standing up. Although the above mentioned beliefs are included in the frames discussed, the findings of the given paper showed that those do not exhaust the set of frames that affect decision-making process. This demonstrates how the analyses of this work complete the overall framing theory. Namely, while talking about injustice frames, most of the authors mean framing the situation as unjust and therefore, labeling it as a social concern. In contrast, this paper gives a distinction between those two - as the analysis showed, while a problem could be interpreted as intolerable and unfair by one group of people, the others could not associate it with themselves as their concern and therefore, as bystanders and onlookers, they will not participate in the movement. As for the causality between the injustice and the beliefs on antagonists, in the framework of the paper, those two are analyzed under the one the category - blamer. The main reason for this is that as the qualitative data showed, identification of the target of influence automatically gives causal links between injustice and the subject. Once it is identified who should be blamed for, it is not necessary to have separate frames for the connections of those two. Furthermore, although the authors did give much evidence on important precondition of the injustice as well as blamer, there is still no distinct schematic position for the other frames. The scholarship revealed the role of the frame of solution which is part of the consensus mobilization. Snow and Benford elaborate on this in the framework of prognostic task, however they never give specific examples.

The findings concerning motivational frames also enrich empirical evidence on "vocabularies of motives". It is noteworthy mentioning that in comparison to what Snow and Benford claim on the conflicting relationship between certain motives, in case of the research in this paper the same relationship was not revealed. In mass mobilization all five frames of motivational task were promoted which was not the case in previous social mobilizations (except case#2 when protesters asked to go home). The contrasting findings in this sense demonstrate that further research is needed specifically on interaction of motivational frames. As it is shown in hierarchical scheme of frames motivational task is the last one in hierarchy and this is the way it worked in social mobilizations in Georgia. Only consensus mobilization, even if the constructed frames have all the components of resonance, would not lead to mass mobilization. Hence, it is important to proceed to all stages (tasks) of the Model. In addition to macro and micro mobilization, the role of the factors from meso

mobilization could not be overlooked. As Gerhards and Rucht (1992) argue the major objectives of meso mobilization are in coordination of group and in collection of the resources. Although the latter was not discussed in the paper, the former one has been raised not only in literature review but also in empirical study. In particular, the Models demonstrated that their functioning is conditional upon information diffusion. Many scholars (e.g Swank and Fahs 2012) have devoted their work on considering frames in the framework of diffusion.

Aside from above mentioned, it is worth noting that the proposed hierarchical scheme of frames make much sense from the perspective of emotions as well as Rational Choice Theory. When the frames in the first two levels of the Model are achieved, optimism about the success as well as social problem frames logically fit in cost-benefit calculations. Even frames on self-efficacy and propriety can be considered in the framework intangible benefits for the potential participants. Furthermore, in case there is an issue of the fear in society, the frames directed to overcoming it would make the action less risky and more beneficial. Overall, when the favourable outcome is anticipated, the problem is directly associated with public good where the protester has its interest, the risks regarding to action are minimized and the decision on joining protests becomes more worthwhile as well as beneficial.

In order to further test the presented Model it will be interesting to apply it to other mobilizations in post-Soviet countries as well as to the rest of the social movement in the West.

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