the essay aims to analyse some problems relating to the ascertaiment of one of the mainstays of the principle of mens rea, ie. the intention. In particular, the author explores the different meanings of ''intention'' (from the viewpoint both of legal systems and of theories about mental states), the theoretical and pratical possibility of its ascertainment. According to the a., the main problems about the proof of intention consist in elaborating a precise, rationally justified, definition of ''intention'' and, above all, in the epistemological and methodological questions related to its ascertainment in a given case. In particular, the essay claims that the ascertainment of the subjective elements always presents always a greater degree of uncertainty than the the ascertainment of other facts, and that this is due to the very nature of mental states.
Proving Intention : Some General Remarks / F. Poggi - In: Law, Politics and Morality: European Perspectives II : On Knowledge and Adjudication of National and European Law / [a cura di] J. Ferrer Beltrán, M. Narváez Mora. - Berlin : Duncker und Humblot, 2006. - ISBN 978-3-428-10945-6. (( Intervento presentato al 2. convegno PHD Euroconference in Legal Philosophy tenutosi a Girona, Spagna nel 2002.
Proving Intention : Some General Remarks
F. PoggiPrimo
2006
Abstract
the essay aims to analyse some problems relating to the ascertaiment of one of the mainstays of the principle of mens rea, ie. the intention. In particular, the author explores the different meanings of ''intention'' (from the viewpoint both of legal systems and of theories about mental states), the theoretical and pratical possibility of its ascertainment. According to the a., the main problems about the proof of intention consist in elaborating a precise, rationally justified, definition of ''intention'' and, above all, in the epistemological and methodological questions related to its ascertainment in a given case. In particular, the essay claims that the ascertainment of the subjective elements always presents always a greater degree of uncertainty than the the ascertainment of other facts, and that this is due to the very nature of mental states.Pubblicazioni consigliate
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.