The two institutional solutions adopted for transition by South Africa and Uganda are the result of diverse power (im)balances among internal political forces. A situation of quasi-monopolistic control by the NRM on the Ugandan constitution- making exercise is reflected in a political system that leaves very little room for other political organisations. By contrast, in South Africa, the striking of a constitutional deal at a moment when none of the two main camps could dominate the opponent has produced a strong recognition of the multiplicity of organised political actors. To assess the chances of future consolidation and stabilisation of the two systems, two questions crucially need an answer through further research: the problem of the actual legitimacy of the new institutions, and the related one of their practical effectiveness. South Africa followed an aggregationist approach based on pragmatic negotiations among a multiplicity of organisations. Since the latter were broadly acting as representatives of different constituencies, the process appears to have brought about-if not full consensus-a significant degree of acceptance of the solution adopted. This acceptance, in turn, looks like a promising starting point for the effectiveness of the new institutional framework. In Uganda, by contrast, legitimacy for the new institutions was sought through a more paternalistic and centre-controlled approach.22 Insisting on its being 'different', the no-party model could not even claim legitimacy on the basis of some commonly accepted democratic paradigm. Moreover, the possibility of stabilising and making effective a participatory system without political parties is still in need of evidence. The legitimacy and effectiveness of the new constitutional framework seem to be endangered by the latter's somewhat top-down or imposed origin and by the absence of political parties, two features that, arguably, contribute to the increasing political polarisation and to the ongoing anti-system rebellions taking place today.

Constitutional alternatives for the regulation of ethnic politics? : Institution-building principles in Uganda’s and South Africa’s transitions / G.M. Carbone. - In: JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN STUDIES. - ISSN 0258-9001. - 19:2(2001), pp. 229-252. [10.1080/02589000120066470]

Constitutional alternatives for the regulation of ethnic politics? : Institution-building principles in Uganda’s and South Africa’s transitions

G.M. Carbone
Primo
2001

Abstract

The two institutional solutions adopted for transition by South Africa and Uganda are the result of diverse power (im)balances among internal political forces. A situation of quasi-monopolistic control by the NRM on the Ugandan constitution- making exercise is reflected in a political system that leaves very little room for other political organisations. By contrast, in South Africa, the striking of a constitutional deal at a moment when none of the two main camps could dominate the opponent has produced a strong recognition of the multiplicity of organised political actors. To assess the chances of future consolidation and stabilisation of the two systems, two questions crucially need an answer through further research: the problem of the actual legitimacy of the new institutions, and the related one of their practical effectiveness. South Africa followed an aggregationist approach based on pragmatic negotiations among a multiplicity of organisations. Since the latter were broadly acting as representatives of different constituencies, the process appears to have brought about-if not full consensus-a significant degree of acceptance of the solution adopted. This acceptance, in turn, looks like a promising starting point for the effectiveness of the new institutional framework. In Uganda, by contrast, legitimacy for the new institutions was sought through a more paternalistic and centre-controlled approach.22 Insisting on its being 'different', the no-party model could not even claim legitimacy on the basis of some commonly accepted democratic paradigm. Moreover, the possibility of stabilising and making effective a participatory system without political parties is still in need of evidence. The legitimacy and effectiveness of the new constitutional framework seem to be endangered by the latter's somewhat top-down or imposed origin and by the absence of political parties, two features that, arguably, contribute to the increasing political polarisation and to the ongoing anti-system rebellions taking place today.
Uganda, Sudafrica, democratizzazione
Settore SPS/04 - Scienza Politica
2001
Article (author)
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2434/19968
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