The Unconscious as Root of Kant’s A Priori Sentimentalism

In this paper I shall argue that the concept of the unconscious plays an important role in kant's ethical thought and constitutes the basis to which he appeals on many occasions when he tries to justify the structure of moral consciousness, although he does not devote a special section or chapter to this subject. I will first try to legitimate the idea that since the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals kant's moral theory has been based on the very important role of feelings and that it cannot be considered as absurd or as contrasting either with the intentions or with the results achieved by the philosopher to interpret his ethical position as a particular kind of sentimentalism. Second, I will focus my attention on the relation between kant's "sentimentalism" and the relevant functions that unconscious processes fulfill within moral consciousness. The aim of this paper is to shed new light on elements that could make possible a wider and more thorough revaluation of dimensions in kant's philosophy that have been either in part or wholly neglected: ethical sentimentalism and its relation to the unconscious.