In evaluating arguments in meta-metaphysics, it is customary to compare advantages and drawbacks of different proposals, contrasting them in a cost-benefit style. In particular, when the very possibility of a research field of the kind is considered, foes of metaphysics raise a whole host of problems, which, in the worst scenarios, lead to lack of meaning or inconsistency of the discipline as such. On their side, friends of metaphysics usually reply with their own arguments, unfolding additional problems imported by the theses of the opposite field. According to this picture, an evaluation of the disagreement in meta- metaphysics assumes the task of comparing arguments on both sides, with the hope of some advancement in the controversy. My thesis is that an assessment of the debate along these lines risks missing the philosophical background of the various arguments, and that the philosophical background is what gives the arguments their proper meaning. In this paper, I consider a case study to show the relevance of a general philosophical background in order to evaluate the consistency of an argument. The case is offered by Lowe’s evaluation of Kant’s refusal of metaphysics (or, at least, of what Lowe takes to be a refusal of metaphysics). I won’t take side in the controversy, but I will rather argue that the inconsistency that Lowe finds in any transcendental argument against metaphysics is artificially built and misses the point, and that it is driven by motives deeper than what we may think at a first sight. In showing the weakness of Lowe’s reply to Kant, I am not necessarily arguing that Kant is right and hence metaphysics is not possible, as Kant may be wrong anyway and metaphysics may be possible for a number of other reasons. Furthermore, the transcendental project, especially in the neo-Kantian variety, may as well be read as a foundation of metaphysics, even though maybe deflationarily considered as Lowe himself mentions this development. Just for the sole purpose of showing this very possibility, I will offer a brief sketch of this interpretation in the final part of the paper. However, the main aim of this analysis is meta- philosophical: namely, to display the link between particular arguments in meta-metaphysics and general philosophical backgrounds, which can be thought of as linguistic and conceptual frameworks. Those frameworks assign the meaning to basic notions and expressions such as “existence” and “reality”. If this is true, then the present case study shows that an “external” consideration of arguments extracted out of different philosophical frameworks may be deceptive. In the end, this particular controversy about an argument in the history of philosophy may be instructive for theoretical meta-metaphysics as well.

The Alleged Flaw of Transcendentalism and the Possibility of Metaphysics / P. Valore - In: Studies in the Ontology of E.J. Lowe / [a cura di] T. Tambassi. - Neunkirchen-Seelscheid : Editiones Scholasticae, 2018. - ISBN 9783868382136. - pp. 9-26

The Alleged Flaw of Transcendentalism and the Possibility of Metaphysics

P. Valore
2018

Abstract

In evaluating arguments in meta-metaphysics, it is customary to compare advantages and drawbacks of different proposals, contrasting them in a cost-benefit style. In particular, when the very possibility of a research field of the kind is considered, foes of metaphysics raise a whole host of problems, which, in the worst scenarios, lead to lack of meaning or inconsistency of the discipline as such. On their side, friends of metaphysics usually reply with their own arguments, unfolding additional problems imported by the theses of the opposite field. According to this picture, an evaluation of the disagreement in meta- metaphysics assumes the task of comparing arguments on both sides, with the hope of some advancement in the controversy. My thesis is that an assessment of the debate along these lines risks missing the philosophical background of the various arguments, and that the philosophical background is what gives the arguments their proper meaning. In this paper, I consider a case study to show the relevance of a general philosophical background in order to evaluate the consistency of an argument. The case is offered by Lowe’s evaluation of Kant’s refusal of metaphysics (or, at least, of what Lowe takes to be a refusal of metaphysics). I won’t take side in the controversy, but I will rather argue that the inconsistency that Lowe finds in any transcendental argument against metaphysics is artificially built and misses the point, and that it is driven by motives deeper than what we may think at a first sight. In showing the weakness of Lowe’s reply to Kant, I am not necessarily arguing that Kant is right and hence metaphysics is not possible, as Kant may be wrong anyway and metaphysics may be possible for a number of other reasons. Furthermore, the transcendental project, especially in the neo-Kantian variety, may as well be read as a foundation of metaphysics, even though maybe deflationarily considered as Lowe himself mentions this development. Just for the sole purpose of showing this very possibility, I will offer a brief sketch of this interpretation in the final part of the paper. However, the main aim of this analysis is meta- philosophical: namely, to display the link between particular arguments in meta-metaphysics and general philosophical backgrounds, which can be thought of as linguistic and conceptual frameworks. Those frameworks assign the meaning to basic notions and expressions such as “existence” and “reality”. If this is true, then the present case study shows that an “external” consideration of arguments extracted out of different philosophical frameworks may be deceptive. In the end, this particular controversy about an argument in the history of philosophy may be instructive for theoretical meta-metaphysics as well.
Settore M-FIL/01 - Filosofia Teoretica
Settore M-FIL/06 - Storia della Filosofia
2018
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/653014
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