Taking as its starting point María Cristina Redondo’s book Positivismo jurídico “in-t e r n o”, this article proposes an alternative conception of normativist legal positivism. The arti-cle argues that legal theory can be neutral to the extent that it is intersubjective and transparent regarding its own metaphysical premises. On the one hand, thus, the article aims to shed light on the role of metaphysics and common sense in the construction of the concept of law. On the other hand, it seeks to make more transparent the ethical-political choices that constitute legal discourses, including theoretical ones. To pursue these goals the article first analyzes Redondo’s theses on the ontolog y / epistemolog y distinction and the possibility of objective knowledge, and advances the idea that inter-subjectivity, and not objectivity, should be the appropriate cri-terion for normativist legal positivism. Second, the article examines the role of normativity in normativist legal positivism, focusing on the metaphysical nature of the thesis that law belongs to the fields of normativity and practical reason. The following sections then discuss reductio-nist and anti-reductionist conceptions of legal “entities” (norms, normative statements, propo-sitions, and beliefs) and the theory of legal sources. The final section addresses the question of the axiological neutrality of legal theory and discusses the possibility of describing participants’ internal point of view without committing to existing legal practice(s).
Normative Legal Positivism: from Metaphysics to Politics = Positivismo jurídico normativo: de la metafísica a la polític / S. Zorzetto. - In: ISONOMIA. - ISSN 1405-0218. - 54:2(2021), pp. 134-166. [10.5347/isonomia.v0i54.463]
Normative Legal Positivism: from Metaphysics to Politics = Positivismo jurídico normativo: de la metafísica a la polític
S. Zorzetto
Primo
Writing – Original Draft Preparation
2021
Abstract
Taking as its starting point María Cristina Redondo’s book Positivismo jurídico “in-t e r n o”, this article proposes an alternative conception of normativist legal positivism. The arti-cle argues that legal theory can be neutral to the extent that it is intersubjective and transparent regarding its own metaphysical premises. On the one hand, thus, the article aims to shed light on the role of metaphysics and common sense in the construction of the concept of law. On the other hand, it seeks to make more transparent the ethical-political choices that constitute legal discourses, including theoretical ones. To pursue these goals the article first analyzes Redondo’s theses on the ontolog y / epistemolog y distinction and the possibility of objective knowledge, and advances the idea that inter-subjectivity, and not objectivity, should be the appropriate cri-terion for normativist legal positivism. Second, the article examines the role of normativity in normativist legal positivism, focusing on the metaphysical nature of the thesis that law belongs to the fields of normativity and practical reason. The following sections then discuss reductio-nist and anti-reductionist conceptions of legal “entities” (norms, normative statements, propo-sitions, and beliefs) and the theory of legal sources. The final section addresses the question of the axiological neutrality of legal theory and discusses the possibility of describing participants’ internal point of view without committing to existing legal practice(s).File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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