Recent debates on the nature of preferences in economics have typically assumed that they are to be interpreted either as behavioural regularities or as mental states. In this paper I challenge this dichotomy and argue that neither interpretation is consistent with scientific practice in choice theory and behavioural economics. Preferences are belief-dependent dispositions with a multiply realizable causal basis, which explains why economists are reluctant to make a commitment about their interpretation.
Preferences : neither behavioural nor mental / F. Guala. - In: ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY. - ISSN 0266-2671. - (2019 Mar 06). [Epub ahead of print] [10.1017/S0266267118000512]
Preferences : neither behavioural nor mental
F. Guala
2019
Abstract
Recent debates on the nature of preferences in economics have typically assumed that they are to be interpreted either as behavioural regularities or as mental states. In this paper I challenge this dichotomy and argue that neither interpretation is consistent with scientific practice in choice theory and behavioural economics. Preferences are belief-dependent dispositions with a multiply realizable causal basis, which explains why economists are reluctant to make a commitment about their interpretation.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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