The paper is an extension of the Gabillon and Martimort model (2004), which studies how the independence of the institution in charge of monetary policy may stabilize inflationary fluctuations due to political uncertainty when the economy is characterized by lobbies that seek to promote their own interests to the detriment of the general interests of society.
Political Stabilization by an Independent Central Bank / F. Salsano. - Birkbeck : University of London, 2018 Jul 11. (WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS & FINANCE)
Political Stabilization by an Independent Central Bank
F. Salsano
2018
Abstract
The paper is an extension of the Gabillon and Martimort model (2004), which studies how the independence of the institution in charge of monetary policy may stabilize inflationary fluctuations due to political uncertainty when the economy is characterized by lobbies that seek to promote their own interests to the detriment of the general interests of society.
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