Even though he is not very explicit about it, in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language Kripke discusses two different, albeit related, skeptical theses – the first one in the philosophy of mind, the second one in the metaphysics of language. Usually, what Kripke says about one thesis can be easily applied to the other one, too; however, things are not always that simple. In this paper, I discuss the case of the so-called “Normativity Argument” against semantic dispositionalism (which I take to be epistemological in nature) and argue that it is much stronger as an argument in the philosophy of mind than when it is construed as an argument in the metaphysics of language.

Two Epistemological Arguments against Two Semantic Dispositionalisms / A. Guardo. - In: THE JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE, MIND AND THE ARTS. - 1:1(2020 Jun 30), pp. 5-18.

Two Epistemological Arguments against Two Semantic Dispositionalisms

A. Guardo
Primo
2020

Abstract

Even though he is not very explicit about it, in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language Kripke discusses two different, albeit related, skeptical theses – the first one in the philosophy of mind, the second one in the metaphysics of language. Usually, what Kripke says about one thesis can be easily applied to the other one, too; however, things are not always that simple. In this paper, I discuss the case of the so-called “Normativity Argument” against semantic dispositionalism (which I take to be epistemological in nature) and argue that it is much stronger as an argument in the philosophy of mind than when it is construed as an argument in the metaphysics of language.
Psychology of meaning; Metaphysics of meaning; Rule-following paradox; Kripkenstein’s paradox; Semantic dispositionalism; Normativity argument
Settore M-FIL/01 - Filosofia Teoretica
   Dipartimenti di Eccellenza 2018-2022 - Dipartimento di FILOSOFIA
   MINISTERO DELL'ISTRUZIONE E DEL MERITO
30-giu-2020
https://edizionicafoscari.unive.it/media/pdf/article/the-journal-for-the-philosophy-of-language-mind-an/2020/1/art-10.14277-Jolma--2020-01-001.pdf
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/754208
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