

Restarting “normal” life after Covid-19 and the lockdown: Evidence from Spain, the United Kingdom, and Italy

Cristiano Codagnone^{1,2,3}, Francesco Bogliacino^{4, 5, X}, Camilo Gómez^{4, 5}, Frans Folkvord^{2,6}, Giovanni Liva², Rafael Charris^{5,7}, Felipe Montealegre^{4, 5}, Francisco Lupiañez Villanueva^{2,3}, Giuseppe A. Veltri⁸

¹*Università degli studi di Milano, Via Conservatorio 7, 20122 Milano*

²*Open Evidence Research Group, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Avinguda del Tibidabo, 39-43 08035 Barcelona*

³*Faculty of Information and Communication Science, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Avinguda del Tibidabo, 39-43 08035 Barcelona*

⁴*Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Carrera 30, No 45-03, Bogotá, Colombia*

⁵*Centro de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Cl. 44 No 45-99, Bogotá, Colombia*

⁶*Tilburg School of Humanities and Digital Sciences, Tilburg University, Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2, 5037 AB Tilburg, the Netherlands.*

⁷*Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, United States*

⁸*Università degli Studi di Trento, Department of Sociology and Social Research, via Verdi, 26 I-38122 Trento, Italy*

X Corresponding author. Address for correspondence: Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Kr 30, No 45-03, Bogotá (Colombia), fbogliacino@unal.edu.co

Abstract

Currently, unprecedented series of events are taking place that affect the institutional structure of the world economy and the social fabric of our societies. In this article, we examine the expectations of the economic outlook, fear of the future, and behavioural change during the lockdown, for three European countries (Spain, the United Kingdom, and Italy) that have been severely hit by Covid-19. We use a novel data source that we collected to monitor the three countries during the pandemic. As outcome variables, we use expectations (e.g., economic outlook, labour market situation, recovery), fear (e.g., scenario of new outburst, economic depression, restriction to individual rights and freedom), and behavioural change across the following dimensions: savings, cultural consumption, social capital, and risky behaviour. After providing descriptive evidence that is representative of the population of interest, using longitudinal data from the same survey on exposure to shocks and matching techniques, we

1 estimate the impact of exposure to shock occurred during the crisis on the same outcome
2 variables.

3 **Keywords:** COVID-19; fear; expectation; behavioural change; negative economic shocks

4 **JEL Classification:** D84; D90; D91; I12; H12

5 **Word count:** 10639

6 **Acknowledgment and Funding:** Funding has been provided by Open Evidence and BDI-
7 Schlesinger Group. We thank Noe Andreu for help with the programming and the data
8 collection and Douglas Rodríguez who helped as RA. We appreciate suggestions by Laura
9 Jimenez and Ricardo Macías for the design of the behavioural change questions in the
10 instrument. The editor and two anonymous referees have been very helpful. The standard
11 disclaimer applies. The authors declare no conflict of interest.

12

13 This is a preprint of an article published in Social Indicators Research. The final authenticated
14 version is available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-021-02697-5>

15

16

1. Introduction

The year 2020 has witnessed an unprecedented series of events that put into question the institutional structure of the world economy (*the rules of the game*) and the social fabric of our societies. In March 2020, Covid-19 was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO 2020). Almost everywhere, countries adopted strict mitigation strategies, inspired by China's success in the containment and suppression of the contagion. Nonetheless, the combination of the Covid-19 and the mitigation strategies has produced one of the worst crises of the last century, in terms of both economic and health consequences, and is threatening a global depression (Van Bavel et al. 2020; Bibby et al. 2020). Uncertain prognoses for when the lockdown will be reduced and people can restart their lives again, economic expectations, looming severe shortages of resources for testing and treatment, public health measures that infringe on personal freedoms, large and sometimes even growing financial losses, and conflicting messages from authorities, are considered to be the major stressors that undoubtedly will contribute to widespread emotional distress and increased risk for severe health problems, associated with the COVID-19 crisis (Pfefferbaum and North 2020; Duan and Zhu 2020).

Pandemic outbreak and mitigation strategies produced tangible shocks (e.g., losing one's job, loss of earnings, having to do home schooling, impossibility to keep social contacts) compounded by a climate of radical uncertainty on the epidemiological and clinical aspects of the pandemic, on when and how social distancing would be lifted, and on the economic consequences. Different personalities have argued in favour of the necessity to restart, i.e. for the societies to converge to a *new normal*, where collective actions, markets, and institutional mechanisms can coordinate individual plans.

We claim that to envision the post pandemic restart of our societies, an important role is played by expectations, emotions (e.g., fear, stress, anxiety), and behavioural change in key dimensions (e.g., saving, cultural consumption, networking, health). First, expectations are a fundamental coordination mechanism for our economies. A significant change in the expectations about the future, being those rational or mainly based on emotions, can have a substantial macroeconomic impact. For instance, pessimistic expectations about the labour market situation may have significant negative effects on aggregate consumption and wage growth, because consumers and employees restrain themselves in their consumptions when they are uncertain about the future (Garz 2013). Similarly, higher uncertainty about the future economic situation causes firms to temporarily pause their investments and hiring (Bloom 2009). Second, our societies are also hardwired to defuse fears and other negative emotions. Fear is an ill advisor at individual level, because it impairs the normal functioning of the cognitive control and other processes that occur in the pre-frontal cortex (Roth et al. 1988; Öhman 2007; Eysenk 2013). At the aggregate level, fear is a threat to our political systems, whose rules are based on the capacity of collective bodies to aggregate preferences and of *rational* dialogue to settle conflicts and disputes (Nussbaum 2004; Bobbio 1980; Sartori 1987), whereas fear can be exploited by populist forces, as it has been occurring in the last decade. Third, although a looser concept, behavioural change captures the basic tenet that certain decisions have long run consequences, if they are related with savings, patterns of consumption, health behaviour and networking. Bad health habits hamper future productivity (Lenhart 2019), deaccumulation of savings leaves a person exposed to future shocks, as typical of poor households (Banerjee and

1 Duflo 2007), giving up connections decreases the chances to take advantage of future job or
2 carrier opportunities (Sibley et al. 2020), changing cultural consumption patterns during the
3 pandemic may have several adverse effects, for it plays a key role as generative mediator of social
4 identities and stratification (Katz-Gerro 2004), increasing already existing inequalities in cultural
5 capital (Bennet and Silva 2006).

6 In this study, our first aim is to understand and visualize under what circumstances the *new*
7 *normal* will take place. To accomplish it, we provide a descriptive account of expectations, fear,
8 and behavioural change in three countries, using a representative sample, measured at the lifting
9 of the lockdown, just after the worst of the first wave is over. Our second aim is gaining insights
10 into how the crisis has disrupted expectations, emotions, and behavioural change. Therefore, we
11 need to identify how the degree of exposure to shocks, occurred during the crisis, affected those
12 variables. This can shed light on how to target policies to soften the impact of the crisis and to
13 better shape the long run recovery. These objectives can be stated through the following research
14 questions: What are the expectations and fear towards the future and the behavioural change
15 occurred during the first wave of the pandemic in a representative sample of the population of
16 Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom? What are the differences in those outcomes attributable
17 to the degree of exposure to labour market and health shocks?

18 Addressing these two aims contributes to increase our understanding of some of the
19 psychological, social, and economic consequences of the current economic halt. There is an
20 emerging body of literature that is starting to look at the unequal impact of lockdown on
21 different social groups and at the potential for structural increase in inequalities (Hanspal et al.
22 2020; Bergamini 2020; Tabner 2020; Brunori et al. 2020; Adams-Prassl et al. 2020a; Adams-
23 Prassl et al. 2020b; Perugini and Vladislavjevic 2020). Evidence on how the gradient of exposure
24 has shaped expectations and emotions about the future, and behavioural change is still largely
25 missing.

26 To fill the gap in the literature and to provide some important insights for policy makers, we
27 will use a subset of the data from a longitudinal study conducted in three waves in the UK, Spain
28 and Italy between April 24 and May 20 (Bogliacino et al. 2020). We will focus on data from wave
29 three, where we elicited expectations (general, labour market situation, recovery), fear (scenario
30 of new outburst, economic depression, restriction to individual rights and freedom), and
31 behavioural change across the following dimensions: savings, cultural consumption, social
32 capital¹, risky health behaviour. One important added value of these data, which is missing in
33 other sources, is that we collected these outcome variables between the 10th and the 20th of May,
34 when the three countries were slowly exiting the lockdown, and this represents the perfect timing
35 to both detect behavioural change during the worst phase of the crisis, and to elicit expectations
36 and fear towards the future while the reopening is under way. Additionally, we will use the
37 information from the three waves to identify the degree of exposure to shocks, by measuring

¹ Social capital is defined in slightly different ways depending on the theoretical perspective (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman 1988, 1990; Putnam 1993, 2000). At a very basic level it can be said that the concept entails both normative (norms and values) and instrumental dimensions (networks). At macro level social capital can be equated to civic sense entailing norms, social values, trust, and social network (especially participation in association). It is a source of an important systemic resource such as generalised trust. At a more micro level social capital can be defined as the ensemble of social networks that can enable individuals to gain access to desired resources and outcomes.

1 the negative events that respondents experienced during the Covid-19 and lockdown crisis. Our
2 results have robust external validity, because we started with a representative sample (in wave I)
3 and we plausibly correct for selection bias (technically, we use machine learning techniques to
4 estimate the probability of dropout, conditional on baseline characteristics, and then reweight
5 the data). A methodological choice of the paper concerns the application of matching technique
6 to ensure that the outcomes of those highly exposed are compared with the outcomes of less
7 exposed who share their characteristics. This strategy allows us to compute a counterfactual,
8 establishing the difference in expectations, fears, and behavioural change had the persons never
9 suffered an increase in the degree of exposure. To do so, we first present a synthesis of the causal
10 paths (Direct Acyclical Graphs, DAG, Pearl 2009; Cunningham 2018) that go from (crisis
11 driven) shocks to the outcome variables, to make sure that we balance subjects on observables
12 characteristics, and we reasonably estimate a difference in outcome with respect to a
13 counterfactual. Although unobservable characteristics may vary along the degree of exposure, a
14 strength of our data is that we can focus on the intensive margin, which is less subject to the risk
15 of endogenous selection, instead of the extensive margin (comparing exposed with unexposed),
16 where the consequences of self-selection appear to be more serious. Since our identification
17 relies on our DAG, the causal claims are conditional on the plausibility of our model.

18 According to our estimates, in the three countries we detected shared pessimism and
19 expectations of recovery that goes well beyond the current year; widespread fears, especially with
20 regards to an economic depression, and, finally, disruption of social capital, deaccumulation of
21 savings, and unhealthy behaviour, with potential long run consequences. There is a gradient
22 according to the degree of exposure, at least in terms of use of savings, social capital, and
23 expectations regarding labour prospect. The effect on fears is not robust to different estimators,
24 but it appears to be consistent also with the hypothesis that the severity of shocks induced a
25 reassessment of the future.

26 In Section 2, we describe how the uncertainty of the current crisis shaped outcome variables
27 and present a scheme of the causal paths linking shocks to expectations, fear, and behavioural
28 changes. In Section 3, we illustrate our data and methodology, and in Section 4 we comment the
29 results. In Section 5 we discuss the implications of our findings and we conclude. The
30 questionnaire and the supplementary statistical analyses are in the Supplementary Online
31 Materials (SOM).

32 **2. Covid-19 and the future: theoretical framework**

33 In this section we present the theoretical underpinnings of our analysis and methodology.

34 ***2.1 Reshaping of expectations, fears, and behavioural change under radical uncertainty***

35 In decision theory, choices shape the collective outcomes for a given institutional setting
36 (Gintis 2007). These choices are determined by beliefs, preferences, and constraints: beliefs give
37 coordinates while facing uncertainty, preferences rank alternatives in each choice set, and
38 constraints determine those choice sets.

39 Beliefs, preferences, and constraints change in response to the environment. Beliefs are
40 constantly updated in response to new data, sometimes this updating is biased because of
41 phenomena such as motivated reasoning and confirmatory bias (MacFayden 2006). Although

1 theories of rational behaviour assume preferences to be stable, in reality “preferences are
2 ineluctably a function of such parameters as hunger, fear, and recent social experience, and
3 beliefs can change dramatically in response to immediate sensory experience” (Gintis 2007: p.
4 4). Finally, past decisions affect available choices: mistakes can have long run consequences, such
5 as in poverty traps (Barret et al. 2019), or as we said in the introduction, because bad health
6 habits or losing connections may have long run consequences in terms of both health and
7 economic opportunities (Machin and Manning 1998; Bonanno et al. 2010).

8 We conjecture that in this contingency, beliefs, fear, and rules of behaviour changed because
9 the crisis has introduced large doses of uncertainty, and because the policy response may have
10 further fuelled this uncertainty. Governments, in fact, generally abstained from providing
11 contingent scenarios for the mid-term, while the main decisions appear to have been guided by
12 the precautionary principle instead of the cost benefit analysis (Codagnone et al. 2020), and the
13 former is prone to trigger availability cascades (Sunstein 2018).

14 The uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding the pandemic itself and lockdown have both
15 objective and subjective dimensions, both of which have been framed² in the public discourse
16 that accompanied lockdown. The way governments initially framed the pandemic and the way
17 to contain it has been picked up and exacerbated in the media. It can be argued that using the
18 metaphor of the war was unfortunate to maintain uncertainty and ambiguity under control: war
19 is associated with danger, and war is a state of emergency where the person in charge is taking
20 the decisions without leaving discretionary margins to those low in the hierarchy, but in this case,
21 things were made worse by the lack of any clear strategy for the near future and the return to
22 normality. Additionally, communication by the governments fuelled uncertainty because of the
23 lack of robust evidence to support many aspects of this pandemic, that were afterwards rectified,
24 e.g. the lethality of the virus, the numbers of contagion, the infectiousness, the availability of
25 tests, the capacity of healthcare systems to cope with the wave of patients in need of intensive
26 care, the research for a vaccine. Second, uncertainties surround also the negative economic short
27 and long run consequences of lockdown (Baker et al. 2020): the economic impact of the
28 pandemic, the policy responses, the speed of the recovery, the survival of firms, consumers’
29 spending. If we consider all these aspects of uncertainty and ambiguity, there are strong reasons
30 to believe that they induced a reassessment of the expectations about the future. Scholars in
31 China have already tested the relationship between the ambiguity shock induced by Covid-19
32 and the macroeconomic expectations (Li, 2020). These emergent findings and stylized facts
33 confirm that the provision and the framing of information by institutional channels and by the
34 media are having an impact on people’s economic sentiment, in line with previous results in
35 other contexts (Garz 2013; Goidel et al. 2010).

36 In addition, lockdown introduced some mandatory restrictions that forced immediate
37 behavioural change, for individuals were asked to stay home and many economic activities were

² In this respect a brief detour on the framing literature helps sharpen some aspects relevant to our paper. The framing perspective, originating in other disciplinary fields (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Benford & Snow 2000; Klandermans 1997; Snow and Benford 1988; Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford, 1986; Entman 1991, 1993; Kuypers 2010), in the last two decades has been increasingly applied to the study of politics and policy making and related communication strategies (Béland et al. 2016; Carstensen and Schmidt 2016; Seabrooke and Wigan, 2016; Mügge 2016; Jones, Thomas and Wolfe 2014; Maor 2014; Maor 2016).

1 temporarily closed (Baker et al. 2020). Spending levels dropped because of the reduction of
2 public contact, social activities, the closure of sport and shops and the suspension of a large
3 number of economic activities. At any rate, this temporary behavioural change may become
4 permanent when it is crystallized by the occurrence of full-blown shocks.

5 We expect citizens in Spain, the United Kingdom and Italy to hold a majoritarian negative
6 attitude towards the future, both in terms of personal and general state of the economy
7 (Hypothesis 1), and in terms of fear of dystopic scenarios (H2, new pandemic outburst,
8 economic depression, restriction on freedom and rights). Additionally, we expect a self-reported
9 increase in risky behaviour (H3), an increased use of saving (H4), and a decrease in social
10 (relational) capital (H5). We lack a clear prediction in terms of cultural consumption, since the
11 crisis has generated both a demand effect and a supply effect (a well-documented lowering down
12 of the cost of access to cultural consumption), thus we test the hypothesis that there was no
13 change in cultural consumption (H6).

14 ***2.2 Shocks and outcomes***

15 Besides a general effect of uncertainty on our outcome variables, there is a clear gradient in
16 that some sectors of the population have suffered several negative events that directly affected
17 their behaviour, the beliefs and the emotions. These are the shocks caused by the crisis. Strictly
18 defined, negative shocks are losses of income or accumulated assets and can be classified
19 according to the source of the loss; namely, health, labour market, natural disaster, and poverty,
20 amongst others. We have measured in our data many of these different shocks, such as: loss of
21 employment (job or livelihood), decrease in earning or income, temporary or definitive closing
22 of one's business, inability to get access to sufficient food, and consequently need to apply for
23 unemployment subsidy or for requesting the support for charities or NGOs, inability to access
24 healthcare when needed, having sought to get tested for Covid-19, and having to home-school
25 child(ren).

26 The literature shows that large variations of income for sugar cane farmers induce a cognitive
27 toll (Mani et al. 2014). Laboratory experiments where shocks are induced as losses on
28 accumulated earnings from a Real Effort Task confirm this evidence (Bogliacino and
29 Montealegre 2020). It has been argued that this cognitive toll makes people concentrate on the
30 worries, distracting attention from the ongoing decisions, which may induce counterproductive
31 behaviour, such as lack of adherence to medication, unsafe sex, inability to comply with saving
32 plans, procrastination etc. Asset losses can also dampen the beliefs about what it is achievable in
33 the future (Ibáñez and Moya 2010; Moya and Carter 2019). Therefore, we expect that through
34 these alternative channels, negative shocks affect behaviour, inducing counterproductive choices
35 in health (H7) (e.g. risky behaviour such as lack of adherence to medication, unprotected sex),
36 in the use of savings (H8) (increasing deaccumulation), and neglect of important relationships
37 (H9) (depreciation of social capital).

38 We learned from the literature on violence that mental health pathologies such as depression,
39 chronic anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder, induced by victimization, may cause a state
40 of despair, negative perceptions regarding the future, and hopelessness (Abramson, Metalsky
41 and Alloy 1989; Sympson 2000; Yehuda 2002; Moya and Carter 2019). We also know that
42 negative shocks during the lockdown are associated with stress, depression, and anxiety

1 (Codagnone et al. 2020). As a result, we conjecture that shocks induce more pessimism towards
2 the future (H10), in terms of individual labour prospect and lower demand for cultural
3 consumption (H11), because hopelessness is associated with a sense of alienation. We speculate
4 that a similar effect extends to the general fears of the future and aggregate economic prospect
5 (H12).

6


7 ***2.3 Causal mechanisms: Direct Acyclical Graph***

8 To estimate the impact of shocks on outcomes, in absence of exogenous variation that would
9 balance other plausible causal mechanisms, we need to put forward the causal paths that connect,
10 directly and indirectly, shocks to expectations, fear, and behavioural change. While the direct
11 path is the causal impact of interest (*ceteris paribus*, what is the effect of shocks), the backdoor
12 paths are confounding factors, because they induce spurious correlation by influencing why
13 certain individuals may be more prone to severe shocks and have systematic differences in terms
14 of outcome variables. Due to these underlying differences, we would have observed different
15 expectations, fear and behaviour, had these individuals not being exposed to severe shocks.
16 Once we close these backdoor paths, properly controlling for variables measuring these
17 connections, we can then compute meaningful comparisons.³

18 A Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) of the problem is plotted in Figure 1 using *dagitty* (Textor
19 et al. 2016). A DAG uses the language of Graph theory to show the causal connections between
20 the relevant variables (Pearl 2009). In the DAG, outcomes represent the dependent variables of
21 interest. The exposure variable is the shock. We are interested in the direct connection between
22 shocks and outcome. Nevertheless, there are backdoor paths that connect shocks and outcome.
23 Two of them are through confounds: these are omitted variables that explain both exposure to
24 shocks and outcome. One is through a mediator mechanism: the fact that shocks affect
25 preferences and cognitive performance. Since Bogliacino et al. (2021) estimated the relationship
26 between shocks and preferences, we focused here only on the direct path between shocks and
27 outcome (and not on the indirect path mediated by preferences). In the graph, there are also
28 unobservables, U and V, which we assume are affecting confounds. We will justify this
29 assumption below.

³ To understand the logic of this identification strategy, let us use a textbook example (Cunningham, 2018). Assume that we want to test if being in first class of Titanic increases the probability of survival. It is argued that the social norms in the sea recommend women and children first, thus if the latter categories were more represented in first class, simply estimating the probability of survival by class of the boat may confound the causal effect of social norms. To overcome this inferential problem, we need to compare between classes of the boat, within gender and age cells. In the same vein, in our setting, we should postulate causal mechanisms that may confound the relationship between shocks and beliefs, fears, and behaviour and define proper control variables to exclude these confounding factors.

1 *Figure 1 The DAG of shocks and beliefs, fears, and behavioural change*



2

3

4 One first block of relevant confounds is represented by socio-economic conditions.⁴ We
 5 know from the literature on poverty that poor households are more frequently hit by negative
 6 shocks (Haurshorfer and Fehr 2014). We also know that low socio-economic background
 7 predicts exposure to negative health shocks in the context of the current crisis (Codagnone et
 8 al. 2020). Differences in socio-economic background are obviously related with differences in
 9 expectations, fears, and behaviour. Well established research argues that socio-economic
 10 background influences how beliefs are updated and used facing uncertainties and, especially, to
 11 shape the subjective interiorization of constraints that in turn determine the subjectively
 12 perceived choice set and eventually behaviour. This hypothesis is amply confirmed in the
 13 literature on the psychology of class (Manstead 2018), in classical sociological works (e.g.
 14 Bourdieu 1977; 1986) and also in recent well-known books monographs on inequality (Atkinson
 15 2015; Wilkinson and Pickett 2019). Current class position affects the way people think, their
 16 beliefs and, consequently, their behaviour (Doney et al. 1999), for instance: moving down the
 17 social hierarchy from middle to lower positions, individuals are more likely to see social events
 18 in situational terms for they have a lower sense of personal control (Manstead 2018). According
 19 to Bourdieu’s theory, class position and the volume and structure of capital that agents possess
 20 shape their habitus of individuals, which is defined as a system of dispositions, appreciations,
 21 and practical mastery (Bourdieu 1977; 1980; 1984; 1986). The habitus is a generative mechanism

⁴ By definition of “Acyclical” graphs, the arrow cannot be bidirectional, i.e. socio-economic status and shocks cannot directly influence each other. This implies that this view of causality is ill equipped to deal with simultaneity. Notice however that if the arrow would go in the opposite direction, this would not harm identification as we are controlling for SES. A similar argument would hold for health below.

1 at work in a wide variety of different contexts and, thus, influences a large variety of behaviors.
2 Thus, one would expect that there is clear social gradient in the way different individuals are
3 experiencing the uncertainty and shocks produced by Covid-19 and related mitigation strategy:
4 more vulnerable groups feel less control and tend to have more negative expectations, to be
5 more fearful, and to have already changed their behaviour in defensive and/or dysfunctional
6 manner.⁵

7 A second block of confounds is associated with the health condition, and in this particular
8 context with susceptibility and vulnerability from the Covid-19. In biology, susceptibility is the
9 extent to which a person would suffer, once contracted the virus. Vulnerability is the likelihood
10 to contract it and depends on the degree of communitarian exposure. In addition, there is an
11 ample literature showing that health status and particularly having chronic conditions compound
12 the effects of negative shocks. Chronic conditions, in the same way as unexpected health shocks,
13 besides producing tangible direct (medical costs) and indirect effects (workday loss, loss of
14 productivity, human capital deterioration, decrease in savings and consumptions), have also
15 intangible psychological effects such as anxiety, fear, and suffering (Mendola et al. 2007; Wagstaff
16 2007; Jones et al. 2020).

17 A third block of variables concerns preferences traits. Preference traits are usually made of
18 two components: the first one is relatively stable, and explain consistency of choice in many
19 domains, the second one is deemed to be affected by life experience (Gintis 2007). We know
20 from multiple quasi experimental and experimental studies that negative shocks, alone or in
21 conjoint with other phenomena (e.g. trauma) affect preferences in different domain: increasing
22 time discount (Haushofer et al. 2014; Voors et al. 2012), risk aversion (Decker and Schimtz
23 2016), reciprocity (Cavatorta et al. 2020), trust (Cassar et al. 2017), and cooperation and
24 prosociality in general (Bauer et al. 2016). At the same time, preferences are obviously related
25 with beliefs and choice (on self-serving beliefs, Mobius et al. 2011; Eli and Rao 2010; Grossman
26 and Owens, and on preferences explaining choices, Varian 1982; Andreoni and Miller 2002). As
27 a result, preference and cognitive function operate as a mediator or mechanism.

28 One could argue that there are other unobservable variables that explain beliefs, fear, and
29 behavioural change. In Figure 1 above, we labelled them U and V. These other varying factors
30 do not harm our identification of the causal effect, as long as they are mediated by health and
31 socio-economic factors. Given our review of the literature, we claim that this identifying
32 assumption is reasonable, but results should obviously be interpreted conditionally on its
33 plausibility.

34 Based on this review of the literature, in the estimation of counterfactuals fears, beliefs and
35 behaviour in absence of strong shocks, we need to control for baseline socio-demographic
36 characteristics to close the path of the social gradient on the outcome variables, for preference
37 traits to close the path shocks-preferences-outcome, and for baseline health status to close the
38 one involving health, shocks and outcomes.

⁵ Notice that some authors argue for non-linearity, as middle class may suffer from uncertainty during crises more than lower classes since they have more to lose and higher social expectations (Kiess and Lahusen 2018; Steijn et al. 1998), and more than upper classes as the latter are simply less exposed.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

3. Methodology

Data

The policy context of the three countries is reported in the SOM, Section 2, Country Cases. The data used in this paper comes from the large-scale data collection project by Bogliacino et al. (2020). In this project, a random sample drawn from a representative online panel in Spain, United Kingdom and Italy was interviewed three times, first in the week from the 24th of April to the 1st of May (N=10551), then in the week from the 2nd of May to the 9th of May (N=4490), and finally from the 10th of May until the 20th of May (N=3191) (hereafter, wave I, wave II, and wave III). We restricted participation to 18-75 years old, no other data selection was performed on those who completed the interview. The project included longitudinal measures and specific experimental manipulations in each wave. All the materials and methods are reported in the pre-registered study.⁶ Ethics approval was obtained from the Institutional Review Board of the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya. All respondents provided written informed consent. The relevant portions of the questionnaires are reported in Supplementary Online Material, Section 1.

Outcome variables for this paper have been collected in wave III, through three blocks of questions (see questionnaire wave III, Q8 – Q15). The first block included expectations and it is made of three questions, two on optimism over the economic outlook and personal job outlook (taken from Eurobarometer) and one on the length of the recovery (standard formulation). The second block included questions on evaluating how likely a certain future scenario is considered (standard formulation) and the scenarios evaluated were: 1) A new outbreak of the disease; 2) An economic depression; and 3) A permanent restriction to our rights and freedom. Participants are asked to answer on a Likert scale from one to four. The third block of questions asked about behavioral change in the lockdown with respect to normal. Since we had to design this last set of questions, we validated them with professional psychometric standards. The questions asked were about use of savings, cultural consumptions, maintenance of relevant personal contact (social capital), and unhealthy lifestyle.

From wave I, we matched all the baseline information on socio-demographic characteristics and health status. From wave II, we collected information on preferences (Falk et al. 2018 Global Preference Survey) and cognitive function (Cognitive Reflection Test, Frederick 2005). These enabled us to close the backdoor paths as discussed in the previous section.

To estimate the size of exposure to negative events during the period of data collection, we use the following question “Over the past week, have any of the following events happened to you?” (stressful events shocks, hereafter) and includes having been forced to stay at home, having lost the employment, having suffered a reduction in earnings, having had to homeschool children, having been unable to access healthcare, having been unable to get access to food, sought to get

⁶ The software used for the analysis was Stata 15 (StataCorp 2017). We also used the kmatch routine (Jann 2017) and rforest routine (Zou and Schonlau, 2021).

1 tested for Covid-19, having had to apply for unemployment subsidy or government support,
2 and sought help from charities. Answer per each item is Yes/No.

3 ***Controlling for selection bias***

4 While the original sample was representative, the sample of wave III is affected by attrition. To
5 make sure that the outcome variables reflect the population of interest, we define importance
6 weights equal to the inverse of the probability of survival (defined as not dropping out) until
7 wave III. The true likelihood of survival in the population is not observable, thus we estimate
8 the conditional probability, using a set of 60 variables from the answers in questionnaire in wave
9 I. These variables cover participants' sociodemographic characteristics, health condition, and
10 geographical location to have a well-defined outlook of attributes that could predict the dropout.
11 The complete list of variables is presented in SOM Table S1.

12 While we could estimate a standard linear probability or logit model, since we are focusing on
13 prediction, we opted for a machine learning algorithm, which is more accurate in predicting
14 attrition. The estimation method follows a random forest algorithm. This algorithm is
15 characterized by using numerous decision trees. The central idea is to create an uncorrelated
16 forest of decision trees to make the prediction. To build each uncorrelated decision tree, the
17 method uses two strategies: random selection of features and bagging. The random selection of
18 features is the selection of a random subset of features (e.g. age, gender, geographical zone, etc.)
19 from all the variables selected for the prediction to create the decision nodes in each tree. This
20 implies that amongst the trees in the forest, we have considerable diversification in terms of
21 decision nodes. Bagging or bootstrap aggregation consists of randomly select with replacement
22 a training sample of size N from the database to run the estimation in each tree. Observations
23 not included in the training sample are defined as the out-of-bag sample. By using bagging, it is
24 possible to calculate the out-of-bag error (OOB-error). The OOB-error is a measure of how
25 good the prediction of the random forest is when it is used in the out-of-bag sample. The OOB-
26 error provides an overview of the quality of the random forest. If the convergence of the OOB-
27 error is reached rapidly with respect to the number of trees, the algorithm is suitable for the
28 prediction. We set the random forest algorithm with 550 trees (iterations), a training sample of
29 size $N = 10551$, and with 60 features to be randomly selected for each tree. By using all the data,
30 we somehow overfit and maximize the accuracy, however, we show in the SOM that results are
31 consistent when we use subsamples of the data.

32 ***Identification Strategy***

33 To identify the causal effect of exposure to Covid-19 and lockdown crisis, we use a selection on
34 observable research design and we estimate via matching. Hereafter, we define treated
35 individuals those highly affected by the crisis, and control individuals those who were not. We
36 focus on intensive margin to soften the threat of endogeneity (i.e. we compare a difference of
37 degree instead of a switch from non being expose to being expose). Matching means
38 reconstructing ex post a control group using a metric defined over observables to identify the
39 closest non treated individuals to each treated unit. Stated in simple words: we would like to
40 estimate a counterfactual, what would have happened if those severely affected by shocks had
41 not been hit, and we would need a sample of non-severely hit citizens that, on all the relevant
42 explanatory factors of the outcomes, are on average non different from those severely hit. We

1 reconstruct such a sample, ex post, searching for individuals which are close enough according
2 to the *observable* characteristics, whose explanatory power of the outcomes is significant.

3 To measure treatment status, we create an index of stressful events shocks. As we said in the
4 data section, we used the question “Over the past week, have any of the following events
5 happened to you?”. Since responses are Yes/No to each potential source of shocks, we can sum
6 over the total number of shocks. We classify participants either as treated or control, using the
7 median of the index as threshold. Participants above the median value were assigned to the
8 treated group and participants below the median to the control group.

9 The assignment to the two groups is not random; as a result, simple mean comparison between
10 treated and untreated group is affected by selection bias. To control for this selection bias, we
11 match participants from treatment and control group using two measures of distance in terms
12 of observables: the likelihood of getting the treatment, conditional on the observables
13 (Propensity Score Matching, PSM), and a measure of distance defined over the space of
14 observables (Mahalanobis Distance Matching, MDM).

15 The identification assumptions are the conditional independence assumption (CIA) and the
16 common support. The former states that once we close the backdoor paths, i.e. we control for
17 the variables that may confound shocks and outcomes, the assignment to shocks is as good as
18 random. In simple words, this implies being able to measure through observables all relevant
19 omitted variables. To satisfy this central assumption, we carry out a rigorous selection based on
20 a theoretical criterion to identify which observable variables affecting the outcomes could be
21 driving as well the likelihood of being hit by shocks. This assumption is untestable, but our
22 theoretical background is transparently reported in Section 2. The second assumption is the
23 common support: this means that in the domain defined by the control variables, the likelihood
24 of being affected by shock is strictly positive. This corresponds to avoiding comparing
25 individuals hit by shock with individual *different*, in that they have a zero likelihood of being
26 severely affected. This second assumption can and will be tested empirically.

27 The coefficient we estimate is the effect of the intensity of the shock on beliefs, fears, and
28 behavioral changes over those that were severely hit (average treatment effect on the treated,
29 ATT hereafter). To state it simply, it is the difference between the outcomes observed after
30 having been severely hit by shocks and the outcomes that we would have observed on the very
31 same individuals, if they had suffered only mild shocks.

32 As we said, we use two methods. In the first method, we follow the standard propensity score
33 matching method proposed by Rubin (1977), and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). First, we
34 estimate the propensity score for each participant using a logistic regression with the set of
35 covariates previously selected. Second, we make a nearest-neighbor matching using the
36 propensity score estimated. In the matching, we use the three nearest neighbors with
37 replacement (i.e. we will have three controls per each treated unit, and we can use control units
38 more than once) and we only considered the observations that were in the common support.
39 The second method we implement is Mahalanobis distance matching. This method matches the
40 closest observations using a normalized and scale-invariant distance measure over the covariates.
41 Supported by the theoretical selection and to have comparable results between methods, we use
42 the same set of covariates used in the propensity score matching method. As before, we use

1 three nearest neighbors with replacement and we only consider the common support. In
2 addition, in both methods we estimate also the impact using a bias correction to adjust for
3 differences in the covariates: this is equivalent to adjust the counterfactual for the fact that we
4 are comparing individuals in the two groups which are not exactly the same in terms of
5 observables and compute the causal effect with respect to this “corrected” control group.
6

7 **4. Results**

8 **4.1 Expectations, fear, and behavioural change in the population, controlling for attrition**

9 In Tables 1-10, we report the descriptive statistics for the outcome variables, projected to
10 the overall population, after correcting for selection bias. The original data, without correction,
11 are included in the SOM, Table S3-S12. We also provide two Tables, one with the population
12 proportions according to age, gender, and geographic residence in the three countries (data from
13 Eurostat), and the other with the proportions from the first wave. The original sample has similar
14 proportions along these three dimensions (see SOM Table S13).

15 The estimated random forest model for selection bias is reported in the SOM (Figure S 1
16 and Tables S1 – S2) as well: we report the OOB-error convergence, which stabilizes after 100
17 iterations at somewhere below 0.30, the matrix of variable importance for each variable used
18 when building the classifier, and the fit of the model (Spearman rank-order correlation
19 coefficient=0.7956, $p=0.000$) between the dropout and the estimated dropout probability. The
20 results are highly correlated when we compare total sample and out-of-sample prediction with
21 10%, 15%, 33%, 50% and 70% of the sample for learning. From the diagnostic tests, we
22 conclude in favour of the robustness of the exercise.

23 The first question asked is about the general economic outlook for 2021 (Table 1). Overall,
24 only 15.2% did not expect a change with respect to the current situation, 55.9% expected it to
25 be worse, and 19.2% better. Slightly less than 10% did not provide an answer. There are
26 differences across countries: pessimism was the highest in Spain, where 62.6% expected a worse
27 year, while the rate was 58.9% in UK and 45.9% in Italy.

28 When asked about the expectation for the personal job situation (Table 2), citizens’ belief
29 was less pessimistic, with a 43% overall that saw a stable prospect with respect to the ongoing
30 year (already a year of crisis, though). On average, 27.2% saw a worse job situation in 2021, the
31 highest was in Spain again, with a share of 34.8%, followed by Italy with 26.8% and the UK with
32 20.4%.

33 In terms of recovery and going back to normal (Table 3), 39.2% overall expected the
34 recovery to take from six months to one year, whereas 37.7% more than one year. In this case,
35 the grimmest prospect was offered by British beliefs, where 81.6% expected the recovery to last
36 at least six months. This share decreased to 76.1% in the case of Spain, and 72.3% for Italy.

37

38

1 *Table 1 What are your expectations for the year to come: will 2021 be better, worse or the same, when it comes to the economic situation (in our*
 2 *country)? [Corrected by dropout effects]*

Belief: Economic outlook	SP	UK	IT	Overall
Better	16.7%	17.8%	23.1%	19.2%
Worse	62.6%	58.9%	45.9%	55.9%
The same	14.8%	13.5%	17.3%	15.2%
Don't know	5.9%	9.8%	13.7%	9.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

3
 4 *Table 2 What are your expectations for the year to come: will 2021 be better, worse or the same, when it comes to your personal job situation?*
 5 *[Corrected by dropout effects]*

Belief: Job prospect	SP	UK	IT	Overall
Better	18.0%	9.9%	22.3%	16.6%
Worse	34.8%	20.4%	26.8%	27.2%
The same	37.8%	55.2%	35.0%	43.0%
Don't know	9.5%	14.4%	15.9%	13.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

6
 7 *Table 3 What are your expectations on the recovery from the current pandemic: when do you think we will go back to our normal lives like before the*
 8 *outbreak? [Corrected by dropout effects]*

Belief: Timing of recovery	SP	UK	IT	Overall
2-3 months	7.0%	5.1%	9.6%	7.2%
4-5 months	16.5%	13.3%	18.1%	15.9%
6 months-1 year	36.1%	41.1%	40.3%	39.2%
More than one year	40.5%	40.5%	32.0%	37.7%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

9
 10 In the following three questions, we asked about fears. In particular, we asked participants
 11 to evaluate the likelihood of three negative scenarios: a new outbreak of the pandemic, an
 12 economic depression, and the permanent restriction on rights and freedom. Results are
 13 presented in Tables 4-6 below. The first scenario was considered somewhat likely or very likely
 14 by 83.7% overall, increasing up to 90.9% in Spain, whereas it was 84.4% in the UK and 76.1%
 15 in Italy. Economic depression was estimated as somewhat likely or very likely by 91% of the
 16 population in the three countries: 92.4% in Spain, 90.3% in the UK, and 90.5% in Italy. A
 17 permanent restriction on rights and freedom was seen less likely but still a credible scenario for
 18 the majority of the population: 56.2% saw it as somewhat likely or very likely, with 65.3%, 49.4%,
 19 and 54.3% respectively for Spain, the UK, and Italy.

20

1 *Table 4 Among the following negative scenarios for the future, please indicate how likely you consider them? A new outbreak of the disease*
 2 *[Corrected by dropout effects]*

Fear: pandemic outbreak	SP	UK	IT	Overall
Very Unlikely	3.2%	3.4%	5.5%	4.0%
Somewhat Unlikely	5.9%	12.3%	18.4%	12.2%
Somewhat Likely	50.1%	56.1%	60.9%	55.7%
Very Likely	40.8%	28.3%	15.2%	28.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

3
 4 *Table 5 Among the following negative scenarios for the future, please indicate how likely you consider them? An economic depression [Corrected by*
 5 *dropout effects]*

Fear: Econ depression	SP	UK	IT	Overall
Very Unlikely	2.5%	3.5%	3.6%	3.2%
Somewhat Unlikely	5.2%	6.2%	5.9%	5.8%
Somewhat Likely	28.8%	38.3%	41.3%	36.2%
Very Likely	63.6%	52.0%	49.2%	54.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

6
 7 *Table 6 Among the following negative scenarios for the future, please indicate how likely you consider them? A permanent restriction to our rights*
 8 *and freedom [Corrected by dropout effects]*

Fear: Limited freedom	SP	UK	IT	Overall
Very Unlikely	10.7%	13.1%	14.0%	12.6%
Somewhat Unlikely	24.0%	37.4%	31.7%	31.2%
Somewhat Likely	48.0%	38.7%	42.7%	43.0%
Very Likely	17.3%	10.7%	11.6%	13.2%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

9
 10 The next set of questions is related with behavioural change. We asked participants to
 11 compare the behaviour during the last month with respect to the four weeks of February. This
 12 was necessary to provide a point in time without pandemic that was close enough to make them
 13 estimate reasonably the difference. Participants are asked to evaluate on a five-points Likert scale
 14 from definitely more to definitely less. The behaviours considered were four: withdrawal from
 15 savings, consumption of cultural products, staying in contact with people relevant for your
 16 career, status or your future possibility to get a job, and adoption of risky health behaviour. We
 17 report the results in Tables 7-10 below.

18 Overall, 37.4% used their saving in exactly the same proportion, while 31.6% used probably
 19 or definitely more. In Spain, 28.1% withdrew in the same proportion and 36.3% withdrew more.
 20 In the UK, 45.7% withdrew in the same proportion, and 21.9% did it more. In Italy, 37.8% and
 21 37.3% did it respectively the same and more. In terms of consumption of cultural products,
 22 36.5% bought it in the same proportions, while 22.1% did it more. The proportions are 27.7%
 23 and 25.5% for Spain, 44.8% and 16.5% for the UK, and 36.3% and 24.8% for Italy. In terms of
 24 maintenance of social capital, 41.2% invested the same amount of time, while 47.3% spent less.
 25 These proportions were 31.1% and 57.7% for Spain, 53.2% and 34.6% for the UK, and 38.4%
 26 and 50.6% for Italy. Finally, 48% adopted risky behaviour the same number of times, while 23%

1 did it more. The proportions were 41% and 36% for Spain, 53% and 24% for the UK, and 50%
 2 and 26% for Italy.

3 *Table 7 If you compare your behaviour during the last four weeks with that of the four weeks of February of this year, do you think that during the*
 4 *last four weeks you have withdrawn from your savings [Corrected by dropout effects]*

Behavioural: Use of savings	SP	UK	IT	Overall
Definitely more money in the past month than February	17.0%	10.1%	19.2%	15.3%
Probably more money in the past month than February	19.3%	11.8%	18.1%	16.3%
Exactly the same amount of money in the past month as in February	28.1%	45.7%	37.8%	37.4%
Probably less money in the past month than February	22.4%	14.7%	14.9%	17.2%
Definitely less money in the past month than February	13.2%	17.7%	10.1%	13.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

5

6 *Table 8 If you compare your behaviour during the last four weeks with that of the four weeks of February of this year, do you think that during the*
 7 *last four weeks you have purchased or consumed cultural products (e.g. books or e-books, online visit to a museum, theatre, opera or concert) [Corrected*
 8 *by dropout effects]*

Behavioural: Cultural consumption	SP	UK	IT	Overall
Definitely more in the past month than February	9.4%	5.5%	9.8%	8.1%
Probably more in the past month than February	16.1%	11.0%	15.0%	14.0%
Exactly the same number in the past month as in February	27.7%	44.8%	36.3%	36.5%
Probably less in the past month than February	13.8%	11.9%	11.1%	12.3%
Definitely less in the past month than February	33.0%	26.8%	27.8%	29.1%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

9

10 *Table 9 If you compare your behaviour during the last four weeks with that of the four weeks of February of this year, do you think that during the*
 11 *last four weeks you have stayed in contact with people relevant for your carrier, status or your future possibility to get a job [Corrected by dropout*
 12 *effects]*

Behavioural: Social capital	SP	UK	IT	Overall
Definitely more times in the past month than February	3.8%	4.8%	4.2%	4.3%
Probably more times in the past month than February	7.4%	7.3%	7.0%	7.2%
Exactly the same number of times in the past month as in February	31.1%	53.2%	38.4%	41.2%
Probably less times in the past month than February	16.2%	14.0%	16.9%	15.7%
Definitely less times in the past month than February	41.5%	20.6%	33.7%	31.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

13

14 *Table 10 If you compare your behavior during the last four weeks with that of the four weeks of February of this year, do you think that during the*
 15 *last four weeks you have adhered to an unhealthy lifestyle (e.g. consumption of unhealthy food, tobacco, alcohol, drugs, unprotected sex, lack of*
 16 *adherence to medication) [Corrected by dropout effects]*

Behavioral: Unhealthy	SP	UK	IT	Overall
Definitely more times in the past month than February	7%	7%	7%	7%
Probably more times in the past month than February	16%	16%	16%	16%
Exactly the same number of times in the past month as in February	41%	53%	50%	48%
Probably less times in the past month than February	14%	10%	11%	12%
Definitely less times in the past month than February	22%	14%	15%	17%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

17

18

1 **4.2 Results of the estimation with matching**

2 We now move to describe the results of the matching estimation. We recall that we used two
3 estimators: propensity score matching (PSM) and Mahalanobis distance (MDM). PSM compares
4 the participants who received more than the median of shocks with respect to those that did not
5 but are closest in terms of predicted likelihood to be treated, according to a logistic estimation
6 and using the following variables as predictors: [Sociodemographic module] age, gender,
7 married, unemployed, homeownership, number of people in home, number of children in
8 school, education level, household income, urban residency; [Preferences module] negative and
9 positive reciprocity, altruism, trust, time preferences, risk preferences and cognitive function;
10 [Health condition module] health condition, long-standing illness, long-term medical treatment,
11 number of visits to doctor past year, comorbidity; [Vulnerability module] need to earn an
12 income, need to care for others outside your home, do not want to miss certain social events /
13 gatherings, urge to practice sports, and need to leave the house for some time (results in SOM
14 Table S14). MDM follows a similar logic, but in this case the closeness is assessed in terms of a
15 distance applied to all predictors. We also computed two estimators that correct for the bias
16 induced by the fact that the closeness in terms of this set of variables is not perfect (i.e. we will
17 not find two units with exactly the same characteristics).

18 For PSM, we assessed both the common support and the balancing of covariates between
19 the group of higher exposure to shock (treated) and lower exposure to shocks (control). In SOM
20 Figure S2, we report the common support used in the matching, in total 3188 observations are
21 on support and 3 observations are off support. Table S15 shows the mean comparison for the
22 covariates after and before the matching and the same comparison for the synthetic measure of
23 the propensity score. These diagnostics show that matching reduces the bias between groups by
24 100% (i.e. we are effectively comparing units with the same likelihood of getting the severe
25 shocks). Furthermore, there is a considerable bias reduction in terms of the covariates after the
26 matching, with respect to the ex-ante comparison between severely and non-severely hit
27 participants: in fact, the average bias in the covariates went from 24.7 to 3.1 after the matching.
28 The balance between treated and control groups is confirmed when we test the overall measures
29 of covariates imbalance after matching ($\text{Chi}^2=32.89, p=0.240$). In fact, the absolute standardized
30 difference of the means of the linear index of the propensity score in the treated and (matched)
31 non-treated group, also called Rubins' B, is 21.2 after matching and the ratio of treated to
32 (matched) non-treated variances of the propensity score index, also called Rubins' R, is 1.02 after
33 matching. In order to consider a matching as sufficiently balanced, it is recommended to have a
34 Rubins' B less than 25 and a Rubins' R between 0.5 and 2 (Rubin 2001).

35 To understand the results of the estimation from a quantitative point of view, we rescaled
36 the outcome variables in the following way. In the first block (beliefs or expectations), for the
37 first two variables related to economic and personal job outlook, we assign a value of 1 when
38 the answer is "better", 0 when the answer is "the same", and -1 when the answer is "worse".
39 Notice that we exclude those answering "I don't know", to have a meaningful ordinal ranking.
40 The third variable (belief of the length of the recovery) do not need a transformation because it
41 already has an ordinal order, the larger the value of the variable, the longer it is believed that the
42 recovery will take. In the second block, for the three variables related to fear of a new outbreak
43 of the disease, economic depression and restrictions of rights and freedom, we create a dummy

1 variable with the value of 1 when the answer is very likely or somewhat likely, and 0 when the
2 answer is very unlikely or somewhat unlikely. For the third block of variables: savings, cultural
3 consumption, social capital, and unhealthy lifestyle, we assign a value of 2 to the answer definitely
4 more, 1 to probably more, 0 to the same, -1 to probably less, and -2 to definitely less.

5 In Figure 1, on the y-axis, we represent the three blocks of outcome variables, while on the
6 x-axis, we indicate the size of the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT). The ATT is
7 interpreted as the variation in outcome variable that occurred, *ceteris paribus*, because of the
8 increase in exposure to shock above the median. Each small circle is the point estimate, while
9 the segment represents the 95% confidence interval. In SOM, Table S16, we report the point
10 estimate and the standard error for each outcome variable across methods.

11 As can be seen in Figure 1, the ATT differs among the outcome variables but in general, is
12 robust within outcome, across the four matching methods. Let us start from the beliefs block.
13 We found no evidence of an effect by the increase in exposure to shock, neither on the economic
14 outlook nor on the belief of time of recovery. In fact, the null hypothesis of absence of effect is
15 not rejected neither in PSM (for economic outlook: $t=-1.05$, $p=0.292$; with bias correction: $t=-$
16 1.04 , $p=0.299$, and for time of recovery: $t=-0.82$, $p=0.410$; with bias correction: $t=-0.73$,
17 $p=0.468$) nor in MDM (for economic outlook: $t=-0.38$, $p=0.704$; with bias correction: $t=-1.21$,
18 $p=0.226$, and for time of recovery: $t=-0.36$, $p=0.718$; with bias correction: $t=1.54$, $p=0.123$).
19 However, personal job prospect was strongly and negatively affected by the increase in exposure
20 to shock above the median, specifically, the point estimation of the ATT among methods varies
21 between -0.18 and -0.16. The result was confirmed by the rejection of the null hypothesis of
22 absence of effect in both PSM ($t=-3.77$, $p=0.000$; with bias correction: $t=-4.14$, $p=0.000$) and
23 MDM ($t=-4.36$, $p=0.000$; with bias correction: $t=-3.61$, $p=0.000$).

24 For the second block, we found mixed evidence of shocks on fear of a new outbreak of the
25 disease, an economic depression, and restrictions of rights and freedom. Particularly, we fail to
26 reject the null hypothesis of absence of effect with PSM (new outbreak disease: $t=-0.79$,
27 $p=0.430$; with bias correction: $t=-0.94$, $p=0.347$, economic depression: $t=-1.54$, $p=0.124$; with
28 bias correction: $t=-1.54$, $p=0.124$, and restrictions of rights: $t=-0.30$, $p=0.765$; with bias
29 correction: $t=-0.32$, $p=0.745$). Nevertheless, according to the MDM estimator, the null
30 hypothesis of absence of effect is usually rejected (in two out of three cases without correction
31 and in all cases with correction) at 10% of significance (new outbreak disease: $t=-2.36$, $p=0.018$;
32 with bias correction: $t=-1.97$, $p=0.049$, an economic depression: $t=-3.06$, $p=0.002$; with bias
33 correction: $t=-2.25$, $p=0.024$, and restrictions of rights: $t=-0.05$, $p=0.958$; with bias correction:
34 $t=-1.90$, $p=0.057$). To conclude, based on MDM results, being severely exposed to shock had a
35 negative impact on the fear of a new outbreak, of an economic depression, or of a restriction of
36 rights and freedom.


37 Finally, in the third block, we found no evidence of shocks on cultural consumption or on
38 unhealthy lifestyle. In fact, the null hypothesis of absence of effect is not rejected with PSM (for
39 cultural consumption: $t=0.05$, $p=0.961$; with bias correction: $t=0.21$, $p=0.835$, and for unhealthy
40 lifestyle: $t=-0.08$, $p=0.940$; with bias correction: $t=0.05$, $p=0.958$) or with MDM (for cultural
41 consumption: $t=1.49$, $p=0.135$; with bias correction: $t=0.91$, $p=0.365$, and for unhealthy
42 lifestyle: $t=-0.25$, $p=0.800$; with bias correction: $t=-0.70$, $p=0.486$). On the other hand, the use
43 of savings was strongly and positively affected by an increase in the exposure to shock, whereas

1 the maintenance of relational capital was negative affected. In particular, the ATT size on the
 2 use of savings is between 0.29 and 0.43 depending on the estimator (for PSM: $t=5.96$, $p=0.000$;
 3 with bias correction: $t=6.67$, $p=0.000$, and for MDM: $t=8.02$, $p=0.000$; with bias correction:
 4 $t=4.47$, $p=0.000$) and for social capital the ATT size varies between -0.11 and -0.14 (for PSM:
 5 $t=-2.43$, $p=0.015$; with bias correction: $t=-2.11$, $p=0.035$, and for MDM: $t=-2.40$, $p=0.016$; with
 6 bias correction: $t=-1.96$, $p=0.051$).

7 Notice that in SOM, Figure S3 we report the results using the 60th percentile of negative
 8 shocks as threshold for treatment status. Results are almost identical.⁷

9
 10
 11

Figure 2 Average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) by methods



12
 13
 14
 15

5. Discussion and Conclusions

⁷ By summing all shocks, we are technically giving equal weights in the index. To control for sensitivity to this methodological choice, in SOM Figure S4, we report the analysis when we build the index via principal component analysis: we extract the normalized first component, and we split participants considering treated those above the median. The results are very robust.

1 In this article, we have shown the beliefs, fears, and behavioural changes of citizens in three
2 countries (Spain, the United Kingdom and Italy), on the verge of the post Covid-19 first wave.
3 We have discussed how the crisis always forces citizens to reassess their beliefs, their fears and
4 their behaviour. We postulate that the climate of uncertainty and the exposure to shocks that
5 occurred during the crisis were likely to shape those outcome variables. This contribution fills a
6 gap in the current literature on the effects of Covid-19 and related lockdown mitigation strategy
7 where evidence is largely missing on how the gradient of exposure to negative shocks has shaped
8 expectations and emotions about the future, and behavioural change. We did so, by presenting
9 a novel database from a longitudinal study conducted in three waves in Spain, the United
10 Kingdom and Italy between April 24 and May 20 (Bogliacino et al. 2020). We focussed on the
11 data from the third wave on expectations (general, labour market situation, recovery), fear
12 (scenario of new outbreak, economic depression, restriction to individual rights and freedom),
13 and behavioural change across the following dimensions: savings, cultural consumption, social
14 capital, unhealthy lifestyle. We used, however, also the data from wave 1 and wave 2 to control
15 for the effects of, respectively, socio-economic background and health status (from wave I), and
16 the indirect effect via cognitive performances and preferences (from wave II).

17 At descriptive level, the findings support our initial hypotheses, showing that most of the
18 respondents in the three countries report negative expectations about the future and appear
19 entrenched by possibly unjustified fears about *extremely negative* scenarios. The descriptive results
20 are consistent with the hypothesis that, given the objective and subjectively perceived radical
21 uncertainty and the framing adopted by governments and the media, even those individuals who
22 were not severely impacted by the pandemic and/or lockdown have updated their expectations
23 about the future and are fearful about what awaits in the coming months. Two findings from
24 those presented earlier suffice here to support this statement: 56% of the sample expected 2021
25 to be worse than 2020; an economic depression was considered somewhat likely or very likely
26 by 91% of sample. Descriptive data are also quite unequivocal on the fact that this has produced
27 sizeable behavioural changes for what concerns savings and social capital. Almost one third of
28 the sample was forced to use their savings during lockdown more than in last month before the
29 outbreak of Covid-19. This evidence suggests a tangible behavioural change and a source of
30 worry that feeds back into the creation of negative expectations and fears. As much as 47.3% of
31 the sample has lost contact with people relevant for their career, status or the future possibility
32 to get a job during the lockdown as compared to before the outbreak of the pandemic.
33 Behavioural changes are less pronounced for what concerns risky health behaviour and more
34 polarized for the case of cultural consumption. Only 23% of the sample indicated that they
35 adopted unhealthier lifestyle during the lockdown compared to before. On the other hand, for
36 cultural consumption 22.1% have increased it, 36.5 maintained the same pattern, and 41.4%
37 consumed less.

38 We presented a DAG positing that negative shocks have a direct effect on our outcome
39 variables, an indirect effect via cognitive ability and preferences, and are potentially confounded
40 by socio-economic background, and health status. Controlling for the latter three causal paths
41 via adoption of a selection on observables research design, we have been able to conclude that
42 the gradient of exposure to negative events (above the median) has statistically significant effects
43 on six out of 10 outcomes. First, being severely exposed to shocks determined stronger negative

1 expectations about one's future jobs prospects. Second, the severity of exposure decreased the
2 fears of an economic depression, of a new outbreak of the pandemic, and of permanent
3 limitations to our freedom and rights, although the result was not robust to the choice of the
4 estimator. Third, individuals who were more severely exposed to shocks used their saving more
5 than before the pandemic outbreak in ways that are more marked than had they not experienced.
6 Fifth, the same applied to social capital in that strong negative shocks led individuals to disregard
7 instrumental social relations more than in presence of milder exposure to shocks.

8 With respect to the latter findings, it is important to remark, in particular, the first and the
9 last results for, if consolidated, could lead to a negatively self-propelling loop. It is known that
10 income and employment shocks exert negative effects on social capital reducing the social
11 networks that help the unemployed to find new opportunities (Machin & Manning 1998).
12 Decades of research demonstrate that social connections are vital to wellbeing and coping with
13 difficult situations (Sibley et al. 2020) and that those without social connections and with pre-
14 existing vulnerabilities may be more at risk. As high exposure to shocks is making individuals, at
15 the same time, more pessimistic on their jobs' prospect and using less their social capital, there
16 is a short-term negative interaction effect that may become a long-term effect, especially if
17 expectations and fears are reinforced. Furthermore, the sociological literature and the literature
18 on the psychology of class already tell us that more vulnerable groups are less used to take
19 advantage of social capital and tend to interpret constraints and the structure of opportunities in
20 self-limiting way. This already entrenched patterns could be multiplied by the negative shocks
21 produced by Covid-19 and related lockdown mitigation strategies, so that the impact of the latter
22 would become even more unequal than it is currently being shown to be. The emerging studies
23 cited in the introduction about the inequality effect of lockdown, in fact, focus only on the
24 tangible dimensions. Our findings suggest that there is a less tangible dimension related to
25 habitus, beliefs, and emotions that could further exacerbate the inequalities generated by the
26 pandemic and lockdown.

27 One of the strengths of the current study is that we have conducted data collection in three
28 separate countries that have been more severely hit by the Covid-19 than other European
29 countries. Second, the richness of the data made it possible to provide a characterization of the
30 outcome variables that is representative of the population of interest (external validity), and to
31 estimate a plausible counterfactual of exposure to shock to identify the causal impact (internal
32 validity). Third, as the literature on Covid-19 is expanding rapidly, only limited studies have
33 focused on the psychological, social, and economic consequences of the current economic halt.
34 Nonetheless, the current study also has some limitations. First, although our surveys have been
35 conducted for several weeks, following the panel for a longer period would have provided us
36 with a better understanding of the long-term effects of the pandemic and the lock-down situation
37 on people's health and well-being, and of course ideally, one would have included a baseline pre-
38 lockdown. Second, this study focused on three countries that have been hit hardest by the
39 pandemic, whereby Spain and Italy had very strict lockdown regulations. If we would have
40 included also countries that have experienced less health consequences of the Covid-19, such as
41 Eastern European countries, or countries that implemented less strict regulations, such as the
42 Netherlands and Germany, the comparisons between countries could have been richer. Third,

1 regional variations are also very important to understand the first wave of the Covid-19, as it
2 was clearly the case for Italy, but exploring them was beyond the scope of this paper.

3 Our findings have clear policy implications. From the first set of results, we infer the need
4 for policies that are able to restore hope and reduce radical uncertainty. Government ought to
5 present the citizenry with contingent mid-term plan, not only in terms of public budget resources
6 earmarked to the purpose. Particularly, they should mitigate fears that very pessimistic scenarios
7 will occur. The second set of implications from the results concerns the consequences of shocks.
8 Government should recognize that the degree of exposure has been heterogenous and should
9 design new instruments of social policy and social assistance that provide coverage even to those
10 households which are normally outside the range of social insurance schemes, softening the
11 deaccumulation that took place from private assets and savings. Moreover, they might introduce
12 active labour market policies to counteract the neglect of important networking activities during
13 the lockdowns. Finally, they should mitigate negative job prospect expectations, as this may lead
14 to an exit of the labour force with detrimental consequences in the long term.

16 6. References

- 17 Abramson, L. Y., Metalsky, G. I., & Alloy, L. B. (1989). Hopelessness depression: A theory-
18 based subtype of depression. *Psychological Review*, 96(2), 358–372.
19 <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.96.2.358>.
- 20 Adams-Prassl, A., Boneva, T., Golin, M., & Rauh, C. (2020a). Inequality in the Impact of the
21 Coronavirus Shock: New Survey Evidence for the UK.
22 <https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.52477>
- 23 Adams-Prassl, A., Boneva, T., Golin, M., & Rauh, C. (2020b). Inequality in the Impact of the
24 Coronavirus Shock: Evidence from Real Time Surveys. IZA DP No. 13183. Available
25 [https://www.iza.org/publications/dp/13183/inequality-in-the-impact-of-the-coronavirus-
26 shock-evidence-from-real-time-surveys](https://www.iza.org/publications/dp/13183/inequality-in-the-impact-of-the-coronavirus-shock-evidence-from-real-time-surveys)
- 27 Andreoni, J., & Miller, J. (2002). Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the
28 Consistency of Preferences for Altruism. *Econometrica*, 70(2), 737–753. doi:10.1111/1468-
29 0262.00302
- 30 Atkinson, A. B. (2015). *Inequality. What can be done?*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
- 31 Baker, SR, Bloom, N, Davis, SJ, Terry, SJ (2020) COVID-Induced Economic Uncertainty.
32 NBER, wp 26983
- 33 Banerjee, A. V., & Duflo, E. (2007). The economic lives of the poor. *Journal of economic perspectives*,
34 21(1), 141-168. Barrett, M. R. Carter, & J.-P. Chavas (Eds.) (2008) *The economics of poverty*
35 *traps*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 36 Bauer, M., Blattman, C., Chytilová, J., Henrich, J., Miguel, E., & Mitts, T. (2016). Can War Foster
37 Cooperation? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 30(3), 249–274.
38 <https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.30.3.249>
- 39 Béland, D., Carstensen, M. B., & Seabrooke, L. (2016). Ideas, Political Power and Public Policy.
40 *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(3), 315-317. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2015.112216
- 41 Benford, R., & Snow, D. (2000). Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and
42 Assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26, 611-639. Retrieved from
43 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/223459>

- 1 Bennett, T., & Silva, E. B. (2006). Introduction cultural capital and inequality: Policy issues and
2 contexts. *Cultural Trends*, 15(2-3), 87–106. doi:10.1080/09548960600712777
- 3 Bergamini, E. (2020, March 31). How COVID-19 is laying bare inequality. *Bruegel*, Retrieved
4 from <https://www.bruegel.org/2020/03/how-covid-19-is-laying-bare-inequality/>
- 5 Bibby, J., Everest, G., & Abbs, I. (2020). Will COVID-19 be a watershed moment for health
6 inequalities. The Health Foundation.
- 7 Bloom, N. (2009). The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks. *Econometrica*, 77(3), 623–685.
8 doi:10.3982/ecta6248
- 9 Bobbio, N (1980) Stato, governo, societ. Per una teoria generale della politica (Democracy
10 and dictatorship. The nature and limits of state power) Turin: Einaudi
- 11 Bogliacino, F., Codagnone, C., Montealegre, F., Folkvord, F., Gómez, C., Charris, R., Liva, G.
12 (2021a). Negative Shocks Predict Change in Cognitive Function and Preferences: Assessing
13 the Negative Affect and Stress Hypothesis. *Scientific Reports*, [10.1038/s41598-021-83089-](https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-83089-0)
14 [0](https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-83089-0).
- 15 Bogliacino, F., Lupiáñez, F., Codagnone, C., Charris, R., Gómez, C., Folkvord, F., Montealegre,
16 F., Veltri, G., Liva, G. (2020). Longitudinal study on behavioral, psychological, socio-
17 economic effects induced by the exposure to CoViD-19, by government measures, and by
18 communication strategies in three countries: Italy, Spain, and United Kingdom. SocArXiv.
19 June 2. doi:10.17605/OSF.IO/TBYS6
- 20 Bogliacino, F., & Montealegre, F. (2020). Do negative economic shocks affect cognitive function,
21 adherence to social norms and loss aversion?. *Journal of the Economic Science*
22 *Association*, 6(1), 57-67.
- 23 Bonanno, G. A., Brewin, C. R., Kaniasty, K., & Greca, A. M. L.
24 (2010). Weighing the costs of disaster: Consequences, risks, and resilience in individuals,
25 families, and communities. *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*, 11(1), 1–49.
26 <https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100610387086>
- 27 Bourdieu, P. (1977). *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, New York: Cambridge University Press
- 28 Bourdieu, P. (1980). Le capital social: notes provisoires. *Actes de la recherche en sciences*
29 *sociales*, 31(1), 2-3.
- 30 Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste*. Harvard university
31 press.
- 32 Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In J. Richardson (Ed.), *Handbook of Theory and Research*
33 *for the Sociology of Education* (pp. 241-258). New York: Greenwood.
- 34 Brunori, P., Maitino, M., Ravagli, L., & Sclicone, N. (2020). Distant and Unequal. Lockdown
35 and Inequalities in Italy. Unicaldine. Available at
36 http://www.unicaldine.it/research/BMRS_2020.pdf
- 37 Carstensen, M., & Schmidt, V. (2016). Power through, over and in ideas: conceptualizing
38 ideational power in discursive institutionalism. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(3), 318-337.
- 39 Cassar, A., Healy, A., & von Kessler, C. (2017). Trust, Risk, and Time Preferences After a Natural
40 Disaster: Experimental Evidence from Thailand. *World Development*, 94, 90–105.
41 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.12.042>
- 42 Cavatorta, E., Zizzo, D. J., & Daoud, Y. (2020). Does exposure to violence affect reciprocity?
43 Experimental evidence from the West Bank. *Discussion Papers Series*.
- 44 Codagnone, C., Bogliacino, F., Gómez, C., Charris, R., Montealegre, F., Liva, G., ... & Veltri, G.
45 A. (2020). Assessing concerns for the economic consequence of the COVID-19 response
46 and mental health problems associated with economic vulnerability and negative economic
47 shock in Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. *Plos one*, 15(10), e0240876.
- 48 Coleman, J. (1988). Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 94,
S95.

- 1 Coleman, J. (1990). *Foundations of Social Theory*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- 2 Cunningham, AS (2018) The Causal Identification Mixtape v1.7 tufte-latex.googlecode.com
- 3 Decker, S., & Schmitz, H. (2016). Health shocks and risk aversion. *Journal of Health Economics*, 50,
4 156–170. doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.09.006
- 5 Draghi, M. (2020, March 25). We face a war against coronavirus and must mobilise accordingly.
6 *Financial Times*, Retrieved from [https://www.ft.com/content/c6d2de3a-6ec5-11ea-89df-](https://www.ft.com/content/c6d2de3a-6ec5-11ea-89df-41bea055720b)
7 [41bea055720b](https://www.ft.com/content/c6d2de3a-6ec5-11ea-89df-41bea055720b)
- 8 Duan, L., & Zhu, G. (2020). Psychological interventions for people affected by the COVID-19
9 epidemic. *The Lancet Psychiatry*, 7(4), 300-302.
- 10 Eil, D., Rao, J., (2010). The good news–bad news effect: Asymmetric processing of objective
11 information about yourself. *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*
- 12 Entman, R. (1991). Symposium Framing U.S. Coverage of International News: Contrasts in
13 Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents. *Journal of Communication*, 41(4), 6-27.
14 doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.1991.tb02328.x
- 15 Entman, R. (1993). Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. *Journal of*
16 *Communication*, 43(4), 51-58.
- 17 Eysenck M. W. (2013) *Anxiety: The Cognitive Perspective*. Psychology Press, New York.
- 18 Falk, A, Becker, A, Chomen, T, Enke, B, Huffman, D, Sunde, U (2018) Global Evidence on
19 Economic Preferences. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 133(4): 1645-1692
- 20 Frederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. *Journal of Economic perspectives*,
21 19(4), 25-42.
- 22 Garz, M. (2013). Unemployment expectations, excessive pessimism, and news coverage. *Journal*
23 *of Economic Psychology*, 34, 156–168. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2012.09.007
- 24 Gintis, H. (2007). A framework for the unification of the behavioral sciences. *Behavioral and*
25 *Brain Sciences*. 30, 1–61.
- 26 Goidel, K., Procopio, S., Terrell, D., & Wu, H. D. (2010). Sources of Economic News and
27 Economic Expectations. *American Politics Research*, 38(4), 759–777.
28 doi:10.1177/1532673x09355671
- 29 Grossman, Z and Owens, D. (2012) An unlucky feeling: Overconfidence and noisy feedback
30 *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 84 510– 524
- 31 Hale T., Webster S., Petherick A., Phillips T., and Kira B. (2020). Oxford COVID-19
32 Government Response Tracker, Blavatnik School of Government.
- 33 Hanspal, T., Weber, A., & Wohlfart, J. (2020). Income and Wealth Shocks and Expectations
34 during the COVID-19 Pandemic, CESifo Working Paper, No. 8244, Center for Economic
35 Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich. Available at
36 <https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/216640>
- 37 Haushofer, J., & Fehr, E. (2014). On the psychology of poverty. *Science*, Vol. 344, pp. 862–867.
38 <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1232491>
- 39 Ibáñez, A. M., & Moya, A. (2010). Vulnerability of victims of civil conflicts: Empirical evidence
40 for the displaced population in Colombia. *WorldDevelopment*, 38(4), 647–663.
41 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.11.015>
- 42 Jann, B. (2017). *kmatch*: Stata module for
43 multivariate-distance and propensity-score matching, including entropy balancing, inverse
44 probability weighting, (coarsened) exact matching, and regression adjustment. Available
45 from <https://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s458346.html>.
- 46 Jones, B. D., Thomas, H. F., & Wolfe, M. (2014). Policy Bubbles. *Policy Studies Journal*, 42(1), 146-
171. doi:10.1111/psj.12046

- 1 Jones, AM, Rice, N, Zantomio, F. (2020) Acute health shocks and labour market outcomes:
2 Evidence from the post crash era. *Economics and Human Biology*,
3 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ehb.2019.100811>
- 4 Katz-Gerro, T. (2004). Cultural consumption research: review of methodology, theory, and
5 consequence. *International Review of Sociology*, 14(1), 11–29.
6 doi:10.1080/0390670042000186743
- 7 Li, K. K. (2020). How Does the COVID-19 Outbreak Affect People’s Expectation about the
8 Macroeconomy?. Available at SSRN 3567937. Klandermans, B. (1997). *The Social Psychology of*
9 *Protest*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- 10 Kuypers, J. (2010). Framing Analysis as a Rhetorical Process. In P. D'Angelo & J. Kuypers (Eds.),
11 *Doing News Framing Analysis* (pp. 286-311). New York: Routledge.
- 12 Lenhart, (2019) The effects of health shocks on labor market outcomes: evidence from UK
13 panel data. *The European Journal of Health Economics*, 20:83–98
- 14 MacFayden, AJ (2006) Beliefs in Behavioral and Neoclassical Economics, in: Altman, M (Ed)
15 Handbook of Contemporary Behavioral Economics, London, England and Armonk, New
16 York: M. E. Sharpe
- 17 Machin, S., & Manning, A. (1998). The causes and consequences of long-term unemployment
18 in Europe. CEPDP (400). *Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political*
19 *Science, London, UK*. ISBN 0753012332
- 20 Mani, A, S. Mullainathan, E. Shafir, J. Zhao (2014) Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function. *Science*
21 341, 976–980.
- 22 Manstead, A.S.R. (2018), The psychology of social class: How socioeconomic status impacts
23 thought, feelings, and behaviour. *Br. J. Soc. Psychol.*, 57: 267-291. doi:10.1111/bjso.12251
- 24 Maor, M. (2014). Policy persistence, risk estimation and policy underreaction. *Policy Sciences*, 47(4),
25 425–443.
- 26 Maor, M. (2016). Emotion-driven negative policy bubbles. *Policy Sciences*, 49(2), 191-210.
27 doi:10.1007/s11077-015-9228-7
- 28 Mendola M, Bredenkamp C, Gagnolati M (2007). The Impoverishing Effect of Adverse Health
29 Events: Evidence from the Western Balkans. Policy Research Working Paper 4444.
30 Washington, DC: World Bank
- 31 Mobius, M.M., Niederle, M., Niehaus, P., & Rosenblat, T.S. (2011). Managing Self-Confidence:
32 Theory and Experimental Evidence. Working Paper 17014. National Bureau of Economic
33 Research.
- 34 Moya, A and Carter, M (2019) Violence and the formation of hopelessness: Evidence from
35 internally displaced persons in Colombia. *World Development*, 113: 100-115
- 36 Mügge, D. (2016). Studying macroeconomic indicators as powerful ideas. *Journal of European*
37 *Public Policy*, 23(3), 410-427.
- 38 Nussbaum, M (2004) *Hiding From Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law*. Princeton, New
39 Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- 40 Öhman A (2007) Fear and anxiety. Overlaps and dissociations. *Handbook of Emotions*,
41 eds Lewis M, Haviland-Jones JM, Barrett LF (Guilford, New York), pp 709–729.
- 42 Pearle, J (2009) *Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference*, Cambridge, 2nd edition
- 43 Perugini, C., & Vladisavljevic, M. (2020). Social Stability Challenged: Pandemics, Inequality and
44 Policy Responses, IZA Discussion Papers 13249, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
45 Available at <http://ftp.iza.org/dp13249.pdf>
- 46 Pfefferbaum, B., & North, C. S. (2020). Mental health and the Covid-19 pandemic. *New England*
47 *Journal of Medicine*.

- 1 Putnam, R. (1993). *Marking Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton
2 University Press.
- 3 Putnam, R. (2000). *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon
4 & Schuster.
- 5 Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. (1983). The central role of the propensity score in
6 observational studies for causal effects. *Biometrika*, 70(1), 41-55. Roth R. H., Tam S., Y., Ida Y,
7 Yang J., X, Deutch A., Y. (1988) Stress and the mesocorticolimbic
8 dopamine systems. *Ann N Y Acad Sci* 537:138–147.
- 9 Rubin, D. B. (1977). Assignment to treatment group on the basis of a covariate. *Journal of*
10 *educational Statistics*, 2(1), 1-26. Rubin, D. B. (2001). Using propensity scores to help design
11 observational studies: application to the tobacco litigation. *Health Services and Outcomes*
12 *Research Methodology*, 2(3), 169-188. Sartori, G (1987) *Theory of Democracy Revisited* New
13 York: Chatam House
- 14 Seabrooke, L., & Wigan, D. (2016). Powering ideas through expertise: professionals in global tax
15 battles. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(3), 357-374.
- 16 Sibley, C. G., Greaves, L., Satherley, N., Wilson, M., Overall, N., Lee, C., ... Barlow, F. (2020).
17 Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic and Nationwide Lockdown on Trust, Attitudes towards
18 Government, and Wellbeing. SocArXiv. April 2020. <https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000662>
- 19 Snow, D., & Benford, R. (1988). Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization.
20 *International Social Movement Research*, 1, 197–217.
- 21 Snow, D., Rochford, E., Worden, S., & Benford, R. (1986). Frame Alignment Processes,
22 Micromobilization, and Movement Participation. *American Sociological Review*, 51(4), 464-481.
23 doi:10.2307/2095581
- 24 StataCorp (2017). *Stata Statistical Software: Release 15*. College Station, TX: StataCorp LLC.
- 25 Sunstein, C. R. (2018). *The Cost-Benefit Revolution*. In *The Cost-Benefit Revolution*.
26 <https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/11571.001.0001>
- 27 Sympson, S. C. (2000). Rediscovering hope: Understanding and working with survivors of
28 trauma. In C. R. Snyder (Ed.), *Handbook of hope* (pp. 285–300). Elsevier.
29 <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-654050-5.X5000-3>.
- 30 Tabner, I. (2020, April 8). Five ways coronavirus lockdowns increase inequality. *The Conversation*,
31 Retrieved from [https://theconversation.com/five-ways-coronavirus-lockdowns-increase-](https://theconversation.com/five-ways-coronavirus-lockdowns-increase-inequality-135767)
32 [inequality-135767](https://theconversation.com/five-ways-coronavirus-lockdowns-increase-inequality-135767)
- 33 Textor, J, van der Zander, B, Gilthorpe, MK, Liskiewicz, M, Ellison, GTH (2016) Robust causal
34 inference using directed acyclic graphs: the R package 'dagitty'. *International Journal of*
35 *Epidemiology* 45(6):1887-1894.
- 36 Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice.
37 *Science*, 211(4481), 453. Retrieved from
38 <http://science.sciencemag.org/content/211/4481/453.abstract>
- 39 Van Bavel, J. J., Baicker, K., Boggio, P. S., Capraro, V., Cichocka, A., Cikara, M., ... & Drury, J.
40 (2020). Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 pandemic
41 response. *Nature Human Behaviour*, 1-12.
- 42 Varian, H.: The nonparametric approach to demand analysis. *Economica* 50(4), 945–976 (1982)
- 43 Voors, M., J., Nillesen, E., E., M., Verwimp, P, Bulte, E., H., , Lensink, R, Van Soest, D (2012)
44 Violent Conflict and Behavior: A Field Experiment in Burundi. *American Economic Review*,
45 102(2): 941-964
- 46 Wagstaff, A. (2007). The economic consequences of health shocks: evidence from Vietnam.
47 *Journal of health economics*, 26(1), 82-100. Wilkinson, R. e Pickett, K. (2009). *The spirit level:*
48 *why more equal societies almost always do better*, London, Allen Lane.

- 1 WHO (2020) WHO announces COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic, available at:
- 2 <https://bit.ly/3frWeLK>
- 3 Yehuda R (2002) Post-traumatic stress disorder. *N Engl J Med* 346:108–114.
- 4 Zou, R. Y. & Schonlau, M. (2021). RFOREST: Stata module to implement Random Forest
- 5 algorithm.