

**“Social Capital, Trust and Legal Institutions”**

**PhD thesis**

**“Renato Treves” International PhD Programme**

**in**

**Law and Society**

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**17 December 2012**



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## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

*En primer lugar quisiera agradecer al Prof. Vincenzo Ferrari por su rol de Director de mi tesis y haber creído en mi proyecto de investigación, y por su apoyo durante todo el transcurso de estos años. Asimismo agradezco a todas las personas que forman parte del “Renato Treves” International PhD Programme in Law and Society, por su disponibilidad y paciencia. En especial quiero agradecer a mis compañeros del programa, por los momentos y experiencias compartidas, cuya amistad ha sido tan importante para avanzar en este proyecto.*

*Quisiera agradecer a OPSM por su interés en llevar a cabo la implementación del cuestionario, y poner a mi disposición recursos de calidad y excelencia.*

*Asimismo, quisiera agradecer a todas las personas que a lo largo de estos años me han brindado de manera desinteresada su atención, ofreciéndome consejos y palabras de aliento. En especial quisiera agradecer a mis amigos, que han sabido acompañarme y apoyado en cada decisión que he tomado, aún si ellas han significado permanecer todavía en la distancia.*

*Y finalmente, quisiera agradecer a Dios y a mi familia. A Dios por las oportunidades dadas y el don de la fe, que da sentido a todo esfuerzo. A mis padres, por su apoyo incondicional y su ejemplo, sostén fundamental durante estos 33 años de vida. A Ramiro, por su generosidad constante en todo sentido, y en especial por sus valiosos comentarios y asistencia durante estos años de doctoranda. A Rosario, que, aún a su corta edad, ha sabido ser la fiel compañera durante la escritura de esta tesis, apoyándose también con largas noches y siestas de paz y tranquilidad. A mis padres y familia dedico esta tesis de doctorado.*

## PREFACE

During the last decades there has been a growing perception that institutional frameworks, such as political regimes, the welfare state and economic systems, which had once been taken for granted, are now showing their flaws and inefficiencies. This fact has created a sense of uncertainty, discomfort and reaction from different societies.

Nowadays, it is not surprising to read and feel that modern democracies are undergoing a crisis of trust in the institutions that once would have granted them stability. The efficiency and consistency of many democratic institutions are put under the spotlight.

Moreover, there is, indeed, consensus on the fact that social sciences are undergoing a fragmentation process, too, which represents one of the most relevant phenomena in present times.

In addition, this new social climate has been influenced by new features which have been potentiated by the phenomenon of globalization, such as, among others, massive migration movements, new inter-cultural frameworks, the enlargement of national boundaries, and the revolution of information and communication technologies, which are new factors shaping the social arena.

The implications of these new circumstances on legal theory cannot be disguised. As Richard A. Posner describes, the most exciting development in legal thinking in the last century has been the growth of interdisciplinary legal studies – the application of the social sciences and the humanities to law, in the hope of making law less formalistic, more practical, better grounded empirically and better tailored to social goals<sup>1</sup>.

Some scholars have ventured in saying that such declining trust in institutions shows a failure of law, in the sense that the existent legal system has not been able to support or foster the legitimacy framework suitable for the efficient functioning of the public sector. It is necessary to analyze which is the role that law is playing in these new realities; whether it is mainly on the drafting of more accurate laws, or whether it should also contribute to other factors which promote law compliance and the well functioning of the legal system.

Back in the 60's, the legitimacy of the State had already been put under the spotlight. Those who had argued towards this crisis were denounced as conspirators. However, they were only trying to

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<sup>1</sup> Cfr. Posner, Richard A., *Frontiers of legal theory*, Harvard University Press, 2004, Cambridge, MA.



analyze, critically, the economic and social forms of organization underlying modern society. In this sense, the *Legitimation crisis* (1975), by Jürgen Habermas, was seen as a provocative thesis which focused more in questioning a certain form of government whose crisis was, supposedly, far from coming true in reality, than accounting for the effective changes undergone in the State structure. In the legal sphere, jurists had been busy developing their own intellectual agendas. Legal positivism theory, which was still vivid at universities and other academic spheres, reacted defensively in order to preserve its dogmas from the critics proposed by this new social thinking, which was more receptive to the insidious scientific theory.

Four decades later, the evidence of this change has been convincing. Financial and economic global crisis, the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe, and more recently, the falling down of dictatorships in Africa and the Middle East, among others, have inaugurated a period of critical analysis of any established order. The demand for an interdisciplinary approach, capable of going into depth into this new complex world acquired more strength. The demands have also reached legal theory, and in particular, with regards to its broken promises. The present of social legal sciences reflects, in a certain way, the struggles of social criticism to justify institutional inefficiencies and the lack of answers to the new demands of societies.

The described situation and the search for new approaches is what has triggered the present Ph.D thesis. My graduate studies in Law at the University of Buenos Aires and my working experience as a lawyer at one of the most renowned law firms in Argentina, Cabanellas, Etchebarne, Kelly & Dell' Oro Maini, helped me to identify the personal need to give my academic and professional background an innovative twist. Following this idea, in 2005 I moved to Milan, (Italy) to pursue a Master in Public Management at Bocconi University. These studies introduced me to the public sphere. I was able to rediscover my legal background from a new approach, with particular focus on social issues. After obtaining my master degree in 2006, I started working at the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), based in Turin, Italy. In over three years I had the opportunity to be involved in worldwide programmes and projects which focused on international development from the legal and institutional perspective. These experiences were key for getting in contact with interdisciplinary new approaches which would make my interest in getting into depth in the law and society arena, grow. Thus, in this sense, the possibility to be part of the International Ph. D Programme in “Law and Society” Renato Treves of the University of Milan appeared as the best framework for my growing interests in law and institutions in a globalized

world, addressed from new innovative interdisciplinary approaches, such as the theory of social capital.

The present Ph.D. thesis will address the issue of social capital and law, with particular focus on trust in legal institutions. The aim is to contribute to the efforts done in pursuit of a better understanding of the actual transformations and changes in the institutional and legal spheres. The theory of social capital is presented as an innovative approach. Concepts such as trust, interpersonal networks and norms acquire a new importance and are seen as key elements for reading present times.

The choice of the subject of this thesis was also influenced by personal experiences. As member of the *Fundación de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales* (FINES Foundation) I had the opportunity to be part of numerous research projects, most of them innovative at the time, related to the notion of social capital and its components. In 2000, the World Bank had commissioned the *Opinión Pública, Servicios y Mercados* (OPSM) Consultancy, based in Buenos Aires, to carry out one of the first diagnosis on the levels of social capital, which was published, afterwards, by the World Bank<sup>2</sup>. The mentioned work was one of the first adaptations of the World Bank's methodology developed for social capital research to a concrete case. In year 2001 a social, economic and financial crisis exploded in Argentina. This crisis not only destroyed the financial system, but also deeply affected the Argentinean social and political structures. Within this context, in 2003 the FINES Foundation carried out updated versions of the survey carried out by OPSM for the World Bank, and from that moment onwards, continue developing different research on the social capital issue.

The personal experience of living through the Argentinean crisis, and being witness of other radical crisis suffered by developed nations, such as Spain, where I was born, and Italy, my second country by adoption, encouraged me to search for explanations and understandings on the foundations of trust in institutions and the basis for social cooperation: that is to say, the concept of social capital.

## **The crisis of institutions and the concept of social capital**

Many efforts have been carried out in order to propose explanations, solutions or approaches to face the new challenges of the previously described institutional crisis. Such crisis has been

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<sup>2</sup> World Bank, "Argentina, Together we stand, divided we fall. Levels and determinants of social capital in Argentina", May 31, 2002, World Bank Report n.24281.

characterized by a decline of trust on the systems and frameworks that once provided stability and predictability. The series of transformations in the traditional perceptions of the relationship between institutions and society challenged the approaches which had been adopted up to the moment. The mechanisms implemented, which came mainly from the economic sphere, resulted not to be enough to face effectively the new demands posed. Current paradigms for economic analysis of law, such as rational choice, were characterized by traditional assumptions which proved out to be defied. There was a need for innovative theoretical and methodological approaches to social issues, and one of these is the concept of “social capital”.

Until some decades ago, most of occidental societies were govern by solid States, powerful enough to intervene in the economy and successfully achieve the objectives of social justice and redistribution. Legal systems reflected the State’s will over the society. However, in modern times, those societies seek more modest and limited agendas. Societies strive to overcome the consequences of a true economic and social crisis. They search for a State that acts more as a facilitator, striving to govern without resources, through the coordination and the involvement of other social actors. This setting, however, does not substitutes politics, nor the State, as the main actor in the political game. This setting simply establishes a new social balance, a new type of governance whose features are still being trying to be interpreted and understood.

The concept of governance has lately acquired a wider vision towards the relationships between the private and public spheres. The efforts to re-establish the social order have called for different approaches. On one hand the State is struggling to find its new roles within the complex reality, trying to reinforce the public powers over the overwhelming demands. On the other hand, the State is facing the challenge of allowing society to thrive spontaneously, fostering the reinforcement of its networks and emphasizing the role of the social capital.

Today, governing takes coordinating, reaching consensus, leading to coherence and consistency in the social behaviour. Political institutions are no longer the only ones to shape the public sphere. The challenge is to promote a setting in which political institutions successfully manage to keep their steering role among a context characterized by plural and heterogeneous, local, national and supranational actors, capable of contesting the monopoly of public rationality, which was hold, until not so long ago, exclusively, by the State.

So, how to articulate political and institutional frameworks capable of managing the new dimensions of this new social complexity? The answers are not always in the hands of those in charge of decision making processes. The consolidation of economic reforms and a highly

competitive context require considerable doses of transparency and accountability. New social values and attitudes establish new patterns for social behaviour which require an analysis of its causes, features, effect and main implications.

The described context calls for a programme of reconstruction of the idea of democracy, in which the demands for recovering the trust in institutions, as the bases for long term decision making processes, prevail. Thus, this requires new relationships between general and particular interests, and new dimensions for social responsibility.

Under the described conditions, reforms require the capability of managing change, and striving to survive in an ever complex political environment. Addressing a State reform implies addressing a new context of values and expectations. In addition, the approach to adopt is that of a globalization perspective, in which information and communication technologies have revolutionized political action. Civil society, hence, has also become a new protagonist in a scene in which networks define and frame new scenarios.

The rediscovery of the notion of social capital, already present in the sociology of law tradition, has raised a rapid consensus, not only among social sciences, but also among a series of the most varied theories and methodological approaches. Thus, the interest of the present work on the social capital theory, and, in particular, from the sociology of law point of view.

From its origins, sociology has been struggling between two poles<sup>3</sup>. On one hand the focus on the individual, and on the other, on their actions. It is only recently that sociology started to provide more attention to behaviours rather than the individual. It could be said that there has been a twist from the “hard” and systemic views of society towards a “soft” image of the social fabric. This turn has proposed a dynamic universe of interactions. “Hard” variables, such as status, economic situation and technological developments, slowly started to give way to “softer” variables, such as norms and values<sup>4</sup>. In this sense, the traditional idea of the *homo economicus* and rational choice started to be replaced by the idea of an individual with values, bonds and emotions. This view can be traced to the classics, such as Alexis de Tocqueville, with his “habits of the heart”. However it has been in modern sociology that scholars provided more insights to this approach, being one of these the concept of social capital.

Social capital means different things to many different people. Some identify social capital with features of social organizations such as trust, others with social networks, and others with a

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<sup>3</sup> Sztompka, P., *Trust, A Sociological Theory*, Cambridge University Press, UK, 1999, p. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Sztompka, P., *Trust. A Sociological Theory, op. cit, ibidem*.

combination of all these. However, they all share the enthusiasm of applying the concept to all the informal engagements we like, care of, and approve of. Though traditionally, economists, political scientists, anthropologists and sociologists have been engaged in studying interpersonal networks, recently each group has begun to peer into the others' publications to see whether they can better understand the links connecting their particular objects of interests.

The expression "social capital" refers to the group of informal institutions, relationships, norms, attitudes and values that determine and structure social interactions, both in quantity and quality. Social capital is the factor that facilitates the coordination and cooperation processes in the horizontal and vertical associations between individuals. Social capital is directly linked to social cohesion. Concepts such as cooperation, trust, ethnicity, communities, networks and human relations have been seen as key factors in the quality of social fabric and the sustainability of social and economic development processes.

Most scholars agree on the fact that social capital is an important phenomenon. The disagreements come on how to define it. Though in modern literature definitions on social capital are varied, they generally share common elements, some values whilst others include networks or trust<sup>5</sup>, for instance. Social capital has been defined as "features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action"<sup>6</sup>. Social capital refers to the relationships among individuals, given by means of social networks, norms of reciprocity and trust. Social capital theory introduces trust, networks and norms as essential factors in human actions, challenging the neoclassical economic theory of rational choice. Within this context, for instance, the social capital theory suggests that beneath cooperation underlies trust: trust on the belief about the others' intrinsic motivation. In addition, networks and norms in which individuals are embedded, strengthen cooperative actions by changing the pay-offs for certain actions. This proposition also challenges the neoclassical assumption of atomistic humans.

The phenomenon of social capital has been under scrutiny and academic discussion for many decades. Undergone research on social capital suggests that many disciplines have contributed to its disentanglement. Economists, sociologists and political scientist have tried to define the concept of social capital from their own perspective, without providing a well-finished framework. Therefore, the analysis of the concept of social capital leads us to think inter and multidisciplinary.

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<sup>5</sup> Cfr. Stückel, Darryl, Mayer, Roger C. and Sitkin, Sim B., "Understanding social capital: in whom do we trust?" in Bartkus, Ona V., Davis, James H. (Eds.), *Social capital. Reaching out*, reaching in, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2009.

<sup>6</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993, p. 167.

The social capital theory proposes that social relations have value. They represent an important resource for individuals and groups of individuals to obtain certain benefits that would be impossible to obtain on their own, or would only be possible with an extra cost. The richness of the social capital theory is that it can also link social and institutional behaviour. However, it is important to stress that being societies a complex and dynamic reality among different spheres, the social capital approach cannot be taken as the sole explanation to these relations. Social capital theories have provided explanations or interpretations to human action from different disciplines: economy, sociology, and political science, to name a couple. However, none of these is enough to provide a final word. It is necessary to provide a multidisciplinary approach in order to get closer to the better understanding of society.

The social capital theory has had a wide acceptance since it opens the boundaries of traditional approaches to development. The social capital theory introduces trust and norms of reciprocity, networks and forms of civic engagement, and formal and informal institutions, underestimated by traditional theories. The social capital approach considers essential these factors, sometimes as causes and sometimes as outcomes. By addressing these factors, the social capital approach broadens the universe of analysis without dismissing the insights from early theories.

## **Trust**

“Specific trust, along with general trust, is an essential concept in the definition of social capital”<sup>7</sup>. Trust has been gaining relevance among the cultural factors which define a society, particularly considering the present dilemmas and challenges which modern society is facing. In a changing world, where scenarios are shaped and reshaped, it is essential to deploy trust. On one hand, globalization has opened boundaries, but on the other, has made parts extremely interdependent in the financial and economic, cultural and political spheres. Cooperation has become a pressing need for progress, while at the same time, carries with it the challenge of its uncertainties. As the dependence grows, the need for relying and trusting others grows as well. In addition, the present conditions of the globalized world have brought about increasingly possibilities and opportunities, both with positive and negative and uncertain outcomes. The more these grow, the less possible to predict outcomes and the more risky decisions turn. Simultaneously, the array of possibilities and

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<sup>7</sup> European Commission, “Social Capital, Special Eurobarometer 223 / Wave 62.2 – TNS Opinion & Social”, Fieldwork December 2004, February 2005.

opportunities has turned reality more complex. Institutional frameworks, technological systems, economical systems have become more complex and difficult to decipher, even to their actors. Placing trust entails taking a risk about the outcome of our decision. There are good reasons for calling contemporary society “the risk society”<sup>8</sup>. However, these contexts, again, inevitably lead to trust in order to move on, no matter on what this trust is based on.

Hence, trust, which once could be considered as something appertaining to the particular sphere, is now also given a meso and macro perspective. Trust becomes an important aspect in cultural life and in the civic culture. Trust becomes an important feature of civil society: horizontal trust among individuals, and vertical trust of individuals towards public institutions. The issue of trust is analyzed and differentiated in different perspectives: for instance, interpersonal trust, social trust and general trust.

Interpersonal trust enlarges interaction, fostering new relationships and strengthening existing ones. Trust fosters tolerance, accepting strangers, and managing differences in different levels. Trust strengthens the bond of the individual with the different communities (family, the nation, etc.), contributing to a feeling of identity and inclusion which, at the same time, fosters collective action and solidarity among community members.

When trust is reciprocated, cooperation is likely to be developed and as a result, provokes a self-enhancing capacity. However, when distrust prevails, untrustworthiness and breaches of trust predominate, generating a vicious cycle, based on suspicion and cynicism. When trust is missing, alternatives to trust are created; some of them within a legal framework, others, creating dysfunctional consequences for the wider society<sup>9</sup>. In addition, when there is a lack of trust, social capital tends to be eroded giving place to isolation and anonymity, conflict and breakdown of relationships. Furthermore, communication becomes more difficult, giving place to defensive attitudes and prejudices. When the mistrust is placed on the institutional framework, it is likely that alternative mechanisms, such as gangs, and Mafia, and illicit identities, such as deviant subcultures, might appear.

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<sup>8</sup> De Giorgi, Raffaele, “The risk of risk society and the limits of law” in *Sociologia del Diritto* XXXVI/2009/2, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2009; Beck, U., *La società del rischio*, Carocci, Roma, 2000.

<sup>9</sup> Sztompka, P., *op. cit.*, p. 116.

## Social capital not addressed by the law

General social capital theories have helped to explain human behaviour from an economic, political and sociological point of view. However, they have been unable to explain the significant differences in human performance. Scholars have turned to social capital theory hoping to overcome the limits of these paradigms<sup>10</sup>. In this sense, concepts such as trustworthiness, trust and norms have been introduced in the economic field, and into broader social sciences. However, defining these concepts has been a difficult task since each discipline has thrived to do so, but from their own perspective -particularly in the economic field, which has long insisted on its rigorous, analytical and quantifiable measurement<sup>11</sup>-. Thus, so far, experience has showed that the analysis of the concept of social capital leads us to think inter and multidisciplinary.

There are innumerable studies on the effects and interactions of social capital with other disciplines, such as workplace productivity, economic development, education, governance, psychology, network analysis, management theory and normative and trust research, among others<sup>12</sup>. However, there has been no direct focus on the relation of social capital and law.

The concept of social capital results appealing to governments and development agencies since it provides useful insights that could help decision makers in their investments for increasing the efficiency and possibility of successful outcomes for development initiatives. And social capital can contribute to this success<sup>13</sup>. High levels of social capital have been associated with improvement of children's welfare, education, safety, economic prosperity, public health, individual well-being and democracy. In addition, high levels of social capital have also been related to more efficient and effective organizations, communities and governments. An interesting approach has been the study of trust in institutions, with particular focuses on procedures, on organizations, on groups. However, once again, little has been said about social capital and law.

The existence of social and legal norms that foster certain behaviours is necessary for the generation of trust. Legal and formal institutions provide an environment and framework for legal behaviours to happen and be consolidated. At their turn, communities and intermediate social structures contribute to legitimating and supporting local and national institutions. There is strong

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<sup>10</sup> Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H., "Introduction: the yet undiscovered value of social capital" in Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H. (Eds.), *Social capital. Reaching out, reaching in*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2009, p. 1.

<sup>11</sup> Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H., *op. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>12</sup> Dasgupta, Partha, Serageldin, Ismail, *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*, The World Bank, Washington D. C., 2000, p. 46; Bartkus, V. O., Davis, J. H. (Ed.), *Social Capital. Reaching out, reaching in*, Edward Elgar, UK, USA, 2009.

<sup>13</sup> Cfr. Uphoff, Dasgupta, Partha, Serageldin, Ismail, *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*, the World Bank, Washington D. C., 2000.



comparative evidence about the substantial link between social legitimacy and levels of trust on institutions and levels of stability and good governance. The key to success in the interaction among both levels is mutual trust and value and norms sharing. The performance of institutions affects the level of reliability; the institutional design and the effective implementation of laws are essential for generating trust among the parties involved at different levels. A solid institutional framework fosters predictability and positive expectations from individuals. If institutions repeatedly disappoint expectations, individuals would not know what to expect, or worse, would know that whatever the outcome, their trust would be deceived. When social capital networks based on mistrust are created, the macro level is consequently discredited.

Trust is transformed into an essential concept in order to understand the relationship between social capital and law: how can justice work if it is based on mistrust on the others? Any political regime needs to be formed by institutions, which will then sustain it and determine its perceptions from society: the trust of society on institutions guarantees legitimacy. Thus, trust is fostered when a considerable dose of social capital exists, too.

At the moment, there has not been a deep interest on the role of legal culture, institutions and law in social capital. It is evident, however, based on current experiences on development processes, that the legal culture, values, principles, rules, institutions, law analysis and argumentative tools do matter. The possible debate on social capital and law, particularly, rule of law, supposes a link between values on one side, and the capacity of association and compliance to law by citizens<sup>14</sup>.

## Hypothesis

The described situation presents the opportunity to step aside from theoretical reflections and focus on the empirical testing of a new approach, such as social capital and law. The premise that the effects of social capital can be found in different areas such as democracy and governance, economic development, education and labour economics<sup>15</sup>, suggests that further research can be carried out in the quest for new insights and building bridges, as it is social capital and law.

The present work intends to address the issue of social capital and institutions, focusing, in particular, on the study of trust and legal institutions. In this sense, the social capital theory is proposed as an approach to analyze the relationship among these two issues.

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<sup>14</sup> Holmes, S., "Derecho, poder y confianza" in Bergman, M., Rosenkratz, C. (coordinators), *Confianza y derecho en América Latina*. Fondo de Cultura Económica, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, México D.F., 2009, p. 57.

<sup>15</sup> Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H., *op. cit.*, p. 11.

Why addressing the issue of trust and legal institutions? As previously described, in present times, the crisis of trust in institutions might also have affected the legal systems and related legal institutions. These entities might also be undergoing a process of social evaluation and scrutiny, which allows for a deeper analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, progresses and steps back of the rule of law. As Rosenfeld explains, though there might be trust in law, law is not based on trust. Trust is based on faith and solidarity, whereas law is a matter of rational expectations, based on the internalization of legal norms<sup>16</sup>.

The decline of statute law vis-à-vis other law sources, and the growing role of justice have put the agency and the legal processes in the centre of the public debate. This encompasses debates, such, as for instance, the relationship between the judiciary power and the State institutions, between the judges and the political power, and how these interact with the society.

With reference to the judiciary, for instance, in some emerging democracies the judicial power has been assuming a political role which has become evident: social conflicts have been “judicialized”, litigiousness has increased, and the judiciary have assumed a leading role. Being this appropriate or not, reasonable or not, in a context of institutional gaps and perceived failure, societies have tended to deposit on the judiciary new expectations and demands which, sometimes, exceed the natural competencies and possibilities of judges. Thus, these new claims and demands require complex solutions, which slowly create a breakpoint in the feeling of trust between the individuals and the legal system. What kind of break is created? Which is the expected the role of law and legal institutions in a given society? How law and justice are perceived by the society?

In addition, it can be observed that different democracies react differently to crime. Some might remain committed to legality despite cases of corruption, others might be more tolerant to such crimes. Which are the reasons for such different reactions? Are there any values underlying such reactions? Does this mean that there is a relation between justice and trust, more than rule of law and trust? Common sense suggests that supporting the rule of law necessarily means trusting public institutions and the government. However, this might not be so. Other preconditions, values and motivations might be lying underneath.

Experiences have showed that governments present difficulties in responding to the demands from the population. Local governments have realized that there is a need for new approaches that

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<sup>16</sup> Rosenfeld, M.: “Estado de derecho, predictibilidad, justicia y confianza: una Mirada crítica” in Bergman, M., Rosenkratz, C. (coordinators), *Confianza y derecho en América Latina*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, México D.F., 2009, p. 69.

will foster a better relationship among the government and the local population, based on concepts such as trust, networks, social cohesion and enhanced social capital.

Robert Putnam, in his book *Making Democracy Work*, has pointed out that reciprocity relationships -social capital- is a main factor for effective democracy. This factor might determine also the performance of local government institutions. Within this context, the level of social capital of a given society acquires a particular role. This research intends to analyze the issue of social capital -e.g. levels and types of social capital, social capital building, trust, norms and perceptions- and trust in legal institutions.

General trust and social capital building requires institutional facilitation and vice versa, general trust and social capital facilitates institutional development. The levels of social capital might determine the levels of acceptance and adaptability of a given society to laws, norms and values. The existence of efficient law enforcement institutions provides people the necessary confidence for settling an agreement with another party, reducing transaction and opportunity costs. However, if the parties do not trust law enforcement institutions, they will invest more resources to assure the fulfilment of the agreement or otherwise, reduce the resources that they were about to invest<sup>17</sup>. Law plays as the essential bridge among individuals who would like to cooperate in a determine way, but lack trust on the other's motivations. Nevertheless, what happens when the individuals involve do not trust even law? Law has been characterized as a substitute for law<sup>18</sup>. However, as such, it is not a magic solution. For instance, law can be modified unexpectedly, and by doing so, it undermines its claimed assurance of expectations<sup>19</sup>.

## Research description

The present works intends to be a contribution to the ongoing efforts to understanding the relation between law and society, by unravelling the issue of social capital and institutions, and particularly, trust and legal institutions.

This research intends to shed some light to this problematic from a sociology of law point of view. Within this context, this research will focus on the analysis of the crisis of trust in law and legal institutions from a social capital approach.

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<sup>17</sup> Bergman, M.: "Confianza y derecho" in Bergman, M., Rosenkratz, C. (coordinators), *Confianza y derecho en América Latina*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, México D.F., 2009, p. 87.

<sup>18</sup> Rosenkrantz, C.: "Confianza en el derecho", in Bergman, M., Rosenkratz, C. (coordinators), *Confianza y derecho en América Latina*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, México D.F., 2009, pp. 107-109.

<sup>19</sup> Rosenkrantz, C., *op. cit.*, p. 114.

The adopted approach implies two analytical levels: the macro and micro levels. The macro level comprises the institutional context in which social relationships take place, that is to say, the type of government, the legal system, the participation in organizations and political processes. The micro level comprises concepts such as structural cognitive social capital. The former features concepts such as behaviours, attitudes, norms of trust, solidarity and reciprocity, whereas the latter presents more tangible concepts, such as horizontal and vertical organizations and networks and collective action. All these components are in continuous interaction, creating both vicious and virtuous cycles, depending on the context and its further development.

From this perspective, the present work will aim at exploring the relationships between social capital, trust, institutions and law. Law is the tool through which institutional structures incorporate norms and formal rules that facilitate interaction and the exchange of goods and services in a given society. Through the law, it is established what is allowed and what is proscribed, which are the procedures for verifying compliance with the law and which are the ones for applying sanctions. The threshold in which informal institutions can replace rules, laws and tribunals is very thin. The macro level will always be the one hold responsible for providing an understandable, transparent and coherent framework. Institutions at the macro level are the ones to provide the proper context for institutions at the micro level to flourish and develop. And, in their turn, the latter also support regional and national institutions and provide them stability. On another level, the key to success in social interaction depends on the capacity of societies to foster that their members -both individuals and natural intermediate associations-, share values, procedures and norms, and that these, in their turn, generate mutual relationships of trust.

The research undertaken considers two different levels.

Firstly, the theory of social capital and its implications in modern sociology of law will be addressed (chapters 1 and 2). Secondly, the social capital approach will be applied to the study of the legal institutions in a concrete case: the Argentina case (chapter 3).

Argentina was chosen as the case study due to several reasons. Firstly, the personal knowledge of the country and personal experiences lived through out the crisis that burst in 2001 and present times. Secondly, the availability of empirical information, product of studies and research in which I took part and to which I have access as member of one of the main institutions devoted to social capital research in Argentina, the FINES Foundation. And, thirdly, and most important, the possibility of designing and carrying out a specific survey to support my doctoral research.

To this end, between the end of year 2010 and beginning of 2011 I designed a specific survey on social capital, institutions and law, which was carried out in February 2011, with the support of the FINES Foundation and the OPSM Consultancy. The survey was carried out in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and its results are the main component of chapter 3 of the present work.

The results obtained provide a better illustration of the main hypothesis proposed in the initial chapters of the present work. The conclusions allow us to consolidate some of the hypothesis which, though temporary, offer a better picture of the legal culture of the present Argentina and its relationships with general political culture and basic essential attitudes.

The results cannot be judged as definitive. However, they are worth enough to support the main hypothesis on social capital, applied to the specific case of the social capital diagnosis in the Argentina legal culture. I believe the results are solid and present the basis for new hypothesis and further research.

This work does not intend to provide a finished concept and analysis of the subject. It will provide the essential features in order to create a proper theoretical framework, choosing the relevant aspects to our field of work, which is law and society.

## CHAPTER 1

### WHAT IS SOCIAL CAPITAL: theoretical framework

During the last decades economists have been engaged in the study of markets; political scientists in the study of the State; and anthropologists and sociologists have been busy dealing with the study of interpersonal networks. Recently, each discipline has started to peer into the others' works to see whether they can better understand the links connecting their particular objects of interest<sup>20</sup>. One of the outcomes of this endeavour has been the development of the concept of "social capital" as an organizing principle in the social sciences<sup>21</sup>. As Dasgupta and Serageldin express, "it is difficult to think of an academic notion that has entered the common vocabulary of social discourse more quickly than the idea of social capital"<sup>22</sup>.

In addition to the importance that it has been acquiring in social sciences, the notion of social capital has also played a key role in the efforts made to explain the generalized economic crisis that the current century has been undergoing so far<sup>23</sup>. It could be said that part of this crisis is due to a generalized crisis of trust.

The phenomenon of social capital has been under the shed light, subjected to discussion, "often yielding far more heat than light"<sup>24</sup>. The research undertaken so far suggests that though many disciplines have had a word on it, none of them has the last word on it. To unveil the real essence of social capital a multidisciplinary approach needs to be done<sup>25</sup>.

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<sup>20</sup> Dasgupta, Partha and Serageldin, Ismail, *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*, The World Bank, Washington D. C., 2000, Preface, p. x.

<sup>21</sup> Dasgupta, Partha and Serageldin, Ismail, *op. cit., ibidem*.

<sup>22</sup> Dasgupta, Partha and Serageldin, Ismail, *op. cit., ibidem*.

<sup>23</sup> For a thorough discussion on this cfr. Pharr, S.J. and Putnam, R.D (Eds.), *Disaffected democracies. What's troubling the trilateral countries*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2000.

<sup>24</sup> Lewicki, Roy. J. and Brinsfield, Chad. T.: "Trust, distrust and building social capital" in Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, ch.11. p. 275.

<sup>25</sup> Akçomak, I. Semih and ter Weel, Bas.: "The impact of Social Capital on Crime: Evidence from the Netherlands". Discussion Papers Series, Institute for the Study of Labor, The Netherlands, 2008, argues that despite the interest of sociology, economics, management, political science and health sciences on social capital there is still not a consensus on the definition and the measurement of social capital due to lack of interaction between disciplines. In other words, the social capital of social capital researchers is low between disciplines. He suggests that research on social capital theory has been undertaken by so many disciplines that advancements in social capital research can only be achieved by conducting cross disciplinary research.

Economists, sociologists and political scientist try to define the concept of social capital from their own perspective, creating more confusion than actually resolving the problem of its definition<sup>26</sup>. Though the analysis of the social capital framework leads us to think interdisciplinary, this research does not intended to diverge from the sociology of law perspective, which is the framework of this work. Therefore, a legal approach to the description of social capital will be assumed.

Moreover, this work does not intend to come up with a finalized concept and analysis of the subject. It will deal with the essential features in order to suggest a proper theoretical framework, choosing the relevant aspects to our field of work, which is law and society. The intention of this research is to provide food for thought for future research developments, from an innovative perspective, not explored before, such as social capital and law.

High levels of social capital have been associated with the improvement of children's welfare, education, safety, economic prosperity, public health, individual well-being, confidence on institutions and democracy. Moreover, high levels of social capital also have seemed to correlate with more efficient and effective organizations, communities and governments<sup>27</sup>. However, little has been said about social capital and law.

Generally speaking, the main proposition of social capital theory is that social relations are a valuable resource for individuals and groups of individuals to achieve certain benefits that would be impossible to obtain on their own, or would only be possible with an extra cost. It can be applied across different levels of analysis: from an individual person to a group, organization, community, region or even nation<sup>28</sup>.

Societies are dynamic realities in which economic and sociological factors and processes take part in an interrelated manner. Social capital, hence, comes into a scene as a valuable concept since it helps linking social and institutional behaviour. However, social capital does not stand by itself; it is only one approach to a more complex universe which presents the most varied effects and factors<sup>29</sup>.

General social capital theories have helped to explain human behaviour from an economic, political and sociological point of view; however, they have been unable to explain the significant

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<sup>26</sup> Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard and Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase: "The troika of sociology, political science and economics" in Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard and Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase (Eds.): *Handbook of Social Capital. The Troika of Sociology, Political Sciences and Economics*. Edward Elgar, UK, USA, 2009. Ch. 1, pp. 1-13.

<sup>27</sup> Stickel, Darryl, Mayer, Roger C. and Sitkin, Sim B.: "Understanding social capital: in whom do we trust?" in Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, ch.12, p. 304.

<sup>28</sup> Nahapiet, Janine: "Capitalizing on connections: social capital and strategic management" in Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, ch. 8, pp. 207-8.

<sup>29</sup> Bertilsson, Thora Margareta and Hjorth-Andersen, Christian: "The Nordic welfare state" in Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard and Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase (Eds.): *Handbook of Social Capital. The Troika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics*. Edward Elgar, UK, USA, 2009, ch.13, pp. 212-227.

differences in human performance. Scholars have turned to social capital theory hoping to overcome the limits of these paradigms<sup>30</sup>.

According to Ostrom and Ahn, the social capital theory has had a successful acceptance because of the limitations presented by “standard” approaches to the problems of development. These limitations called for a more careful examination of certain factors, such as trust and norms of reciprocity, networks and forms of civic engagement, and formal and informal institutions, which were left out from earlier theories. The social capital approach considers these factors essential, sometimes as causes and sometimes as outcomes. By elaborating on these factors, the social capital approach improves knowledge, identifying richer causality among them, and achieving these without dismissing the insights from early theories<sup>31</sup>. In a certain way, the contributions of the social capital theory have filled in a gap and provided new approaches which have renewed the social sciences agenda in a significant way.

Social capital theory places trust, networks and norms in a strong contrast to neoclassical economic theory which applies the rational choice model of human decision-making. Neoclassical economy assumed that rational human beings behave in an atomistic and selfish manner. So, the social capital approach, by adding these factors, has challenged some of the neoclassical economic assumptions about cooperation. In this case, social capital theory suggests that cooperation rests on an underlying trust in behaviour, in which trust means a belief about another’s intrinsic motivation, that is to say, in the other’s trustworthiness. Moreover, the other two factors, the networks and norms in which individuals are embedded, strengthen the cooperative behaviour by changing the pay-offs for certain actions. This also challenges the neoclassical assumption of atomistic humans<sup>32</sup>.

## 1. Defining social capital

One of the debates around the concept of social capital is whether it should be considered a form of capital. Social capital has been introduced to the discussion along with other forms of capital:

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<sup>30</sup> Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H.: “Introduction: the yet undiscovered value of social capital” in Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, p. 1.

<sup>31</sup> Ostrom, Elinor and Ahn, T. K.: “The meaning of social capital and its link to collective action” in Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard and Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase (Eds.): *Handbook of Social Capital. The Troika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics*. Edward Elgar, UK, USA, 2009, ch.2, p. 18.

<sup>32</sup> Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H., *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.



physical, natural and human. At the same time, the usage of the term “capital” has naturally lead academics to think in economic terms -the discussion coming mostly from this discipline.

All forms of capital can be understood as assets of various kinds<sup>33</sup>. Social capital is an accumulation of various types of social, psychological, cultural, cognitive, institutional and related assets that increase the likelihood of mutually beneficial and cooperative actions. And these assets are productive for both parties.

In addition, Dasgupta<sup>34</sup> explains that the idea of social capital does not exactly fit in contemporary economic thinking, since it is difficult to measure. Moreover, using the term “capital” for something that it is not tangible, durable and fungible as other forms of capital, does not make things easier. However, since social capital refers to knowledge and skills, and these are indeed considered capital, and have economic returns, it is still valid to talk about social capital in economics.

From a sociological point of view, Turner<sup>35</sup> argues that scholars have lately tried to redefine the concept of social capital along with the other forms of capital -human, natural, physical- and “tend to pour ‘old sociological wine’ into the “new and smaller bottles” of economics, proposing narrow definitions of social capital, such as simply social networks or civic associations. He suggests, however, that if it is to be integrated sociological knowledge into economic thinking, a broader concept of social capital needs to be proposed<sup>36</sup>.

According to Serageldin and Grootaert<sup>37</sup>, social capital is generally recognized as something necessary for the functioning of social order, along with certain degree of common cultural identifications, a sense of belonging and shared behavioural norms. It is the “glue that holds societies together”<sup>38</sup>. However, the authors state that the term has been used in different ways, depending on the field of study. For instance within the political science, sociology and anthropology literature, social capital has been regarded as the set of norms, networks and organizations through which persons access to power and resources that are instrumental for facilitating decision-making and policy formulation. From the economists’ point of view, they have identified the importance of social capital in economic growth and development.

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<sup>33</sup> Uphoff, Norman: “Understanding Social Capital: Learning from the Analysis and Experience of Participation” in Dasgupta, Partha and Serageldin, Ismail: *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*, The World Bank, Washington D. C., 2000, p. 216.

<sup>34</sup> Dasgupta, Partha: “Economic Progress and the Idea of Social Capital” in Dasgupta, Partha and Serageldin, Ismail: *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*, The World Bank, Washington D. C., 2000, p. 326.

<sup>35</sup> Turner, Jonathan H.: “The Formation of Social Capital” in Dasgupta, Partha and Serageldin, Ismail: *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*, The World Bank, Washington D. C., 2000, p.94.

<sup>36</sup> Turner, Jonathan H., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>37</sup> Serageldin, Ismail and Grootaert, Christiaan: “Defining Social Capital: An Integrating View” in Dasgupta, Partha and Serageldin, Ismail: *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*, The World Bank, Washington D. C., 2000, pp. 40-44.

<sup>38</sup> Serageldin, Ismail and Grootaert, Christiaan, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

Using the term capital for the value and power of social interactions and connections has not always been accepted<sup>39</sup>. However, this work does not intend to go into this discussion since it exceeds the scope of the investigation.

The actual literature offers a multitude of definitions of social capital. Some of them might be vague or narrow; others are based on reasonable intuition and social theory. However, as Ostrom states, most of them address two basic assumptions: social capital is a resource that is available to members of a social network, and social structure is often the type of capital that all members of a group can access to promote their interests<sup>40</sup>.

In attempt to offer an overview of the manifold ways to define social capital O. V. Bartkus and J. H. Davis provide an overview of the major theoretical contributions, which do not spare the possible discussions that could generally rise from these.

**Table 1. Definitions of social capital<sup>41</sup>**

David Hume (1751, in McNally (1994), p. 169)	'Self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice. [As society develops], a sympathy (or moral sense) with public interest is the source of the moral appropriation, which attends that virtue.'
Alexis de Tocqueville (1945 [1840])	'Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations ... Wherever at the head of some new undertaking you see the government in France, or a man of rank in England, in the United States you would be sure to find an association.'
Lyda Judson Hanifan (1920), p. 22	'...that in life which tends to make these tangible substances count for most in the daily lives of a people; namely, goodwill, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the individuals and families that make a social unit.'
Glenn Loury (1992), p. 100	'...naturally occurring social relationship among persons which promote or assist the acquisition of skills and traits valued in the marketplace.'

<sup>39</sup> Cfr. Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H., *op. cit.*

<sup>40</sup> Ostrom, Elinor: "What is social capital?" in Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In.* Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, ch.1, p. 17.

<sup>41</sup> Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H., *op. cit.*,p. 3.

Pierre Bourdieu (with Wacquant, 1992), p. 19	'Social Capital is the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.'
James Coleman (1994), p. 302	'Social Capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: they consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure.'
Robert Putnam (1993), p. 169	'...features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action.'
Burt (1992), p. 9	'...friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through whom you receive opportunities to use your financial and human capital.'
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), p. 243	'...the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit. Social Capital thus comprises both the network and the assets that may be mobilized through that network.'
Woolcock (1998), p. 153	'...the information, trust, and norms of reciprocity inherent in one's social network.'
Adler and Kwon (2002), p. 23 Burt (1992), p. 9	'Social capital is the goodwill available to individuals or groups. Its source lies in the structure and content of the actor's social relations. Its efforts flow from the information, influence and solidarity it makes available to the actor.' '...friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through whom you receive opportunities to use your financial and human capital.'
Ostrom and Ahn (2003), p. xiv	'social capital as an attribute of individuals and their relationships that enhances their ability to solve collective action problems.'

As first attempt, social capital could be identified as the assets or resources present in different types of social relationships that could benefit either individuals or groups of individuals. These

assets are useful for achieving personal goals or even collective action. Most of the literature breaks down social capital in two factors: relationship structure- for example, network size, configuration and density; and relationship content- for example, norms, institutions, and values. This is because neither structure nor content can provide meaningful insights on their own<sup>42</sup>. Therefore, it is important to analyze structure and content in order to understand the real dimensions of social capital.

Despite the fact that scholars differ in the conditions for social capital, there is indeed consensus on the fact that social capital stands for the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures<sup>43</sup>. Nevertheless, this common ground is open to the most varied uses.

In any case, whether social capital is seen from the societal-group level or the individual level, all scholars agree on the fact that the interaction of the members is what maintains and reproduces social capital<sup>44</sup>.

Fishman<sup>45</sup> explains that there are two types of social relations, one based on the intrinsic meaning of the relation, and another based on the scope of that relation. The first one tends to be stronger, and could seem not possible to use for it the economic term of “capital”. Nevertheless, the social capital approach refers to adopting the term “capital” for social relations. The culture or subcultures in which individuals are embedded are apparently crucial for understanding the meaning of the behaviours that individuals adopt. However, it is also important the magnitude of the motivations that make individuals make use of the social resources in order to obtain benefits.

According to Lin<sup>46</sup> the social resources embedded in one’s social network can be ascribed, that is, born with them, such as gender and race, or acquired, such as education, or prestigious or authoritative jobs or positions. And, when these resources are being invested for expected returns in the marketplace, they become social capital. Social capital is not the possessed goods, but the resources accessible through direct and indirect ties.

On one aspect, Bourdieu treats social capital as the group of actual or potential resources linked to the possession of a durable social network. On another, Coleman defines social capital according to its function: “social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of different

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<sup>42</sup> Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H., *op. cit.*, pp. 1-3.

<sup>43</sup> Portes, Alejandro: “The two meanings of Social Capital”; *Sociological Forum*, Vol. 15, n. 1, 2000, p. 6.

<sup>44</sup> Lin, Nan: *Social Capital. A theory of Social Structure and Action*. Cambridge University Press, 2001, p.8.

<sup>45</sup> Fishman, Robert M.: “On the costs of conceptualizing social ties as social capital” in Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, pp. 66-80.

<sup>46</sup> Lin, Nan, *op. cit.*, p. 55,

entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors — whether persons or corporate actors — within the structure. Like other forms of capital and human capital, social capital is not completely fungible but may be specific to certain activities. A given form of social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or even harmful for others”<sup>47</sup>. Social capital is a resource that makes possible actions that would not be possible in its absence<sup>48</sup>. It is the social structure that provides more elements than the simply network.

Putnam defines social capital as “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action”<sup>49</sup> According to Putnam, “the core idea of social capital theory is that networks have value and that social contacts affect the productivity of individuals and groups. Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them<sup>50</sup>”. Francis Fukuyama<sup>51</sup> also shares this view; he gives the most general statement of what social capital is: “the ability of people to work together for common purposes in groups and organizations”<sup>52</sup>.

Lin defines social capital as the “investment in social relations with expected returns in the marketplace. The market chosen for analysis may be economic, political, labour or community”<sup>53</sup>. Even though Lin uses economic terms, he adapts these to any context. Neo-capital theories see capital as an investment of personal resources -skills, knowledge, values, norms, etc.- for the production of certain benefits, and vested in individual actors. However, this individual perspective becomes expanded by the notion of social capital, a capital captured through social relations. Within this framework, this capital is seen as a social asset by virtue of the actors’ connections and access to resources in the network or group of which they are members<sup>54</sup>. Within a social network context, Lin further explains social capital as “the resources embedded in social networks accessed and used by actors for actions”<sup>55</sup>. In this concept, social capital is composed by the resources embedded in social

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<sup>47</sup> Coleman, J.S. *Foundations of Social Theory*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 1990, p.302.

<sup>48</sup> Coleman, J.S., op. cit., ibidem.

<sup>49</sup> Putnam, Robert D.: *Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993, p. 167.

<sup>50</sup> Putnam, Robert D.: *Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American Community*. Simon & Schuster, N. York, 2000, p.19.

<sup>51</sup> Fukuyama, Francis, *Trust*, Free Press Paperbacks, New York, 1995, p. 10.

<sup>52</sup> Hardin, Russell: *Trust*. Polity, UK, 2006.

<sup>53</sup> Lin, Nan, op. cit., p. 19.

<sup>54</sup> Lin, Nan, op. cit., ibidem.

<sup>55</sup> Lin, Nan, op. cit., p. 25.

relations rather than individuals, and by the access and use of such resources. This framework can be also applied to other forms of capital, for example, human capital, in which investing in the acquisition of skills is useful for certain markets, which calls for the recognition of such skill by others in the social network and further use of it for a certain purpose.

Current research on social capital allows a wide variety of aspects of social structure to be defined as a potentially yielding social capital<sup>56</sup>. For this reason, for instance, many researchers have narrowed the approach, focusing on social networks rather than social structure. Their attempt is to predict the effects of social capital on network members and also to identify the mechanisms that transmit these effects.

Ostrom<sup>57</sup> also suggests that if social capital is such a valuable concept, social capital theory should come up with the identification for the conditions that make individuals willing to create and keep it. Ostrom explains that current thinking states that there are two elements that are important for defining such behaviours or commitments: the type of network or social connections among the members; and the particular form of the behaviours.

Ostrom identifies that some scholars classify the types of social capital according to the kind of embeddedness. One hand, structural embeddedness refers to the *impersonal* configuration of linkages among people or units<sup>58</sup>; for example, network ties linking interdependent actors within a formal system. And on the other hand, relational embeddedness, which shows the types of *personal* relationships that people have built across time and repeated interaction<sup>59</sup>. Such is the example of fraternal organizations and business networks. Behaviours vary according to the situations and the networks in which they are set. However, when speaking of formal frameworks, such as a society or a state, individuals are more willing to contribute to the creation of what are often more formal networks that produce and help sustain various forms of public goods<sup>60</sup>.

Hardin explains that there is another vision on social capital, which relates to law, in which the framework is provided by norms and other type of relationships, such as legal institutions. The results is sometimes more effective and efficient. However, he continues stating that in much of the

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<sup>56</sup> Cfr. Ostrom, Elinor, *op. cit.*, p. 19 and Solow, Robert M. (1999): "Notes on social capital and economic performance" in Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin (Eds.): *Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective*, Washington, DC: World Bank, pp.6-10.

<sup>57</sup> Ostrom, Elinor, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>58</sup> Nahapiet, Janine and S. Ghoshal: "Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the Organizational Advantage", *Academy of Management Review* 23(2), 1998, p. 244, cited in Ostrom, Elinor: "What is social capital?" in Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, ch.1, pp. 17-38 (19).

<sup>59</sup> Nahapiet, Janine and S. Ghoshal: "Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the Organizational Advantage", *Academy of Management Review* 23(2), 1998, p. 244, cited in Ostrom, Elinor: "What is social capital?" in Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, pp. 17-38 (19).

<sup>60</sup> Ostrom, Elinor, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

neo-institutional account of the success of firms, more importance is given to the informal devices of social capital which displace the formal devices of hierarchical control.<sup>61</sup>

According to Hardin<sup>62</sup>, for political scientists, such as Fukuyama and Putnam, the interest in social capital lies on the linkage between levels of social capital and collective outcomes. In this sense, high levels of social capital seem to be essential for collective well-being in terms of economic development, effective political institutions, low crime rates, and lower incidences of other social problems, for instance. Their focus is on trust, norms, and networks, at the individual level. For them, the main issue is how these factors at the individual level can affect the collective level, such as the performance of institutions, including even the whole of the government. So, as Hardin signals, the view of Putnam and other scholars is apparently different from that of Coleman. Although Coleman talks about corporate actors, he does so in terms of achieving things that would not be possible to achieve individually -the examples he provides are student political groups, doctor patient relations, neighbourhood child care, and the Cairo bazaar<sup>63</sup>.

As Hardin exposes, for the political scientists, the importance of social capital is at the individual level since it allows groups and societies to do at the collective level. Individual level social capital fosters the performance of public institutions and that of the economy. Hardin sustains that the causal relation among these is not strong but it is mainly asserted from various correlations<sup>64</sup>. For Putnam and others, the main correlation is supposed simultaneous decline in generalized trust and in trusting government over the past few decades in the United States<sup>65</sup>. For Fukuyama, however, the main, though loose, correlation is between cross-societal differences in general trusting and in economic performance<sup>66</sup>.

According to Hardin<sup>67</sup>, the main difference between these political scientists and Coleman is the direction of their causal arrows. For Coleman, the causal arrow goes from the social relations to the individual level. For the political scientists the causal arrow goes from the individual level to the institutional level. To illustrate this difference in visions, Hardin provides the example of trust. For Coleman, several relationships enable individuals to trust each other. For political scientist, trust at the individual level trust enables institutions to perform work well. So, as the author points out,

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<sup>61</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

<sup>62</sup> Hardin, Russell., *op. cit.*, pp. 77-9.

<sup>63</sup> See section referring to James Coleman.

<sup>64</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

<sup>65</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, p.78.

<sup>66</sup> Hardin, Russell: "Social capital and trust", prepared for presentation at the conference "Trust and Social Capital," at CIDE. Mexico City, 31 October 2003; Hardin, Russell, : *Trust. Polity, UK, 2006, cb4* p. 77-9.

<sup>67</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

under the concept of social capital there are quite varied and different causal relations. However, it is still missing from the list, the effects that institutions have on individual level relations<sup>68</sup>.

Hardin explains that for Fukuyama and Putnam point of view, the levels of social capital can have a strong causal role in the general levels of governmental and economic performance<sup>69</sup>. However, the visions are different enough in order to allow some factors of such capital to go into the utility function. They could directly produce welfare rather than just causally contribute to the production of other factors that produce welfare.

However, these visions can be confusing, since, for example, in the case of Coleman, the concept is used to explain trust, whereas in the case of Putnam and the others, it is supposed to include trust.

For the above mentioned reason, Hardin prefers rather to use the term *organizational* and *network* capital rather than the more general social capital<sup>70</sup>.

In addition, Hardin poses the question whether these types of capital benefit individuals by what they can do or by what they can enable individuals to do. He continues explaining the Francis Fukuyama argument which states that the participation in such networks and organizations prepares psychologically individuals for the demands of working in modern firms<sup>71</sup>. However, according to Hardin such case might seem to apply to a developing nation or to a sub-population. He continues explaining that maybe the human capital required for modern times is different from the one of some years ago, since today it is more likely to be produced in organizations such as local political groups and sports clubs. Hardin states that the social capital proposed by Fukuyama could be, instead, the kind of human capital or attitude needed for the specific entrepreneurial activity. However, he continues, if this is the case, it would not be a problem in economic terms, since, in most of the advanced democracies, enterprises are continuously updated and they already involve the human capital that is already obtained and produced in superior education.

Most scholars agree on the fact that social capital is an important phenomenon. The disagreements come on how to define it. Though definitions on social capital in modern literature are varied, many share elements, some values, whilst others include networks or trust<sup>72</sup>. According to Stickel, Mayer and Sitkin, values, networks and trust do not constitute social capital but rather its

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<sup>68</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>69</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>70</sup> Hardin, Russell: "Social capital and trust", prepared for presentation at the conference "Trust and Social Capital," at CIDE. Mexico City, 31 October 2003; Hardin, Russell, *Trust*, ch.4, pp. 77-79.

<sup>71</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>72</sup> Stickel, Darryl, Mayer, Roger C., and Sitkin, Sim B., *op. cit.*, 305.



causal antecedents of social capital<sup>73</sup>. Each of these elements contributes to a wider phenomenon that is the ability of effective collective action. Individuals, therefore, invest time and effort, and behave in such a way that collective action can be possible. However, these behaviours and investments do not represent social capital. “Values, networks and trust do not improve the collective but rather make it more likely that its members will behave in ways to improve it”<sup>74</sup>.

The authors propose social capital as a bridge between the different variables values, networks and trust, and the outcomes they facilitate<sup>75</sup>. They propose social capital as an asset, like financial capital or human capital. They also propose it as a resource or a capability, in which “social capital is the socially derived potential for actions that contribute to the collective”<sup>76</sup>. However, as a resource, it is different how it is created and how it is used. Within this context, social capital facilitates member or members of a group to contribute to a collective need. The authors state that using the analogy of potential energy in physics, “social capital is the capacity to produce action, independently of whether the action is performed or not”<sup>77</sup>.

The authors believe that values, networks and trust, which are also components of Putnam’s definition on social capital, have strong effects, and that it is essential an interaction among them in order to invest on social capital.

The concept of trust is understood in various ways, also depending on the level of trust which is being considered. Therefore it is important to understand trust in order to understand social capital. Serageldin and Grootaert argue that considering the different and distinct definitions provided by literature, an integrated view of social capital is necessary for measuring and making the concept operational<sup>78</sup>. Thus, in addition, as Ostrom points out, the fact that social capital can have effects on different areas, from democracy and governance, to economic development, education and labour economics, suggests there should be more theoretical reflection and clear empirical testing on the integrity of the social capital concept, and most likely interdisciplinary approaches across the social sciences<sup>79</sup>.

Economists have come to accept that not only labour and capital are important for sustained growth and prosperity, but also a number of other factors which have been traditionally studied within other disciplines, such as sociology. The notion of social capital is easy to incorporate into a

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<sup>73</sup> Stickel, Darryl, Mayer, Roger C., and Sitkin, Sim B., *op. cit., ibidem*.

<sup>74</sup> Stickel, Darryl, Mayer, Roger C., and Sitkin, Sim B., *op. cit., ibidem*.

<sup>75</sup> Stickel, Darryl, Mayer, Roger C., and Sitkin, Sim B., *op. cit., ibidem*.

<sup>76</sup> Stickel, Darryl, Mayer, Roger C., and Sitkin, Sim B., *op. cit., ibidem*.

<sup>77</sup> Stickel, Darryl, Mayer, Roger C., and Sitkin, Sim B., *op. cit., ibidem*.

<sup>78</sup> Serageldin, Ismail and Grootaert, Christiaan, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

<sup>79</sup> Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H., *op. cit.*, p. 11.

growth perspective, as social capital will reduce transaction costs and facilitate trade and wealth creation<sup>80</sup>.

It is time to introduce at least a tentative and provisional definition of social capital. It will not be an “essential” definition, but a broad and purely operative one, with the aim to help on the basic arrangements of an empirical research.

In this sense it is possible to define social capital broadly as the comprehensive cluster of institutions, relationships, networks, attitudes and values that govern interactions and relations among people which lead them to collective action contributing to economic, social and institutional development<sup>81</sup>.

This broad and provisional definition provides us a tool for research. Implicitly, this basic formula distinguishes two forms of social capital. Firstly, “structural” social capital, referred to relatively objective and externally observable social structures –networks, associations and institutions-, and the values, rules and procedures they embody. Secondly, “cognitive” social capital, related to more subjective and intangible elements such as perceptions, observations, generally accepted attitudes, shared values, norms of behaviour, reciprocity relationships and trust<sup>82</sup>

Our definition –mostly oriented by Grootaert and Van Bastelaer- allows a description of social capital elements, based on its forms and scope. It is possible to identify social capital at the micro-level, in the form of horizontal networks of individuals, sharing, values, norms, views, perceptions. At the meso-level, one can identify horizontal and vertical relations among intermediary groups. At the macro-level, it is possible to observe the institutional and political framework of social activities, including institutional arrangements, economic incentives and major determinants of economic, social and legal development. The described framework is illustrated in the following figure:


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<sup>80</sup> Bertilsson, Thora Margareta and Hjorth-Andersen, Christian: “The Nordic welfare state” in Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard and Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase (Eds.): *Handbook of Social Capital. The Troika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics*. Edward Elgar, UK, USA, 2009, pp.212-227 (.220).

<sup>81</sup> Similar to Grootaert, C., van Bastelaer, Thierry: Understanding and measuring social capital, A multidisciplinary Tool for Practitioners, The World Bank, 2002, p. 2.

<sup>82</sup> Similar to Grootaert, C., van Bastelaer, Thierry, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

**Figure 1. The forms and scope of social capital<sup>83</sup>**



## 2. Social capital in the sociology tradition

During the last years, the notion of social capital has become one of the most popular concepts to be exported from the sociology theory into everyday language. The social capital approach has evolved as a remedy for the illnesses affecting society. Similar to other sociological concepts, the original meaning of the term and its heuristic value are being put to severe tests by its increasingly diverse applications.<sup>84</sup> Much of the controversy surrounding the concept of social capital deals with the fact that it is applied to different problems, with different theories and different units of analysis<sup>85</sup>.

The concept of social capital is not new. The idea that involvement and participation in groups can have different consequences for the individual and the community is not new to the sociology theory. Moreover, it has been linked to classic authors and to classic theories of social exchange, psychology, and economics. Durkheim had already put the emphasis on group life as a solution to anomie and self-destruction<sup>86</sup>. In his study on the social division of law, he described the legal bond of contracts and the idea that a true contract arises only when there is a declared agreement on the

<sup>83</sup> Grootaert, C., van Bastelaer, Thierry, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

<sup>84</sup> Portes, Alejandro: "Social Capital: its origins and applications in Modern Sociology"; *Annual Review Sociology*, 24:1-24, 1998, p.2.

<sup>85</sup> Cfr. Portes, Alejandro, *op. cit.*, and Portes, Alejandro, "The two meanings of social capital", *Sociological Forum*, Vol. 15, N. 1, 2000.

<sup>86</sup> Cited in Portes, Alejandro, "Social Capital: its origins and applications in Modern Sociology", *Annual Review Sociology*, 24:1-24, 1998, p.2.

wills of the two bargaining parties. The contract evolves as society progresses from mechanical to organic solidarity. The contract's main function is to ensure solidarity by encouraging social relations of cooperation and compromise between parties performing specialized and distinct roles. Contractual solidarity and the relationship between legal evolution and societal complexity are basic ideas of Durkheim's sociology of law, still contributing to the analysis of the non-economic conditions of economics progress.

Karl Marx's idea of capitalism is inescapable tied to certain ideas and arrangements that are realized in and guaranteed by law. It is also a strong contribution to the construction of the modern idea of social bond as a confluence of economic and non economic factors. The essential legal relations of the contract and private property came to cover every time more the social relationships in evolving capitalism. The marxist ideas of structure and superstructure allow, even today, to identify how the economic structure and the activities of judicial decision-makers are linked to the specific decisions that constitute and maintain the mode of production<sup>87</sup>. Marx had distinguished between an atomized class-in-itself and a mobilized and effective class-for-itself<sup>88</sup>.

The term of social capital simply recaptures an idea present since the beginnings of the sociological tradition<sup>89</sup>. It was only recently that it was developed into what it is nowadays known as social capital. Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert Putnam - from the political science part- are the main authors who have shaped the concept of social capital in its modern application, accompanied by the contributions of innumerable authors coming from different disciplines.

Originally, the idea of social capital can be traced back up to some of the founding fathers of modern legal thought, like Alexis de Tocqueville. Tocqueville visited the United States at the beginning of the nineteenth century. With him, the European world discovered the extraordinary rich young American republic. He discovered that the American society was flourishing throughout an intense network of both natural and voluntary associations, of various kinds: "Americans of all ages, all stations of life, and all types of disposition are forever forming associations. There are not only commercial and industrial associations in which all take part, but others of a thousand different types – religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very limited, immensely large and very minute...Nothing, in my view, deserves more attention than the intellectual and moral associations in

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<sup>87</sup> For a general view on Marx contribution to the modern analysis of institution building and it's role on the constitution of capitalist society, see Stone, Alan: "The place of Law in the Marxian structure-superstructure archetype", in Treviño, A. Javier: *The Sociology of Law. Classic and contemporary perspectives*. New Brunswick (USA), Transaction Publishers, 2008, pags. 149-159.

<sup>88</sup> Cited in Portes, Alejandro, *op. cit.*, p.3.

<sup>89</sup> I adopt the term "sociological tradition" in the broad sense of the current study of sociological ideas and vision. Cfr. As example Nisbet, R.A.: *The sociological tradition*, Heinemann, London, caps. 1 and 3. Also, Robert Nisbet and Robert G. Perrin: *The social bond*. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1977, cap. 2.

America”<sup>90</sup>. Tocqueville’s views are still extraordinary important and prophetic findings regarding the fluent dynamism of the American society.

J. Elster stresses the figure of Tocqueville as “the first social scientist”<sup>91</sup>, in the current sense of the expression. Although his work is fragmented and not systematic, it is so, indeed, his proposal: “A new world needs a new political science” –stated at the first pages of *Democracy in America*. Even though Tocqueville is generally ignored both by sociologists and jurists, the influence of his observations on the emergency of democratic institutions in the social context of a revolutionary America is clear and even increasing over time. Tocqueville anticipated almost all the conceptual tools from an innovative perspective, such as methodical individualism, the organization of his vision of society and the functionalist and teleological approach. His work is generally seen as a dialectic antithesis of Marx’s work and figure. However, it should be read from a more fructiferous perspective, such as that of social scientist, inspired by renovation and empirical research. Elster underlines Tocqueville’s contribution to the definition of many social sciences tools: the study on the creation of social habits, preferences and needs, the generation of individual and social beliefs, the notion of self-interest and its relation to individualism and, especially, with the phenomena of coordination and cooperation. The tocquevillean idea of “social equilibrium” would influence all the future sociological tradition in all its aspects. “More than once –Tocqueville wrote in different parts of his work on democracy in America- I have sought to explain the prodigious influence that the social state seemed to me exert on the laws and mores of men”<sup>92</sup>.

The first contributions to social capital theory date from the beginning of the XXth century. In the 1920’s, L.J. Hanifan, state supervisor of rural schools in Virginia, was the first user of the term. Hanifan, referring to the importance of community involvement for successful schools, stated: “those tangible substances [that] count for most in the daily lives of people: namely good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit....The individual is helpless socially, if left to himself....If he comes into contact with his neighbour, and they with other neighbours, there will be an accumulation of social capital, which may immediately satisfy his social needs and which may bear a social potentiality sufficient to the substantial improvement of living conditions in the whole community. The community as a whole

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<sup>90</sup> Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Harper, New York, (1832) [1969], pp. 513-517, quoted by Putnam, R.D.: *Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American Community*, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2000, p.48.

<sup>91</sup> In general, see Elster, Jon: *Alexis de Tocqueville, the first social scientist*. Cambridge University Press,

<sup>92</sup> In general, see Elster, Jon, *op. cit.*, p. 97. Elster defines Tocqueville’s contribution to modern social sciences in terms of “*the most theoretically informed analyses ever written*” (pag. 191). Also interesting for this actual reevaluation of Tocqueville’s view on the role of values and beliefs on the foundation of institutions, written before most of Tocqueville’s contemporary biographies is. Hennis, Wilhelm: *La “Nueva Ciencia de la Política” de Tocqueville*, en “Revista de Estudios Políticos”(Nueva Epoca) Vol. 1981, pags. 7-38.

will benefit by the cooperation of all its parts, while the individual will find in his associations the advantages of the help, the sympathy, and the fellowship of his neighbours”<sup>93</sup>.

But it was in 1986 when Pierre Bourdieu used the term “social capital” to express the ideas that foretold the current meaning of the term. This conceptualization was followed by James Coleman in 1988.

In the 1970’s, Robert Putnam had started to publish, together with American and Italian colleagues, the results of empirical researches on the role of trust in the formation of civic traditions in modern Italy<sup>94</sup>. However, it was in 1993 when Robert Putnam and his colleagues unleashed the social capital research into its current widespread and lively phase of development<sup>95</sup>.

The first theoretical developments of the concept have centred on individuals or small groups as the units of analysis. Within these, it is possible to mention Pierre Bourdieu and James Coleman. Though with some differences, both scholars focused on the benefits accruing to individuals or families by virtue of their ties with others. The subsequent research literature followed mainly these theoretical approaches, focusing on the types of resources that accrue to persons by virtue of their social ties<sup>96</sup>. However, it was the focus on communities that caught the eyes of scholars. For Coleman the importance of communities was for the benefits it would provide to individuals. In this new trend the benefits accrued not so much to individuals as to the community as a whole. This stretching was initiated by the political scientist Robert Putnam. He started to speak about “stocks” of social capital possessed by communities and even nations.

## 2.1. Pierre Bourdieu

The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu was the first scholar, in 1986, to provide a first systematic contemporary analysis of social capital. In his article “The forms of capital”, he defined the concept as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition”<sup>97</sup>.

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<sup>93</sup> Lyda Judson Hanifan, “The Rural School Community Center”, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 67 (1916): 130-138, quotation at 130, cited in Putnam, R.D.: *Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American Community*. Simon & Schuster, N. York, 2000, p. 19.

<sup>94</sup> For a complete list of the referred empirical researches, see Putnam, Robert D, *Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993, Preface, p. 207. The referred works of Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti would give place, afterwards, to Putnam’s first significant work in the development of the idea of social capital.

<sup>95</sup> Cfr. Ostrom, Elinor and Ahn, T. K.: “The meaning of social capital and its link to collective action” in Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard and Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase (Eds.): *Handbook of Social Capital. The Tronika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics*. Edward Elgar, UK, USA, 2009, ch.2, p. 17.

<sup>96</sup> Portes, Alejandro: “The two meanings of Social Capital”, *Sociological Forum*, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2000, p.2.

<sup>97</sup> Bourdieu, Pierre, *The Forms of capital* in *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*. Ed. JG Richardson, Greenwood, New York, p. 51.

With the concept, Bourdieu explained the benefits which could accrue from the participation in a group and how there might be a voluntarily investment by a group to make it possible.

In his article, Bourdieu mainly describes the different forms of capital -cultural and social- and how these can be ultimately reduced to economic capital. In this sense, through social capital, actors can gain direct access to economic resources (loans, markets, etc.), they can increase their cultural capital (for instance, contacts with refined experts), or even can become members of institutions which provide valued credentials (institutionalized social capital). He stresses the fact that the acquisition of social capital requires deliberate investment of both economic and cultural resources<sup>98</sup>. However, he states that the processes that create these forms of social capital have their own dynamics, and that they not always clearly show their economical root, which is likely to be disguised.

Bourdieu explains that the social world is an accumulation of history, and being capital an accumulation, he allows the introduction of the concept of capital to the social sphere, as the product of accumulated labour, with all its effects. He says that it is a “*vis insita*”, inscribed in objective and subjective structures, but it is also a “*lex insita*”, an immanent law underlying the regularities of the social world.

Bourdieu continues to explain that due to the complexity of the social world, it is impossible not to introduce the concept of capital, not only in its economic connotation, which is the most widespread, but in all its forms<sup>99</sup>.

According to the author, it is possible to identify three forms of capital: “*economic capital*, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and might be institutionalized in the form of property rights”; “*cultural capital*, which is convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the forms of educational qualifications”; and “*social capital*, made up of social obligations (‘connections’), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the forms of a title of nobility”<sup>100</sup>.

He suggests that the different forms of capital eventual reduce to an economic benefit. He starts explaining that cultural capital can be, at the same time, described in three forms: in the *embodied* state (i.e., in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body), in the *objectified* state (i.e., in the form of cultural goods, such as books and instruments), in the *institutionalized* state (a form of

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<sup>98</sup> Bourdieu, Pierre, The Forms of capital in Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education. Ed. JG Richardson, Greenwood, New York, pp. 53-55.

<sup>99</sup> Getting in depth with economic theories on social capital exceeds the scope of this research.

<sup>100</sup> Bourdieu, Pierre, *op. cit.*, 47.

objectification which confers original properties on the cultural capital which it is presumed to guarantee).

Bourdieu came across the notion on cultural capital when he was trying to analyze the different scholastic performance of children coming from different social classes. He states that the scholastic yield from educational action depends on the cultural capital previously invested in the children by their families. And furthermore, the economic and social yield of the educational qualification depends on the social capital inherited, which can be used as the same time to back it up.

Building the embodied state of cultural capital requires a considerable personal effort and time; it cannot be transmitted instantaneously, but by a *habitus*. He states that cultural capital is linked to a singular person; it declines and dies with its bearer. He continues explaining that the initial accumulation and the process of appropriating objectified cultural capital depends on the cultural capital embodied in the whole family. Moreover, the link between economic and cultural capital resides in the time needed for acquisition, that is to say, the amount of free time that a person can allow himself in order to start his acquisition process.

Opposite to the embodied state of cultural capital, the objectified state of cultural capital (such as paintings, instruments, media, etc.) is transmittable due to its materiality. These can be appropriated both materially, meaning economic capital, property rights, and symbolically, in terms of embodied cultural capital. However, he says that it is effective capital as long as it is appropriated by agents and then implemented and invested as a resource for cultural production in the social classes struggles, in which the individuals wield strengths and obtain profits proportionate to their objectified capital - and therefore to the extent of their embodied capital.

Afterwards, the Bourdieu describes the institutionalized state of cultural capital, in which it is conferred institutional recognition to the cultural capital possessed by any given agent -for example, by the form of academic qualifications, which confers its holder a conventional, constant and legally guaranteed value to his cultural capital. This institutionalize state makes it possible to give economic value to a certain academic capital.

After describing what is to cultural capital and its different states, Bourdieu goes further analyzing social capital. According to the author “social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group- which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word”. According to Bourdieu, these



resources are also partially irreducible to objective relations of proximity in physical or even in an economic and social space.

Social capital depends on the exchanges of institutionalized mutual acknowledgement with a minimum of objective homogeneity. The volume of social capital possessed depends on the size of the network of connections an agent can mobilize, and on the volume of the capital, whichever the kind, that he possess in relation to those to whom he is connected.

“The profits which accrue from membership in a group are the basis of the solidarity which makes them possible”<sup>101</sup>. However, this does not mean that they are consciously pursued nor naturally produced. There is always an initial act of institution of the relationships, which will be eventually repeated and become beneficial in the short or long term. In his words: “exchange transforms the things exchanged into signs of recognition and, through the mutual recognition and the recognition of group membership which it implies, reproduces the group”<sup>102</sup>.

As he did with the other forms of capital, Bourdieu also relates social capital to economic capital, in the sense that investing in the sociability that social capital entails, requires also effort, expenditure of time and energy, which leads also to economic capital. According, to the author, there needs to be some profit, otherwise it is not worth investing for the members of the group.

Moreover, he mentions that in this kind of groups, there is a need for delegation in order to concentrate all the social capital; for example, in the case of a family, it is the *pater familias* who is entitled to represent and speak for the interests of the group, that is, the family. In other types of groups, however, it is necessary to institutionalize the delegation and delimit the responsibilities and authorizing the correspondent recognitions. This ought to be regulated by the group members in order not to jeopardize the social capital which is gathering them, and which, at the same time, they are willing to commit to for the sake of the common representation. Still, there exists the risk that the mandated agent might exert some kind of power on the group; this agent might misappropriate the capital which the group assembles. This could be also the paradoxical scenario in which, even under these conditions, it is the agent who gives the group recognition, for example, the king of a certain country. It is by him, by his name, by what he is, that the group is recognized by outsiders.

In addition, Bourdieu’s analysis stresses the fungible or convertible aspect of the different forms of capital and on the fact that eventually, they can be reduced to economic capital. He says “the different types of capital can be derived from economic capital, but only at the cost of a more or less

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<sup>101</sup> Bourdieu, Pierre, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

<sup>102</sup> Bourdieu, Pierre, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

great effort of transformation which is needed to produce the type of power effective in the field in question”. He explains that economic capital can give automatic access to certain goods and services, and how, on the other hand, other types of capital might require an investment of time or are obtained by virtue of social relationships. In his words “in contrast to the cynical but also economical transparency of economic exchange, in which equivalents change hands in the same instant, the essential ambiguity of social exchange, which presupposes misrecognition, in other words, a form of faith and bad faith (in the sense of self-deception), presupposes a much more subtle economy of time”. For instance, the transformation of economic capital into social capital requires a specific effort, be it expenditure of time, a gift, or attention. And the same happens with cultural capital: for example, in order to transmit this cultural capital within a family, the mother needs to have free time to devote to their children (by purchasing the time of others), or economic capital is needed in order to assure longer schooling period.

The conversion of the different forms of capital ensures the reproduction of capital, and these can also be distinguished according to their reproducibility or how easily they can be transmitted. However, as Bourdieu describes it, the more “disguised” the economic aspect of the exchanges, the riskier the investment.

According to John Field<sup>103</sup> Bourdieu’s sees social capital as exclusive of elites, designed to secure their relative position, and it was not likely that less privileged people could also find benefits in their social ties. Nevertheless, independently of any kind of interpretation that could be done to Bourdieu’s theory, his contribution is still an eye opener since his analysis contributes with an interesting logic of social capital and its interactions with other forms of capital and their accumulation.

## 2.2. James Coleman

The American sociologist James Coleman is one of the most important developers of the notion of social capital. In his “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital”<sup>104</sup>, with the scope of analysing dropouts in high school, he introduces the concept of social capital, describes its forms and structural conditions.

Coleman analyzes the role of social capital in the creation of human capital. He defines social capital as “a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some

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<sup>103</sup> Field, John: *Social Capital*. Routledge, London and New York, 2003, Vol. 94.

<sup>104</sup> Coleman, James S., “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital”; *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 94, 1988.

aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain action of actors- whether persons or corporate actors- within the structure”<sup>105</sup>. Under the term, Coleman includes mechanisms that generate social capital (such as reciprocity expectations and group norms), the consequences of its possession (such as direct access to resources), and the social organization that provides the context for both sources to materialize. It is important to distinguish the resources on one side, and, on another, the ability to obtain them by virtue of membership in different social structures. This distinction is explicit in Bordieu but obscured in Coleman, since equating social capital with the resources acquired through it can easily lead to tautological statements. In this sense, Lin<sup>106</sup> also makes a note on Coleman’s definition on social capital. He explains that the functional view on social capital might implicate a tautology: the causal factor is defined by its effectual factor. He proposes to treat and measure these two factors independently otherwise the theory would lose consistency if the conditional factors are part of the definitions of the primary concepts. Lin explains that these confusions are the result of expanding the notion of social capital beyond its theoretical roots in social relations and social networks.

According to Coleman, sociologists see the actor as someone socialized, and his action, within a social context, shaped by norms, rules and obligations. Economists, on the other hand, see the actor as someone self-interested, whose goals are independent, and act independently; his actions are moved by the principle of maximizing utility. In his work Coleman tries to put together these two ways of reasoning, using the social capital tool. He explains that there have been attempts from both disciplines to examine how, on one hand, social structure affects economic activity, and on the other, how the economic market is shaped by the social context. However, according to Granovetter<sup>107</sup>, there has been a failure in recognizing the importance of concrete personal relationships and networks in the creation of trust, expectations, and creating and enforcing norms, even in new institutional economics.

Coleman, in his work, wants to directly import the economic principle of rational choice in the analysis of social systems. Coleman defines social capital by explaining: “if we begin with a theory of rational action, in which each actor has control over certain resources and events, the social capital constitutes a particular kind of resource available to an actor. Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all

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<sup>105</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. S98.

<sup>106</sup> Lin, Nan, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>107</sup> Granovetter, Mark. “Economic Actions and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness”; *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 91, Issue 3 (Nov. 1985), 481-510 cited in Coleman, J.S. “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital”; *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 98, S97.

consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors – whether persons or corporate actors- within the structure. Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible”<sup>108</sup>. Coleman accepts the existence of social capital among corporate actors; the relations among corporate actors can constitute social capital for them as well (for example, information sharing).

He explains that like physical and human capital, social capital is not completely fungible. In addition, though it might facilitate certain actions, it might be harmful or useless in others. Moreover, opposite to other forms of capital, social capital exists in structures between and among actors; it is not in the actors or independent from them.

In order to better illustrate the concept of social capital, he offers some examples. In the New York diamond market, when negotiating a sale, transactions are possible due to the trustworthiness among the parties. One would handle the other a bag of stones trusting that the other would not replace any of his stones. And the only assurance for that is trust. In New York, the diamond market is mainly managed by the Jewish, which is a closed community. Marriages are among members, they live in the same community and they participate in the same synagogue. The closure of this community is what provides the basis trustworthy business among them.

Coleman provides other two very simple examples in order to show the value of social capital, both with economic and noneconomic outcomes. The first one represents a Jewish family who moves from Jerusalem to Detroit. The mother claims that social capital was different back in Jerusalem, where she felt safer in letting their children play alone without supervision. Back in Jerusalem, the social norm would imply that children would be looked at by adults in the vicinity, something that is not possible in suburban Detroit. The other example Coleman provides is the internal mechanisms in the Kahn El Khalili market in Cairo, where, when the owner of a shop is required something which his shop is not specialized into, he would become a money charger, either because he would be having a commission for taking the client to another merchant’s shop, or because new obligations would be created.

Coleman’s work focuses on the role of social capital in the creation of human capital. Just as physical capital is the product of materials that turn into tools that in their turn produce something, human capital is created by changes in the persons in terms of skills and capabilities. Social capital

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<sup>108</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

comes into scene due to its role in the the relations among the people that then produce an action. However, contrary to physical capital, social capital is less tangible.

Differentiating himself from Bourdieu, he stated that social capital was not something limited to the powerful class, but it was also available to poor or marginalised communities. According to Coleman, social capital represented a resource which involved the expectation of reciprocity, which goes beyond any individual, wanting to involve wider networks governed by trust and shared values.

According to John Field, James Coleman moving force was to place the economic theory of rational choice in contemporary sociology, and within this framework that he sought to place his concept of social capital<sup>109</sup>.

Coleman pointed out the disintegration of what he called the “primordial” social ties guaranteeing the observance of norms, which would lead to social problems such as insecurity and crime. He thus defended the community ties still in place and where these basic organizations were disappearing, he advocated for the establishment of a new organization in which economic incentives would be replacing the social capital eroded<sup>110</sup>.

The importance of Coleman’s contribution is that he highlights the importance of social capital to the creation of human capital, and the identification of some of the mechanisms through which it is generated. He also introduces an interesting discussion of the concept of “closure” which will be described in the following chapters.

It was the focus on the *community* which attracted the attention of scholars from other disciplines, such as Putnam. This “conceptual stretch<sup>111</sup>” made it possible to speak of the possession of “stocks” of social capital by communities, and even nations. According to Portes, since the individual and the collective benefits deriving from the primordial ties are not exclusive, it is possible to say that Coleman did not oppose to the use and development of the concept of social capital produced by Putnam<sup>112</sup>, as it would be described later. However Portes does stress that it is qualitatively not possible to assimilate social capital from nations to individual social capital.

In his explanation of social capital, Coleman considers lower-level structures of ongoing relationships such as family work groups. These structures enable individuals or corporate actors to

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<sup>109</sup> Field, John, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-29.

<sup>110</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, pp. S95-S120.

<sup>111</sup> Portes, Alejandro, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>112</sup> Portes, Alejandro, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

cooperate successfully with each other, to trust each other, to protect each other from abuses. Just like trust, social capital is relational<sup>113</sup>.

### 2.3. Robert Putnam<sup>114</sup>

In the 1970's, Robert Putnam, together with a group of colleagues, had initiated a series of empirical studies on the formation of civic culture in Italy. This preliminary work would give place, in 1993, to his first significant work on social capital: *Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy*<sup>115</sup>. However, it was in 2003, after he published his book *Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American Community*<sup>116</sup> that Robert Putnam became widely recognized as a proponent of social capital. Differently to Bourdieu and Coleman, Putnam comes from a political science background.

In his first work Putnam wanted to explore the origins of effective government<sup>117</sup>. Putnam's initial question was "why do some democratic governments succeed and others fail?"<sup>118</sup>. He wanted to explain the differences in the political stability and economic prosperity between the northern and the southern regions of Italy. Throughout his work he presents a complete comparative evaluation of policy processes in each of the regions of Italy. These are examined through time and space. He examined the connection between performance and civic life and discovered that some regions of Italy had vibrant networks and norms of civic engagement, whilst others had a vertical political structure and a fragmented society, within a cultural context of distrust. This led him to analyze why some regions were more civic than others. His research showed that it all went back to the middle ages when Italy was divided in two different regimes: a powerful monarchy in the south and a group of remarkable communal republics in the centre and the north. According to Putnam these traditions have had decisive consequences for the quality of public and private life in the Italian regions today.

He concluded that the better institutional performance from the northern regions was due to a more successful relationship between the government and civil society. He suggested that the origin could be traced back to the medieval ages in which, in the north, there were self-regulated city states, whereas in the south, as a consequence of the Norman autocracy, the government and civil society

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<sup>113</sup>Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, p.76.

<sup>114</sup> For an overview of the criticism risen from Putnam's thesis on social capital, for the moment, not covered in the present work, among other works, see: McLean, Scott, Schultz, David A., Steger, Manfred B. (Eds.), *Social Capital, Critical Perspectives on Community and "Bowling Alone"*, New York University Press, 2002; Portes, Alejandro: "Social Capital: its origins and applications in Modern Sociology"; *Annual Review Sociology*, 24:1-24, 1998.

<sup>115</sup> Putnam, Robert D.: *Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993.

<sup>116</sup> Putnam, Robert D.: *Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American Community*, Simon & Schuster, N. York, 2000.

<sup>117</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 15.

<sup>118</sup> Putnam, Robert D.: *Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993, p. 3.

where detached, and their relationship stained with mutual suspicion and fear, preventing institutional development.

Finally, Putnam analyzes why norms and networks of civic engagement are so powerful to actually affect government, and also they can last for long periods of time. Putnam proposes understanding institutional performance and public life from the logic of collective action and the concept of “social capital”. He concludes that institutional change shapes political life, and that the institutional success is tailored by the historic and social context<sup>119</sup>.

Putnam introduced the concept of social capital in order further elaborate on this thesis. “Social capital here refers to features of social organisation, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions”<sup>120</sup>. Social capital is presented as a phenomenon that contributes to collective action since it counterweights defectors, foster norms of reciprocity, facilitates access to information, and acts as the basis for future cooperation<sup>121</sup>. Putnam views social capital as a set of horizontal associations among people who have an effect on the productivity of the community. These associations include networks of civil engagement and social norms. The key feature for Putnam is that it facilitates coordination and cooperation for the mutual benefit of the members of the association<sup>122</sup>.

After studying the Italian case, Putnam focused on the United States. In 1995 he published the paper “Bowling Alone: America’s declining social capital”<sup>123</sup> which then gave the title to his renowned book *Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American Community*<sup>124</sup>. This work aimed at revisiting the initial hypothesis on social capital from his former research on civic traditions in Italy, through the lens of the crisis on social capital in the American society.

In this work Putnam uses the metaphor of a lonely bowler to show that Americans are less likely to play in leagues. Bowling leagues group people, who do not know each other, into a periodic activity, helping to build and sustain a wider set of networks and values that foster reciprocity and trust, fostering mutual collaboration. He proposes the thesis that social capital in the American society is declining, people are getting more isolated. Putnam suggests that the factors that have contributed to the downturn in civic engagement and social capital are, firstly, the pressures of time and money, including pressures on two-career families, secondly, suburbanization

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<sup>119</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 16

<sup>120</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 167.

<sup>121</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 173; Field, John, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

<sup>122</sup> Cfr. Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, pp. 163-176

<sup>123</sup> Putnam, Robert D., “Bowling Alone: America’s declining social capital”, *Journal of Democracy*, 96, 65-78, 1995.

<sup>124</sup> Putnam, Robert D.: *Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American Community*, Simon & Schuster, N. York, 2000.

and rising mobility, and thirdly, the effect of electronic entertainment, and in particular, television, which has made news and entertainment increasingly individualized, and then, generational change, the substitution of the civic generation by less involved children and grandchildren<sup>125</sup>.

Putnam describes that after the Second World War and during the sixties, civic associations boomed in the United States. Society had become civic-minded, respectful for public life, and willing to engage in community affairs due to a strong sense of shared identity and reciprocity. The baby boomers were approaching college and were getting involved in civic life -something that used to be normal for the middle aged<sup>126</sup>. However, this trend had declined in the last decades, and Putnam attempted to explain what happened to civic and social life in American communities, by addressing the concept of “social capital”.

Putnam explains that “social networks have value. Just as a screwdriver (physical capital) or a college education (human capital) can increase production (both individual and collective), so too social contacts affect the productivity of individuals”. For Putnam “social capital refers to connections among individuals -social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them”<sup>127</sup>. Putnam proposes trust and reciprocity as an essential element of the norms that arise from social capital networks<sup>128</sup>. According to Putnam, social capital is related to “civic virtue”, but a “civic virtue that needs to be embedded in a network of reciprocal social relations. Isolated virtuous individuals are not necessarily rich in social capital<sup>129</sup>”.

According to Putnam, social capital has an individual or private and a collective or public aspect<sup>130</sup>. Individuals form connections in order to obtain benefits. He proposes the example of ambitious job seekers and their insistent interest in networking in order to get their jobs, relying on who they know (social capital), rather than on what they know (human capital). However, social capital not only affects individuals, but also the wider community. The benefits accruing to a certain individual might be beneficial to all: in a given neighbourhood crime rate is lowered because neighbours watch out for the others. One might get this benefit even if he does not actively participate in the activity. So, in this context, Putnam

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<sup>125</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 282.

<sup>126</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 18.

<sup>127</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 19.

<sup>128</sup> Field, John, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

<sup>129</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op.cit., ibidem.*

<sup>130</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 20.



suggests that social capital can be both a “private good” and a “public good”<sup>131</sup>. Everybody can enjoy the benefits of social capital even though they have not directly invested on it. However, in order to maintain these social connections some rules might apply. Social networks imply mutual obligations of reciprocity; they are not interesting as merely contacts. There is an expectation that you or somebody else will return that favour.<sup>132</sup>

Nevertheless, networks and associated norms of reciprocity not always have positive outcomes. They benefit the persons inside the network, but, for the outsiders, it might have other than desired effects<sup>133</sup>. Social capital can be used for purposes that have negative effects on the external community. He puts the example of urban gangs, mafia, and power elites who often exploit social capital to obtain antisocial effects. Therefore, he suggests that it is important to analyze how the positive consequences of social capital (mutual support, cooperation, trust, institutional effectiveness) can be maximized and the negative effects (sectarianism, ethnocentrism, corruption) minimized<sup>134</sup>.

Some forms involve repeated, intensive, multistranded networks, such as co-workers that hang out after work, but others are more episodic, single stranded and anonymous, for example, the familiar faces you meet around the neighbourhood<sup>135</sup>. Other forms are formally organized, such as parent associations; others are informal, such as bowling leagues. Some have public purposes, such as a volunteer fire squad, and others have only private purposes, like a Rotary club<sup>136</sup>. Putnam, though, suggests that the most important distinction is between *bridging* and *bonding*<sup>137</sup>, which will be described in the following pages.

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As it can be observed from the precedent sections, the concept of social capital has been progressively broadened.

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<sup>131</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit., ibidem.*

<sup>132</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit., ibidem.*

<sup>133</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 21.

<sup>134</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 22.

<sup>135</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op.cit., ibidem.*

<sup>136</sup> Putnam, Robert D.*op. cit., ibidem.*

<sup>137</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit., ibidem.*

Social capital has been addressed from different perspectives, depending on the level at which the benefit is conceived -whether it is accrued for the group or for the individual. No matter the perspective, scholars agree on the fact that it is by the interaction of their members that social capital is reproduced and maintained. They mostly share the idea that social capital consists of resources embedded in social relations and social structure, which can be mobilized when an actor wishes to increase the likelihood of success in his actions. Social capital is an investment in social relationships through which resources of other actors can be accessed and borrowed<sup>138</sup>.

Putnam includes informal and local horizontal associations, Coleman provides hierarchical associations. Serageldin and Grootaert<sup>139</sup> provide a third view on social capital, by adding national structures such as government and the rule of law. These different views, however, have things in common: they all link economic, social and political issues and they all agree that social relationships are affected and affect economic outcomes. And they all imply that desirable social relationships and institutions have positive externalities. Sometimes, since it is not possible for individuals to appropriate these externalities, they under invest in social capital. Therefore, they create a role for public support<sup>140</sup>. They all recognize the potential that social relationships have for improving development performance but also mentioned the possibility that these might have negative outcomes. Therefore the outcomes depend on the nature of the relationship, taking into consideration norms, values and the legal and political context.

### 3. Forms of social capital

According to Coleman, the value of the concept of social capital lies in the fact that it identifies certain aspects of social structure by their function. The function is what makes valuable such features, since they can be used by the actors to realize their interests<sup>141</sup>. In the following paragraphs it will be analyzed what is it about social relations that can constitute a useful resource for individuals, using as a base Coleman's work<sup>142</sup>. These forms or functions of social capital can be

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<sup>138</sup> Lin, Nan, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-24.

<sup>139</sup> Cfr. Serageldin, Ismail and Grootaert, Christiaan, "Defining Social Capital: An Integrating View" in Dasgupta, Partha and Serageldin, Ismail: *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*, The World Bank, Washington D. C., 2000, pp. 40-58.

<sup>140</sup> Serageldin, Ismail and Grootaert, Christiaan, *op. cit.*, p. 46-47.

<sup>141</sup> Coleman, James. S., *op. cit.*, p. 305.

<sup>142</sup> Following Coleman's suggestion, these functions will not be examined critically, and how they come into being. As Coleman says "the concept of social capital can allow showing how such resources can be combined with other resources to produce different system/level behavior or, in other cases, different outcomes for individuals" (Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*).

carried out formally or informally, and can be applied within and across different levels of social organizations<sup>143</sup>.

### 3.1. Obligations, expectations and trustworthiness of structures

In explaining the nature of an obligation, Coleman talks about “credit slips”<sup>144</sup>: one person does something for another person with the expectation that the favour will be repaid in the future. However, even if both parts of the relation have a credit slip towards the other, not always these credits are fungible. This form of social capital requires two elements: trustworthiness of the social environment and the extent of obligations held.

To illustrate this, Coleman provides the example of rotating-credit associations in Southeast Asia, in which people contribute to a fund, with the expectation that one time they will receive the whole amount. Without trustworthiness among the members, the mechanism would not exist since it would prevent members from contributing without the fear that one person might drop out after receiving the whole amount<sup>145</sup>. These relations could not be successful in larger urban areas, where there is disassociation of persons, disaffected organizations, in other words, less social capital.

Coleman provides the example of hierarchical structures extended families, in which there is a patriarch that has a larger set of obligations to his favour in comparison to the rest of the family. At a macro level, he provides also the example of the political scene, in which a legislator with extra resources builds, by means of these resources, a set of obligations form other legislators who do not enjoy such extensive obligations. Therefore he can obtain benefits in the voting on many issues<sup>146</sup>.

It can be inferred that the set of obligations and expectations is not always symmetric. Differences on the extension of outstanding obligations depend on the actual need of the person for help, the existence of other formal alternatives for help -such as government aid-, the degree of affluences, cultural differences, the degree of closure of the networks, the logistics of social contacts<sup>147</sup>

Trustworthiness becomes an essential element of these relations, and important form of social capital. Coleman puts the example of a couple<sup>148</sup>, in which each of them places extensive trust on the

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<sup>143</sup> Cfr. Uphoff, Norman, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-221.

<sup>144</sup> Coleman, James S.: “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital”, *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 94, p.102.

<sup>145</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 103.

<sup>146</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>147</sup> Coleman, J.S. *Foundations of Social Theory*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 1990, ch.12, p. 307.

<sup>148</sup> Coleman, J.S. “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital”; *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 94; Coleman, J.S. *Foundations of Social Theory*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 1990, ch.12, p. 307.

other and a series of actions take place from this basis, all without the fear of the other's misuse of the placed trust.

In Coleman's work, social capital is seen as a rational choice of the persons because of the expectation of being repaid in the future.<sup>149</sup>

### 3.1. Information channels

Information is an important resource for action, even though access to it might not always be easy or is time consuming. In any case, information can always be accessed through certain social relations. The social capital existing in this kind of relations is not constituted on the expectations of repayment, but merely on the information they provide<sup>150</sup>.

Coleman provides the example of a person that is not deeply interested in current events but is interested in being informed. So, instead of using his time in reading newspapers he turns to others for keeping up to date. The same happens in the case of a scientist who uses his daily interaction with his colleagues to be up to date with the research in his field<sup>151</sup>.

Information sharing can also be of great importance between parties in a contractual situation<sup>152</sup>, particularly, for instance, in receiving the accurate information about penalties for noncompliance in advance. In the presence of not effective courts, many informal associations internalize this policing role of its members. This is the example of the diamond merchants, who close a deal with a handshake and any failure to deliver on a deal means expulsion from the group; and all members accept and are aware of this possibility. However, this also applies for groups whose objectives are not so desirable for the outsiders, such as mafia groups. These groups use social capital to structure their organizations, the same as cartels develop social capital in order to keep control over an industry and get more benefits<sup>153</sup>.

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<sup>149</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 308.

<sup>150</sup> Coleman, James S., "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital"; *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 94, p. 104, Lin, Nan, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

<sup>151</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>152</sup> Serageldin, Ismail and Grootaert, Christiaan, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

<sup>153</sup> Ostrom, Elinor: "Social Capital: A fad or a Fundamental Concept?" in Dasgupta, Partha and Serageldin, Ismail: *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*, The World Bank, Washington D. C., 2000, pp. 172-214 (176).

### 3.2. Norms and effective sanctions

According to Coleman, norms are intentionally established in order to minimize externalities, and generally, the benefits that come from them are captured by the ones who have established them<sup>154</sup>. He states that the capability of establishing effective norms depends on the properties of the social structure<sup>155</sup>.

An effective norm constitutes a strong form of social capital. When norms are supported by social structure, status, honour, or other rewards, it can become a very powerful form of social capital. As Coleman says, “is the social capital that builds young nations...strengthens families by leading family members to act selflessly in ‘the family’s’ interest, facilitates the development of nascent social movements through a small group of dedicated, inward-looking, and mutually rewarding members, and in general leads persons to work for the public good”<sup>156</sup>. These norms can be internalized, or can be supported by rewards or sanctions. They can facilitate action, but they can constrain actions, too. For example, effective norms in an area can reduce innovation as well<sup>157</sup>. Effective norms in a close community can restrain youngsters from having fun.

### 3.3. Authority relations<sup>158</sup>

This kind of relation occurs when a group of people decide to vest a certain person with certain rights. This person has, therefore, an extensive power based on the trust of the persons who invested him. This case brings about the problem of the free riders, when people have the same interests but do not have a common leader.

### 3.4. Appropriable social organization<sup>159</sup>

This is the example of organizations that go further the purposes for which they were created. After the initial purpose is fulfilled, the organization might aid others, constituting social capital available for use. In this kind of social structure, individuals are linked in more than one context, whereas in the close social structures, they are linked through one type of relation.

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<sup>154</sup> Coleman, James S.: *Foundations of Social Theory*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 1990, ch.12, p.316.

<sup>155</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 317.

<sup>156</sup> Coleman, James S.: “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital”; *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 94, p. 105.

<sup>157</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>158</sup> Coleman, James S.: *Foundations of Social Theory*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 1990, ch.12, p. 311.

<sup>159</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

### 3.5. Intentional organization<sup>160</sup>

This is the case of an organization which has been built as an investment; for example, business organizations, created by owners of financial capital in order to obtain benefit from it. Another example is the case of voluntary organizations that produce a public good, such as parents associations at schools. They bring benefits to the parents, the school, the community and the children. The difference in the latter case is that it benefits also people that might not participate in the association.

These kinds of associations prevent uncoordinated or opportunistic behaviour since they provide a framework within which individuals interact repeatedly, enhancing trust among members<sup>161</sup>.

### 3.6. Social structures that facilitate social capital

Coleman explains that all social relations and structures eventually facilitate some sort of social capital. According to him, actors establish relations with a purpose and continue with them in time if they provide benefits<sup>162</sup>. The different types of social capital provide different types of benefits and effects. In his words, “social organization constitutes social capital, facilitating the achievement of goals that could not be achieved in its absence”<sup>163</sup>.

### 3.7. Creation, maintenance and destruction of social capital<sup>164</sup>

Coleman suggests the following factors for the creation and destruction of social capital<sup>165</sup>:

a) Closure: In a social system or relationship where there is a weaker actor, actors who played that role are likely to develop social networks that have closure in order to strengthen their position in relation to more powerful actors.

b) Stability: Mobility of individuals within a social structure threatens social capital and the structure itself. However, this does not apply to social capital deriving from formal organizations based on positions. In this case, individuals are simply occupants of their position, and their performance, not their mobility, is what affects the structure.

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<sup>160</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 313.

<sup>161</sup> Serageldin, Ismail and Grootaert, Christiaan, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

<sup>162</sup> Coleman, James S.: “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital”; *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 94, p. 105.

<sup>163</sup> Coleman, James S.: *Foundations of Social Theory*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 1990, ch. 12, p. 304.

<sup>164</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 318.

<sup>165</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

c) Ideology: Ideology can create social capital by directing an individual on how to act or behave in the interests of something or someone different than himself. Such is the example of religious ideologies which lead people's behaviour. For instance, religious affiliated private schools have lower dropout rate than other schools, private or public. Apparently, this is the effect of the connection between school and parents, through the religious community<sup>166</sup>. However, ideology can also inhibit social capital. Coleman puts the example of individualistic ideologies, for example, the one promoting a separate relation with God, basis of much of the protestant doctrine. He puts the example of Durkheim's study on the factors leading to individualism and its effect on the tendency to commit suicide<sup>167</sup>.

d) Factors that make people less dependent on others: These factors include affluence and the possibility of having official sources of aid. The presence of these factors makes individuals to be more independent and the social capital is not generated, is not renewed. And, same as physical and human capital, social capital gets depreciated with time. Social relations need to be maintained, otherwise, eventually, they will end up fading away. Expectations and obligations fade with time, and norms require regular communication to be effective<sup>168</sup>.

### **3.7.a. Investing in social capital**

In order to better explain how social capital is created and the importance of investing on it, Uphoff<sup>169</sup> provides a comparison to an investment approach. Structural and cognitive elements of social capital can be created over time, but they cannot be simply "seeded"<sup>170</sup>. Social capital elements need to "take roots"<sup>171</sup>. Roles, rules, norms and values take a slow time to be established, though social networks are built up more quickly. At the same time, social relationships and values and norms, can erode as fast as and more easily than their process of formation. Much of the process for the creation of social capital is not planned and purposive<sup>172</sup>.

The creation of social capital requires more than introducing roles; these roles need to be accepted, they need to match people's behaviours in predictable and productive ways. A role exists when there are shared and mutual expectations about the way in which a certain person in a certain position should be behaving, and these expectations are shared by both parts of the relationships. In

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<sup>166</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 320.

<sup>167</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 321.

<sup>168</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>169</sup> Uphoff, Norman, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

<sup>170</sup> Uphoff, Norman, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>171</sup> Uphoff, Norman, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>172</sup> Uphoff, Norman, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

social organizations in which expectations are based on norms, values and beliefs, cooperation tends to be easier, since there is no need to use incentives or coercion. Establishing rules and procedures is a first step for creating structural social capital, followed by a high degree of acceptance and voluntary compliance to make them beneficial.

All forms of structural social capital are influenced by past experiences since they shape expectations on future behaviours. The enforcement and reinforcement of rules and procedures might require, though, some expenditure, in terms of training, applying sanctions, etc. At the same time, social networks require, at least at the short run, a first sacrifice.

The investment in cognitive social capital also requires some costs. The articulation of norms, values, and beliefs does not require costs, but living up to them does. Trust and solidarity will only be in place if there is enough confidence that the others will uphold this, too. Hence, people have to make sacrifices to demonstrate that they respect these norms, values and beliefs.

With the existence of shared norms, values, beliefs, and attitudes, even if people seek self-interest, they also are willing to cooperate for mutual benefit. Even if there is little social capital, there is still cooperation. Uphoff<sup>173</sup> suggests that social capital which presents a combination of self interest and altruism for cooperation is more productive, because there is other's well being in addition to oneself's. In any case, these two attitudes can indeed coexist in reality.

### **3.7.b. Blocking Social Capital**

According to Hardin "blocking social capital"<sup>174</sup> could be described as the case in which the focus is put on the individual consumption and the lack of any organizational or functional roles. Individuals would be kept away from developing their own social capital for political leadership. He provides the example of the Qaddafi and the Saudi rulers, or dictatorships, which are extremely costly to the economies of their nations. The objective is to block or destroy social capital by taking people out of various networks in which they would be able to have opportunities of connecting with others and accomplish various goals, in particular, the ones that go against the governments' will. Moreover, he puts the example of Marx, which said that social capital developed in factories not only enabled workers to act in their interests, but also, they had the daily opportunity to discuss among themselves and to really understand what where those interests. And this was not possible for

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<sup>173</sup> Uphoff, Norman, *op. cit.*, pp. 223-231.

<sup>174</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-94.



peasants, who lacked organizations, and hence, did not have the opportunity to develop the necessary social capital for mobilizing in their own interests.

#### 4. Functions and effects of Social Capital

There are innumerable studies on the effects of social capital on school performance, economic development, sources of employment, crime prevention. Associations and institutions provide an informal framework for producing diverse effects<sup>175</sup>.

Portes<sup>176</sup> distinguishes three basic functions of social capital: a) a source of social control; b) a source of family support; c) a source of benefits through extra familial networks.

**Social control.** Many studies focus on social capital as a means for rule enforcement. Sources of this type of function can be found in bounded solidarity and enforceable trust. The main effect is to make formal controls unnecessary. This is the case, of the previously cited example of the diamond traders in New York.

In this context, however, Coleman remarks that since informal family and community structures have been disappearing, there is the need to create alternative formal institutions. According to Coleman, modern sociology's task is to guide the process of social engineering that will substitute obsolete forms of control based on primordial ties with rationally devised material and status incentives. The function of social capital as a means for social control is also evident when analyzing social capital and law<sup>177</sup>.

**Family support.** According to Coleman, children that grow in single parent families or families in which both parents work have less of this type of social capital. He puts the example of Asian immigrant mothers which stay at home in order to help their children with their homework, and how parental support foster positive children outcomes.

Portes cites other examples in which the role of family support counterweights the lack of community bounds. First, the study carried out by Hagan et al (1996) in the city of Toronto showed that in migrant families, children having strong parental support would overcome better the loss of community bounds caused by migrating from another city.

Another example he provides is the one given by Gold (1995), in which he explains the change of parental roles among Israeli families in Israel and immigrant Israeli families in the United States. He

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<sup>175</sup> Serageldin, Ismail and Grootaert, Christiaan, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

<sup>176</sup> Portes, Alejandro, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>177</sup> Portes, Alejandro, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

states that in Israel there are close community bonds that facilitate the supervision and rearing of children because other members of the community assume responsibility for their well-being. However, an immigrant Israeli family in the States has to face the lack of community, in an anomic environment. Therefore, Israeli mothers compensate the lack of community ties by exclusive dedication to their children. Therefore, female labour force participation is much greater in Israel than among Israelis in the United States.

In these examples, the decrease on one type of social capital (social control) is compensated by and increase on another type (familial support).

**Benefits through extra familial networks.** This is the most common function attributed to social capital. It is commonly used as a source, for instance, for access to employment, entrepreneurial success, and occupational ladders. Granovetter (1974) spoke about “strength of weak ties” to refer to indirect influences outside the family circle. There are many studies pointing out the importance of social networks for access resources such as community credits, ethnic business enclaves, and participation in the market.

Portes ends his description by stressing that the different functions of social capital might clash among them. For example, the capacity to enforce rules (social control) can be jeopardized by the existence of close networks which facilitate the violation of those rules.

Putnam also studies the possible effects of social capital<sup>178</sup>. According to him social capital allows citizens to resolve collective problems more easily. He states that the institutional mechanism created by social norms and networks can ensure compliance with the collective will and mitigate the “prisoners’ dilemma”, “the free-rider problem”, and “the tragedy of the commons”<sup>179</sup>.

Then, “social capital greases the wheels that allow communities to advance smoothly”<sup>180</sup>. If people trust and are trustworthy, transaction costs are reduced. There is no need to spend extra money, time or efforts in assuring the businesses or social interactions.

Another positive effect of social capital is creating awareness of the many ways in which people are linked. People who have active and trusting relations with others are a positive asset to the community. They tend to be more tolerant and empathetic.

Social capital also improves people’s lives. Putnam provides measured and well-documented information to suggest that social capital does have an important impact in people’s lives. He does so

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<sup>178</sup> Cfr. Putnam, Robert D.: *Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American Community*. Simon & Schuster, N. York, 2000, ch.16.

<sup>179</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 288.

<sup>180</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit, ibidem*.

by analyzing child care and education, healthy and productive neighbourhoods, economic prosperity, health and happiness, and democratic citizenship and government performance.

#### 4.1. Negative effects of social capital

The literature on social capital mainly focuses on the positive effects of social capital. However, the resources available to individuals might be used to cause consequences that are not necessarily the most desirable for the whole of the community. Portes stresses the importance of highlighting this fact in order to “avoid the trap of presenting community networks, social control, and collective sanctions as unmixed blessings”, and in order to “keep the analysis within the bounds of serious sociological analysis rather than moralizing statements”<sup>181</sup>. He explains that recent studies have identified at least four negative consequences of social capital: exclusion of outsiders, excess claims from group members, restrictions on individual freedom, and downward levelling norms<sup>182</sup>.

Firstly, the same bonds that put together the members of a community are the ones that exclude others from belonging: for example, the already mentioned case of the traditional monopoly of Jewish merchants over the New York diamonds trade. This situation was already identified in the past –for instance, when Adam Smith<sup>183</sup> argued that the meeting of merchants inevitably ended up against the interests of the public.

The second negative effect of social capital can be the limitation of other initiatives by their members. The members of the community have to attend the demands of other less productive members. Highly solidary communities give place to high levels of free-riding, diverting the efforts on opportunities for economic development.

Third, the participation in a community requires conformity. In small communities there is a strong social control: children can play in the streets without problems, neighbours look for each other. However, social control tends to be sometimes too strong and close minded, that might provoke the exit of some members. For instance, in small villages, oppressive social control can provoke the younger generations to leave.

Forth, the group solidarity can have negative effects on the mainstream society. Individual success undermines group cohesion because the latter is based on the fact that these cannot happen.

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<sup>181</sup> Portes, Alejandro, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

<sup>182</sup> Portes, Alejandro, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>183</sup> Smith A., *The Wealth of Nations*, MD: Penguin, Baltimore, 1979. (1776), p.232, cited in Portes, Alejandro: “Social Capital: its origins and applications in Modern Sociology”; *Annual Review Sociology*, 24:1-24, 1998, p.15.

Therefore, norms are downward levelled in order to put everyone at the same level, forcing the more ambitious ones to leave the group.

These examples depict a social capital whose effects are opposite to the ones celebrated in common literature. As Portes says “sociability cuts both ways<sup>184</sup>”.

Similarly to many other social theorists, Putnam, suggests that community ties restrict freedom and tolerance<sup>185</sup>. The trade-off for being free of hermetic social norms is that individuals do not longer connect as before, so, there is less tolerance about the effects of others’ actions. He states that there is a positive linkage between social capital and civic tolerance. At least for the United States, over the last decades, most changes in both tolerance and civic engagement can be traced to generational succession.

As described before, community connections could turn out to be oppressive<sup>186</sup>. However, the only way to have solidarity is by sacrificing liberty and equality. Some forms of bonding social capital may discourage creating bridging social capital. This is the case, for example, in which bonding social capital is based in ethnic groups. As he poses it “bridging and bonding social capital are good for different things. Strong ties with intimates friends may ensure chicken soup when you’re sick, but weak ties with distant acquaintances are more likely to produce leads for a new job”<sup>187</sup>. So, he suggests the dilemma is crucial from the collective point of view since it is bridging social capital the one that needs to be created for effective policies, though it is the type more difficult to create.

## 5. Features of social organization

According to Putnam, trust, norms and networks are essential elements of social organizations for the existence of social capital. In this section, the issue of networks will be discussed, in addition to what has been already explained in the precedent sections. The issues of trust and norms will be addressed in following sections, framing them in what attains to the scope of this research that is social capital and law, and in particular, trust and law and its institutions.

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<sup>184</sup> Portes, Alejandro, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

<sup>185</sup> Cfr. Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, ch. 22.

<sup>186</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 357.

<sup>187</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 363.

## 5.1. Networks

Putnam defines social capital as “features of social organizations, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions”<sup>188</sup>.

From a simple perspective, a group or network is created when at least psychologically three or more individuals define themselves as sharing certain characteristics, which may also differentiate them from others<sup>189</sup>.

Putnam makes a distinction between horizontal and vertical networks<sup>190</sup>. Horizontal networks are generally formed by persons that share the same situation, whichever they are. Contrarily, vertical networks are composed by individuals who occupy different positions. This type of networks are difficult to maintain only with trust and cooperation. Vertical network are more complex in comparison to horizontal ones, since information does not flow equally. In addition, the sanctions which support norm compliance are less likely to be imposed upwards.

Social networks vary from the size of a nuclear family to a large voluntary organization<sup>191</sup>. Individuals are born in social networks; they enter, exit and belong to social networks continuously and simultaneously. Direct and indirect ties are built through networks. To establish networks, however, requires some cost, be it, for instance, time. One can join a network because of a shared value, or because it enables cooperation and civic engagement, for instance. The decision to invest on a social tie can have different motivations: one’s well-being, economic reasons, pleasure, and so on. The benefits and costs of joining a network and continuing in it are unanticipated<sup>192</sup>. Dense networks of social exchange are a crucial condition for the rise of the norm of generalized reciprocity<sup>193</sup>. In its turn, reciprocity norms are developed through the transmission of information across individuals about who is trustworthy and who is not<sup>194</sup>.

Stickel, Mayer and Sitkin<sup>195</sup> argue that networks could be identified as a different area of research within social capital. According to them it is when networks are more extensive and stronger that social capital appears to be present, and they suggest that this is due to the presence of trust in this

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<sup>188</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>189</sup> Davis, James H. And Bartkus, Viva Ona: “Organizational trust and social capital” in Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, ch. 13, pp. 319-338 (324).

<sup>190</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 174.

<sup>191</sup> Dasgupta, Partha: “Economic Progress and the Idea of Social Capital” in Dasgupta, Partha and Serageldin, Ismail: *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*, The World Bank, Washington D. C., 2000, p. 380.

<sup>192</sup> Dasgupta, Partha, *op. cit.*, p. 381.

<sup>193</sup> Cfr. Ostrom, Elinor and Ahn, T. K.: “The meaning of social capital and its link to collective action” in Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard and Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase (Eds.): *Handbook of Social Capital. The Troika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics*. Edward Elgar, UK, USA, 2009, ch.2, p. 27.

<sup>194</sup> Ostrom, Elinor and Ahn, T. K., *op. cit.*, p. 28.

<sup>195</sup> Stickel, Darryl, Mayer, Roger C. and Sitkin, Sim B., *op. cit.*, p. 310.

relationship. So, when allowing new people in already developed networks, trust can be built by knowing one another, providing knowledge of unknown others through trusted sources, and offering increased opportunities to interact with those others. As a result, the network reduces uncertainty and the potential risk inherent in investing in social capital. Investing in social capital still means a risky exchange; however, the stronger the network and reliable the information, the more is risk mitigated. On the contrary, if networks are weak or non-existent, relationships are limited to the members with whom an individual has direct contact. In this case, there are less or no paths to get information about others' trustworthiness; thus trust is less likely to be developed. The authors, hence, stress that networks and trust are interdependent. Individuals who trust others more are more likely to form networks and share relevant information than individuals who do not trust others. Similarly, the more developed the network, the more complete the information one can collect about others' trustworthiness.

However, whilst networks can contribute to the development of trust, they cannot provide guarantee that trust will be enhanced. The possibility of getting credible information about others does not imply that one will trust them. If the others in the collective are not trustworthy, more information from the network could lower trust. Likewise, a high level of trust among members of a close group might lead this group to isolate itself and hinder trust from the larger collective.

Trust can encourage the development of networks, but does not necessarily cause them<sup>196</sup>.

### **5.1.a. Bridging and bonding social capital**

Everyday life suggests that social networks play a double sided role in development and well-being. On the one side, they are a fertile ground for nurturing trust and shared values, which reduce monitoring costs and facilitate transactions. However, networks can work in the opposite direction as well: members of the group may use their ties as a means for the pursuit of narrow interests, and organizations may lobby against the interest of other groups. The distinction between bonding and bridging and social capital reflects the different roles that networks may play in shaping a society<sup>197</sup>.

According to Putnam, the distinction between bonding and bridging social capital is one of the most important distinctions to make<sup>198</sup>. Bonding social capital (or exclusive) tends to strengthen

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<sup>196</sup> Stickle, Darryl, Mayer, Roger C. and Sitkin, Sim B., *op. cit.*, p. 311.

<sup>197</sup> Sabatini, Fabio: "The labour market" in Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard and Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase (Eds.): *Handbook of Social Capital. The Troika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics*. Edward Elgar, UK, USA, 2009, pp. 272-275.

<sup>198</sup> Putnam, Robert D.: *Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American Community*. Simon & Schuster, N. York, 2000, p. 22. He attributes coining these labels to Ross Gittel and Avis Vidal in *Community Organizing: Building Social Capital as a Development Strategy* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1998), 8.

specific identities within a homogenous group of people. Examples of bonding social capital are ethnic fraternal organizations, church-based women's reading groups<sup>199</sup>. Bridging social capital (or inclusive) tends to group people coming from different social groups. Examples of bridging social capital are civil rights movements, youth service groups, ecumenical religious organizations<sup>200</sup>.

Each of them meets a different need. On one hand bonding social capital is good for promoting reciprocity and solidarity, and on the other is good for maintaining strong loyalty within the group and reinforcing a common identity. Dense networks within an ethnic enclave mean an important social and psychological element. Mark Granovetter calls these relations "weak", as opposed to "strong" ties with relatives and intimate friends. According to him, these weak ties are more valuable than stronger ones. Putnam quotes Xavier de Souza Briggs in saying that bonding social capital is good for getting by, but bridging social capital is crucial for getting ahead<sup>201</sup>.

Bonding social capital relates to networks between homogenous groups of people that constraint their members within the group boundaries. Bridging networks are constructed on weak ties, connecting people who belong to different backgrounds<sup>202</sup>. Bridging and bonding social capital are necessary for social groups to form and interact with each other. Bonding emerges naturally and it is easier to be built, whereas bridging is more likely to have positive political and economic outcomes, but is more difficult to generate<sup>203</sup>.

The Saguaro Seminar<sup>204</sup> defines bonding social capital as "social ties that link people together with others who are primarily like them along some key dimension. For example, a group that meets of 50-year old African American men. [In reality some groups are bonding in some ways and bridging in others: for example, the Knights of Columbus is bonding with respect to religion, but bridging across social class.] In general one's social support (e.g., people who bring you chicken soup when you're sick or visit you in the hospital) tend to be your bonding social capital". Bridging social capital

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<sup>199</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>200</sup> Putnam, Robert D.: *op. cit.*, *ibidem*. He attributes coining these labels to Ross Gittel and Avis Vidal in *Community Organizing: Building Social Capital as a Development Strategy* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1998), 8.

<sup>201</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 23; Granovetter, Mark S.: "The strength of weak ties", *American Journal of Sociology* 78 (1973): 1360-1380; de Souza Briggs, Xavier: "Doing democracy up close: culture, power, and communication in community building". *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 18(1998): 1-13.

<sup>202</sup> Sabatini, Fabio, *op. cit.*, pp. 272-275.

<sup>203</sup> Letki, Natalia: "Social capital in East-Central Europe" in Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard and Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase (Eds.): *Handbook of Social Capital. The Troika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics*. Edward Elgar, UK, USA, 2009, pp. 162-176 (167).

<sup>204</sup> For further information visit: [www.hks.harvard.edu/saguaro](http://www.hks.harvard.edu/saguaro). Since 2000 the Saguaro Seminar initiative has been focusing on improving social capital measurement and the availability of social capital data. Furthermore it undertakes analysis of building social capital in a changing environment.

is defined as “social ties that link people together with others across a cleavage that typically divides society (like race, or class, or religion)”<sup>205</sup>.

Bridging social capital is useful for linking external resources and for disseminating information<sup>206</sup>. Bridging social capital can generate broader identities and reciprocities, whereas bonding narrows the possibilities.

“Bonding social capital constitutes a kind of sociological superglue, whereas bridging social capital provides a sociological WD-40”<sup>207</sup>. It is important to note that though it creates strong in-group loyalty, bonding social capital might also create a strong out-group antagonism. Nevertheless, in general terms, both forms of social capital can have powerful positive effects.

Some organizations can indeed present a mix of both forms of social capital. Putnam puts the example of the black church, which brings together people from the same race and religion across class lines<sup>208</sup>. The bonding and bridging social capital are not exclusive one from the other; they are represented in a more or less way in the different forms.

Some authors identify a further classification: “linking” social capital. This refers to the relationships among individuals, or groups of individuals which enjoy different position in terms of power, be it political or economic. This type of ties is important in terms of leverage beyond normal community linkages<sup>209</sup>.

Caulkins<sup>210</sup> provides a diagram which clearly describes the features of bonding and bridging social capital and the interaction among them. The framework allows a systematic comparison between different levels and types of social units: among nations, among nations and organizations, and among same social units along time. It is a dynamic, not static framework.

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<sup>205</sup> Definition provided by Robert Putnam’s Saguaro Seminar at John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, available at <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/saguaro/glossary.htm>.

<sup>206</sup> Field, John, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

<sup>207</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>208</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>209</sup> Sabatini, Fabio, “The labour market” in Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard and Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase (Eds.), *Handbook of Social Capital. The Troika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics* Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2009, p. 274-5. The author proposes the example of civil society organizations which allow citizens to come into contact with institutions to carry out advocacy activities through collective action.

<sup>210</sup> Caulkins, D. Douglas: “Grid-group analysis” in Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard and Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase (Eds.): *Handbook of Social Capital. The Troika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics*, Edward Elgar, UK, USA, 2009, p. 62.



**Table 2. Grid-group and bonding/bridging social capital<sup>211</sup>**

Low group High grid	High group High grid
<p>B</p> <p>Strong structure and weak incorporation, high bridging social capital low bonding social capital</p> <p>descriptive terms: isolated subordination, fatalism, apathy, clientelism</p>	<p>C</p> <p>Strong structure, strong incorporation high bridging social capital high bonding social capital</p> <p>descriptive terms: bureaucracy, hierarchy, collectivism</p>
<p>A</p> <p>Weak structure and weak incorporation low bridging social capital low bonding social capital</p> <p>descriptive terms: individualistic, competitive, entrepreneurial</p>	<p>D</p> <p>Weak structure, strong incorporation low bridging social capital high bonding social capital</p> <p>descriptive terms: egalitarian, sectarian, enclave</p>
Low group Low grid	High group Low grid

Each of these structures needs the other to define their identity. The features included in each quadrant can be found in any empirical situation. In the figure, grid refers to the degree in which an individual is constrained by external rules. Caulkins<sup>212</sup> explains that grid can be measured by at least four variables. First, autonomy, which changes inversely with grid. The greater the choice or control, the lower the grid. Second, the more insulated is the individual, the higher the grid. This insulation can be physical (for example an office remote), structural (for example hierarchy), normative (for example classified information), and symbolic (for example a prisoner with uniform). Third and fourth, reciprocity and competition. The environment is high grid if there is not much possible

<sup>211</sup> Caulkins, D. Douglas, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>212</sup> Caulkins, D. Douglas: *op. cit.*, pp. 64-69.

reciprocity. On the other hand, if there is an open market, the possibilities for competition are less constrained, and there is less grid.

Within this framework, Caulkins proposes reading the figure from a social capital point of view, in which grid is bridging social capital and group is bonding social capital. According to the author “bonding social capital unites members of the same group or category and strengthens group boundaries, while bridging social capital links different social networks or groups and mitigates the focus on group boundaries”<sup>213</sup>. Bridging social capital provides trust relations among individuals and groups that may not have face-to-face relations. In groups with high bonding and bridging social capital, individuals have the advantage of close support and close linkage to other groups. In groups with low bonding social capital, and high bridging social capital, however, a sort of clientelism is formed, in which a person who does not have the support from the group is linked to a single patron who controls the possibilities of choice available to him. The specifications included inside each quadrant represent, at the same time the characters of any social organization. He states that this grid-group framework can apply to micro to macro level organizations, from small firms to large nations. Over time, the relative dominance of the quadrants might shift weights. In addition, the context needs also to be taken into consideration, since every group has its cultural bias, its tendency towards one of the quadrants that can be more or less variable over time.

In quadrant A, both bonding and bridging social capital are poorly develop. The individualist thinks only for himself and not in the other, who might be in need. The individualist looks for the other only if he can get benefits from doing so. He does not belong to a close group nor has interest in belonging to one. If anything goes wrong they blame bad luck or personal incompetence.

Quadrant B depicts the scenario of the isolated subordination, in which the individual is constrained according to his position in the hierarchical framework. Due to the position in this hierarchical environment, some individual might not be involved in decision-making processes. When things go differently as expected, they blame fate.

In Quadrant C behaviour is controlled by positional criteria (for example, heredity or age) rather than by hierarchical rules or merit. The individuals live in a collective environment where all enjoy the same luck; they feel securely bounded and stratified. When things go wrong the blame goes to deviants, not to the system.

Quadrant D presents an environment of sectarianism or egalitarian enclavism, in which the external boundary is a constant concern. In this context, organizations that fit in this quadrant

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<sup>213</sup> Caulkins, D. Douglas, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

consider themselves unique and categorically different from other organizations. For egalitarians, the majority system threatens their way of life. Sectarian enclaves look inward rather than outward<sup>214</sup>. Since individuals belonging to these organizations believe that the outsider or different is dangerous for them, scapegoating and expulsion of unworthy members of the group happens from time to time. The concept of leadership is not accepted, since it represents inequality. Leadership might emerge, a charismatic one, though, when the group is under threat. From the outsider point of view, these organizations can be seen as sectarian or deviant.

As explained before, every social unit, be it small or large scale, potentially contains all four types. A normal community presents hierarchy in its government, individualistic enterprise, opposition from enclaves, and isolated passive members. Quadrant A provides entrepreneurship and innovation, quadrant C tries to keep the basic values and traditions, quadrant D adds self-confidence and active groups that equilibrate the hierarchists and the individualists, and there is always a group of fatalists that allow themselves to be manipulated by whoever is in power (quadrant B).

Two social units which tend to the extreme levels of group and grid appear to be problematic. Their constraints limit the possibility of building productive bridges among them or, if they manage to do so, they become toll bridges, and transaction cost become higher: high developed structures, with rules and bureaucracy and extreme closed organizations which are hostile to other sectors of society.

The closure which characterizes certain social groups will be analyzed in the following section.

### **5.1.b. Closure of social networks**


As explained previously, bonding social is characterized by closure of its network. The presence of closure means that there are enough ties between a certain number of people to guarantee the observance of the internal norms. These norms are appropriable by all members of the community and reduce transactions costs (and legal contracts).

In order to illustrate closure in social structures, Coleman provides the example depicted in fig.1. If A carries out actions that have a negative effect on B and C, B and C cannot combine forces against A (fig. 1a). However, in a structure with closure, if B and C are connected, they can act together (fig. 1b).

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<sup>214</sup> Caulkins, D. Douglas, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-6.

Figure 2. Network without (a) and with (b) closure<sup>215</sup>



According to Coleman, what makes norms effective is the closure of the social structure. Thus, it is possible to impose certain conducts due to the existence of potential collective sanctions.

The consequence of closure is that by means of a set of effective sanctions, it is possible to monitor and guide the members' behaviour. This closure is important in social structures, not only for making norms effective, but also because it creates the trustworthiness within the social structure.

In some structures, trust intermediates can constitute a substitute for closure. Coleman puts the following example: A must decide whether to trust T or not, but he has no relation with T. However, he trusts B's judgment, who does have relation with T, so he can make a better assessment based on his trustworthiness over B<sup>216</sup>.

Where there is a weaker individual in a relationship (in terms of resources), all actors of this type would try to develop closure networks so that their position can be strengthened in relation to the more powerful actors<sup>217</sup>.

Closure provides power to its members; it gives them the possibility to cope with externalities, either through the created norms, and the possibility of applying sanctions.

Lin explains that according to some scholars closure is a requirement for the utility of social capital<sup>218</sup>. For instance, Bourdieu sees social capital as the investment of the dominant class and stresses the importance of membership in a group with clear demarcation, excluding outsiders. Or Coleman proposes closure as an advantage of social capital because it ensures that trust, norms, etc., are maintained. Lin believes that the requirement of closure for the utility in social capital is not necessary or realistic<sup>219</sup>. He explains that affirming this denies the importance of building bridges,

<sup>215</sup> Coleman, James S.: "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital"; *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 94, p. 106.

<sup>216</sup> Coleman, James S.: *Foundations of Social Theory*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 1990, ch. 12, p. 318.

<sup>217</sup> Coleman, James S. *op. cit.*, p. 319.

<sup>218</sup> Lin, Nan, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>219</sup> Lin, Nan, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

weaker ties or structural holes. For some situations a close network is advantageous (a mother looking for a school for the children), but in others, looking outside the boundaries and building bridges might be more useful (looking for a job).

As Brass explains<sup>220</sup>, there might be a tendency toward connecting to friends of friends, resulting in closure, moved by the preference for interacting with other similar ourselves. According to the author, people tend to connect with others who are similar because of ease of communication, and because people are more likely to trust others who are similar to them. And by trusting the other, one thinks that the other's behaviour can be more easily predicted. He suggests that just as this might be more a natural tendency than a strategy, brokerage may be more accidental than strategic. People are always meeting new people, accidentally. This brokerage represents the majority of the people's brokerage opportunities, after which people make choices about future interactions, and introducing these new contacts to other people. Such decisions may not be calculated, but they help create the social structure that becomes social capital.

To summarize the central contributions of the social capital approach to socio-legal analysis, it is possible to recall the initial approach: the central question posed by Putnam in his initial work: which are the conditions for creating strong, responsive, effective, representative institutions? The long way of the social capital approach to the issue could be that institutions are shaped by a convergence of social factors. Institutions embedded in a strong social capital background are strong, solid and efficient. Trust, networks and shared values are the basic aggregate strength that explains success and long lasting effects on social life.

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<sup>220</sup> Brass, Daniel J.: "Connecting to brokers: strategies for acquiring social capital" in Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, pp. 260-274 (263).

## CHAPTER 2: A SOCIAL CAPITAL APPROACH

### Part I. On trust and institutions

During the last decades, and in particular, in the last years, several events have demonstrated that some institutions, formal and informal, public and private, that once represented the authority, the rule of law, respect and trustworthiness, are being questioned in their effectiveness, and even legitimacy.

Apparent lifelong regimes have been questioned and violently overthrown. The citizenship has gone out to the streets to claim responses to their actual demands (independently if they are legitimate or not). Neighbors have grouped together to march claiming for justice and solutions. An example of this, in the International arena, is the so called “Arab spring” initiated in Tunisia, which triggered protests and demonstrations all over the region, and which eventually ended, to mention two cases, with the resignation of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, and the violent uprising in Libya and the death of Muammar Gaddafi. The same feeling of protest also exploded in the so called predictable western world. The Spanish *indignados* movement, citizens who did not consider themselves to be represented by any traditional party nor favored by the measures approved by the government, raised their voices all over the country. And their voice echoed in many other countries. In this sense, Times magazine considered that the “protester” merited to be the 2011 “person of the year”<sup>221</sup>. What did these protesters had in common? They all shared a sense of disbelief in their country’s political systems, which had become inefficient or corrupt. Institutions that once could have been the point of reference now are disintegrating, and fake idols are torn into pieces. Thus, these events are radically changing the course of history.

However, after revolution, democracy does not come magically. An Egyptian girl said "I know what I don't want"<sup>222</sup>. Democracy is not automatic, and building it is not as easy as it seems. It is easy to know what you do not want, but getting to know and bring into being what you want is not an simple task. One thing is for sure, they do not want the old *statu quo*, in the case of Egypt, they do not want tyranny back: they want freedom and democracy.

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<sup>221</sup> Andersen, Kurt, “The Protester”, *Time*, 14/12/2011, available at <http://www.time.com/time/person-of-the-year/2011/>.

<sup>222</sup> Andersen, Kurt, *op. cit.*.

This picture, however, should not be read with dramatic eyes. Protests and revolutions have existed and framed history since the existence of humankind. Conflict is, at least in a latent mode, inherent to any human relation. As Ferrari explains, the issue of conflict is considered to be such a central concern in any social science, and in particular, sociology, that many scholars consider it to be a sort of a still driving force, the “*prius*” of any scientific explanation for sociality<sup>223</sup>.

The series of events that we have been facing in the last years have to be read as what they are: the making of history, that is to say, the height of the traditional *statu quo*, and transformation and rebuilding of new realities that thrive to fit the new demands of an ever changing and globalized world. And this, is neither a start nor the end, since, we have not quite arrived at the end of history<sup>224</sup>.

In the Egyptian case, the relationship between authority and citizenship has changed forever. People, particularly youth, realized that, no matter their backgrounds or their affiliation, by getting together and uniting their forces towards a common objective, they could, and actually did, change history. And it was this discovery the actual revolution<sup>225</sup>. As activist Mahmoud Adel Elhetta told Times reporter: "the only good thing Mubarak did was unite us"<sup>226</sup>.

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Modern times are undergoing a process which challenges the already known *statu quo* and the old structures. Apparently, the traditional systems and their prerequisites are no longer operative<sup>227</sup>. These might have become outdated, or, instead, it is also possible to talk about their transformation or evolution. It is no longer possible to seek safety and stability in the past; it is necessary to look forward, in the future. Traditional systems are challenged by certain issues that, though are not new, have gained unusual or new dimensions in the last years.

Society, along history, has been shaped and reshaped. We have moved from societies based on fate to those moved by human agency<sup>228</sup>. In addition, the world has become more dependant. Tight linkages among political, military, economic, financial and social spheres call for inevitable

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<sup>223</sup> Ferrari, Vincenzo, *Prima lezione di sociologia del diritto*; Editori Laterza, Bari, 2010, p. 9.

<sup>224</sup> Andersen, Kurt, *op. cit.*.

<sup>225</sup> Andersen, Kurt, *op. cit.*.

<sup>226</sup> Andersen, Kurt, *op. cit.*.

<sup>227</sup> De Giorgi, Raffaele, “The risk of risk society and the limits of law” in *Sociologia del Diritto* XXXVI/2009/2, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2009, p. 59.

<sup>228</sup> Sztompka, Piotr, *Trust. A Sociological Theory*, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 11.

cooperation. Hence, as the need for cooperation grows, so does the need to deploy trust and reliability on others.

This new social order, has expanded its horizons and possibilities at all the possible spheres, and hence, brings about also new hazards. The development of social life and technology is twofold: on one hand it provides a variety of new possibilities and alternatives, but on the other, the possibilities of disastrous failures, as well as harmful side effects (for instance, industrial catastrophes, environmental destruction, etc.). Therefore, these new possibilities also augment the risks that come with them. The more options available, the more courses of action possible, and the more unpredictable the consequences of the decision we might take. Thus, as Sztompka says, we often have to resort to trust<sup>229</sup>.

In addition, some sectors of society have become cryptic even to its own members. The complexity of organizations, institutions and technological systems, plus their global and international scope, make it sometimes difficult for the street level citizen to understand or grasp what they really are. Again, trust becomes an indispensable strategy to deal with these mysteries; trust prevents us from getting paralyzed and allows us to continue to act<sup>230</sup>.

Moreover, individuals find themselves in a weak position towards those from whom they depend. On one hand, at the micro sphere, managers of institutions and organizations, providers of services, and so forth, are most unknown to most of the individuals they serve. And on the other, individuals have little possibility of influencing, controlling, or monitoring their activities. Individuals cannot access such information and spheres, though they extremely depend on them<sup>231</sup>.

The expansion and opening of countries boundaries have also fostered the possibilities of massive migrations and constant exchange of individuals. It is normal nowadays to be surrounded by strangers and meeting new people, from different backgrounds, nationalities, cultures and ethnics. To cope with strangers, and with new realities, trust becomes a necessary resource<sup>232</sup>.

Whenever there is uncertainty on the other persons' motivations, trust comes to fill in the gap. This is the subject of the famous prisoner's dilemma. When we lack information we can either decide to defect or collaborate. Both decisions, if stable, provide equilibrium to the individual. However, given these in social scenarios, this equilibrium differs in levels of efficiency and institutional performance. In a Hobbesian scenario, actors would realize that they would be better off if they were

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<sup>229</sup> Sztompka, Piotr, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

<sup>230</sup> Sztompka, Piotr, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>231</sup> Sztompka, Piotr, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

<sup>232</sup> Sztompka, Piotr, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.



more cooperative, but getting to that point is beyond the power of any individual. A hierarchical solution has, at least, the virtue of being attainable by individuals who recognize that they don't trust their neighbors<sup>233</sup>. However, what happens when this hierarchy does not provide the trustful support individuals were seeking outside their individuals?

Social trust, norms of reciprocity and civic engagement are mutually reinforcing, in addition to successful cooperation. Effective collaborative institutions require interpersonal relationships and trust, which are internalized and reinforced by social organization. These, in their turn, are supported by norms and networks of civic engagement<sup>234</sup>.

Within this context, this research intends to identify these events, these crisis, as a window to introduce the concept of social capital and read actual events from a different and new approach. Norms and institutions that once framed people's behaviors and expectations now suffer a crisis of legitimacy and trust. The sources that once constituted the basis for the creation of norms and institutions, have now shifted. People seek new fundamentals that better represent them; they have opened their mindsets to handle other concepts and circumstances. People have realized that they share norms and values, such as reciprocity, solidarity, and that social bonds do matter and can lead them to attain goals together. And this is a boosting force than can be stronger than any political system and positive and successful benefits can be obtained.

The following sections will attempt to address the issues of trust in norms, institutions and law from a social capital perspective. The essence of what social capital theory has to say in these issues will be proposed as a new lens for re-reading the actual crisis in order to provide an innovative approach and possible way outs to understand contemporary circumstances.

## **1. Social capital and trust**

### **1.1. What is trust**

As already described in the first chapter, social capital has been identified with different issues: features of social organizations -such as trust, norms, and networks-, trust, social networks, and so

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<sup>233</sup> Cfr. Svendsen, G. T. and Svendsen, G. L. (Ed.): *Handbook of Social Capital. The Troika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics*, Edward Elgar, UK, USA, 2009, p.2; Putnam, Robert D.: *Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993, p. 178.

<sup>234</sup> Cfr. Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 181.

on. However, they all have in common one thing: the notion of trust<sup>235</sup>. As Coleman said “trust is a form of social capital”<sup>236</sup>. Whenever there is trust and trustworthiness in a group, there is more likelihood that things can be accomplished than if these were poor or did not exist. In Putnam’s words, “a society characterized by generalized reciprocity is more efficient than a distrustful society, for the same reason that money is more efficient than barter”, otherwise, every exchange will have to be controlled, and things would be more costly to be accomplished: “trustworthiness lubricates social life”<sup>237</sup>.

Throughout the last decades, there has been a numerous production on literature on the social value of trust. Political scientists, sociologists, economists, and jurists have understood that trust facilitates different types of relations and enriches the social fabric. Trust facilitates collective action and coordination among individuals and has become a main issue when speaking about “social capital”<sup>238</sup>.

Trust is enhanced when individuals are trustworthy, are networked with one another and when it is embedded in institutions that reward honest behaviour. The existence of trust among a group of individuals can often be explained as a result of other forms of social capital such as networks and institutions<sup>239</sup>.

This current concern on trust can show a culturalist turn in sociological theory, which shows the growing interest in the domain of “soft” cultural variables, intangibles and imponderables of social life<sup>240</sup>. There is much debate within social capital analysis over whether trust is a strict historical norm or based on rationality. For the economists’ rational choice theory, the lack of information concerning other people undermines trust. This is the conflict in the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma. However, sociologists such as Luhmann oppose the rational choice perspective, arguing that one person trusts when he lacks information. For Luhmann the primary function of trust is to help individuals cope

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<sup>235</sup> Dasgupta, Partha: *Economic Progress and the Idea of Social Capital* in Dasgupta, Partha and Stiglitz, Joseph: *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*, The World Bank, Washington D. C., 2000, pp. 325-423 (328).

<sup>236</sup> Coleman, J.S.: “The creation and destruction of social capital: implications for the law”, 3 *Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y* 375 1987-1988, p. 383.

<sup>237</sup> Putnam, Robert D.: *Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American Community*. N. York: Simon & Schuster, 2000, p.21.

<sup>238</sup> Cfr. Bergman, Marcelo and Rosenkrantz, Carlos (Coords.): *Confianza y derecho en América Latina*. Fondo de Cultura Económica, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, México D.F., 2009. The book addresses this idea along its different chapters.

<sup>239</sup> Ostrom, Elinor and Ahn, T. K.: *The meaning of social capital and its link to collective action* in Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard and Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase (Eds.): *Handbook of Social Capital. The Troika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics*. Edward Elgar, UK, USA, 2009, p. 22.

<sup>240</sup> Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard and Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase: *The troika of sociology, political science and economics* in Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard and Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase (Eds.): *Handbook of Social Capital. The Troika of Sociology, Political Sciences and Economics*. Edward Elgar, UK, USA, 2009, pp. 1-13.

with the increasing social complexity and uncertainty that characterizes post-industrial/modern society: we have to trust or otherwise any action would be impossible<sup>241</sup>.

Trust is an essential element in any transaction. It is what makes a market function as expected, or the reason why social actors would meet their obligations in a given agreement. This fact was assumed, but not in depth explained or recognized, for instance, in the economic theory. Similarly, in the public institutions arena, until recently it was assumed that it was the government's agents who would be trustworthy, and not the citizens. The Government, therefore, would adopt measures to enforce obligations (for example, citizens would be reluctant to pay taxes)<sup>242</sup>. However, the assumption that it is the Government the trustworthy party has also been put under the spotlight.

The crossroad comes when trust needs to be defined. Trust is used in many ways in the colloquial language. The concept of trust is understood in various ways, also depending on the level of trust which is being considered. Therefore it is important to understand trust in order to understand social capital<sup>243</sup>.

Trust is a mechanism in which an individual creates expectations about the actions of others, which might affect this individual's choice of action<sup>244</sup>. Dasgupta differentiates "confidence" from "trust". For confidence, and following Luhmann<sup>245</sup>, he understands the belief on the ability to perform adequately; whereas for trust he understands the individual's underlying motivations and incentives to behave in a certain way. For example, about police forces, one might lack confidence that the police will be effective if there is a scarcity of officers, whereas one might not trust police officers if we know that its members are corrupt. And the same can apply to other civil service and law itself<sup>246</sup>.

But what is it that moves an individual to trust another? Scholars have argued about the different elements and/or preconditions that make place for trust. Trust is constituted by many factors, such as expectations, reputation and cognitive judgements about other's motivations, which make them more or less trustworthy. And if trust is acted upon, it entails various things such as risk<sup>247</sup>.

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<sup>241</sup> Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard and Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

<sup>242</sup> Dasgupta, Partha: *Economic Progress and the Idea of Social Capital* in Dasgupta, Partha and Serageldin, Ismail: *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*, The World Bank, Washington D. C., 2000, pp. 325-423 (330).

<sup>243</sup> Cfr. Stickel, Darryl, Mayer, Roger C. and Sitkin, Sim B.: *Understanding social capital: in whom do we trust?* in Bartkus, O. V., Davis, J. H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, ch.12, pp. 304-318 (p. 6).

<sup>244</sup> Dasgupta, Partha, *op. cit.*, p. 330.

<sup>245</sup> Dasgupta, Partha, *op. cit.*, 331.

<sup>246</sup> Dasgupta, Partha, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>247</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

Almost any conception of trust is based on an expectation<sup>248</sup>. And this is a rational expectation, based on reasons for believing that the trusted person will fulfil the trust, be it the willingness to continue that relationship due to financial interests, emotional bonds or reputation, for instance. Trust can have different contexts: individuals or groups. In any of these cases, incentives and sanctions are important issues for the interaction<sup>249</sup>.

Why does a person behave in a trustworthy manner? Which are the incentives? What makes an individual trustworthy? Dasgupta explains that trust is also based on reputation, and reputation is built upon behaviours over time. People invest on reputation in order to have benefits later. In this sense, reputation can be considered an asset, to be gained not only by persons, but also by institutions and social organizations<sup>250</sup>. Individuals see the value of being considered trustworthy, particularly in views of future transactions; even a selfish person can see the value of that<sup>251</sup>. Repetitive successful interaction represents a sign of a solid network, which is a form of social capital.

How can trust or reputation be measured? According to Dasgupta, there is no unit to measure these concepts. However, it is not a crucial issue, since their value can be measured by the extent to which mutual benefits can be realized. In any case, trust is still relevant since its presence or absence determines our choices and behaviours.

Dense horizontal networks with the capacity of transmitting information across members also create an incentive to behave in a trustworthy manner<sup>252</sup>. Sometimes, these interactions are also framed within institutional rules that also represent incentives for the parties to behave according to what is expected. These rules can foresee rewards or sanctions or provide information or alternative conflict resolution mechanisms in order to be able to govern themselves<sup>253</sup>.

But what happens when in a relationship, little or nothing is known about the other parties? Not always can trust be explained by the incentives coming from the social structure. In this case, the context will provide the parties the hints on how to behave: by observation, intuition or whatever indicator might result useful for them. The context can talk about the other's reputation and motivation, and by analyzing the other's perspective to see what he is likely to gain or lose. This

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<sup>248</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>249</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-31.

<sup>250</sup> Dasgupta, Partha, *op. cit.*, pp. 333-ss.

<sup>251</sup> Ostrom, Elinor and Ahn, T. K.: *The meaning of social capital and its link to collective action* in Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard and Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase (Eds.): *Handbook of Social Capital. The Troika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics*. Edward Elgar, UK, USA, 2009, p. 24.

<sup>252</sup> Ostrom, Elinor and Ahn, T. K., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>253</sup> Ostrom, Elinor and Ahn, T. K., *op. cit.*, pp. 28-30.

knowledge might reduce uncertainty about what to expect from others and make it easier to take risks<sup>254</sup>. This scenario is the case of modern market economies and democratic political orders in which individuals are constantly dealing with others beyond the boundaries of intimate relations and close networks<sup>255</sup>.

The existence of a potential sanction acts as a strong incentive for people to fulfil their obligations, or even to make any agreement at all. However, this threat of punishment needs to be effective; individuals have to believe in effective enforcement agencies. These enforcement agencies need not be limited to the State. Society at large can also enforce these behaviours by the threat of ostracism<sup>256</sup>. An example of this is the diamond market in New York, mainly managed by the Jewish community. Market norms are enforced by the strong bonds in the community; a breach in a commercial agreement will mean that he will be segregated not only from the market, but from the community as well.

Moreover, according to Henrik Jordahl<sup>257</sup>, inequality is also a strong determinant of trust. A major economic advantage of trust is that transaction costs – especially costs of policing and enforcement – are reduced when buyers and sellers can seal an agreement with a handshake. Contrarily, in unequal societies, people are less prompt to trust others than in more egalitarian communities. And this could be due to economic, social or political factors.

## 1.2. Trust and cooperation

As a rule, levels of trust are considered to explain or predict levels of cooperation<sup>258</sup>. According to Krishna<sup>259</sup>, trust and cooperation exist in some form in every society. Even if trust is narrow, that is, limited to a small group, it does exist. The problem becomes knowing whom to trust and to what extent. So, in this sense, the task of building social capital is enlarging this circle of trust. The same happens with expectations of behaviour. How I should behave, how others will behave, and how others expect the others to behave influence every action we make. When these expectations are convergent and complement each other, cooperation is possible. In a scenario where expectations are different and detached, cooperation is more difficult. Therefore, engaging in social capital is

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<sup>254</sup> Stickel, Darryl, Mayer, Roger C. and Sitkin, Sim B., *op. cit.*, p. 311.

<sup>255</sup> Ostrom, Elinor and Ahn, T. K., *op. cit.*, p. 26.

<sup>256</sup> Dasgupta, Partha, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

<sup>257</sup> Jordahl, Henrik: *Economic inequality* in Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard and Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase (Eds.): *Handbook of Social Capital. The Troika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics*. Edward Elgar, UK, USA, 2009, p. 323-336 (323).

<sup>258</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

<sup>259</sup> Krishna, Anirudh: *Creating and Harnessing Social Capital* in Dasgupta, Partha and Serageldin, Ismail: *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*, The World Bank, Washington D. C., 2000, p. 75.

necessary for building up appropriate expectations. These expectations of trust not always come from cultural or cognitive reasons; they are also framed by existing institutions. The structural conditions in which these relationships are embedded might be more or less supportive and beneficial for these to develop. Having an institutional foundation for cooperation reinforces expectations of collaboration<sup>260</sup>.

### **1.3. Trust and distrust**

Trust has been analyzed in many different ways: starting from the perceptions of the one that is going to decide to trust, or taking into consideration the analysis of the one to be trusted, or taking into consideration what is to be trusted, or the context in which the trusting situation takes place. Moreover, discussions have gone around the issue whether trust and distrust are opposite ends of the same concept or whether they are different entities that can coexist. Roy J. Lewicki and Chad T. Brinsfield<sup>261</sup> claim that different types of trust can exist and that trust and distrust are conceptually and empirically distinct and they can healthily coexist. They state that both trust and distrust lay at the basis of the social capital existing in many interpersonal, group or organizational relationships. And this is because if the relationship is to continue to be productive, the parts involved need to constantly face how to build trust and manage distrust.

Within this context, Lewicki and Brinsfield<sup>262</sup> propose Table 3 which shows the dynamics between trust and distrust. Low trust is not the same as high distrust. Low trust suggests lack of hope, an unsure assessment of the other's behavior. High distrust suggests fear, skepticism and a need to monitor closely the other's behavior. High trust leads to hope, faith and confidence; whereas low distrust suggests no fear, skepticism and a reduced need to monitor the other.

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<sup>260</sup> Cfr. Stiglitz, Joseph: *Formal and Informal Institutions* in Dasgupta, Partha and Stiglitz, Joseph (Eds.): *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*, The World Bank, Washington D. C., 2000, pp. 59-68.

<sup>261</sup> Lewicki, Roy J. and Brinsfield, Chad T.: *Trust, distrust and building social capital* in Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social Capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, UK, USA, 2009, p. 275.

<sup>262</sup> Lewicki, Roy J. and Brinsfield, Chad. T., *op. cit.* 283.

**Table 3. Integrating trust and distrust: alternative social realities**

High Trust Characterized by: Hope Faith Confidence Assurance Initiative	High value interdependence Opportunities New initiatives  2	Trust but verify Relationships highly segmented and bounded Opportunities pursued and downside continually monitored  4
Low Trust Characterized by: No Hope No Faith No Confidence Passivity Hesitance	1 Casual acquaintances Limited interdependence Bounded, 'arm's'-transactions Professional courtesy	3 Undesirable eventualities expected and feared Harmful motives assumed Interdependence managed Pre-emption: Best offense a good defense Paranoia
	Low Distrust Characterized by: No Fear Absence of Skepticism Absence of Low Monitoring Non-vigilance	High Distrust Characterized by: Fear Skepticism Cynicism Wariness and Watchfulness Vigilance

Relationships are complex as they can represent complex realities and experiences in which one person can trust and distrust the other at the same time. According to Lewicki and Brinsfield, this scenario is far more functional and with varied interactions rather than a simple unidimensional one.

Trust may not begin at 'zero'<sup>263</sup>. Parties that have no information about the other nevertheless are likely to show a remarkable amount of initial trust. This minimal predisposition might be related to personalities that dispose someone to be more trusting, or because individuals might quickly rapidly process the littlest information about the other, such as external personal appearance, to determine whether he is trustworthy or not. Moreover, the trusting situation might be framed by informal or formal or normative structures providing protection in case of breach.

<sup>263</sup> Lewicki, Roy. J. and Brinsfield, Chad. T. *op. cit.*, p. 285.

## 1.4. Trust and social capital

There is wide controversy around the relationship of social capital and trust. Some scholars argue that trust is a necessary ingredient for - or antecedent of - social capital, others claim trust is a consequence, other declare that trust and social capital are essentially the same thing<sup>264</sup>.

Putnam considers trust as an important component or necessary prerequisite for social capital<sup>265</sup>. However, it is also being discussed where trust is what brings about the positive benefits, or whether trust facilitates other factors that create the benefits, in a sort of indirect model. Though this point of view has not been dominant in research, trust is a necessary but not sole ingredient for creating and sustaining social capital<sup>266</sup>. Trust requires at least accepting the vulnerability of basing one's decision on the expectations on other's behaviour, however, it does not mean that the other will eventually act as it is expected to.

Trust needs to be differentiated from trustworthiness, which is a characteristic of the parties. Trust is the willingness to be vulnerable to the other, and accept the risk. Trust can be applied across different levels: personal groups and larger communities levels. This flexibility is essential for understanding trust in social capital<sup>267</sup>.

The decision to invest in social capital is essentially a trust decision<sup>268</sup>. Trust is the willingness to be vulnerable to another party when that party cannot be monitored or controlled. When trusting is limited to a small group, trust might not present many problems. However, when trust is to be shifted to a larger group, where members do not know each other in depth, the predisposition to trust falls down. It is easier to invest in social capital when we know the group, since it is manageable and there is possibility of cohesiveness, than when we are facing a larger, collective group. In this latter case, investing in social capital gets vaguer; in larger groups monitoring becomes a problem, in particular dealing with the 'free-rider'<sup>269</sup> problem.

Free-riding in large groups is a very sensitive issue in social capital. Not only because monitoring the others' contribution is difficult, but also because there is the risk that when some members

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<sup>264</sup> For further insights on this: Davis, James H. and Bartkus, Viva Ona: *Organizational trust and social capital* in Bartkus, O. V., Davis, J. H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, pp. 319-338 (319).

<sup>265</sup> Putnam, Robert D.: *Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1993 (167-171).

<sup>266</sup> Cfr. Lewicki, Roy. J. and Brinsfield, Chad. T. *op. cit.*, pp. 276-278.

<sup>267</sup> Stickel, Darryl, Mayer, Roger C. and Sitkin, Sim B., *op. cit.*, p. 308.

<sup>268</sup> Stickel, Darryl, Mayer, Roger C. and Sitkin, Sim B., *op. cit.*, 309.

<sup>269</sup> "This is the situation where a shared resource needs to be maintained by every member of the group. However, while every member benefits from the resource, the cost of maintaining it is not allocated to any particular person or set of persons. As a result, some people will use the resource without contributing to it - a tactic known as 'free-riding'" in Stickel, Darryl, Mayer, Roger C. and Sitkin, Sim B.: *Understanding social capital: in whom do we trust?* in Bartkus, O. V., Davis, J. H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, ch.12, pp. 304-318 (309).



observe others free-riding, they might also abuse or stop contributing directly. This situation would lead to a vicious cycle of declining contribution and might threaten social capital development<sup>270</sup>.

Stickel *et al* argue that social capital is not possible without a first organizational trust. In such environment members are willing to engage in activities together, thus risk is mitigated since they are more open to being vulnerable. Social capital is built from their mutual collaboration. However, how can a community foster this initial organizational trust? According to the authors it is directly linked to the strength of its networks, the breadth and depth of its shared norms (for example, reciprocity, helpfulness), and the abilities of the members and the group itself<sup>271</sup>.

This organizational trust can be framed by different organizing mechanisms, such as market, hierarchy or clan<sup>272</sup>. In the first case the price is the mechanism for linking anonymous sellers and buyers. In the second case an acknowledged authority coordinates, commands and controls. In the case of clan, it refers to the internal rules that organize communities. When all the members of the community share these norms, they are accepting certain commitments towards the others, and hence, can interact among them without the use of market or hierarchical institutions. It is collaborative communities that provide the basis for confidence, trust and mutually reinforcing expectations. However, there is still a question to answer: how can the trust that sparks among two persons be taken to a further level, to an organization level? Heckscher and Adler suggest the existence of a 'thick' and 'thin' trust. The first one represents a high degree of confidence in others' actions due to the long-term stability of relationships, while the second one represents a lower degree of trust, such as a mere expectation that the others will to act in their own self-interest<sup>273</sup>.

However, as explained before, the literature has assumed that in a new relationship trust often begins above a 'zero' level. Lewicki and Brinsfield<sup>274</sup> propose the following forms of trust and distrust for the development of social capital:

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<sup>270</sup> Stickel, Darryl, Mayer, Roger C. and Sitkin, Sim B., *op. cit.*, pp. 309-310.

<sup>271</sup> "Our model is firmly grounded on existing trust literature and empirically tested with a sample of students and study teams in the business college of a major university. More specifically, our research investigates bonding social capital- in other words, relationships within a closed and tightly knit community – a reasonable assumption given the nature of most graduate business programs. By providing both a theoretical model and empirical evidence for organizational trust's role in creating social capital, we hope to provide direction as to how social capital may be better understood and measured in the future. The concluding discussion outlines possible implications of this model for subsequent investigations into both bonding and bridging social capital". For further information on this Davis, James H. and Bartkus, Viva Ona: *Organizational trust and social capital* in Bartkus, O. V., Davis, J. H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, pp. 319-338 (319-ss).

<sup>272</sup> Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H.: *Conclusion: frontiers of social capital research* in Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social Capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, UK, USA, 2009, p. 350.

<sup>273</sup> Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H., *op. cit.*, pp. 350-351.

<sup>274</sup> Cfr. Lewicki, Roy. J. and Brinsfield, Chad. T., *op. cit.*, pp. 291-298.

#### **1.4.a. Factors contributing to enhance trust and social capital:**

- Other's positive reputation, grounded on recommendations from other social contacts or experiences.
- Category-based trust, considering the belonging of the other to a certain social or category that merits trustworthiness.
- Role-based trust, based on the position that the other occupies in society.
- Rule-based trust, if there are formal boundaries that protect the interaction and foster the willingness to trust.
- Past history of successful interaction among the parties.
- Predictability in the other's actions, consistency in the responses to the usual stimuli and reliability on whether the other will perform as expected Positive emotions that can arise naturally and spontaneously.
- Third parties as mediators of trust.
- Development of a collective identity (at an organizational level) and identification with the organization's goals.
- Shared values and goals.
- Enabling emotional 'connections' due to a belief in that they have shared goals and values.

#### **1.4.b. Factors to manage distrust:**

- Recognize the existence of strong distrust. The authors propose some indicators of dysfunctional distrust: aversion to work with others because of perceived vulnerability of trust, suspicion about the other's motivations and intentions, history of broken agreements and unkept promises and negative characterization of the other.
- Creation of explicit agreements for managing the relationship.
- Agreement on procedures for monitoring and verifying the other's actions.
- Establishment of sanctions for violations of agreements.
- Apologize and attempt to repair trust violations in case of a breach.
- Cultivation of ways to minimize interdependence and future interaction with the other while still meeting one's own needs.
- Managing Identification based trust.

- Exploring the validity of identity, for cases in which the members are supposed to belong to a same group.
- Openly acknowledge areas of contention.
- Develop a mutually acceptable process for controlled interaction.

To sum up, trust can take different forms. Trust presents different and complex dynamics in the development and maintenance of social capital. Though it has been proposed that trust and distrust are different entities, in situations of low social capital managing distrust might be a very important first step toward developing and strengthening trust and enhancing the complex fabric of social capital<sup>275</sup>.

#### **1.4.c. The crisis of trust**

Lately, there has been an increasing concern by scholars on the apparent decline of trust in several of the advanced democracies<sup>276</sup> and regimes. However, as Hardin points out, complaining that rising distrust is something bad, means missing an important point. If the world is getting more globalized, societies are getting enlarged and so are the possibilities for interaction. Therefore, there is more need for trusting more people, but “we must have the other side of the coin: distrusting more people”<sup>277</sup>.

### **1.5. Risk**

It is not possible to talk about trust without the notion of risk. Trust could be defined as a willingness to be vulnerable to the other, who cannot be monitored or controlled in the performance of the expected behaviors<sup>278</sup>. Risk is inherent to this vulnerability. Therefore, trusting assumes taking risk into the relationship. This risk is handled according to the level of trust that the trustor eventually decides to place on the trustee: if it is superior to the risk, he will accept the risk, if the level of trust is lower than the inherent risk, the trustor will not perform the action.

The so-called risk society occupies centre stage in today’s scholarly discussions<sup>279</sup>. Besides, it is not unusual to hear the man-on-the-street talking about the risks that modernization, technology and a more connected and globalized world have brought about. The enlargement of cities has created

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<sup>275</sup> Lewicki, Roy. J. and Brinsfield, Chad. T., *op. cit.*, p. 298.

<sup>276</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

<sup>277</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

<sup>278</sup> Stückel, Darryl, Mayer, Roger C. and Sitkin, Sim B., *op. cit.*, p. 305.

<sup>279</sup> Beck, U., *La società del rischio*, Italian edition, Carocci, Roma 2000; See also the Annual Meeting of the Research Committee on Sociology of Law, I.S.A., held in Milan and Como, Italy, 9-12 July, 2008, which was specifically devoted to “Law and Justice in the Risk Society” (some of the papers discussed appeared in *Sociologia del diritto*, XXXVI/2009/2).

constant new interactions with larger numbers of people, many of them strangers. So, as Hardin<sup>280</sup> points out, the typical question of “would you say that most people can be trusted?” would need some revisiting since the “most people” of nowadays, presents a much larger category than 40 or 50 years ago. Moreover, increasing immigration and increased mixing across ethnic groups also suggest that “most people” means today something different than before.

The trade off for more opportunities and a more diverse life is being less constant and stable. People must constantly deal with new people. Trust is constantly challenged. Risks are larger, because opportunities are larger than for earlier generations. Today, people seek the support of third parties, in particular institutional support, to enforce the desired cooperation. Before, people would be backed up by community norms and the community itself would be the enforcement agency. However, people need to accept that life has changed, societies have evolved and it is not possible to go back to earlier times. As Hardin says “our lives have long since transcended such community”<sup>281</sup>. These new changes and possible scenarios have created an essential concern with trust (and trustworthiness). Today people must face the risk of failure of cooperation on more occasions than before. However, if these are handled well, the benefits are enormous. According to Hardin, the real change in risk-taking is that risks taken individually have surpassed those risks taken collectively. He says “we virtually become the risks we are willing to take, for better or for worse”<sup>282</sup>.

New opportunities imply the appearance of new risks. New risks imply new considerations, assessments, and thinking outside the already known or traditional schemes. The traditional system and environment implied safety even within its envisaged risks, already identified, with its possible solutions. The traditional ways meant certain closure associated with trust, alignment and known efficiency<sup>283</sup>. However, a new approach is required; and brokerage becomes an important tool. Brokerage means building connections across groups to increase exposure to diverse opinions and practices. Brokerage is associated with growth and innovation<sup>284</sup>. Just as Burt suggest, bridging differences today creates a risk of limiting future growth. However, the risk might be mitigated with more flexible embedding networks such as competing coalitions or safe-harbor common areas<sup>285</sup>.

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<sup>280</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 37-ss.

<sup>281</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

<sup>282</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 37-ss.

<sup>283</sup> Burt, Ronald S.: *Network duality of social capital* in Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, reaching In*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, pp. 39-40.

<sup>284</sup> Burt, Ronald S., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>285</sup> Burt, Ronald S., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

Risk entails coping with uncertainty regarding the future. As Raffaele De Giorgi states “risk becomes a generalized medium of communication”<sup>286</sup>. Even if individuals are not aware, risk underlines every reality and social system. Safety and security are assumed as given, as “the way it should be”. This might be because of the positive value that is attributed to security and the negative connotation given to risk. Traditionally, risk is required to be minimized and avoided<sup>287</sup>. However, it is not possible to assure safety no matter how hard it is tried to avoid risk. Trying to avoid risks, however, brings about new risks. Risk is related to the future, to the uncertainty of not knowing in front of new choices. The possibility of having the right information for acting belongs to past actions; choosing for the future implies, even if minimum, a risk.

The individual also needs an internal transformation in order to adapt himself to the new conditions of the more complex society. Nevertheless, following De Giorgi, this risk society need not be interpreted in an apocalyptic way. It is a risk society in the sense that the future offers now a higher number of alternatives and possibilities. In this sense, risk might also be a cultural product, sometimes, not even materially real<sup>288</sup>.

In order to face this new reality, neither morals, nor principles can be of use in indicating which the right path to follow is. De Giorgi provides the example that borders can be closed to limit mass immigration but this leads to an increase in illegal immigration and organized crime<sup>289</sup>.

Within this context, the future depends more and more on decision-making. Contemporary societies are mastering in risk management techniques. They require the capability of learning from themselves. The complex society presents simultaneity of occurrence, opacity, closure of social systems and the universal inclusion of all within them. These allow learning from the past and facing new challenges, assuming also that these challenges will bring with them new challenges as well<sup>290</sup>.

Risk today is different from risk in ancient world. Today, there is no fear to the will of the gods and fate. Risk today is the product of a world that provides much more options and possibilities than before.

What can law do about risk? Apparently law cannot do anything about it. Law can intervene before and after a contingency has happened, generally reflected in monetary terms. . Law can control which decisions are lawful and which are not, but cannot proscribe or prevent risk. At the

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<sup>286</sup> De Giorgi, Raffaele, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

<sup>287</sup> De Giorgi, Raffaele, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

<sup>288</sup> Febbrajo, A.: “For a socio-legal theory of risk” in *Sociologia del Diritto* XXXVI/2009/2, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2009, pp. 69-82 (71).

<sup>289</sup> De Giorgi, Raffaele, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

<sup>290</sup> De Giorgi, Raffaele, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

political level, politicians are undergoing more pressure and tend to dump on law the finding of solutions, which not always is possible. Therefore, bargaining power starts to expand its margins of tolerance of what is lawful and what is not. Trials get overloaded with unpredictability and the duration of processes and outcomes become uncertain<sup>291</sup>. Within this context, law is weakened in its normative function, and hence, expectations towards law are transformed<sup>292</sup>. Law provides fewer guarantees against disappointments, and access to law has become, at the same time, more risky. Law has become unable to control its stability and therefore, its validity. Politics entrust law with expectations and tasks transforming its functions and becoming more involved with the environment rather than remaining indifferent. Negotiable and tolerable illegality has become more widespread. As De Giorgi depicts, it seems as the violation of law has become more the result of a normalized mode of legal action than the result of a negation of law. In some cases law ends up reflecting the willingness of the moment; something totally different from what Kelsen had thought: i.e., it is law infringement that lays at the basis of the functions of law<sup>293</sup>. Moreover, law might not be able to create the conditions for an acceptable level of certainty required by individuals.

From a sociological perspective, however, law is not the only social structure that performs a regulatory action. There is also family, and the community, for instance. However, law is considered to be the ultimate resource for regulating in a legitimate way<sup>294</sup>. Febbrajo<sup>295</sup> identifies different strategies of risk-management for contemporary legal systems. Firstly, there should be a core of legal contents that are more resistant to change, which could be the case of fundamental rights. Secondly, there is a need to identify new legal persons able to take over the risk that can suffer individuals, for example the case of firms as a liable legal person. Thirdly, the possibility of diluting risks by implementing procedures, in which the uncertainty can be handled by the certainty of fixed steps in a known procedure. Outside these strategies, however, social changes affect legal culture. So, there is still the risk that new laws are not recognized by individuals or require a constant assessment of their possible negative effects and social impact.

Apart from the legal context, law is exposed to other new risks, brought about by the rapid transformations characterizing contemporary times. Among these, mention can be made of globalization, which has enlarged the perception of the risk range, with, for instance, the creation, every time more, of transnational legal frameworks. Moreover, multiculturalism is becoming more

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<sup>291</sup> Cfr. De Giorgi, Raffaele, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

<sup>292</sup> De Giorgi, Raffaele, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

<sup>293</sup> De Giorgi, Raffaele, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

<sup>294</sup> Febbrajo, A., *op. Cit.*, p69-70).

<sup>295</sup> Febbrajo, A., *op. cit.*, pp. 73-75.

widespread, characterized also by mass migrations and societies with different clusters of cultures, which present and require new situations of adaptation and inclusion. In addition, technical progress has also created new conditions, where new frames are needed, large distances are shortened, and they need to be handled efficiently. Therefore, the boundaries between law and other social systems seem every time more subtle. This has already occurred between law and economy, law and politics, law and science. Legal systems have to cope, nowadays, with both normative and cognitive expectations at once, in an interconnected manner. Febbrajo proposes more flexibility in law's interactions with other social systems, in which distinctions are adjustable and take risk and contingencies into account. The author speaks of "an 'ecological' law that communicates with its environment and with other social systems, trying to respect their logic and avoid any kind of hegemony<sup>296</sup>". Within this context, Maria Rosaria Ferrarese<sup>297</sup> goes into depth in the process known as "constitutional dialogue", which refers to the current practice of many judges and courts which take decisions referring not only to their own countries' constitutional law, but also taking into consideration laws and ways of reasoning from foreign or international courts. This trend involves other actors, such as private parties, lawyers, NGOs in this dialogue.

## 2. Social capital and norms

Social capital takes different forms. Some scholars, such as Putnam, identify social capital as trust, networks, norms, and social beliefs<sup>298</sup>. According to Ostrom, shared norms are forms of social capital, but norms might have different consequences. For instance, the norm of reciprocity implies a measure of asymmetry among parties<sup>299</sup>. In addition, Ostrom stresses the importance of institutions or norms fostered by community networks<sup>300</sup>.

The theory of social capital has contributed to identify new factors for the explanation of human behavior, such as trust, networks and norms. As explained in the precedent sections, the social capital theory expands the rational choice model for human decision making, fostered by neoclassical economists. The social capital theory proposes trust as the base for human cooperation; trust and

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<sup>296</sup> Febbrajo, A., *op. cit.*, p. 79.

<sup>297</sup> Ferrarese, Maria Rosaria, "Transjudicial dialogue and constitutionalism: a risk or an opportunity for democracy?" in *Sociologia del Diritto* XXXVI/2009/2, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2009, pp. 115-ss.

<sup>298</sup> Cfr. Putnam, Robert D.: *Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993; Putnam, Robert D.: *Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American Community*. N. York: Simon & Schuster, 2000.

<sup>299</sup> Ostrom, Elinor: *Social Capital: A Fad or a Fundamental Concept?* in Dasgupta, Partha and Serageldin, Ismail: *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*, The World Bank, Washington D. C., 2000, p. 177.

<sup>300</sup> Ostrom, Elinor: *What is social capital?* in Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, ch.1, pp. 26-ss.

trustworthiness of the others' intrinsic motivation underlies social relations. Two aspects of social capital, networks and norms in which individuals are embedded, reinforce cooperation by changing the pay-offs of actions. These challenge the neoclassical assumption of atomistic humans<sup>301</sup>. Community networks, norms and ongoing relationship affect individuals' behavior, reinforced by trustworthy behavior.

Norms provide further reasons for individuals to behave in a trustworthy manner. Norms indicate which is the accepted behavior within the community, and prescribe correspondent sanctions, which can be negative, in the case norms are not complied with, or positive, in the opposite case. Networks and norms, such as the norm of reciprocity, are added by social capital theory to analyze what moves individuals to behave in a trustworthy manner and cooperate.

This chapter does not intend to analyze and expose over the theory of norm creation and formation. It will only provide a quick overlook to introduce the issue.

Like in any social term, there is no just one definition of concepts. According to Coleman, norms “specify what actions are regarded by a set of persons as proper or correct, or improper or incorrect. They are purposively generated, in that those persons who initiate or help maintain a norm see themselves as benefiting from its being observed or harmed by its being violated [...] Those subscribing to a norm, or, as I will say, those holding a norm, claim a right to apply sanctions and recognize the right of others holding the norm to do so”<sup>302</sup>. As Ferrari states, a norm is a model to which a certain behaviour refers to, or can refer to, or must refer to<sup>303</sup>. Social norms frame individuals' behaviour since they encourage and constraint certain actions. Generally, norms provide positive outputs for the people that comply with them and their behaviour is accepted by the community. Norms also establish the potential sanction for those one that do not obey them. This could be a reason for which individuals have an interest in establishing norms. However, the fact that they establish them does not mean that they enforce actions; they can only control them in a coordinated way<sup>304</sup>.

Dasgupta understands social norm as a behavioral strategy that is subscribed to by all. Such strategy has to be self enforcing, and it is in the interest of all the members of the community that all

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<sup>301</sup> Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H.: *Introduction: the yet undiscovered value of social capital* in Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, pp. 1-14 (4).

<sup>302</sup> Coleman, James S: *Foundations of Social Theory*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 1990, p.242-243.

<sup>303</sup> Ferrari, Vincenzo: *Diritto e società*, Editori Laterza, Bari, 2010, p.42.

<sup>304</sup>



act in accordance to it<sup>305</sup>. The maintenance of norms depends on their regular practice at a societal level<sup>306</sup>.

Eric Posner defines social norms as “a rule that is neither promulgated by an official source, such as a court or a legislature, nor enforced by the threat of legal sanctions, yet is regularly complied with”<sup>307</sup>. According to the author, examples of these vary from norms of etiquette to customary law in prepolitical societies.

The importance of norms and their role in the functioning of societies has been stressed throughout the history of social theory. Norms are property of a social system, not of individuals who interact with them. Norms exist at the macro level though they apply their functions at the micro level; they guide, and hence, explain, individual behavior<sup>308</sup>. Norms are generated and maintained by a community that sees a benefit in observing them, and accepts a certain reward or sanction in case they observe them or not. Social norms specify what actions are regarded proper or improper by a group of people<sup>309</sup>. Individuals who are subjected to norms take them in consideration for their actions, though, generally speaking, are not determined by them. They are aware of the outcomes of their behaviors. By subscribing to a norm, individuals claim a right to apply sanctions and recognize the right of the others also. Within this context, individuals recognize the authority of other individuals to apply the sanctions or rewards. This authority is not formally vested on them, nor in a unilateral manner; it is just the result of a social consensus under which circumstances certain individuals can make use of this authority<sup>310</sup>. This process, however, exists when norms come into being, that is to say, when an individual accepts being subjected to a norm. And this happens when an individual internalizes the norm.

Coleman proposes three components of social theory: the macro to micro transition, purposive action at the micro level, and the micro to macro transition. He suggests that norms are macro construction based on actions at the micro level but which have their consequences at the macro level. Norms are a social construction which depends on a feedback process in which its positive or negative outcomes encourages or discourages certain actions. Within this framework, the process

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<sup>305</sup> Dasgupta, Partha, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

<sup>306</sup> Graeff, Peter: *Social capital: the dark side* in Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard and Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase (Eds.): *Handbook of Social Capital. The Troika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics*, Edward Elgar, UK, USA, 2009, p. 145.

<sup>307</sup> Posner, Richard A.: “Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach”; *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 87, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1997), American Economic Association, pp. 365-369.


<sup>308</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 241.

<sup>309</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 242.

<sup>310</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 243.

begins at the micro to macro level, to then be appropriated by the system, and finally comes back to the micro level.

**Figure 3. Relations of micro and macro levels in the emergence of a norm<sup>311</sup>**



## 2.1 The demand for a norm

An individual can carry out an action that has consequences on others. These others, therefore, have an interest in the first action, since the consequences can mean positive or negative externalities for them. Coleman puts the example of smoking. The action of the smoker has negative externalities on the nonsmokers. On the contrary, the house owner who removes the snow from the sidewalk in front of his house benefits the passerby<sup>312</sup>. Coleman poses the dilemma of how to limit the first action and how to encourage the second, which, in this case, refers to a public good. The dilemma is how to encourage that all the community collaborates by performing the same action. Coleman suggests that if the individuals are induced jointly to perform such action, the benefits will exceed the costs for each individual and the public good will be provided<sup>313</sup>.

When referring to public goods, each of the actors who benefits from the actions of others would be willing to exchange rights of control of his own action for rights of partial control over the action of the others. The interest on the externalities of one's own actions does not constitute a norm; it rather creates the basis for a norm, "a demand for a norm on the part of those experiencing certain externalities"<sup>314</sup>. These exchanges can be explicit or implicit. Coleman calls conjoint norms those ones in which the actors appear as both targets and beneficiaries. There is one direction of action that benefits each individual and one that does not. The problem arises when the externalities arising

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<sup>311</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 245.

<sup>312</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 249.

<sup>313</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 249-250.

<sup>314</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 251.

from the action envisaged by the norm are not immediately apparent<sup>315</sup>. In another context, there are also norms that are generated but do not necessarily cause externalities on others, such as dress codes or etiquette. These are conventional norms, even though there might be doctrinal theories about them<sup>316</sup>.

When conjoint norms exist within a homogeneous community it is possible to speak of social efficiency, since the interests for and against the action are comprised within the same actors. All actors will be better off if there is a norm to control the benefits of the individuals' actions. The right of control is not within the individual, but it is redistributed to the group as a whole. When the group is not homogeneous, social efficiency is more difficult to define, since the balance between the positive and negative externalities is not in equilibrium. This can be the case in which externalities are imposed by actors who are different from the ones that will be experiencing the externalities<sup>317</sup>.

Coleman further explains that if the action that is proscribed is not to do something, the action will be constrained and social efficiency will only be reached if there is a social relationship among the individuals. The absence of social relationships will prevent individuals from enjoying the externalities of the action<sup>318</sup>.

Coleman suggests, in addition, another issue to be taken into consideration, with regards to the distribution of the right to control other's actions. Sometimes, this distribution is unequal and the interests of some actors have more weight on the others'. This means that there is a group of individuals with more power over others who can even impose disjoint norms to others, or even not be subjected to effective sanctions themselves. This could be the example of societies in which there are rules regarding the behavior of unmarried or widow women, imposed by men, who are different from the target individuals. Or the cases of some traditional societies in which wealthy and powerful members are not subjected to effective sanctions in case of breaching a norm. The reason for this latter case might be that it is more costly to try to apply a sanction to this kind of individuals than the benefits achieved by the sanction, mainly because of the difference in power<sup>319</sup>.

According to Coleman the internalization of norms means that "an individual comes to have an internal sanctioning system which provides punishment when he carries out an action proscribed by the norm or fails to carry out an action proscribed by the norm"<sup>320</sup>. Socialization is the process by

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<sup>315</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 257.

<sup>316</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 258.

<sup>317</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 260.

<sup>318</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 262.

<sup>319</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, pp. 262-3.

<sup>320</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 293.

which norms get internalized. From young age individuals are inculcated certain norms that expect to guide their behavior throughout their lives. Though many norms are formed within communities, many others are formed early in life, within family, friends and schools.

During the socialization process, the individual tends to identify himself with the socializing agent. This process can be found in parents educating their children, states encouraging individuals to identify with the nation, or even private firms fostering different activities so that the employees identify themselves with the company, too. There is a will from the individual to identify himself with the structure, and this will is the initial step for internalizing norms<sup>321</sup>. It is interesting to note, however, that there might be an underinvestment in internalization, since apparently the benefits returning from the cost of socializing do not return in the same magnitude. A parent will not see the returns of the education when the child would leave their home; a firm can invest in increasing the human capital of its employees, however, will not be recovering the whole of it, since it is likely that an employee will change companies and apply the obtained human capital to a new structure.

The internalization of norms through habituation may seem highly efficient because it reduces the cost of compliance<sup>322</sup>. Posner suggest that norm internationalization reduces human choice, due to the threat of disapproval, or ostracism, and its negative consequences. When norms are fully internalized, the individual is not making a choice; the choice was made by its parents, educators or peers. However, if choice is to be valued from an ethical or instrumental perspective, one would need to reduce the domain in which people comply unthinkingly with norms, without questioning them. Posner provides as examples of norm-formation schooling children in tolerance, public-spiritedness, law-abidingness, respect for rights, and so forth. He states that these might encourage the student to think for himself and built in him the specific intellectual tools for questioning moral norms, such as rationalization and casuistic reasoning, and discovering latent inconsistencies between moral norms, pluralism, and moral skepticism. It will also give students knowledge about alternative norms that they might not have acquired otherwise. Ignorance of alternatives is a powerful constraint on free choice<sup>323</sup>.

According to Posner law acts as both a complement and a substitution of norms. He provides the example of the legal enforcement of contracts. On one hand contracts create specific norms for a specific activity that a centralized legal authority would lack sufficient information to regulate. So, the legal enforcement of contracts is complementing, rather than creating, the norms that would not

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<sup>321</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 295.

<sup>322</sup> Posner, Richard A., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>323</sup> Posner, Richard A., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

otherwise exist. In fact, many contracts are adhered to, even when there is no feasible means of legal enforcement, by considerations of reciprocity.

## 2.2 Norm compliance

Social networks are perceived to have an important role in the diffusion and reinforcement of norms. However, it is extremely difficult to isolate the unique role played by the network in the formation in norms<sup>324</sup>. The social capital theory adds more color to these mechanisms.

At the individual level, people feel compelled to comply with social norms. This action could be based, for instance, on the threat of the other people's sanctions, or internal moral motivations. In this case, norms can become rules of behaviour. However, this enforcement is easy when it is given within a close or tight community. Close networks are more efficient to establish and maintain norms within the group; it gets more difficult to enforce these norms outside the group.

A norm is enforced, within a community, through social sanctions. However, these sanctions need not be understood as something extreme; it simply refers to the signals that people send to one another in everyday life. A sanction is the exercise of recognizing the right of oneself and of the others' to control individuals' partially. Sanctions can be negative, if addressed to proscribe or discourage a certain action, or positive, if addressed to prescribe or encourage it<sup>325</sup>. They can also be subtle, from a disapproving look or a raised eyebrow<sup>326</sup>, or severe, up to ostracism. According to Campbell<sup>327</sup>, this process of norm enforcement through social sanctions only occurs when three conditions are given. Firstly, the prescribed behavior is generally recognized as something that everybody should do or not do. The other two conditions apply not to the norm but to the individuals: the members of the community need to recognize the legitimacy of other members to enforce these norms, and there needs to be a social relationship with these members. Moreover, Kramer<sup>328</sup> explains that if there is a further identification of the individual within the in-group or a larger collective, the sanctions or rewards will be more effective, since they will be more aware and

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<sup>324</sup> Nickerson, David W.: *Experimental approaches to the diffusion of norms* in Bartkus, Ona V., Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, p. 186.

<sup>325</sup> Cfr. Coleman, James S: *Foundations of Social Theory*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 1990, p. 248.

<sup>326</sup> Campbell, David E.: *Communities, schools and voter turnout: a case study in social norms*, in Bartkus, Ona V., Davis, James H. (eds.): *Social Capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK - Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, pp. 160-185 (164).

<sup>327</sup> Campbell, David E.: *Communities, schools and voter turnout: a case study in social norms* in Bartkus, Ona V., Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, pp. 160-185 (165-166).

<sup>328</sup> Kramer, Roderick M.: *Social capital creation: collective identities and collective action* in Bartkus, Ona V., Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, pp. 239-259 (242-243).

sensitive of social norms. Homogeneity among members facilitates the formation of social identity and the possibility of creating the above mentioned conditions.

Social relationships are an important asset for supporting actions. In order to make a social norm effective, a sanction needs to be in place to help enforce it. However, this fact also depends on the existence of a social relationship among the members. Based on Coleman's work<sup>329</sup>, consider the following situations:

**Figure 4. Structures of relations among actors that have differing potentials for the emergence of a norm<sup>330</sup>**




Figure 4a) shows the case in which the actors have no relation among themselves, so there is no possibility of imposing sanctions or rewards to the others. In figure 4b), however, there is a relationship between A<sub>1</sub> and A<sub>2</sub> and A<sub>1</sub> and A<sub>3</sub>. If A<sub>1</sub> fails to fulfill an expectation, A<sub>2</sub> and A<sub>3</sub> can only impose a sanction to A<sub>1</sub> independently. However, figure 4c) depicts the situation in which all members are interconnected. Therefore, if A<sub>1</sub> fails again, it is possible for A<sub>2</sub> and A<sub>3</sub> to apply a sanction jointly, with more likelihood of obtaining positive results. In order to arrive to an effective sanction, however, there must be good communication among members, and other interests must be involved so that they could act as leverage over each other<sup>331</sup>.

The employment of a sanction carries with it some kind of cost. However, this cost should be less than the benefit that the sanctioners would obtain for enforcing a norm. Otherwise, the sanction would not be credible, and the norm viable<sup>332</sup>.

The example described in the previous paragraph highlights the importance of closure of social networks in order to overcome failures in the system -such as free-riders or breaches of obligations

<sup>329</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 276.

<sup>330</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 276.

<sup>331</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 271-2.

<sup>332</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 272.

or disappointments in expectations. “Closure of social networks is important not only for the existence of effective norms, but also for another form of social capital: the trustworthiness of social structures that allows the proliferation of obligations and expectations”<sup>333</sup>. In an open structure, a sanction can only be pursued by the individual to whom the obligation is owed, it is difficult to build a reputation, and collective sanctions are more difficult to be applied.

Moreover, sometimes there is the possibility that the gains represent different values to the individuals. For example, the case of an expression of encouragement for another’s action might cost the person very little, but represent a grater reward for the other. Social structure also internalizes externalities. There is a potential within the social system. The benefits for carrying out an action do not limit to those ones transmitted back to the individual through the social structure, since these are amplified by the potential that exists in the structure<sup>334</sup>.

Posner<sup>335</sup> suggests four incentives for obeying norms: 1) self-enforcement providing benefits to the individual; 2) emotions; 3) expressions of disapproval, such as ridicule or ostracism; and 4) internalization, i.e. norms are obeyed due to a feeling of guilt or shame.

Putnam<sup>336</sup> states that the degree to which a community adopts a norm of reciprocity can indicate the proportion of its members who act in a trustworthy manner. Even the selfish and rational *homo economicus* would act in a trustworthy manner if faced with a strong, well-enforced norm<sup>337</sup>.

Campbell<sup>338</sup> explains that the process of norm enforcement occurs when the prescribed behavior is generally recognized as something that individuals ought to do (or, prevent themselves from doing). Individuals have to recognize the legitimacy of other members within their community to enforce the norm, and there must be among them some social relationship with those people, so that the sanctions can be effective. Campbell continues explaining that in order to strengthen norm enforcement, the individuals need to identify themselves with the community that creates the norms, otherwise, the individual would act in his own interest and sanctions would not be effective. Members that identify with the group will be much more aware and sensitive to the effects of complying or not to their norms. Moreover, homogeneity within a community also facilitates the formation of a social identity. People with shared values or backgrounds are more likely to arrive to

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<sup>333</sup> Coleman, James S.: “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital”; *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 94, 1988, pp. 107-108.

<sup>334</sup> Coleman, James S.: *Foundations of Social Theory*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 1990, p. 277.

<sup>335</sup> Posner, Richard A., *op. cit.*, pp. 365-369.

<sup>336</sup> For a further explanation refer to: Putnam, Robert D.: *Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993, pp171-176.

<sup>337</sup> Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H., *op. cit.*, p. 5.

<sup>338</sup> Campbell, David E., *op. cit.*, pp. 164-165.

a consensus on social norms, and enhance the legitimacy with which they view one another's opinion. However, the perceptions of the things that people have in common are totally dynamic. What unites some today might not in the future; people might change their views, or have in common certain things and change their views on others. Moreover, the effectiveness of norms is also given by the level of internalization. When an individual has properly internalized a certain norm, he acts accordingly, even if there is no one to judge his actions<sup>339</sup>.

Social norms not always provide positive outcomes. The assessments of good or bad outcomes depend on their cultural, political and social context. The outcomes of certain norms within a subgroup can have negative effects on the larger community. For instance, some immigrant groups create economic advantages to their members, excluding non-members and limiting exchanges with them<sup>340</sup>. This is an example of the negative outcomes or dark side of social capital, which has been explained in chapter 1.

## 2.3 Types of norms

According to Putnam<sup>341</sup>, social trust arises from two related sources: norms of reciprocity and norms of civic engagement. Norms are inculcated and maintained by socialization and sanctions, and civic education. Norms of generalized reciprocity and networks of civic engagement encourage social trust and cooperation since they reduce uncertainty and the incentives to defect others; plus, they foster future cooperation. Individuals are able to trust and be trustful due to the social norms and networks in which their actions are embedded<sup>342</sup>.

### 2.3.a Norm of reciprocity

According to Putnam<sup>343</sup> the most important norm underlying social trust is reciprocity: "The touchstone of social capital is the principle of generalized reciprocity – I'll do this for you now, without expecting anything immediately in return and perhaps without even knowing you, confident that down the road you or someone else will return the favor"<sup>344</sup>.

The value of social relations is in part given by the norm of reciprocity, which relates to expectations and trust. Though there is also self-interest in these kinds of relations, ultimately, it is

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<sup>339</sup> Campbell, David E., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>340</sup> Graeff, Peter, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

<sup>341</sup> Putnam, Robert D.: *Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 171.

<sup>342</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 177.

<sup>343</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 171.

<sup>344</sup> Putnam, Robert D.: *Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American Community*. N. York: Simon & Schuster, 2000, p. 134.



trust, at its base, what is sustaining and assuring its maintenance along time. Pure self-interest cooperation is weak since it is only a matter of one of the parties realizing that the other is not investing as much as he is doing to weaken such tie. However, people need not to be intimate for such type of relationship; it is necessary that at least he is not indifferent to the other. It is the values, norms, attitudes and social structures that frame this expectation of reciprocity which fosters investing on each other and qualify as social capital<sup>345</sup>.

Putnam explains that those members of a community who follow the principle of generalized reciprocity find their self interest is served in the fact that the favor will come back sooner or later. Some examples of short term return could be keeping an eye on your neighbor's house, or taking turns to bringing snacks to work, or caring for other's children at the play yard. Long term returns are difficult to identify, since they are difficult to distinguish from altruism and difficult to cast as self interest. In any case, the author stresses that that is what Tocqueville meant by "self-interest rightly understood"<sup>346</sup>.

Putnam explains that when each individual is able to relax himself a little, for example, no needing to double check the change given by the clerk, or double check that you closed with a key your car, transactional costs are reduced. Trust and honesty lubricate social life and generalized trust makes society more efficient. However, the maxim "honesty is the best policy" needs to be followed by all members. Social trust is a valuable asset, only if it is guaranteed<sup>347</sup>. What can assure the good faith of others? Law and efficient courts could be an answer, but using them for the simplest agreement would surely raise transaction costs. A community embedded in strong social norms could be the answer; a solid social fabric where reputation and social exchange do have value.

The norm of reciprocity is likely to be associated with dense social networks. When members trust each other, they are more likely to engage themselves in exchanges. The embeddedness of these norms depend on the pre-existing social networks, both formal and informal, horizontal (bonding together individuals of equivalent status and power) or vertical (linking unequal individuals in asymmetric relation of hierarchy and dependence)<sup>348</sup>. In real life, however, these categories are never totally separated, even prison guards occasionally fraternize with inmates.

Putnam identifies two sorts of reciprocity norms: one sometimes called "balanced" or "specific" and another called "generalized" or "diffuse". The first one refers to a simultaneous exchange of

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<sup>345</sup> Uphoff, Norman: *Understanding Social Capital: Learning from the Analysis and Experience of Participation* in Dasgupta, Partha and Stiglitz, Joseph E.: *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*, The World Bank, Washington D. C., 2000, pp. 227-231.

<sup>346</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 135.

<sup>347</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>348</sup> Putnam, Robert D.: *Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 171-176.

benefits, such as an exchange of presents at the office. The second one refers to long term relationships in which there is an expectation of repayment in the future, for instance, friendship. As the author points out, the norm of reciprocity is a highly component of social capital. Communities in which this norm is followed constraint opportunism and resolve problems of collective action.

### 2.3.b Norm of civiness

A wide variety of scholars propose civiness as essential for social trust and attitudes of cooperation, which in turn promote and sustain good government<sup>349</sup>. Putnam<sup>350</sup> argued that social connections and civic engagement have a dominant influence in public life, and that civic disengagement, declining connectedness and involvement in associational life has profound and wide-ranging effects on society and politics. One of the major recent concerns in research is whether civiness fosters political trust, and thus, whether the widespread decline in confidence in government is lined to an erosion of social capital<sup>351</sup>.

In his book *Making Democracy Work* Putnam refers to the patterns of civic involvement and social solidarity as the “civic community”<sup>352</sup>. He explains that the level of citizenship is signalled by the active participation of the people in public affairs. Citizens in the civic community need not be altruistic. However, Putnam, following Tocqueville, says that they might be ‘self-interested’ in the context of broader public needs, an interest that it is also in the interest of the others<sup>353</sup>. Furthermore, the civic community entails political equality to its members. Such community is organized in horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation, and not in vertical ones, based on authority and dependency. Moreover, citizens in a civic community are expected to be helpful, respectful and trustful, even when they differ in opinions among themselves. This is because there is tolerance. The civic community is embedded in a framework of norms and values from different social structures and practices. These structures or associations contribute to the effectiveness and stability of the democratic government because the effects towards the members and the effects towards the exterior are in a healthy equilibrium. Internally, the associations lead their members to cooperate. Putnam cites the *Civic Culture*<sup>354</sup> surveys carried out in different countries, which have shown that members of associations have demonstrated to have more political sophistication, social

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<sup>349</sup> Cfr. Pharr, Susan J. and Putnam, Robert D (Eds.): *Disaffected democracies. What's troubling the trilateral countries*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2000, ch. 8.

<sup>350</sup> Putnam, Robert D.: “Bowling Alone: America’s declining social capital”, *Journal of Democracy*, 96, 1995, pp. 65-78.

<sup>351</sup> Cfr. Pharr, Susan J. and Putnam, Robert D. (Eds.), *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>352</sup> Putnam, Robert D.: *Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993, ch.3.

<sup>353</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 88.

<sup>354</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 90.

trust and political participation. Putnam explains that participation in civic organizations inculcates skills of cooperation, as well as a sense of shared responsibility for collective endeavours<sup>355</sup>. Moreover, when people participate in cross-cutting groups, whatever their nature, their attitudes tend to be more moderate as a result of their interaction and management of different pressures.

A person's attitudes are influenced by friends, family, co-workers and neighbors. For example, children tend to follow their parents' lead in political behaviors and beliefs. These phenomena have led some to believe that interpersonal influence is obvious and ubiquitous, though complex<sup>356</sup>.

Putnam<sup>357</sup> explains that networks of civic engagement are expressed through intense horizontal social interactions. They represent a very important source for social capital since, the denser they are, the more collaborative members will be. This is so because networks of civic engagement increase interconnectedness and interaction among members, therefore, non-compliance in individual transactions will have higher costs for the defector. Furthermore, networks of civic engagement foster reciprocity. These kinds of networks also facilitate communication and information exchange on the trustworthiness of their members. Reputation, keeping promises and accepting norms are strong civic norms. Trust and cooperation depend on reliable information about the interests of the partners. In addition, networks of civic engagement are a sign of successful past collaboration, which leads to future collaboration, too. Networks of civiness are likely to be effective in horizontal relationships, not as much in vertical relationships. This is due to the fact that information flows less fluently in vertical relationships, and norms of reciprocity are less likely to be adhered to voluntarily among subordinates than equals.

Campbell<sup>358</sup> analyzed the effect of the school experience in civiness during adolescence, and then the link between adolescent engagement and adult voting. He based his work on the central importance of school in the life of the typical adolescent, and the traditional mandate of school to prepare their students as engaged citizens. He states that schools provide civic education, however, not only on the formal course, but also in more subtle ways. Research has shown that institutions, such as schools, can enhance shared norms of trustworthiness, trust and reciprocity. In this sense, schools are communities and can provide the space for its members to contribute and collaborate. He then analyzes the effect of adolescent engagement in adult voting. Adolescence is the moment

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<sup>355</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>356</sup> Nickerson, David W., *op. cit.*, p. 186.

<sup>357</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, pp. 171-176.

<sup>358</sup> Campbell, David E., *op. cit.*, pp. 172-ss.

for internalization of social norms. For his analyses he uses the data provided by the Youth Parent Socialization Study<sup>359</sup>. He concludes that the “civic climate of one’s high school has an impact on voter turnout at least 15 years following high school”. Campbell<sup>360</sup> suggests that there are two types of voters: the *homo politicus*, who votes in highly competitive situations because he believes his vote has value and can make a difference, and the *homo civicus*, who votes because he believes that voting is a civic duty. The school has a stronger impact than the peer perception, “it is the *homo civicus* climate rather than the *homo politicus* climate that makes the difference”<sup>361</sup>. He explains, though, that it is not possible to generalize individual behavior from aggregate data. His findings are not limited, though, to voter turnout or to schools, since voting is only one form of collective action, and school, one type of institution. “As scholars of business increasingly turn to the study of social capital, they are well advised to take heed that social capital not only entails the extent of individuals’ social networks, but also the communal normative culture in which those individuals are embedded”<sup>362</sup>.

## 2.4 The function of norms

The functions of social norms can be assimilated to those of legal norms. Social norms guide individuals’ behaviour or at least they offer choices of action. This fact can only be possible when social norms enjoy a high grade of legitimization by the community in which they are embedded. Thus, it can be said that they enjoy efficacy<sup>363</sup>.

Norm efficacy is related to the grade of legitimation by target individuals. Norms enjoy social legitimation when they are accepted as a guide for the choice of action from members of a community<sup>364</sup>. Some of the reasons for a norm to be effective could be, either because the target individuals share the scope or underlying values of the norm, or the threat of a negative sanction if it is not followed, or the willingness to obtain a positive sanction if the norm is complied with<sup>365</sup>.

With regards to legal norms, Pocar suggests that, though it is rare, in some cases the norm is obeyed only because it is a legal norm, and as such, it is presumed to be legitimate<sup>366</sup>. Moreover, he states that only when the legal norm and the legal system enjoy a certain minimum legitimacy, it is possible for the enforcement agency to address individual conflicts. In addition, the resolution of

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<sup>359</sup> For further information on this study and on the data analyzed, see Campbell, David E., *op. cit.*, p. 175.

<sup>360</sup> Campbell, David E., *op. cit.*, pp. 161-ss.

<sup>361</sup> Campbell, David E., *op. cit.*, p. 178.

<sup>362</sup> Campbell, David E., *op. cit.*, p. 181.

<sup>363</sup> Pocar, Valerio: *Guida al diritto contemporaneo*, Editori Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2002, p. 73.

<sup>364</sup> Pocar, Valerio, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>365</sup> Cfr. : Pocar, Valerio, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>366</sup> Pocar, Valerio, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

such conflict also needs to enjoy certain legitimacy, that is to say, it needs to be recognized as valid not only by the “winning” part, but also by the whole community, otherwise, the very function of law will be frustrated. In this case, the individual conflict would go back to the underlying social conflict that gave birth to it<sup>367</sup>. It should be noted that when legal institutions intervene in a certain conflict, they solve the problem formally, that is, from the legal system point of view; however, the conflict might not be resolved effectively, that is, removing the circumstances and reasons that provoked such conflict<sup>368</sup>.

The prime social function of law is social control. It reduces conflict, on one hand, by guiding behavior, and on the other, by resolving individual conflicts<sup>369</sup>. Legal norms stabilize expectations from members of a community. Without these, it would be impossible to leave individuals to regulate *ad hoc* each possible interaction. The possibility of foreseen possible behaviors provides individuals with the appropriate strategy for each particular case. In order for this to happen, legal norms should be known by the members all, or at least by the vast majority of members of the community.

The primary and secondary socialization process contributes to the transmission, along generations, of the legal culture of a community. The knowledge of legal norms –and this also applies for social norms–, allows the reflexivity of expectations and the possibility to guide behavior. Knowing the appropriate norm is not enough. It is also necessary to be able to know or assume the other party’s course of action<sup>370</sup>.

In addition what has already been explained, Pocar identifies some issues to be addressed with regards to the knowledge about legal norms<sup>371</sup>. For instance, the phenomenon of globalization and “localization” has provoked large migration movements. Within a same territory different groups coexist, appertaining to different cultures, which, at the same time follow different cultural – and even legal- normative systems. This circumstance is aggravated by the complexity of modern legal systems, which, it is not possible to assume to be known by the members of the community, let alone new immigrants. Moreover, though social norms tend to be clear and, generally speaking, univocal, legal norms tend to be expressed in a technical language which sometimes might be cryptic, equivocal, or even contradictory, which is difficult to assimilate and understand by the street level citizen.

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<sup>367</sup> Pocar, Valerio, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-4.

<sup>368</sup> Pocar, Valerio, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

<sup>369</sup> Pocar, Valerio: *op. cit.*, pp. 75-ss.

<sup>370</sup> Pocar, Valerio, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

<sup>371</sup> Pocar, Valerio, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-ss.

The problems just mentioned render problematic the efficacy of legal norms when confronted with other, subjective, type of norms, such as social norms (which tend to gain more importance inside a community). Members of a community might create internal strategies, framed by sub norms, the source of which could be legal norms, but not necessarily the only one<sup>372</sup>.

## 2.5 Norms and social capital

From the precedent sections it can be inferred that though trust is essential for creating and maintaining social capital, it is not enough. Trust is the baseline for other factors, such as networks, norms and institutions, and values. A network or social organization is the structure in which social capital is manifested; however, the existence of such structure does not mean that social capital exists. Positive, productive norms need also to exist to moderate the relationships among members<sup>373</sup>. When these norms are strong, social capital is created; if these are weak, it is more difficult to establish social capital. Trust takes an important role in fostering the structure for norms to be developed. However, at the same time, certain norms can also weaken social capital, for instance, the presence of dysfunctional norms in organizations, such as discrimination, incivility, diminish social capital<sup>374</sup>. This type of norms increase negative expectations and represent obstacles for establishing relationships.

In a certain way, social norms can be considered social capital<sup>375</sup>. Coleman<sup>376</sup> explains that “a prescriptive norm that constitutes an especially important form of social capital within a collectivity is the norm that one should forgo his own self-interests and act in the interests of the collectivity. A norm of this sort, reinforced by social support, status, honor, and other rewards, is the social capital which builds young nations (and which dissipates as they grow older), strengthens families by leading members to act selflessly in the family’s interest, facilitates the development of nascent social movements from a small groups of dedicated, inward looking, and mutually rewarding persons, and in general leads persons to work for the public good”. These norms act as means for social coordination that can contribute to solving problems of procurement or public goods<sup>377</sup>. Davis and

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<sup>372</sup> Pocar, Valerio, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-ss.

<sup>373</sup> Lewicki, Roy. J. and Brinsfield, Chad. T., *op. cit.*, p. 289.

<sup>374</sup> Lewicki, Roy. J. and Brinsfield, Chad. T., *op. cit.*, pp. 290-291.

<sup>375</sup> Cfr. Graeff, Peter, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-161.

<sup>376</sup> Cfr. Coleman, J.S., “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital”, *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 94; Coleman, J.S. *Foundations of Social Theory*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 1990.

<sup>377</sup> Graeff, Peter, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

Bartkus propose social capital as organizing principle<sup>378</sup>. In addition, according to Weede<sup>379</sup>, norms, together with trust, authority and institutions constitute social capital. Social capital is productive when it fosters cooperation, social order, and hence, rule of law. The rule of law facilitates two human goals that otherwise would be contradictory: individual freedom and predictability<sup>380</sup>. In an environment in which property rights, individual freedom and expectations are respected, social capital becomes an asset superior to any order without property rights<sup>381</sup>. The existence of trust among members of a community reduce coordinating and transactions costs. Individuals are more willing to comply with social norms, since trust is supporting their expectations on the others' actions. Of course, authority relations also require previous trust. Individuals who freely accept the authority of others trust their capabilities and their subjection to some efficacy mechanism<sup>382</sup>.

Informal social norms do not disappear when these are formally institutionalized by complex societies. Neither enhanced consciousness, nor internal motivations or contradictions, nor the existence of a law enforcement authority will prevail over individual personal interests or informal norms, even if they are at odds with law<sup>383</sup>.

### 3. Institutions

The study on institutions has always been the main interest of political scientist. However, recently, theorists have approached the issue from a different perspective, applying questions such as game theory and rational choice<sup>384</sup>. According to Putnam, this new institutionalism agrees on the fact that institutions shape politics and that institutions are shaped by history. However, after his study on the Italian regions, Putnam adds a third fact, that institutions' performance is shaped by the social context in which they are situated<sup>385</sup>. Formal institutions might operate differently depending on the context. With this new trend of "new institutionalism", attention is devoted to the design of institutions to improve their performance<sup>386</sup>.

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<sup>378</sup> Davis, James H. and Bartkus, Viva Ona: *Organizational trust and social capital* in Bartkus, O. V., Davis, J. H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, pp. 319-338 (349-ss).

<sup>379</sup> Weede E., *op. cit.*, p. 391.

<sup>380</sup> Weede E., *op. cit.*, p. 394.

<sup>381</sup> Weede E., *op. cit.*, p. 391.

<sup>382</sup> Weede E., *op. cit.*, p. 392.

<sup>383</sup> Weede E., *op. cit.*, p. 393.

<sup>384</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>385</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 8.

<sup>386</sup> Putnam, Robert D.: *op. cit.*, p. 10.

Broadly speaking, institutions could be defined as “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”<sup>387</sup>, or as the “prescriptions that specify what actions (or outcomes) are required, prohibited or permitted, and the sanctions authorized if the rules are not followed”<sup>388</sup>. Ferrari defines institutions as the group of norms of any nature that structures, with certain stability, social behaviour; any social behaviour considered mandatory, useful or even pleasant, within a group is considered an institution<sup>389</sup>. These definitions can be applied to different fields of human interaction.

As already said, institutions structure human interaction. Institutions are the means by which individuals cope with the basic problems and situations of life: from the environment, to defending themselves from the enemies, to social order. Thus, the norms regulating them are generally known by all the members of the community and are regarded with a certain level of value standards about what is correct and what is not, sometimes entailing a moral character, and establish a sanction for their violation<sup>390</sup>.

Institutions are created to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable structure. However, this does not mean that institutions are static. They evolve and change over time accompanying human action. They are constantly changing the known structure. Nevertheless, they do so slowly and, as North describes it, as a glacier<sup>391</sup>, changes can be observed looking back in time.

Institutions are closely linked to the environment in which they are embedded, they respond to this environment and in general terms there is an initial concordance. However, these causalities do not mean that institutions perform in an efficient way<sup>392</sup>.

It is widely accepted that institutional change influences the social, economic field, though the interaction among these and institutions has not been analyzed in depth so far<sup>393</sup>. Institutional change can be caused by many different and complex factors: change of rules, social norms, informal constraints, and change in enforcement ways. In the case of formal institutions, they can even change drastically, such as a revolution. However, in the case of informal ones, the change is less dramatic, since usually these are in embedded in such a way that it makes it more subtle.

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<sup>387</sup> North, Douglass. C.: *Institutions, Institutional change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge University Press, UK, 1997, p. 3.

<sup>388</sup> Ostrom, Elinor and Ahn, T. K.: *The meaning of social capital and its link to collective action* in Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard and Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase (Eds.): *Handbook of Social Capital. The Troika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics*. Edward Elgar, UK, USA, 2009, pp. 17-35 (28).

<sup>389</sup> Ferrari, Vincenzo: *Prima lezione di sociologia del diritto*, Editori Laterza, Bari, 2010, p. 13.

<sup>390</sup> Turner, Jonathan H.: *The Formation of Social Capital* in Dasgupta, Partha and Serageldin, Ismail: *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*, The World Bank, Washington D. C., 2000, pp. 94-146 (97).

<sup>391</sup> North, Douglass. C., *op. cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>392</sup> Stiglitz, Joseph, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-64.

<sup>393</sup> Cfr. North, Douglass. C., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.



The evolution of institutions is boosted by organizational change. Institutions describe the resources in society, and organizations are the ones that make use of them and evolve, eventually carrying institutions with them. North describes institutional change in two steps: first, by the inputs that come from the symbiotic relationship between institutions and organizations, and second, by the feedback processes by which individuals perceive and react to changes in the opportunity set<sup>394</sup>. These perceptions are, at their time, dependant on the information they receive, which is generally incomplete, and the way they process it, which is generally framed by subjective mechanisms.

Contrary to what classic economics upholds, there are many cases in which human behaviour is not guided by wealth maximizing, but by altruism or self-imposed constraints, such as honesty, reputation, and integrity, which change the outcomes of an expected rational choice. At the same time, it is possible to observe that people understand the environment through the subjective ways for processing the information they receive and through the pre established mental constructions. Human behaviour seems, therefore, more complex than it is proposed by the utility model of rational choice. Issues such as trust, reputation and other aspects of human behaviour turn out to be superior survival traits in some circumstances<sup>395</sup>. The way in which individuals decipher reality and process information plays a critical role in decision making. It accounts for ideology, subjective perceptions, and amount and quality of information received. And this can vary from person to person.

Institutions therefore are created as shared patterns to guide individuals' behaviour, and to reduce the inherent uncertainty of human interaction. A characteristic of these human interactions is their costliness, whose sources are a community's political, economic or social institutions<sup>396</sup>. Parties necessarily incur in a certain cost, higher or lower. The institutional framework is what in a certain grade determines the cost of transacting and the cost of transforming the product of exchange<sup>397</sup>. Institutions differ in complexity, in sphere of action (small or large scale) and depend on their being culturally embedded. How efficient they solve the coordination depends on the individuals, the environment, and the ability of the individuals to understand and order the environment<sup>398</sup>. Therefore, an essential factor for institutions efficiency is their enforcement. This enforcement is given by imposed constraints that vary from kinship ties, to bonding, or conduct codes. Sometimes,

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<sup>394</sup> North, Douglass. C., *op. cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>395</sup> North, Douglass. C., *op. cit.*, p. 21.

<sup>396</sup> North, Douglass. C., *op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>397</sup> North, Douglass. C., *op. cit.*, p. 34.

<sup>398</sup> North, Douglass. C., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

the enforcement requires the involvement of a third party. However, self-enforcement is not enough to prevent opportunism, cheating or free-riding.

According to Lin, institutions, together with networks, constitute the infrastructure which guides society<sup>399</sup>. However, he stresses that, though it is generally assumed that institutions affect and guide human and organizational behaviour, it is still not clear how this process takes place; how rules are learned and subscribed to; and how institutions and social networks are linked.

According to Lin, institutions, though they might not do it in an efficient way, provide the organizing principles for actions and interactions, they “uphold individual and collective identities”<sup>400</sup>. Networks reduce transaction costs and are potential vehicles for institutional transformation.

Individuals acquire institutions through different processes. One of them is socialization: families are the first unit to provide the basis to educate individuals in the shared values. Another process is through family’s networks, which provide the possibility of knowing other individuals, and parental resources, which eventually will allow the possibility of schooling. Moreover there are also institutionalizing organizations. Some of them aim at training and indoctrinating individuals in certain values and skills, associated with previously existing institutions, such as schools and academies. Other institutionalizing organizations aim at enforcing rules and controlling behaviour, such as prisons and mental hospitals.

Institutions attempt to reduce the uncertainty of everyday life. Institutions provide a frame for interaction, which can be informal (such as social norms and conventions), or formal (specifically created by people, such as law and government). Moreover, in order to be effective, sanctions must be envisaged in case of violation. Though formal institutions are easier to identify than the informal ones, both of them are equally important.

### **3.1 Informal institutions**

Just as Lin explains, institutions are a cultural outcome; they are not the product of a scientific process. Institutions guide certain values in social actions and interactions in the forms of morality, faith, ideology, decency or capability<sup>401</sup>. When these are shared, recognised, and subscribed to by the organizations, networks and individuals from a society, they constitute the institutional framework of such community.

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<sup>399</sup> Lin, Nan, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

<sup>400</sup> Lin, Nan, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

<sup>401</sup> Lin, Nan, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

Informal institutions go together with formal ones. However, informal institutions are important in themselves, too. For example, North gives the example of revolution, i.e. a discontinuous institutional change, at the end of which some informal institutions will still remain in a society despite the abrupt change in its formal institutions. Generally speaking, informal institutions derive from culture; they are embedded in knowledge, values and norms that have shaped human behaviour for a considerable time.

In a community in which there are no formal institutions, informal institutions play an essential role. These communities are characterized by a strong and dense social network which is the base for constructing the informal institutions that will provide them stability. Dense social networks enjoying a strong closure provide the necessary certainty to function efficiently. There is a strong bond among members, and deviance cannot be tolerated since it threatens the achieved stability<sup>402</sup>. However, as Ostrom *et al* point out, agreeing on an initial set of rules is not an easy task, too. It requires high levels of trust among members, otherwise, monitoring activities and defining appropriate sanctions for violations increases transactions costs. Moreover, patterns for interpretation and exceptions need also to be discovered, which occurs, generally, after some type of conflict<sup>403</sup>.

Although it might be difficult to identify informal institutions, sometimes formal institutions, and the cost of transactions give a lead. North provides the example of the decline of the interest rate in the Dutch market, in which the increasing security of property rights was a consequence of the effective interaction of formal and informal constraints<sup>404</sup>.

Coleman expresses the concern about the destruction of the informal sources of social capital which arise as by-products of other activities<sup>405</sup>. His concern is about young people's social capital, so he focuses mainly on the continuity of the family as the basic social unit. The family has been replaced by other forms of organizations, for instance, corporation, which first gathered men, and now is also absorbing women. The psychological idea of home has changed<sup>406</sup>. So, according to Coleman, all the tasks that before corresponded to the family, such as taking care and educating children and taking care of elderly people, have been assumed by the State, not always in an efficient

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<sup>402</sup> North, Douglass C., *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39.

<sup>403</sup> Ostrom, Elinor and Ahn, T. K., *op. cit.*, p. 30.

<sup>404</sup> North, Douglass C., *op. cit.*, p. 43.

<sup>405</sup> According to Coleman (Coleman, James S.: "The creation and destruction of social capital: implications for the law", 3 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 375 1987-1988, p. 397) the family does not represent any more the central place it used to have: adult members are having fewer reasons to invest on their children and more reasons to invest in their own interests. In the past, a child meant help in the family business, and assistance in the elderly age of their parents.

<sup>406</sup> Coleman, James S.: "The creation and destruction of social capital: implications for the law", 3 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 375 1987-1988, p. 397.

way. This process of change in the family unit has not been accompanied by a parallel growth in other institutions to aid these societal needs<sup>407</sup>.

Social capital differs from other forms of capital in the sense that the persons or persons that invest on it cannot capture the benefits it provides. With physical capital, the owner invests and is the direct beneficiary of the value created. If this were not possible, there would be an underinvestment. The extent in which a person can capture this value is given by a legal or logistics framework<sup>408</sup>. Nevertheless, there might also be inability to capture the value due to legal or logistics sources. Such could be the case of some socialist countries, in which there are legal limitations in exchanges, unless the State is involved<sup>409</sup>. However, this is not the case with social capital. This represents a very important difference between informal social organizations and formal social organizations such as a firm. It shows the importance of the possibility of allocating rights, made by the law. In informal or voluntary social associations, social capital is created as a by-product of actions carried out for other purposes, there is no allocation of property rights to facilitate or ensure its coming into being<sup>410</sup>.

Coleman proposes the allocation and relocation of rights as the most important contributor to the creation and destruction of social capital. He mainly focuses on this process towards individuals and corporate actors<sup>411</sup>. However, it can be suggested the same scheme to individuals and public institutions. He proposes that whatever the allocation of rights, the changes in social structures over time bring about a shift of *de facto* rights from some actors in society to others<sup>412</sup>. In particular, he explains also the importance of legal reallocation of rights in these processes. For instance, the reallocation of family rights by the creation of legal devices in labor law, such as maternity and paternity leave, limitation of working hours, etc.

However, it has to be assumed that society is changing. Values, norms and historic institutions are changing with time, adjusting to new requirements and modern times. Therefore, the “once upon a time” cannot be satisfactorily revived. Society has to be in grade of facilitating the creation for the different forms of social capital that suits the new actors and their demands<sup>413</sup>.

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<sup>407</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 398.

<sup>408</sup> Cfr. Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 393.

<sup>409</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, *ibidem.* .

<sup>410</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 394.

<sup>411</sup> Cfr. Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 398.

<sup>412</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 398.

<sup>413</sup> Coleman, James S., *op. cit.*, p. 404.

## 3.2 Formal institutions

Institutions can be formal or informal, and both types coexist in reality. They complement and improve the effectiveness of each other. Formal institutions reduce information, monitoring and enforcement costs<sup>414</sup>.

Following North's definition, institutions are the rules of the game devised by individuals in order to establish order and predictability of social outcomes. It is possible to find formal institutions in the political, economic and social sphere. They are framed by formal rules. In the case of political rules, they provide a hierarchy to the polity and its decision making structure. Written laws, administrative regulations, court decisions and so forth are formal rules written on paper and enforced by public authority<sup>415</sup>. Moreover, formal institutions encompass formal structures, such as governments, political regimes, court systems, firms, companies, nongovernmental organizations, central banks, among others. They produce goods and services that are used by the community. The State also produces goods and services and, at the same time, the formal rules that constitute part of the institutional environment. These, together with the informal institutions, structures the society and thus, constitutes the institutional environment<sup>416</sup>.

However, no formal rule can completely cover the demands of daily life, and informal rules come to fill in the gaps. For instance, when the mandates from relevant laws and official regulations are deemed impractical or improper, individuals create their own rules to *de facto* re order reality and re assign rights and responsibilities. Hence, no set of formal rules can guarantee successful development in all contexts. The type of rules that individuals will find appropriate are those that coincide with existing norms and patterns of behaviour<sup>417</sup>.

When a society develops economically, its social capital should accompany this process. The interpersonal networks will start to be replaced with formal institutions of a market-based economy, such as legal and governmental frameworks. This process might involve some decrease in social capital, but eventually this relationship will create other types of social capital, embedded in the market system<sup>418</sup>.

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<sup>414</sup> Cfr. North, Douglass. C., *op. cit.*, p. 46.

<sup>415</sup> Ostrom, Elinor and Ahn, T. K., *op. cit.*, p. 28.

<sup>416</sup> Chhibber, Ajay: *Social Capital, the State, and Development Outcomes* in Dasgupta, Partha and Serageldin, Ismail: *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*, The World Bank, Washington D. C., 2000, pp. 296-309 (297).

<sup>417</sup> Ostrom, Elinor and Ahn, T. K., *op. cit.*, p. 29.

<sup>418</sup> Cfr. Stiglitz, Joseph, *op. cit.*, pp. 563-65.

Ostrom and Ahn<sup>419</sup> explain that some scholars argue that legal rules and formal institutions are inefficient ways to solve collective-action problems and that sometimes they might even undermine the very basis for social cooperation. However, formal institutions play a very important role in sustaining and facilitating social cooperation; they can encourage or discourage individuals to behave in cooperative ways. Nevertheless, the story does not end in agreeing on an initial set of rules. If the individuals in charge of applying the rules do not trust each other, there would be a need to design further mechanisms for monitoring activities, applying sanctions, exceptions, and solving conflicts on interpretation.

### 3.3 Institutional spheres

Turner proposes five spheres of institutions: kinship, religion, economy, polity and law<sup>420</sup>. Each sphere differentiates from the other in the sense that they present different and autonomous units (for example, firms for economy, and family for kinship), placing individuals in differentiated categories (for example “worker” and “father”). Moreover, there are distinctive symbols that facilitate the interaction (for example “profit” and “commitment”) and there are different ways in communicating within each unit (“money” and “love”)<sup>421</sup>.

The micro level of formal and informal civil associations necessarily is affected by the outcomes of the macroeconomic environment and political economy. This can enable and enhance, but also damage or undo, the effects of local level social capital. Where there is good governance, effective courts and people enjoy freedom of rights, local associations thrive and complement the functions of institutions at the macro level. However, if these do not function properly, local institutions might try to substitute them, unbalancing the system. Therefore, just as it is necessary to assess the macro policy environment for the investment in a project, it is also necessary to consider the local associations. Local associations cannot be considered in isolation<sup>422</sup>.

Moreover, complementarities between micro and macro levels of social capital not only affect the macro outcomes but also strengthen both levels. Macro institutions can enable the appropriate environment for micro institutions to develop and flourish. In return, micro institutions support regional and national institutions and give them a measure of stability. The key features for this to happen are shared values, norms and mutual trust among them. Local institutions need not share

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<sup>419</sup> Cfr. Ostrom, Elinor and Ahn, T. K., *op. cit.*, p. 28.

<sup>420</sup> Turner, Jonathan H., *op. cit.*, p. 97.

<sup>421</sup> Turner, Jonathan H., *op. cit.*, p. 97-98.


<sup>422</sup> Serageldin, Ismail and Grootaert, Christiaan: *Defining Social Capital: An Integrating View* in Dasgupta, Partha and Serageldin, Ismail: *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*, The World Bank, Washington D. C., 2000, pp. 40-58 (49).

norms among themselves, but at least common norms with the macro institution, since cohesion would likely improve the work towards a common objective. In any case, this interaction will increase levels of social capital at both levels. Serageldin and Grootaert<sup>423</sup> put the example of Switzerland, where the cantons joined in a confederation that seek the creation of a sovereign state, as a case in which micro and macro level interaction has been successful.


However, it can also happen that that micro and macro level institutions fail to interact successfully, due to the lack of shared norms or difficulties to build trust. This would provoke a scenario of instability and deterioration until ties are weakened and eventually broken. Serageldin and Grootaert<sup>424</sup> put the example of the ex-Yugoslavia (where the norm of human respect was in discussion) or Québec (where distrust is at the economic sphere).

The authors provide the following figures (5 and 6) to better depict the described scenarios<sup>425</sup>:

**Figure 5. Positive interaction between macro and micro institutions**



**Figure 6. Negative interaction between macro and micro institutions**



<sup>423</sup> Serageldin, Ismail and Grootaert, Christiaan, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

<sup>424</sup> Serageldin, Ismail and Grootaert, Christiaan, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

<sup>425</sup> Serageldin, Ismail and Grootaert, Christiaan, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

According to the authors<sup>426</sup>, one of the issues that determine which scenario will prevail is the macro level framework and how it is perceived by the micro level institutions, in terms of legitimation, representation and fairness. Another factor to be taken into consideration is the relationship between formal and informal institutions. At the micro level, governmental institutions and other institutions interact within different networks, civic and voluntary associations. These relationships define the constraints and objectives of these associations. A third factor is the quality of the institutions themselves. The functioning and effectiveness of the institutions, both at macro and micro level, and at the formal and informal spheres, do matter for the outcomes. It is not enough to share values and norms; they also need an effective organization and management to reach their objectives according to their common goals. The authors provide the example of former ex-soviet nations, in which the sudden disappearance of the government eroded trust and left the people to rely on local and informal associations. This stresses the importance of a constructive interaction among both levels.

The authors, moreover, suggest that the process by which social capital develops between these two levels is dynamic<sup>427</sup>. For example, when informal associations and networks develop successfully and eventually are replaced by formal structures. However, the authors explain that it is not clear if this shift from informal to formal institutions increases or decreases social capital, and furthermore, if this shift is an additive or multiplicative process<sup>428</sup>.

### **3.4 Institutions in the law sphere**

According to Turner<sup>429</sup>, in order for legal institutions to be perceived as trustworthy, it is a prerequisite that they maintain its autonomy from the other spheres, especially polity. Otherwise, law would not be seen as universal and courts would not be seen as independent. However, legal institutions should be flexible and open to discussion as political issues are also examined. Under these circumstances, legal institutions will be perceived as trustworthy, trust will be generated, and so social capital.

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<sup>426</sup> Serageldin, Ismail and Grootaert, Christiaan, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

<sup>427</sup> Serageldin, Ismail and Grootaert, Christiaan, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

<sup>428</sup> Serageldin, Ismail and Grootaert, Christiaan, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>429</sup> Turner, Jonathan H., *op. cit.*, pp. 109-110.



### 3.5 Institutional change

Institutions, together with the social settings<sup>430</sup>, evolve through history, but not always remain in an efficient equilibrium. Some authors attribute history a strong value for the definition of institutional performance. North provides a comparison of the institutional development of North America and Latin America. He explains that the North Americans inherited from England a decentralized kind of government, whereas Latin Americans received traditions from late medieval Spain, characterized by centralized authoritarianism, vertical power dependence, and familism<sup>431</sup>. Historically, these two regions had different social and institutional contexts, which provided different opportunities and motivations. Putnam also identifies a similar case in his previously described study on the differences between Italian regions, among the North and South of the country respectively<sup>432</sup>.

North provides a description of what could be a process of institutional change in the economic sphere<sup>433</sup>. A change in relative prices takes both parties to realize that they need a change and renegotiation of an agreement or contract. Generally, these agreements are based on a hierarchy of rules, and therefore, the renegotiation includes also revisiting the higher rules (or otherwise violating them). The party with more bargaining power will attempt, so, to restructure the rules at higher level. With time, the norm of behaviour or custom will eventually be gradually eroded, or changed, or replaced by other norms or customs. This is a simplified version, which surely might get complicated by politics, opportunism or the tenacity of norms and customs. Informal institutions, such as cultural habits, change at a different pace than formal institutions. Sometimes, formal institutions are created to overrule informal institutions. The theoretic stability will be achieved when both formal and informal institutions and their enforcement are in equilibrium<sup>434</sup>. For instance, post-communist societies were thought to have low levels of trust and reciprocity at the individual level, due to the weakness of the formal associational structures. However, research has showed that interpersonal trust and informal networks were created to cope with the unstable and unpredictable institutional setting<sup>435</sup>.

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<sup>430</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 179.

<sup>431</sup> North, Douglass C., *op. cit.*, pp. 101-102, 112-117.

<sup>432</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>433</sup> Cfr. North, Douglass C., *op. cit.*, p. 86.

<sup>434</sup> Cfr. North, Douglass C., *op. cit.*, p. 87.

<sup>435</sup> For further insights of this, please refer to Letki, Natalia: *Social capital in East-Central Europe* in Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard and Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase (Eds.): *Handbook of Social Capital. The Troika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics*, Edward Elgar, UK, USA, 2009, pp. 162-176.

As North says “institutional change is overwhelmingly incremental”<sup>436</sup>. Institutional change happens gradually. The big general change is built by changes at other margins. The author puts the example of the marginal changes that accompanied the change from feudal structure, such as technology of warfare<sup>437</sup>. Small changes, alterations and redefinitions are what in a whole make the fundamental institutional change.

Furthermore, North<sup>438</sup> proposes some conditions for incremental institutional change. Incremental institutional change needs to be accompanied by a proper political framework. The thrift for seeking compromise solutions provokes the finding of new alternatives. If this change is supported by ideology, a stronger commitment takes place, with massive support, which helps to overcome the free-riding problem.

However, it must be considered that there is a constant tension between formal and informal institutions. Informal institutions evolve on the base of previous formal institutions, and so on. There might be an initial inconsistency which will gradually find its equilibrium. In the meantime, much of the informal institutions still survive since they resolve basic exchange problems among individuals<sup>439</sup>.

Lin describes what for him is the more interesting and powerful institutional transformation: the ones that begin with social networking. He describes the case in which a group of actors, which share alternative rules or values, either because of gender, ethnic, or social circumstances, start to interconnect, maintain and reinforce their interests, creating a solid network. As this network expands and the number of members increases, so does the shared resources. Thus, the likelihood of a social movement increases as well, with the possibility of challenging and transforming prevailing institutions<sup>440</sup>.

### **3.6 The institutional approach to the creation of social capital**

The consequences of social capital in institutional performance have been studied by many scholars<sup>441</sup>. Civic activism facilitates self organization and also generates trust and reciprocity. It is considered a valuable resource for economy and political institutions.

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<sup>436</sup> North, Douglass C., *op. cit.*, p. 89.

<sup>437</sup> North, Douglass C., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>438</sup> North, Douglass C., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>439</sup> North, Douglass C., *op. cit.*, p. 91.

<sup>440</sup> Lin, Nan, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

<sup>441</sup> For a list of authors see Letki, Natalia, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

Within the debate on how social capital is created, Bo Rothstein and Dietlind Stolle<sup>442</sup> propose different approaches: a society centered approach, and an institutional centered approach. In the society approach, social capital is developed through a historic process. Societies are built on traditions of civic engagement and cooperation which eventually produce outcomes such as norms of reciprocity and generalized trust. This theory, however, presents some grey areas. Many voluntary organizations produce generalized trust, but others produce exactly the opposite, they attempt to install distrust in other people. Moreover, generalized trust occurs when trust goes beyond the group. So, trust that stays within the group should be considered as something negative to society? Therefore, the authors conclude that associativeness can be good for many things but it does not seem to produce generalized interpersonal trust and norms of reciprocity, as social capital theory implies<sup>443</sup>.

As an alternative, Rothstein *et al* propose the institutional centered approach, with the support of other scholars, in which, in order for social capital to flourish, it needs to be embedded in and linked to certain political, administrative and legal institutions<sup>444</sup>. According to this approach, the levels of social capital in a society depend on the political and governmental environment and not mainly in the civil society arena. The central idea is that governmental and public institutions channel and influence the amount of social capital in their societies. And vice versa, the possibilities for individuals to establish social trust and cooperative action depend on public institutions and policies. Several studies have been carried out with respect to how social capital can facilitate building effective social and political institutions<sup>445</sup>. However, the causality flow is not clear. Brehm and Rahn<sup>446</sup>, for instance, using data from the US from the General Social Survey, found that confidence in institutions has a larger effect on interpersonal trust than the other way around.

So, no theory can give full account of how social capital is generated. Nor the bottom-up approach, nor the top-down approach. However, the authors suggest that the missing causal link between social capital and trust in government is due to the failure in disaggregating the concept of “government”. The authors suggest individualizing the institution and its importance for the generation of social capital (be electoral, judicial, military, administrative or any other political

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<sup>442</sup> Rothstein, Bo and Dietlind, Stolle: *Political institutions and generalized trust* in Castiglione, Dario, van Deth, Jan W. and Wolleb, Guglielmo (Eds.): *The Handbook of Social Capital*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 278-287.

<sup>443</sup> Rothstein, Bo and Dietlind, Stolle, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

<sup>444</sup> North, Douglass C., *op. cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>445</sup> Cfr. Rothstein, Bo and Dietlind, Stolle, *op. cit.*, pp. 279-280.

<sup>446</sup> Brehm, J. and Rahn, W.: “ Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital”, *American Journal of Political Science*, 41: 999-1023, cited in Rothstein, Bo and Dietlind, Stolle: *Political institutions and generalized trust* in Castiglione, Dario, van Deth, Jan W. and Wolleb, Guglielmo (Eds.): *The Handbook of Social Capital*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 273-302 (280).

institution)<sup>447</sup>. Citizens interact with the different institutions, in different ways. In some cases, they play the role of the “client”, being the object of public policy, receiving public health and public education, for instance. In other cases, citizens play the role of voters, in which they get involved due to a direct interest; therefore, people who support the ideas of those in power are likely to have more confidence on the representative organs. However, it is not likely that this trust will influence trust among individuals.

The case should be different with institutions which are called upon to implement public policy. If these institutions act according to certain shared norms and values, citizens judge them in terms of their fairness, neutrality and impartiality. Thus, there is reason to believe that most people will be acting by the rules, and hence, can be trusted<sup>448</sup>.

The way in which teachers, doctors and other guardians of public institutions behave is an indicator of the general moral standard in the society, which in turn influences the belief about other people being trustful<sup>449</sup>. The mechanism for this is that if citizens systematically experience partial behavior from street-level bureaucrats, they might be prompt to distrust other people in society. The existence of impartial institutions makes an individual more likely to believe that the other citizens will behave in the same manner. Oppositely, if institutions are generally perceived as unfair, impartial, and citizens see themselves in the situation to engage in illegal practices to thrive in daily life, it is more likely that one will think that his neighbor will perform equally, and therefore, will not trust other citizens<sup>450</sup>.

Institutions that depend on election factors, such as parliament, government, political parties, are most likely to fall under the category of biased institutions<sup>451</sup>. Institutions that are expected to function independently from the political power, such as the army, legal institutions, and the police, are expected to behave less biased and partial, even though it might not be like that in reality. Citizens do make distinctions when trusting different government institutions, since these institutions differ in their function (e.g., provision of public services, law enforcement, and law management). There is another category of institutions that generate other type of confidence. This is the case of the media, which theoretically control the performance of power institutions.

After the previous description, Rothstein *et al* propose that the major source of variations in generalized trust is to be found on what they call the implementation side of the political system, that

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<sup>447</sup> Cfr. Rothstein, Bo and Dietlind, Stolle, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

<sup>448</sup> Rothstein, Bo and Dietlind, Stolle, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

<sup>449</sup> Rothstein, Bo and Dietlind, Stolle, *op. cit.*, pp. 283-4.

<sup>450</sup> Rothstein, Bo and Dietlind, Stolle, *op. cit.*, p. 284.

<sup>451</sup> Rothstein, Bo and Dietlind, Stolle, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

is to say, the institutions in charge of implementing public policy -such as the police, the courts, and other governmental organizations. Within this context, the author cite a study carried out by Tyler<sup>452</sup>, whose empirical data show that when citizen believe that law enforcement procedures are fair, they are more prompt to accept legal decisions.

The author provides a further example, the case of corruption<sup>453</sup>. In theory, legal and order institutions have the task of punishing those who behave contrary to the assumed expectations, that is, steal, breach contracts, bribe and engage in other non cooperative and illegal activities. If these institutions perform in an effective and fair way, it is unlikely that citizens involved in these types of activities have a chance of getting their way with it. So, individuals will be more prompt to believe that the other will also behave in a trustworthy manner. Rothstein *et al* propose that it is the combination of fairness and efficiency that makes this casual mechanism to take place. Contrarily, if these institutions are corrupted in some way, citizens will naturally transmit such practice to other citizens. Corruption causes fellow citizens to act in a corrupt manner and they will feel compelled themselves to behave in corrupt ways. Distrust on governmental institutions weakens general trust.

Rothstein *et al.* propose another example of institutional trust: the reporting of a crime<sup>454</sup>. If citizens are victims of a crime but do not bother to report it to the police or courts, this might mean that they do not trust that these institutions, whose task is to provide protection and safety, will be effective. The citizen, therefore, might feel unprotected, distrust other citizens, or infer corruption or biases on institutions and therefore, infer also this towards fellow citizens.

With relation to public services, the authors makes a distinction between selective and universal public services. The former relate to those services in which a citizen with a particular condition is required to apply for it. In this case the citizen has to face the street level bureaucrat and his own interpretation of the regulations to be applied. This interpretation mechanism is generally followed by informal mechanisms, as well as directives from supervisors, in order to “test” the individual. Sometimes this discretionary decision ends up being unfair or not so transparent, and there is also place for abuses from the part of the citizens, in which they claim something that might not really correspond to them. In the case of universal public services, there is no need for discretion since it reaches all citizens in an equal manner.

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<sup>452</sup> Tyler, T. R.: *Why People Obey the Law*, New Haven, Yale University Press; “Trust and Democratic Governance”, in V. Braithwaite and M. Levi (eds.), *Trust & Governance*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 269-314, cited in Rothstein, Bo and Dietlind, Stolle: *Political institutions and generalized trust* in Castiglione, Dario, van Deth, Jan W. and Wolleb, Guglielmo (Eds.): *The Handbook of Social Capital*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 273-302 (286).

<sup>453</sup> Rothstein, Bo and Dietlind, Stolle, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

<sup>454</sup> Rothstein, Bo and Dietlind, Stolle, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

Political scientists have been particularly concerned about the role of the government in creating and facilitating the conditions for social capital<sup>455</sup>. Social capital intervenes in the dynamics of state institutions along three possible dimensions<sup>456</sup>: a downwards devolution of power and responsibility within the state; the linking of the different sectors; and the decentralization of decision-making from state organs to community and voluntary bodies. However, with this sense, one criticism to social capital theory could be that it offers the state the possibility of delegating key responsibilities to others<sup>457</sup>. However, could not it be that the new social order calls for restructuring previous presumptions?

### 3.7 Institutional capital

Social capital theory has been analyzed from a communitarian view -which refers to local level organizations and groups-, and from a networks view, analyzing it from a horizontal and vertical perspective - that is from a bonding and bridging networks point of view. Krishna<sup>458</sup> describes what he calls “institutional capital”. He proposes two examples. Someone’s house burns down at night, and the following day the neighbors get together to help this person to rebuild his house. This collective action could be the result of the coordination of the community leader, who decides who should do what. Alternatively, this collective action could be the result of neighbors which, without the presence of a community leader, respond to norms of appropriate behavior, and spontaneously assist with the rebuilding. Both cases have the same outcomes; however, they differ in their respective potentiality. The first case is what the author calls “institutional capital”, and the second, “relational capital”.

Institutional capital follows a certain structure and is generally embedded in given network. Rules and procedures are on place, and generally, roles are assigned and accepted by all members of the community. Relation capital is more diffuse and might not have a shaped structure. Individuals follow embodied norms.

Assumed rules and procedures, however, could be proper for dealing with certain issues, but not for others. Therefore, efforts will always be required to adapt these for dealing with new scenarios. These efforts will be easier if there is already in place a diffuse reciprocity relation, that is, a highly relational capital. The same happens the opposite way, shared norms of reciprocity and trust in a

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<sup>455</sup> Baron, Stephen, Field, John and Schuller, Tom: *Social Capital: A Review and Critique* in Baron, Stephen, Field, John and Schuller, Tom (Eds.): *Social Capital, Critical Perspectives*, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 1-38 (33).

<sup>456</sup> Baron, Stephen, Field, John and Schuller, Tom, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>457</sup> Baron, Stephen, Field, John and Schuller, Tom, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

<sup>458</sup> Krishna, Anirudh, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

given community eventually could need coordination into a structure, which can be formal or informal, implicit or explicit. Relational and institutional capital represent analytical categories of social capital that generally go together, and usually, overlap each other<sup>459</sup>.

The basis for institutional capital is generally transactions, for example in markets, or legal frameworks, motivated by roles, rules and procedures. Relation capital is based on personal relations -such as family, ethnicity, religion-, motivated by shared beliefs and values<sup>460</sup>.

**Figure 7. Classification scheme<sup>461</sup>**

		Relational capital	
		Strong	Weak
Institutional capital	Strong	(1) <i>High social capital</i> Task: extend scope of activities	(2) <i>"Strong" organizations</i> Task: legitimation, intensification
	Weak	(3) <i>"Traditional" associations</i> Task: introduce rules, procedures, and skills	(4) <i>Anomic, atomistic, or "amoral"</i> Task: assist development of structures and norms

Hardin also develops the issue of institutional capital. He quotes an ancient Greek “Anonymus Iamblichus” according to which: “The first result of lawfulness is trust, which greatly benefits all people and is among the greatest goods”. Law, and government, as suggested by the author, facilitate trust among people; risks can be taken to their great benefit, a similar vision to Thomas Hobbes’ theory in which a stable government was needed to protect individuals from other individuals and enforce contractual exchanges.<sup>462</sup>

The interpersonal capital that contributes to successful collective endeavors at lower levels might also have an impact on the institutional context in which this individual interacts. Certain forms of interpersonal capital might lead individuals to perform their tasks within institutions better than they

<sup>459</sup> Krishna, Anirudh, *op. cit., ibidem*.

<sup>460</sup> Krishna, Anirudh, *op. cit.*, 79.

<sup>461</sup> Krishna, Anirudh, *op. cit., ibidem*.

<sup>462</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

could do otherwise and, hence, contribute to those institutions and the institutional capital that they represent<sup>463</sup>.

Within the institutional framework Woolcock and Narayan<sup>464</sup> add another view, explaining that that the vitality of community networks and civil society is in great part an outcome of the political, legal and institutional environment. This approach argues that the capacity of social groups to act in collective interests depend largely on the quality of formal institutions in which they are embedded. Moreover, it also highlights that the performance of states and firms also depend on their internal coherence, competence and accountability towards outsiders. Issues such as bureaucratic delays, lack of property rights safeguards, ethnical tensions, or failure to protect civil liberties are seen as impediments for developing social trust, and hence, social capital. However, the authors state that by addressing the macro level of a society, the policy sphere, this approach lacks the micro component. Therefore, the authors propose a distinct approach, which integrates the networks and institutional view.

Neither State nor societies are inherent good or bad; they are variables which impact each other. Moreover, the different micro, meso and macro spheres do not have the sufficient resources for development; they necessarily need the interaction among each other. However, it is true that the State has a unique role, since it is the only actor that can provide public services, enforce rule of law, and is responsible for mediating among the different spheres with its inherent issues. Therefore, a synergy is required between government and citizens, a synergy based on complementarities and connectedness among the different actors. Obviously, this interaction is dynamic and requires different interventions and combinations of bonding, bridging and linking social capital. Social capital becomes the mediator to create a common ground for dialogue among the different actors. This synergy might not always work effectively and could degenerate in conflict and tension. When societies are characterized by poor governance, informal networks come as substitutes to cope with the failed state policies.

### **3.8 Institutions and social capital**

One of the values of social capital theory is the possibility of shifting the focus of analysis from individual behavior to the pattern of relations between agents, social units and institutions, even

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<sup>463</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

<sup>464</sup> Woolcock, M., Narayan, D.: "Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research, and Policy", World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 15 (2), 2000, p. 11.



acting as a link between micro, meso and macro levels in society<sup>465</sup>. This is supported by the multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approach to reality proposed by social capital theory. The social capital theory, moreover, proposes issues regarding value in the social science discourse. Terms such as trust, sharing and community are rediscovered, and foster discussion about human behavior, which is what policy is based on<sup>466</sup>.

### 3.9 Are institutions social capital?

Ostrom *et al* treat institutions as a form of social capital rather than just an outcome of social capital<sup>467</sup>. Institutions play a significant role in fostering cooperation<sup>468</sup> and their diverse forms enhance shared norms of trustworthiness, trust and reciprocity.

Ostrom describes two different points of view around research and social capital. She explains that some researches shared a static view, in which one variable cannot be at the same time cause and effect. Other researchers have a dynamic view, in which investments on capital in a certain moment can generate more capital which can also be used to build more capital in a future moment. Putnam shares this last point of view. For him social capital is an independent variable that affects institutions, seen in their turn as a dependant variable. In his study on the development of Italian regions, he explains that the different forms of social capital and its history have a saying on the eventual institutional development of the different regions from the north and south of the country<sup>469</sup>.

Moreover, Ostrom explains that within a dynamic paradigm of social capital, institutions affect and are affected by the trustworthiness and other characteristics of the members of the group. Furthermore, institutions are a potential means to increase individuals' trust in others and to leverage existing networks to create better institutions<sup>470</sup>.

In his study on the Italian regions, Putnam already discussed the consequences of social capital for institutional quality. He was followed by many other authors. Letki<sup>471</sup> explains that civic associanism encourages self organization and the creation of norms of trust and reciprocity, reducing transaction costs and fostering interactions among individuals. These factors, in their turn, stimulate

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<sup>465</sup> Baron, Stephen, Field, John and Schuller, Tom, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

<sup>466</sup> Baron, Stephen, Field, John and Schuller, Tom, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

<sup>467</sup> Ostrom, Elinor: *What is social capital?* in Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, pp. 26-7.

<sup>468</sup> For further information cfr. Ostrom, Elinor, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>469</sup> Ostrom, Elinor, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>470</sup> Ostrom, Elinor, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>471</sup> Letki, Natalia, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

economy and political institutions. However, it is not possible to assert causality between social capital and the quality of institutions. Putnam already explained that social capital is an exogenous factor which determines institutional performance<sup>472</sup>.

#### **4. Social capital, trust, norms and institutions**

Macro processes and transformations that affect daily life escape the individual's reach. Their genesis develops within close and not transparent circles. Individuals ignore where decisions are taken, how they flow, how they act. In addition, in a globalized world, new actors appear and get involved in decision-making processes. International organizations, global means of communication and big social movements make individuals not familiar with all involved stakeholders, making them feel uncomfortable and insecure. Furthermore, the ever growing cultural pluralism brings about an axiological problem, creating a confusion of values, heterogeneity in behaviours, habits and traditions. This circumstance can create rootless environments: everybody participates in a free and rapid changing world. However, this participation does not guarantee anything.

Such weaknesses, though, give place to opportunities for the creation of new social machineries. New international consortia are created to prevent abuses, new international treaties are signed, and new charity and philanthropic associations are formed. There is a renaissance of communities who group individuals sharing same values, professions. Communication channels are strengthened. These, with time, may bring back the feeling of intimacy and familiarity that has been fading away.

The level of trust towards other individuals or any kind of institutions may be the result of past circumstances, collective memory and traditions which involve ideas, convictions, norms and values<sup>473</sup>. Various aspects of public life, such as integrity, honesty, responsibility and unselfishness, are losing strength; and individuals' feeling of security, certainty and stability give way to feelings of mistrust, cynicism and fear. This feeling of mistrust is reflected in diverse aspects of social life: public institutions, private relations, the market, consumer goods, etc.

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<sup>472</sup> Cfr. Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*

<sup>473</sup> Cfr. Barlinska, Izabela: "Fluctuaciones de la confianza en tiempos de globalización y de transiciones socio-políticas" in *Modernidad, crisis y globalización: problemas de política y cultura*, Colección Mediterráneo Económico, Núm. 14, Almería, 2008, p. 123, available at <http://www.asp-research.com/pdf/me1406%20izabela.pdf>.

According to Prior Sztompka<sup>474</sup> five factors would be necessary for facilitating trust: 1) transparency of public life: clear and accessible decision taking processes, knowable to any citizen; 2) familiarity of the individual with the social environment (natural, technological, cultural, and ethnic environment): today we face the existence of international consortia and global communications. There is a need for being familiar with the new actors, to shorten gaps in order to increase the feeling of belonging and understand processes; 3) consistency of norms in society (among rules, norms and values) and a clear definition of rights and duties: normative cohesion and compatibility among rules; 4) security and reliability on others which will be following the same social rules; 5) stability of institutions, organizations and structures of social life.

Trust has become an imperative factor in a transforming and changeable modern society. The transition from the traditional to modern and more complex society requires leaving behind outdated traditions and norms. Trust is essential for supporting and filling the normative and structural gap in these transition processes, there is a need for a leap of faith.

## 4.2. Trust in institutions

Effective and efficient institutions are essential for development in any field: economic, social, and institutional. In order to operate effectively, institutions need to inspire confidence on individuals<sup>475</sup>. However, as previously described, there is a growing perception that institutional frameworks, such as democratic regimes or the free market economy, that once were taken for granted, accepted without discussion, are now starting to show their deficiencies and flaws<sup>476</sup>. Though nowadays the democratic ideal remains unrivalled, the same regimes that used to support it, criticize it and identify its weaknesses. As Rosanvallon<sup>477</sup> states, this is the main political problem of modern times, and the reason why trust on political leaders and institutions is one of the issues most addressed by political scientists in the last two decades.

But, can institutions *per se* be trustworthy? There is discussion whether institutions, an abstract identity, can be object of trust. It is assumed that institutions are tools for trust generation. Effective norms and well-functioning institutions are incentives for individuals to behave according to

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<sup>474</sup> Sztompka, Piotr: "Confianza. El fundamento de la sociedad", Znak, Cracovia, as explained by Barlinska, Izabela in "Fluctuaciones de la confianza en tiempos de globalización y de transiciones socio-políticas", in *Modernidad, crisis y globalización: problemas de política y cultura*, Colección Mediterráneo Económico, Núm. 14, Almería, 2008.

<sup>475</sup> Clausen, Bianca, Kraay, Aart, Nyiri, Zsolt, "Corruption and confidence in public institutions : evidence from a global survey", Policy Research working paper; no. WPS 5157. The World Bank, Washington, 2009, p. 4.

<sup>476</sup> Sztompka, Piotr: *Trust. A Sociological Theory*. Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 9.

<sup>477</sup> Rosanvallon, Pierre: *La contrademocracia. La política en la era de la desconfianza*, Manantial, Buenos Aires, 2007, p. 21.

expectation. They foster an essential tool for social interaction: predictability<sup>478</sup>. An adequate institutional framework also provides stability to the individuals' expectations. If institutions betray the expectations and fail to apply the correspondent sanctions and punishments, this could undermine the possible positive expectations from the individuals, which could lead them to trust them less. Thus, a possible scenario would be that of instability, in which the individuals do not know what to expect at all, they know they will be disappointed in their trust. According to M. Bergman and C. Rosenkrantz<sup>479</sup>, this is the case of Latin America in general: there are low levels of interpersonal trust as a result of the impossibility of public institutions to enforce legal norms in an effective way. These low levels of trust are not generated because of what the law says, but because of its ineffective enforcement and implementation.

#### 4.2.a. The government<sup>480</sup>

Public institutions matter. The strength of public institutions is a determinant for the economic development of a community. A predictable market, political stability, absence of multilayered corruption and crime, and reliability in the judiciary reflect the capabilities of public institutions<sup>481</sup>.

Hardin<sup>482</sup> addresses some conceptual issues of the uses and abuses of the terminology of trust in government. He explains that trust in government cannot be compared with personal trust; trusting someone implies more than the trust of a person in the government. Interpersonal trust implicates a reciprocal relation; trust in government is far more complex. However, it is common to find that in most of the discussions regarding the decline of trust in government, individuals apply the characteristics of relations of trust and trustworthiness between close friends to trust between citizens and their government. Hardin suggests, instead, speaking of confidence, rather than trust, in government. Since it is not possible to know personally or enough public officers, eventually, it is a matter of inductive expectations and acquiescence. The second issue raised by the author is that the concern should be focused on trustworthiness rather than trust, since the changes in trust are rooted in the perceived trustworthiness of the government. Third, trust brings with it the expectation of the other behaving according to certain motivations and his competence to fulfil the trust. In the case of

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<sup>478</sup> Bergman, M.; Rosenkrantz, C.: *Introducción. La confianza y el derecho en América Latina: Aproximaciones conceptuales* in Bergman, M.; Rosenkrantz, C. (Coords): *Confianza y derecho en América Latina*. Fondo de Cultura Económica- Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica, México, 2009, p. 17.

<sup>479</sup> Bergman, M.; Rosenkrantz, C., *op. cit.*, p. 19.

<sup>480</sup> Following Ferrari (Ferrari, Vincenzo: *Diritto e società*, Editori Laterza, Bari, 2010, p.99), the term "government" is used not in its strict sense, that is, as public body constituted to perform the executive power, but in its broad sense, to designate the sum of activities inherent to the guidance and management of a country, such as the executive power, the legislative power.

<sup>481</sup> Dasgupta, Partha, *op. cit.*, pp. 398-401.

<sup>482</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

politicians, he suggests differentiating their competence from their motivations<sup>483</sup>. The judgment on competence, made by the citizens, might be related to the capabilities of the government agents to master the tasks they have to face. However, in some cases, it is a matter of competence and motivation. In societies which are used to corruption, power is seen as the access to chances and benefits that would not be possible otherwise; the perception is not focused on their competences, but on their true motivations.

When dealing with the issue of trust in government, it is important to differentiate personal trust from positional trust. It is normal to associate trust to a certain social role or position, which inevitably extends to every incumbent. It is important to stress that personal trust vested in certain individuals is important for preserving, enhancing, or even diminishing positional trust. It can even extend trust to the whole institution which the individual represents. Sztompka puts the example of Karol Wojtyła, former Bishop of Krakow, becoming Pope John Paul II. Wojtyła was assuming a position of established high trust for at least the majority of Catholics, and therefore, he was raising his personal trust through the incumbency of the office. However, due to his personal charisma, he brought and enhanced trust in his office and in the papacy during his pontificate, and even left the Church greatly rejuvenated<sup>484</sup>. Another example that Sztompka provides is with regards to the new democratic institutions in post communist Poland, such as the Constitutional Court and the Ombudsman. These reached high levels of trust mainly due to the individuals which were in charge of them (two eminent and widely trusted lawyers: Andrzej Zoll and Ewa Letowska, whose outstanding work was widely acknowledged)<sup>485</sup>. And the same mechanisms happen the other way round, when individuals with low interpersonal trust achieve a position which has been enjoying high positional trust. These examples depict how personal trust may affect positively or negatively positional trust, and even spread the effect to the whole institution. Nevertheless it may also happen that such mechanisms do not take place. For instance, at times of an election, citizens might think that no candidate is trustworthy enough; however, this does not prevent them from voting anyway. Why this takes place? According to Sztompka, because they still believe that democracy is still the best system<sup>486</sup>.

Moreover, when citizens are asked about their actual trust in government, it is common to hear the contradictory claim that they trust the officials with whom they have close interaction, but not

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<sup>483</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

<sup>484</sup> Sztompka, Piotr, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

<sup>485</sup> Sztompka, Piotr, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

<sup>486</sup> Sztompka, Piotr, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

the government as a whole, or otherwise, they trust government as a whole, but think that politicians are deceiving.

Hardin explains that when talking about governmental decline, and the correspondent reaction of citizens, it is important to analyze the phenomenon within a certain context. In this sense, if a survey shows that there is a decline in the perception of the governmental performance, it should be noticed that this decline is in comparison with a past performance. Therefore, how was that past performance? Moreover, the author stresses the fact that it might not be the case that government today is more or less competent than it was two generations ago; it might happen that it is the public agenda that has changed in such way that it makes that contemporary governments appear less competent than before. The issues they have to face now are less systematically linked, technically more complex and go essentially beyond popular understanding. However, what does not escape popular understanding is the failure in dealing with them, that is to say, the outcomes of not dealing with them successfully. Hardin continues explaining that when one person decides to trust much or less someone, it is because one knows a fair amount about the other. One believes that the other has several motivations to serve our interests: there is enough value in the relationship to consider including the interests of one on the interests of the other. Moreover, there might be strong moral commitments to want to fulfill the other's interest, and there might be a psychological predisposition to be a trustworthy person. However, when speaking of the government, it is only possible to apply the motivations factor. It is not possible to know enough about government officials in order to trust them. Elected government officials might not be motivated by the citizen's interests, acting in an opportunistic way in order to obtain votes. This is the reason for which Hardin proposes, analytically, not to speak about trust in government but rather confidence in government; because it is difficult to affirm that individuals trust government as they would trust a person. Within this context, the government needs a minimum of confidence from citizens; otherwise, if the government needed trust, in the sense understood among individuals, it would mean that it has been failing in its function, since most citizens cannot trust government that way<sup>487</sup>.

The problem of power differentials is always an obstacle to trust. Individuals suffer from power dependence, which, according to Hardin, undermines any hope an individual might have to get the official to reciprocally cooperate with the citizens. Even if, eventually, public officials do care about the citizens' interest, the latter will always be in a weaker position, and might end up voting for them

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<sup>487</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

in the next election even if there is not much confidence on the candidate<sup>488</sup>. Furthermore, confidence does not come magically. Developing a stable confidence takes time and is grounded on expectations of reliability.

It is possible to talk about trust within the government, which makes cooperative policy efforts easier, but this is independent from the citizen trust in government. Though it is most likely that citizens might lack confidence in the government or have objections to its performance, it is the citizens who voted the officials in charge at the first place. Therefore, it is interesting to analyze the level of correct or misleading information that citizens have at the moment of voting. It is not rare to find citizens that believe or approach issues in a simplistic way<sup>489</sup>. In such cases, we should be less confident of the citizens than of the government. Sometimes, some issues are hard to understand for the individuals, either because of the technical information that it implies, or the difficulty to analyze the whole picture. Moreover, in some societies there are little incentives for individuals to vote, and hence, less incentives to get involved and get informed and understand how to vote. Thus, according to Hardin, as the complexity of politics increases, party alignment diversifies and the electorate grows larger, these considerations increase and decrease the expectation that the electorate will vote consciously<sup>490</sup>.

#### **4.2.b. Politicians**

The phenomenon of globalization has incorporated new issues to the public agenda. There is a higher celerity in the transfer of goods. Markets have gotten closer. Nowadays, it is possible to buy something from the other side of the globe with just one click. And this applies also to individuals. The environment, immigration and safety have diversified and gotten more complex. Though immigration processes have always occurred, recently, due to demographic growth, or economic, social or political reasons, societies have witnessed more accelerated movements of individuals across the globe. Globalization is fading territories among societies. In addition, States' national agendas are trying to fit even more the international agenda. The global is embedding itself in the local<sup>491</sup>. The citizenship has also become more demanding towards politicians. Individuals want politicians

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<sup>488</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

<sup>489</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 170: Hardin provides examples of referendums in which citizens voted without measuring the actual consequences of their votes.

<sup>490</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-173.

<sup>491</sup> Ferrarese, Maria Rosaria, *op. cit.*, p.113.

capable of handling such complexity in an effective and trustworthy manner whilst serving their interests - which sometimes they themselves do not understand which they are<sup>492</sup>.

Hardin explains that, generally speaking, it is difficult for citizens to judge their governments as trustworthy. At best they can judge whether the government appears to be competent and whether it produces apparently good outcomes. And, based on these premises they decide whether they trust more or less the government. However, it is difficult for them to identify whether the problem lies on the competency or the motivation of the government officials. It could be the case that if a government handles crises and disasters successfully, it can be given credit for its apparent competence even while it is held accountable for failing to prevent such events.

Hardin proposes another cause for the apparent declining confidence in government: the intolerance of ambiguity. Individuals are not comfortable with ambiguity, and this might mislead them to see political issues individually and neglecting the large array of other issues. Those who can handle ambiguity easily might be comfortable with ill-defined candidates and parties that may do little more than look good<sup>493</sup>.

#### 4.2.c. Supranational institutions

The multiplication in number of international and supra-national political and para-political entities with normative power has also put State sovereignty under the spotlight. The legal norms coming from organizations such as has the UN, the EU, the OEA and the Arab League, among others, have penetrated, in an official way, the national legislations of the different countries<sup>494</sup>.

Pharr and Putnam<sup>495</sup> propose the internationalization of the public agenda as another factor that could lead to a decline of trust in National institutions, summed up to the fact that international organizations have shown not to be 100% effective. Several examples<sup>496</sup> have showed that experts had relied on idealized models and rules without paying attention to the local institutions. Solutions have been imposed: a top-down bureaucratic approach typical from development agencies that have produced contra productive results. As Ostrom says “donor activities often amounts to sending ‘experts’ who copy institutions in ‘Denmark’ to launch institutions in ‘Djibouti’”<sup>497</sup>. Institutions that

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<sup>492</sup> Cfr. Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>493</sup> Hardin, Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

<sup>494</sup> Ferrari, Vincenzo, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

<sup>495</sup> Among the vast literature on this subject, it is possible to highlight “Pharr, Susan J. and Putnam, Robert D (Eds.): *Disaffected democracies. What’s troubling the trilateral countries*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2000”.

<sup>496</sup> For examples of successful projects refer to: Ostrom, Elinor: *What is social capital?* in Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, ch.1, pp. 17-38.

<sup>497</sup> Ostrom, Elinor, *op. cit.*, p. 33.



have been designed by people living in developed and modern democracies are likely to be successful in that context. When they are applied automatically in other contexts, without paying attention to local institutions, the likelihood of success is low. Social capital, in its forms of institutions and norms, need to be tailored to the specific context and circumstances<sup>498</sup>.

### 4.3. Trust in legal institutions – a new social order

As previously described, there is a shared perception that the social order we were used to is changing. Some might see them as a decline, others, more optimistic, as a change towards evolution, to fit modern standards and demands. The causes, reasons, and possible short, medium and long term solutions differ considerably. However, at least in what social sciences are concerned, there is a general agreement on the fact that the crisis of the State, understood in terms of the crisis of its legitimacy in its modern ways of organization, is one of the most important social phenomena in the actual debate. And the implications of this in law and rule of law are undeniable.

When thirty years ago the legitimacy of the modern State was put under the spotlight<sup>499</sup>, those who argued towards the crisis of modern democracies were criticized and thought to be plotting against those who hold the power at that time. The proposed crisis was seen as something that was not possible to verify in facts, whilst the effective and real change in State structures, in particular social and economic, were over seen.

Legal scholars, were focusing more on their own intellectual agendas, and this debate had been left aside. Legal positivism was accepted as dogma, and there was no place for criticism. In the Latin American context, little attention was paid to this by legal scholars and researchers. According to Bergman and Rosenkrantz<sup>500</sup>, legal research has been discussing and analyzing formal structures, rather than law in action. However, day to day life has shown that the decision to trust public officials depends on their likelihood to respect and enforce law rather than on the law contents<sup>501</sup>.

Three decades later, facts are speaking for themselves. The demand for an interdisciplinary approach has become stronger. The criticism is not mainly towards legal positivism, but rather towards its unkept promises. The *malaise* of legal theory reflects the difficulty of institutions to cope

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<sup>498</sup> Ostrom, Elinor, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>499</sup> Cfr. Pharr, Susan J. and Putnam, Robert D. (Eds.), *op. cit.*

<sup>500</sup> Bergman, Marcelo and Rosenkrantz, Carlos, *op. Cit.*, p. 16.

<sup>501</sup> Bergman, Marcelo and Rosenkrantz, Carlos, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

and respond to actual demands and expectations<sup>502</sup>. The inherited legal positivism is challenged by modern times.

Modern legal systems do not represent that logic normative pyramid structure, proposed by Kelsen, anymore. Modern legal systems can be now described as interconnected and overlapped dynamic networks, with different extensions, densities and strengths, due to the most diverse normative spheres, differing in scope, competence and intensity. As, amongst others, Ferrari highlights<sup>503</sup>, in present times individuals are immersed in an interconnection of legal systems: depending on the circumstance, his actions can be regulated by family, religious, National norms, or even a supra-national regulation, such as European communitarian law. There is a universe of different, interconnected, and sometimes overlapping, legal systems, which coexist, simultaneously, in a complex and always changing environment, featured by cultural diversity, power inequality, and social conflict.

However, as Ferrari explains, legal systems always oscillate between order and entropy, or order and disorder<sup>504</sup>. There is a historic cyclical and symbiotic relationship among both extremes. Sometimes, there is in legal history a predominance of order over disorder - for instance when social norms are collected and codified. However, these accepted and assumed norms do not remain detached from time. Time does not stop, human relationships and interests mutate and technology also plays its role. Therefore, once again, the tension between order and disorder will eventually call for new approaches to address the new demands<sup>505</sup>.

Some decades ago most of western democracies presented a State strong enough to intervene in the economy and social sphere. Law was the voice of the State, the way in which it communicated with the society. In modern times, the State has become more a facilitator of action, coordinating and promoting the action of other social actors. The State is not the main actor, it confronts with a civil society which is even more involved and articulated in networks, and it is more active, informed and demanding. Coercion is not anymore a distinctive feature of legitimate power. A legitimate action is that which is able to handle the logics of the different actors in a convergent way. This does not mean that the State or politics have been replaced; it is only a sign that the State has been forced

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<sup>502</sup> Among the vast literature on this subject, it is possible to highlight: Pharr, S.J. and Putnam, R.D (Eds.): *Disaffected democracies. What's troubling the trilateral countries*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2000.

<sup>503</sup> Ferrari, Vincenzo: *Diritto e società*, Editori Laterza, Bari, 2010, p.56. About the much discussed question of the crisis of the modern state, from a socio-legal perspective, e.g., Santos, Boaventura de Sousa, *Toward a New Common Sense. Law, Society and Politics in the Paradigmatic Transition*, Routledge, New York 1995; Arnaud, André-Jean, *Critique de la raison juridique. 2. Gouvernants sans frontières. Entre mondialisation et post-mondialisation*, LGDJ, Paris 2003; Ferrarese, Maria Rosaria, *Diritto sconfinato. Inventiva giuridica e spazi nel mondo globale*, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2006.

<sup>504</sup> Ferrari, Vincenzo, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

<sup>505</sup> Ferrari, Vincenzo, *op. Cit., ibidem*.

to look for a new social balance, which is still in the process of being identified. We are not talking about a de-regulation, but rather, a shift of the regulating activity towards other institutions<sup>506</sup>.

The centralized management of the State is giving space to a new approach which requires involving the different stakeholders, opening dialogue with a common language, on shared interests and towards common objectives and goals, based on consensus and instrumental rationality. The State and positive law have not disappeared, they have been transformed. Their functions are being restructured, and therefore, so are their resources. States, international organizations and the agencies which involve the main actors are grouped under the umbrella of new regulatory international systems -such as treaties, administrative organizations, international arbitration tribunals and courts. Within this context, order means extending the scope of international law, acquiring the new conditions in which States and their interactions and conflicts are embedded in this new globalized arena.

Modern times are complex. Societies are more differentiated though more interdependent. There is a cognitive revolution of expectations and chances. Reality is contradictory: on one hand individuals are offered plenty of alternatives, but on the other, they become more vulnerable to risk. At the same time, there is the problem of access to opportunities and alternatives. Access is not granted in an equal manner, and sometimes one is either in or out. Society is in a continuous tension; individuals are constantly competing, being measured and proven in their limits. Moreover, individuals are in a weak situation compared to those institutions that provide goods and services.

The phenomenon of globalization has shortened distances, whilst simultaneously enlarging possibilities. However, the complexity and speed of exchanges exceeds the capacity of response from norms, stressing the importance of personal networks and trust. This new social order calls for special skills and capabilities in order to put up with the new complex circumstances. The theory of social capital then comes to provide a new light to this situation of crisis, change, and restructuration. Existing shared values, norms, institutions, and social networks have value; they support trust relationships, both vertically and horizontally. A considerable part of transactions is based on trust and informal mechanisms. The asymmetry and difficulty to access information, the changing decision making processes, the new mechanisms in an ever increasing competitive market calls for cooperation. Trust, therefore, reduces access to information, transaction, and control costs. Trust cuts down the timing, processes and costs of traditional law in the globalized world.

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<sup>506</sup> Ferrari, Vincenzo, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

Most scholars share the view that social capital has implications on the institutional, political and economic quality and performance of a given society, independently of the differences on the definition, causes and elements of the social capital phenomenon. The social capital theory provides an approach in which the macro and micro levels are in constant interaction. The key to a successful synergy lies on, following the social capital framework, sharing values and norms and establishing networks of trust and reciprocity. When the formal institutions from the macro level fail to perform efficiently or as expected, informal networks arise from the micro sphere in order to replace or fill in the gap left by the former. These networks are based on distrust on the macro institutions, and foster an increasing discredit.

In order to face these new demands, it is possible to identify some approaches, such as political liberalization and an emergency approach. The first one implies reassuring the democratic principles and processes: wide participation and the validity of the republican principles of division of powers, fundamental liberties and political and social rights, due process, transparency and control of decisions. This approach prioritizes consensus, mediation and social and political agreement. The emergency logic implies, on the other hand, conditions of governability that arise when circumstances exceed the decision making capacity of the system. Emergency situations are characterized by the secrecy of the decision making processes and an extension of the reserve zone from the central administration. This top-down mechanism limits participation. This generally occurs in situations of economic and financial readjustment.

After these emergency measures, a second wave of reforms appears in the scene. Due to the rapid changes and the required steps to follow with the new measures, the social agenda appears as a main issue to be faced by the State. In order to consolidate the emergency measures, it is essential to provide the society with transparent and accountable processes. New values and social attitudes present new patterns of social behavior which are necessary to be identified for better governance. The public and social spheres need to accompany this process. Without a transparent communication strategy from public institutions, the logic of mistrust takes place with its particular features and mechanisms. Local loyalties, secret ties, mistrust, legal uncertainty, discretionary powers and impunity appear in the scene, in a context of permanent confrontation. The rules of the game in the political and legal arena change constantly and hence, there is no guarantee of a stable development; the risks get higher<sup>507</sup>. However, it is also in this context that people find themselves

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<sup>507</sup> Cfr. Kalmanovitz, Salomón, “Las instituciones colombianas en el siglo XX”, Discurso, Banco de la República, Colombia, 1999, available at [http://www.banrep.gov.co/presentaciones-discursos/presen\\_kalmanovipz.htm](http://www.banrep.gov.co/presentaciones-discursos/presen_kalmanovipz.htm).

with no other alternative than cooperation. The citizenship recognizes that they are in the weak position with regards to the State; they are aware of their limitations and boundaries. There is no other choice than searching for others in the same situation and group together in order to unify efforts towards common interests.

The concept of “governance” comes, hence, into action. Governance comes as a mechanism for restructuring social order; but this time involving society in the process in order to potentiate its networks and the role of social capital. For the State, governing becomes coordinating, striving for consensus, searching for coherence and consistency in social behavior. Political institutions do not have the monopoly of government articulation anymore. The debate now is towards a governance arena in which in addition to national and supranational, local actors also have a word in the public agenda. However, how to articulate this new complex scenarios in an effective manner? The world’s dynamics affect the decision-making processes made by national governments. The timing and conditions in which events take place provoke that decisions are taken as a reaction rather than as an action; and the possible answers are not necessarily in the hands of the actors with decision making power.

Within this framework of frustration and restructuration, the social capital theory provides a new vision on institutions. Shared norms and values, institutions and networks have value, they do matter. They constitute what can be considered the social capital of a society, which leads to cooperation and reciprocity, enabling individuals to achieve certain goals that would not be able to attain by themselves. The analysis of the actual situation ultimately takes to the notion of trust, one of the main components of social capital. As explained before, the notion of trust encompasses all the spheres of human interaction: the cultural, economic, political and personal spheres: from trust among neighbors, to the trust of citizens on the judicial system and the trust within political institutions. Trust orders society by interpersonal networks, underlying relationships and norms in the political culture, as well as behaving as a tool to unite towards social mobilization, a populist phenomenon that characterizes modern times.

A.M. Slaughter<sup>508</sup> provides some features to this new order, in which the State is no longer the main actor, though, paradoxically, he is still so. This does not mean that the State is disappearing; it is only giving place to the institutions which make part of it. These institutions, which represent both national and state interests, are starting to interact with foreign counterparts, beyond country

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<sup>508</sup> Slaughter, Anne-Marie: *A new social order*, Princeton University Press, p. 18.

boundaries. States have started to develop mechanisms for aggregating institutions' interests. In addition, governmental networks continue to co-exist even within the international organizations.

The new local, national and international actors engage themselves in new networks, both horizontal and vertical. On one hand officers share information, mutual assistance and process harmonization; on the other, these networks link organizations at different levels. Bonding, bridging and linking social capital, trust and interpersonal relations embedded in networks of trust and reciprocity are key to understand the social resources.

The logic of social capital is that of republican life, civic traditions and civic virtue, which leads individuals to participate and interact, under the assumption that the Common good is the best of the goods. However, these interactions would not be possible without the notion of trust, starting from the fact that all individuals share, believe and trust that the common good is the best of the goods.

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In the traditional idea of law, law is portrayed as institutionalized rationality, a system with unity and stability. Law is the expression of general will, which is formalized through the deliberative and legislative action. Social life is ordered by law, which recognizes and identifies individuals' rights, liberties and formalizes expectations. Within this perspective, law should be general, abstract, concrete and stable, in order to guarantee an impartial, objective and coherent system. This conception of law, and its State, is actually challenged by the explosion of new social phenomena accompanied by new demands. In a complex arena, there are more social realities than the one shown by law; there is the reality of the law practitioners, judges, legislators, bureaucrats, the international community and the common citizen. The State finds itself deregulating, and outsourcing some of its functions, which were once essential.

Within this new framework of demands, the legislative function also loses its generality and abstraction, and is rather called upon to rule, with increasing frequency, on concrete and particular cases. Moreover, the legislative function is also loosening the apparent coherence which used to characterize it. The principle of no contradiction among legal norms is becoming more difficult to apply. Due to the complexity of norms and the enlargement and interconnection of different legal systems, it is likely to find contradictions in the particular cases. The large quantity and complexity of regulations make coherence among them a very difficult job. If this is a complicated task for law practitioners, it will surely be for the common citizen, who has limited access to accurate and proper

technical knowledge about laws and their functioning. This fact creates in the individual a feeling of insecurity and difficulty to internalize legal norms.


Latin America is an example of democracies which had suffered these kinds of reforms and transformations. The democracies which have been able to manage the new public agenda have thrived economically and socially. They have successfully combined and coordinated fiscal deficit, privatization, tax reform and market deregulation, whilst empowering the citizenship with equality, cooperation and sustainability. So, the old idea of “government” can be called “good government”. The idea of a democratic government is, therefore, restructured, in which there is a demand to recover trust in the institutions in views of long term solutions. Social support is conditioned to the capability of guaranteeing governance conditions. Thus, from this perspective, political costs are beared by those who are not able to transmit conviction to the people and put back or neglect reforms.

Within these new frameworks, however, law still comes to reduce transaction costs. Though the adaptation of law is slow and gradual in comparison with the accelerated passes of globalization, it is possible to identify the establishment of new institutional structures which tend to improve and get consolidated with time. Inter-governmental, inter-organizational and supranational networks cope to handle with the new alternatives and possibilities of this new order. Hence, the real importance of institutions over law *stricto sensu*; institutions respond quicker to the dynamism, exceptionality and level of differentiation of the new issues they intend to regulate. Written law might be too universal and general in its applicability in the intention of assuring legal safeguards. Oppositely, new international norms do not follow the same process. Their genesis is given by the necessity to answer particular interests that initiate the process.

Professional associations also get on board in the effort to accompany and support this new international legal order. Professionals of law, jurists, magistrates, referees and experts group, NGOs, civil society associations, and the citizenship have been getting involved together in networks to come up with mechanisms for the prevention and management of conflicts, share information and propose possible frameworks to conflict resolution. They contribute to the reduction and administration of legal complexities. They develop strategies for economic analyses, business management and risk assessment, among others that support legal debate. They are involved in legislative processes and support both private and public entities in this new complex legal arena.

From the formal point of view, as Pocar notices<sup>509</sup>, even though it is the State the responsible for the production of laws, it is more common now to find laws whose sources are based on entities different from the State, such as international organizations, and particularly, economic organizations. Within this context it is possible to uphold that the system of sources of national law have mutated from the ones proposed by legal positivism.

**Figure 8. The origin and nature of legal norms<sup>510</sup>**



In this context, Slaughter describes a new world order, and she places transjudicial dialogue within a dense web of horizontal networks connecting national governments<sup>511</sup>.

The efficacy of law depends also on the efficacy of the judicial system. A judicial apparatus that is able to enforce law fosters a perception, from society, of efficiency and legitimacy. Trust is transformed into an essential concept for understanding the relationship between social capital and law. Otherwise, how can we speak of justice, if nobody trusts justice? It is difficult to obey, respect and collaborate with legal institutions and justice if individuals do not trust them or perceived them as inefficient or illegitimate.

> Social capital > trust > legitimacy > institutional efficacy > justice > development >  
 > institutional efficacy > justice > development > trust > social capital

<sup>509</sup> Pocar, Valerio, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

<sup>510</sup> Pocar, Valerio, *op. cit.*, p. 45.


<sup>511</sup> Slaughter, Anne-Marie, *op. cit.*, cited in Ferrarese, Maria Rosaria, *op. cit.*, p. 117.



The above figure describes the process in which high levels of trust and reciprocity promote a perception of legitimacy from institutions, and therefore, facilitating their performance in an effective way. This leads to the acceptance and respect for law and justice, which creates an ordered society, prompt to economic and social development. High levels of development, simultaneously, are given in a context of well performing institutional. These are possible if institutions are perceived as trustful, and citizens are prompt to trust and be trustful.

In another aspect, multiculturalism has also challenged the efficacy of law. The homogeneous community, characteristic from some decades ago, or that can still be found in small villages, brings about a series of conflicts with law efficacy. Within a homogeneous community it is likely that its members, at least, generally speaking and in its majority, have shared values and norms. This foster a high efficacy of law, promoted by a high level of integrity and hence, social order. However, in a community context of cultural diversity, it is likely that each social group will have its own values and norms, not necessarily coinciding with the others. Within this panorama the level of efficacy of law is lowered, creating conflict, and hence, social disorder. The problem gets more complex when the content of social norm is in conflict with the legal order<sup>512</sup>.

**Figure 9. The social functions of law<sup>513</sup>**



Globalization challenges law not only in its representative feature, but also in its rationality and coerciveness. The decline of written law and the new demands gaining more relevance, place the

<sup>512</sup> Pocar, Valerio, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

<sup>513</sup> Pocar, Valerio, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

judiciary and judicial processes in the center of public opinion. Hence, the capacity of justice administrators to cope with these new social demands has become essential. However, this new social demands sometimes go beyond the capacities and competences of the judiciary. Once more, trust comes in the scene. Individuals find themselves in front of a State that cannot provide answers to their new demands and finding solutions or satisfactory treatment to these becomes conflictive. This lack of trust from the part of individuals makes them exert more pressure on the State - pressures that sometimes are misplaced or are addressed to the wrong agency-, producing a negative perception at the eyes of the citizenship. The role of law and its institutions in a democratic society is put in the center of the socio-legal analysis.

The decline of general trust and social capital, the crisis of political institutions, the growth of ethnic and racial conflict and the problems brought by globalization are features of new scenarios which democratic institutions have to cope with.

The crisis of institutions, plus the growing level of distrust, is aggravated by a citizenship much more informed and critic about the performance of public institutions.

For some scholars, this crisis is the result of malfunction of the mechanisms generators of trust and social cohesion. It would mean a crisis of the existent social capital in the society. Others think that the crisis is the result of the conflict between the political class, both the complicity and the ignorance of the means of communication, and the incapability of the judiciary to communicate effectively. For others, the crisis affects all the State institutions, not only the judicial power.

It could be ventured that this crisis of trust in institutions is due to both exogenous and endogenous causes. On one hand, it is rooted on the actual transformations of a society that is more complex and conflictive, and on the other, the actual performance of the public institutions. More complex societies determine new pressures and demands that the systems have to attend with their limited and relative traditional resources. In the case of justice administration, as Ferrari states, the judiciary is not a private company<sup>514</sup>. Whilst a private company can refuse to do go ahead with a certain activity, a judge cannot refuse to perform a legitimate judicial instance, even if there are no resources or it is very costly.

The complexity of modern societies hinders any attribution of the monopoly of justice from judicial decisions. Conflicts are more complex and require alternative resolutions which allow skipping formalisms, time constraints, and administrative costs. The submission to the decision of a

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<sup>514</sup> Ferrari, Vincenzo, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

third party requires recognition of authority of this third party, legitimated by law. However, law is nowadays going under a loss in this recognition of authority. Law is going through a deterioration of the trust and acceptance by the society of its basic principles. Legislation is also being questioned in its rationality; politics, in its orientation towards the public interest; justice, in its objectivity and impartiality. From a very simplistic perspective, law comes from the idea of a basic social agreement, inspired by interest, fear, respect to traditions, or feeling of auto preservation. Whatever the reason, individuals give up using their own force to solve conflicts in favour of mechanisms of substantive and reasonable resolution of conflicts. There is a compromise and an agreement. However, presently, there is a general feeling of dissatisfaction by the society. Individuals tend to generate and develop contradictory expectations and demands, most of the times contrary to reality, which lead them to look for a scapegoat for its flaws and responsibilities.

The changes in the traditional functions of law are accompanied by social fragmentation and a complex and varied normative framework. The efficacy of law is following non traditional courses<sup>515</sup>. The capacity of legal norms to guide human behaviour is getting reduced as the demand for other conflict resolution channels increases. The fragility with which the legal system presents its capacity to guide human behaviour and face conflicts in particular is also reflected in its capacity to build a legitimate source of power<sup>516</sup>.

Within the context of crisis, disorder or entropy, individuals, alone and in organized ways, seek for new shared values and interests that support and guide their behaviour. In this context the theory of social capital sheds a new light. Identifying and strengthening existing social networks, trust relationships, and social norms and institutions can provide a new approach to re establishing the missing links in the modern and ever changing reality. And, hopefully the process will go along democratic paths.

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<sup>515</sup> Pocar, Valerio, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

<sup>516</sup> Pocar, Valerio, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

## Part II. Measuring social capital

Research on social capital is relatively recent. Although the concept on its current form could be traced to the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and the most important theoretical developments to the late 90s, it has been only on the last two decades that empirical research has been carried out. It has been stressed that the lack of an agreed-upon and established definition of social capital, combined with its multidisciplinary appeal, has led to the spontaneous growth of different interpretations and methodological approaches. Despite different efforts from international institutions, current research follows different patterns with a lack of consensus on the categories, tools and procedures.

The present chapter attempts to summarize the state of the art in social capital empirical research, underlining the features of the main methodological approaches, trying to provide a tool for the basic framework of our own empirical research.

Current research on social capital agrees on the idea that it has to be measured using a variety of qualitative and quantitative instruments. The following description will provide support to a useful approach to the institutional and legal aspects of social capital, mostly based on the use of perception studies regarding access to justice and some basic indicators about the relationship between the forms of social capital and legal concepts and instruments.

Social capital is the glue that sticks society together<sup>517</sup>. It is what interweaves the different social institutions together within a certain community. How to measure this complex phenomenon? The social capital multidimensional nature discussed in the previous sections necessarily means a multidimensional approach when doing empirical research on social capital.

In order to optimize social capital findings, it is necessary to understand the dynamics of both interpersonal and group relations in the context in which it is being studied. Social capital allows itself to be addressed through a mixed-method research approach. The opportunity of employing both qualitative and quantitative methods provides researchers with the possibility of understanding the different existing links between the different dimensions of social capital as well as better depicting the existing structures, perceptions and processes of social capital in a given community<sup>518</sup>.

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<sup>517</sup> Serageldin, Ismail and Grootaert, Christiaan: *Defining Social Capital: An Integrating View* in Dasgupta, Partha and Serageldin, Ismail: *Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective*, the World Bank, Washington D. C., 2000, p. 44.

<sup>518</sup> Nyhan Jones, Veronica and Woolcock, Michael: *Mixed methods assessments* in Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard and Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase (Eds.): *Handbook of Social Capital. The Troika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics*, Edward Elgar, UK, USA, 2009, pp. 379-401 (381).

Though the concept of social capital is still undergoing debate, many efforts have been made in order to enhance the quality of the empirical data available on social capital and better understand the nature and extent of social relations and its consequences on other spheres. It is possible to find many different sources of different nature: from local and national household surveys, to historical records and field experiments, from case studies, to qualified interviews and ethnographic investigations.

## 1. Social capital measurement

There is a wide variety of empirical research done on social capital, which has used different methods, and different levels of units and spheres. It can be inferred that the complexity and interdisciplinary features of social capital makes measuring the social capital phenomenon not an easy task. However, all efforts have shared the objective to contribute to the endeavour of identifying the most accurate direction on how social capital can be better understood and measured. There is still a long way to explore and exploit, still, both at the theoretical and empirical field.

However, the measurement of social capital is precisely one of the major critical remarks addressed to the social capital theory. According to some scholars the social capital measurement has resulted elusive due to the lack of a comprehensive definition. The different existing definitions have given place to different units and levels of analysis and, therefore suggesting different methods of measurement. Moreover, the objects of analysis are also difficult to address. Concepts such as trust and networks are by nature problematic due to their ambiguity and diffuse connotations. In addition, the issue of social capital measurement is still undergoing an exploring phase, which has lead researchers to work with proxy indicators, identified from the existing data. Following Putnam's explanation<sup>519</sup>, the challenge of studying the social capital climate along time is that it is certain what information we want from the past. However, the past is gone, and it is not possible to go back and conduct a well-designed study tailoring our needs. Therefore, the inferences that are possible to make are not perfect. There is still a considerable way to go before it is possible to come up with one, universal and true technique –if this is possible at all. In the meantime, as explained before, efforts are been made to fine tune a combination of qualitative, quantitative and comparison techniques for social capital empirical research.

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<sup>519</sup> Putnam, Robert D.: *Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American Community*, Simon & Schuster, N. York, 2000, p. 26.

Within this context, the following sections will provide a description of selected surveys carried out in the field of social capital in particular, and surveys identifying social capital indicators which concern the scope of this research. These have been used as a basis for the design of a specific questionnaire for diagnosing the issue of social capital and its core element, trust, with relation to legal institutions.

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Bartkus<sup>520</sup> explains that there are two possible approaches to measuring social capital. Firstly, a direct approach, which focuses on the number and strength of relationships within a collective and several variables, and then analyzes their effects on a social capital model. These effects, could be the *per capita* gross domestic product (GDP) growth or household wealth. This approach, however, requires at least a basic universal conceptualization of social capital. A second indirect approach identifies some of the characteristics of social capital and then correlates these to effects. This technique also uses the positive and negative externalities that social capital causes to infer its existence<sup>521</sup>. Within these two approaches, there is also the diversion on units of analysis: macro-units – (countries, economies, societies, etc.) or micro units (individual communities, families, institutions, households, etc.). Other differences appear regarding the more horizontal or vertical perspective on social capital of the researcher. For instance, the World Bank initiatives mainly focus on horizontal definitions of social capital in terms of number of formal and informal associations and institutions either at the macro level or at micro levels of the whole community. Oppositely, other scholars, such as Ostrom, share a more vertical perspective of social capital, in which the collaboration between well- functioning public and private institutions co-produce the public goods needed for economic development.

In any case, it is difficult to provide a complete and comprehensive list of all the informal networks and associations existing within a community. So, some scholars have attempted to create a social capital measurement model at the micro level. Narayan and Pritchett<sup>522</sup> have carried out a survey of 1400 households in 87 Tanzanian villages and created a social capital index at family and community levels, which is based on the density and characteristics of formal and informal networks.

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<sup>520</sup> Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H.: *Conclusion: frontiers of social capital research* in Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, p. 346.

<sup>521</sup> Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>522</sup> Cfr. Davis, James H. and Bartkus, Viva Ona: *Organizational trust and social capital* in Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, p. 348.

This approach has been followed by World Bank to create an index based on the density of associations, member heterogeneity and degree of active participation<sup>523</sup>.

In order to explain better high school performance of catholic schools than other private or public schools Coleman<sup>524</sup> uses the concept of social capital<sup>525</sup>. In addition, Davis and Bartkus<sup>526</sup> argue that organizational trust is essential for social capital. Organizational trust facilitates the necessary environment for trust among individuals to develop and generate the willingness of members to commit and engage in activities by mitigating the risks associated with individual and collective action. Moreover, the authors explain that the level of organizational trust is given by the density and strength of networks among members, shared social norms and the capabilities of the individuals and the group itself. The authors test this model in a sample of students.

At the macro level some scholars, such as Putnam<sup>527</sup>, have proposed indices to attempt direct measurement. For Putnam, social capital is the combination of associations in a society and their membership. Dasgupta and Serageldin propose that it can be measured by the extent to which mutual benefits can be realized in a given context. And, at a macro level, Dasgupta argues that social capital can be measured through total factor productivity<sup>528</sup>. Other attempts have included using trust and civic engagement as proxy of social capital. The World Bank has also attempted the creation of an index of social capital at local level based on the density and characteristics of formal and informal networks<sup>529</sup>. But as Bartkus *et al* say, “the fact that social capital effects have occurred in areas as disparate as democracy and governance, economic development, education and labor economics suggests that further insights will likely arise by building bridges and conversations among researchers across social sciences<sup>530</sup>”.

Whichever the technique or the variables, indicators or proxies chosen, social capital researchers are strongly advised to undertake the hard work of judiciously adapting the various components of

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<sup>523</sup> For further information on the World Bank’s surveys: Grootaert, Christiaan et al: *Measuring Social Capital, An Integrated Questionnaire*, World Bank Working Paper n.18.

<sup>524</sup> Coleman, James S.: “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital”; *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 94, 1988; Coleman, James S.: *Foundations of Social Theory*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England, 1990.

<sup>525</sup> For an extensive list of examples of studies regarding social capital refer to Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H.: *Introduction: the yet undiscovered value of social capital* in Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, pp. 1-14.

<sup>526</sup> Cfr. Davis, James H. and Bartkus, Viva Ona, *op. cit.*, pp. 319-338.

<sup>527</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*

<sup>528</sup> Dasgupta, Partha, *op. cit.*, p. 394.

<sup>529</sup> Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H.: *Introduction: the yet undiscovered value of social capital* in Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H. (Eds.): *Social capital. Reaching Out, Reaching In*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK- Northampton, MA, USA, 2009, p. 11.

<sup>530</sup> Bartkus, Viva Ona and Davis, James H., *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

already designed social capital measuring tools to suit the questions and situations at hand<sup>531</sup>. In this sense, Serageldin and Grootaert explain that there is an “appropriate social capital” for a given country: there is an appropriate level and composition of social capital for a given country at a given time. This level considers the dynamic combination with other forms of capital. Social capital needs to be analyzed together with other types of available capital in that country (human, natural, economic, etc.), in combination with information on micro and informal institutions, and investigate the interaction of these with other organizations and governmental organizations and determine which processes are affected and how. The case study must be guided by a methodological framework that facilitates measurement and analysis of findings in order to assess hypotheses<sup>532</sup>. When using social capital measuring tools, the researcher must be sensitive to the cultural context. However, this contextualizing exercise does not mean that research can be opened wide to innumerable and unassociated measurement tools. The core categories useful to analyze social capital need to remain constant even if the context varies from case to case<sup>533</sup>. As Krishna expresses, “while the scale of social capital may have to be constructed separately for each different context, *instruments* can be devised that will assist in the construction of such a scale among each of these different contexts”<sup>534</sup>. Flexibility should be essential for these tools; however, not in the essential concepts, these should be tight<sup>535</sup>, and their analysis, rigorous.

## 1.1. Measuring social capital

Social capital has been defined as features of social organization, such as networks, norms and trust that foster coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit<sup>536</sup>. Several concerns arise when deciding to measure social capital: what types of networks are the ones that matter for building trust and norms? How to address trust and norms?

In his work on the American community, Putnam describes the methodological challenges he had to face. As a first strategy he crossed the majority of sources of information he had. As he pointed out, his work meant going back on time, trying to trace back information which no one had to think

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<sup>531</sup> Nyhan Jones, Veronica and Woolcock, Michael, *op. cit.*, p. 380.

<sup>532</sup> Serageldin, Ismail and Grootaert, Christiaan, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

<sup>533</sup> Cfr. Krishna, Anirudh, and Shrader, Elizabeth.: “Social Capital Assessment Tool”, prepared for the Conference on Social Capital and Poverty Reduction; The World Bank, Washington DC, June 22-24, 1999, p. 2, available at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOCIALCAPITAL/Resources/Social-Capital-Assessment-Tool--SOCAT-/sciwp22.pdf>.

<sup>534</sup> Krishna, Anirudh, and Shrader, Elizabeth, *op. cit.*, p. 7, available at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOCIALCAPITAL/Resources/Social-Capital-Assessment-Tool--SOCAT-/sciwp22.pdf>.

<sup>535</sup> Grootaert, Christiaan and van Bastelaer, Thierry: *Understanding and measuring social capital, A multidisciplinary Tool for Practitioners*, The World Bank, 2002, p 19.

<sup>536</sup> Putnam, Robert D.: “Bowling Alone: America’s declining social capital”, *Journal of Democracy*, 96, 1995, p. 65.



ahead to collect at that moment, and trying to converge a number of different series, each carried out by different researchers<sup>537</sup>. He had to look not only at polls, but also at institutions and behaviour, particularly because not all community activity is embodied in record-keeping organizations. Putnam suggests that these deficiencies in organizational records can however, be offset by social surveys; a well designed survey can provide a powerful snapshot on opinions and behaviour<sup>538</sup>.

Initially, social capital was measured in terms of the density of horizontally organized social networks. With the subsequent research on the subject, measurement increased its complexity by adding other dimensions, too<sup>539</sup>.

Some scholars provide a description of the different comparison among different social capital dimensions<sup>540</sup>:

- **Structural vs. cognitive social capital:** the structural elements of social capital have to be assessed separately from cognitive elements. While structural elements promote the environment for cognitive elements to develop, these are the ones that predispose individuals to collective action<sup>541</sup>. Group solidarity is difficult to verify without references to norms; and, in addition, the type of network is not a reliable indicator for human interaction within a group, since the type of network that on one context promotes cooperation, on another can promote competition. However, in order to be valid, a study should account for both dimensions.
- **Horizontal vs. vertical organizations:** In his work on the Italian regions, Putnam argued that it was the existence of horizontal networks what fostered social capital, whereas vertical networks inhibited it. However, this point of view was later challenged, since it was demonstrated that a strong density of horizontal networks not necessarily shows higher levels of social capital. For instance, the case of the Boy Scouts, based on a strong hierarchy has demonstrated to be regarded as successful by most social capital researchers.
- **Heterogeneous vs. homogeneous organizations:** There are numerous studies which demonstrate that the composition of groups matters for both social capital and other effects,

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<sup>537</sup> Putnam, Robert D.: *Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American Community*, Simon & Schuster, N. York, 2000, Appendix I.

<sup>538</sup> Putnam, Robert D., *op. cit.*, p. 416.

<sup>539</sup> Grootaert, Christiaan and van Bastelaer, Thierry, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

<sup>540</sup> Grootaert, Christiaan and van Bastelaer, Thierry, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-23; Krishna, Anirudh and Shrader, Elizabeth: "Social Capital Assessment Tool", prepared for the Conference on Social Capital and Poverty Reduction; The World Bank, Washington DC, June 22-24, 1999.

<sup>541</sup> Grootaert, Christiaan and van Bastelaer, Thierry, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

such as economic developments. However, other scholars have upheld the opposite, i.e. homogeneous networks tend to be more effective.<sup>542</sup>

- **Formal vs. informal organizations:** Which type of organization structure should be analyzed, only those formally organized, or would informal ones also should be included? Or as the some scholars pose it, “are strong associational ties better than weak ones, or vice versa?”<sup>543</sup>.

Scholars agree on the fact that whichever the feature of social organization, it is not enough to describe human relationships<sup>544</sup>. Social interaction, even if there are identified patterns, most likely will vary from a situation to another. In addition, as explained in the first chapter, what can be positive social capital on one context could mean social capital with unsocial outcomes on another. What might represent an effective measurement approach in one context might not be the same in another context. As Krishna *et al*<sup>545</sup> say “horizontal vs. vertical may matter for social capital in Italy but not so much in rural north India”.

## 2. Social Capital: Tools for a diagnosis

### 2.1. World Bank social capital measurement tools<sup>546</sup>

Empirical evidence has demonstrated that social capital can be best measured through the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods. Due to its multidimensional nature, the concept calls for a comprehensive approach with the combination of both perspectives. To this end, the World Bank developed the Social Capital Assessment Tool (SOCAT) and the Social Capital Integrated Questionnaire which successfully integrates both qualitative and quantitative techniques.

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<sup>542</sup> Grootaert, Christiaan and van Bastelaer, Thierry, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

<sup>543</sup> Grootaert, Christiaan and van Bastelaer, Thierry, *op. cit.*, *ibidem*.

<sup>544</sup> Krishna, A., and Shrader, E.: “Social Capital Assessment Tool”. Prepared for the Conference on Social Capital and Poverty Reduction; The World Bank, Washington DC, June 22-24, 1999.

<sup>545</sup> Krishna, A., and Shrader, E., *op. cit.*, p. 6.


<sup>546</sup> For further information on the World Bank’s social capital measurement tools, refer to <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTSOCIALCAPITAL/0,,contentMDK:20642703~menuPK:401023~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:401015,00.html>, Grootaert, Christiaan and van Bastelaer, Thierry: *Understanding and measuring social capital, A multidisciplinary Tool for Practitioners*, The World Bank, 2002; Krishna, Anirudh, and Shrader, E.: “Social Capital Assessment Tool”, prepared for the Conference on Social Capital and Poverty Reduction; The World Bank, Washington DC, June 22-24, 1999; Grootaert, Christiaan et al: *Measuring Social Capital, An Integrated Questionnaire*, World Bank Working Paper n.18.

The World Bank has identified the concept of social capital as essential for enhancing the quality, effectiveness and sustainability of the Institution' operations, particularly those which are community based. In this sense, the World Bank developed and produced numerous initiatives to provide a framework to social capital research and practical incorporation in their activities. To this end, and as a first step towards the development of a uniform measure of the different dimensions of social capital, the World Bank developed two social capital measurement tools to measure both cognitive and structural social capital in the communities which will benefit from its projects. In addition, these tools integrate qualitative and quantitative measures and are valid and reliable across a wide range of community, household and institutional contexts, as well as applicable at all levels of project design.

The scope of the World Bank's Social Capital Assessment Tool (SOCAT) is to provide qualitative and quantitative data useful for determining the baseline levels of social capital and monitoring progress over the course of the implementation of its development projects. Its elaboration is based on tools from 26 studies conducted in 15 countries worldwide, and it was tested among urban, rural and indigenous populations in Latin America and rural populations in India. The SOCAT provides a community and organizational profile containing both qualitative and quantitative instrument, and a household survey which provides quantitative data.

As Grootaert and Van Bastelaer<sup>547</sup> point out, ideally, social capital measurement should capture insights of the following four quadrants:

**Figure 10. The forms and scope of social capital**



Through the SOCAT, social capital is addressed at the macro and micro levels. The macro level refers to the institutional context in which the organizations are embedded and includes formal

<sup>547</sup> Grootaert, C., van Bastelaer, Thierry, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

structures and relationships such as legal frameworks, rules of law, political regime, level of decentralization and level of participation in policy processes. The micro level, on the other hand, refers to the potential contribution that horizontal organizations and social networks provide to development. Two different types of social capital can be identified in this micro level: cognitive and structural. Cognitive social capital refers to its less tangible side, which includes values, beliefs, behaviours and social norms, such as trust, reciprocity and solidarity. These should be shared by the members of the community in order to foster collective action. Structural social capital refers, on the other hand, to informal and formal local level institutions that foster community development.

In practice, most experience has been gained with the measurement at the micro and meso levels. And in particular, the SOCAT covers the lower part of fig. 1.3. The data collected through the SOCAT can be analyzed by its own, if the aim is to examine the existing levels of social capital, to map distribution of social capital among different social areas, or to obtain a better understanding of the functioning of certain organizations. Other times, the data collected through the SOCAT needs to be crossed with other surveys, for instance, if social capital wants to be analyzed together with income or uses of services. In addition, the SOCAT was designed as a flexible tool that can be implemented both at national and local level and that can be adapted according to the particular case.

Structured questionnaires as well as open-ended participatory methods are used. It presents a “Community profile” section which comprises a series of interviews conducted in the community during the initial days of fieldwork, including group interviews, focus groups, community assets mapping and an institutional diagram exercise. The “Household survey” section attempts to measure indicators of both structural and cognitive social capital and intends to facilitate analyzing social capital with other variables such as poverty, inequality, and growth. The survey might be carried out on its own, or in combination with other sections of the SOCAT or other surveys. The “Organizational profile” section attempts to identify, in a given community, the existing relationships among formal and informal local level institutions and networks, and assess the organization’s internal features that may promote or not social capital. The section includes semi-structured interviews with the organization’s leaders, with members, and non members.

The most interesting and useful feature of this tool is the possibility of obtaining detailed information on structural and cognitive social capital.

The “Household survey” particularly addresses structural and cognitive social capital. To this end, the questionnaire identifies three key dimensions for describing organizations: density of membership, diversity of membership, and the extent of participation in the decision making

process. The measurement of cognitive social capital is address through the following dimensions: solidarity, trust and cooperation and conflict resolution.

The SOCAT also includes collective action as an indicator of social capital. World Bank researchers have considered that collective action is an output measure and that its usefulness lies on the fact that collective action requires a minimum of social capital in order to be effective<sup>548</sup>.

In addition, the World Bank has developed the Social Capital Integrated Questionnaire (SC-IQ)<sup>549</sup> with the aim to obtain quantitative data on various dimensions of social capital, as part of a larger household survey. In particular the tool considers six dimensions of social capital: groups and networks; trust and solidarity; collective action and cooperation; information and communication; social cohesion and inclusion; empowerment and political action. This tool has been pilot-tested in Albania and Nigeria.

The SC-IQ was designed to be used by researchers, project managers and evaluators, and policymakers. It has been designed to be a particular section to be incorporated to larger surveys to be carried out. Therefore, it requires a previous experience with the issue of social capital since it needs to be adjusted to the specific context in which it will be carried out.

The questions are designed to address the multi-dimension feature of social capital. In this sense, it explores the existing types of groups and networks and the contribution to these, the respondent's perceptions of the trustworthiness of others and key institutions, as well as the strength of norms of cooperation and reciprocity<sup>550</sup>. The questionnaire is also designed in a way that it addresses the distinction between bonding and bridging social capital.

The SC-IQ reflects both structural and cognitive social capital, the ways in which social capital operates, and the major areas of outcomes: groups and networks, trust and solidarity, collective action and cooperation, information and communication, social cohesion and inclusion, empowerment and political action.

In the same fashion as the SOCAT, the SC-IQ is a prototype tool which requires adaptation to the local context before its application, such as assessing which is the proper balance between the different issues to address and which questions are relevant to the particular case.

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<sup>548</sup> However, as Grootaert, C., van Bastelaer, T. note, the exception to this statement would be totalitarian societies in which people are forced to work together (Grootaert, Christiaan and van Bastelaer, Thierry, *op. cit.*, p. 55).

<sup>549</sup> Grootaert, Christiaan et al: *Measuring Social Capital, An Integrated Questionnaire*, World Bank Working Paper n.18.

<sup>550</sup> Grootaert, Christiaan et al, *op. cit.*

## 2.2. Eurobarometer<sup>551</sup>

Since 1973 the Public Opinion Analysis sector of the European Commission has been carrying out a series of surveys to monitor the evolution of public opinion in the Member States with the aim of assisting in the preparation of texts, decision-making and the evaluation of the Institutions's work.

There are different types of surveys, depending on the scope and the target countries to be addressed:

- The "Standard Eurobarometer", which consists in approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per Member State, which is conducted between 2 and 5 times per year, with reports published twice yearly.
- The "Special Eurobarometer", which concerns specific in-depth thematical studies regarding the services of the European Commission or other EU Institutions, and it is integrated in Standard Eurobarometer's polling waves.
- The "Flash Eurobarometer surveys", which consists of *ad hoc* thematical telephone interviews conducted at the request of any service of the European Commission.
- The "Qualitative Studies", which carry out an in-depth investigation of the motivations, feelings, and reactions of selected social groups with regards to a specific issue, through discussion groups or with non-directive interviews.
- The "Candidate Countries Eurobarometer", which were carried out between 2001 and 2004 in all the 13 countries applying for EU membership. The methodology used was similar to that of the Standard Eurobarometer.

The studies have addressed the major topics related to European citizenship, such as enlargement of the EU, social situation, health, culture, information technology, the environment, the Euro, defence and social capital, among others.

In 2004 the Directorate General Employment and Social Affairs, coordinated by Directorate General Press and Communication of the European Commission, carried out the "Special Barometer n°223"<sup>552</sup> to measure the level of social capital networks in the European Union and in

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<sup>551</sup> Available at [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm).

<sup>552</sup> Between 22nd November and 19th December 2004, the TNS Opinion & Social, a consortium created between Taylor Nelson Sofres and EOS Gallup Europe, carried out wave 62.2 of the EUROBAROMETER, on request of the EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Directorate-General Press and Communication, Opinion Polls. The SPECIAL EUROBAROMETER N°223 is part of wave 62.2 and covers the population of the respective nationalities of the European Union member States, resident in each of the Member States and aged 15 years and over. The basic sample design applied in all Member States is a multi-stage, random (probability)

two candidate countries at that moment, Bulgaria and Romania. The study responded to the awareness of European institutions of the importance of developing and strengthening social capital networks in order to assure social cohesion and eliminate social exclusion<sup>553</sup>. The incorporation of new member states brought about new challenges concerning integration for which the development of the social capital was considered as something important to take into consideration.

The study was carried between November and December 2005, and published in February 2005. The survey consisted of 25.978 interviews. To this end, and in this opportunity, the social capital dimensions to be measured were:

- The context and determinants of social capital: personal satisfaction with main social, economical and political domains as well as satisfaction with personal fields.
- Trust and socialization: generalized trust and informal socialization (time spent in socializing with friends, neighbours and work colleagues).
- Informal Social Capital.
- Networks and associational activities.
- Social capital and political and civic commitment.
- The care of elderly.

With regards to the context and determinants of social capital, the analysis went from the macro level to the meso and individual level. As a first step, the level of satisfaction of the individual was analyzed at these three levels:

- the government: satisfaction with level of democracy in the interviewee's particular country;
- the community: level of satisfaction with the neighborhood (quality of tap water, air, public services, educational system, health system, social housing and, training, and childcare facilities);
- the individual level (job and financial situation, personal safety, health, housing, social life, and life in general).

With reference to trust, the EU used the World Values survey question “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with

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one. In each EU country, a number of sampling points was drawn with probability proportional to population size (for a total coverage of the country) and to population density.

<sup>553</sup> Available at [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_223\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_223_en.pdf).

people?”). And, with respect to socialization, it addressed the level of importance and frequency given to social gathering (with family, friends, neighbors and work colleagues).

Concerning informal social capital, the EU focused mainly on the active and passive aspects of informal networks one could count on when needing help or support. These networks could exist among different social groups.

With regards to networks, the approach given was towards examining the association life of European at different dimensions: memberships, donations and active participations.

In relation to political and civic life, the survey addressed the issues of how importance politics was for citizenships through different types of questions.

And finally, in connection of the care of the elderly, the survey analyzed the point of view of the citizens with regards to several issues concerning ageing, such as housing, healthcare and pensions.

The EU also carried out other surveys, which, though they do not address specifically the issue of social capital, they do analyze aspects which could be related to the topic of this thesis, that is, trust and legal institutions. In this sense, the EU carried out Special Eurobarometer Surveys on citizenship and sense of belonging, values of the European, attitudes and perceptions of Europeans towards corruption, the role of the EU in justice, freedom and security policy areas, and trust in European institutions (which is also addressed in the Standard Eurobarometer).

### **2.3. Latinobarómetro<sup>554</sup>**

Latinobarómetro is a non-profit organization which carries out an annual public opinion survey. The study comprises approximately 19,000 interviews along 18 Latin American countries, representing more than 400 million inhabitants. The scope of Latinobarómetro is to carry out research on the development of democracy and economies, together with societies, through the analysis of citizens’ attitudes, behavior and values. Latinobarómetro is a measurement tool used by local social and political actors, public institutions and international organizations.

The survey does not address the issue of social capital specifically. However, it approaches issues that are in direct relation. In this sense, the survey comprises questions regarding life satisfaction, interpersonal trust, trust in public institutions, civic culture and politics, and in a majority, attitudes towards democracy. In addition, the survey provides questions which comprise issues regarding the support of democracy and rule of law: respect for the law, respect for democratic institutions and law enforcement. Latinobarómetro provides an online data analysis section, in which it is possible to

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<sup>554</sup> Available at <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/LATDatos.jsp>.



browse question indexes and have access to question texts, frequencies for each answer, crosstabs of each question by country or by any other variable, with the possibility of creating graphics.

## **2.4. World Values Survey<sup>555</sup>**

The World Values Survey (WVS) is a worldwide investigation on sociocultural and political change. It is carried out by a network of social scientist from leading universities all around world. The WSV was launched by the European Values Survey, which targeted the European region. This initiative was aimed to be carried out globally.

The project is currently carried out by an international network of social scientists, with local funding for each survey. The national sample must be at least of 1,000 people in their own society. The WVS is guided by a steering committee with representatives from all regions of the world. The data provided by the WVS has been widely used for academic research and for institutional purposes.

The first wave of the values survey was collected from 1981 to 1990. The WVS has provided empirical data on the gradual changes in what people wanted out of life. Further waves of research were carried out in 1990-1991, 1995-1996, 1999-2001 and 2005-2007. More than 80 independent countries have been surveyed in at least one wave of this investigation. The WVS database makes it possible to examine cross-level linkages, such as that between public values and economic growth; or between environmental pollution and mass attitudes toward environmental protection; or that between political culture and democratic institutions<sup>556</sup>.

The variables that the WVS addresses comprise the following dimensions: perceptions of life, the environment, work, family, politics and society, religion and morale and national identity<sup>557</sup>. The WVS provides an online data analysis section, in which it is possible to browse the variable index, the question texts, frequencies for each answer, crosstabs of each question by country or any other variable, and even create graphics.

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<sup>555</sup> Available at [http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder\\_published/article\\_base\\_46](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_46).

<sup>556</sup> Available at <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>.

<sup>557</sup> For further details, refer to the World Values Survey Online Data Analysis available at <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>.

### 3. Social capital indicators and dimensions

Research and measurement of social capital has showed that, for a correct empirical analysis, it is necessary to address both structural and cognitive social capital<sup>558</sup>. In this sense, it has already been discussed the fact that networks and associations require trust and adherence to norms in order to work effectively, and likewise, trust is fostered by strong networks and associations.

Social capital measurement has been undergoing some skepticism and it is generally argued that the proposed indicators are at best imperfect proxies<sup>559</sup>. Grootaert and Van Bastelaer argue that the point is not to equate social capital measurement indicators with underlying social capital. The authors make an analogy with human capital in order to best describe this point of view: “This theory, developed some 40 years ago, claims that human capital embodied in individuals increases their ability to earn income over their lifetimes. Two convenient proxies were proposed to measure this ability: years of schooling and years of work experience. No one confused these proxy indicators with human capital *per se*. Rather, the proxies are input measures that capture the two most important ways in which human capital is acquired. Even 40 years after the development of the human capital model, measuring human capital directly (through performance or aptitude tests) remains very difficult. But this difficulty has not prevented the empirical literature on human capital from blossoming and leading to many extremely useful results for developing and implementing education policy. The social capital model may currently be at the same early stage that human capital theory was 30 to 40 years ago”<sup>560</sup>. Indicators can be studied individually or in combination. However, it is to note that each of them is relevant on its own to understanding social capital<sup>561</sup>.

In his book *Bowling Alone*, Putnam presents a series of empirical data depicting social trends in the U.S., during the second half of the twentieth century. For an earlier work<sup>562</sup> Putnam had used the General Social Survey and the National Election Studies. However, for the mentioned publication, he complemented such data with other sources, among which the CCB Neddham Life Style Surveys, and the Social Political Trends. He depicts an American society with political apathy and with casual disregard to other people. According to Putnam, social capital is related to “civic virtue”, but a “civic

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<sup>558</sup> Grootaert, Christiaan and van Bastelaer, Thierry: *Understanding and measuring social capital, A multidisciplinary Tool for Practitioners*, The World Bank, 2002, p.43.

<sup>559</sup> Grootaert, Christiaan and van Bastelaer, Thierry, *op. cit., ibidem.*

<sup>560</sup> Grootaert, Christiaan and van Bastelaer, Thierry, *op. cit., ibidem.*

<sup>561</sup> Grootaert, Christiaan and van Bastelaer, Thierry, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

<sup>562</sup> Putnam, Robert D.: “Bowling Alone: America’s declining social capital”, *Journal of Democracy*, 96, 65-78, 1995.

virtue that needs to be embedded in a network of reciprocal social relations. Isolated virtuous individuals are not necessarily rich in social capital<sup>563</sup>”.

In his study on the Italian regions Putnam used four indicators to measure civic engagement:

- associational life,
- newspaper readership,
- electoral turnout, and
- preference voting patterns;

and twelve indicators for assessing institutional success<sup>564</sup>:

- cabinet stability,
- budget promptness,
- statistical and information services,
- reform legislation,
- legislative innovation,
- day care centres,
- family clinics,
- industrial policy instruments,
- agricultural spending capacity,
- local health unit expenditures,
- housing and urban development,
- and bureaucratic responsiveness.

In his book *Bowling alone*, in order to measure social capital, Putnam bases his study on the analyses of trends using the following indicators:

- political participation,
- civic participation,
- religious participation,
- connections in the workplace,

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<sup>563</sup> Putnam, Robert D.: *Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American Community*, Simon & Schuster, N. York, 2000, p. 19.

<sup>564</sup> Putnam, Robert D.: *Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern Italy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993, ch.3.

- informal social connections,
- altruism, volunteering, and philanthropy,
- reciprocity, honesty, and trust.

In another aspect, World Bank researchers Nyhan Jones and Woolcock<sup>565</sup> organized the vast literature on social capital and conceptualized social capital as a household or community (or micro) variable with six, non exclusive, different dimensions or proxies for social capital, which reflect the group membership characteristics and subjective perceptions of trust and norms that are most commonly associated with social capital:

- groups and networks: participation in social organizations, community activities and informal networks; diversity of a group's membership, selection of leaders and involvement over time;
- trust and solidarity: trust among neighbours, strangers and key service providers, and perceptions over time;
- collective action and cooperation: how members have worked with others in joint projects or responses to crisis, consequences of violating community expectations;
- information and communication: means of receiving information on market conditions and public services, access to communication infrastructure;
- social cohesion and inclusion: nature and extent of differences, inclusion, conflicts resolution and sociability;
- empowerment and political action: members' sense of happiness, personal efficacy and capacity to influence local events and broader political outcomes.

#### **4. The case of Argentina**

The first analysis on the social capital situation in Argentina was carried out in 2001 by the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit from the World Bank<sup>566</sup>. The aim was to assess whether, in the Argentina context, social capital could play a role. The report did not intend to make an exhaustive study of the concept of social capital. It attempted to provide some snapshots and information that could be used to promote dialogue among the different actors involved.

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<sup>565</sup> Grootaert, Christiaan et al: *Measuring Social Capital, An Integrated Questionnaire*, The World Bank Working Paper n.18.

<sup>566</sup> World Bank, "Argentina, Together we stand, divided we fall. Levels and determinants of social capital in Argentina", May 31, 2002, World Bank Report n.24281AR.

Its results were presented in the “Report n. 24281-AR, Argentina: Together we stand, divided we fall. Levels and determinants of social capital in Argentina”. The researchers addressed a still unknown issue to the country, in a moment in which the social accelerated deterioration of local social conditions was asking for a more profound and complete diagnosis of the institutional and social crisis that Argentina was going through.

The World Bank’s interest in carrying out such project, which did not have many international precedents, was the result of the institution’s interest in providing answers to deep questionings concerning the remarked general contrast between the country’s possibilities, widened during the ‘90s, and the process of institutions decline and social deterioration. The economic reforms made at the beginning of the decade had proved not to facilitate a stable social environment. By 1998, almost a 29% of the population lived in poverty conditions, while unemployment, inequality and social exclusion augmented<sup>567</sup>. These tense conditions, plus a collective pessimism, could have predicted the institutional and social crisis that would have exploded right after the presentation of the above mentioned report.

The World Bank study was based on series of indicators, picked up from secondary sources, which were gathered during a first qualitative research. Among the basic assumptions it is possible to name the crisis of trust in institutions, not only in the public but also the civil society sphere. According to the researchers, in 2001, Argentina showed indexes of participation and trust significantly lower than other developing and developed countries, with numbers similar to the means obtained in the ‘80s and ‘90s. Though the country had experienced a growth in the number of third sector organizations, these had not obtained the expected impact on participation. This was explained by the effort of this organizations on redefining their roles and responsibilities rather than focusing on serious strategies for social inclusion, summed up to the scepticism of society, product of the difficulties to remove clientelism traditions. In addition, organizational weakness and State dependency were also to explain the low levels of participation.

The diagnosis presented by the World Bank provided some general descriptions:

- Deep social, political and economic disruptions had been a constant in Argentina history, always accompanied by dramatic changes in social institutions.
- The return to democracy in the ‘80s, and the macroeconomic reform of the ‘90s, had transformed the State-society relations, processes yet incomplete.

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<sup>567</sup> Zuleta Puceiro, E., Adúriz, I., Ava, P., “Presentación del diagnóstico actualizado del Capital Social en la Argentina”, OPSM Consultancy, Ushuaia, 7 de octubre 2004.

- The low capacity of public institutions to respond to the new exigencies and demands of a transformed social and economic model had generated dissatisfaction.
- There was space for the development of civil society in Argentina; however, their capacity might have been still limited.
- Clientelism, low level of trust in institutions, high levels of insecurity and corruption presented a difficult environment for the promotion of social capital.

For the Argentina survey, the World Bank adapted the SOCAT to the country situation. Moreover, the questions referring to trust were based on hypothetical questions on real situations at personal level, rather than basing them on impressions on trust at community level. These modifications seek to shed light on the relationships between social capital environments and microenvironments.

The questionnaire was divided in four sections. The first one contained questions related to the socioeconomic conditions of the interviewee; the second one, questions related to the interviewee participation in formal organizations and/or spontaneous collective actions; the third one, questions designed to measure collective action both during “normal” and crisis scenarios; the fourth one, addressed levels of trust and solidarity, while also including perceptions of public institutions and levels of general trust.

A pre-test was initiated in Argentina in May 2000. During May and June 2000 the OPSM Consultancy proposed modifications and adaptations of the original World Bank questionnaire to the Argentina reality. The field study was carried out during June and involving 2235 households, covering both rural<sup>568</sup> and urban centres.

From the results obtained it was possible to come up with a series of conclusions that integrated the first social capital diagnosis to be made in Argentina. Some of the World Bank conclusions were:

- Even though the importance of NGOs and civil society organizations was growing, it was not enough to increment the aggregated levels of participation, trust and social cohesion.
- The higher level of participation was presented in the field of religious organizations. 47% of the total of organizations in which Argentineans took part were from a religious affiliation.
- The family appeared as the dominant social framework, particularly in moments of crisis.

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<sup>568</sup> Rural centres involved were small municipalities of upto 5000 inhabitants.

- There were considerable differences among regions, though all of them presented low levels of social capital.
- There was a link between income, genre and level of education: the male Argentineans with higher income, employed and highly educated were the ones with more probabilities to trust and participate in organizations. Though it was more frequent to see more participating women, those male that participated tended to lead such organizations.
- The poor participated in order to survive, the richer did so to progress.
- The poor did not have the opportunity to access leadership and decision making positions within the organizations.

It could be estimated that in Argentina a favourable environment and micro levels of social capital were closely linked. Individuals who participated in their communities or who trusted their neighbours were more likely to trust public institutions. Similarly, it was more likely that those individuals who trusted either individuals or public institutions at the macro level would be more likely to participate in organizations and trust other individuals. It was suggested that these findings matched previous similar studies, which also remarked the important linkage between a favourable environment and micro levels of social capital.

Countries which do not have high levels of bridging social capital, or had such networks destroyed, for instance, in the case of countries which suffered the totalitarian influence of communism, may have developed or had to rely upon bonding social capital in compensation. It might also be the case that some countries have seen strong bonding networks “crowd out” bridging ones, in that citizens of these countries privilege their familiar networks to such a degree that they discriminate and even fight against more public ones<sup>569</sup>.

## 5. Work in progress

This second part of chapter 2 has attempted to describe some of the most relevant surveys on the issue of social capital and trust, related to the perspective which attains the scope of this thesis. As it has been previously explained, social capital measurement is still undergoing an explorative process. Not only due to the rather young age of social capital theory, but also due to the growing interest and

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<sup>569</sup> Patulny, Roger, *The sociability of nations: international comparisons in bonding, bridging and linking social capital*, in Svendsen, Gert Tinggaard and Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase (Eds.): *Handbook of Social Capital. The Troika of Sociology, Political Science and Economics*. Edward Elgar, UK, USA, 2009, p. 418. .

involvement of different disciplines, which causes that new approaches and interpretations are added to the state of the art. The complexity and interdisciplinary features of social capital do not make its measurement an easy task. However, unlike some scholars who assume a skeptical position towards social capital measurement, we suggest a more flexible approach, in which we recognize the value of each contribution, recognizing that even if not complete or imperfect, they contribute to the better understanding of the social capital phenomenon. Eventually, every social capital measurement method and data collected should be taken as what it is, a tool, and not a means, for better understanding the phenomenon of our interest.

The following chapter presents the development of an empirical general research on social capital and law, with particular focus on the issue of trust in legal institutions. Such research was carried out in the city of Buenos Aires. The mentioned research aims at providing a unique contribution to the development carried out so far to the present Ph.D. thesis.



# CHAPTER 3: THE EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE

## Part I. Social capital, institutions and law

### 1. Introduction

The evolution of a society is a complex process which involves economic, social and institutional factors. Human behaviour and social interaction are guided by both social norms and formal legal rules. The “rules of the game” that structure social and economic systems define institutions as clusters of formal and informal rules –statutory and common law-, religious precepts and codes of conduct. The interaction between formal law and other sources of social normativity has been the object of a wide spectrum of methodological approaches –from the sociological founding tradition to actual Social Capital approach<sup>570</sup>.

The strategic importance of the concept of social capital lies not only in its heuristical value- that is to say, in its capacity to describe and explain the integration between social and economic factors- but also in its normative value. In other words, the value lies in its capacity to establish conditions under which economic, social and cultural behaviours can, in fact, bring about, in a convergent way, the strengthening or weakening of a particular economic, social or institutional order.

The analysis of the sociology tradition reveals that most of the key-concepts of social modern theory were addressed from a methodological perspective known today as the empirical approach – particular methodological guidelines which set out the problems, the formulation of hypothesis, the strategies for checking concepts and ideas. Concepts such as “community”, “power”, “development”, “progress”, “anomy”, “alignment” and “modernization” exerted a powerful influence in the construction of the scientific tradition of sociology –reinforced by empirical research in the modern sense of the expression<sup>571</sup>.

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<sup>570</sup> For a general overview, it is possible to refer to the following contributions in two compilations of special relevance: Drobak, John N. (Ed.): *Norms and the law*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, in particular the contributions of Drobak, J.N. , Ferejohn, J., Friedman, L.M., North, D.C. , Ostrom, E., Sen, A. and Sunstein, C; and Hechter, Michael & Opp, Dieter, Karl-Dieter (Eds.), *Social norms*, Russell Sage Foundation, N. York, 2001, and in particular the contributions of Horne, C., Harding, R., Eggertsson, T., and Ekickson, R., among others.

<sup>571</sup> On this problem, see Robert Nisbet, *Sociology as a form of art*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977, especially its *Introduction*. A general overview of the classical contribution to a conceptual analysis of the foundational views on law, community and the role of institutions, see, Treves, Renato (Coord): *Alle rorigine della sociologia del diritto*. Milano, Franco Angelli Editore, 1983.

For some disciplines, such as economy, until not so long ago, accepting and including these notions was not an easy task. However, the perspectives on institutional economics allowed further development in the operation of these concepts and, therefore, allowed a better understanding. This is the case, also, of the notion of social capital.

Social Capital is a factor of social cohesion. It helps linking social and institutional behaviour. Furthermore, it helps linking sociological and economic considerations. However, it cannot stand alone; it is only one approach to a field that compounds other effects and factors.

In addition, the use of the term “sociological” does not imply adherence to any method or theory from sociology. The term must be taken in a methodological and theoretical broad sense. Sociological approach of legal ideas requires an understanding across different disciplines; and it is termed sociological because of the need to reinterpret law systematically and empirically as a social phenomenon<sup>572</sup>.

From this perspective, the present analysis intends to address the social dynamics that constitute social capital from a basic empirical perspective. The rational reconstruction of the concept of social capital is based on the description of the processes which constitute social capital in a concrete case (perception and evaluation processes, opinion and attitudes of support, adhesion or rejecting to values, norms, proceedings, and public and private institutions). This work proposes, precisely, an empirical analysis of social capital and its relation to the development of institutional and legal issues in a concrete context: Argentina.

Among the possible methodological approaches to be adopted, the study of perceptions and attitudes of society towards institutions was chosen. The institutions selected for the empirical analysis include political institutions and also those institutions which, in a broad and general way, group different realities -such as the Judicial Power, the Public Ministry, lawyers, public officers, judges and other stakeholders-. These are commonly grouped under the “justice administration system” label. This choice has taken in consideration the meaning of the term “institution” provided by Ferrari: “a group of norms of any kind that structures in a durable way social behaviour”<sup>573</sup>. The value of this definition lies on the fact that it does not limit the concept to those actions that have been crystallized in social organizations. It also includes those social actions that, though less formal, are more frequent, and are, indeed, more influential on preferences, choices and decision making, both individually and collectively. In this sense, the proposed concept of “institutions” includes

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<sup>572</sup> Cotterrell, Roger, “Why must legal ideas be interpreted sociologically?”, *Journal of Law and Society*, Volume 25, Number 2, June 1998, ISSN: 0263-323X, pp. 171-92.

<sup>573</sup> Ferrari, Vincenzo, *Derecho y Sociedad, Elementos de sociología del derecho*, Universidad del Externado, Bogotá, 2006, p. 39.

natural forms of sociability, such as family, marriage, collective transactions, ruled by legal norms, and other institutions, such as universities, schools, the parliament, the town council, the judiciary and law practitioners. As Ferrari expresses, institutions are, at the same time, a stimulus, a mean and a product of social action.

The sociological approach, in this case, through the methodology of a social survey, aims at analysing and identifying values, perceptions, evaluations and tendencies in behaviour, both emotional and cognitive, of a concrete society, and in relation to its particular legal culture<sup>574</sup>. In this sense, the empirical research focuses on the case of the Argentinean society, in the specific context of the city of Buenos Aires. In addition to the specific legal culture, the survey aims at identifying the features of the factors involved in the processes of building and maintaining the trust in the institutions that constitute the justice administration system.

The main focus will not be the culture of law, in its strict sense, which refers to intra-legal factors and the study of legality, typical of jurists and in general legal operators, but rather on the culture on law, which refers to the culture of general society, the societal view on law and institutions, essential for their legitimation. This refers to the perceptions, beliefs and ideas about law and institutions, and the factors that foster and strengthen -or weaken in some cases- the attitudes of trust in them. The present study is not, therefore, a study on internal legal culture, but rather external legal culture, the one belonging to the citizenship and other stakeholders related to the legal and judicial system.

The basic, technical approach will be mainly quantitative. The tool for accessing the research target –social capital in relation to other factors that structure the Argentine legal culture-, is a general survey on a representative sample of the universe belonging to the city of Buenos Aires, at the moment of the survey.

It is important to stress that this approach is not the only one possible. It is simply the one that best allows putting into practice the methodology on social capital research already used in the works and studies described in the precedent chapters. The interpretation of the survey will be based on the typical tools for modern quantitative research on social capital.

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<sup>574</sup> The term “culture” is used in a similar sense as the one used by Ferrari: the group of conceptions, ideas, norms and values that inspire a society in its daily life, and includes, therefore, both the symbolic and physical exchanges (Ferrari, Vincenzo, *op. cit.*, p. 43). In a similar sense, broadly speaking, it is possible to define “cultura” as “the group of attitudes, opinions, and convictions that feature a particular social group and assure, in the particular context, the attribution of shared meanings” (cfr. Febbrajo, Alberto, *Sociologia del Diritto*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2009, p. 50).

The main focus will be the analysis of the relationship between interpersonal trust, and trust in legal institutions. Particular attention will be given to trust in the judicial institutions by the citizenship.

Why addressing the issue of the judicial institutions? As explained in chapter 2, in actual times, the judicial function – considered in a general way, not only the strict activity of applying the law- is nowadays going through a process of social evaluation and scrutiny which allows for a deeper analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, progresses and steps back of the rule of law. In a context such as the one presented by modern democratic societies, in which there is a crisis of representativeness of institutions such as the executive and legislative branches, social powers fill in empty gaps. This phenomenon broadens the importance of judicial decisions, creating a bigger influence on decision making processes that were once limited to the political sphere.

Every day, more judges are not limiting themselves to applying the law. Judges are increasingly building and “constructing” law. Interpreting and applying the law means constructing or building new solutions, distributing services and goods, solving conflicts in controversial ways. Judges assume options, and innovate in the established order. In a certain sense, the judge appears as a social broker, contributing and making political decisions, and in this sense, they strengthen the political accent of their institutional interventions. This triggers the growing interest of the public in knowing the backgrounds and qualifications of judges, the effective consequences and reasons underlying their decisions. For these reasons, and with the strengthening of democratic life, the social demands towards the system of justice are strengthened, deepened, and broadened.

The decline of statutory law vis-à-vis other law sources and the growing role of the judicial power have put the agency and the legal processes in the centre of the public debate. This encompasses a debate on the new relationship between the judiciary power and the State institutions, between the judges and the political power, and how these interact with the society.

In some emerging democracies –such as Argentina-, the judicial power has been assuming a political role which has become more and more evident with time. Social conflicts have been “judicialized”, litigiousness has increased, and the judiciary have assumed a leading role in this process. Independently of this being correct or not, in a context of institutional crisis, societies have tended to deposit new expectations and demands on the judiciary. Most of the times, these attributions result inappropriate since they go beyond the nature, competencies and faculties of judges. However, the disappointment from society generates criticism and questionings with difficult approach and resolution, creating a break point in the relationship between the individuals and the

judicial system. What kinds of gaps are created? Which is the expected role of law and legal institutions in a given society?

In the case of Argentina, however, it is worth stressing the important role played by the judicial system –and particularly, the judiciary- in the transition process of the country towards democracy, which started in 1983. The transition process from an authoritarian regime - which had ruled the country for vast authoritarian periods, and particularly, between 1976 and 1982- to democracy, provided the judicial system a leading role. In 1983, the elected president of Argentina, Raúl Alfonsín, designed a strategy without precedents in any democratic transition processes. This strategy envisaged, as main objective, the trial, by ordinary civil tribunals, of the Military Juntas that had governed the country. In this context, the amnesty laws that the military government had pronounced were declared null, and all the members of the three Military Juntas were accused and taken to the ordinary tribunals. The reason for focusing the transition process on taking the responsible ones to justice responded to the fact that it was the Judicial Power, among the other constitutional institutions, the only institution that enjoyed high levels of trust from the citizenship. And this was essential to legitimate the new democratic system. The citizenship was suspicious about the Congress. Political parties were held responsible for the situation that in 1976 had precipitated the military intervention. The only institution, in 1982, capable of inspiring high levels of trust was the judiciary. A new Supreme Court was the only possible option capable of renewing the basic rules of the games that the National Constitution had established and that had been valid without interruptions since 1853. At the time, the process of legitimating the transition process was possible due to the prestige, reputation and recognition of the independency enjoyed by the judges. Therefore, the legitimation of the democratic transition process initiated by Raúl Alfonsín started with the trials to the Military Juntas, held responsible for the excesses and violations of human rights.

Throughout almost thirty years of democratic transition, that prestige and social legitimation, however, got deteriorated. The causes are not so different from those which gave origin to the global crisis of credibility and trust in the justice systems. Nevertheless, the expectations of society on the judiciary, as administrators of justice and providers of political conflicts, still subsist. Still, the Argentinean, is a society which enjoys a highly developed legal culture, supported by tribunals and universities of high prestige.

It is the described context what gave rise to the interest of further focusing this research on the relationships between the social perceptions of the justice administration systems and the processes of the construction of social capital.

Buenos Aires presents a perfect case for this type of investigation. Buenos Aires is the capital city of Argentina, and is seat of the federal government and main constitutional institutions. Buenos Aires is a modern and multicultural city. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, it has been opened to important migratory flows which have converted the city in one of the most dynamic and populated cities of the world<sup>575</sup>. Buenos Aires is also seat of the National Supreme Court of Justice, which is the setting for intense judicial debates, amplified by a powerful legal culture and supported by a considerable quantity of universities and a broad network of means of communications. Furthermore, Buenos Aires is also seat of the most important national newspapers, radio stations with national reach, and the most important open TV channels. This framework stresses the relevance that implies a database referring to the external legal culture of the inhabitants of the city of Buenos Aires.

Comparative experiences have showed that transitional governments present difficulties in responding to the demands from the citizenship. In its initial stages, democratic transitions unleash repressed expectations, which quickly exceed the response capacity of the institutions inherited from the authoritative period. An overload of long time repressed demands is generated. Local governments have realized that there is a need for new approaches that will foster a better relationship among the government and the local population, based on concepts such as social network, social cohesion and enhanced social capital.

Robert Putnam, in *Making Democracy work*, has pointed out that reciprocity relationships -social capital- is a main factor for effective democracy. This factor might also determine the performance of local government institutions. It must be noticed that, however, societies and social habits differ from region to region, from country to country, from developing to developed countries. Comparative research has showed that, for instance, Latin-Americans tend to trust the closer circle of persons – family, neighbours, friends, work colleagues and classmates-, more than people that they do not know in depth, and they hold prejudices against people belonging to different races and beliefs. The levels of interpersonal trust tend to be low and this contributes to the low levels of trust in political, economic and legal institutions. Hence, the interest for studying the articulating mechanisms of social capital.

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<sup>575</sup> Buenos Aires is the capital and largest city of Argentina, and the second-largest metropolitan area in South America, after Greater Sao Paulo. It is located on the western shore of the estuary of the Río de la Plata, on the southeastern coast of the South American continent. Greater Buenos Aires conurbation, which also includes several Buenos Aires Province districts, constitutes the third-largest conurbation in Latin America, with a population of approximately sixteen million, with a mainly European origin. The 1994 Constitutional Amendment granted the city autonomy. In 1996, following the 1994 reform of the Argentinean Constitution, the city held its first mayoral elections under the new statutes, with the mayor's title formally changed to "Head of Government".

Within this context, the level of social capital of a given society acquires a particular role. This research intends to analyse the issue of social capital (e.g. levels and types of social capital, social capital building approaches, trust, norms and perceptions) in relation to trust in legal institutions.

General trust and social capital building require institutional facilitation and, vice versa, general trust and social capital facilitates institutional development. The levels of social capital might determine the levels of acceptance and compliance of a given society to laws, norms and values.

There is a wide global experience showing that economic growth depends on a great part on private initiatives and investment. The role of the State and public initiatives has a growing importance, but it can never totally substitute private decisions and the taking of private risks. Even pure political decisions have some basic conditionings regarding the efficiency and rational consideration of social risks. This means adequate incentives that promote either positive or perverse outcomes. This is a basic reason for social confidence on institutions. Markets and State decisions need to be supported by non-market institutions in order to perform well. Institutions – as it has been said many times regarding global experience on economic reforms- do matter.

The main purpose of this research is to assess whether institutions really matter, in the case of a society that particularly shows the cycle of important ups and downs in both political and economic development. Argentina could be considered as an extreme demonstration of the role of law in the process of gestation of a society with very low incentives for cooperation and trust. Decades of declination, under the influence of a recurrent cycle of authoritarian-democratic experiences, can show how a general political culture based on mistrust on institutions can provide either bad or good incentives to institutional growth and democratical consolidation.

One of the main hypotheses of the present work is that law has failed in its role of promoting institutional trust. Law has been perceived as an abstract tool, sometimes even imported from other legal cultures, such as the European in the case of the codes, or the American in the case of the Constitution. Lacking in social and moral dimensions, defined by categories strange to the previous traditional constitutions of the National State, law has not been able to consolidate itself as an effective social practice. It has failed in promoting interpersonal trust. In the past and in present times, law has been considered as technical tool, only used by experts and lacking in factors that could make possible the active adhesion of citizens. Moreover, the constant interruptions of democratic life and the generalization of economic and political emergency situations, has set an agenda for different interdisciplinary approaches. And, among these, the social capital theory comes up an innovative approach to assist in clarifying the present situations.

## **2. Social Capital in the City of Buenos Aires: A framework for the analysis**

### **2.1. The basic framework**

The previous chapters have addressed the issue of social capital and trust in legal institutions from a theoretical perspective. At an empirical level, a specific diagnosis tool was designed in order to depict social capital from a legal perspective, and analyze its incidence on some legal institutions such as law and justice. The design of the selected technical tool was based on the methodology already used in this type of investigations which have produced successful results. Among these it is possible to mention the World Bank's (SOCAT), the World Values Survey, the Eurobarometer, the Latinobarómetro, and other surveys carried out locally by the local government and renowned consultancies.

Serageldin and Grootaert explain that there is an “appropriate social capital” for a given country: there is an appropriate level and composition of social capital for a given country at a given time.

In addition, it is necessary to consider the dynamic combination with other forms of capital available capital in the specific country (human, natural, economic, etc.), in combination with information on micro and informal institutions, and analyze the interaction of these with other organizations and governmental organizations, to determine which processes are affected and how. The case study must be guided by a methodological framework that facilitates measurement and analysis of findings in order to assess hypotheses. Researchers are strongly advised to undertake the hard work of judiciously adapting the various components to suit the questions and situations at hand.

The empirical research carried out is an attempt to integrate and build upon selected methods used by the early social capital researchers working on various issues in developing countries<sup>576</sup>. The ultimate goal is to work towards new approaches that are, at the same time, more useful and refined.

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<sup>576</sup> The methodological framework and basic questionnaire of the Social Capital Survey was prepared during the first stages of my research and particularly in year 2010. In February 2011 I worked in Buenos Aires, fine tuning the drafted questionnaire throughout meetings with experts on the field of social surveys, and in particular, related to institutional and justice issues. The FINES – a non-profit organization based in Buenos Aires, very well known for previous experiences with the World Bank research on Social Capital in Argentina- gave me access to previous valuable research, supported by the World Bank and Argentina public and private institutions. For the fieldwork we established an agreement with OPSM, a consultancy firm with special expertise in surveys on the judicial system in Argentina. The consulting firm provided all the technical personal and fieldwork logistics. OPSM also provided technical assistance since they already had set up a platform for data collection and processing for applying the proposed questionnaire to a representative sample of population in the city of Buenos Aires.



In addition, previous studies carried out in Argentina in general and in Buenos Aires in particular<sup>577</sup> have been specifically considered for the present work.

The research carried out, which represents the basis of my empirical investigation, does not intend to establish causality relationships among the different elements. Social capital is a complex concept and encompasses different elements, appertaining to different disciplines.

## **2.2. The methodological approach – technical specifications**

The survey was carried out in collaboration with OPSM Consultancy. OPSM is a leading firm in the consultancy market and applied social research in Argentina. It started its activities in April 1993. OPSM delivers a broad spectrum of services in the field of market research, means of communication, public opinion, social studies and quality programmes, both in the private and public sector. OPSM presents a considerable and important experience in the field of monitoring and evaluation of public policy and social protection programmes. In 2000, the World Bank commissioned OPSM to carry out one of the first diagnosis on the levels of social capital, which was published, afterwards, by the World Bank<sup>578</sup>. The mentioned work was one of the first adaptations of the World Bank's methodology developed for social capital research to a concrete case. Furthermore, due to the social, economic and financial crisis exploded in Argentina in 2001, in 2003, OPSM, together with the FINES Foundation, carried out a new updated survey on the diagnosis of the levels of social capital in Argentina.

I had the opportunity to present OPSM my research project, and after a couple of meetings they offered their availability for carrying out the survey related to my research. Their interest was based on its innovative approach and focus on social capital, trust, institutions and law. In views of this opportunity, in February 2011, I travelled to Buenos Aires with the purpose of presenting the questionnaire that I have been drafting since the beginning of my research. To this end, the draft questionnaire was fine tuned after holding meetings with experts on the field of social surveys, and in particular, related to institutional and justice issues. OPSM was also interested in the outputs and future outcomes of this survey. We established an agreement with the OPSM Consultancy: I would provide them with the finalized questionnaire, and they would put at my disposal their survey structure already set up for data collection and processing.

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<sup>577</sup> Among these studies it is worth mentioning the research carried entrusted to OPSM by the World Bank in 2001, its update in 2002, and numerous studies carried out at local level. The design of the tool was enriched by guidelines and models collected from the investigations promoted by the World Bank, in addition to other precedents which will be mentioned in the subsequent sections.

<sup>578</sup> World Bank, "Argentina, Together we stand, divided we fall. Levels and determinants of social capital in Argentina", May 31, 2002, World Bank Report n.24281.

The survey design responded to the following basic steps and specifications.

### **2.2.a. Geographic coverage**

The proposed geographic coverage targeted to the present survey is the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (from now onwards referred to as “Buenos Aires”).

### **2.2.b. Population**

The first step to take was the identification of the units of analyses to address. In accordance to the approach taken by most of the relevant social capital research already done, the unit of analysis were individuals from private households. The latter are defined, operationally, as “the group of people, related or not, who live under the same roof and which are associated for the provision of their alimentary or other basic needs”<sup>579</sup>. It has been excluded from the population the collective households, that is to say, those individuals who live under the same roof due to other type of circumstances, such as military, health, religious or punishment reasons.

It is interesting to note that, in particular, 90% of the population of Buenos Aires can be reached by telephone, and enjoy access to a fixed telephone line<sup>580</sup>.

The sample consisted of 250 households in Buenos Aires. In this sense, the following tables present the distribution and structure of the total population of the Buenos Aires - according to the Argentinean National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC), with the modifications and updates provided by the Census of the Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires- and the proposed distribution and structure of the population to be surveyed:

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<sup>579</sup> This is the definition adopted by the Argentina National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC) for the carrying out of its Permanent Household Survey (EPH). The associations or units should be constituted by groups of individuals related among themselves on the basis of a common past and a common future; in this sense, linked through a common life Project which identifies and assigns each individual a particular role. The most common of these is family ties, however, the concept is broad enough to include other bonds which might not be necessarily based on this type of kinship.

<sup>580</sup> Information provided by the National Communications Secretariat.

Distribution of total population in Autonomous City of Buenos Aires			
Male	18 to 29 years old	311023	12.3%
Male	30 to 49 years old	430239	17.0%
Male	50 to 64 years old	239736	9.5%
Male	65 years old and +	146271	5.8%
Female	18 to 29 years old	330542	13.1%
Female	30 to 49 years old	503718	19.9%
Female	50 to 64 years old	321187	12.7%
Female	65 years old and +	248088	9.8%

Distribution of survey population in Autonomous City of Buenos Aires				
Male	18 to 29 years old	29	11.6%	
Male	30 to 49 years old	38	15.2%	
Male	50 to 64 years old	27	10.8%	
Male	65 years old and +	19	7.6%	
Female	18 to 29 years old	26	10.4%	
Female	30 to 49 years old	40	16.0%	
Female	50 to 64 years old	42	16.8%	
Female	65 years old and +	29	11.6%	

It is possible that there might be some variability in the population in comparison to the total population which the sample pretends to represent. In order to prevent that some groups are over represented or other are under represented, the process of data weighting was envisaged. In this sense, over-represented groups are given a weight of less than one, and under-represented groups are given a weight of greater than one.

Gender	Age group	Total population ACBA	Survey population ACBA	Weighting factor with reference to total population	Weighting factor with reference to survey population
Male	18 -29	311023	29	10725	1.1
Male	30 - 49	430239	38	11322	1.1
Male	50 - 64	239736	27	8879	0.9
Male	65+	146271	19	7698	0.8
Female	18 -29	330542	26	12713	1.3
Female	30 - 49	503718	40	12593	1.2
Female	50 - 64	321187	42	7647	0.8
Female	65+	248088	29	8555	0.8

All the estimations presented in the present work are calculated using the appropriate weighting factors indicated in the table above. Within this context it is deemed necessary mentioning that due to this weighting, in some very limited cases, particularly in the cases of Figures, it is possible to observe values which differ from the possible values proposed in the question - for instance, in graphics showing replies referring to a 1 to 10 scale, it might be possible to observe values above 10 and below 1. These differences are caused by the weighting; however, they do not imply a substantial modification in the results according to the scope of the survey.

### 2.2.c. Thematic coverage

In views of the specific objectives of the research -the levels of trust in institutions, in relation with the process of social capital building-, the survey identified as main basic variables the ones that indicate the basic demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, as well as the dimensions which relate to the indicators of social capital elements.

The aim of addressing the basic demographic characteristics is obtaining a primary description of the human resources in the studied population, in terms of structure and general internal composition. The variables identified were: place of residence, age, gender, quantity of group members, and relationship with head of household. These were collected from all the individuals included in the surveyed population.

Socioeconomic characteristics describe the ways in which individuals relate with the socio-productive structure. Addressing these features allows the construction of a Socio-economic Level Index (*Índice de Nivel Económico-Social* –INSE). The operation of the variables included in this index is the one suggested by the Argentinean Marketing Association (*Asociación Argentina de Marketing* - AAM). The INSE proposed by the AAM represents a feature of the household, which extends to all its members. The index describes, in an indirect way, the availability of economic resources, and in a direct way, based on the level of education, the social insertion of the main household supporter. The collected indicators included three aspects: 1) the occupational situation of the main household supporter and the other members of the group, 2) the level of formal instruction or education received by the main household supporter, and 3) the personal assets, which could be divided in a) possession of goods and services, and b) possession of a car.

The questionnaire was divided in several thematic sections<sup>581</sup>, addressing different issues related to social capital, interpersonal trust, networks, cooperation, and trust in legal institutions:

- Social cohesion: integration in different issues of communitarian life, such as the society in which the interview lives, the neighbourhood of origin, community of origin, country of origin, groups of friends and acquaintances.

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<sup>581</sup> Based on the ones proposed by the World Bank. See World Bank, “Measuring Social Capital, An Integrated Questionnaire”, World Bank Working Paper n.18.

- Trust in law enforcement, political social and legal institutions: level of trust in the capabilities of law and order, political, legal and civil society institutions, for assuming and solving efficiently people's demands.
- Trust in the legal system: trust in the effective force of the legal system, laws in general and in particular, the judicial system, the performance of judges, the respect for the law and legal institutions and legal culture.
- Interpersonal trust and solidarity: trust in strangers, trust in different social groups, and willingness of others to help in case of need.
- Collective action and cooperation: likelihood of people in the neighbourhood getting together to solve a common problem, and participation in public issues and community activities.
- Information and national identity: main sources of information and characteristics of the Argentinean society.
- Access to law: guarantees personal freedoms and rights, basic needs, access to justice, equal opportunities, no discrimination, and protects from violence and insecurity.

For the general assessment of the judicial system, the empirical research was complemented by the *“Monitor de Tendencias económicas y sociales, Abril 2011// N° 244. Evaluación social e imagen del poder judicial en la Argentina”*, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2011, carried out by OPSM Consultancy.

#### **2.2.d. Methodology**

The survey consisted in telephone interviews based on a structured questionnaire on the diagnosis of social capital, law and institutions in the metropolitan area of the Autonomous city of Buenos Aires. The survey covered male and female citizens, 18 years old and older, and residents in the identified area.

For the implementation of the questionnaire, and carrying out of the survey, OPSM followed its standard methodology placed for this kind of research, which was adapted to the specific case.

Firstly, by means of using a map presenting the census fractions of the selected city, sample points (equivalent to nine blocks) were selected in a random way. The quantity of required households for each fraction was proportional to the total number of households in each fraction. The establishment of the different quota per gender, age and socioeconomic situation, reproduces the

demographic structures provided by the National Household Survey – which, at the moment in which the survey was carried out was updated as per the National Census 2001<sup>582</sup>.

In order to select and obtain the telephone numbers of the sample points, OPSM uses the software DATEL2003. This software possesses the complete list of telephone numbers which is provided by the telephone companies. DATEL2003 provides the possibility of identifying telephone numbers according to their location in terms of street and number. As a result, a complete telephone numbers data base is drawn up in accordance to the established sample and quota.

The telephone numbers data base is exported to the Bellview C.A.T.I. (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing) system, from Pulse Train Co. (London), for its exploitation. Bellview C.A.T.I. offers a quota control system which prevents exceeding the pre-established quantity for each of the variables (location, gender, age, etc.) which make up the sample. In this sense, the concentration of cases in the strips with easier access is prevented.

The system envisages the re-calling, up to three times during the day, to the telephone numbers which presented no answer, occupied line or answering machine. In this sense, any bias due to absence is diminished.

In the case in which the interviewee cannot answer to the questions at that moment, but is willing to participate in the survey, the system offers the possibility of rescheduling an appointment, and the call is automatically made at the arranged time.

The telephone numbers data base does not include those telephone numbers corresponding to commercial units and faxes, telephones numbers which have not been answered in more than three opportunities on the same day, those which, though they were answered by individuals, these refused to collaborate with the survey, and the telephone numbers which would be exceeding the established quota in terms of location, gender and age.

### **2.2.e. Data collection and processing**

The implementation of the questionnaire, the data collection and data elaboration was entirely carried out through the CATI Bellview software, minimizing any manual handling of the information. The consideration of the sample data was carried out using the same software, according to the INDEC information corresponding to gender, age and areas of the City of Buenos Aires.

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<sup>582</sup> Though at the moment of carrying out the survey the last Census had been carried out in 2010, its results were only made available in year 2012, by the time this thesis was already written.

The CATI software, which OPSM counts with, provides a top quality management of telephone research, guaranteeing the strict fulfilment of the pre-established quota required for the specific survey. The software controls that the effective telephone calls do not exceed the quantity established for each category or distribution criteria. This control is set up in combination with quality procedures that minimize any manual intervention. The software prevents the concentration of cases in areas which present an easier access, due to their socio-economic conditions, providing an ideal geographic dispersion. It allows rescheduling telephone calls which have been answered by answering machines, faxes, or, though they were answered by the individuals, they were not available at the moment of the first call. In this sense, violent situations are prevented, unnecessary costs are reduced, and low rates of refusals are guaranteed.

The software allows the generation of multiple choice questions or simple open or closed questions. It is also possible to programme filters and jumps of questions, guaranteeing a correct application of the questionnaire, minimizing any possible editing.

The interviews are carried out by survey takers belonging to the permanent staff of OPSM, who is specially trained for the particularities of the specific research. In this particular case, the experience of the survey takers and supervisors in similar studies – carried out since year 2000, not only for the World Bank but also for other private and public institutions such as the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Security-, facilitated in a remarkable way all the steps of the investigation. The survey takers are constantly monitored and supervised. The telephone calls are made from an exclusive platform connected to a server. The phone calls are made throughout the day, from 9.30 to 21 hours.

In order to control the possible non sampling errors, the software offers the possibility of an online and on screen supervision throughout the duration of the telephone interviews.

The information data base was made available in magnetic format, which can be adapted to any statistical package available in the market (EXCEL, SPSS, SAS, etc).

The results were projected, according to the elevation criteria of the sample, in tables which include total values, and vertical and horizontal percentages– according to the different data crossing of interest.

## **2.2.f. Characteristics and advantages of the research methodology - telephone interviews**

Telephone interviews present numerous advantages with regards to other methodologies:

**Sampling:** telephone interviews allow addressing a broad and geographically dispersed sample.

**Speed:** due to the speed in which it is possible to carry out interviews, it is possible to assign enough survey takers to complete an optimum daily quantity of interviews.

**Privacy and easy access:** The telephone interviews are carried out within the privacy of the house of the interviewee, avoiding any personal exposure and reducing the discomfort of having to open the door of the own house, speaking through the entry phone or moving to other locations. In this sense, the confidentiality and anonymity of the replies is guaranteed to the maximum. For these reasons, telephone interviews provide a differential and segmented access to specific groups of the population which might be more difficult to reach –such as high and low socioeconomic level groups.

**Supervision:** survey takers are constantly monitored and supervised. The survey takers coordinator can observe and supervised each detail of the field work and even listen and record interviews that can be considered to be relevant.

**Costs:** telephone interviews provide a high number of replies in comparison to the number of refusals. This provides a considerable reduction in time and economic resources. In addition, the selection, training and control of survey takers are simpler procedures than for other type of methodologies.

**Benchmark:** the majority of the most relevant surveys carried out in Europe, the United States of America and Latin America are carried out through telephone interviews.

**Availability of information:** in big cities, such as Buenos Aires, more than 90% of the homes have fixed line phones.

### 2.3. Technical fiche

The survey covered a representative sample of 250 households from the metropolitan area of the city of Buenos Aires<sup>583</sup>. The size of the sample implied a standard error of +/- 6.2% in the cases in which  $p=0.5$  with a confidence level of 95.5%.

The survey was field tested during the first week of March 2011 and it was applied to the representative sample of households from 7 to 14 March. The interviews were made by a team of twelve interviewers, who were supervised by OPSM coordinators.

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<sup>583</sup> According to the INDEC, “Censo Nacional de Población, Hogares y Viviendas 2010”, Instituto Geográfico Nacional (IGN), the total population of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, as per 2010 was 2,890,151 individuals; 1,329,681 male: and 1,560,470 female.



The data processing was carried out using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) programme. The field work was under the responsibility of OPSM experts, which were in constant communication with me.

The following study does not intend to provide a final word on social capital measurement. It is only an attempt to integrate and build upon selected methods already used by social capital researchers, with the addition of the approach on trust in legal institutions. This research intends to propose new tools for further research, with the strong advice of a judicious adaptation to the different context in particular.

## 2.4. Sample profile

The total interviewed population consisted of a sample of 250 individuals appertaining to 250 households in the metropolitan area of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires.

The interviewed population was structured as follows:

**Table 4. Gender**

<b>Total</b>	100%
<b>Male</b>	44.5%
<b>Female</b>	55.5%

**Table 5. Socioeconomic situation**

<b>Total</b>	100%
<b>High</b>	16.1%
<b>Medium</b>	50.6%
<b>Low</b>	33.3%

**Table 6. Age**

<b>Total</b>	100 %
<b>18-29 years old</b>	25.4%
<b>30-49 years old</b>	36.9 %
<b>50-64 years old</b>	22.2 %
<b>65+ years old</b>	15.6 %

**Table 7. Age, gender and socioeconomic situation**

	Male			Female		
	Socioeconomic situation			Socioeconomic situation		
	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low
<b>18-29 years old</b>	1,70%	8,90%	1,70%	2,50%	4,00%	6,50%
<b>30-49 years old</b>	2,70%	9,80%	4,50%	5,00%	11,40%	3,50%
<b>50-64 years old</b>	2,10%	4,90%	2,50%	1,80%	5,70%	5,10%
<b>65+ years old</b>	0,30%	3,00%	2,40%	---	2,70%	7,10%

### **3. Social Capital Assessment: an empirical approach**

The concept of social capital has been identified as one of the factors that characterizes economic and social outcomes in a given society. Research and studies have shown that social capital differs from country to country, even among the different regions within a country, and within a region itself. These differences could be explained by the different aspects that determine social capital, which, at the same time, vary from case to case: history, culture, etc.

Considering that social capital comprises complex relations between individuals and institutions, the issue will be approached from different levels of interaction: macro-national/institutional, meso-community and micro-individual level. Using a multilevel survey makes the simultaneous analyses of the different levels easier, improving estimations and validations, whilst, at the same time, provides a better understanding of the social capital phenomenon.

The relationship between the institutional environment and social capital is sometimes proposed as being symbiotic: social capital depends on the environment, and this environment is affected by the levels of social capital. Unravelling this relation is a complex task which is not the aim of this survey.

The sample intends to include individuals from different ages, level of education and socio-economic situation. Thus, it is not possible to assume that if asked directly about the institutional framework the individuals would understand what they are expected to answer. Therefore, the survey will address the institutional framework along a series of questions that will lead to infer the whole situation. In addition, this survey does not intend to provide an evaluation on the performance of the Argentina governmental institutions, but rather obtain a picture of the basic legal culture and expectations from the citizens with the present situation in Argentina and in the City of Buenos Aires, together with the social processes regarding the formation of social capital, institutional trust and confidence on legal and judicial institutions.

#### **1. Perceptions on the institutional situation**

The first question of the survey refers to the public perceptions on the social and institutional situation of Argentina and the city of Buenos Aires, at the time in which the survey was carried out. This question addresses an external dimension of the legal culture. It aims at identifying the positive and negative attitudes towards social and institutional issues, under the assumption that these are affected by the current conditions of the particular context to be studied.

The incorporation of this external variable responds to the hypothesis that positive perceptions and attitudes towards the social and institutional context affect openness, optimism and trust towards the others, whereas, the opposite, negative perceptions and attitudes foster being on the defensive, pessimism,

mistrust and hostility towards the others, institutions, and the current rules of the game existing in a society. Within a context of positive social expectations, the society tends to accept institutions. Trust on institutions is very often a consequence of a positive assessment of the institutional context. Contrarily, the perception of a negative context generates defensive attitudes and hostility. Positive visions strengthen the horizontal and vertical interpersonal trust on the rule of the games and the role of institutions.

In this sense, the described situations are reproduced by the results presented by Table 8.

**Q1. Evaluation on the present social and institutional situation in Argentina and the city of Buenos Aires.**

**Generally speaking, which is your opinion on the present situation in Argentina and in the city of Buenos Aires?**

**Table 8. Replies Q1 – Evaluation on the present social and institutional situation in Argentina.**

	Total (%)	18 – 29 (%)	30 – 49 (%)	50 - 64 (%)	65 + (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Socioeconomic situation		
								High (%)	Medium (%)	Low (%)
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>Very good</b>	5,5	3,3	6,5	4,5	8,2	6,9	4,5	5,3	5,4	5,8
<b>Good</b>	26,3	19,6	33,2	20,4	29,1	29,5	23,6	21,3	<b>30,3</b>	22,5
<b>Neither good/bad</b>	25,5	31,2	26	24,3	16,7	20,6	29,4	29,2	26,8	21,7
<b>Bad</b>	35,4	40,5	28,2	37,4	41,6	33,1	37,3	<b>34,6</b>	<b>31,9</b>	<b>41,3</b>
<b>Very bad</b>	6,1	5,3	4,8	10,2	4,3	8,3	4,3	9,6	3,8	7,7
<b>DK/DA</b>	1,2	---	1,3	3,2	---	1,6	0,9	---	1,7	1,1

The results presented in Table 8 show that 35.4% of the population believed that the country is undergoing a bad situation, whereas only 26.3% believe that the present situation is good. If it is to consider the extremes, 6.1% thinks the situation is very bad, and 5.5% think that it is very good. Only 25.5% consider a midpoint, qualifying the present situation to be neither good nor bad.

The results obtained reflect a stable and similar situation, in which the positive opinions are slightly lower than the negative ones. The intermediate answer, expressed by “neither good nor bad”, reaches one quarter of the surveyed population. In a political culture, such as the one to be found in Buenos Aires, which tends to be suspicious and critical when referring to the public sphere, the intermediate opinion is distributed equally, by halves, between the two positive and negative poles of opinion.

With reference to the age variable, if we sum up the percentages for “bad” and “very bad”, the interviewees in the age groups 18-29 and 50-64 tend to be more critical about the situation in the country than the other groups of age. The age group 30-49 and 65+ tend to be more optimistic about the current

situation. It is interesting to note that these groups correspond to the elderly, which have already lived through many crises and to the group of individuals which are assumed to be fully working. As for gender, it is possible to observe a tendency for male to be more optimistic than female. Regarding the socioeconomic situation, the interviewees in a lower and higher level tended to be more critical, whereas the medium level group tended to be more optimistic.

**Table 9. Replies Q1 – Evaluation on the present social and institutional situation in Buenos Aires.**

	Total (%)	18 – 29 (%)	30 – 49 (%)	50 - 64 (%)	65 + (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Socioeconomic situation		
								High (%)	Medium (%)	Low (%)
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>Very good</b>	1,6	---	2,6	1,4	2	1,7	1,4	1,9	1,6	1,3
<b>Good</b>	23,1	21	21,8	18,6	36	22,5	23,6	23,7	23,4	22,4
<b>Neither good/bad</b>	31,7	31,5	37,5	33,3	16,1	29,9	33,2	33,6	36,8	23
<b>Bad</b>	31,4	40,8	26,8	29,9	29,3	27,8	34,4	23	29,2	39
<b>Very bad</b>	10,7	6,7	10	13,6	14,5	16,6	5,9	17,8	7,3	12,2
<b>DK/DA</b>	1,5	---	1,3	3,2	2,2	1,6	1,5	---	1,7	2,1

With regards to the situation in the city of Buenos Aires at the time in which the present survey was carried out, according to the results presented in Table 9, 10.7% considered the situation to be very bad, 31.4%, to be bad, and a 31.7% consider the situation to be neither good nor bad. 23.1% consider the situation to be good, and only 1.6% consider the situation was very good. The replies show that there is a tendency towards a negative evaluation, with more than 40% thinking that the situation was bad or very bad, and almost 30% without a clear strong evaluation, thinking that the situation was neither good nor bad.

With reference to the age variable, the age groups 18-29, 50-64 and 65+ follow almost the same expectations: more than 40% of the interviewees of each group believe the situation in Argentina is bad or very bad. The group of 65+ tends to be the more optimistic with almost 40% of replies for “very good” and “good”. As for gender, male tend to be more pessimistic than women. Regarding the socioeconomic situation, the interviewees in a lower situation tend to be the most pessimistic. The medium and low level groups present similar tendencies in their opinions.

It is interesting to note that the surveyed population, which corresponds to the city of Buenos Aires, has a better opinion on how things are going for Argentina than from their own city.

At the time of the survey, the country was undergoing a period of generalized optimism with reference to economic and social expectations. Once the political conflicts between the Government and the organizations representing the agricultural organizations raised in 2008 and 2009 were overcome, the country was enjoying a revolution of rising expectations – particularly in March 2011, time in which the survey was carried out, which also represents a special time for the agricultural activity. The international situation, favorable for the development of exportations, the success of economic policies in particular referring to fiscal equilibrium, the industry activity, the low unemployment rate and control of the social crisis fostered the idea that whichever the personal or family situation was, things were under control and the country was consolidating a favorable environment for progress.

Even though the personal or communitarian situation would be perceived as uncertain or not so positive, the general situation was perceived as improving, generating positive views on economic, social and political issues. The political framework and the electoral process lead, five months later, to one of the most resounding victories in the modern history of the country, with 54% of the votes and a remarkable difference with the opposing political forces –more than double of the votes corresponding to the other parties and thirty points of difference with the second most voted party. There was a set of economic, political and social motivations which mainly favored positive perceptions and attitudes.

On the negative opinion (bad or very bad answers) the tendency is to dim the image towards the rest of the country, i.e. less “too bad” with respect to “bad”. The interviewees consider the situation in the country to be bad, though not extremely bad, whereas there are more people that consider the situation in the city of Buenos Aires to be very bad.

With reference to expectations –meaning, the ideas on the future-, the positive situation is reproduced. Regarding the future, a considerable majority –equal or superior to a one third of the interviewees-, expressed positive attitudes, both towards the evolution of the national situation and towards the local level of Buenos Aires. The other third of the surveyed population, which in both cases exceeds the 30%, also perceives that the situation of the country will remain the same, meaning, basically, a positive level. The idea that things will get worse reaches a 19% for the country and 21.6% with reference to the city of Buenos Aires.

## **Q2. Expectations on the prospective situation in Argentina and in the city of Buenos Aires**

**Generally speaking, do you think the situation in Argentina and in the City of Buenos Aires,  
will get better, remain the same, or worsen in the next couple of years?**

**Table 10. Replies Q2. Prospective situation of Argentina.**

	Total (%)	18 – 29 (%)	30 – 49 (%)	50 - 64 (%)	65 + (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Socioeconomic situation		
								High (%)	Medium (%)	Low (%)
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>Get better</b>	35,3	36,2	36,9	22,5	48,4	33,7	36,7	35,6	33,3	38,3
<b>Remain the same</b>	34,6	32,9	37,2	37,9	26,5	36,8	32,8	23,2	43,1	27,1
<b>Get worse</b>	19,4	23,6	15,2	24,9	14,5	22	17,3	32	12,5	23,8
<b>DK/DA</b>	10,7	7,3	10,7	14,7	10,6	7,5	13,3	9,3	11,1	10,8

Table 10 shows that even though 41.5% of the population think that the situation in Argentina is bad and very bad (Q1), 35.3% thinks that the situation will improve. On the less optimistic side 34.6% believe that the situation will remain the same, and 19.4% that it will get worse.

For the city of Buenos Aires, the percentage of negative views on the situation (“bad” plus “very bad”) equals a total of 42.1% (Q1), a lower percentage, 34.6%, considers that the situation will remain the same. A similar percentage of the population believes it will get better and 19.4% consider that the situation will get worse.

With reference to age, the group 65+ tends to be more optimistic, with 48.4% of replies referring to a situation that will get better. The less optimistic tend to be the individuals in the group 50-64, followed by the 18-29 group. In relation to gender, there is not a significant difference between males and females, though male tend to be more pessimistic than women. As for the socioeconomic situation, the most pessimistic, according to the results, tend to be the individuals corresponding to the high level. The medium level group clearly presents a tendency to believe that things will remain the same, and the low level groups presents a moderate view along the different visions.

## 2. Levels of cooperation and communitarian integration

From a certain point of view, social capital describes relationships among people. These relationships can regard, among a vast number, family, group of friends, neighbours, the community and even macro institutions. Within this context it is important to study the individual level, how people interact and socialize within their community. This section addresses the sphere of socialization. One of the manifestations of positive levels of social capital is the occurrence of frequent social interactions<sup>584</sup>.

<sup>584</sup> World Bank; “Measuring Social Capital, An Integrated Questionnaire”, World Bank Working Paper n.18.

The analysis of the feelings of belonging in communitarian life, and the feeling of effective social inclusion within immediate social circles is one of the internal variables to be taken into consideration. Table 11 synthesizes the results obtained in the inquiry over the perceptions on social integration.

### Q3. Perceptions on the level of social cohesion

From a personal viewpoint, please express to what extent you feel integrated in each of the following spheres of communal life.

Table 11. Replies Q3. Perception on level of social cohesion.

	To a great extent (%)	To some extent (%)	To a small extent (%)	Not at all (%)	Doesn't know (%)	Didn't answer (%)
The society in which you lives	32.9	42.6	18	6	0	0.5
The neighbourhood of origin	33	29.1	17.8	11.6	6.8	1.8
The community of origin from family	25.9	27.6	15.2	17.8	8.6	4.9
The country of origin from family	28.2	20.3	17.1	20.7	8.6	5.2
The current neighbourhood	42.4	36.4	14	4.8	0.9	1.4
Childhood friends	21.8	23.6	16.3	28.4	6.7	3.2
School friends	20	23.4	16.5	27.5	8.2	4.5
Colleagues from work	25.1	29.2	9.7	18.6	6.5	10.8

Table 12. Replies Q3. Social cohesion: "to some extent" and "to a great extent".

	Total (%)	18 – 29 (%)	30 – 49 (%)	50 - 64 (%)	65 + (%)	Male	Female	Socioeconomic situation		
								High (%)	Medium (%)	Low (%)
The society in which you lives	75.5	67.4	75.4	78.9	83.8	71.9	78.4	65.2	82.8	69.4
The neighbourhood of origin	62.1	64.8	58	62.1	67	60.2	63.5	48.9	67.2	60.5
The community of origin from family	53.5	55.9	52.3	52.2	54.2	57.1	50.6	54.7	53	53.6
The country of origin from family	48.5	47.8	48.8	46.3	52.3	45.1	51.3	48.6	48.1	49.1
The current neighbourhood	78.8	81.1	75.8	71	93.7	80.1	77.8	77.9	80.9	76.1
Childhood friends	45.4	58.4	46.2	37.6	33.2	45	45.7	54.5	52.5	30.1
School friends	43.4	58.8	51.3	27.4	22.3	50.4	37.8	52.7	50.2	28.5
Colleagues from work	54.3	51.2	66.8	49.9	36.6	58.5	51	67	57.9	42.9

The interviewees were asked with reference to their feeling of belonging and integration with different spheres of social life. At first sight the results obtained show that Argentines feel, generally speaking, integrated with the different spheres of communitarian life. This observation is very important, particularly if it is to consider that the majority of the population descends from immigrants. In addition, many of the people living in the city of Buenos Aires are not originally from there; the city of Buenos Aires is still an important destination for those seeking a job, education and life opportunities. In this sense, Table 11 would not be showing results referring to an immigrant, with little sense of belonging. Contrarily, the interviewees feel part of the neighbourhood in which they live, the community to which they have been incorporated, the neighbourhood where they were born and raised, and the country of origin of their families (which sums up a total of 48.4%). To be “*porteño*”<sup>585</sup> implies perceiving and feeling part of the different spheres of belonging analysed in Table 11.

Going into details, Table 11 shows that with regards to the society in which they live, 42.6% feel integrated to some extent to the community where they live, and 32.9% feel integrated to a great extent. Only 18% believed to be so to a small extent, and 6% declared not to be integrated at all. With regards to the integration the neighbourhood of origin, 33% share a strong feeling of belonging with it, 29.1% to some extent, 17.8% to a small extent, and 11.6% not at all integrated. When referring to the community of origin from the family, 27.6% feel integrated to some extent, and 25.9% to a great extent; only 17.8% feel not to be integrated. In relation to the country of origin from the family, 28.2% feel a strong sense of belonging and 20.3% feel it to some extent. However, it is to note that 20.7% do not share a sense of belonging to the country of origin from the family.

In relation to the current neighbourhood where they are living, 42.4% declare to feel integrated to a great extent, and 36.4% to some extent. It is only a 4.8% who do not feel at all integrated.

When referring to the circle of childhood friends, the majority, 28.4%, do not identify with childhood friends, and only 21.8% is very integrated and 23.6% is to some extent integrated. It is interesting to note that the older in age, the weaker the identification with childhood friends. And, inversely, the younger in age, the stronger this feeling is.

With relation to school friends, the trend is similar, with a 27.5% declaring not to be integrated with this group of friends, 23.4% to some extent and 20% to a great extent. The interviewees were asked about the relation with work colleagues, 29.2% and 25.1% declared to be to some extent and very integrated with colleagues from work, whereas 18.6% declared not to be integrated at all. The majority of people who are

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<sup>585</sup> Name given to the people of or from Buenos Aires.



integrated with colleagues from work come from the group of people of 30 to 49 years, which is assumed that people are already inserted in the job market.

It is interesting to note that according to the data, the older in age, the less contact with childhood or school friends can be observed. It is possible to venture some possible explanations. As an individual gets older in age, it is likely that he will lose contact with early friends due to changes in personal life, such as the enlargement of family life, and the natural cycle of life. In addition, younger individuals are closer in age to childhood and high school moments. There is more probability that their social life has not started to get much diversified with own family, and colleagues from work from successive different jobs.

With reference to gender, women tend to feel more integrated with men. In relation to socioeconomic situation, high level individuals tend to be the ones that feel the least integrated in daily life environments.

In general terms, according to the collected data, it is possible to infer that the interviewed population feel highly integrated with the proposed spheres of social life.

### **3. Common values and socio-cultural orientations**

Q4 inquiries on another important social capital dimension: shared common ideas, socio-cultural principles and values. Q4 addresses the existence of common values within Argentines, how close citizens feel in terms of shared values or the identification of common characteristics.

In general terms, the issue is under strong discussion. The results tend to strengthen the idea that though citizens do feel part of the communities in which they live, Argentines do not necessarily share common values. They are conscious of the difference in terms of normative orientations. The results confirm previous research which had stressed the importance of an heterogeneous and pluralistic political culture in which there is a coexistence of different, and most of the times opposite and differing, ideas, projects and pictures.

The political discourse often emphasizes the importance of reaching a consensus that allows overcoming social differences. The demanded leaderships require the capability of positioning themselves over these differences, in order to generate trust among the different sectors and stimulate agreements between social and political spheres. This idea is central, particularly in countries based on the European political tradition, in which societies have been long divided by civil wars and social conflict due to traditional religious, cultural, ideological and social differences. However, European societies have been able to overcome such differences and identify shared values that unify them towards common strategies of social agreement. The experience of the European democratic transition during the 70's influenced, in a sense, Argentina and other countries of the region. Divided societies at the bottom, were able to overcome

differences due to strategies coming from the top, due to leaders which were able to see the benefits of overcoming such differences at the base of the societies.

Argentina, however, offers different experiences. Argentina is an homogeneous ethnic society, which does not present profound social and ideological differences. Argentina does not have a history of civil and cultural confrontations. It is a society which converges at the bottom, but diverges at the top. It is the case of a society with plural, diverse and heterogeneous ideals, which sustain convergent proposes and objectives, but differs and diverges at the top level due to diverging, confronting and antithetical perspectives of the leadership.

#### Q4. Perceptions on common shared values and principles

**In your opinion, do Argentines share any set of common values or fundamental ethical and cultural principles?**

**Table 13. Replies Q4. Shared values and principles.**

	Total (%)	18 – 29 (%)	30 – 49 (%)	50 - 64 (%)	65 + (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Socioeconomic situation		
								High (%)	Medium (%)	Low (%)
<b>Yes</b>	39,5	34,9	42	35,8	46	38,4	40,3	26,5	42,8	40,6
<b>No</b>	54,2	57,2	54,2	56,9	45,6	57,3	51,7	65,4	53,4	50
<b>Doesn't know</b>	3,3	4	---	4,5	8,5	2,3	4,2	5,3	2,3	4
<b>Didn't answer</b>	3	4	3,8	2,7	----	2	3,8	2,8	1,5	5,4
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The interviewees were also asked about their perception on the existence of shared values among Argentines, in terms of culture and ethics. As Table 13 shows, 54.2% believe that there are no set of shared values among Argentines, against 39.5% who thought that these exist. It is interesting to note that the differences vary according to age. Among the group of individuals between 18 and 29 years, 57.2% believed that the Argentines do not share these values; among the individuals of 65 years and more, 46% believed that Argentines do share common values. And this belief is majority in all the different age subgroups. Only in the case of adults 65 and older the results are relatively even, though it is to be mentioned that this subgroup has also the largest percentage for “Doesn’t know” opinion.

With reference to gender, male tend to be more negative towards the idea of shared values than women. And according to socioeconomic situation, the most sceptical tend to be the individuals which have a high level.

Argentines tend to feel integrated in the communities in which they live and feel part of the different social spheres in which they interact. However, they also feel part of different universes of values. Nevertheless, they get and live together from and within diversity. Argentines are a hybrid society with strong differential features. They identify and preserve different values and principles, but strive to put forward their convergent orientations, which differentiate them from other Latin-American societies. Differently to other societies, such as the American, which make an effort to forge a common identity, Argentines try to preserve their particular socio-cultural features. They recognize diversity, within a common national cultural framework, as an advantage more than as a disadvantage.

Some insights about the migratory history of the country can shed some light to this context of unity with a diversity of values. In almost sixty years that passed between 1810 –year of the independency from Spain- and 1869, the population had grown almost three times. Between 1869 and 1914, the population grew almost four times. In 1914 one of three inhabitants of the country was an immigrant, and, in particular, in Buenos Aires, this relation was one to two. More than two of three active members of the population was an immigrant<sup>586</sup>. This strong foreign influence shaped a society in which the feeling of being different and professing different values was compatible with the sense of belonging to communitarian life.

Typical feature of societies conformed in this way is the development of plurality. Social collectives subsist, with a relative autonomy in their hierarchies, patterns of behaviour and forms of sociability<sup>587</sup>. In Argentina, and more than in any other Latin American country, immigration was considered an essential tool for the building of the modern society and community<sup>588</sup>.

#### 4. Trust in institutions

The level of trust in institutions is one of the most important dimensions for the study of social capital. Trust is the foundation or corner stone of social capital, and in general, of interpersonal relationships<sup>589</sup>. The predisposition of individuals to participate in interpersonal horizontal exchanges strengthens the level of cooperation and generates, in its turn, an openness to explore new and deeper alternatives for learning, working and being engaged together. Inversely, the lack of these types of bonds generally underlies processes of recession and defensiveness. Law and institutions strengthen and foster these types of

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<sup>586</sup> Cfr. Devoto, Fernando J., *El país del primer centenario. Cuando todo parecía posible*, Buenos Aires: Capital Intelectual, 2010, p. 36-37.

<sup>587</sup> Devoto, Fernando J., *op. cit.*, p. 39. For an overview on the broad phenomenon and importance of the role of the middle class in the construction of society, cfr. Adamovsky, Ezequiel: *Historia de la clase media argentina. Apogeo y decadencia de una ilusión 1919-2003*. Buenos Aires, Editorial Planeta, pp. 53-93.

<sup>588</sup> Villavicencio, Susana (Ed.): *Los contornos de la ciudadanía. Nacionales y extranjeros en la Argentina del Centenario*, Eudeba, Buenos Aires, 2003, and in particular the introductory article: “Ciudadanos para una Nación”, pp. 13-32.

<sup>589</sup> Bergman, Marcelo y Rosenkrantz, Carlos, “La confianza y el derecho en América Latina: aproximaciones conceptuales”, in Bergman, Marcelo y Rosenkrantz, Carlos (Coords.): *Confianza y derecho en América Latina*, Fondo de Cultura Económica/CIDE, Mexico, 2009, p. 11.

predispositions. As long as they work efficiently, institutions make possible to predict the behaviour of others and provide security to our own responses. Trust and law presuppose each other.

Institutions represent one of the most important aspects that foster or hinder the trust of citizens on the political system. Many have labelled modern societies as the “society of mistrust”, underlying the crisis of trust as one of the main features. As Rosanvallon expresses, the erosion of trust in political leaders and in institutions is one of the biggest problems of present times. Hence, the fact that this is one of the phenomena most studied by contemporary social sciences<sup>590</sup>. The issue is recurrent and along more than fifty years it has been calling the attention of academics and researchers on the dynamics of democracy in modern societies<sup>591</sup>.

As it has been previously explained, the characteristics of the institutional environment are essential for fostering or decreasing the development of social capital. Being trust an essential element of social capital, this survey proposed a social capital approach towards legal institutions. Hence, the importance of the analyses of the data obtained and showed in the following tables.

In this section, trust in institutions is analysed through the targeting of different spheres. The objective is to obtain data on, firstly, trust in law and order institutions, secondly, political institutions, thirdly, institutions from society and, finally, trust in institutions which attain to law and justice. Particular emphasis is made on trust on legal institutions, with the formulation of questions regarding law compliance, trust in the performance of justice, law effectiveness and civicness. The interviewees were asked to express their levels of trust taking into consideration the capacities of these institutions to provide effective solutions to the citizenship.

#### **4.1. Trust in law and order institutions**

The survey addresses a first level of analysis referring to trust in the main law and order institutions. By law and order institutions we understand those which, based on the National Constitution and laws, perform different institutional functions of power –legislative, jurisdictional and governmental ones.

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<sup>590</sup> Rosanvallon, Pierre, *La Contrademocracia. La política en la era de la desconfianza*, Manantial, Buenos Aires, 2007, p. 21.

<sup>591</sup> In the mid70's the issue was already approached by the Trilateral Commission Report on the crisis of governability of democracies: Crozier, Michel, Huntington, Samuel P. y Watanuki, Joji, *The crisis of democracy: report on the governability of Western Democracies*, New York University Press, New York, 1975; Lipset, Seymour Martin, y Schneider, William, *The confidence gap*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1983; Nye, Joseph S., Zelikow, P. D. y King, D.C., *Why people don't trust on Government*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1997; Norris, Pippa, *Critical citizens: global support for democratic government*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999. In addition, among a vast literature on the issue: Cantril, A. H. y Davis Cantril, S., *Reading mixed signals. Ambivalence in American public opinion about government*, The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington DC, 1999.

### Q5.A. Trust in law and order institutions

Please indicate the level of trust that you have in the following legal institutions, from the point of view of their capacity to effectively address and solve the problems of the people. Please provide a grade between 1 and 10 (being 1 no trust at all, and 10, the highest degree of trust).

Table 14. Replies Q5.A. Trust in law and order institutions: averages.

	Total	18 – 29	30 – 49	50 - 64	65 +	Male	Female	Socioeconomic situation		
								High	Medium	Low
1. The Judicial system of the city of Buenos Aires	4	4.3	4.7	4.7	4.4	4.7	4.6	4.5	4.7	4.5
2. The Federal Judicial System	3.9	4.7	4.4	4.6	4.4	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.3
3. The Police Department	3.6	4.3	4.1	4.2	4.2	4.1	4	4	4.1	4.1
4. Criminal law judges and prosecutors	3.8	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.5	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.7
5. The Supreme Court of Justice	4	5.1	5.2	5.3	4.6	5.4	5.1	5	5.3	5
6. The penitentiary system	3	3.2	3.8	3.6	3.1	4	3.9	3.7	3.8	3.2
7. Provincial judges	3.3	5.8	5.4	5.8	4.9	5.8	5.6	6	5.6	5.1
8. Law Schools	5.2	6.8	6.7	7	6.7	7	6.9	7.1	7.2	7.4
9. The Ministry of Security	3.9	4.2	4.5	4.7	4.2	4.9	4.9	5	4.8	4.4

**Table 15. Replies Q5.A. Trust in law and order institutions: total averages, median and mode.**

<b>Q5.A. Trust in law and order institutions</b>					
	<b>Average</b>	<b>Median</b>	<b>Mode</b>	<b>Doesn't know (%)</b>	<b>Didn't answer (%)</b>
<b>1. The Judicial system of the city of Buenos Aires</b>	4	4	5	3.7	0.4
<b>2. The Federal Judicial System</b>	3.9	4	1	2.7	0
<b>3. The Police Department</b>	3.6	4	1	0.7	0.3
<b>4. Criminal law judges and prosecutors</b>	3.8	4	1	5.3	0.3
<b>5. The Supreme Court of Justice</b>	4	4	1	7.2	1.1
<b>6. The penitentiary system</b>	3	2	1	9.5	1.2
<b>7. Provincial judges</b>	3.3	3	1	25.9	2.1
<b>8. Law Schools</b>	5.2	6	7	18.2	1.2
<b>9. The Ministry of Security</b>	3.9	4	1	12.2	1

Table 14 shows the first set of institutions which corresponded to law and order institutions.

The interviewees were asked to express their levels of trust taking into consideration the capacities of these institutions to provide effective solutions to the citizenship. The interviewees had to grade between 1 and 10 (being 1 no trust at all, and 10, the highest degree of trust), how much trust they had on the capacities of certain institutions to provide effective solutions to the citizenship.

One of the most remarkable results, consistent with a series of similar investigations carried out in Argentina, is the identification of a relative high level of trust in academic institutions. Independently from their specific functions, public universities appear as institutions capable of assuring, disseminating and promoting civic values. In addition, public universities appear as useful arena for the elaboration of public agendas and even processes of social mediation. Represented in this survey by law schools, this high level of trust puts them in a predominant position, even over the Supreme Court of Justice and the rest of the executive departments of the government.

It is interesting to note that most of the average performance of all these institutions is between 3 and 4. The highest average performance after law schools was obtained by the Supreme Court and the Judicial System of the City of Buenos Aires, with 4. These were followed by the Ministry of Security and the Federal Judicial System, with 3.9. The Criminal Law judges and prosecutors received an average of 3.8, and the Police Department obtained a 3.6. The lowest averages were received by the provincial judges, 3.3, and the Penitentiary System, with 3. The low level for the provincial judges could be explained by the fact that

the interviewees are citizens from another jurisdiction, different from the provincial judicial system. This explanation can be supported by the fact that 25.6% of the population declared not to know about this issue. In addition, the general mode, among all sub questions has been 1, which means that the value which has been more repeated has been 1.

**Figure 11. Distribution of the level of trust with relation to law and order institutions according to Table 14 and 15.**



Figure 11 presents a boxplot showing the 25<sup>th</sup> percentile, the median and the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile together with the extreme values corresponding to each of the nine sub-questions. As it can be seen, the level of trust, according to the interviewees, shows a large spread for all the proposed institutions. The Police Department, the criminal judges and prosecutors, the penitentiary system, provincial judges and the Ministry of Security, even have the 25<sup>th</sup> percentile almost equal to the minimum value. Data also show skewness towards low values, as also suggested by the significant low modes in the table above. The figure shows a wide spread among the replies. Even though the general mode has been 1 (see Table 15), the median tends to 4, which is a relatively close value to the general average.

#### 4.2. Political institutions

Table 16 shows the distribution of replies referring to the levels of trust in political institutions. It is to be understood as political institution those which are specifically linked with political representation and participation.

In order to understand the empirical outcomes of the present research, it is necessary to provide an overview of the political features of the Argentina political experience. Since year 1930, Argentina has been suffering recurrent military power intervention processes. The democratic experience is rather young and has been constantly thrown into confusion due to the alternation of military and civic cycles. Even

though its Constitution is one of the oldest in the world (1853), with minor reforms during the XIX century and with a major reform in year 1994, its validity has never been interrupted. On another aspect, Argentina is a federal country, organized under a presidential regime, with a National government and 24 provincial jurisdictions, each of them organized by its own Constitution and representative political institutions. The National Legislative Power is composed of two chambers: the Chamber of Deputies, with 257 members, which represent the Nation as a whole, and the Senate, with 72 members –3 for each provincial district.

Argentina presents a plural political party system, based on two main parties –peronists and radicals-, complemented by other diverse political parties or coalitions. At the moment it is possible to find 10 active electoral coalitions, with effective National representation capacity. Each of the 24 provinces has, at the same time, a political party system, significantly diverse, according to cultural and political regional traditions.

The problem of political representation is, nowadays, of extreme importance. Similarly to many countries in Latin America, political parties are going through a deep crisis of participation and representativeness. The presidential system has fragmented traditional political forces and, particularly in the last years, has incentivized the emergence of changing electoral coalitions, which define themselves according to the highly personalized candidacies. The public debate on the representativeness of political parties has been deepened by a context of strong economic crisis. Due to the economic and financial crisis of year 2001, the political party system has been undergoing profound restructuring and redefinitions. Hence, the importance of addressing the issue of trust in political institutions.

#### **Q5.B. Trust in political institutions**

**Please indicate the level of trust that you have in the following legal institutions, from the point of view of their capacity to effectively address and solve the problems of the people. Please provide a grade between 1 and 10 (being 1 no trust at all, and 10, the highest degree of trust).**



**Table 16. Replies Q5.B. Trust in political institutions: averages.**

	Total	18-29	30-49	50-65	+65	Male	Female	Socioeconomic situation		
								High	Medium	Low
<b>1. The National Executive Power</b>	4.2	4.9	5	4.9	4.9	5	4.7	4.9	4.9	5.1
<b>2. The Chamber of Deputies</b>	3.9	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.5	4.8
<b>3. Provincial governors</b>	3.8	4.6	4.7	5	4.7	4.9	4.8	4.8	5	4.7
<b>4. The Senate</b>	3.7	4.7	4.4	4.4	4.2	4.6	4.7	4.5	4.8	4.2
<b>5. The labour unions</b>	3.1	3.9	3.8	3.8	3.7	4.1	3.9	3.9	4.2	4.1
<b>6. The Government of the city of Buenos Aires</b>	3.9	3.9	4.2	4.2	3.9	4.5	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.3
<b>7. Political parties</b>	3.4	4.3	4.1	4	3.8	4.3	4.3	4.1	4.4	4.4
<b>8. The Legislative body of the city of Buenos Aires</b>	3.8	4.9	4.7	4.5	4.1	4.9	4.8	4.4	5.1	4.8
<b>9. Business organizations</b>	3.8	4.5	4.7	4.6	4.9	5.5	5.3	4.7	5.7	4.4

**Table 17. Replies Q5.B. Trust in political institutions: total averages, median and mode.**

<b>Q5. B. Trust in political institutions</b>					
	<b>Total Average</b>	<b>Median</b>	<b>Mode</b>	<b>Doesn't know</b>	<b>Didn't answer</b>
<b>1. The National Executive Power</b>	4.2	4	1	2.1	0.6
<b>2. The Chamber of Deputies</b>	3.9	4	1	3.1	0.3
<b>3. Provincial governors</b>	3.8	4	1	12.6	1.1
<b>4. The Senate</b>	3.7	4	1	8.4	1.6
<b>5. The labour unions</b>	3.1	2	1	5.5	0.9
<b>6. The Government of the city of Buenos Aires</b>	3.9	4	1	2.2	0.8
<b>7. Political parties</b>	3.4	3	1	4.1	1.7
<b>8. The Legislative body of the city of Buenos Aires</b>	3.8	4	1	8.7	1.4
<b>9. Business organizations</b>	3.8	4	1	18	4.8

The replies obtained stress the importance, at the time in which the survey was carried out, of the trust in the National Executive Power. In the case of Argentina, a presidential republic, the executive organ is formed by the president, at that time, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Some months after this field work,

the President would be obtaining her re-election with one of the highest percentages of votes in the electoral history of the country.

Table 16 shows the second set of institutions, which corresponds to the political sphere.

If we analyse the general averages, the National Executive power was the institution which obtained the highest value, 4.2, followed by the Chamber of Deputies and the Government of the City of Buenos Aires, with 3.9, provincial governors, the Legislative Body of the City of Buenos Aires, and business organizations, with 3.8. The Senate followed with 3.7, and political parties, with 3.4. The institutions which received the lowest grade in trust from the citizens were the labour unions, with 3.1 as the average.

The age group 18-29 tended to be relatively more trustful than the other groups, and the age group 65+ tended to be the less trustful. Male tended to be more negative than women. High and medium socioeconomic level groups tended to be the most pessimistic, whereas the low level group showed to be relatively significant more trustful than the other groups.

**Figure 12. Replies Q5.B. Distribution of trust with reference to political institutions according to Table 16 and 17.**




Figure 12 presents a boxplot showing the 25th percentile, the median and the 75th percentile together with the extreme values corresponding to each of the nine institutions. As can be seen, the level of trust, according to the interviewees, shows a large spread for all the proposed institutions. Provincial governors, the Senate, labour unions, the Government of the city of Buenos Aires, political parties and business organizations even have the 25th percentile close to the minimum value. Data show also some skewness towards low values, as also suggested by interesting fact that in all institutions, the mode was 1, which means that the grade which was given the most to these political institutions was 1 (see Table 17).

### **4.3. Institutions from society**

A third level of inquiry refers to social institutions in general, that is, the ones appertaining to civil society. The questionnaire adopts a very wide definition, which includes public, private and third sector institutions, which are defined as “social” due to their importance as instances of inclusion, participation and representation of individuals. The list includes institutions that have been influential in the public realm during recent times.

The political crisis of 2001 stressed the importance of the “third sector”, understood as an intermediate sphere, with features, limitation and lax and flexible contents. International research has showed, in the Argentina case, the importance of some sectors, which, lacking representativeness and formal capacity, were materially capable of channelling efforts and presenting a new social agenda. This sector includes, among others, NGOs and civil society organizations. In the Argentina case, it should also be included other public institutions, such as the public school and University, and other professional circles which influence the public debate. These present values and visions, the call for public adhesion and participate in the construction of alternatives to the crisis. Such is the case, for instance, of the “economists”, understood as the professional sphere with relevant participation in the fields of information, education and social communication.

### **Q5.C. Trust in institutions from society**

**Please indicate the level of trust that you have in the following legal institutions, from the point of view of their capacity to effectively address and solve the problems of the people. Please provide a grade between 1 and 10 (being 1 no trust at all, and 10, the highest degree of trust).**

**Table 18. Replies Q5.C. Trust in institutions from society: averages.**

	Total	18-29	30-49	50-65	+65	Male	Female	Socioeconomic situation		
								High	Medium	Low
1. NGOs	5.8	6.8	7.3	6.8	7	8	7.7	7.7	7.8	6.8
2. Environmental organizations	6.2	6.7	6.8	6.4	6.9	7	6.9	6.6	7.2	7
3. The Catholic Church	4.6	4.9	5	4.9	4.9	4.9	5	4.7	5.2	4.9
4. Public school	6.3	6.8	6.7	6.6	6.8	6.9	6.8	6.7	6.9	7
5. Churches in general	4.6	5.2	5.5	5.6	4.9	5.5	5.5	5.3	5.6	4.9
6. National newspapers	5.1	5.4	5.3	5.2	5.2	5.5	5.6	5.4	5.5	5.1
7. Public universities	6.7	7.7	7.7	7.7	7.5	7.8	7.5	7.4	7.7	7.8
8. TV	4.6	4.2	4.3	4.1	4.2	4.5	4.6	4.5	4.5	4
9. The radio	5.7	6	5.8	5.8	6.2	6	6	5.9	6	6.2
10. Private universities	5.5	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.5	6.8	7	6.6	6.6	6.3
11. Consumers' protection organizations	5.3	6.6	6.5	6.4	6.2	6.5	6.9	6.5	6.8	6.1
12. Journalists	5.1	5.3	5.5	5.4	5.1	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.6	5.2
13. Economists	4.6	4.6	4.9	4.9	4.5	5.6	5.5	5.3	5.4	4.7
14. International organizations (such as the WB and the IADB)	3.7	4.6	5	5	4.8	5.1	5.7	5.4	5.4	4.9

**Table 19. Replies Q5.C. Trust in institutions from society: total averages, mode and median.**

	<b>Average</b>	<b>Median</b>	<b>Mode</b>	<b>Doesn't know (%)</b>	<b>Didn't answer (%)</b>
<b>1. NGOs</b>	5.8	6	6	24	1.5
<b>2. Environmental organizations</b>	6.2	6	6	8.3	0.6
<b>3. The Catholic Church</b>	4.6	5	1	3.3	0.7
<b>4. Public school</b>	6.3	6	7	2.8	0.3
<b>5. Churches in general</b>	4.6	5	1	9.5	1.7
<b>6. National newspapers</b>	5.1	5	5	4.5	0.9
<b>7. Public universities</b>	6.7	7	6	8.6	0.3
<b>8. TV</b>	4.6	5	5	1.6	0.5
<b>9. The radio</b>	5.7	6	5	2.2	0
<b>10. Private universities</b>	5.5	6	6	25.8	1.4
<b>11. Consumers' protection organizations</b>	5.3	6	5	24.7	1.4
<b>12. Journalists</b>	5.1	5.5	6	3.8	0.4
<b>13. Economists</b>	4.6	5	5	7.8	2.3
<b>14. International organizations (such as the WB and the IADB)</b>	3.7	4	1	26	4.5

With reference to the total averages, the ones who enjoy the highest level of trust are the public universities with 6.7, followed by public school, with 6.3 and environmentalist organizations, with 6.2. These were followed by NGOs, with 5.8, the radio, with 5.7, private universities, with 5.5, the consumers' protection organizations, with 5.3, and journalists and national newspapers, with 5.1. The Catholic Church and churches in general, the TV and the economists, received all an average of 4.6. The institutions which received the average are international organizations, with 3.7.

In addition, in this section, the majority of mode corresponds to 6. However, it is interesting to note that with regards to NGOs, private universities, consumers' protection organizations and international organizations, the percentages of individuals who answered that they did not know is significantly high, representing in most of the cases almost 25% of the interviewees. In the case of the just mentioned institutions, if the "didn't know" answers are to be considered in the calculation of the mode, the mode is "didn't know".

**Figure 13. Replies Q5.C. Distribution of levels of trust in relation to institutions from society according to Table 18 and 19.**




Figure 13 presents a plot showing the 25th percentile, the median and the 75th percentile together with the extreme values corresponding to each of the fourteen institutions. As it can be seen in the figure above, the level of trust according to the interviewees shows a large spread for all the proposed institutions. Data show some skewness towards high values. The particular means in each institution are distant from the general mean. This fact suggests the mentioned spread and diversification of answers.

#### 4.4. Trust in legal institutions

A fourth level of inquiry refers to legal institutions in general, that is, institutions which refer to justice in general, law practitioners and professionals and law protection agencies and organizations.

#### Q5.D. Trust in law and justice institutions

Please indicate the level of trust that you have in the following legal institutions, from the point of view of their capacity to effectively address and solve the problems of the people. Please provide a grade between 1 and 10 (being 1 no trust at all, and 10, the highest degree of trust).

**Table 20. Replies Q5.D. Trust in law and justice institutions: averages.**

	Total	18-29	30-49	50-65	+65	Male	Female	Socioeconomic situation		
								High	Medium	Low
1. Justice in general	4.1	4.5	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.5	4.4	4.5	4.6
2. Lawyers	4	4.5	4.7	4.4	4.5	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.7	4.7
3. Notaries	4.2	5.4	5.7	5.2	5.3	5.9	5.8	5.3	6	5.5
4. Human rights organizations	5.5	5.7	5.7	5.6	5.6	6.2	6.1	6	6.2	5.6
5. Judiciary Tribunal	4.3	5.5	5.8	5.6	5.3	6.4	6.1	5.9	6.2	5.6
6. The Ombudsman	5	6.2	6.1	6	5.8	6.4	6.6	6.1	6.5	5.7

**Table 21. Replies Q5.D. Trust in law and justice institutions: total averages, mode and median.**

	Average	Median	Mode	Total Mode	Doesn't know (%)	Didn't answer (%)
1. Justice in general	4.1	4	5	5	1.3	0
2. Lawyers	4	4	5	5	2.6	0.3
3. Notaries	4.2	4	5	5	11.9	0.7
4. Human rights organizations	5.5	6	7	7	5	1
5. Judiciary Tribunal	4.3	5	1	Doesn't know	25.5	1.3
6. The Ombudsman	5	5	6	Doesn't know	21.2	1

The forth set of institutions corresponds to the law and justice institutions.

If it is to be considered the general averages, the institutions which enjoy more trust are human rights organizations, with 5.5, followed by the Ombudsman, with 5. These were followed by the Judiciary Tribunal, with 4.3, the notaries, with 4.2, and justice in general, with 4.1. Lawyers received the lowest average, with 4. It is interesting to note that concerning the Judiciary Tribunal and the Ombudsman, they obtained also high percentages of “didn’t know” answers: 25.2% and 21.2% respectively. This is also translated in the fact that for these institutions, the mode was also “didn’t know”. If we analyze the modes without considering the “didn’t know” answers, the general mode was 5.

**Figure 14. Replies Q5.D. Distribution of levels of trust in relation to law and justice institutions according to Table 20 and 21.**




Figure 14 presents a boxplot showing the 25th percentile, the median and the 75th percentile together with the extreme values corresponding to each of the six institutions. As can be seen in the figure above, the level of trust according to the interviewees shows a large spread for all the proposed institutions.

## **5. Institutional efficiency**

The survey envisaged a specific question on trust on the legal system and institutions. The interviewee was asked his level of trust, in terms of “to a great extent”, “to some extent”, “to a small extent”, “not at all”. He was asked about laws in general, the procedures to designate, control and remove judges, the criminal procedure codes, the electoral system, public statistics, the regulation and control of public services, public and private corruption control mechanisms, the organization of employment and poverty reduction programmes, the National Constitution and judicial processes.

The questionnaire presents, similarly to the precedent questions, a wide list for channelling professional groups and institutional actors, characterized, due to their participation in recent events of the Argentina case, by main instances which concentrate social expectations and demands, debates and alternative proposals. It is interesting to stress in the following question, the importance of evaluating the levels of decisional and operative efficacy to effectively act towards the solution of the problems aroused.

The question refers to the perception of the capacity of each institution to provide effective responses to the problems set out by the general crisis of the country. It does not address the legitimacy of each institution, but rather their capacity to operate and produce positive responses in a context of crisis.

### **Q6. Perceptions on the capacity of institutions to provide effective responses to the crisis**

**With reference to the legal system (such as laws in general, processes and institutions),  
please indicate the level of trust on their capability to solve  
the current problems of the Argentinean society.**



**Table 22. Replies Q6. Capability of institutions to provide effective responses to the crisis.**

	To a great extent (%)	To some extent (%)	To a small extent (%)	Not at all (%)	DK/DA (%)
1. Legislation in general	12.1	45.6	30.8	9.8	1.6
2. Processes for the appointment of judges	3.1	18.9	40.4	26	11.7
3. Mechanism of control and removal of judges	2.6	14.6	39.5	28.3	14.9
4. Criminal law procedural codes	2.8	22.9	37.9	20.6	15.8
5. The electoral system	9.1	32.7	35.6	19.8	2.8
6. Public statistics (INDEC)	1.8	16.1	33.2	44.1	4.8
7. Regulation and control of public services	3.5	22.8	38.6	29.7	5.4
8. Public corruption control mechanisms	1.9	8.2	35.7	49.7	4.5
9. Private corruption control mechanisms	2.2	8.7	34.3	49.2	5.5
10. The organization of employment and poverty reduction public programmes	5.5	22.7	43.3	23.6	4.9
11. The National Constitution	28.1	29.5	27.6	9.9	4.9
12. Judicial decision-making procedures	4.6	22.4	42.8	21.1	9.1
Total average	6.4	22.1	36.6	27.7	7.2

**Table 23. Replies Q6. Total levels of trust in the capability of institutions to provide effective responses to the crisis: replies by age, gender and socioeconomic situation.**

	Total (%)	18-29 (%)	30-49 (%)	50-65 (%)	+65 (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Socioeconomic situation (%)		
								High	Medium	Low
To a great extent	4.8	6.2	7.1	8.7	7.1	5.9	4.8	4.2	7.3	6.2
To some extent	21.9	24.6	20.4	19.1	24.6	20.1	21.9	19.4	23.4	21.5
To a small extent	37.9	37.9	33.5	36.1	31.7	40.6	37.9	41.8	37.6	32.7
Not at all	25.2	26.3	33.9	25.9	30	25.8	25.2	32.2	24.8	29.7
DK/DA	10.2	5	5.2	10.2	6.7	7.6	10.2	24.3	6.8	10

Going to the details of the replies, Table 22 shows that the institutions which enjoy the highest level of trust on their efficacy to solve the society’s problems are legislation in general and the National Constitution. Legislation in general and the National Constitution received more than 50% of replies if the replies to “to a great extent” and “to some extent” are added.

The National Constitution presents the highest percentage on the highest level of trust (28.1% in “to a great extent), and legislation in general received the highest percentage on the institution which enjoys trust to some extent from the population, with a 45.6% of the replies.

With regards to institutions who were evaluates as “to a small extent” capable of providing effective responses to the crisis, the ones which received the highest percentage where the organization of

employment and poverty reduction public programmes, with 43.3%, followed by judicial decision-making processes, with a 42.8% and the processes of appointment of judges, with 40.4%.

The institutions that received the lowest level of trust were the mechanisms of control of public and private corruption, with 49.7% and 49.2% respectively of opinions on the “not at all” reply. These were followed by public statistics (INDEC), with a 44.1%. The social suspicion towards the mechanisms which produce public statistics –in the survey represented by the National Statistics Institute (INDEC) - is, in the case of Argentina, one of the main reasons for the generation of mistrust in the economic general processes and in the main part of the economic and social policy strategies. The lack of trustful national statistics reproduces public mistrust towards the state sector, and particularly, to the government.

As it can be seen from the Tables 22 and 23, the population of the city of Buenos Aires has general low levels of trust on the legal system and the legal institutions that have been chosen for this study. In this sense, 37.9% of the population declared to have trust to a small extent on the chosen legal institutions, and 25.2% declared not to have trust at all on them.

With reference to the different age groups, the group 18-29 showed higher levels of trust in comparison to the other groups. The group 50-64 showed a tendency to be less trustful than the average. With respect to the socioeconomic levels, the high level group showed a tendency to trust less than the average. The other socioeconomic groups showed a more moderate view. As for a gender, females tend to be more trustful than males.

It can be observed that mistrust is preponderant. However, it is interesting to note that the percentages of replies for the “Doesn’t know/ Didn’t answer” for groups 18-29 and 65+ present higher percentages than the average. This could be explained by the level of knowledge on certain issues, due to the young age, or due to the lack of involvement in current issues.

## **6. Trust in the judicial system: performance and impartiality**

Within the same section referring to trust in the legal system and institutions, the interviewees were asked about the level of trust on the good performance and impartiality of judges. This aspect, which will be complemented by a specific survey on the judicial system, focused on the general justice system, which includes all the institutions which, in some way or the other, intervene in the justice administration process. The specific question refers to the performance or functional performance, in terms of the capacity to guarantee impartial responses to controversial issues.

### **Q7. Trust in the performance and impartiality of judges**

**Generally speaking, how much do you trust the good performance and impartiality of judges?**

**Table 24. Replies Q7. Trust in the performance and impartiality of judges.**

	Total (%)	18 - 29 (%)	30 - 49 (%)	50 - 64 (%)	65 + (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Socioeconomic situation (%)		
								High	Medium	Low
								<b>To a great extent</b>	1,7	1,7
<b>To some extent</b>	35,8	30,9	42,2	27,2	40,6	32,4	38,4	42,2	36,8	31
<b>To a small extent</b>	41,6	46,6	36,4	46,5	38,8	43	40,4	34,1	44,5	40,8
<b>Not at all</b>	19,8	18,9	19	23,4	18,4	20,8	19,1	23,7	15,4	24,8
<b>DK/DA</b>	1,2	2	---	2,9	---	0,8	1,5	---	0,7	2,4
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Interviewees were asked to reply in terms of “to a great extent”, “to some extent”, “to a small extent” and “not at all”. Table 24 shows that 41.6% of the population declared to trust in the good performance and impartiality of judges to a small extent, and 35.8% to some extent, and 19.8% declared not to trust them at all. Only 1.7% trusts them to a great extent. The tendency is moderate, between trusting to a small and to some extent. The more distrusting are the groups 18-29 and 50-64, whereas the groups 30-49 and 65+ tend to be more trustful. As for the gender variable, both male and female share a similar tendency to trust the performance and impartiality of judges to a small extent. The same happens with the socioeconomic situation, the high and medium level groups tend to be more trustful than the low level group.

### **7. Judicial distrust: reasons and motivations**

In the present section, the survey analyses the reasons and motivations which inspire attitudes of mistrust in the judicial system, tribunals and judges. These attitudes of mistrust concern both “structural” – related to crisis in the performance of democratic institutions- and current circumstances –particular of each moment and referred to concrete events and problems and conflicts of the administration of justice. Structural circumstances imply long term phenomena. Current circumstances imply, contrarily, cyclical events, which vary in the short term.

The question refers to, in general terms, the perception on the fact that the resistance and mistrust are due to concrete existence of general reasons.

### **Q8. Motivations for not trusting judges and the judicial system**

**Some people do not trust judges and the judicial system in Argentina; do you believe they have good reasons for not trusting them?**

**Table 25. Replies Q8. Motivations for not trusting the judicial system.**

	Total (%)	18 - 29 (%)	30 - 49 (%)	50 - 64 (%)	65 + (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Socioeconomic situation (%)		
								High	Medium	Low
								<b>Total</b>	100	100
<b>To a great extent</b>	42,8	44,1	37,2	49	45,3	41,5	43,9	56	7,2	5,1
<b>To some extent</b>	45,4	45,2	51,3	39,7	39,9	46,7	44,4	9,4	51,4	39,2
<b>To a small extent</b>	9	8,7	9	6,8	12,8	7,5	10,3	4,7	8,3	12,2
<b>Not at all</b>	1,1	---	1,2	1,6	2	2,5	---	---	1,5	1,1
<b>DA/DK</b>	1,6	2	1,2	2,9	---	1,8	1,5	---	1,6	2,4

This question aimed at deciphering which is the perception of the population regarding the low levels of trust on these institutions, independently from their own perspective. According to the results showed in Table 25, 45.4% replied that there are, to some extent, good reasons for people not to trust the judicial system and judges, and 42.8% declared that these reasons are to a great extent valid. So, generally speaking, 88.2% of the interviews believe that there are at least minimum good reasons not to trust the judicial system, with no particular deference for gender, age, or socioeconomic situation.

### **8. Motivations for not trusting the law**

The survey addresses the study of the specific reasons or concrete motivations for not trusting laws. Similar to many of the contemporary democracies, Argentina also suffers the lack of trust in laws. This is a complex phenomenon which involves attitudes of mistrust towards the processes of creation of laws, towards their legitimacy, their efficiency and performance towards the satisfaction of social needs. The idea that law fails in its specific functions of social control, administration of social conflict, channelling of expectations and prevision with regards the future, leads numerous sectors of society to harbour attitudes of suspicion or open mistrust in law in general and legal institutions.

### **Q9. Motivations for not trusting the law**

**Some people do not trust laws in general. Considering the Argentina case, do you think they have good reasons for not trusting them?**

**Table 26. Replies Q9. Motivations for not trusting the law.**

	Total (%)	18 - 29 (%)	30 - 49 (%)	50 - 64 (%)	65 + (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Socioeconomic situation (%)		
								High	Medium	Low
								<b>Total</b>	100	100
<b>To a great extent</b>	37,9	32,6	33,2	49,2	41,4	40	36,2	47	31,8	42,7
<b>To some extent</b>	44,8	53,1	47,8	35,1	38	40,5	48,3	40,6	49,5	39,8
<b>To a small extent</b>	13,7	12,6	12,9	12,7	18,7	12,1	15	6,8	13,9	16,7
<b>Not at all</b>	2,5	1,7	4,8	---	2	5,7	---	5,6	3,2	---
<b>DK/DR</b>	1,1	---	1,2	2,9	---	1,8	0,5	---	1,6	0,9

Table 26 shows that the majority of the respondents, 44.8%, replied that people have to some extent good reasons for not believing in laws in general, and 37.9% replied that they have good reasons not to trust them. The sum of both indicators (82.7) shows, clearly, the important level of good reasons for suspicion and non-confidence. This tendency is moderate among the different age groups, gender and socioeconomic situation.

### **9. Motivations for not trusting specific legislation**

At this stage, the questionnaire addressed the reasons and motivations for not trusting legislation, one of the dimensions of the crisis of the judicial system.

Argentina presents a general feeling of public mistrust on legislation. Currently, public consensus has been broke off, resulting in an inevitable tension between the logics of the parliamentary and the democratic systems. Civil society suspects from the parliament, political powers and institutions. It does not accept the representativeness of the leaders, since, deep inside, rejects the phenomenon of representation itself.

The issues brought about by the legislative system focuses on social and political phenomena, which exceed the problem of the performance of the legislative power. They broaden the gap between expectation and reality. The basis of the existence and original and functional legitimation are questioned, within the democratic theory.

In this instance, the questionnaire addressed the levels of trust generated by certain legislative sectors, which, due to its importance in the social and economic emergency, are subjected to constant public criticism.

## Q10. Motivations for not trusting particular laws

With reference to certain laws in particular, according to your personal experience, do you believe people have good reasons not to trust them?

Table 27. Replies Q10. Motivations for not trusting particular laws.

	It's reasonable not to trust (%)	It's not reasonable not to trust (%)	Doesn't know (%)	Doesn't answer (%)
<b>Tax laws</b>	59,6	21,3	18,5	0,6
<b>Criminal laws</b>	65,7	14,9	18,7	0,8
<b>Civil laws</b>	58,1	26,8	14,7	0,3
<b>Traffic regulations</b>	55,6	30,1	13,9	0,3
<b>Labour laws</b>	59,5	24,6	15,5	0,3
<b>Electoral laws</b>	61,9	22,4	14,9	0,8
<b>Commercial laws</b>	55,3	19,9	24	0,8
<b>Total averages</b>	59.4	22.9	17.2	0.50

Continuing with the analysis of how people perceive the fact that many people do not trust laws, the interviewees were asked in particular detail on different types of law: tax laws, criminal laws, civil laws, traffic laws, labour laws, electoral laws and commercial laws. They had to reply if they believe whether it is reasonable that people do not trust certain types of laws, or whether it is not reasonable that people do not trust certain types of laws.

According to Table 27, the laws which suffer the major discredit are criminal laws: 65.7% of the population considered that there are good reasons not to trust them. These are followed by electoral law, with a 61.9%, and by tax and labour laws, with 59.6% and 59.5%. 58.1% considered that it is reasonable not to trust civil laws, followed by commercial and traffic laws, with a 55.6%. The total averages suggest that in general, 59.4% of the interviewed population considered that there are good reasons not to trust the proposed set of laws.

It is interesting to note that almost 60% of all the interviewees discredited the types of law proposed. The tendency is that the majority of the interviewed individuals in each variable group, in terms of different group of age, gender, or socioeconomic situation, believed that it is reasonable not to trust the proposed types of laws. However, it is interesting to note that, among the age groups, though the group 18-29 tended to have the lowest percentages in the option "It's reasonable not to trust", they tended to have the highest percentages, even above the average, in the "Don't know" reply.

## 10. Motivations for not trusting law and public institutions

Similar to the case of institutions in general and justice administration institutions, the questionnaire inquires whether there exist concrete reasons that justify the mistrust in the laws related to the main problems aroused by the crisis. The question refers to whether the interviewee considers that there are concrete reasons not to trust in laws and both legislative and administrative institutions in charge of the production of norms and regulations.

### Q11. Motivations for not trusting law and public institutions

In a country such as Argentina, do you believe it is worth respecting the law and public institutions?


Table 28. Replies Q11. Motivations for not trusting law and public institutions.

	Total (%)	18 - 29 (%)	30 - 49 (%)	50 - 64 (%)	65 + (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Socioeconomic situation (%)		
								High	Medium	Low
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>Yes</b>	76,2	69,4	79,4	71,9	85,7	72,8	78,9	70,5	82,1	69,9
<b>No</b>	8,3	8,7	8,8	10,4	3,9	13,3	4,3	9	5,4	12,5
<b>It depends</b>	13,8	21,9	9,2	14,7	10,4	13	14,5	20,5	9,9	16,6
<b>DK/DA</b>	1,6	0	2,7	2,9	---	0,8	2,3	---	2,6	1,1

This inquiry responded to analysing the level of civicness of the population. Table 28 shows that 76.2% replied that it is worth respecting laws and institutions, and 13.8% replied that it depended on the situation. The social replies are forceful enough. Three quarters of the society have replied that there are strong reasons for justifying the criticisms and questionings of the legislation and the institutions in charge of producing and maintaining them.

The age group 18-29 showed a tendency to be more flexible at the moment of evaluating whether it is worth respecting or not the laws, as well as women in comparison to men. With reference to socioeconomic situation, though the majority of the sectors tend to believe that it is worth respecting laws and public institutions, low and high level groups tend to have been open to further evaluation in the particular case.

Figure 15. Scatter plot displaying Q11 and Q9.



The above “scatter/bubble plot” displays coloured squares at the locations specified by the possible answers for, in this case, questions 9 and 11. The size of the square is directly proportional to the percentage that the specific points represent. In addition, the squares are coloured according to the scale presented to the right: the darker the colour, the smaller the percentage; the lighter the colour, the highest the percentage.

Figure 15 shows the crossing of the replies corresponding to up to what extent it is reasonable to respect the laws and institutions (Q9) and if it is worth respecting laws and institutions (Q11). The plot shows that there is a tendency in those who believe that it is worth respecting laws and institutions, to also think that it is reasonable to respect. In this sense, according to the observed data, the majority of those who thought that it is worth respecting the laws and institutions, think that it is reasonable to respect them to some extent. It is possible to identify, therefore, the existence of a value on respecting laws and institutions.



Figure 16. Scatter plot displaying Q11 and Q6.




Figure 16 presents crossing of the replies of Q11 with only one of the items asked in Q6: the effectiveness of laws in general. This item was chosen among the twelve offered in Q6 since it was considered it represented the general legal framework. Figure 16 presents the tendency which shows that the majority of those individuals who believed it was worth respecting laws and institutions also trust the effectiveness of laws in general. However, contrarily the second largest group of the individuals who replied “Yes” to Q11, believed only to a small extent in the effectiveness of laws in general. This could describe a contradiction in which society might be forced to be living in. On one hand they believe in something, in the value of respect to laws and institutions, but on the other, reality and reason dictates behaviour based on daily circumstances which lead these individuals not to have a high level on trust on their effectiveness. However, they do still believe that it is worth respecting them. Once again, it could be said that there is a strong value on respecting laws and institutions.

### 11. Respect for the law and public institutions

The following question complements the previous questions, and refers to the evaluation of the attitude of those individuals who are prompt to respect law and institutions. Should they be considered and respected or rather should they be considered as naïve?

## Q12. Evaluation on the level of respect to laws and public institutions

In a country such as Argentina, do you believe that those who respect the law and public institutions should be respected or is being naïve?

Table 29. Replies Q12. Evaluation on the level of respect to laws and public institutions.

	Total (%)	18 - 29 (%)	30 - 49 (%)	50 - 64 (%)	65 + (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Socioeconomic situation (%)		
								High	Medium	Low
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>Should be respected</b>	63,9	64,4	61,9	64,6	67	55,6	70,6	64,3	69,9	54,6
<b>Is being naïve</b>	15	14	15,1	15,2	16,3	22,7	8,9	17	10,4	21,1
<b>Neither one nor the other</b>	19,2	19,6	21,8	16,1	16,7	20,7	18	13,8	18,2	23,4
<b>DK/DR</b>	1,9	2	1,2	4,1	---	1	2,5	5	1,5	0,9

According to the data provided in Table 29, 63.9% believed that those who respect the law should be considered and respected, whereas only 15% think that those who respect the law are being naïve. 19.2% think that neither one nor the other qualification, the issue should not be taken to such extremes. Women tend to be more considered towards those who respect the law. However, there is no significant difference in the tendencies among the different variables.

According Table 29, 63.9% of the interviewed individuals believe that he who respects the law should be respected and should not be considered to be naïve. This percentage is consistent with the replies of question 11, in which the majority think that it is worth respecting laws and institutions.

### 12. Personal motivations for respecting the law

In the following question, the survey focuses on the reasons for which the attitudes and respect for law are generated. The replies include different reasons, generally speaking, for which one would comply and respect the law.

Continuing with the issue of the respect to laws, the interviewees were asked about their personal motivations for respecting and complying with them. In this sense, they were asked about different motivations, and how important these were for them for their behaviour: fear of sanction and cost of no respecting the laws, feeling of moral obligation to respect laws, education received on complying with laws, whether it is more reasonable to adequate to laws, behaving as one would wish the others to behave, it is more convenient to respect the laws, moral duty, honour issue and law is a rational order which is

convenient for all to follow in order to make things work efficiently. The motivations proposed had to be graded between 1 (low importance) to 10 (high importance).

### Q13. Personal motivations for respecting the law

Which are your personal motivations for respecting and complying with laws?  
Please, grade from 1 (low importance) to 10 (high importance) the following motivations.

Table 30. Replies Q13. Personal motivations for respecting the law.

	Total (%)	18 - 29 (%)	30 - 49 (%)	50 - 64 (%)	65 + (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Socioeconomic situation (%)		
								High	Medium	Low
1. The fear of a sanction and the cost for not to obey the law.	6.9	6.7	7	6.8	7.4	6.7	7	7	6.8	7
2. A moral obligation.	8.1	7.7	8	8	8.9	8	8.1	7.8	8.3	7.9
3. Was educated to respect laws.	8.4	8.2	8.3	8.5	9	8.2	8.6	8.4	8.4	8.5
4. It is more reasonable to obey the laws that not to obey the law.	7.9	7.3	8	7.7	8.8	7.4	8.2	8.1	7.9	7.7
5. Behaves in the same way he expects the others to behave.	7.9	7.3	8.1	7.9	8.6	7.5	8.3	8.1	8	7.7
6. It's more convenient to respect laws than not to do so.	7.8	7.5	7.6	7.7	8.8	7.5	8	7.4	7.8	7.8
7. It's a habit and social norm. Everybody does it.	7	6.8	7	6.7	8	6.8	7.2	7.3	6.9	7.1
8. It's a matter of honour.	6.8	6.1	6.9	6.6	7.7	6.2	7.2	6.3	6.8	6.9
9. Law is a social rational order and as such it is convenient that people comply with it in order for society to work efficiently.	8.3	8.1	8.1	8.3	9	8	8.6	8.3	8.1	8.6

According to Table 30, the most important reason for complying with the law is having been educated to respect law, which received an average of 8.4 on importance. This was followed by the recognition of law as a social rational order which makes society work (with an average of 8.3) and by the identification of a moral aspect in complying with laws (with an average of 8.1).

With reference to age groups, the most important motivations for respecting the laws for individuals from the 18-29 group were education and respecting the social order. The least important motivations were honour and the fear of a sanction. For the age group 30-49, the most important motivations were education and the fact that law is a social order and the expectations law generates. The least important motivations were honour and the fear of a sanction. For the individuals appertaining to age group 50-64,

the most important motivations were education and being law a social order, and the least important motivations were honour and being laws a habit. For the age group 65+, the most important motivations were education and being law a social order, and the least important motivations were honour and the fear of a sanction. There is no a significant difference among the motivations along the different age groups.

As per gender, male and female, generally speaking the most important motivation to obey law was shared: education. However, it is interesting to note that for women is more important to respect social expectations, the honour factor, and the convenience of respecting the laws.

With reference to socioeconomic situation, the most important motivations for the individuals of the high level group are education and being law a social order. However, for medium level individuals, it is education the most important motivation, followed by the moral obligation factor. In addition, for low level individuals, the most important motivation is being law a social order and then the education received.

**Figure 17. Replies Q13. Distribution of levels of trust and motivations for respecting the law according to Table 30.**




Figure 17 shows that though there is a large spread in all replies, there is skewness towards the higher values. All the proposed motivations have received grades towards the higher levels. In the case of “A moral obligation” (2), “Was educated to respect laws” (3), “It is more reasonable to obey the laws that not to obey the law” (4), “Behaves in the same way he expects the others to behave” (5), “It is more convenient to respect laws than not to do so” (6) and “Law is a social rational order...” (9), half of the replies were grades between 8 and 10 or 9 and 10. Furthermore, most of the particular means is above the general mean. Moreover, the median in the majority of replies is 8 or higher. In addition, all of the proposed motivations obtained an average above 6, which could make us infer that there is a strong value underlying the respect for law.

### 13. Confidence in institutions: cognitive factors

Within the context of the personal motivations and internalization of legal concepts, interviewees were asked to mention a maximum of four sources for receiving formal education or information on civic issues. The aim is to establish which could be the priorities for an ideal civic education policy, orientated to strengthen, in the citizenship, the attitude of respect and compliance with law.

### Q14. Sources of education on civic issues

Do you recall receiving any kind of information or formal or informal education on civic issues such as the ones we have been discussing so far

(e.g. law, the National Constitution, rights, political institutions)?

Please identify the sources which have been most important for you (up to four).

Table 31. Replies Q14. Sources of education on civic issues.

	Total (%)	18 - 29 (%)	30 - 49 (%)	50 - 64 (%)	65 + (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Socioeconomic situation (%)		
								High	Medium	Low
								At elementary school	30,3	33,2
At high school	65,4	78,7	65,4	62,8	47,7	66,9	64,3	74,9	72,6	50
At University	22,4	24,5	26	24	8,2	20,1	24,3	46,5	21,1	12,9
Through higher education	6,1	1,7	10,2	5,7	4,1	6,4	5,8	5,9	7,1	4,7
Through personal relations	29,6	40,9	20,6	33,6	26,7	34	26,1	36,8	31,8	22,7
Through work relations	13,3	10,3	16,8	14,5	8	15	12	10,8	14,8	12,2
Through the media	27	24,5	28,4	28,4	25,4	18,8	33,5	18,8	25	33,8
Through NGOs	1,5	----	1,3	2,9	2	1,5	1,4	3,1	----	2,9
Through churches	4,3	-----	6,5	5,7	4,3	2,8	5,5	3	0,7	12
Through daily life	45,5	44,9	42,3	46,5	52,5	46	45	50,7	46,1	42,1
From family education	54	59,5	54	47,6	54,2	53,4	54,5	56	58,2	46,7
Never received formal education or information on these issues	0,8	----	1,2	----	2	1,7	----	----	----	2,3
Doesn't know/ Didn't answer	0,3	----	----	1,4	----	----	0,5	----	----	0,9

According to Table 31, the four sources most chosen by the interviewees corresponded to high school, with 65.4% of replies, family education, with 54%, from daily life, with 45.5%, and elementary school, with 30.3%.

It is interesting to note that for the age group 18-29, the fourth most important source of education has also been interpersonal relations, with a 40.9% of replies, almost 10 points over the average. Interpersonal relations has also been identified as an important source for the age group 65+ (though below the average percentage), and for the individuals belonging to the low level of socioeconomic situation.

**Figure 18. Replies Q14. Scatter plot displaying sources of education on civic issues and age range.**




Figure 18 provides a scatter graphic which shows that the major sources of education and information for civic issues were first high school, with a similar distribution along the different ages, followed by family life, daily life interactions, and elementary school. It can be inferred that the primary circles of the individuals, such as family, daily interactions and mandatory school<sup>592</sup>.

Among the initiatives which have been considered more effective in generating civic attitudes towards the law, it has been stressed the importance of personal testimonies, daily life experiences, and informal education tools. Informal sources have prevailed over formal educational mechanisms.

<sup>592</sup> Law N° 898 of the City of Buenos Aires declares thirteen years of mandatory education, which comprises kindergarden, elementary and high school.

#### 14. Education as the basis of respecting the law

The following question went in depth into the level of knowledge of the population on civic and legal issues. The interviewees were asked on their perception of the level of knowledge on certain matters by the rest of the population.

#### Q15. Level of education on the respect for the law

Some people believe that one of the explanations for the institutional crisis that the country is facing is the level of education and knowledge that the citizens have on legal issues.

What level of education and knowledge do you believe people have on laws, rights, judicial processes and other legal issues?


Table 32. Replies Q15. Level of education on the respect for the law.

	High (%)	Medium (%)	Low (%)	No level (%)	Doesn't know (%)	Doesn't answer (%)
Level of knowledge on laws in general	6,3	30,5	49,6	11	2,6	0
Level of knowledge on administrative and judicial processes	7,8	15,2	46,7	22,7	7,6	0
Level of access to justice to defend and make use of rights	9,2	24,4	44,1	17,2	4,2	1
Level of knowledge on ethical and legal principles	9,1	18,4	42,5	23,2	6,4	0,3
Level of tolerance to corruption	25,3	13	30,2	26,4	4,7	0,4
Total averages	11.54	20.3	42.62	20.1	5.1	0.4

It can be observed, from Table 32, that the respondents believe that the Argentinean population presents a low level of knowledge on the legal issues proposed in Q15 (42.32%). All the legal issues received the highest percentage of replies on the low level of knowledge. On the other hand, it is worth noticing that though it is believed that there is a low level of knowledge on this issue, the level of tolerance to corruption is considered to be high with reference to the other items proposed. However, according to the results of Q14, almost all individuals should have received education on legal issues at school. It is interesting to wonder which could be the reasons for this. Is it because there is a lack of information that the corruption is more tolerated? Do people lack information on what is corruption? Is it that corruption is, unfortunately, such a common issue that people have lowered ethical standards?

In general terms, it is possible to observe a moderate tendency from all variable groups towards the belief that people have low level of knowledge or education on the respect to law. There seems not to be a significant different among gender. With regards to socioeconomic level, the high level group is more critical on the tolerance to corruption that the other two groups which present a more moderate position.

**Figure 19.** Plot displaying the motivations in relation to the perception on the level of knowledge of others on legal issues<sup>593</sup> (Q15) and the relation to the level of motivation to comply with the law (Q13).



It is possible to identify two different tendencies in Figure 19. When levels of motivation to comply with law (Q13) are crossed with level of knowledge of laws (Q15), from 0 to 5 in the level of motivation, the motivations do not present a clear tendency. However, from point 5 to 10, the curves show a clear tendency. The figure describes that in general, higher levels of motivation coincide with high levels of knowledge. It is possible to identify a significant correlation from point 5 to 10. However, it is important to stress that this type of graphic presents a limitation: it does not consider the precise quantity of people that correspond to each point in the graphic. Therefore, for instance, the curve corresponding to “education” shows a certain point of low level of knowledge coinciding with a low level of motivation. This point could refer to one or two people or a hundred, and hence, mislead the analyses of the replies of Q15. Therefore, if we want to add an extra variable, that is to say, the quantity of persons, to this graphic, every point in the graphic needs to be multiplied by the number of persons corresponding to that point (see Figure 20). By means of this process, the number of people acts as a weighting factor, giving more consistency to the analysis of trends under investigation.

**Figure 20.** Plot displaying the average level of knowledge per number of individuals<sup>594</sup> (Q15) in relation to the level of motivation to comply with the law (Q13).

<sup>593</sup> The replies in Q15 corresponded to qualitative values, in terms of “High”, “Medium”, “Low” and “No level”. For the creation of Figure 19, these replies were given a quantitative value, which, with the addition of the weighting of the replies, lost its initial value. Therefore, in order to present the data, Figure 19 only present “High” and “No level”, being the curves spread along these two extremes, with an increase of level of knowledge from “No level” to “High”.

<sup>594</sup> *Idem* footnote 593.






Figure 20 shows the crossing of the average level of knowledge and the level of motivation, with reference to the quantity of people in each point of the curves. This calculation can be expressed in the following formula:

$$Index_i = N_{ij} \cdot \langle LoK_i \rangle$$

In this formula,  $i$  represents the different types of motivations, as in Q13,  $j$  the levels of motivations, and  $N_{ij}$  the number of people which provided to each motivation  $i$  a certain level  $j$ .  $\langle LoK \rangle$  indicates the average Level of Knowledge.

The aim of this index is to show more robust conclusions on the replies of questions 13 and 15, since it minimizes the risk of over estimating low levels of motivations. However, by adding the number of people, the correlation depicted on figure 19 is not as strong as it can be seen on figure 20.

## 15. Validity of republican principles

The principles of republican ethics and politics have been widely recognized in the Argentina tradition. They are the basis of which could be called the “philosophical background” of legal culture. These are present in the *idearum* of the historic constitution of the country and they come from the political tradition of constitutional republic. Such principles have been cultivated through public education, and even through the numerous interruptions of constitutional normality.

In this sense, an important part of the investigation is to inquiry on the level of effective validity of such principles in the practice of social relationships. In this sense, the interviewees were asked about their perception on their validity in current times in Argentina.

## Q16. Effective validity of republican principles

It has been stressed the importance of the strengthening of republican principles. With reference to the following principles, please provide a grade between 1 (low level) and 10 (high level) according to your perception of their effectiveness, nowadays, in Argentina.

Table 33. Replies Q16. Effective validity of republican principles.

	Total	18 - 29	30 - 49	50 - 64	65 +	Male	Female	Socioeconomic situation (%)		
								High	Medium	Low
1. Division of powers	5	5.7	4.9	4.7	4.5	4.7	5.2	4.1	5.2	5.2
2. Equality before the law	4.1	4.8	4	3.9	3.7	4	4.3	3.3	4	4.7
3. Due process	5	5.4	5	4.8	4.5	4.8	5.1	4.1	5	5.4
4. Reasonableness of laws	5.2	5.2	5.2	5.2	5.4	5.1	5.3	4	5.5	5.4
5. Transparency and integrity	4.3	4.5	4.6	3.9	3.8	4.3	4.3	3.1	4.5	4.6
6. Access to information	5.8	6.1	5.7	5.4	6	5.7	5.8	4	6	6.2
7. Accountability of public officers	3.5	4.1	3.4	3.4	3.1	3.5	3.6	2.7	3.6	3.9
8. Validity of personal freedoms	5.3	5.2	5.6	5.1	4.9	5.2	5.3	4.3	5.4	5.6
9. Human rights protection	5.7	5.7	5.6	5.6	6	5.6	5.7	4.9	5.9	5.8
10. Judicial independency	5.2	5.9	5	5	4.8	4.7	5.6	3.5	5.2	6
11. Civic participation	5.4	5.8	5.3	5.1	5.4	5.4	5.4	3.6	5.7	5.9
12. Social inclusion	4.7	5.3	4.5	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.9	3.1	4.9	5.2
13. Effective strength of laws	4.7	5.6	4.4	4.3	4.2	4.5	4.8	3.9	4.6	5.1
14. Fight against racial discrimination	5.3	5	5.6	4.9	5.4	5.6	5	4.5	5.5	5.3

**Table 34. Replies Q16. Validity of republican principles: total average, median and mode.**

	<b>Total Average</b>	<b>Median</b>	<b>Mode</b>	<b>DK %</b>	<b>DA %</b>
<b>1. Division of powers</b>	5	3	1	4.8	1.6
<b>2. Equality before the law</b>	4.1	5	4	3.2	0
<b>3. Due process</b>	5	5	1	13.2	2.8
<b>4. Reasonableness of laws</b>	5.2	6	7	8.4	2
<b>5. Transparency and integrity</b>	4.3	4	4	6.4	1.2
<b>6. Access to information</b>	5.8	4	1	6.4	1.2
<b>7. Accountability of public officers</b>	3.5	5	5	3.6	1.6
<b>8. Validity of personal freedoms</b>	5.3	4	1	6	2
<b>9. Human rights protection</b>	5.7	5	5	3.6	0.8
<b>10. Judicial independency</b>	5.2	6	7	9.6	2.8
<b>11. Civic participation</b>	5.4	5	5	9.2	1.2
<b>12. Social inclusion</b>	4.7	5	7	4	0.4
<b>13. Effective strength of laws</b>	4.7	5	4	8	1.2
<b>14. Fight against racial discrimination</b>	5.3	4	1	4.8	0.8

The interviewees had to grade from 1 to 10 their perception of validity in current times in Argentina. The averages obtained presented in Table 33 show that the principle which was perceived as more valid in current times in Argentina is the access to information, with an average of 5.8, followed by the protection of human rights, with an average of 5.7. These were followed by civic participation, with 5.4, validity of personal freedoms and fight against discrimination, with 5.3, reasonableness of laws and judicial independency, with 5.2, and division of powers and due process, with 5. The remaining principles received 4.7, for social inclusion and effective strength of law, 4.3, for transparency and integrity, 4.1, for equality before the law, and 3.5 for accountability of public officers.

**Figure 21. Replies Q16. Distribution of validity in relation to republican principles according to table 33 and 34.**




Figure 21 shows that there is a wide spread in the replies referring to question 16. There is skewness towards low values of validity. It is interesting to note that almost 75% of the replies referring to division of powers, due process, transparency and integrity, accountability of public officers and effective strength of laws are situated below the general mean, which is 5. In addition, with reference to due process, 50% of the replies corresponded to a 1 or a 2. The rest 50% was distributed between 2 and 10.

### 16. Interpersonal trust and solidarity

This section addresses the issues of interpersonal trust among family, friends, neighbours, work colleagues and other members of the community, and solidarity. Interviewees were asked the widely used question on interpersonal trust used in numerous cross national surveys. In addition, individuals were asked about solidarity within the community.

This is a crucial point in the investigation on social capital indicators. As the World Bank wisely stresses, trust is an abstract concept that is difficult to measure because it means different things to different people<sup>595</sup>. The surveys therefore focuses from generalized trust (trust to strangers), to trust to particular groups of people. Some of the questions might seem redundant, in particular, the ones referring to neighbours and neighbourhoods. The purpose is to obtain considerable data for possible cross-validations.

Q17 corresponds to an adaptation of the widely used question on the typical question regarding interpersonal trust “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in your dealing with other people?”.

<sup>595</sup> World Bank; “Measuring Social Capital, An Integrated Questionnaire”, World Bank Working Paper n.18.

## Q17. Trust in unknown people

With reference to trust on people who you don't know in depth but you eventually are related, generally speaking, do you tend to trust them or do you tend not to trust them and be careful?

Table 35. Replies Q17. Trust in strangers.

	Total (%)	18 – 29 (%)	30 – 49 (%)	50 - 64 (%)	65 + (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Socioeconomic situation (%)		
								High	Medium	Low
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>Tend to trust unknown people</b>	24,6	25,6	31,7	13,1	22,3	29,7	20,5	18,9	30,7	18
<b>Tend to be careful with unknown people</b>	75,4	74,4	68,3	86,9	77,7	70,3	79,5	81,1	69,3	82

Table 35 shows that 75.4% of the population replied that, generally speaking, they tend to be careful with people that they do not know, whereas 24.6% replied that they tend to trust people they do not know.

Though all the subgroups tend to be careful with unknown people, the most suspicious individuals are the ones belonging to group 50-64, followed by the group 65+. Individuals belonging to group 30-49 tend to be more trustful, followed by 18-29. However, this tendency is not strong in the general complex. As for gender, women tend to be more distrustful than men. With respect to socioeconomic situation, the individuals enjoying a high and low level tend to be more suspicious than individuals with a medium level.

Figure 22. Replies Q17. Trust in strangers according to age.




Figure 22 shows in detail the different age groups and their percentages of replies for question 17. In this sense, it can be seen that almost 70% of the individuals of each age group tend not to trust strangers and behave carefully. The age groups which shows the biggest difference is the one corresponding to 50 to 65 years old.

**Figure 23. Replies Q17. Trust in strangers according to gender.**




Figure 23 shows in detail the interviewed male and female and their percentages of replies for question 17. In this sense, it can be seen that almost all women tend to be less trustful with strangers, in comparison to men.

**Figure 24. Replies Q17. Trust in strangers according to socio-economic level.**




Figure 24 shows in detail the socioeconomic level of the interviewees and their percentages of replies for question 17. In this sense, it can be seen that almost 70% and more of the individuals of each age group tend not to trust strangers and behave carefully. The age groups which shows the biggest difference is the one corresponding to 50 to 65 years old.

**Figure 25. Replies Q17. Main effect plot of level of trust in institutions in relation to trust in strangers.**




Figure 25 represents the data crossing of the tendency to trust or not to trust strangers (Q17) and the level of trust in different types of institutions (Q5). This type of graphic is called “main effect plot”<sup>596</sup>. Each coloured circle represents the average of trust for law and order institutions, political institutions, institutions from society and law and justice institutions for both the persons who tend to trust strangers, and the ones who tend not to trust strangers and behave carefully. The two circles are connected with a line. The relative significance of its slope shows whether there is a main effect or not among these factors. In the present case, the aim is to analyze whether the tendency to trust or not to trust strangers has an effect on the levels of trust on the different types of institutions proposed. In order to analyse this, the slopes need to be compared. In addition, for this particular case, each type of institution is represented by the general average of levels of trust obtained for the different groups of institutions. Figure 1.17 shows that the lines tend to be rather plain, which is coherent with a low correlation. Only the curve corresponding to institutions from society shows a slight slope, which tends to coincide, at the same time, with the highest averages of trust for these types of institutions. In addition, the dotted line shows what it would be the medium level for trust in a scale of 1 (low level) to 10 (high level). It is interesting to note that all four lines lie beneath this medium level of trust.

In addition, the correlation coefficient was calculated between those who trust strangers (Q17) and the general average of trust in the different types of institutions analyzed in Q5, and the correlations obtained were: for trust in law and order institutions: 0.22; for trust in political institutions: 0.2; for trust in

<sup>596</sup> The presence of a slope indicates that a factor has a main effect on the other. The effects of different factors can be compared by comparing the slopes. “The effect of a factor is defined as the change in response produced by a change in the level of the factor. It is called main effect because it refers to the primary factors in the study” (Montgomery, Douglas C., Runger, George, C., Hubele, Norma F, *Engineering Statistics*. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2001, p. 357).

institutions from society: 0.27; and for law and justice institutions: 0.28. Therefore, it can be observed that there is no correlation between trust in strangers and trust in institutions.

### 17. Interpersonal trust

In Q18 the interviewees were asked about their trust on different types of people. They had to reply, on a scale from 1 (no trust) to 10 (high levels of trust), how much they trusted the members of their families, friends, colleagues from work, bosses and hierarchy superiors, priests and pastors, and professors and teachers.

### Q18. Interpersonal trust

In relation to the following groups of people, please provide from a scale of 1 (no trust) to 10 (high trust) how much do you trust them, in terms of your willingness to trust and confide them your problems and expect from them a disinterested help.

Table 36. Replies Q18. Interpersonal trust: averages.

	Total	18 - 29	30 - 49	50 - 64	65 +	Male	Female	Socioeconomic situation (%)		
								High	Medium	Low
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>1. Members of family</b>	9.1	9	9.1	9.2	9.4	8.9	9.3	9.7	9.1	8.9
<b>2. Friends</b>	8.6	8.7	8.6	8.5	8.9	8.5	8.8	9.1	8.8	8.2
<b>3. Neighbours</b>	6.4	5.8	6.2	6.6	7.9	6	6.8	6.4	6.5	6.3
<b>4. Colleagues from work</b>	8.2	6.8	7.8	8.5	11	7.8	8.5	6.9	8	9.1
<b>5. Bosses and immediate superiors</b>	8	6.2	7.6	8.7	10.9	7.4	8.5	6.9	7.6	9
<b>6. Priests and pastors</b>	7.4	6.4	7.5	7.6	8.9	7	7.8	8.6	7.1	7.4
<b>7. Teachers and professors</b>	9	7.9	8.8	9.2	10.8	8.5	9.4	9.5	8.6	9.3

Table 37. Replies Q18. Interpersonal trust: total averages, “doesn’t know” and “didn’t answer”.

	Total average	DK (%)	DA (%)
<b>1. Members of family</b>	9.1	0.4	0
<b>2. Friends</b>	8.6	0.4	0.4
<b>3. Neighbours</b>	6.4	1.6	0.4
<b>4. Colleagues from work</b>	8.2	4.4	16.8
<b>5. Bosses and immediate superiors</b>	8	5.6	18.8
<b>6. Priests and pastors</b>	7.4	3.6	10.8
<b>7. Teachers and professors</b>	9	4.4	12.4



Table 36 shows that the category of individuals which received the highest rank for trust is family, with an average vote of 9.1. Family stands out among the other social references and authorities. Family was followed by teachers and professors, with a 9, friends, with 8.6, colleagues from work, 8.2, and bosses and immediate superiors, with 8. The groups which received the lowest trustworthy rank are priests and pastors, with 7.4, and neighbours, with 6.4. It is interesting to note that though kinship related to the working environment are included among the groups which are most trusted, but at the same time, present relatively high percentages of “Didn’t answer”.

**Figure 26. Replies Q18. Distribution of level of trust in relation to groups of people.**




Figure 26 shows a wide spread among the replies of question 17. All the replies show a wide spread, except for family and friends which clearly show high levels of trust in comparison with the other groups proposed<sup>597</sup>. Neighbours and colleagues from work show the same distribution. Priests and pastors show a skewness to low levels of trust, and neighbours, colleagues from work and professors and teachers show skewness to higher levels of trust. Almost 75% of the replies regarding bosses and immediate superiors and priests and pastors have levels of trust below the general mean. For the rest of the groups, at least 50% of the replies is above the general mean.

<sup>597</sup> The outliers showed in the graphic correspond to 23 people with reference to family, and 4 people with reference to friends. The graphic was made with MATLAB, for which outliers represent those

**Figure 27.** Scatter plot for average level of trust in different groups of institutions (Q5) in relation to average level of interpersonal trust (Q18).




Figure 27 shows scatter plots for the data crossing referring to the replies for levels of interpersonal trust (Q18) and trust in certain groups of institutions (Q5). For these particular cases, the crossings were made on the base of general averages of trust, both for interpersonal trust and for the trust in the different groups of institutions. From the graphics shown in figure 27 it can be observed that there is a significant dispersion, however, there is a tendency towards mid-levels of interpersonal with mid-levels of trust in the different groups of institutions. The red spot in each graphic represents the mean of the two crossed variables. The red line shows the linear tendency to which the crossing of the general data would be approximating. The indexes of correlation were calculated for the four cases, presenting positive correlations as follows: 0.47 for Q18-Q5A, 0.42 for Q18-Q5B, 0.58 for Q18-Q5C, and 0.56 for Q18-Q5D.

## 18. Levels of social solidarity

The following question presented three statements which made reference to solidarity among neighbours. This represents a basic dimension, essential for interpersonal trust. The interviewees are asked about the level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements: “The majority of the people in this neighbourhood is open to others and is willing to help in case of need”, “People in this neighbourhood is individualistic and only minds his own business” and “In this neighbourhood one cannot be too careful; someone might want to take advantage from you.”.

## Q19. Levels of social solidarity

Please indicate whether you highly agree, agree, disagree, or highly disagree with the following statements.

**Table 38. Replies Q19. Levels of social solidarity.**

	Highly agree (%)	Agree (%)	Disagree (%)	Highly disagree (%)	DN/DR (%)
The majority of the people in this neighbourhood is open to others and is willing to help in case of need.	12,6	54,9	23,5	3,3	5,7
In this neighbourhood one cannot be too careful; someone might want to take advantage from you.	6	36,5	48,5	3,9	5,1
People in this neighbourhood are individualistic and only mind their own business.	8.1	40.2	38.9	3.6	9.2

According to Table 38, the majority of the replies ranged among a moderate point of view, either they agreed or disagreed; there were small percentages which highly agreed or disagreed. With reference to the statement “The majority of the people in this neighbourhood is open to others and is willing to help in case of need”, 54.9% agree with it while 23.5% disagreed with it. Concerning “In this neighbourhood one cannot be too careful; someone might want to take advantage from you”, 48.5% disagree with it, whereas 36.5% agreed with it. These results follow the replies of the previous statement, which provided, in a certain way, the neighbours, with an optimistic valuation. However, with regards to “People in this neighbourhood are individualistic and only mind their own business” it was an almost equal percentage: 38.9% disagree with this statement and 40.2% agreed with it.

When considering the variables of age, gender and socioeconomic situation (see Annex II for details), they all share the tendency towards believing that the majority of people in the neighbourhood is open to others and willing to help in the case of need. However, with respect to the fact that someone might want to take advantage, the age group 18-29 tend to be more positive, and the majority from this groups tends to disagree with that affirmation. The same situation occurs with men in comparison to women. As for the affirmation on the fact that people in the neighbourhood are individualistic, the age group 65+ and women tend to disagree with this statement, contrarily to what it is believed by the majority of the individuals belonging to the different variable groups.

### **19. Collective action and cooperation**

This section surveys the extent to which individuals got involve with their communities with relation to joint activities or in response to certain problems. Collective action and cooperation has been used as a proxy to social capital in numerous studies. This is due to the fact that collective action is only possible if

there is some level of social capital, no matter how minimum it is. The aim is to collect the extent and willingness of collective action and the type of activities that are carried out together.

**Q20. Collective action and predisposition to social cooperation**

Suppose there is a problem of general interest in your neighbourhood (such as a cut in the provision of water, electricity or gas); which is the likelihood that neighbours will mobilize together in order to solve the problem?

**Table 39. Replies Q20. Collective action and predisposition to social cooperation.**

	Total (%)	18 - 29 (%)	30 - 49 (%)	50 - 64 (%)	65 + (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Socioeconomic situation (%)		
								High	Medium	Low
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>Very likely</b>	21,9	20,9	17,9	27,2	25,4	16,7	26,1	16,3	20,5	26,8
<b>Likely</b>	45,4	42,3	50,1	37,4	50,3	46,8	44,2	39,2	51	39,7
<b>Neither likely nor unlikely</b>	11,1	10,6	10,1	12,9	11,7	15,3	7,8	5	13,4	10,6
<b>A little unlikely</b>	9,7	13,6	8,9	10,4	4,1	8,8	10,4	10,9	10,1	8,4
<b>Very unlikely</b>	7	5,6	7,7	10,6	2,2	7,9	6,2	15,5	2,4	9,7
<b>DA/DR</b>	5	7	5,3	1,4	6,3	4,5	5,4	13,1	2,6	4,8

Table 39 shows that 45.4% of the population replied that it is likely that neighbours will get together to solve problems which affect the community, supported by a 21.9% which replied that this situation would be most likely. 11.1% believed it was neither likely nor unlikely, whereas 9.7% and 5% believed this was unlikely or very unlikely, respectively.

When analyzing the different variables, it was interesting to note that the most positive towards the likelihood of collective action where the age groups 30-49 and 65+. The age group 50=64 presents a more polarized position among the different points of view. There was not a significant difference among genders. With regards to socioeconomic situation, the individuals belonging to low level groups tend to be more positive than in relation to medium and high level individuals.

**Figure 28.** Scatter plot for average level of interpersonal trust in relation to likelihood of collective action and social cooperation.




Figure 28 shows a scatter plot which does not present any clear tendency or correlation. In this sense, the correlation coefficient was calculated and it equalled to 0.02, which means that it is not possible to find a correlation among the average level of interpersonal trust and the likelihood of collective action and social cooperation.

**Figure 29.** Scatter plots for average level of interpersonal trust in relation to average level in different types of institutions (Q5)




Figure 29 presents four different scatter plots presenting the data crossing of the average level of trust in institutions, as per Q5A-law and order institutions, Q5B- political institutions, Q5C- institutions from society and 5BD- law and justice institutions. The graphic presents data in which it is not possible to identify a clear tendency. In particular, the different correlation indexes were, respectively, 0, 0.02, -0.14

and 0; which means that there it is not possible to find a correlation among the average level of interpersonal trust and the level of trust in institutions.

## 20. Predisposition for social mobilization

The interviewees were asked regarding their involvement in public life, and their participation in community activities. The aim is to investigate in depth one of the most important dimensions of interpersonal trust: the predisposition to mobilize towards the affirmation and defence of interests perceived and felt as shared and common.

In order to understand the importance of the collected data, it is necessary to take into consideration that Argentina has a political tradition of collective mobilization. Traditional political parties recognize a tradition of social movements. These social movements go beyond formal partisan organization. In recent crisis situations, this tradition has been projected towards different forms of political activism, especially in the sphere of social fight and demand.

### Q21. Participation in social mobilization


In the past three years, have you participated in any of the following activities?

Table 40. Replies Q21. Participation in social mobilization.

	Yes (%)	No (%)	DK/DA (%)	Socioeconomic situation (%) YES		
				High	Medium	Low
1. Getting in touch with a person of power	17.2	82	0.8	37	15.4	10.3
2. Succeed in getting catching media's attention with reference to a particular problem	7.6	91.2	1.2	19.2	4.8	7.4
3. Being active in information campaigns	8.4	90	1.6	14.9	5.2	10.8
4. Being active in an electoral campaign	6	93.2	0.8	5	7.1	4.8
5. Taking part in a protest or manifestation	27.2	72	0.8	37.7	32.5	17.9
6. Contacting a political representative	5.6	92.8	1.6	14	2.3	5.9
7. Participate in a meeting with public officers	7.2	91.6	1.2	20.8	5.1	4.4
8. Writing a petition or notification to a public officer	10	88.8	1.2	13.7	8	9.3
9. Making donations in money or species	35.6	62.8	1.6	40.8	38.8	28.9
10. Volunteering in a charity organization	17.6	80.4	2	13.5	21.8	14.4
11. Becoming member of an NGO	6.4	92.4	1.2	5.6	8.4	4.8
12. Participation in public audiences	5.6	93.6	0.8	6.9	6.5	3.3

13. Participation in a collection	24.8	73.2	2	33.3	24.8	22
14. Participation in a street or road blockage	2.8	96.8	0.4	---	5.8	---
15. Participation in an “ <i>escrache</i> ” <sup>598</sup>	5.2	93.6	1.2	5.3	7.7	2.8
16. Participation in a chain in any social network	23.6	75.6	0.8	53.4	26.3	11.4
17. Follow up of an issue with political or social implications through the media	38	61.6	0.4	62.6	34.3	29.3
18. Suiting a file case or appeal for legal protection	8	91.2	0.8	5.9	8.9	9.6
19. Becoming member of a human rights protection or antidiscrimination organization	3.2	96.4	0.4	5	2.5	4.3

Figure 30. Number of individuals and their number of participation in activities in the last three years.



The obtained data shows, however, that the predisposition to mobilization or the participation in public causes is, in current Argentina, a minority phenomenon. In general, the interviewed population rejects active forms of mobilizing commitment. This is a sign which indicates the decline of political and social participation, a feature that Argentina society shares with the majority of developed democracies. Table 40 shows that the activity which received the highest percentage in participation by the interviewees was following up of an issue with political or social implications through the media, with a 38%, followed by making donations, with a 35.6%. It is interesting to note that even though these were the ones with a highest percentage, the percentage in itself is low and it cannot be said that it represents the majority of the population. In addition, these activities do not imply getting involved and interacting with others. On the contrary, though they do imply a certain degree of commitment, it does so but in a solitary way, without exposing oneself too much. With reference to activities which imply involvement with other people, the one presented the highest percentage of participation is taking part in a group protest or manifestation,

<sup>598</sup> “Escrache” consists of a mobilization against a particular persona through acts of repudiation close to his home or working place with the objective to call the attention of the media.

with 27.2%. In relation to offering personal time to causes, only 17.6% express to have volunteered in a charity organization.

It can be observe from Figure 30 that, in general terms, the interviewed individuals have a low level percentage of participation. In most of the activities, the no participation reaches almost 90% of the individuals, except for the case of activities which imply donations of time, money, species or any kind of collection. The participation, though negative, tends to be a little slightly polarized when referring to protests and manifestations.

With reference to age (see Annex II for detailed information on the replies to Q21), it is interesting to note that there seems to be a strong relation between those activities which imply involvement in a social network with the age group. The younger the age, the more participation in this kind of initiatives. However, with reference to following issues through the media, it is the other age groups which appear to be more active.

With reference to getting in contact to an influential person, age groups 30-49 and 50-64 tend to be more active than the other age groups.

With reference to gender, both men and women tend to follow the same tendencies with the exception of activities which have a political implication, such as getting in contact with an influential person, participation in electoral campaigns, contacting and petitioning politicians or public officials.

With regards to socioeconomic situation, though, generally speaking, the majority tends not to participate, the ones who have participated tend to be in their majority from high level individuals. Analyzing the participation according to the socioeconomic situation is a complex task, which might require further study in order to come to specific conclusions. The participation could be conditioned by, not only the interest to do so, but also the availability of time from the individuals. Some individuals who would be willing to participate might not have the time to do so, do to, for instance, the lack of relative leisure time. At the same time, it could be that individuals in higher level do not feel the need to join since they are already better off than the rest of the groups, or, contrarily, since are able to manage their working hours, so, they are able to participate more than the rest. These are only speculations which require to be studied more in depth.

**Figure 31. Distribution of number of participation in activities in the last three years.**






Figure 31 presents a boxplot analyzing the number of times an individual had participated in the proposed activities, during the previous three years to the moment in which the survey was carried out. In this sense, it is interesting to note that 25% of the survey population declared to have participated five times or more, and 25% to have participated at least one time or no time at all. Taking these as a base to identify the extremes of participation, according to the raw data, the number of individuals which had participated five times and more equalled 53, which coincides with the number of individuals who declared not to have participated at all in any of the activities mentioned (53).

**Figure 32.** Scatter plot for average level of interpersonal trust (Q18) and average level of trust in different types of institutions (Q5), applied to the most participative and less participative groups of individuals (Q21).




Figure 32 shows four different scatter plots presenting the average level of interpersonal trust in relation to the average level of trust of the different types of institutions as per Q5A-law and order institutions,

Q5B- political institutions, Q5C- institutions from society and 5BD- law and justice institutions. The data is crossed, however, only in relation to the most participative and less participative individuals. The most participative individuals are the ones belonging to the 4<sup>th</sup> percentile according to Figure 31, and the no participative have been considered as those ones that have not participated at all in the last three years. In this sense, observing the graphics presented in Figure 32, it is not possible to identify a clear tendency. However, When the correlation coefficients were calculated, it was interested to note that there is a significant correlation between the no participative individuals and the level of interpersonal trust and trust in institutions. For these cases, the correlation coefficients were: 0.52 for Q18-Q5A, 0.46 for Q18-Q5B, 0.69 for Q18-Q5C, and 0.56 for Q18-Q5D. For the cases of the most participative individuals, however, no correlation was found for Q18 and Q5A, Q5B, and Q5D, and a weak correlation for Q18-Q5C (0.4).

## **21. Levels of information and trust**

Access to information has being increasingly recognized as central for communities in order to have a stronger voice in issues which directly affect their well-being<sup>599</sup>. This section explores the means by which individuals receive information and the level of trust they have on these sources.

The interviewees were asked to identify among 24 possible sources of information, which were the first four he would turn to in case of a communitarian problem.

## **Q22. Trust in sources of information**

**With reference to problems of communitarian interest, which are, according to you, the most trustworthy sources of information?**

**Please, identify which is, according to you, the first, second, and third most trustworthy source of information among the following options.**

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<sup>599</sup> World Bank; "Measuring Social Capital, An Integrated Questionnaire", World Bank Working Paper n.18.

**Table 41. Replies Q22. Trustworthy sources of information.**

	Total	18 – 29 (%)	30 – 49 (%)	50 - 64 (%)	65 + (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Socioeconomic situation (%)		
								High	Medium	Low
								Opinions or testimonies from family, friends and neighbours	56,9	62,4
Social networks in the web (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc.)	18,9	30,5	25,7	7,7		16,0	21,3	36,3	18,5	11,1
Community bulletin	4,4	3,7	5,1	4,3	3,9	5,1	3,8	4,1	4,3	4,6
Shops	4,7	7,3	2,4	1,6	10,4	6,1	3,6	7,9	1,3	8,4
Communal or local newspaper	5,1	5,3	7,7	2,7	2,2	4,9	5,3	3,1	6,0	4,8
Internet portals	17,7	14,3	25,9	14,7	8,0	18,8	16,8	31,1	18,3	10,3
National newspapers	34,1	34,2	24,1	43,8	43,8	37,2	31,6	19,1	39,1	33,7
Radio	42,4	32,9	39,8	44,9	60,7	39,9	44,4	15,8	41,1	57,4
TV (news programmes)	66,1	58,5	67,1	72,1	67,7	57,0	73,5	62,9	63,4	71,8
Mobilizing groups or associations	4,9	1,7	5,1	5,9	8,0	6,6	3,5	5,3	6,7	1,8
Labour unions	0,7	1,7	----	1,4	----	1,0	0,5	1,9	0,8	----
Political parties or associations	2,4	5,3	----	4,5	----	3,5	1,5	2,2	3,0	1,5
Community leaders	0,4	1,7	----	----	----	1,0	----	----	0,8	----
Judges and prosecutors	0,4	----	1,2	----	----	1,0	----	2,8	----	----
NGOs	2,2	3,3	3,8	----	----	3,9	0,9	8,7	0,8	1,3
Federal Police	1,7	----	3,8	1,6	----	2,8	0,9	----	2,6	1,3
Lawyers	0,4	----	1,2	----	----	1,0	----	----	----	1,3
City of Buenos Aires Police	0,7	1,7	----	1,4	----	1,0	0,5	----	0,8	0,9
Churches	3,2	1,7	5,1	2,7	2,0	3,6	2,9	5,6	3,4	1,8
Internet	12,1	16,0	14,0	7,3	8,2	14,7	10,1	12,1	15,7	6,7
Consumer and users associations	1,2	----	1,3	1,6	2,0	1,5	0,9	1,9	1,7	----
None	9,3	12,6	5,1	10,0	2,6	8,8	9,7	15,4	6,1	11,1
Doesn't know / Didn't reply	0,3	----	----	1,4	----	----	0,5	----	----	0,9

According to Table 41, among the first four sources of information, 66.1% chose the TV, followed by the opinion and testimony of family, friends or neighbours with 56.9%, and 42.4% chose the radio. However, the source which was chosen as the first one to turn to was the opinion and testimony of family, friends or neighbours with a 38%, the source to be chosen as the second one to turn to resulted TV, with 22.4%. TV also resulted to receive the majority of choices for the third source, with 22.2% of replies.

With reference to gender and age, there does not seem to be a significant difference in their tendencies. However, it is interesting to note, that with reference to the socioeconomic situation, the medium level tend to be turn to social networks and internet portals with more frequency than low or high level individuals.

#### **4. Preliminary conclusions**

The data presented in the preceding sections allows drawing some preliminary conclusions. The key purpose is to underline some of the issues of the contemporary debate that could be useful for a general view on the factors of social capital and their influence in the institutional background.

1. The Argentinean society has fully entered a deep transformation process, result of its growing participation in large cultural, social, economic and political exchanges in this turn-of-the-century global society. It is a complex set of changes, with foreseeable progress and setbacks, and where continuity of results will be largely dependent upon the effort and conviction of all players to change legacy structures. Stabilizing adjustments and structural reforms are a widespread trend in today's world, present in the most diverse societies and economies.

2. In Argentina, novelty results from the way in which such policies have been implemented. This is due to the fact that they have adapted to the country's individual needs and therefore, have attained good operational efficiency and political feasibility. Nevertheless, the uniqueness of the Argentine case lies in the way society and leaders have committed to and led this change, which was called for by a new reality. A collective memory of a long list of frustrations and the conviction that there were no feasible alternatives has supplied a share of realism and adaptation.

3. This explains the breakdown of social consensus around policies that would have otherwise been subjected to much stronger confrontation in other times and in other circumstances. A very well informed and politically motivated society gave a positive answer in terms of capacity of overcoming severe social challenges. Despite the worst social conditions, society tends more to re-equilibration than to the opposite social direction.

4. The discussion about the confidence on Government and the crisis of institutions and possible solutions to it is also a function of largely universal schemes. Argentina is certainly not an exception to what is happening in the rest of Latin American countries and even to some of the more advanced democracies. During the last decade, crisis requirements prevail over program contents, strategic or tactical considerations and even personal convenience. Change, thus, brings about a true mutation in which society, by conditioning its leaders, has played the leading role. Answers are rather adaptive in nature, and

result from demands by various government sectors. However, nothing has yet been developed to include them all. In this regard, Argentina's experience is no different from those against which it is currently compared.

5. Original stabilization demands have been replaced by new claims, different in content and scope. The "social agenda" comes to the forefront in a country experiencing deep changes and where the debate about the new State is a pending issue. Between 1983 and 1989 Argentina rebuilt its institutions and basic democratic rules. In the period 1989 – 1994 the country restructured its economy and neutralized stagnation. In the actual period 2001-2011, there is comprehensive redefinition of public/private relations, where the social capital fabric is in the limelight. Nowadays it is possible to find a new agenda that prioritizes the development of legal frameworks and public control mechanisms capable of warding off the risks resulting from a new relationship between public powers and individual initiatives.

6. The basic factor is the return of the State to the centre of the social arena, but within a framework of mistrust on some of the basic institutions of the rule of law. Can State initiatives and institutional capacity fill the institutional gap?

5. From the point of view of redesigning institutional solutions, the cultivation of the conditions and determinants of social capital is a crucial priority of the country. This means promoting open and permanent participation, empowering people to be part of central processes of institutional redesigns and to consolidate institutions that are central pieces of the fabric of social feelings and sentiments. The rule of law is a guarantee for a long run trend of reinforcing collective efforts. That means, at the same time, to implement strategies that are in line with a degree of complexity that, to some extent, exceed the individual capacities of a given party or even of the agreement between major parties. It is about reaching a comprehensive agreement: a new social contract where society plays the key role. Leaders are just an instrument for a radically new kind of political and institutional action.

6. The concept of social capital is a valuable instrument for the analysis of new realities but it is necessary to take into serious consideration the real process of social construction of collective trust and confidence. An advancement on the quantity and quality of social bonds seems to be more the result of critical experiences that promote resilience reflexes than the spontaneous effect of the consolidation of stable conditions of market improvement and democratic consolidation. There is strong evidence in the sense that social capital is not the result of cultural economic and political equilibrium. On the contrary it is the direct effect of popular response against extreme adversity. Realizing that condition of social capital can help in the renewal of the agenda of the social conditions of democratic progress and consolidation.

## **Part II. Social capital, conflict, cooperation and judicial institutions**

Modern constitutional powers are undergoing structural changes in their organization, functions and dynamics; and Argentina is no exception to this. The first part of the chapter presented the analysis of the main features of the new political culture, the role of social capital and the phenomena of trust and mistrust in institutions, as a vector of change in the traditional functions of power designed by the rule of law. These changes have tended to affect the vision of the role of the judicial system and its institutions.

Part II. focuses in some of the features of the Argentinean political culture, with specific focus on the social tendencies to conflict and cooperation. Within this context, the research also addresses the study of the perceptions, visions and expectation of the Argentinean society with regards to the structure and dynamics of the judicial system in general and the judicial institution in particular.

The starting point of this final stage of the research is the issue of the growing “judicialization” of legal life. Law and institutions are acquiring conflictive features. Law is judicialized and its repercussions in social life have become one of the main phenomena in the new institutional context. On one hand, the multiplication and amplification of the instances to access law is evident. On the other, there is a new composition of interests and alternative conflict resolution techniques. Under these conditions, the judicial power is moving forward on to the, until not so long ago called, “political matters” and, in addition, it is expanding the justice character of all the problems.

This phenomena includes, among others, the growing participation of the judicial function in issues which were reserved before to the legislative function, or the amplification of the possibilities to access to justice for the resolution of problems which before did not correspond to the magistrates’ intervention. Justice tends to assume a leading role in the complex of social mechanisms which aim at safeguarding the control of the “political correction” of political and social processes.

The social response focuses on a growing demand for rights, as a result of the consolidation of the political and legal culture characteristic of modern societies, and as a result of the pressures towards an integral democratization and of the crisis of the republic representation. This context describes, in addition, another main feature of the global legal panorama: the expansion of the constitutional control with reference to contents, methods and forms of exercise of rights.

Judicial activism reflects the demands for judges to occupy the gaps in the political system. Society pretends new responses to the new problems that overload the capacity of the political system. The Argentinean constitutional system presents a diffuse system of constitutional control of laws and

administrative decisions. In any instance and in any moment it is possible for citizens to claim to the justice protection and safeguard of their rights.

The basic premise for this new active conception of the power of judges is that governments will generate sensitiveness and compassion towards social conflicts if their public officers are compelled by judges. Even though it is doubtful the use of this type of approaches as a tool for institutional progress, they apparently receive public acceptance. This is due to the popular demand for more sensitiveness and compassion from governments, and due to the media impact that these judicial interventions can usually generate<sup>600</sup>. The following sections will analyse the referred changes in relation to the Argentina case.

The social evaluation of the judicial system complements the different aspects in the relationships between social capital, institutions and law analysed so far. In order to address this particular dimension, the present research turned to a complimentary source of information: a group of surveys that have periodically monitored the perceptions on the judicial system. These surveys are carried out annually by the FINES Foundation and OPSM Consultancy. Though these surveys are based on a national sample, the results offer, nevertheless, the necessary information for the complimentary required. The evaluation of the perceptions, images, and attitudes towards the judicial system imply addressing a considerable quantity of issues, difficult to be incorporated in a questionnaire such as the one designed for the present PhD thesis – due to the complexity and length of the questions. For this reason, the results obtained by the monitors are used as a complementary source of information.

Even if the samples are different, it is important to stress that the mentioned national monitor was carried out in March 2011, the period in which the PhD empirical research was also carried out. The Monitor 2011 was carried out between 28 March and 1 April 2011. The sample consisted of 1100 direct interviews to individuals of 18 years and older resident in the national territory. The data was collected from 65 towns, located in the different regions of the country. The survey consisted of a semi-structured questionnaire directed to monitor and evaluate the perceptions and tendencies of public opinion on the economic, political and social situation of the country. The sample was designed according to stratification by size of the city, and region. Five population strata were used: Metropolitan Area, cities with more than 100 mil inhabitants, cities with 50 to 100 mil inhabitants, cities with 10 and 50 mil inhabitants and cities with less than 10 mil inhabitants. The results present a global error of 2.5 % for the totals, with a level of trust of 95%.

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<sup>600</sup> For an overview and criticism on the assumption that extraordinary judicial interventions can trigger profound and sustainable reforms, cfr. Sandler, R. and Schoenbrod, D., *Democracy by decree. What happens when courts run government*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2003. The authors confess: “Cada primavera del medio siglo transcurrido desde Brown v. Board of Education, muchos de los miles de graduados de las escuelas de derecho inician sus carreras profesionales soñando con convertirse en héroes defendiendo derechos ante las cortes o creándolos en el Congreso. Nosotros mismos caímos en esa aspiración”.

# 1. Argentina's political culture

## 1. Some outlooks on Argentina social self-image

The inquiry on the perception on some main features of the self-image or subjective image that Argentines have of themselves is one of the core issues in the research on the Argentina case. The interviewees were asked regarding the Argentina society. They were presented a series of statements on Argentinean self-image as a society, and they had to reply whether they highly agreed, agreed, disagreed or highly disagreed with them.

The results obtained show that Argentines see themselves as a society in which bonds of unity tend to weaken. Argentines form an heterogeneous and plural society, in which diversity tends to predominate over homogeneity, and individual or group projects tend to impose themselves over collective projects. At the same time, Argentines see themselves as an open and democratic society which can turn down the value of given word and the commitment towards the others. In addition, it is seen as a society not very respectful of laws and institutions, in which individual interests tend to impose over the interests of the community.

### Q23. Sense of belonging

Please indicate whether you highly agree, agree, disagree, or highly disagree with the following statements.

Table 42. Replies Q23. Sense of belonging.

	Highly agree (%)	Agree (%)	Disagree (%)	Highly disagree (%)	DK (%)	DA (%)
The unity of Argentines and national identity is not as strong as it used to be	17,6	59,7	15,6	1,9	4,9	0,3
The current Argentina presents a modern and heterogeneous society in which differences in values and visions is every time bigger	14,6	58,1	17,6	2,6	7,1	---
Argentines are respectful of laws and institutions	0,3	17,3	70,2	9,9	2,4	---
Argentines are respectful of given word	---	26,2	52	11,1	10,7	---
Argentines are democratic	5	60,5	24,2	7,3	2,3	0,7
The unity of Argentines and national identity is not as strong as it used to be	18.4	58	16.4	2	4.8	0.4



According to Table 31, 59.7% agreed on the fact that the unity and national identity of Argentines is not as strong as it used to be. 58.1% agreed that modern Argentina society is getting more heterogeneous and the differences between values and visions of life are every time bigger. 70.2% believe that Argentines, as a people, are not respectful of laws and institutions. 52% disagree on the statement which describes that Argentines, generally speaking, respect given word. 60.5% agree on the statement which describes Argentines as democratic people.

With reference to age, the different groups tend to follow the same tendency in their replies, with the exception of the case of the statement of “Argentines are respectful of given word”. In this case, the age group 18-29 tends to be more optimistic than the other age groups.

In addition, with regards to the statement “Argentines are democratic”, though there is a tendency towards agreeing with the this, though the agreeing percentages are lower than for the other replies. Still with reference to this statement, in relation to the three socioeconomic level groups, they follow the same tendency. However, it is slightly more polarized than with the other replies.

## **2. Perceptions on social conflict**

The data collected reveals that the Argentinean is a society which fosters divergence and conflictive pluralism. This reinforces, at the same time, the self-image of a conflictive society, in which the attitudes of violence impose over the attitudes for respect and the tendency to sort out things through agreed on solutions. It is a society moved by centrifugal rather than centripetal forces, in which the need for law and institutions turns out to be essential.

Within this context, the issue of social violence acquires significant importance. Contrarily to other societies in the region, with a long history of civil violence, Argentina cannot be defined as a violent society. The indicators for urban violence appear as one of the lowest in the continent, even though there is, in current times, a growing negative perception on urban violence, especially in the city of Buenos Aires. However; in the political and social sphere, the situation is different<sup>601</sup>.

### **Q24. Perceptions on social violence**

**Generally speaking, do you believe the Argentinean is a violent society?**

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<sup>601</sup> An exception to this is the phenomenon that took place in the 70's in which the context of political violence, the urban guerrilla and the military repression resulted in a violent dictatorship, whose features even now call for reflection.

**Table 43. Replies Q24. Perceptions on social violence.**

	Total (%)	18 - 29 (%)	30 - 49 (%)	50 - 64 (%)	65 + (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Socioeconomic situation (%)		
								High	Medium	Low
								<b>Total</b>	100	100
<b>To a great extent</b>	42,6	40,5	45,8	47,8	31,2	43,9	41,6	47,9	37,2	48,4
<b>To some extent</b>	38,3	47,8	34,8	30,6	41,9	35,3	40,6	38,1	42,1	32,6
<b>To a small extent</b>	12,5	8,4	14,3	11,6	16,1	15,2	10,2	8,2	13,5	12,9
<b>Not at all</b>	5,9	1,7	5,1	8,6	10,8	4,5	7	5,9	5,8	6,1
<b>Doesn't know</b>	0,7	1,7	----	1,4	----	1	0,5	----	1,4	----

Table 43 shows that 42.6% of the surveyed population perceived the Argentinean society as a very violent one. This result was supported by a 38.3% who replied that it is “some extent” violent one. As it can be seen from the table, there does not seem to be a significant implication towards gender, age, or socioeconomic situation.

### 3. Perceptions on corruption

The analysis of both public and private corruption is another essential factor in social capital research. The lack of transparency in social life induces defensive reactions. It leads society to compete precisely on those issues in which it should cooperate. In addition, the society tends to develop “protection” bonds, under the form of social capital, with negative outcomes for the rest of the society: clientelism, subjection and controls based on pragmatism or fear. The uncertainty towards the future and the feeling of vulnerability reflect personal insecurity. The fear to lose their job, the difficulties to access social assistance, to mention some of the common fears, fosters phenomena such as a loyalty to structures based on clientelism.

The collected data depicts a society that recognizes an unequivocal tendency to corruption. Independently of the objective phenomenon of public and private corruption, there is an increasing perception that corruption is extensive and growing. A vast majority of the interviewees –more than eight out of ten interviewees- believe that the Argentinean society is a corrupt one. This is an essential dimension of the self-image of an individualistic society, in which the satisfaction of personal interests imposes over other interests, even if it means going beyond public ethics.

## Q25. Perceptions on corruption

Do you agree with those who say that the Argentinean is a corrupt society?

Table 44. Replies Q25. Perceptions on corruption.

	Total	18 - 29 (%)	30 - 49 (%)	50 - 64 (%)	65 + (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Socioeconomic situation (%)		
								High	Medium	Low
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>Highly agree</b>	43,7	37,9	46,1	50,8	37,3	46	41,8	52,5	37,5	48,8
<b>Agree</b>	39,8	45,8	41,1	29,7	41,4	41,3	38,6	38,5	46,2	30,8
<b>Disagree</b>	14,3	16,3	10,4	15,2	19,1	9,9	17,8	9	13,5	18,1
<b>Highly disagree</b>	1,9	----	2,4	2,9	2,2	2,8	1,2	----	2,8	1,3
<b>Doesn't reply</b>	0,3	----	----	1,4	----	----	0,5	----	----	0,9

Table 44 shows that 43.75% of the respondents highly agreed on describing the Argentinean as a corrupt society. This was supported by 39.8% of replies, which also agreed on that. As it can be seen from the table, there does not seem to be a significant implication towards gender, age, or socioeconomic situation.

#### 4. Perceptions on social predisposition to trust and cooperation

Another crucial aspect of the Argentinean self-image is the perception of the effective attitude towards cooperation. According to our data, a substantial majority of people consider that the rest of the people react and function in a defensive way, and behave, as a whole, with caution and suspicion. The perception that the others act in a defensive way generates, in its turn, defensive responses, creating a vicious cycle. A vast majority agrees with the general idea that the common citizen behaves in a defensive manner, imposing an individualistic conception which makes social cooperation difficult. Hence, a reactive and prone to conflict culture is shaped.

Our social capital survey shows that participation rates in Argentina are low. As a logical consequence collective action and mobilization are also relatively rare. There is little experience, among the respondents, in having mobilized around a community need or presenting a petition to leaders. And, only a very small percentage has presented a petition through well-connected intermediaries. Thus, it would seem that there is little interaction between Argentines and their public officials. That social capital is not used to bridge citizens and their representatives or governors. Argentines are sceptical towards mobilization. The peronist tradition of social movements is far away from everyday life needs and expectations.

## Q26. Social predisposition to trust and cooperation

**Do you agree with those who believe that Argentines, generally speaking, are individualistic and do not easily cooperate in general interest issues?**

**Table 45. Replies Q26. Social predisposition to trust and cooperation.**

	Total	18 – 29 (%)	30 – 49 (%)	50 - 64 (%)	65 + (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Socioeconomic situation (%)		
								High	Medium	Low
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>Highly agree</b>	33,7	28,9	35,7	33,1	37,5	34,7	32,9	40,3	26,5	41,4
<b>Agree</b>	37,7	42,2	32,6	41,5	37,3	35,8	39,3	39,3	43,1	28,9
<b>Disagree</b>	21,4	25,3	25,6	14,3	15	20,7	21,9	15,7	22,8	21,9
<b>Highly disagree</b>	5,1	3,7	3,6	7	8	6,8	3,7	4,7	5,5	4,7
<b>Doesn't know</b>	1,4	----	1,2	2,7	2,2	1	1,7	----	2,1	0,9
<b>Didn't reply</b>	0,7	----	1,2	1,4	----	1	0,5	----	----	2,3

Table 45 shows that 37.7% of the population replied that they agreed with those who say that Argentines are individualistic and do not easily cooperate in general interest issues. This was followed by a 33.7% who highly agreed with that statement. As it can be seen from the table the replies tend to be more polarized in comparison to the replies in the other questions.

### 5. Social predisposition to authoritarianism and conflict

A natural question that arises is the following: is the Argentinean, an authoritarian and conflictive political culture? Very strong historical evidence suggests a positive answer, considering the constant interruption of democratic institutional normality. However, the replies obtained in the survey do not allow definitive conclusions. The replies are relatively at the same level, even within variables, even though positive answers tend to predominate. A total of 55.6% consider that Argentines have an authoritative personality and tend to confront. However, 38.1% does not share this general perception.

## Q27. Social predisposition to authoritarianism and conflict

**Do you agree with those who say that Argentines are authoritative and conflictive by nature?**

**Table 46. Replies Q27. Social predisposition to authoritarianism and conflict.**

	Total (%)	18 - 29 (%)	30 - 49 (%)	50 - 64 (%)	65 + (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Socioeconomic situation (%)		
								High	Medium	Low
								<b>Total</b>	100	100
<b>Highly agree</b>	17,1	17,6	19,1	16,3	12,4	21,5	13,6	29,5	12,2	18,5
<b>Agree</b>	38,5	44,5	34,6	38,8	37,3	35,1	41,1	31,5	42,1	36,3
<b>Disagree</b>	32,8	32,6	32,3	30,2	38	28,5	36,3	27,9	33,8	33,6
<b>Highly disagree</b>	5,3	----	7,5	5,7	8,2	6,2	4,6	5,9	6,4	3,4
<b>Doesn't know</b>	5,3	5,3	6,3	4,5	4,1	7,2	3,9	3,1	4,8	7,2
<b>Didn't reply</b>	1	----	----	4,5	----	1,6	0,5	2,2	0,7	0,9

## 6. Predisposition to cooperation and social integration

The interviewees were asked on whether, independently from ideological and political differences, Argentines are prompt to act in a convergent way, prioritizing common objectives. The answers tend to emphasize the existence of a natural predisposition to reach an agreement. This fact confirms the hypothesis, already proposed, on a society united at the base of its perceptions and attitudes towards collective action, even if it is divided at the top level. Different to other the Argentinean perceives itself as a plural and heterogeneous society with regards to general values and visions, even though it is united in its collective basic aspirations and motivations. It is a society with a tendency to unity and convergence at its bottom, where disagreements are generated at the top level, since ideological and political differences inspire conflict and confrontation.

### Q28. Predisposition to cooperation and social integration

**Do you agree with those who say that Argentines, in daily life and independently of the political context, get along well among them?**

**Table 47. Replies Q28. Predisposition to cooperation and social integration.**

	Total (%)	18 - 29 (%)	30 - 49 (%)	50 - 64 (%)	65 + (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Socioeconomic situation (%)		
								High	Medium	Low
								<b>Total</b>	100	100
<b>Highly agree</b>	8,6	12,6	5	7,3	12,4	10,4	7,1	12,3	7,8	8
<b>Agree</b>	62,6	63,5	64,7	61	58,4	59,1	65,4	59	65,1	60,5
<b>Disagree</b>	18,7	16,3	20,3	22,9	12,6	19,1	18,3	17,6	20,6	16,3
<b>Highly disagree</b>	6,1	5,9	6,2	4,3	8,5	5,5	6,5	8,1	3,1	9,6
<b>Doesn't know</b>	2,6	---	2,6	3,2	6,1	3,9	1,5	3,1	2,6	2,4
<b>Didn't reply</b>	1,5	1,7	1,2	1,4	2,2	2	1,2	---	0,8	3,3

Table 47 shows that 62.6% of the population replied that they agreed with those who say that Argentines, in daily life, and independently of the political context, get along well among them. Only 18.7% declared not to agree with this. The rest of the population was almost equally distributed among the other extremes. As it can be seen from the table, there does not seem to be a significant implication towards gender, age, or socioeconomic situation.

## 7. Access to law

Law regulates individuals' rights and obligations. The basic legal principle of presumption of knowing the law, however, cannot be assured in present times. Diversification of the legal system, globalization, and economic resources are some of the conditions that makes knowing all the rules of the game a difficult task. This section addresses the issue of access to law in terms of access to legal needs and information.

### Q29. Access to law

**Generally speaking, do you believe that the laws and legal institutions of this country protect you and guarantee your personal rights and freedoms?**

**Table 48. Q29. Access to law.**


	To a great extent (%)	To some extent (%)	To a little extent (%)	Not at all (%)	Doesn't know (%)	Didn't reply (%)
1. Protect personal civil rights and freedoms	4	44	34,6	12,4	4,9	---
2. Consider basic health, education and labour needs	7,9	38,3	32,6	19,9	0,3	0,9
3. Allow an effective access to defending and guaranteeing personal rights	5,4	39,2	35,2	15,6	3,7	0,9
4. Allow petitioning and presenting demands to the authorities	2,7	45,7	31	15,5	4,2	1
5. Offer equal opportunities for progress	2,9	27,6	40,6	28,4	---	0,5
6. Consider persons like you	4,7	34	35	21,2	4	1,1
7. Protect against discrimination	6,8	45,3	27,7	15	4,3	0,9
8. Respect private property	9,2	45,6	24,5	16,3	3,4	1,1
9. Protect from violence and insecurity	2,1	20,5	42,8	33,2	1,4	---
10. Guarantee gender equality	9,9	44,4	31,6	13	1,1	---
11. Allow access to judges consideration and protection	0,8	27,4	37	20,1	12,7	2

According to the results shown in Table 48, 44% of the population consider that the Argentinean legal system protects to some extent personal rights and freedoms. 38.3% also consider that it considers basic health, education and labour needs to some extent. 39.2% believe that it allows an effective access to defending and guaranteeing personal rights to some extent. 45.7% consider that it allows petitioning and presenting demands to the authorities to some extent. With regards to equal opportunities for progress and consideration for street-level citizens, 40.6% and 35% respectively consider that these are guaranteed to a little extent. 45.3% consider that the legal system protects against discrimination to some extent, which is supported by a 44% who think that it guarantees gender equality to some extent. 45.6% considers that it protects private property to some extent. 42.8% believe that they are protected from violence and insecurity to small extent, and 37% consider that the access to judge's consideration and protection is allowed to a small extent.


With reference to age, it is possible to observe that the age group which tends to feel that laws and legal institutions so not protect or guarantee personal rights and freedoms enough is the one corresponding to 18-29, and the one that seems more satisfied is 30-54 (see Figure 33). With reference to gender, though in general terms, male and female share a similar position, women tend to feel less protected than male (see Figure 34). In relation to socioeconomic situation, though the three different identified levels share a

similar trend, the ones which seem to feel less protected tend to be the individuals belonging to the low level of socioeconomic situation group (see Figure 35).

**Figure 33. Access to law according to age.**




**Figure 34. Access to law according to gender.**





**Figure 35. Access to law according to socioeconomic situation.**



## 2. Trust in the judicial system

The present section presents the results of the “Monitor de Tendencias económicas y sociales, Abril 2011// N° 244. Evaluación social e imagen del poder judicial en la Argentina”, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2011, carried out by OPSM Consultancy in March 2011. The results are used to complement the survey carried out on social capital, law and institutions, which were both carried out in the same period of 2011.

### 1. Confidence on the different aspects of the judicial system

A first series of available data refer to the social evaluation on some structural features of the judicial system. These include the general demands presented by society, with reference to the administration of justice, conflict resolution, and in general, the resolution of disputes among individuals. The administration of justice is, in principle, a third party, whose role is to act as an instance in the conflict resolution and as safeguard of social peace. It is with regards to such functions that interviewees evaluate the extent to which the judicial system presents or not the attributes which is demanded.

#### Q. General assessment of different aspects of the judicial system

How do you assess the following different aspects of the judicial system?  
Grading from 1 (very Negative) to 10 (very positive).

**Table 49. Replies to general assessment of different aspects of the judicial system.**

	Very positive	(8-7)	(6-5)	(4-3)	Very negative	Don't know
<b>Professional background of judges</b>	4,9	23,7	36,7	22,8	6,7	5,3
<b>Effective contribution to the protection of property rights</b>	2,7	20,2	41,3	22,7	8,7	4,4
<b>Respect to law and the Constitution</b>	3,1	17,6	40,6	30,7	6,3	1,8
<b>Procedures for the nomination and promotion of judges</b>	2,2	13,7	32,0	18,7	4,0	24,4
<b>Predisposition to institutional modernization</b>	9,3	34,9	31,2	10,4	2,4	10,7
<b>Sentencing procedures</b>	2,2	15,6	44,0	25,3	4,0	8,9
<b>Level of social representativeness of judges</b>	1,8	13,1	46,2	27,2	7,2	4,4
<b>Autonomy and independence of judges</b>	2,7	16,0	41,3	31,2	5,3	4,4
<b>Professional ethics</b>	0,9	16,0	40,0	28,4	4,0	10,7
<b>General system efficiency</b>	1,8	13,1	47,6	29,6	2,7	5,3

From a first analysis of the data it is possible to infer that the interviewees perceive, in general, that judges have a solid professional background. They perceive judges as committed with the defence of property rights, and, even if a little less, respectful with law and the Constitution. The interviewees, however, do not know, or suspect, the procedures for the nomination and promotion of judges – highly controversial in Argentina.

At the same time, even though they recognize in judges a predisposition for the modernization of the judicial system, they question some aspects of the decision making processes. Such is the case of the excessive relevance that is given to the judicial precedent, which is perceived as something too conservative. In addition, the social representativeness of judges, their independence and autonomy are also under suspicion. The judges' professional ethics has also received a rather low evaluation.

Even though the professional background and predisposition to modernization of the judicial system are highly valued, there are some doubts regarding the general efficacy of the system. It could be concluded, that, generally speaking, this doubt is not due to the level of technical knowledge of the judges.

It is possible to identify a gap between, on one hand, the levels of social trust, and, on the other, the performance of the judicial system. It is the lack of response from the judicial system what generates attitudes of mistrust, which, eventually will lead to a loss of trust, linked to the formation of social capital. This brings about a decline in the levels of social acceptance and commitment, both in interpersonal relations at horizontal level, and in vertical or hierarchical relations – legitimation problems.

## **2. The judicial system and social and economic problems**

The search for explanations on the erosion of trust in the general efficiency of the system is subjected to different methodological approaches. The first one could be the analysis of the social perception on the capacity of the system to administrate some of the core issues of the economic and social crisis.

The following table addresses a description of the results obtained when the interviewees were asked up to what extent the administration of justice contributes to the solution of some of the economic and social problems that affect Argentina.

## Q. The judicial and social and economic problems

How would you assess the functioning of the judicial power in relation to some selected social and economic problems? Grade from 1 (very negative) to 10 (very positive).

**Table 50. Replies to question referring to the judicial and social and economic problems**

	Very positive	(8-7)	(6-5)	(4-3)	Very negative	DK/DA
Effective contribution to economic crisis problem-solving	2,7	18,2	40,9	22,2	6,7	9,3
Effective contribution to the investigation on corruption and administrative fraud	4,0	13,8	29,8	33,8	15,1	3,6
Impartiality in conflictive social interests	2,2	19,6	44,0	22,7	6,2	5,3
Realistic economic approach to the direct consequences of judicial decisions	2,7	18,7	47,1	18,7	2,7	10,2
Awareness of the social and economic consequences of judicial decisions	2,5	19,3	38,7	20,0	6,5	13,0
Social responsiveness	2,2	20,4	36,4	30,2	8,0	2,7
Effective contribution to the defence of the Constitution and individual and social rights	5,3	26,2	34,7	24,9	4,9	4,0

In a general sense, the replies obtained show that the society positions itself in a mid-point between positive and negative perceptions. The levels of replies do not present the minimum levels, but rather middle ones, which show that the interviewees have, in general, a precise idea on the contribution of judges to the resolution of conflicts.

Judges present an image of good level of social sensitiveness and responsiveness, a clear consciousness on the social and economic implications of their decisions, and an attitude of respect towards the Constitution, and in particular, with respect to the safeguard of individual rights. Even though the society positions itself in an intermediate position, with mixed positions, the issue of impartiality is still one of the critical questionings. Independently of the images on the performance of judges, it is key, in this instance, the perception of legal security and predictability of judicial decisions, in a context of unsettling economic emergency.

### 3. General quality performance of the judicial system

The issue of the quality and efficiency of the performance of the judicial power is another key issue of the present research. Table 51 reproduces the general replies to the question on the social perceptions towards the general improvement of the judicial system.

#### Q. Performance of the judicial system regarding some selected issues

Regarding some selected issues, do you think the Argentina judicial system has improved or worsened in the last five years?

Table 51. Replies to the question on the social perceptions towards the general improvement of the judicial system.

	Improved (%)	Worsened (%)	Remains the same (%)	DK/DA (%)
Technical level of judicial decisions	27,6	22,2	44,0	6,2
Autonomy from political power	25,8	27,1	41,8	5,3
Commitment with democratic values and principles	24,9	20,0	49,8	5,3
Professional responsiveness	26,7	20,0	47,6	5,8
General attitude to judiciary modernization and reform	32,0	11,1	49,8	7,1
Relationship with society	29,3	20,4	47,1	3,1
Professional background	32,9	16,6	35,3	15,2
Professional attitude and commitment with law and order	17,3	37,3	42,7	2,7
Ethical background	24,0	20,0	50,7	5,3
Concern towards the social consequences of judicial decisions	21,8	22,7	51,6	4,0

In general, the preferences, attitudes and evaluations of the interviewees remain in a moderate level. In the majority of the issues, the interviewees have noticed that, in the last years, the level of general performance of the system has not changed in a substantial way.

According to the data collected, the evaluation on the technical level of judicial decisions, the commitment with democratic principles and values and the sense of social responsibility have tended to improve. The attitude towards the improvement and general modernization of the judicial system, the ethical education and the levels of technical and professional training and formation of judges has also increased. The consideration towards the social and economic impact of judgments, however, has remained without major variations.

#### **4. Judiciary involvement in political problems**

It is interesting to analyze, in addition, the perceptions and expectations of the Argentinean society on the judicial system, with particular focus on the involvement of the judicial power in issues that, according to the society, belong to the political sphere.

In the case of Argentina, it is necessary to underline, firstly, the already mentioned stepping forward of the judicial power on the so-called “political issues” and the growing “judicialization” of social, economic and cultural problems. Secondly, the increasing involvement of the judicial function in issues which attained, in the past, exclusively to the legislative and administrative functions. Thirdly, the growing tendency of legislative and administrative organs to delegate part of their functions to the jurisdictional organs. Fourthly, the expansion of the possibilities to access justice. Fifthly, the increasing inclusion of justice in the group of social mechanisms, both formal and informal, aiming at controlling the political correction of political and social processes – such as the public debates on corruption and political scandals. Lastly, the expansion of the constitutional control, both in relation to contents, methods and forms on the exercise of rights.

As long as judges have control over the democratic decisions of legitimate public powers, they will concentrate the attention of public opinion, and hence, the demands and pressure on their performance will increase as well. The judicial power is subjected to demands which are not required to other constitutional organs.

#### **Q. Political involvement of judges**

**Do you think that judges are too much involved in political conflicts?**

**Table 52. Replies to question referring to the political involvement of judges.**

	<b>Total (%)</b>
<b>Very involved</b>	36,0
<b>Involved</b>	16,4
<b>Very little involved</b>	27,1
<b>Not involved</b>	14,7
<b>DK/DA</b>	5,8

To the 52,4% of the interviewees, Argentinean judges appear to be involved in politics, even though the expression “very involved” is only shared by a 36%. This proportion should be considered under the light of the fact a 27% considers that judges are, in reality, very little involved, and that a 14,7 denies the fact that they are involved at all. It could be concluded that this issue is widely under debate in the public opinion, without a particular majority position. Even though a majority tends to see as negative the phenomenon of judicial activism, a minority considers that this political intervention is, in fact, a response to the existing institutional gaps, and that judges are contributing with their decisions to social needs that otherwise would not be solved.

### **5. Efficiency of judicial intervention**

The analysed data, so far, gives place to addressing another essential issue on public trust: the evaluation of the capacity of the justice administration system to assure certain objectives or aims proposed by the general principles of the rule of law.

## Q. Efficiency of judicial intervention

Do you think that judicial intervention is really efficient regarding the general goals of the system?

**Table 53. Replies to question referring to the efficiency of the judicial intervention.**

	Yes (%)	No (%)	Doesn't know (%)	Didn't answer (%)
Do you think that judicial processes effectively reach the truth?	65,8	28,4	5,3	0,4
Do you think that judicial processes are really impartial?	41,8	48,0	9,3	0,9
Do you think that the general economic costs of the judicial system are, in general, reasonable?	21,8	49,8	26,7	1,8
Do you think that judicial processes are understandable to the average citizen?	19,6	72,4	7,1	0,9
Do you think the rituals and formalities of judicial processes are understandable to the average citizen?	20,9	69,3	8,4	1,3
Do you think the extent and duration of judicial processes are reasonable?	13,8	80,4	4,9	0,9
Do you think that the economic costs of litigation are affordable to the average citizen?	12,4	74,2	12,9	0,4

The results obtained in the social capital survey have stressed the confidence on the capacity of the justice administration system to assure that judicial processes reach to the truth of the facts under investigation. A 65.8% judges positively the system in this aspect, important for the social legitimation of the system and its procedures. The rest of the analyzed objectives offer, however, a different result. The impartiality of judges remains uncertain: it is affirmed by 41.8% of the interviewees and it is under suspicion of a 48.0%.

The same occurs with the general efficiency of the system. For a 49.8% the economic costs of the judicial system are not reasonable, whereas 21.8% of the interviewees agree with them. This perception can be contemplated together with the fact that a 80.4% believe that the extent and duration of judicial



processes are not reasonable or a 74.2% considers that the economic costs of litigations are not affordable to the average citizen.

Independently from the duration and costs of judicial processes, it is still significant the fact that a 72.4% believe that judicial processes and procedures are not understandable to the average citizen and that for a 69.3% the rituals and formalities of judicial processes are also not understandable to the average citizen.

## **6. Effectiveness of selected judicial reform initiatives**

The research is also complemented with a specific analysis of the perceptions and attitudes of the interviewees, on the level of feasibility and usefulness of a series of initiatives and proposals regarding the modernization of the Argentinean judicial system. It is important to stress that the majority of the reforms analyzed are under discussion in most of the democratic societies. They consist of a group of proposed reforms, that though they are tailored to the Argentina case, they follow international tendencies.

### **Q. Effectiveness of some selected judicial reform initiatives**

**There is a debate on some initiatives for judicial reform.**

**Do you think these could be really effective regarding the proposed goals of the reform?**

**Grade from 1 (very ineffective) to 10 (very effective).**

**Table 54. Replies to question referring to the effectiveness of some selected judicial reform initiatives.**

	Level of effectiveness					
	(%)					
	1-2	3-4	5-6	7-8	9-10	DK/DA
Aggravation and more severe sanctions and penalties	6,2	3,1	12,9	27,6	47,6	2,6
Strengthening the Rule of Law and division of powers	4,4	2,7	11,6	31,6	44,0	5,8
Information and education public campaigns	2,7	3,6	4,4	24,4	62,7	2,2
Transparency and public control on political finances	6,2	4,9	8,9	17,3	58,2	4,4
Independence and autonomy of judicial power	3,1	1,3	9,3	19,1	61,3	5,8
Strengthening of Media	3,6	2,2	12,4	28,9	50,7	2,2
Reduction in the age of penal responsibility	18,2	2,7	10,7	11,6	52,9	4,0
Deregulation	13,8	4,4	12,4	26,2	30,2	12,8
Strengthening of police force	4,4	3,6	11,1	16,0	61,3	3,5
Control of public corruption	2,7	2,2	6,2	8,9	77,3	2,6
Improving general economic situation	5,3	0,4	4,9	13,8	73,3	2,2
Improving and facilitating access to Justice	2,2	0,6	4,3	17,3	73,3	2,2
Improving professional backgrounds of judges	3,1	1,9	6,2	20,4	63,9	4,4
Improving professional backgrounds of lawyers	3,1	1,0	6,7	21,3	63,9	4,0
General reform and modernization of judicial power	2,2	1,8	5,8	26,7	54,2	9,4
Improving selection and nomination of judges	1,8	1,3	4,0	20,9	64,9	7,1
Improving the quality of legislation	4,4	0,9	6,2	20,9	63,6	4,0
Improving the quality of judicial decisions	2,2	0,9	7,1	21,8	61,8	6,2
Access and simplicity of judicial procedures	1,8	1,8	5,8	20,4	60,9	9,3
Aggravating sanctions	7,6	1,8	8,0	16,9	59,1	6,7
Building more jails	12,9	3,6	14,7	16,9	45,8	6,2

The results obtained by the research show, in general, high levels of agreement on the feasibility and usefulness of the majority of the reforms proposed. In particular, the increase on the levels of information, education and communication of the functioning of the system has received wide adhesion. Interviewees have, in general, stressed the importance of a proper level of public information on the reforms which tend to modernize institutions, especially those inherent to the judicial system.

Even the initiatives towards the improvement of the social and economic framework of the system have obtained social adhesion, in the sense that part of the problem is the deterioration of the material conditions that build the context, the improvement of the processes for the nomination and promotion of judges, and the improvement of legislation and of the quality levels of judicial decisions. Quicker and more efficient access to justice are the initiatives supported the most.

The reforms referring to the strengthening of the rule of law and assurance of the division of powers received even support. The structural institutional quality generates, for the interviewees, a favourable ground for partial reforms, all of them convergent to the common objective of improving and modernizing the justice administration system.

### **3. Preliminary conclusions**

The analysis of the perceptions of society on the structure and dynamics of the process of justice administration and of the performance of institutions in charge of its management, reveal the level of deterioration of the system and of its main actors.

Among the possible causes for this deterioration it is worth mentioning the type of protagonism that judges have been acquiring on the political management of emergency, and the role that these, and other fundamental institutions, have found themselves occupying. From the surveys previously analyzed it is possible to infer the following:

1. In the Argentinean case, justice has been key in the mobilization and affirmation of participative democracy process. During the first thirty years of democratic transition, since 1983 until today, social and cultural transformations and political events have situated justice in the centre of popular criticism. The trust in justice has always been a determinant factor of levels of trust and social capital of the political system as a whole.

2. In current times, the normalization of the most critical aspects of this process has not diminished the importance and protagonism of the judicial power. To the contrary, the issue of the performance and quality of justice continues to be on top of the public agenda, in a society still reactive to the

implementation of democratic solutions to problems that consider essential for the consolidation of the democratic system. All of these refer, immediately, to the role of justice in the certification of social relationships and in the generation of safeguards for predictability and security for the future.

3. Within this new framework, the crisis of trust in justice reflects the impact of the changes in the political culture. The emergency of a new political culture, more personalized and des-institutionalized, has deteriorated the trust in the capacity of the judicial institutions to achieve its basic functions. The political manipulation of the judicial nominations, the subjection of the selection process to public scrutiny with a strong role of the media, the abuse of political indictment, and the pretension of cooptation of new members appear to be the predominant strategies.

4. The entertainment dimension that some areas of the judicial activity have acquired has stained the public image of judicial power. Electoral changes determine fundamental changes in the structures of the judicial power, since each new government has destabilized the inherited Supreme Court, introducing, every new time, changes in the composition of the Tribunal. Even though, lately, these changes have meant an improvement for the Court, the political pressure has not been diminished. This effect is transmitted to the rest of the system, particularly in the mechanisms of selection and nomination of new members. Hence, the tendency towards short term attitudes by some members of the judiciary, highly dependent on the electoral approaches and cycles.

5. Within this framework, what society perceives as the judicial “service”, is, mainly, the performance of tribunals, but also, legal professions, security forces, notaries, penitentiary institutions, institutions for the education and research of law, and, in addition, the different administrative and governmental instances and agencies that facilitate access to law and justice. All of these contribute to the safeguard of the well-functioning of the system and, hence, the building of trust.

6. The general vision of society on these actors and institutions is rather moderate. It rejects extremes. It recognizes a certain level of technical preparation of judges, the close-to-reality dimension of their decisions, and the level of commitment with their duty and with the values of the system. It distrusts, however, their lack of independency and autonomy, their political activism in filling the gaps of the crisis of representativeness and participation of the political system. Society is aware of the fact that the cost for political participation and commitment is high, though it recognizes that political objectives, otherwise, conspire against their independency and autonomy.

7. The role of the judicial system is key for understanding the genesis, development and solutions of the main problems of society. Urban security, jobs, legal security, corruption, institutional crisis, transaction costs, the restructuration of the international positioning of the country, the reconstruction of public credit

and the reactivation of economy have in the judicial system a starting and final point, an instrument, a procedure, an active and a passive subject, a problem, and a solution.

8. As long as administering justice depends, in all its levels, on the quality of the judges and of the justice administration personnel, the judicial independency becomes an essential imperative for society. The judicial independence supposes judges free from any political influence. The safeguards of this independency are given by the systems of nomination, promotion, qualification, removal, conditions and forms of work organizations, remuneration, incentives, and training and professional training. The availability of resources, both material and human and in infrastructure, play a key role in the definition of the effective conditions of personal independency of the judges. The perception of an existing gap between the ideals and the realities is at the base of the feelings of suspicion, the expectations and demands showed by the data collected in the present research.

9. The basic problem for the building of social capital and trust in the judicial system lies on the perception that the judicial system is reactive and defensive, without a clear strategic projection in the mid and long term. Hence, the demand for policies that contribute to the objectives of a reform. This is a problem not only suffered by the judicial power, but also by the other branches of the State, as it has been described in chapter 2. The reason is clear: every society – and the Argentinean is no exception- requires from its institutions a strategic approach. When a government – or institution, such as the judicial power-, gives to the society a sense that it is moving according to a mission, vision, a set of objectives and goals, a responsible administration of resources and objective mechanisms of results evaluation, it generally enjoys the support of the efforts, even when the results and concrete benefits are not seen in the short term. Contrarily, if an institution does not manage to project a strategic image, even the best results will be lost in the scepticism of cautious and reactive society.

10. Current transformations have imposed a radical modification, maybe irreversible, of this initial perspective, as a result of the social demand for a public judicial power, which should be active, responsible, promoter of values and constructor of citizenship. Nowadays, in Argentina, as in any other consolidated democracy, judges are demanded capacity and efficiency. At the same time, justice is demanded a critical function, and control, without limitations.

11. In the current idealization mechanism of the Argentinean society, justice is situated over any other power. Politics are judicialized, and justice is politized. Judges monopolize the original interpretation of the Constitutions, and, from this perspective, they are socially responsible for the critical control of legislation, the government and the administration. The exercise of this pretension is done even though there is deep criticism from the political sphere and public opinion. Justice assumes, hence, legislative and governmental

functions over the rest of the political, economic and social powers. In this sense, it assumes the costs of its social protagonism.

## FINAL CONCLUSIONS

The precedents chapters and sections have attempted to contribute to the efforts already carried out for understanding, on one hand, the existing relations among the different factors which generate trust in law and on the other, the dynamics of the strengthening and decline of trust in social, economic institutions. To this end, the present work proposed analyzing the issue of trust in legal institutions from the perspective of the social capital theory.

Ever since its rediscovery in the last years –thanks to the joint efforts of social scientists and institutional economists–, the notion of social capital has become a key concept in the evolution of the relationship between social sciences and economy. Nevertheless, there had been little interest, and almost no treatment, from the perspective of socio-legal research. In recent years, a vast literature has proposed a broader agenda of analysis, the potentialities of which have been intended to be explored in the present research.

The starting point for an analysis of the relationships between law, trust and social capital is a basic fact: the decline of general levels of social trust in institutions. Independently from traditions, political situations, geographic differences and economic and social contexts, indicators of trust are fluctuating in a declining sense. Even if it is possible to affirm that the democratic project remains unrivalled, many of the regimes that used to proclaim it have been generating criticism, which has become more frequent every day. The erosion of social trust in political leaders and in institutions is the biggest problem of modern times. Hence, this issue has become one of the most studied by contemporary social sciences<sup>602</sup>.

The adopted approach implies an analysis at two different levels: the macro and micro levels. The macro level comprises the institutional context in which social relationships are embedded –the type of government, the legal system, the participation in organizations and political processes. The micro level comprises, one hand, cognitive concepts such as behaviours, attitudes, norms of trust, solidarity and reciprocity, and on the other, structural concepts such as horizontal and vertical organizations and working networks and collective action. All of these concepts are in continuous interaction, creating both vicious and virtuous cycles, depending on the context and its further development.

With the aim of evaluating the value and potentialities of this approach, an empirical research on the spheres of trust in legal institutions was carried out in Argentina. To this end, innovative methodological approaches from both social sciences and specific investigations on social capital were considered. These

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<sup>602</sup> Rosanvallon, P., *La Contrademocracia. La política en la era de la desconfianza*, Manantial, Buenos Aires, 2007, p. 21.

tools had already been implemented mainly by multilateral organisms in their contribution to the study of non-economic conditions of social development. The research, which was developed on the particular case of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, Argentina, has allowed the exploration of the instrumental capacities of some of the methodological models, and at the same time, collect data in order to provide possible answers to some of the basic questions posed in different fields of sociology of law and institutions.

The obtained results showed that individuals would like to trust legal institutions. However, the institutional effective performance and the consequences in the economic and social spheres advise the citizenship not to do so. The reciprocity, trust and expectations have been deceived. Contexts which suffer political instability and economic uncertainty are prompt to generate a culture of suspicion. Citizens adopt attitudes of suspicion and defensiveness; they postpone commitment and suspect the advantages of cooperation. In a political and legal culture such as the one of Argentina –not much different to other consolidated democracies of the world-, individuals tend to compete in those things in which they should be cooperating, and tend to cooperate in things in which would not be beneficial to society. The result is a society of mistrust, with low levels of social capital and barriers to development and innovation processes.

As it has been exposed in the previous pages, the global crisis has triggered a series of new demands and questionings, which have affected the different spheres of life: personal, community, national and international ones.

In the last decades, different streams of research have emphasized the importance of processes for generating and strengthening trust as the fundamental basis for an harmonious institutional growth, able to sustain development processes, the consolidation of political democracy and economic development.

Already in the mid 70's, social sciences had tried to renew its classical questions over legitimation processes and late capitalism. Transitional processes in southern Europe and the so called crisis of advanced democracy motivated the recovery of old interrogatives on the institutional factors taking part of the processes of legitimation and social governance. Non-governmental organizations, think tanks and research programmes all over the world have since raised their concerns on the decline of prestige of central government institutions, particularly democratic ones<sup>603</sup>. Throughout these last decades, several events had put in evidence that the relationship between individuals and certain established structures has been deteriorated and, even in some cases, broken in its essence, producing radical effects. Institutions, both formal and informal, that once provided security and a stable framework are being questioned in their effectiveness and even legitimacy. It is possible to mention, in the last century, the fall of the Soviet regime,

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<sup>603</sup> Crozier, Michel, Huntington, Samuel, Watanuki, Joji, "The crisis of democracy. Report on the governability of democracies to the Trilateral Commission", Trilateral Commission, New York University Press, New York, 1975.



the East European authoritarian regimes changes toward open democracies and the Third Wave of worldwide democratization process. More recently, the overthrow of long term dictatorships, such as the ones that gave raised to what has been called the “Arabic spring”.

The world has changed, has evolved, and so has the population. With the globalization process, individuals have had more access to information, to interaction, and to critical thinking. The empowerment of citizenship has allowed individuals to become strong enough to go out into the streets and present new claims and demands and seek responses to the actual needs. Particular importance in these processes has had the strengthening and empowerment of the civil society, through both naturally and more structured associations. It is possible to identify a generalized sense of disbelief or disappointment in some of the institutions which once represented a point of reference.

In addition, the increasing development of communication and information technologies has revolutionized the social arena. The use of internet, the instant access to information from all over the world, the connection and communication through the new channels proposed by the new social networks has accelerated processes. In addition, if positively exploited, these mechanisms provide a window for shortening the distances between the citizenship and institutions. Access to policy makers and institutions is easier now than some decades ago. This gives space for new mechanisms of participation, constituting a better citizenship and providing a closer control.

These circumstances have caught the interest and attention of policy makers, scholars and researchers from the most varied disciplines. Economists, political scientists, psychologists, and sociologists have tried to understand these phenomena by providing approaches from their own perspective.

In this context, the social capital theory and research methodology appears as an innovative approach to the understanding of this crisis. Reciprocity and trust relationships are a main factor for effective democracy. The levels of social capital in a given society acquire a particular role; and it is possible to affirm that this factor might also help in determining the performance of public institutions.

The present work has addressed, in particular, the issue of trust and legal institutions. The described crisis has also affected the relations of trust in legal systems and related legal institutions. As it could be seen in the survey carried out, there is much to analyze with respect to the perception and expectations on the others, and on the legal system.

In addition, the deterioration of confidence and positive expectations on the legal and judicial system has put legal processes in the centre of the public debate. In a context of crisis and decline of the Nation-State, there is an adjacent crisis on its basic elements: the legislation, the central administration and the justice administration. The questioning goes beyond national boundaries or political systems and even reaches the basic principles of the traditional idea of the rule of law. In contexts of political and global

economy emergency, modern law, essential factor for the certification of social relationships and the administration of the social complexity, becomes a factor of uncertainty and risk. This encompasses a debate on the new features that characterize the relationships among the individual, local, national and international level.

The present research has showed that public institutions present difficulties in responding to the demands from the population. There is an overload of social expectations and demands that defies and goes beyond the capacities of traditional institutions. There has been a breaking point that needs to be re-established and transformed in accordance to the new circumstances, based on concepts such as trust, social network, social cohesion and enhanced social capital.

The traditional perspective of orthodox economists was based on a basic assumption: the existence of an underlying legal and institutional infrastructure capable of guaranteeing a function of neutral arbitration. In a context of financial global crisis, this presupposition, however, has showed to be inexact, or at least, is not considered to be certain or sufficient any more. Evidence, made available by researches, such as the one carried out for the present PhD thesis, indicate that law and legal institutions are also under the spotlight. There is a need for a process of social re-legitimation. Data shows distrust and loss of authority power by institutions. Law is perceived as partial, inevitable affected, distorted and biased by power and vested interests.

Societies are a dynamic reality, which encompass dynamic process in its shaping processes. Public trust fluctuates in cycles of highs and lows. In this sense, building trust requires institutional facilitation and, vice versa, in its turn, trust facilitates institutional development. In addition, a trustful society fosters openness and confidence on the fact that accepting and adapting themselves to laws, norms and values; these are worth it, and do have value.

Promoting a culture of trust strengthens the ties between individuals and the rest of the community which could be at the local, national, or international sphere. In addition, it contributes to making stronger feelings of belonging, and fosters stronger bonds that could lead to collective cooperation, reciprocity, solidarity and even unselfish help.

On the other hand, not intervening in these conflicts would only allow the crisis to continue with its deteriorating force, leading to more atomization, fragmentation and breakdown of ties and interpersonal networks. This scenario would only call for a mobilization of defensive and hostile attitudes, in which the other is seeing as a potential competitor.

Re-establishing the trust in those institutions which generate and administrate the rules of the game in a society will, gradually, facilitate the ground for meeting the desired levels of trust -which will not only

benefit the individual, but the wider society. A feeling of order and security will only foster cooperation and a culture based on trust.

Re-establishing trust in legal institutions, however, is not an easy task. It represents only part of a more general and broader process which involves social structures, all sort of public institutions, normative systems, and clear and transparent national and international frameworks. In this sense, this process will always involve human beings, responding to demands, opportunities, whilst seeking collective action and cooperation with the available resources. It is also a complex process since, though it involves individuals, it is developed within a set of both formal and informal institutions and structures, old and news, whose features should be meant to last in the long term or at least set the foundations or conditions for the future envisaged or expected scenarios. To undertake this venture it is necessary to deploy trust in all its forms, placing trust, entrusting and evoking trust.

As previously stated, this promotion of generalized trust must be facilitated, fostered and accompanied by an appropriate, effective and efficient institutional framework. It is possible to identify some issues to be considered<sup>604</sup>:

- Normative coherence: A solid normative structure fosters norm compliance. Normative coherence makes social life more predictable, ordered and secure, raising the likelihood of expectations being met.
- Social stability: long lasting and persistent social networks, associations, institutions, organizations and systems provide reference to the individuals, in addition to a feeling of belonging and security. This stability will be the factor that, with time, will be building what could be called “tradition” in a given society, which in its turn, guides trust in the possible behaviours to expect.
- Transparency and accountability: availability of information, both with reference to the positive and negative outcomes, the rules of the game, and other formal and informal set of norms and structures, contribute to strengthen the feeling of belonging, security and predictability. In addition, access to information also helps in creating a sense of familiarity with the environment, which facilitates the possibility to create expectations according to the circumstances. Moreover, the existence of a set of standards and effective controls diminishes the possibility of abuses. The regularity and responsibility for procedures adds more legitimation to proposed system and insurance in the eventual breach of trust.

Law is, and will certainly be, under new and diverse forms, the basic tool capable of providing the coherent framework for trust to be promoted, fostered and maintain. Efforts should be made to reinforce

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<sup>604</sup> Cfr. Sztompka, P. *Trust. A Sociological Theory*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p 122-ss.

the legal system and related institutions, so that these could perform in their full expected functions. Consistency should allow a non contradictory, transparent, accessible, simple and concrete legal system. In this context, it is important to stress that, in particular, legislation, requires a solid framework that is not feasible of opportunistic changes and ad hoc adjustments. This should be supported by a transparent and concrete political strategy, in which the normative measures follow a clear and accepted blueprint. Policies should also follow the same path, in consistency and control.

To strengthen the transparency in society, governmental actions need to be as open and public as possible. In this sense, the institutions from society also assume an important role. Independent and pluralistic channels of communication and media, public opinion and statistics institutions need to be developed to accompany this process.

Contemporary society has been characterized as the society of mistrust. It is a society in which the real democracy suffers a breaking off of the basis that the democratic project promised: legitimation and trust. Trust is an invisible factor, intangible, of difficult access by social sciences traditional tools. However, restoring and addressing trust has become an essential duty. The importance of trust lies on the fact that it provides a broader quality of legitimation. Trust complements and enriches the procedural nature of democratic methods with a moral dimension due to the values and principles that it evokes and the reference to the common good. In addition trust adds a temporal dimension to broadened legitimation. It provides a continuity dimension towards the past, through the transmission of traditions, practices and institutionalized habits, and towards the future, stressing the possibility to foresee actions and the idea that processes tend to be consolidated and crystallized in established practices. Trust contributes to in a certain way assure and certify the future. Moreover, trust operates as an institutional economizer. It allows societies to optimize its resources. Trust assumes the factors that presuppose democracy. It minimizes mistrust and fears. It allows the development of perceptions and feelings of cooperation in opposition to the feelings of precaution, suspicion generated by the development of the system.

Trust is crucial to shorten the existing distance between the citizen and public institutions. Citizens should be able to feel part of the system which they contribute to build with their vote, the payment of their taxes, and the compliance with its regulations. And, on the other side, it should be reinforced by the idea, from the civil servants side, that they operate as “access points”<sup>605</sup> of the citizens to the systems, placing in them the responsibility of contributing to the process.

Enhancing accountability, also requires reinforcing and consolidating democratic institutions<sup>606</sup>. There is an intimate link between democracy and accountability. Public institutions are accountable through

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<sup>605</sup> Cfr. Giddens, Anthony, *The consequences of Modernity*, Standford University Press, CA, 1990.

<sup>606</sup> Sztompka, P. *Trust. A Sociological Theory*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p.136.

elections, the division of powers, mutual check and balances, constitutionalism and rule of law. An essential role is played by the judicial system, through the reviews of legislation in the concrete case, independency of the judges, and efficient law enforcement organizations, with no space for opportunism or arbitrariness.

None of the described factors, however, is possible without a planned and sound strategy on civic education. Seeds grow in fertile soil. The process of building trust requires a special consideration and preparation of the different stakeholders involved, from the citizenship, to street level bureaucrats, to policy makers and politicians at the local, national and international level. In addition, a conscious civic education should follow throughout the different stages of the individual life, through school, civil society and access to information and independent means of communication. Though complying with law entails trust, law is not entirely based on trust. It is based on rational expectations which aim to be internalized by the citizens during the different stages of their lives throughout different mechanisms, formal and informal.

As expressed before, law plays an essential role in the process of re-establishing trust in the society. However, law itself should also revisit its functions. Part of the crisis described in the precedent section is due to the lack of adequate, efficient and effective responses to the demands posed by modern society. In this sense, the rule of law calls for a new reinforcement, based on the values, demands and prerogatives of modern world. Law needs to be adapted to the new realities it is facing. Division of powers two centuries ago meant a reality very different to the one to be faced today. Democracy in the eighteenth century, democracy in transition, and modern democracy speak, also, of different realities. All the institutions which conform and shape the legal system and whose well functioning promote the rule of law require a successful adaptation to modern times. They will help in establishing certainty, transparency, stability, accountability, enforcement of duties and responsibilities, respect for rights and freedoms, whilst re-establishing the broken bonds and relationships among individuals, and between individuals and institutions. The challenge of democratic institutions is to evolve in order to enhance its better performance.

However, mistrust and animosity, though they can be managed through a proper institutional design, are difficult to be totally eradicated. Nevertheless, a society capable of canalizing internal hates in public institutions will be more cohesive in cases of need. In addition, law talks about punishment. It carries the inherent consideration of the scenario of someone not fulfilling its obligations. Even if law has this authority prerogative, without law, there is no place for trust. There is no natural predisposition to believe in the others without at least a minimum fear of being potentially deceived. A shared feeling of individuals wanting to be part of the same normative community strengthens the rule of law. The quality of

democratic legal institutions requires also a broader conception of the political involvement and participation.

The trust obtained when acting by virtue of shared values, transcends any normative context. In order to make law compliance not a duty imposed by the community, it is important that the subjects of law are involved in the creation process. The interests of both parts, the system and the individuals, should be contemplated and compromised.

The way out to this crisis of trust, is paradoxically, trusting. When the hope on expectations is deteriorated, trying, even if it means getting minimum results, makes it at least worth it. There will be a moment in which a leap of faith, a leap on trust, will be the only solution possible. Even if weak at the beginning, recovering, re-establishing and strengthening the deteriorated bonds, within a rejuvenated institutional framework, will allow afterwards collective action. And it is in this scenario in which the theory of social capital comes as an innovative approach, by stressing the importance and real value that a society has in terms of its networks of reciprocity, solidarity, trust and shared values and norms.

Once the respect and the rule of law has been strengthened, or at least is in the process of achieving consistency, it becomes the foundation for the social organization and its stability. Once this social organization has become stable, the effects will rebound in other extra legal system, such as traditions, norms and values.

Values, norms, attitudes and beliefs, which qualify as social capital, can be built over time, but they can be diminished by the same process. The articulation of these elements does not entail many costs. However, maintaining them might. Accumulation of social capital requires a conscious and committed investment from the society and from the institutional framework in which the former is placed. Principles such as reciprocity, solidarity, respect, trust and honesty will have little support and effect unless there is some confidence that the others will also uphold them. Without accepted and agreed on roles, rules of the games, decision-making and collective action becomes difficult. Facilitating and fostering communication among people, and among people and institutions, as well as mediating and resolving conflicts among these is likewise needed for getting and keeping the different stakeholders together to accomplish things that go beyond their individual capacity. Establishing this setting is the first step towards creating structural social capital. Increasing and maintaining the framework is what makes it fruitful and productive. Networks among the different stakeholders represent the patterns of communication and cooperation that would lead them to the shared objectives, reducing transaction costs and making collective action more feasible and profitable.

Legal institutions are only part of a universe which constitutes the institutional framework of a given community. Laws can be devised in a perfect way; however it is the manner in which its organizations

apply them what makes the difference. The certainty which is expected to be given by the legal system does not concern only individuals' behaviour. It also concerns the way in which it is expected the State to behave. Otherwise, common citizens and the private sector will find themselves in the need of adopting costly measures to protect themselves from this uncertainty –for instance, hiding wealth, capital flight, or even surpassing legal barriers with illegal actions.

The reconstruction of trust is a strategic task. It supposes shared goals and shared vision of what it wants to be achieved. It presupposes policies, objectives, rules and procedures, criteria and standards, all of these updated to the actual needs of current times. The risk society, however, presents a society which has lost its optimism towards the future. It is in this context that the concept of social capital acquires all of its importance.

This is precisely the role of social capital and its core factor: social trust. This entails bonding and bridging social capital and trust and interpersonal confidence which establish links and resources for mutual assistance and cooperation. Furthermore, it establishes mutual understanding which will build bridges along old division lines and social borders.

Social trust is the kind of concept which individuals believe to understand until they are requested for a definition. Thus, it is not surprising to find that definitions are multiple and contradictory. Nevertheless, for the purpose of the argument of the present research, social trust will be defined more broadly, in a sense of shared moral community, both political and social. Trust can be considered when there is agreement on the values a society ought to pursue. Trust has a social morality dimension, within a certain culture. It is evident that in contemporary societies some people trust the others but do not trust the government or political elites or ruling classes. The basis of social and political trust is different, although the societies with strong levels of social or interpersonal trust tend to exhibit good levels of political trust. This aspect depends on another factor: institutions.

Institutions are extensions of trust. They consist of social mechanisms that facilitate coordination and cooperation among groups and individuals, even at an intergenerational scale. Institutions cultivate, preserve and reproduce trust. Cooperation is more and more complex and trust manages and reduces complexity, providing individuals a sense of security. In a tough and complex world, institutions allow individuals the possibility of taking for granted some basic values and visions that individuals sometimes do not really share. Unity is possible despite diversity and heterogeneity.

Being human moral creations, institutions can be considered an artificial extension of trust. Institutions expand the possibilities of interaction and cooperation. Institutions reduce contingency and risks. They make the social bond more efficient. They make individuals more free and equal under the law.

Throughout the present research and conclusions much reference has been made to the operative definition proposed by R.D. Putnam. This definition refers to the value of connections among individuals –social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. The research has been based on a simple working definition, instrumentally useful for the purpose of the research: *we understand social capital as the networks, norms and values, which enable people to act collectively in order to produce a positive externality for them or their community.* This operative definition underlines some basic features of the phenomenon of social capital: levels of participation, collective action, trust and solidarity.

Along tradition, from Aristotle to Tocqueville and the founding fathers of modern social thinking it has been concluded that the level of social development of a given society depends on the levels of social capital. This means that social\_networks have value.

Just as a screwdriver (physical capital) or a college education (human capital) can increase individual and collective productivity, the level and quality of trust and interpersonal networks – that is, social capital- decisively conditions the productivity of individuals, groups, regions and nations. Social capital refers to essential vital connections among individuals. It is the basic cement of social networks and the values, norms and habits of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.

In addition, the ethic of social capital is the ethic of republican civic virtue. Civic virtues are the permanent and constant will of individuals to participate and interact, under the assumption that the common good is the best of individual and particular goods.

Trust is based, precisely, on those shared common experiences and convictions. Trust is more consistent, deep and powerful when embedded in a dense network of reciprocal social relations. Societies based on a generalized sense of reciprocity are much more efficient than distrustful societies. Trust and trustworthiness lubricate social life and expand the advantages of generalized reciprocity.

Institutional trust is the degree to which people perceive that political institutions are producing outcomes consistent with their expectations. This could be the reason why people tend to trust more local institutions and leaders than those at the national level. Their experience has showed that local leaders and civil servants are more responsive, active and engaged than those who rule at more general and abstract levels of the governmental process. There is a stronger relationship between perceptions and images and expectations about institutions and social predisposition to cooperation.

However, it is suggested that special attention should be paid to distinguishing good from bad social capital. We are living a rebirth of some pre-democratic forms of political loyalty. As a result of the crisis of political identities and the failure of the representative function of political parties, democracy has become more direct and plesbiscitarian. My sense is that within this new framework cooperation acquires a



pragmatical sense more close to parochial loyalties and interpersonal clientelism than the old political loyalties more or less mediated by the filters of political ideas, programs and agreements.

Despite the fact that networks and the associated norms of reciprocity are generally good for those inside the network, it is quite possible that external effects of social capital are not necessarily positive. Mafia or Ku Klux Klan are perfect examples of high levels of internal trust and reciprocity with perverse effects over the social environment. Like any other form of capital, social capital can orientate, voluntarily or not, towards antisocial and egoistic purposes. Some recent trends in the phenomenon of unions, political parties and even entrepreneurial associations, some corporatist attitudes of judges and professional organizations, provide the idea that the egoistic logic of sectorial pressures predominates in the generation of new kinds of social conflict, that go beyond the up to the moment known role of social organizations in the process of consolidation of social equilibrium and harmonious social cooperation.

The Argentina case demonstrates that some forms of social capital are, by choice or necessity, inward looking and tend to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups. Some European social reactions to economic crisis can be understood in the same sense.

Some clear examples of bonding social capital include ethnic fraternal organizations, church-based groups, and neighbourhood groups. Other networks are outward looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages. Examples of bridging social capital include the civil rights movement, many youth service groups, and ecumenical religious organizations. Bonding social capital is good for stimulating specific reciprocity and mobilizing solidarity.

Dense networks in ethnic enclaves, for example, provide crucial social and psychological support for less fortunate members of the community, whilst furnishing start-up financing, markets, and reliable labour for local entrepreneurs. Bridging networks, by contrast, are better for the linkage with external assets and for information diffusion. Moreover, bridging social capital can generate broader identities and reciprocity, whereas bonding social capital bolsters our narrower selves. Bonding social capital, by creating strong in-group loyalty, may also create strong out-group antagonism, and for that reason we might expect negative external effects to be more common with this form of social capital.

Nevertheless, under many circumstances both bridging and bonding social capital can have both powerfully positive social effects and negative trends towards a permanent social conflict, based on mistrust, fear and hostility. The quality of democracy depends on its strength to combine these effects in a fruitful way. That means to solve the essential tension between these two kinds of civic virtue.

The research carried out in Argentina has provided the base for mixed feelings and perceptions. It is very difficult to sustain a one-sided explanation and a final balance. If I had to select a standing point for an agenda for the future I would certainly stress the absolute priority of re-establishing the trust

institutions. Institutions are the only safeguard of social trust. Trust is not possible without the support of strong and vital institutions.

This is also the reason why the issue of good governance under the rule of law comes as top priority in public agendas. The concept of good governance is broadening every time more and entails a recovery of the original sense of republican virtues. Good governance means an order based on a participatory and sustainable, legitimate, tolerant and transparent political rule. Good governance refers to a political order seriously engaged in the promotion of equity and equality, able to develop its resources of social capital.

At the same time, good governance depends more on the quality of the rule of law, the accountability and efficiency of public institutions than on presupposed virtues or a spontaneous civil society. We are living a demand-side social revolution. We have to fill a substantial gap between the quality and quantity of social demands and the quality and quantity of the real capacity of our institutions.

The problem of social trust becomes crucial. There is a need for understanding the significance of the moral and cultural basis of the traditional points of view received from the sociological tradition, from new perspectives. Thus, in this sense, the social capital theory comes in stage as one useful and very valuable scientific perspective.

## ANNEX I: Questionnaire

## CUESTIONARIO SOBRE CAPITAL SOCIAL, INSTITUCIONES Y DERECHO

ESTUDIO <b>944</b>	PUNTO MUESTRA .....4-5	CUESTIONARIO .....6-8
NOMBRE DEL ENCUESTADO.....		
CALLE	.....Nº.....PISO.....DPTO.....	TEL.....
ENCUESTADOR		FECHA
SUPERVISOR		HORA

PERTENEZCO A LA CONSULTORA OPSM, QUE HACE UNA ENCUESTA PARA LA UNIVERSIDAD DE BUENOS AIRES. SE TRATA DE SABER CUÁL ES LA PERCEPCIÓN Y LAS OPINIONES QUE LOS ARGENTINOS TENEMOS HOY ACERCA DEL FUNCIONAMIENTO DE ALGUNAS INSTITUCIONES, PARTICULARMENTE DEL DERECHO Y DE LA JUSTICIA Y DE LA RELACIÓN DE ESAS INSTITUCIONES CON LA SITUACIÓN SOCIAL GENERAL DE NUESTRO PAÍS.

**1.- EN GENERAL, ¿CUÁL ES SU OPINIÓN SOBRE CÓMO MARCHAN HOY EN GENERAL LAS COSAS EN NUESTRO PAIS, EN TÉRMINOS DE MUY BIEN, BIEN, NI BIEN NI MAL, MAL O MUY MAL. ¿Y AQUÍ EN ESTA CIUDAD DE BUENOS AIRES?**

	MUY BIEN	BIEN	NI BIEN NI MAL	MAL	MUY MAL	NS/NC	
PAÍS	1	2	3	4	5	6	10
CIUDAD	1	2	3	4	5	6	11

**2.- TAMBIÉN MUY EN GENERAL, ¿LE PARECE QUE LAS COSAS VAN A MEJORAR, SEGUIRÁN IGUAL O EMPEORARÁN EN LOS PRÓXIMOS AÑOS?**

	MEJORARÁN	SEGUIRÁN IGUAL	EMPEORARÁN	NS/NC	
PAÍS	1	2	3	4	12
CIUDAD	1	2	3	4	13

### COHESIÓN SOCIAL

**3.- NOS INTERESA AHORA SABER SI USTED, EN LO PERSONAL, SE SIENTE PARTE E INTEGRADO CON ALGUNOS ÁMBITOS DE LA VIDA COMUNITARIA. POR FAVOR, INDIQUE EN QUÉ MEDIDA SE SIENTE UD. IDENTIFICADO CON CADA UNO DE LOS ÁMBITOS DE LA VIDA SOCIAL QUE LE VOY A MENCIONAR.**

	MUCHO	ALGO	POCO	NADA	NS	NC	
LA SOCIEDAD EN QUE VIVE	1	2	3	4	8	9	14
SU BARRIO DE ORIGEN	1	2	3	4	8	9	15
LA COLECTIVIDAD DE ORIGEN DE SU FAMILIA	1	2	3	4	8	9	16
EL PAÍS DE ORIGEN DE SU FAMILIA	1	2	3	4	8	9	17
SU BARRIO ACTUAL	1	2	3	4	8	9	18
EL CÍRCULO DE AMIGOS DE SU INFANCIA	1	2	3	4	8	9	19
SUS COMPAÑEROS DE COLEGIO	1	2	3	4	8	9	20
SUS COMPAÑEROS DE TRABAJO	1	2	3	4	8	9	21

**4.- ¿CREE UD. QUE LOS ARGENTINOS EN GENERAL SOMOS UNA SOCIEDAD EN LA QUE SE COMPARTEN ALGUNOS VALORES O PRINCIPIOS ÉTICOS, CULTURALES FUNDAMENTALES, O NO?**

SI COMPARTIMOS	NO COMPARTIMOS	NS	NC	
1	2	3	4	22

### CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES

**5.- LE PEDIRÉ AHORA QUE ME DIGA QUÉ GRADO DE CONFIANZA TIENE UD. EN ALGUNAS INSTITUCIONES QUE YO LE VOY A MENCIONAR, DESDE EL PUNTO DE VISTA DE SU CAPACIDAD DE HACERSE CARGO Y RESOLVER LOS POBLEMAS DE LA GENTE.**

LE PIDO QUE CUANDO LE MENCIONE CADA UNA DE ELLAS ME CALIFIQUE EL GRADO DE CONFIANZA QUE LES TIENE, CALIFICANDO ENTRE UN NUMERO 1 (NINGUNA CONFIANZA) HASTA UN 10 (MUCHA CONFIANZA).

#### A.- VEAMOS PRIMERO LAS INSTITUCIONES QUE HACEN AL ORDEN Y LA SEGURIDAD

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NC	
LA JUSTICIA DE LA CIUDAD DE BUENOS AIRES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	23-4
LA JUSTICIA FEDERAL	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	25-6
LA POLICÍA	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	27-8
LOS JUECES Y FISCALES PENALES EN GENERAL	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	29-0
LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	31-2
EL SISTEMA PENITENCIARIO	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	33-4
LOS JUECES DE LAS PROVINCIAS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	35-6
LAS FACULTADES DE DERECHO	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	37-8
EL MINISTERIO DE SEGURIDAD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	39-0

#### B.- VEAMOS AHORA LAS INSTITUCIONES POLÍTICAS

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NC	
EL PODER EJECUTIVO NACIONAL	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	41-2
LA CÁMARA DE DIPUTADOS DE LA NACIÓN	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	43-4
LOS GOBERNADORES PROVINCIALES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	45-6
LA CÁMARA DE SENADORES DE LA NACIÓN	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	47-8
LOS SINDICATOS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	49-0
EL GOBIERNO DE LA CIUDAD DE BUENOS AIRES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	51-2
LOS PARTIDOS POLÍTICOS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	53-4
LA LEGISLATURA PORTENA	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	55-6
LAS ORGANIZACIONES DE LOS EMPRESARIOS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	57-8

#### C.- VEAMOS AHORA LAS INSTITUCIONES DE LA SOCIEDAD

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NC	
LAS ONGs (ORGANIZACIONES NO GUBERNAMENTALES)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	59-0
LOS GRUPOS AMBIENTALISTAS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	61-2
LA IGLESIA CATÓLICA	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	63-4
LA ESCUELA PÚBLICA	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	65-6
LAS IGLESIAS EN GENERAL	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	67-8
LOS DIARIOS NACIONALES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	69-0
LAS UNIVERSIDADES PÚBLICAS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	71-2
LA TV	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	73-4

LA RADIO	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	75-6
LAS UNIVERSIDADES PRIVADAS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	77-8
LAS ORGANIZACIONES DE DEFENSA DEL CONSUMIDOR	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	79-0
LOS PERIODISTAS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	81-2
LOS ECONOMISTAS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	83-4
ORGANISMOS INTERNACIONALES COMO EL BANCO MUNDIAL O EL BID	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	85-6

**D.- VEAMOS FINALMENTE ALGUNAS OTRAS INSTITUCIONES QUE HACEN AL DERECHO Y LA JUSTICIA**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NC	
LA JUSTICIA EN GENERAL	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	87-8
LOS ABOGADOS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	89-0
LOS ESCRIBANOS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	91-2
LAS ORGANIZACIONES DE DEFENSA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	93-4
EL CONSEJO DE LA MAGISTRATURA	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	95-6
LA DEFENSORÍA DEL PUEBLO	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	97-8

**CONFIANZA EN LAS LEYES**

**6.-HABLANDO DE LAS LEYES Y DE ALGUNOS PROCESOS QUE YO LE VOY A MENCIONAR, LE PIDO TAMBIÉN QUE OPINE SI LES TIENE CONFIANZA, EN EL SENTIDO DE SI CREE QUE ESTÁN EFECTIVAMENTE PRERADAS PARA RESOLVER LOS PROBLEMAS ACTUALES DE NUESTRA SOCIEDAD. CAILIFIQUE, TAMBIÉN EN GENERAL, DESDE NINGUNA CONFIANZA HASTA MUCHA CONFIANZA**

	MUCHA CONFIANZA	ALGUNA CONFIANZA	POCA CONFIANZA	NINGUNA CONFIANZA	NS/NC	
LAS LEYES EN GENERAL	1	2	3	4	9	99
LOS PROCEDIMIENTOS PARA DESIGNAR A LOS JUECES	1	2	3	4	9	100
LOS PROCEDIMIENTOS PARA CONTROLAR Y REMOVER A LOS JUECES	1	2	3	4	9	101
LOS CÓDIGOS DE PRODIMIENTO PENAL	1	2	3	4	9	102
EL SISTEMA ELECTORAL	1	2	3	4	9	103
LAS ESTADÍSTICAS PÚBLICAS (INDEC)	1	2	3	4	9	104
LA REGULACIÓN Y CONTROL DE LOS SERVICIOS PÚBLICOS	1	2	3	4	9	105
LOS SISTEMAS DE CONTROL DE LA CORRUPCIÓN ESTATAL	1	2	3	4	9	106
LOS SISTEMAS DE CONTROL DE LA CORRUPCIÓN PRIVADA	1	2	3	4	9	107
LA ORGANIZACIÓN DE LOS PROGRAMAS DE EMPLEO Y POBREZA	1	2	3	4	9	108
LA CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL	1	2	3	4	9	109
LOS PROCESOS JUDICIALES	1	2	3	4	9	110

**7.- HABLANDO AHORA MUY EN GENERAL ¿QUÉ NIVEL DE CONFIANZA TIENE UD. REALMENTE EN EL BUEN FUNCIONAMIENTO Y LA ECUANIMIDAD DE LOS JUECES ARGENTINOS?**

MUCHO	ALGO	POCO	NADA	NS-NC	
1	2	3	4	9	111

**8.- ALGUNA GENTE DESCONFÍA DE LOS JUECES Y EN GENERAL DEL SISTEMA DE JUSTICIA EN LA ARGENTINA, ¿CREE UD. QUE TIENEN RAZÓN EN DESCONFIAR?**

MUCHO	ALGO	POCO	NADA	NS-NC	
1	2	3	4	9	112

**9.- MUCHA GENTE TAMBIÉN DESCONFÍA DE LAS LEYES EN GENERAL. EN EL CASO DE LA ARGENTINA, TENIENDO EN CUENTA LOS PROCEDIMIENTOS Y LA CALIDAD PROMEDIO DE LAS LEYES, CREE USTED QUE TIENE RAZÓN EN DESCONFIAR?**

MUCHO	ALGO	POCO	NADA	NS-NC	
1	2	3	4	9	113

**10.- HABLANDO DE ALGUNAS LEYES EN PARTICULAR, DE ACUERDO CON SU EXPERIENCIA PERSONAL, ¿CREE UD. QUE TIENEN RAZÓN EN DESCONFIAR? LE VOY A MENCIONAR ALGUNOS TIPOS DE LEYES Y LE PIDO QUE ME DIGA SI CREE QUE EN LA ARGENTINA ES RAZONABLE O NO QUE LA GENTE DESCONFÍE.**

	ES RAZONABLE QUE SE DESCONFIE	NO ES RAZONABLE QUE SE DESCONFIE	NS	NC	
LEYES IMPOSITIVAS	1	2	8	9	114
LEYES PENALES	1	2	8	9	115
LEYES CIVILES	1	2	8	9	116
LEYES DE ORDENAMIENTO DEL TRÁNSITO	1	2	8	9	117
LEYES LABORALES	1	2	8	9	118
LEYES ELECTORALES	1	2	8	9	119
LEYES COMERCIALES	1	2	8	9	120

**11.- EN UN PAÍS COMO LA ARGENTINA, ¿CREE UD. QUE VALE LA PENA RESPETAR LA LEY Y LAS INSTITUCIONES?**

	121
SI	1
NO	2
DEPENDE	3
NS/NC	9

**12.- EN UN PAÍS COMO LA ARGENTINA, ¿PIENSA UD., PERSONALMENTE, QUE QUIEN RESPETA LAS LEYES Y LAS INSTITUCIONES MERECE RESPETO Y CONSIDERACIÓN O PECA DE INGENUO? <sup>122</sup>**

MERECE RESPETO Y CONSIDERACIÓN	1
PECA DE INGENUO	2
NI UNA COSA NI LA OTRA: NO HAY QUE EXTREMAR LAS COSAS	3
NS/NC	9

13.- ME GUSTARÍA PREGUNTARLE A UD. QUÉ LO LLEVA PERSONALMENTE A RESPETAR Y ADECUARSE A LAS LEYES. LE VOY A MENCIONAR ALGUNAS RAZONES QUE LA GENTE NOS VIENE DANDO SOBRE ESTE PUNTO Y LE VOY A PEDIR QUE ME SEÑALE QUÉ NIVEL DE IMPORTANCIA TIENE CADA UNA DE ESTAS RAZONES EN SU CASO PARTICULAR. CALIFIQUE ENTRE 1 (MUY POCA IMPORTANCIA) Y 10 (MUCHA IMPORTANCIA)													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NC	
EL TEMOR A LA SANCIÓN Y AL COSTO DE NO RESPETAR LA LEY.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	123-4
SIENTE LA OBLIGACIÓN MORAL DE RESPETAR LA LEY.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	125-6
FUI EDUCADO PARA RESPETAR LAS LEYES.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	127-8
ES MÁS RAZONABLE ADECUARSE A LAS LEYES.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	129-0
ACTÚO DEL MISMO MODO COMO DESEARÍA QUE ACTÚEN LOS DEMÁS.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	131-2
SIENTO QUE ME CONVIENE RESPETAR LAS LEYES.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	133-4
RESPONDO A UNA COSTUMBRE O HÁBITO SOCIAL. TODOS LO HACEN.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	135-6
CREO QUE ES UNA CUESTIÓN DE HONOR.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	137-8
LA LEY ES UN ORDEN RACIONAL DE LA SOCIEDAD QUE A TODOS NOS CONVIENE RESPETAR PARA QUE LAS COSAS FUNCIONEN	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	139-0

14.- ¿RECUERDA UD. HABER RECIBIDO ALGÚN TIPO DE INFORMACIÓN O INSTRUCCIÓN FORMAL O INFORMAL SOBRE TEMAS CÍVICOS DE LOS QUE HEMOS ESTADO CONVERSANDO, TALES COMO EL DERECHO, LA CONSTITUCIÓN, LAS LEYES, INSTITUCIONES POLÍTICAS Y DE GOBIERNO? MENCIONE HASTA CUATRO RESPUESTAS, LAS MÁS IMPORTANTES.		141-148
SÍ, EN LA ESCUELA PRIMARIA.		1
SÍ, EN EL COLEGIO SECUNDARIO.		2
SÍ, EN EDUCACIÓN UNIVERSITARIA.		3
SÍ, EN EDUCACIÓN Terciaria.		4
SÍ, EN LAS RELACIONES PERSONALES.		5
SÍ, EN EL ÁMBITO LABORAL.		6
SÍ, A TRAVÉS DE LOS MEDIOS DE COMUNICACIÓN.		7
SÍ, A TRAVÉS DE ORGANISMOS NO GUBERNAMENTALES.		8
SÍ, A TRAVÉS DE LAS IGLESIAS.		9
LO QUE SÉ LO ADQUIRÍ EN LA VIDA DIARIA.		10
LO QUE SÉ LO APRENDÍ A TRAVÉS DE LA EDUCACIÓN FAMILIAR.		11
NO, JAMÁS RECIBÍ FORMACIÓN NI INSTRUCCIÓN ALGUNA SOBRE ESTOS TEMAS.		12
NS/NC		99



<b>15.- ALGUNOS PIENSAN QUE MUCHOS PROBLEMAS INSTITUCIONALES DEL PAIS SON RESULTADO DEL NIVEL DE EDUCACIÓN Y CONOCIMIENTO QUE LA GENTE TIENE SOBRE LAS LEYES. ¿QUÉ NIVEL DE CONOCIMIENTO CREE UD. QUE TIENE LA GENTE COMÚN SOBRE LAS LEYES, SUS DERECHOS, LOS PROCEDIMIENTOS DE LA JUSTICIA, ETC?</b>							
	MUCHO	ALGO	POCO	NADA	NS	NC	
NIVEL DE CONOCIMIENTO DE LAS LEYES EN GENERAL	1	2	3	4	8	9	49
NIVEL DE CONOCIMIENTO DE LOS PROCEDIMIENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS Y JUDICIALES	1	2	3	4	8	9	50
NIVEL DE ACCESO A LA JUSTICIA PARA DEFENDER Y HACER VALER SUS DERECHOS	1	2	3	4	8	9	51
NIVEL DE CONOCIMIENTO DE LOS PRINCIPIOS ÉTICOS Y JURIDICOS	1	2	3	4	8	9	52
NIVEL DE TOLERANCIA ANTE EL FENÓMENO DE LA CORRUPCIÓN	1	2	3	4	8	9	53

<b>16.- SE INSISTE TAMBIÉN DESDE HACE TIEMPO EN LA NECESIDAD DE UNA MEJOR AFIRMACIÓN Y PROFUNDIZACIÓN DE CIERTOS PRINCIPIOS REPUBLICANOS. LE VOY A MENCIONAR ALGUNOS DE ESTOS PRINCIPIOS Y LE PIDO QUE ME DIGA SI LE PARECE QUE EN NUESTRO PAIS TIENEN O NO UNA VIGENCIA EFECTIVA. MARQUE ENTRE 1 (NADA VIGENTE Y EFECTIVOS) Y 10 (MUY VIGENTES Y EFECTIVOS).</b>													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NC	
DIVISIÓN DE PODERES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	154-5
IGUALDAD ANTE LA LEY	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	156-7
DEBIDO PROCESO	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	158-9
RAZONABILIDAD DE LAS LEYES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	160-1
TRANSPARENCIA E INTEGRIDAD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	162-3
ACCESO A LA INFORMACIÓN	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	164-5
RESPONSABILIDAD DE LOS FUNCIONARIOS PÚBLICOS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	166-7
VIGENCIA DE LAS LIBERTADES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	168-9
PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	170-1
INDEPENDENCIA JUDICIAL	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	172-3
PARTICIPACIÓN CIUDADANA	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	174-5
INCLUSIÓN SOCIAL	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	176-7
FUERZA EFECTIVA DE LAS LEYES	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	178-9
LA LUCHA CONTRA LA DISCRIMINACION RACIAL	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	180-1

### CONFIANZA Y SOLIDARIDAD

<b>17.- UN TEMA QUE NOS INTERESA MUCHO ES EL NIVEL DE CONFIANZA QUE UD. SIENTE EN RELACIÓN CON LA GENTE QUE NO CONOCE PERO CON LA QUE LLEGA A VINCULARSE. HABLANDO EN GENERAL, ¿USTED TIENDE A SER CONFIADO CON LA GENTE QUE NO CONOCE O SUELE TENER CIERTA DESCONFIANZA Y SE MANEJA CON CUIDADO?</b>	
EN GENERAL CONFÍO SIN REPAROS EN LA GENTE DESCONOCIDA	1
EN GENERAL ME MANEJO CON CUIDADO CON LA GENTE DESCONOCIDA	2

18.- HABLANDO AHORA DE SU FAMILIA, DE LAS PERSONAS QUE LO RODEAN, QUE TRABAJAN CON UD., LE PIDO TAMBIÉN QUE OPINE SI EN SU FUERO INTIMO LES TIENE UD. CONFIANZA, EN EL SENTIDO DE SI CREE QUE PUEDE CONFIARLES SUS PROBLEMAS Y ESPERAR DE ELLOS UNA AYUDA DESINTERESADA. CALIFIQUE, TAMBIÉN EN GENERAL, DESDE 1 (NINGUNA CONFIANZA) HASTA 10 (MUCHA CONFIANZA)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NS	NC	No corre sp.	
LOS MIEMBROS DE SU FAMILIA	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	183-4
SUS AMIGOS EN GENERAL	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	185-6
SUS VECINOS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	187-8
SUS COMPAÑEROS DE TRABAJO	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	189-0
SUS JEFES O SUPERIORES INMEDIATOS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	191-2
LOS SACERDOTES O PASTORES DE SU RELIGIÓN	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	193-4
SUS PROFESORES O MAESTROS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	195-6

19.- POR FAVOR, INDIQUE SI USTED ESTÁ MUY DE ACUERDO, DE ACUERDO, EN DESACUERDO O MUY EN DESACUERDO (O NO SABE/PREFIERE NO CONTESTAR) CON CADA UNA DE LAS SIGUIENTES AFIRMACIONES.

	MUY DE ACUERDO	DE ACUERDO	EN DESACUERDO	MUY EN DESACUERDO	NS/NC	
LA MAYORÍA DE LA GENTE EN EL BARRIO/VECINDARIO ESTÁ ABIERTA A LOS DEMÁS Y DISPUESTA A AYUDAR SI ALGUIEN LO NECESITA.	1	2	3	4	9	197
EN ESTE BARRIO/VECINDARIO UNO TIENE QUE ESTAR ALERTA. SIEMPRE ALGUIEN TE PODRÍA SACAR VENTAJA.	1	2	3	4	9	198
LA GENTE EN EL BARRIO/VECINDARIO ES INDIVIDUALISTA Y SÓLO LE INTERESAN SUS PROPIOS ASUNTOS.	1	2	3	4	9	199

### ACCIONES COLECTIVAS Y DE COOPERACIÓN

20.- SUPONGAMOS QUE HUBIESE UN PROBLEMA DE INTERES COMUNITARIO, QUE AFECTASE A TODOS LOS QUE VIVEN EN ESTE BARRIO O VECINDARIO (POR EJEMPLO, CORTES EN EL SUMINISTRO DE AGUA, ELECTRICIDAD O GAS), ¿ QUE PROBABILIDADES EXISTEN DE QUE LA GENTE SE MOVILICE EN CONJUNTO PARA TRATAR DE SOLUCIONAR EL PROBLEMA? CALIFIQUE EN TERMINOS DE MUY PROBABLE, PROBABLE, NI PROBABLE NI IMPROBABLE, ALGO IMPROBABLE, MUY IMPROBABLE. 200

MUY PROBABLE	1
PROBABLE	2
NI PROBABLE NI IMPROBABLE	3
ALGO IMPROBABLE	4
MUY IMPROBABLE	5
NS-NC	9

<b>21.- EN LOS ÚLTIMOS TRES AÑOS ¿HA PARTICIPADO UD. DE ALGUNA DE LAS SIGUIENTES ACTIVIDADES?</b>				
	SI	NO	NS/NC	
ENTRAR EN CONTACTO PERSONAL CON UNA PERSONA INFLUYENTE	1	2	9	201
CONSEGUIR QUE LOS MEDIOS DE COMUNICACIÓN SE INTERESEN EN ALGÚN PROBLEMA	1	2	9	202
PARTICIPAR ACTIVAMENTE EN UNA CAMPAÑA DE INFORMACIÓN	1	2	9	203
PARTICIPAR ACTIVAMENTE EN UNA CAMPAÑA ELECTORAL	1	2	9	204
PARTICIPAR ACTIVAMENTE EN UNA MARCHA DE PROTESTA O MANIFESTACIÓN	1	2	9	205
CONTACTAR A SU REPRESENTANTE POLÍTICO (INTENDENTE, LEGISLADOR,...)	1	2	9	206
PARTICIPAR EN UNA REUNIÓN CON FUNCIONARIOS PÚBLICOS	1	2	9	207
ESCRIBIR O PETICIONAR ANTE UN FUNCIONARIO PARA PEDIRLE O NOTIFICARLE ALGO	1	2	9	208
REALIZAR UNA DONACIÓN DE DINERO O EN ESPECIES	1	2	9	209
OFRECER SU TIEMPO A UNA ORGANIZACIÓN CARITATIVA	1	2	9	210
SUMARSE A ALGUNA ONG (ORGANIZACIÓN NO GUBERNAMENTAL). EJ: USUARIOS, CONSUMIDORES	1	2	9	211
PARTICIPAR EN AUDIENCIAS PÚBLICAS	1	2	9	212
PARTICIPAR EN ALGÚN TIPO DE COLECTA	1	2	9	213
PARTICIPAR DE UN CORTE DE RUTA	1	2	9	214
PARTICIPAR DE UN "ESCRACHE"	1	2	9	215
PARTICIPAR DE ALGUNA CADENA EN LAS REDES SOCIALES	1	2	9	216
SEGUIR UN TEMA CON IMPLICANCIAS POLÍTICAS O SOCIALES CON PROFUNDIDAD A TRAVÉS DE LOS MEDIOS	1	2	9	217
INICIAR UNA ACCIÓN JUDICIAL O UN RECURSO DE AMPARO	1	2	9	218
INTEGRAR UNA ORGANIZACIÓN DE DERECHOS HUMANOS O ANTIDISCRIMINACION	1	2	9	219

### INFORMACIÓN Y COMUNICACIÓN

**22.- CUANDO SE PRODUCE ALGÚN PROBLEMA DE TIPO COMUNITARIO DE LA CLASE DE LOS QUE ESTAMOS COMENTANDO, ¿QUÉ FUENTES DE INFORMACIÓN LE RESULTAN A UD. EN GENERAL MÁS CONFIABLES? LE RUEGO QUE ME MENCIONE LAS TRES MÁS CONFIABLES TENIENDO EN CUENTA UNO SOLO PARA EL PRIMER LUGAR, UNO PARA EL SEGUNDO Y UNO PARA EL TERCERO.**

	1º LUGAR 220-1	2º LUGAR 222-3	3º LUGAR 224-5
OPINIÓN O TESTIMONIO DE PARIENTES, AMIGOS Y VECINOS	1	1	1
MENSAJES POR REDES SOCIALES (FACEBOOK, TWITTER, LINKEDIN, ETC.)	2	2	2
BOLETÍN COMUNAL	3	3	3
COMERCIOS DE LA ZONA	4	4	4
PERIÓDICO COMUNAL O LOCAL	5	5	5
PORTALES EN INTERNET	6	6	6
PERIÓDICO NACIONAL	7	7	7
RADIO	8	8	8
TELEVISIÓN (CANALES DE NOTICIAS)	9	9	9
GRUPOS O ASOCIACIONES MOVILIZADAS	10	10	10
SINDICATOS U ORGANIZACIONES DE TRABAJADORES	11	11	11
ASOCIACIONES O PARTIDOS POLÍTICOS	12	12	12
LÍDERES DE LA COMUNIDAD	13	13	13
JUECES O FISCALES	14	14	14
CENTRO DE GESTIÓN O PARTICIPACIÓN	15	15	15
ONGS	16	16	16
POLICÍA FEDERAL	17	17	17
ABOGADOS	18	18	18
POLICÍA DE LA CIUDAD	19	19	19
LAS IGLESIAS	20	20	20
INTERNET	21	21	21
VOCEROS DE LA EMPRESA	22	22	22
ASOCIACIONES DE USUARIOS O CONSUMIDORES	23	23	23
OTRA			
NINGUNA	97	97	97
NO SABE/ NO CONTESTA	99		

**23.- POR FAVOR, INDIQUE SI USTED ESTÁ MUY DE ACUERDO, DE ACUERDO, EN DESACUERDO O MUY EN DESACUERDO (O NO SABE/PREFIERE NO CONTESTAR) CON CADA UNA DE LAS SIGUIENTES AFIRMACIONES.**

	MUY DE ACUERDO	DE ACUERDO	EN DESACUERDO	MUY EN DESACUERDO	NS	NC	
LA UNIDAD DE TODOS LOS ARGENTINOS E IDENTIDAD NACIONAL YA NO ES TAN FUERTE COMO EN EL PASADO.	1	2	3	4	8	9	226
LA ARGENTINA ACTUAL ES UNA SOCIEDAD MODERNA Y CADA VEZ MÁS PLURAL EN LA QUE LAS DIFERENCIAS DE VALORES Y VISIONES DE LA VIDA ES CADA VEZ MAYOR.	1	2	3	4	8	9	227
LOS ARGENTINOS, SOMOS UN PUEBLO RESPETUOSO DE LAS LEYES Y LAS INSTITUCIONES.	1	2	3	4	8	9	228
LOS ARGENTINOS COMO PUEBLO SOMOS EN GENERAL RESPETUOSOS DE LA PALABRA EMPENADA.	1	2	3	4	8	9	229
LOS ARGENTINOS SOMOS UN PUEBLO DEMOCRÁTICO.	1	2	3	4	8	9	230

**24.- HABLANDO EN GENERAL, ¿CREE UD. QUE LA SOCIEDAD ARGENTINA ES UNA SOCIEDAD VIOLENTA?**

231

MUCHO	1
ALGO	2
POCO	3
NADA	4
NO SABE	8
NO CONTESTA	9

**25.- HABLANDO TAMBIÉN EN GENERAL, ¿ESTÁ UD. DE ACUERDO CON QUIENES DICEN QUE LA SOCIEDAD ARGENTINA ES UNA SOCIEDAD CORRUPTA?**

232

MUY DE ACUERDO	1
DE ACUERDO	2
EN DESACUERDO	3
MUY EN DESACUERDO	4
NO SABE	8
NO CONTESTA	9

**26.- ¿ESTÁ DE ACUERDO CON QUIENES DICEN QUE LOS ARGENTINOS EN GENERAL SON INDIVIDUALISTAS Y QUE LES CUESTA COOPERAR EN CAUSAS DE INTERÉS GENERAL?**

233

MUY DE ACUERDO	1
DE ACUERDO	2
EN DESACUERDO	3
MUY EN DESACUERDO	4
NO SABE	8
NO CONTESTA	9

<b>27.- ¿ESTÁ DE ACUERDO CON QUIENES DICEN QUE LOS ARGENTINOS EN GENERAL SON UN PUEBLO AUTORITARIO Y CONFRONTATIVO POR NATURALEZA?</b>		234
MUY DE ACUERDO		1
DE ACUERDO		2
EN DESACUERDO		3
MUY EN DESACUERDO		4
NO SABE		8
NO CONTESTA		9

<b>28.- ¿ESTÁ DE ACUERDO CON QUIENES DICEN QUE LOS ARGENTINOS EN GENERAL, MÁS ALLÁ DE LO QUE OCURRA EN EL TERRENO DE LA POLÍTICA, EN LA VIDA DE TODOS LOS DÍAS, NOS LLEVAMOS EN GENERAL BIEN ENTRE NOSOTROS.</b>		235
MUY DE ACUERDO		1
DE ACUERDO		2
EN DESACUERDO		3
MUY EN DESACUERDO		4
NO SABE		8
NO CONTESTA		9

### ACCESO AL DERECHO

<b>29) HABLANDO EN GENERAL, ¿SIENTE UD. QUE LAS LEYES Y LAS INSTITUCIONES DE ESTE PAÍS LO PROTEGEN Y GARANTIZAN SUS DERECHOS Y LIBERTADES BÁSICAS?</b>							
	MUCHO	ALGO	POCO	NADA	NS	NC	
PROTEGEN SUS LIBERTADES CIUDADANAS.	1	2	3	4	5	6	236
TIENEN EN CUENTAS SUS NECESIDADES BÁSICAS DE SALUD, EDUCACIÓN Y TRABAJO.	1	2	3	4	5	6	237
LE PERMITEN ACCEDER A UNA DEFENSA Y GARANTÍA EFECTIVA DE SUS DERECHOS.	1	2	3	4	5	6	238
LE PERMITEN PETICIONAR Y RECLAMAR A LAS AUTORIDADES.	1	2	3	4	5	6	239
LE OFRECEN IGUALES OPORTUNIDADES DE PROGRESO QUE A LOS DEMÁS.	1	2	3	4	5	6	240
TIENEN EN CUENTA A GENTE COMO USTED.	1	2	3	4	5	6	241
PROTEGEN CONTRA LA DISCRIMINACIÓN RACIAL	1	2	3	4	5	6	242
RESPETAN SU PROPIEDAD.	1	2	3	4	5	6	243
LO PROTEGEN DE LA VIOLENCIA Y LA INSEGURIDAD.	1	2	3	4	5	6	244
GARANTIZAN LA IGUALDAD ENTRE HOMBRES Y MUJERES.	1	2	3	4	5	6	245
LE PERMITEN ACCEDER A LA ATENCIÓN Y PROTECCIÓN DE LOS JUECES.	1	2	3	4	5	6	246

### DATOS DE CLASIFICACIÓN

EDAD	247-8	SEXO	249
18 A 29		VARÓN	1
30 A 49			
50 A 64		MUJER	2
65 Y MAS			
<i>ESCRIBIR LA EDAD EXACTA</i>			

PODRÍA INDICARME LA OCUPACIÓN DEL PRINCIPAL SOSTÉN DEL HOGAR?		PUNTAJE (250-1)
Encuestador aclare la ocupación del PSH		
Dueño, socio de empresas de mas de 50 empleados – Alta dirección		32
Dueño, socio de empresas de 6 a 50 empleados – Alta gerencia		28
Dueño, socio de empresas de 1 a 5 empleados – Gerencias		22
Profesionales independientes sin empleados a cargo. Jefes intermedios.		16
Técnicos independientes y en relación de dependencia.		12
Comerciantes sin personal, artesanos, empleados especializados, supervisores, capataces.		10
Autónomos especializados, empleados sin jerarquía.		7
Obrero calificado, especializado.		6
Autónomo no calificado, personal no calificado.		4
Ocupación informal.		2
Pasivos (jubilados, pensionados) inactivos.		4
Desocupados.		2

PODRÍA INDICARME LA CANTIDAD DE APORTANTES QUE HAY EN SU HOGAR?		PUNTAJE (252)
4 O MÁS APORTANTES		9
2 A 3 APORTANTES		7
1 APORTANTE		1
PODRÍA INDICARME EL NIVEL DE EDUCACIÓN DEL PRINCIPAL SOSTÉN DEL HOGAR?		PUNTAJE (253-4)
UNIVERSITARIO COMPLETO O POSTGRADO		13
UNIVERSITARIO INCOMPLETO – Terciario – Secundario completo		4
Secundario incompleto – Primario completo – Primario incompleto		0
POSEE EN SU HOGAR ...		PUNTAJE (255-7)
INTERNET	NO SI	8
COMPUTADORA	NO SI	6
TARJETA DE DEBITO	NO SI	5
PODRÍA DECIRME CUÁNTOS AUTOS CON MENOS DE 15 AÑOS DE ANTIGÜEDAD POSEE EN SU HOGAR?		PUNTAJE (258-9)
2 O MAS AUTOS		22
1 AUTO		11
NINGUNO		0
QUE TIPO DE ATENCIÓN MÉDICA UTILIZAN EN SU HOGAR		PUNTAJE (260)
PRIVADA – OBRA SOCIAL – PREPAGA		5
HOSPITAL PÚBLICO		0

## **ANNEX II: Tables of results**

**SEXO DEL ENTREVISTADO**

	Col %
Total	100.0
Varón	44.5
Mujer	55.5

ABRIL 2011

**NIVEL SOCIO ECONOMICO**

		Col %
Total		100.0
NIVEL SOCIO- ECONOMICO	Alto	16.1
	Medio	50.6
	Bajo	33.3

ABRIL 2011

**EDAD DEL ENTREVISTADO**

	Col %
Total	100.0
18 a 29 años	25.4
30 a 49 años	36.9
50 a 64 años	22.2
65 y más	15.6

ABRIL 2011

**EDAD, SEXO Y NIVEL SOCIOECONOMICO**

	Varón			Mujer		
	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO			NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
	Alto	Medio	Bajo	Alto	Medio	Bajo
	Table %	Table %	Table %	Table %	Table %	Table %
18 a 29 años	1.7%	8.9%	1.7%	2.5%	4.0%	6.5%
30 a 49 años	2.7%	9.8%	4.5%	5.0%	11.4%	3.5%
50 a 64 años	2.1%	4.9%	2.5%	1.8%	5.7%	5.1%
65 y más	0.3%	3.0%	2.4%		2.7%	7.1%

ABRIL 2011

**1.1 EN GENERAL, ¿CUAL ES SU OPINION SOBRE COMO MARCHAN HOY EN GENERAL LAS COSAS EN NUESTRO PAIS, EN TERMINOS DE MUY BIEN, BIEN, NI BIEN NI MAL, MAL O MUY MAL.**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Muy bien	5.5	3.3	6.5	4.5	8.2	6.9	4.5	5.3	5.4	5.8
Bien	26.3	19.6	33.2	20.4	29.1	29.5	23.6	21.3	30.3	22.5
Ni bien ni mal	25.5	31.2	26.0	24.3	16.7	20.6	29.4	29.2	26.8	21.7
Mal	35.4	40.5	28.2	37.4	41.6	33.1	37.3	34.6	31.9	41.3
Muy mal	6.1	5.3	4.8	10.2	4.3	8.3	4.3	9.6	3.8	7.7
Ns/Nc	1.2		1.3	3.2		1.6	0.9		1.7	1.1

ABRIL 2011



**1.2 EN GENERAL, ¿CUAL ES SU OPINION SOBRE COMO MARCHAN HOY EN GENERAL LAS COSAS EN ESTA CIUDAD DE BUENOS AIRES, EN TERMINOS DE MUY BIEN, BIEN, NI BIEN NI MAL, MAL O MUY MAL**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Muy bien	1.6		2.6	1.4	2.0	1.7	1.4	1.9	1.6	1.3
Bien	23.1	21.0	21.8	18.6	36.0	22.5	23.6	23.7	23.4	22.4
Ni bien ni mal	31.7	31.5	37.5	33.3	16.1	29.9	33.2	33.6	36.8	23.0
Mal	31.4	40.8	26.8	29.9	29.3	27.8	34.4	23.0	29.2	39.0
Muy mal	10.7	6.7	10.0	13.6	14.5	16.6	5.9	17.8	7.3	12.2
Ns/Nc	1.5		1.3	3.2	2.2	1.6	1.5		1.7	2.1

ABRIL 2011

**2.1 TAMBIEN MUY EN GENERAL, ¿LE PARECE QUE LAS COSAS VAN A MEJORAR, SEGUIRAN IGUAL O EMPEORARAN EN LOS PROXIMOS AÑOS EN EL PAIS?**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mejorarán	35.3	36.2	36.9	22.5	48.4	33.7	36.7	35.6	33.3	38.3
Seguirán igual	34.6	32.9	37.2	37.9	26.5	36.8	32.8	23.2	43.1	27.1
Empeorarán	19.4	23.6	15.2	24.9	14.5	22.0	17.3	32.0	12.5	23.8
Ns/Nc	10.7	7.3	10.7	14.7	10.6	7.5	13.3	9.3	11.1	10.8

ABRIL 2011

**2.2 TAMBIEN MUY EN GENERAL, ¿LE PARECE QUE LAS COSAS VAN A MEJORAR, SEGUIRAN IGUAL O EMPEORARAN EN LOS PROXIMOS AÑOS EN LA CIUDAD DE BUENOS AIRES?**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mejorarán	33.5	37.9	31.7	21.1	48.4	33.6	33.4	35.3	31.1	36.4
Seguirán igual	34.9	31.5	43.9	33.8	20.6	32.8	36.6	22.5	42.6	29.2
Empeorarán	20.5	23.0	13.7	27.7	22.6	27.0	15.4	29.8	16.1	22.7
Ns/Nc	11.0	7.6	10.7	17.5	8.5	6.6	14.6	12.4	10.2	11.7

ABRIL 2011

**3.1 INTEGRACION CON AMBITOS DE LA VIDA SOCIAL: LA SOCIEDAD EN QUE VIVE**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	32.9	26.9	35.8	33.8	34.1	28.6	36.3	19.0	38.4	31.1
Algo	42.6	40.5	39.6	45.1	49.7	43.3	42.1	46.2	44.4	38.3
Poco	18.0	25.3	18.2	13.6	12.1	20.1	16.4	23.7	11.9	24.5
Nada	6.0	5.3	6.3	7.5	4.1	8.0	4.4	11.2	5.3	4.5
No contesta	0.5	2.0					0.9			1.5

ABRIL 2011

### 3.2 INTEGRACION CON AMBITOS DE LA VIDA SOCIAL: SU BARRIO DE ORIGEN

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	33.0	37.6	32.1	29.9	31.9	31.2	34.4	23.0	34.5	35.4
Algo	29.1	27.2	25.9	32.2	35.1	29.0	29.1	25.9	32.7	25.1
Poco	17.8	14.9	20.6	17.5	16.1	17.9	17.6	33.2	11.8	19.4
Nada	11.6	11.0	12.5	11.6	10.6	12.9	10.6	14.8	11.0	11.0
No sabe	6.8	5.3	7.5	7.5	6.3	9.0	5.0	3.1	8.4	6.1
No contesta	1.8	4.0	1.3	1.4			3.3		1.6	3.0

ABRIL 2011

### 3.3 INTEGRACION CON AMBITOS DE LA VIDA SOCIAL: LA COLECTIVIDAD DE ORIGEN DE SU FAMILIA

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	25.9	30.9	21.7	28.8	23.6	23.8	27.6	15.1	24.4	33.4
Algo	27.6	25.0	30.6	23.4	30.6	33.3	23.0	39.6	28.6	20.2
Poco	15.2	13.3	15.5	10.2	24.5	14.1	16.0	10.0	12.6	21.6
Nada	17.8	16.6	14.2	27.2	15.0	14.2	20.7	23.8	17.9	14.8
No sabe	8.6	3.7	12.8	9.1	6.3	9.8	7.7	9.0	9.6	7.0
No contesta	4.9	10.6	5.3	1.4		4.8	5.0	2.6	7.0	3.0

ABRIL 2011

### 3.4 INTEGRACION CON AMBITOS DE LA VIDA SOCIAL: EL PAIS DE ORIGEN DE SU FAMILIA

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	28.2	31.2	27.1	27.0	27.8	22.0	33.3	22.8	27.2	32.4
Algo	20.3	16.6	21.7	19.3	24.5	23.1	18.0	25.8	20.9	16.7
Poco	17.1	19.9	16.8	17.5	12.4	16.7	17.3	17.7	17.2	16.6
Nada	20.7	16.3	20.3	22.9	25.4	19.8	21.4	30.6	18.4	19.3
No sabe	8.6	6.7	8.9	10.6	8.0	13.8	4.4	3.1	11.8	6.4
No contesta	5.2	9.3	5.1	2.7	2.0	4.6	5.6		4.5	8.6

ABRIL 2011

### 3.5 INTEGRACION CON AMBITOS DE LA VIDA SOCIAL: SU BARRIO ACTUAL

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	42.4	42.9	39.5	44.0	46.2	42.4	42.4	28.1	47.1	42.1
Algo	36.4	38.2	36.3	27.0	47.5	37.7	35.4	49.8	33.8	34.0
Poco	14.0	9.0	17.9	18.8	6.3	14.5	13.7	16.7	13.2	14.1
Nada	4.8	5.9	3.8	8.6		3.6	5.8	5.3	4.3	5.4
No sabe	0.9	2.0	1.2			1.0	0.9			2.9
No contesta	1.4	2.0	1.3	1.6		0.8	1.8		1.7	1.5

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### 3.6 INTEGRACION CON AMBITOS DE LA VIDA SOCIAL: EL CIRCULO DE AMIGOS DE SU INFANCIA

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	21.8	33.9	20.6	16.1	12.8	23.1	20.7	23.9	24.2	17.0
Algo	23.6	24.5	25.6	21.5	20.4	21.9	25.0	30.6	28.3	13.1
Poco	16.3	18.0	15.2	19.3	12.1	21.0	12.6	19.3	13.7	18.9
Nada	28.4	18.0	24.5	33.1	48.2	25.5	30.8	23.1	22.6	39.8
No sabe	6.7		12.8	5.7	4.3	5.8	7.3	3.1	7.4	7.3
No contesta	3.2	5.6	1.2	4.3	2.2	2.7	3.5		3.7	3.9

ABRIL 2011

### 3.7 INTEGRACION CON AMBITOS DE LA VIDA SOCIAL: SUS COMPAÑEROS DE COLEGIO

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	20.0	26.9	24.3	11.3	10.6	20.9	19.2	17.4	25.6	12.6
Algo	23.4	31.9	27.0	16.1	11.7	29.5	18.6	35.3	24.6	15.9
Poco	16.5	23.2	12.8	19.3	10.2	14.5	18.0	28.5	11.8	17.7
Nada	27.5	8.7	27.2	35.8	46.6	21.6	32.2	18.9	22.8	38.7
No sabe	8.2	2.0	7.5	11.8	14.5	9.2	7.3		8.8	11.1
No contesta	4.5	7.3	1.2	5.7	6.3	4.4	4.7		6.4	3.9

ABRIL 2011

### 3.8 INTEGRACION CON AMBITOS DE LA VIDA SOCIAL: SUS COMPAÑEROS DE TRABAJO

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	25.1	28.2	33.2	18.6	10.4	23.3	26.6	29.7	23.7	25.1
Algo	29.2	23.0	33.6	31.3	26.2	35.2	24.4	37.3	34.2	17.8
Poco	9.7	12.3	11.9	7.3	3.9	9.7	9.7	3.1	13.3	7.5
Nada	18.6	14.3	12.7	22.5	33.8	15.9	20.7	21.6	15.9	21.1
No sabe	6.5	3.3	6.3	6.1	12.8	8.0	5.4		4.6	12.6
No contesta	10.8	18.9	2.4	14.3	12.8	7.9	13.2	8.4	8.3	15.9

ABRIL 2011

### 4. ¿CREE UD. QUE LOS ARGENTINOS EN GENERAL SOMOS UNA SOCIEDAD EN LA QUE SE COMPARTEN ALGUNOS VALORES O PRINCIPIOS ETICOS, CULTURALES FUNDAMENTALES?

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Si compartimos	39.5	34.9	42.0	35.8	46.0	38.4	40.3	26.5	42.8	40.6
No compartimos	54.2	57.2	54.2	56.9	45.6	57.3	51.7	65.4	53.4	50.0
No sabe	3.3	4.0		4.5	8.5	2.3	4.2	5.3	2.3	4.0
No contesta	3.0	4.0	3.8	2.7		2.0	3.8	2.8	1.5	5.4

ABRIL 2011

**5A.1 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES QUE HACEN AL ORDEN Y LA SEGURIDAD: LA JUSTICIA DE LA CIUDAD DE BUENOS AIRES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	36.8	36.5	33.4	47.1	30.6	40.3	34.0	39.9	30.5	44.9
4 y 5	36.5	30.3	39.9	29.5	48.4	32.5	39.7	30.1	44.2	27.8
6 y 7	18.2	25.6	16.7	13.1	17.1	16.5	19.6	18.2	19.1	16.9
8 y 9	4.4	4.0	7.4	2.9		5.8	3.3	8.7	1.6	6.6
Ns/ Nc	4.1	3.7	2.6	7.3	3.9	4.9	3.4	3.1	4.6	3.7

ABRIL 2011

**5A.2 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES QUE HACEN AL ORDEN Y LA SEGURIDAD: LA JUSTICIA FEDERAL**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	39.6	38.2	38.3	49.9	30.6	45.3	35.1	47.7	33.4	45.2
4 y 5	37.8	37.9	33.7	34.3	52.5	32.4	42.1	32.8	42.2	33.5
6 y 7	14.0	18.6	16.4	7.0	10.6	13.3	14.5	13.6	14.2	13.8
8 y 9	5.8	1.7	10.2	5.9	2.2	6.5	5.3	2.8	7.4	4.9
Ns/ Nc	2.7	3.7	1.3	2.9	4.1	2.4	3.0	3.1	2.7	2.5

ABRIL 2011

**5A.3 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES QUE HACEN AL ORDEN Y LA SEGURIDAD: LA POLICIA**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	48.4	47.2	43.3	54.4	53.8	54.8	43.2	52.7	45.8	50.2
4 y 5	31.5	26.9	36.3	27.2	33.6	27.8	34.5	32.8	32.2	29.7
6 y 7	14.9	16.9	16.6	12.7	10.6	12.1	17.1	14.5	14.8	15.1
8 y 9	4.3	7.3	3.9	2.9	2.0	4.4	4.2		5.7	4.1
Ns/ Nc	1.0	1.7		2.7		1.0	1.1		1.4	0.9

ABRIL 2011

**5A.4 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES QUE HACEN AL ORDEN Y LA SEGURIDAD: LOS JUECES Y FISCALES PENALES EN GENERAL**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	43.2	36.5	43.5	50.1	43.4	46.8	40.3	48.6	39.5	46.2
4 y 5	28.6	21.6	29.8	28.1	37.7	22.9	33.1	28.3	31.1	24.9
6 y 7	18.3	27.2	17.7	14.7	10.6	21.3	16.0	17.2	21.2	14.6
8 y 9	3.4	3.7	5.1	2.7		3.0	3.8	2.8	2.3	5.4
10	0.4	1.7				1.0			0.8	
Ns/ Nc	6.0	9.3	3.9	4.3	8.2	5.1	6.8	3.1	5.1	8.8

ABRIL 2011

**5A.5 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES QUE HACEN AL ORDEN Y LA SEGURIDAD: LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	37.0	36.8	38.0	36.9	34.9	43.0	32.1	41.5	31.7	42.9
4 y 5	30.1	21.3	28.6	38.6	35.8	25.4	33.9	39.5	32.5	21.8
6 y 7	15.7	21.9	15.2	10.2	14.8	16.5	15.1	10.4	18.1	14.7
8 y 9	7.6	5.6	10.4	7.5	4.1	7.0	8.0	5.6	8.0	7.9
10	1.3	2.0	1.2		2.2	1.0	1.5		0.9	2.5
Ns/ Nc	8.4	12.3	6.6	6.8	8.2	7.1	9.3	3.1	8.8	10.2

ABRIL 2011

**5A.6 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES QUE HACEN AL ORDEN Y LA SEGURIDAD: EL SISTEMA PENITENCIARIO**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	56.0	50.8	61.5	55.8	51.8	60.1	52.7	65.3	54.6	53.6
4 y 5	18.9	11.0	19.3	24.5	23.0	17.3	20.2	19.4	19.0	18.5
6 y 7	12.6	17.6	14.0	5.9	10.6	14.9	10.7	10.2	12.6	13.7
8 y 9	1.3	4.0		1.4			2.4		1.6	1.5
10	0.5	2.0					0.9			1.5
Ns/ Nc	10.7	14.6	5.3	12.5	14.5	7.6	13.1	5.0	12.2	11.2

ABRIL 2011

**5A.7 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES QUE HACEN AL ORDEN Y LA SEGURIDAD: LOS JUECES DE LAS PROVINCIAS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	38.3	27.2	42.2	44.2	38.8	44.0	33.7	46.1	34.9	39.8
4 y 5	22.0	10.0	28.4	24.1	23.4	19.3	24.2	30.7	23.9	14.9
6 y 7	8.6	11.6	10.0	5.9	4.1	9.2	8.0	2.8	8.7	11.1
8 y 9	2.2	3.7	2.6	1.4		2.0	2.3	2.8	1.4	3.0
10	1.0	4.0					1.8			3.0
Ns/ Nc	27.9	43.5	16.8	24.5	33.6	25.5	29.8	17.6	31.0	28.2

ABRIL 2011

**5A.8 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES QUE HACEN AL ORDEN Y LA SEGURIDAD: LAS FACULTADES DE DERECHO**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	22.0	18.0	24.3	26.7	16.5	26.4	18.5	35.3	18.4	21.1
4 y 5	18.1	13.7	23.2	15.9	16.7	19.9	16.7	24.0	23.4	7.4
6 y 7	23.4	16.3	24.4	22.9	33.4	21.8	24.7	15.6	23.5	27.1
8 y 9	14.8	24.2	11.3	14.3	8.2	14.5	15.0	10.5	16.8	13.7
10	2.2	5.6	1.2		2.2	2.0	2.4		0.8	5.4
Ns/ Nc	19.5	22.2	15.6	20.2	23.0	15.4	22.7	14.6	17.1	25.4

ABRIL 2011

**5A.9 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES QUE HACEN AL ORDEN Y LA SEGURIDAD: EL MINISTERIO DE SEGURIDAD**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	38.6	32.3	38.4	44.2	41.6	42.8	35.3	41.7	35.4	42.1
4 y 5	23.5	19.9	24.8	22.9	27.1	19.1	27.1	24.3	24.4	21.8
6 y 7	19.7	18.0	23.7	15.7	18.7	24.9	15.5	22.8	20.1	17.6
8 y 9	4.2	5.6	3.9	4.5	2.2	3.5	4.8		4.2	6.3
10	0.8	2.0			2.2		1.5			2.5
Ns/ Nc	13.1	22.2	9.2	12.7	8.2	9.7	15.9	11.2	15.9	9.8

ABRIL 2011

**5B.1 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES POLITICAS: EL PODER EJECUTIVO NACIONAL**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	40.1	37.9	39.8	44.2	38.8	45.8	35.6	46.7	38.1	39.9
4 y 5	30.5	23.9	34.8	26.8	36.2	23.0	36.5	33.8	31.1	27.9
6 y 7	13.7	16.0	14.0	10.2	14.5	16.1	11.8	11.8	13.9	14.5
8 y 9	10.6	14.6	7.5	12.9	8.2	11.6	9.9	7.6	11.5	10.8
10	2.2	3.7	2.6	1.6		2.7	1.8		3.4	1.5
Ns/ Nc	2.8	4.0	1.3	4.3	2.2	0.8	4.4		2.0	5.4

ABRIL 2011

**5B.2 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES POLITICAS: LA CAMARA DE DIPUTADOS DE LA NACION**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	41.4	40.2	39.6	48.7	37.1	46.1	37.6	46.8	41.2	39.1
4 y 5	32.4	22.2	38.8	25.2	44.3	23.3	39.8	36.0	31.1	32.7
6 y 7	18.8	26.0	17.5	14.5	16.5	27.3	12.0	14.1	23.8	13.5
8 y 9	3.4	4.0	1.3	7.0	2.2	0.8	5.5		1.9	7.3
10	0.5	2.0					0.9			1.5
Ns/ Nc	3.4	5.6	2.7	4.5		2.5	4.2	3.1	2.0	5.8

ABRIL 2011

**5B.3 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES POLITICAS: LOS GOBERNADORES PROVINCIALES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	35.3	29.2	34.2	42.8	36.9	42.3	29.6	40.5	35.9	31.7
4 y 5	31.0	21.9	35.2	26.8	41.9	22.7	37.7	37.2	29.6	30.2
6 y 7	16.4	18.3	17.8	14.5	12.6	17.3	15.6	8.7	19.7	15.1
8 y 9	3.1	2.0	3.8	4.1	2.2	2.0	4.0	2.8	1.2	6.3
10	0.5	2.0					0.9			1.5
Ns/ Nc	13.7	26.6	9.0	11.8	6.5	15.7	12.1	10.9	13.6	15.3

ABRIL 2011

**5B.4 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES POLITICAS: LA CAMARA DE SENADORES DE LA NACION**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	38.3	32.3	38.3	46.0	37.1	46.1	32.0	37.4	42.0	33.0
4 y 5	33.9	20.2	41.4	28.4	46.0	27.2	39.2	29.5	33.5	36.4
6 y 7	13.2	18.3	11.2	11.1	12.6	13.9	12.6	10.1	14.5	12.7
8 y 9	4.7	7.3	2.6	7.3	2.2	4.5	5.0	4.7	3.7	6.4
Ns/ Nc	9.9	21.9	6.6	7.3	2.2	8.3	11.3	18.3	6.2	11.5

ABRIL 2011

**5B.5 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES POLITICAS: LOS SINDICATOS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	59.1	44.1	61.6	67.1	66.2	59.6	58.7	72.1	55.7	58.0
4 y 5	17.8	19.3	18.3	17.2	15.0	15.5	19.7	17.4	18.1	17.6
6 y 7	12.6	16.3	12.4	8.8	12.4	17.2	8.9	7.7	17.4	7.6
8 y 9	3.6	7.3	3.9	1.4		2.9	4.2		2.6	6.9
10	0.5	2.0					0.9			1.5
Ns/ Nc	6.4	11.0	3.8	5.5	6.5	4.9	7.6	2.8	6.3	8.4

ABRIL 2011

**5B.6 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES POLITICAS: EL GOBIERNO DE LA CIUDAD DE BUENOS AIRES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	45.5	50.8	43.7	47.1	38.6	51.1	40.9	49.4	45.0	44.2
4 y 5	26.7	23.0	32.2	25.6	21.0	25.6	27.5	43.1	28.1	16.5
6 y 7	15.6	5.9	18.9	12.7	27.5	13.7	17.1	2.8	17.1	19.4
8 y 9	8.4	14.6	3.9	10.2	6.3	7.9	8.8	4.7	7.9	10.9
10	0.8	2.0			2.2		1.5			2.5
Ns/ Nc	3.1	3.7	1.3	4.3	4.3	1.7	4.1		1.8	6.4

ABRIL 2011

**5B.7 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES POLITICAS: LOS PARTIDOS POLITICOS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	48.2	36.8	47.3	54.2	60.3	49.2	47.4	53.3	47.1	47.5
4 y 5	27.3	19.9	32.6	27.4	26.7	24.0	30.0	29.8	27.7	25.6
6 y 7	15.3	21.0	16.3	11.6	8.7	20.0	11.5	14.1	18.4	11.0
8 y 9	3.5	9.3	1.3	2.7		1.9	4.7		3.3	5.4
Ns/ Nc	5.8	12.9	2.4	4.1	4.3	4.9	6.5	2.8	3.6	10.5

ABRIL 2011

**5B.8 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES POLITICAS: LA LEGISLATURA PORTEÑA**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	41.7	38.5	39.5	46.9	44.9	47.3	37.3	44.6	42.9	38.5
4 y 5	27.4	23.0	32.5	28.6	21.0	24.4	29.9	44.9	27.1	19.5
6 y 7	15.7	14.3	20.5	10.2	14.8	16.5	15.1	7.7	17.6	16.8
8 y 9	4.6	7.6	3.8	4.3	2.2	3.7	5.3	2.8	3.1	7.8
10	0.3				2.2		0.6		0.7	
Ns/ Nc	10.1	16.6	3.8	10.0	15.0	8.1	11.8		8.6	17.4

ABRIL 2011

**5B.9 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES POLITICAS: LAS ORGANIZACIONES DE LOS EMPRESARIOS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	36.5	32.9	42.3	35.6	30.2	42.4	31.8	37.9	39.3	31.8
4 y 5	22.5	14.3	24.7	29.0	21.3	19.5	24.9	34.7	24.5	13.5
6 y 7	13.9	12.6	17.5	14.5	6.3	17.7	10.8	7.7	16.8	12.4
8 y 9	3.2	7.3	2.7		2.0	2.6	3.6		2.3	6.0
10	1.1	2.0			4.1	0.7	1.5		1.3	1.5
Ns/ Nc	22.8	30.9	12.8	20.9	36.2	17.2	27.3	19.7	15.9	34.9

ABRIL 2011

**5C.1 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE LA SOCIEDAD: LAS ONG'S (ORGANIZACIONES NO GUBERNAMENTALES)**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	11.1	11.0	12.7	12.0	6.1	14.2	8.6	17.1	6.9	14.5
4 y 5	18.1	21.3	14.3	19.0	20.6	19.8	16.8	16.3	22.7	12.0
6 y 7	28.3	29.2	29.7	29.9	21.3	23.7	32.0	32.3	28.6	25.8
8 y 9	15.7	16.6	16.4	12.5	16.9	14.0	17.0	14.6	16.7	14.6
10	1.4	2.0	2.4			2.0	0.9		1.8	1.5
Ns/ Nc	25.5	19.9	24.5	26.5	35.1	26.3	24.8	19.7	23.3	31.5

ABRIL 2011

**5C.2 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE LA SOCIEDAD: LOS SEXO AMBIENTALISTAS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	12.0	19.9	8.9	12.0	6.3	14.3	10.1	21.4	8.0	13.4
4 y 5	17.0	12.9	19.4	19.5	14.1	18.6	15.6	19.9	21.1	9.3
6 y 7	35.6	33.9	37.7	33.8	35.8	28.8	41.1	42.7	36.5	30.8
8 y 9	20.3	18.6	20.1	23.4	19.1	21.7	19.1	10.5	24.2	19.0
10	6.3	7.9	8.9	1.6	4.1	5.5	6.9	2.8	4.2	11.1
Ns/ Nc	8.9	6.7	5.0	9.8	20.6	11.0	7.2	2.6	5.9	16.5

ABRIL 2011



**5C.3 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE LA SOCIEDAD: LA IGLESIA CATOLICA**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	37.9	41.2	40.2	39.9	24.3	41.9	34.7	44.0	40.5	31.0
4 y 5	18.3	14.0	24.1	17.9	12.4	24.3	13.5	28.8	17.0	15.3
6 y 7	23.1	23.6	21.4	19.5	31.7	22.0	24.1	17.3	26.4	21.0
8 y 9	12.4	11.6	8.0	12.9	23.6	5.0	18.4	7.2	10.0	18.7
10	4.2	4.0	2.6	5.7	6.1	3.2	5.0	2.8	1.2	9.3
Ns/ Nc	4.0	5.6	3.8	4.1	2.0	3.6	4.3		4.9	4.7

ABRIL 2011

**5C.4 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE LA SOCIEDAD: LA ESCUELA PUBLICA**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	10.6	14.0	12.9	9.1	2.0	13.6	8.3	13.7	9.5	10.9
4 y 5	20.8	16.3	21.6	19.0	29.1	23.6	18.6	27.9	21.7	16.1
6 y 7	36.8	41.5	31.1	37.2	41.9	32.5	40.2	42.6	39.1	30.4
8 y 9	20.7	18.6	21.7	22.9	18.9	18.8	22.3	13.6	22.7	21.2
10	7.9	9.6	7.7	7.5	6.1	7.7	8.0	2.2	3.8	16.8
Ns/ Nc	3.1		5.0	4.3	2.2	3.8	2.6		3.2	4.6

ABRIL 2011

**5C.5 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE LA SOCIEDAD: LAS IGLESIAS EN GENERAL**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	32.5	34.6	38.7	27.0	22.3	36.0	29.7	38.2	32.8	29.2
4 y 5	20.6	20.7	20.6	21.8	18.7	24.0	17.8	34.6	21.5	12.4
6 y 7	21.9	23.9	17.8	22.7	27.5	18.9	24.4	14.2	23.3	23.7
8 y 9	10.7	9.6	7.5	11.3	19.3	7.2	13.6	5.0	10.1	14.5
10	3.0	2.0	2.6	2.7	6.1	2.4	3.5		1.2	7.2
Ns/ Nc	11.2	9.3	12.8	14.5	6.1	11.4	11.1	8.1	11.1	13.1

ABRIL 2011

**5C.6 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE LA SOCIEDAD: LOS DIARIOS NACIONALES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	25.5	26.3	28.0	27.2	15.8	36.8	16.5	26.7	27.1	22.5
4 y 5	25.1	16.0	30.7	21.5	31.7	24.4	25.6	40.5	24.3	18.8
6 y 7	26.4	27.6	29.2	20.2	26.9	27.8	25.4	26.6	29.9	21.1
8 y 9	15.7	18.6	8.1	21.1	21.5	6.9	22.8	6.2	14.3	22.5
10	1.8	5.9		1.4			3.3		0.6	4.5
Ns/ Nc	5.4	5.6	3.9	8.6	4.1	4.2	6.4		3.7	10.6

ABRIL 2011

**5C.7 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE LA SOCIEDAD: LAS UNIVERSIDADES PUBLICAS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	6.4	5.3	10.1	6.1		9.3	4.1	11.2	5.5	5.6
4 y 5	16.6	20.2	16.8	17.7	8.2	15.9	17.1	24.9	12.9	18.1
6 y 7	33.4	27.4	31.0	35.4	45.8	34.2	32.6	38.5	37.0	25.3
8 y 9	27.1	32.1	25.7	24.5	25.6	19.9	32.8	17.4	32.1	24.0
10	7.7	5.3	10.1	4.5	10.2	10.5	5.4	8.1	7.4	7.9
Ns/ Nc	8.9	9.6	6.2	11.8	10.2	10.2	7.9		5.1	19.1

ABRIL 2011

**5C.8 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE LA SOCIEDAD: LA TV**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	34.1	31.9	39.5	35.8	22.3	44.3	25.9	38.2	32.1	35.2
4 y 5	27.9	23.9	32.1	24.7	28.9	28.1	27.7	33.4	29.0	23.4
6 y 7	22.8	25.6	19.3	19.3	31.7	17.2	27.3	24.4	26.1	17.0
8 y 9	11.6	14.6	6.5	14.5	15.0	9.6	13.2	4.1	10.5	17.0
10	1.5	4.0	1.3				2.7		1.0	3.0
Ns/ Nc	2.1		1.3	5.7	2.2	0.8	3.1		1.3	4.3

ABRIL 2011

**5C.9 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE LA SOCIEDAD: LA RADIO**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	16.7	19.6	19.4	13.6	10.0	20.1	13.9	19.3	15.5	17.3
4 y 5	25.9	20.2	29.2	33.6	16.1	29.8	22.7	30.0	29.6	18.1
6 y 7	30.1	33.9	28.3	24.5	36.0	28.9	31.0	39.0	32.7	21.9
8 y 9	22.2	18.6	20.5	24.1	29.7	17.0	26.4	11.8	18.2	33.4
10	2.9	5.6	1.3	1.4	4.1	1.6	3.9		2.4	4.9
Ns/ Nc	2.2	2.0	1.2	2.9	4.1	2.5	2.1		1.6	4.3

ABRIL 2011

**5C.10 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE LA SOCIEDAD: LAS UNIVERSIDADES PRIVADAS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	15.0	18.3	16.7	14.7	6.1	16.1	14.1	17.0	13.0	17.0
4 y 5	17.5	15.7	23.2	12.2	14.3	22.2	13.7	17.4	21.5	11.4
6 y 7	23.8	28.6	21.6	24.1	21.0	24.8	23.1	24.2	26.1	20.1
8 y 9	14.9	11.3	16.7	12.9	19.3	11.0	18.0	7.2	14.1	19.9
10	1.7	4.0		2.9		0.8	2.4	2.2	0.6	3.0
Ns/ Nc	27.1	22.2	21.8	33.1	39.3	25.2	28.7	32.1	24.7	28.5

ABRIL 2011

**5C.11 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE LA SOCIEDAD: LAS ORGANIZACIONES DE DEFENSA DEL CONSUMIDOR**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	17.2	18.0	18.1	18.1	12.4	20.1	14.8	21.8	13.6	20.4
4 y 5	17.9	11.0	21.8	17.5	20.6	18.2	17.7	17.1	20.8	14.0
6 y 7	26.5	30.6	26.8	28.1	16.9	25.1	27.7	31.3	25.9	25.1
8 y 9	11.0	12.9	7.8	14.5	10.6	8.7	12.9	6.8	12.2	11.3
10	1.3	2.0	1.3		2.0	0.7	1.8		0.6	3.0
Ns/ Nc	26.1	25.6	24.1	21.8	37.5	27.2	25.1	23.0	26.9	26.2

ABRIL 2011

**5C.12 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE LA SOCIEDAD: LOS PERIODISTAS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	21.5	24.6	20.2	21.1	20.0	32.1	12.9	21.4	19.6	24.4
4 y 5	27.5	23.6	37.2	22.0	18.9	28.3	26.9	36.8	31.7	16.8
6 y 7	34.3	38.2	25.3	42.7	37.5	33.6	34.9	32.8	36.2	32.3
8 y 9	11.4	11.6	8.1	12.7	17.1	3.2	18.0	5.9	8.0	19.2
10	0.9	2.0	1.2			1.0	0.9			2.9
Ns/ Nc	4.3		8.0	1.6	6.5	1.8	6.3	3.1	4.5	4.5

ABRIL 2011

**5C.13 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE LA SOCIEDAD: LOS ECONOMISTAS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	24.4	26.6	25.5	27.4	14.1	34.2	16.5	36.5	21.0	23.8
4 y 5	31.5	23.9	38.7	29.9	28.9	28.3	34.0	20.2	38.5	26.3
6 y 7	27.6	36.5	17.8	28.1	35.6	24.8	29.9	30.6	27.9	25.8
8 y 9	5.9	5.9	4.0	7.3	8.5	2.3	8.9	4.1	2.9	11.4
10	0.4		1.2			1.0				1.3
Ns/ Nc	10.1	7.0	12.8	7.3	13.0	9.5	10.7	8.7	9.8	11.4

ABRIL 2011

**5C.14 CONFIANZA EN LAS INSTITUCIONES DE LA SOCIEDAD: ORGANISMOS INTERNACIONALES COMO EL BANCO MUNDIAL O EL BID**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	33.8	26.9	39.5	36.2	28.2	45.1	24.8	32.6	39.3	26.1
4 y 5	17.1	14.6	23.3	15.9	8.5	14.7	19.1	18.6	20.5	11.4
6 y 7	13.0	11.6	9.8	18.4	15.0	11.0	14.5	20.0	9.3	15.2
8 y 9	5.0	9.0	4.0	2.9	3.9	5.0	5.0	9.0	5.1	3.0
10	0.5	2.0					0.9			1.5
Ns/ Nc	30.5	35.9	23.3	26.6	44.5	24.2	35.6	19.7	25.9	42.8

ABRIL 2011

**5D.1 CONFIANZA EN OTRAS INSTITUCIONES QUE HACEN AL DERECHO Y JUSTICIA: LAS JUSTICIA EN GENERAL**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	39.2	34.2	37.1	44.2	45.1	45.5	34.1	43.3	34.8	43.9
4 y 5	33.6	23.9	37.2	40.2	31.7	29.6	36.9	34.8	35.7	29.9
6 y 7	21.1	34.9	16.7	12.7	21.0	18.2	23.4	19.1	23.5	18.5
8 y 9	4.3	5.3	6.3	1.4	2.2	4.9	3.9	2.8	3.5	6.3
10	0.5		1.3				0.9			1.5
Ns/ Nc	1.3	1.7	1.3	1.6		1.7	0.9		2.5	

ABRIL 2011

**5D.2 CONFIANZA EN OTRAS INSTITUCIONES QUE HACEN AL DERECHO Y JUSTICIA: LOS ABOGADOS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	38.4	34.2	35.7	47.4	39.0	45.8	32.6	47.3	32.6	43.0
4 y 5	35.5	29.5	38.4	34.3	39.9	31.3	38.8	28.3	41.8	29.3
6 y 7	20.1	26.9	20.6	13.6	16.9	17.0	22.6	22.2	19.9	19.3
8 y 9	2.1	4.0	1.3		4.1	0.7	3.3		1.6	4.0
10	0.9	3.7				1.0	0.9		0.8	1.5
Ns/ Nc	2.9	1.7	3.9	4.7		4.3	1.8	2.2	3.2	2.8

ABRIL 2011

**5D.3 CONFIANZA EN OTRAS INSTITUCIONES QUE HACEN AL DERECHO Y JUSTICIA: LOS ESCRIBANOS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	31.6	27.2	31.9	39.7	26.7	35.7	28.4	38.7	27.3	34.8
4 y 5	30.5	25.9	29.8	31.8	37.7	25.1	34.7	26.4	35.7	24.6
6 y 7	20.6	23.6	24.4	10.9	20.8	18.4	22.4	28.1	19.3	19.0
8 y 9	4.7	7.3	2.6	5.7	4.1	4.4	5.0	2.8	5.2	4.9
Ns/ Nc	12.5	16.0	11.3	12.0	10.6	16.4	9.5	4.1	12.5	16.7

ABRIL 2011

**5D.4 CONFIANZA EN OTRAS INSTITUCIONES QUE HACEN AL DERECHO Y JUSTICIA: LAS ORGANIZACIONES DEFENSA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	19.8	19.3	19.1	25.2	14.5	24.8	15.8	32.6	17.1	17.6
4 y 5	21.9	20.6	20.6	23.4	24.9	19.8	23.6	19.2	22.1	22.9
6 y 7	35.9	32.9	38.4	32.7	39.7	33.1	38.2	30.1	41.8	29.9
8 y 9	13.5	16.6	14.2	10.0	12.1	13.1	13.9	18.0	10.1	16.6
10	2.9	4.0	5.1			2.0	3.6		2.8	4.5
Ns/ Nc	6.0	6.7	2.6	8.8	8.7	7.2	5.0		6.2	8.5

ABRIL 2011

**5D.5 CONFIANZA EN OTRAS INSTITUCIONES QUE HACEN AL DERECHO Y JUSTICIA: EL CONSEJO DE LA MAGISTRATURA**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
1 a 3	27.4	21.6	27.8	32.6	28.4	36.3	20.2	34.8	29.0	21.4
4 y 5	23.1	14.3	32.8	21.5	16.9	17.1	28.0	27.5	25.2	17.8
6 y 7	20.3	23.9	23.0	15.7	14.5	19.2	21.2	27.3	21.0	15.8
8 y 9	3.9	5.6	3.9	2.9	2.2	2.7	4.8		3.4	6.4
10	0.5	2.0					0.9			1.5
Ns/ Nc	24.8	32.6	12.5	27.2	38.0	24.7	24.9	10.4	21.4	37.1

ABRIL 2011

**5D.6 CONFIANZA EN OTRAS INSTITUCIONES QUE HACEN AL DERECHO Y JUSTICIA: LA DEFENSORIA DEL PUEBLO**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
1 a 3	21.6	19.6	20.3	26.7	20.2	28.4	16.1	29.8	20.0	19.9
4 y 5	18.7	14.6	19.7	21.3	19.1	12.3	23.8	10.4	20.7	19.7
6 y 7	24.6	27.2	25.6	22.2	21.5	24.6	24.6	31.2	28.2	16.1
8 y 9	11.5	9.0	19.1	4.3	8.0	13.7	9.8	5.6	12.4	13.2
10	1.5	4.0	1.2			1.0	1.8			4.4
Ns/ Nc	22.2	25.6	14.0	25.4	31.2	19.9	23.9	23.0	18.8	26.8

ABRIL 2011

**6.1 CONFIANZA EN LAS LEYES: LAS LEYES EN GENERAL**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Mucha confianza	12.1	7.0	14.2	11.6	16.5	13.0	11.5	7.8	18.9	4.0
Alguna confianza	45.6	54.2	44.3	42.0	40.1	49.3	42.7	48.9	48.1	40.4
Poca confianza	30.8	29.5	32.8	32.0	26.7	25.6	35.0	28.4	25.5	40.1
Ninguna confianza	9.8	9.3	6.2	14.5	12.6	10.4	9.3	12.1	5.9	14.7
Ns/Nc	1.6		2.6		4.1	1.7	1.5	2.8	1.7	0.9

ABRIL 2011

**6.2 CONFIANZA EN LAS LEYES: LOS PROCEDIMIENTOS PARA DESIGNAR A LOS JUECES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Mucha confianza	3.1	2.0	2.6	4.3	4.3	1.8	4.1	3.1	2.1	4.5
Alguna confianza	18.9	16.6	20.3	15.9	23.2	18.0	19.5	19.0	19.1	18.4
Poca confianza	40.4	45.5	39.9	42.0	31.0	39.9	40.8	49.6	40.6	35.6
Ninguna confianza	26.0	23.6	29.1	27.4	20.4	30.3	22.5	23.3	26.7	26.2
Ns/Nc	11.7	12.3	8.1	10.4	21.0	10.0	13.1	5.0	11.5	15.3

ABRIL 2011

### 6.3 CONFIANZA EN LAS LEYES: LOS PROCEDIMIENTOS PARA CONTROLAR Y REMOVER A LOS JUECES

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucha confianza	2.6	2.0	1.2	3.2	6.3	3.3	2.1	2.2	2.2	3.6
Alguna confianza	14.6	8.7	15.4	18.6	16.9	14.3	14.9	13.6	14.4	15.5
Poca confianza	39.5	37.9	43.9	38.6	33.2	36.6	41.9	49.8	41.1	32.2
Ninguna confianza	28.3	31.2	29.0	29.2	20.4	33.9	23.8	26.4	30.8	25.3
Ns/Nc	14.9	20.2	10.5	10.4	23.2	12.0	17.3	8.1	11.5	23.5

ABRIL 2011

### 6.4 CONFIANZA EN LAS LEYES: LOS CODIGOS DE PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucha confianza	2.8	1.7	3.8	1.6	4.1	4.4	1.5	3.1	3.2	2.1
Alguna confianza	22.9	18.3	27.8	26.1	14.5	26.4	20.1	22.2	25.9	18.7
Poca confianza	37.9	38.5	36.4	35.8	43.4	32.7	42.1	43.8	39.1	33.2
Ninguna confianza	20.6	23.9	16.6	24.5	19.1	18.8	22.0	25.0	17.3	23.3
Ns/Nc	15.8	17.6	15.5	12.0	18.9	17.7	14.3	5.9	14.4	22.7

ABRIL 2011

### 6.5 CONFIANZA EN LAS LEYES: EL SISTEMA ELECTORAL

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucha confianza	9.1	7.6	6.2	11.6	14.8	8.7	9.4	4.7	8.8	11.6
Alguna confianza	32.7	26.3	39.6	27.9	33.4	37.7	28.6	31.6	34.6	30.3
Poca confianza	35.6	38.5	35.2	34.7	33.2	30.4	39.8	41.6	37.6	29.6
Ninguna confianza	19.8	21.9	17.7	21.8	18.7	22.2	17.9	20.2	16.6	24.5
Ns/Nc	2.8	5.6	1.3	4.1	1.0	4.3	1.9	1.9	2.4	3.9

ABRIL 2011

### 6.6 CONFIANZA EN LAS LEYES: LAS ESTADISTICAS PUBLICAS (INDEC)

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucha confianza	1.8		1.3	4.3	2.0	1.5	2.0		2.2	2.0
Alguna confianza	16.1	25.6	17.7	8.4	8.2	17.9	14.8	8.7	15.4	20.8
Poca confianza	33.2	44.1	31.0	25.4	31.5	27.1	38.1	38.6	33.6	29.9
Ninguna confianza	44.1	25.0	46.2	57.1	51.8	47.3	41.6	49.9	43.5	42.3
Ns/Nc	4.8	5.3	3.8	4.7	6.5	6.3	3.6	2.8	5.3	5.0

ABRIL 2011

### 6.7 CONFIANZA EN LAS LEYES: LA REGULACION Y CONTROL DE LOS SERVICIOS PUBLICOS

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucha confianza	3.5	3.7	2.6	4.5	4.1	4.2	3.0		3.0	6.0
Alguna confianza	22.8	26.6	22.8	24.1	14.8	25.1	20.9	18.3	20.7	28.0
Poca confianza	38.6	37.2	45.2	28.8	39.5	33.7	42.6	43.8	43.8	28.3
Ninguna confianza	29.7	21.3	28.2	39.7	33.0	34.4	26.0	37.9	26.8	30.2
Ns/Nc	5.4	11.3	1.3	2.9	8.7	2.7	7.5		5.7	7.5

ABRIL 2011

### 6.8 CONFIANZA EN LAS LEYES: LOS SISTEMAS DE CONTROL DE LA CORRUPCION ESTATAL

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucha confianza	1.9		2.6	1.6	4.1	2.5	1.5		1.5	3.6
Alguna confianza	8.2	10.3	9.0	7.0	4.3	8.6	7.9	2.8	9.3	9.1
Poca confianza	35.7	32.9	39.9	32.0	35.6	33.8	37.2	48.6	39.3	23.9
Ninguna confianza	49.7	47.5	47.2	59.4	45.3	52.6	47.4	48.6	45.3	56.9
Ns/Nc	4.5	9.3	1.3		10.6	2.6	6.1		4.6	6.5

ABRIL 2011

### 6.9 CONFIANZA EN LAS LEYES: LOS SISTEMAS DE CONTROL DE LA CORRUPCION PRIVADA

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucha confianza	2.2		2.4	3.2	4.1	4.3	0.6	2.2	2.4	2.1
Alguna confianza	8.7	15.4	7.8	4.3	6.5	10.4	7.4	5.4	9.5	9.2
Poca confianza	34.3	29.2	39.9	31.3	33.4	30.5	37.3	36.8	39.9	24.6
Ninguna confianza	49.2	46.4	47.3	58.3	45.3	49.5	49.0	52.8	42.8	57.2
Ns/Nc	5.5	9.0	2.6	2.9	10.6	5.3	5.7	2.8	5.4	7.0

ABRIL 2011

### 6.10 CONFIANZA EN LAS LEYES: LA ORGANIZACION DE LOS PROGRAMAS DE EMPLEO Y POBREZA

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucha confianza	5.5	5.6	5.0	7.0	4.1	5.4	5.5		4.7	9.3
Alguna confianza	22.7	19.3	27.9	17.7	23.2	27.4	18.9	9.6	27.0	22.6
Poca confianza	43.3	46.4	42.7	37.6	47.5	38.0	47.6	44.6	42.6	43.7
Ninguna confianza	23.6	19.6	23.2	30.8	21.0	24.6	22.9	45.8	18.9	20.2
Ns/Nc	4.9	9.0	1.2	6.8	4.1	4.5	5.1		6.9	4.2

ABRIL 2011

### 6.11 CONFIANZA EN LAS LEYES: LA CONSTITUCION NACIONAL

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucha confianza	28.1	25.0	25.6	29.0	37.7	29.0	27.4	22.0	33.4	22.9
Alguna confianza	29.5	21.6	34.4	30.6	29.1	32.9	26.7	32.7	28.2	29.9
Poca confianza	27.6	31.8	29.9	21.1	24.7	20.2	33.6	30.0	26.5	28.3
Ninguna confianza	9.9	11.0	7.5	16.3	4.3	11.6	8.5	15.2	7.8	10.4
Ns/Nc	4.9	10.6	2.6	2.9	4.1	6.3	3.9		4.1	8.6

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### 6.12 CONFIANZA EN LAS LEYES: LOS PROCESOS JUDICIALES

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucha confianza	4.6	3.3	7.4	2.9	2.2	7.7	2.1	5.9	5.2	3.0
Alguna confianza	22.4	19.6	27.9	22.0	14.8	26.6	19.1	20.2	28.4	14.6
Poca confianza	42.8	43.1	38.0	42.9	53.6	31.6	51.8	45.4	42.1	42.6
Ninguna confianza	21.1	21.6	17.7	27.7	18.9	24.0	18.7	28.6	15.8	25.4
Ns/Nc	9.1	12.3	9.0	4.5	10.6	10.0	8.4		8.5	14.5

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### 7. ¿QUE NIVEL DE CONFIANZA TIENE UD. REALMENTE EN EL BUEN FUNCIONAMIENTO Y ECUANIMIDAD DE LOS JUECES ARGENTINOS?

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	1.7	1.7	2.4		2.2	3.0	0.6		2.6	1.0
Algo	35.8	30.9	42.2	27.2	40.6	32.4	38.4	42.2	36.8	31.0
Poco	41.6	46.6	36.4	46.5	38.8	43.0	40.4	34.1	44.5	40.8
Nada	19.8	18.9	19.0	23.4	18.4	20.8	19.1	23.7	15.4	24.8
Ns/ Nc	1.2	2.0		2.9		0.8	1.5		0.7	2.4

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### 8. MUCHA GENTE DESCONFIA DE LOS JUECES Y EN GENERAL DEL SISTEMA DE JUSTICIA EN LA ARGENTINA ¿CREE UD. QUE TIENEN RAZON EN DESCONFIAR?

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	42.8	44.1	37.2	49.0	45.3	41.5	43.9	56.0	37.2	45.1
Algo	45.4	45.2	51.3	39.7	39.9	46.7	44.4	39.4	51.4	39.2
Poco	9.0	8.7	9.0	6.8	12.8	7.5	10.3	4.7	8.3	12.2
Nada	1.1		1.2	1.6	2.0	2.5			1.5	1.1
Ns/ Nc	1.6	2.0	1.2	2.9		1.8	1.5		1.6	2.4

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**9. MUCHA GENTE TAMBIEN DESCONFIA DE LAS LEYES EN GENERAL. EN EL CASO DE LA ARGENTINA, TENIENDO EN CUENTA LOS PROCEDIMIENTOS Y CALIDAD PROMEDIO DE LAS LEYES ¿CREE UD. QUE TIENEN RAZON EN DESCONFIA?**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	37.9	32.6	33.2	49.2	41.4	40.0	36.2	47.0	31.8	42.7
Algo	44.8	53.1	47.8	35.1	38.0	40.5	48.3	40.6	49.5	39.8
Poco	13.7	12.6	12.9	12.7	18.7	12.1	15.0	6.8	13.9	16.7
Nada	2.5	1.7	4.8		2.0	5.7		5.6	3.2	
Ns/ Nc	1.1		1.2	2.9		1.8	0.5		1.6	0.9

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**10.1 ES RAZONABLE DESCONFIA: LEYES IMPOSITIVAS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Es razonable que se desconfíe	59.6	49.5	60.2	65.3	66.6	58.5	60.5	72.3	56.0	59.0
No es razonable que se desconfíe	21.3	22.7	22.0	23.4	14.3	24.8	18.4	12.6	25.2	19.4
No sabe	18.5	27.9	17.8	10.0	16.9	16.7	19.9	15.1	18.2	20.6
No contesta	0.6			1.4	2.2		1.2		0.6	1.0

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**10.2 ES RAZONABLE DESCONFIA: LEYES PENALES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Es razonable que se desconfíe	65.7	59.4	62.8	78.7	64.2	64.2	66.9	64.4	61.5	72.7
No es razonable que se desconfíe	14.9	15.4	19.3	10.2	10.2	19.1	11.5	14.1	19.1	8.8
No sabe	18.7	23.6	17.9	11.1	23.4	15.8	21.0	21.5	18.6	17.6
No contesta	0.8	1.7			2.2	1.0	0.6		0.8	1.0

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**10.3 ES RAZONABLE DESCONFIA: LEYES CIVILES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Es razonable que se desconfíe	58.1	51.8	55.0	69.2	60.3	55.1	60.6	61.5	51.9	65.9
No es razonable que se desconfíe	26.8	28.6	33.4	25.4	10.4	30.8	23.6	29.6	31.1	19.1
No sabe	14.7	19.6	11.6	5.5	27.1	14.1	15.2	8.9	17.0	14.0
No contesta	0.3				2.2		0.6			1.0

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**10.4 ES RAZONABLE DESCONFIAR: LEYES DE ORDENAMIENTO DEL TRANSITO**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Es razonable que se desconfíe	55.6	49.5	56.5	60.8	56.4	52.9	57.8	57.0	55.9	54.6
No es razonable que se desconfíe	30.1	28.6	34.8	30.6	20.6	32.1	28.5	25.6	33.0	27.8
No sabe	13.9	21.9	8.8	8.6	20.8	15.0	13.1	17.4	11.1	16.6
No contesta	0.3				2.2		0.6			1.0

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**10.5 ES RAZONABLE DESCONFIAR: LEYES LABORALES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Es razonable que se desconfíe	59.5	47.8	62.3	65.3	64.0	64.0	56.0	68.5	55.9	60.8
No es razonable que se desconfíe	24.6	30.9	23.5	27.7	12.6	22.3	26.4	16.9	28.3	22.6
No sabe	15.5	21.3	14.3	7.0	21.3	13.8	17.0	14.6	15.8	15.6
No contesta	0.3				2.2		0.6			1.0

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**10.6 ES RAZONABLE DESCONFIAR: LEYES ELECTORALES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Es razonable que se desconfíe	61.9	51.5	66.6	66.9	60.5	61.0	62.6	69.7	57.8	64.2
No es razonable que se desconfíe	22.4	26.6	17.9	23.1	24.9	24.7	20.5	9.5	28.1	20.0
No sabe	14.9	21.9	14.2	10.0	12.4	14.4	15.4	17.7	14.1	14.8
No contesta	0.8		1.3		2.2		1.5	3.1		1.0

ABRIL 2011

**10.7 ES RAZONABLE DESCONFIAR: LEYES COMERCIALES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Es razonable que se desconfíe	55.3	43.5	57.8	62.6	58.4	55.2	55.5	68.4	55.1	49.3
No es razonable que se desconfíe	19.9	29.8	16.7	17.5	14.5	17.7	21.6	12.0	19.6	24.1
No sabe	24.0	26.6	24.3	20.0	24.9	26.1	22.3	19.6	24.4	25.5
No contesta	0.8		1.2		2.2	1.0	0.6		0.9	1.0

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**11. EN UN PAIS COMO LA ARGENTINA, ¿CREE UD. QUE VALE LA PENA RESPETAR LA LEY Y LAS INSTITUCIONES?**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Si	76.2	69.4	79.4	71.9	85.7	72.8	78.9	70.5	82.1	69.9
No	8.3	8.7	8.8	10.4	3.9	13.3	4.3	9.0	5.4	12.5
Depende	13.8	21.9	9.2	14.7	10.4	13.0	14.5	20.5	9.9	16.6
Ns/ Nc	1.6		2.7	2.9		0.8	2.3		2.6	1.1

ABRIL 2011

**12. EN UN PAIS COMO LA ARGENTINA, ¿PIENSA UD. PERSONALMENTE QUE QUIEN RESPETA LAS LEYES Y LAS INSTITUCIONES MERECE RESPETO Y CONSIDERACION O PECA DE INGENUO?**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Merece respeto y consideración	63.9	64.4	61.9	64.6	67.0	55.6	70.6	64.3	69.9	54.6
Peca de ingenuo	15.0	14.0	15.1	15.2	16.3	22.7	8.9	17.0	10.4	21.1
Ni una cosa ni la otra: no hay que extremar las cosas	19.2	19.6	21.8	16.1	16.7	20.7	18.0	13.8	18.2	23.4
Ns/ Nc	1.9	2.0	1.2	4.1		1.0	2.5	5.0	1.5	0.9

ABRIL 2011

**13.1 IMPORTANCIA DE MOTIVOS PERSONALES DE RESPETO Y ADECUACION A LAS LEYES: EL TEMOR A LA SANCION Y AL COSTO DE NO RESPETAR LA LEY**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	13.4	16.3	11.7	16.5	8.5	14.0	13.0	12.8	14.1	12.7
4 y 5	15.9	19.6	15.8	12.9	14.5	14.1	17.4	17.8	18.2	11.6
6 y 7	22.6	19.9	26.4	19.3	22.6	29.4	17.1	14.0	20.9	29.3
8 y 9	24.2	19.6	24.4	32.9	18.7	23.9	24.4	32.4	23.2	21.7
10	23.9	24.5	21.7	18.4	35.8	18.6	28.1	23.0	23.6	24.7

ABRIL 2011

**13.2 IMPORTANCIA DE MOTIVOS PERSONALES DE RESPETO Y ADECUACION A LAS LEYES: SIENDE LA OBLIGACION MORAL DE RESPETAR LA LEY**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	4.4	5.9	5.1	2.9	2.2	2.8	5.7	8.1	2.2	5.9
4 y 5	5.1	5.3	5.0	7.0	2.0	6.4	4.0	2.8	5.3	5.7
6 y 7	23.1	25.3	26.8	23.8	10.0	28.5	18.8	20.0	21.6	26.9
8 y 9	31.4	35.6	28.6	34.5	26.9	30.8	31.9	39.1	34.3	23.3
10	35.2	26.2	33.3	31.8	59.0	29.6	39.6	30.0	35.7	36.8
Ns/ Nc	0.9	1.7	1.2			2.0			0.8	1.3

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**13.3 IMPORTANCIA DE MOTIVOS PERSONALES DE RESPETO Y ADECUACION A LAS LEYES: FUI EDUCADO PARA RESPETAR LAS LEYES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	3.6	3.7	3.9	4.3	2.0	3.4	3.8	2.2	4.9	2.4
4 y 5	4.2	7.0	3.9	2.9	2.2	4.6	3.9	5.9	4.1	3.6
6 y 7	16.8	16.6	20.2	17.7	8.0	20.6	13.8	17.4	13.2	22.0
8 y 9	29.8	35.0	28.4	27.0	28.6	32.7	27.5	35.8	30.7	25.5
10	45.2	37.8	43.5	46.7	59.2	38.6	50.5	38.7	46.5	46.5
Ns/ Nc	0.3			1.4			0.5		0.6	

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**13.4 IMPORTANCIA DE MOTIVOS PERSONALES DE RESPETO Y ADECUACION A LAS LEYES: ES MAS RAZONABLE ADECUARSE A LAS LEYES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	4.8	5.3	3.9	9.1		6.1	3.8	2.2	4.9	5.9
4 y 5	8.5	17.6	5.0	4.1	8.2	11.0	6.5	11.6	6.1	10.7
6 y 7	24.6	26.9	28.0	26.5	10.0	30.4	19.9	14.0	26.1	27.4
8 y 9	31.4	34.6	31.0	30.2	29.3	28.5	33.8	45.3	32.3	23.5
10	28.8	15.5	29.5	28.8	48.6	21.6	34.6	26.9	27.9	31.1
Ns/ Nc	1.9		2.6	1.4	3.9	2.4	1.4		2.7	1.5

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**13.5 IMPORTANCIA DE MOTIVOS PERSONALES DE RESPETO Y ADECUACION A LAS LEYES: ACTUO DEL MISMO MODO COMO DESEARIA QUE ACTUEN LOS DEMAS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	4.7	7.0	2.6	6.1	4.1	6.9	3.0	2.2	4.0	7.1
4 y 5	6.5	7.6	6.3	5.5	6.3	4.6	7.9	9.0	5.1	7.3
6 y 7	26.9	32.6	30.2	28.5	7.8	37.8	18.2	22.2	26.5	29.8
8 y 9	30.9	39.6	26.2	27.2	33.0	28.6	32.7	33.9	33.6	25.3
10	29.5	13.3	32.2	29.9	48.8	21.1	36.2	32.8	29.3	28.2
Ns/ Nc	1.5		2.6	2.7		1.0	2.0		1.6	2.3

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**13.6 IMPORTANCIA DE MOTIVOS PERSONALES DE RESPETO Y ADECUACION A LAS LEYES: SIENTO QUE ME CONVIENE RESPETAR LAS LEYES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	6.8	7.6	7.8	7.7	2.0	6.8	6.9	11.2	5.7	6.5
4 y 5	9.5	12.0	14.0	4.3	2.0	13.2	6.5	12.1	9.4	8.4
6 y 7	24.6	23.9	24.1	32.2	16.3	28.0	21.9	18.5	22.8	30.5
8 y 9	26.6	32.6	22.0	27.2	26.9	25.4	27.6	38.5	27.6	19.3
10	30.1	23.9	28.3	25.6	50.8	23.8	35.2	19.7	32.1	32.1
Ns/ Nc	2.4		3.8	2.9	2.2	2.8	2.1		2.6	3.3

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**13.7 IMPORTANCIA DE MOTIVOS PERSONALES DE RESPETO Y ADECUACION A LAS LEYES: RESPONDO A UN DEBER DE CONCIENCIA**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	11.3	14.9	8.9	16.3	4.1	12.3	10.6	15.6	11.8	8.5
4 y 5	17.5	17.6	19.3	16.3	14.5	20.5	15.1	13.6	16.8	20.3
6 y 7	25.5	19.6	28.3	29.0	23.4	24.4	26.4	12.7	26.4	30.4
8 y 9	21.3	27.2	21.7	17.0	16.7	21.1	21.5	35.1	20.1	16.4
10	17.3	13.6	16.7	15.7	27.1	12.8	21.0	16.8	20.1	13.3
Ns/ Nc	7.1	7.0	5.1	5.7	14.1	9.1	5.6	6.2	4.8	11.1

**13.8 IMPORTANCIA DE MOTIVOS PERSONALES DE RESPETO Y ADECUACION A LAS LEYES: CREO QUE ES UNA CUESTION DE HONOR**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	16.1	19.9	13.7	22.4	6.3	21.5	11.7	24.3	15.0	13.8
4 y 5	17.6	18.0	20.5	11.8	18.7	19.6	16.0	12.1	16.7	21.8
6 y 7	25.5	28.9	27.2	23.8	18.4	27.1	24.3	32.0	25.4	22.7
8 y 9	12.4	16.3	10.4	14.1	8.5	10.0	14.3	9.6	15.3	9.3
10	14.9	7.9	8.9	18.2	35.8	9.0	19.6	9.6	14.1	18.7
Ns/ Nc	13.5	9.0	19.3	9.8	12.4	12.7	14.1	12.4	13.6	13.9

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**13.9 IMPORTANCIA DE MOTIVOS PERSONALES DE RESPETO Y ADECUACION A LAS LEYES: LA LEY ES UN ORDEN RACIONAL DE LA SOCIEDAD QUE A TODOS NOS CONVIENE RESPETAR PARA QUE LAS COSAS FUNCIONEN**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	4.8	5.6	6.5	4.5		4.5	5.0	8.4	4.3	3.9
4 y 5	6.4	7.0	6.2	6.1	6.1	10.6	3.0	5.9	8.1	3.9
6 y 7	20.6	16.3	27.1	20.8	12.1	22.8	18.9	14.9	23.4	19.3
8 y 9	25.6	37.9	18.1	24.5	24.9	25.6	25.6	28.4	24.1	26.5
10	36.0	26.2	34.5	39.7	50.5	29.1	41.6	36.2	35.5	36.7
Ns/ Nc	6.5	7.0	7.7	4.3	6.3	7.3	5.9	6.2	4.6	9.7

ABRIL 2011

**14. FUENTES DE INFORMACION O EDUCACION FORMAL O INFORMAL SOBRE TEMAS CIVICOS. MENCIONAR HASTA LAS CUATRO MAS IMPORTANTES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Sí, en la escuela primaria.	30.3	33.2	27.0	37.4	23.2	26.8	33.1	21.1	31.3	33.2
Sí, en el colegio secundario.	65.4	78.7	65.4	62.8	47.7	66.9	64.3	74.9	72.6	50.0
Sí, en educación universitaria.	22.4	24.5	26.0	24.0	8.2	20.1	24.3	46.5	21.1	12.9
Sí, en educación terciaria.	6.1	1.7	10.2	5.7	4.1	6.4	5.8	5.9	7.1	4.7
Sí, en las relaciones personales.	29.6	40.9	20.6	33.6	26.7	34.0	26.1	36.8	31.8	22.7
Sí, en el ámbito laboral.	13.3	10.3	16.8	14.5	8.0	15.0	12.0	10.8	14.8	12.2
Sí, a través de los medios de comunicación.	27.0	24.5	28.4	28.4	25.4	18.8	33.5	18.8	25.0	33.8
Sí, a través de organismos no gubernamentales.	1.5		1.3	2.9	2.0	1.5	1.4	3.1		2.9
Sí, a través de las iglesias.	4.3		6.5	5.7	4.3	2.8	5.5		0.7	12.0
Lo que se lo adquirí en la vida diaria	45.5	44.9	42.3	46.5	52.5	46.0	45.0	50.7	46.1	42.1
Lo que se lo aprendí a través de la educación familiar	54.0	59.5	54.0	47.6	54.2	53.4	54.5	56.0	58.2	46.7
No, jamás recibí formación ni instrucción alguna sobre estos	0.8		1.2		2.0	1.7				2.3
Ns/ Nc	0.3			1.4			0.5			0.9
	300.4	318.3	299.9	310.4	258.4	293.4	306.0	324.4	308.7	276.2

ABRIL 2011

**15.1 NIVEL DE CONOCIMIENTO DE LAS PERSONAS SOBRE LAS LEYES : NIVEL DE CONOCIMIENTO DE LAS LEYES EN GENERAL**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	6.3	7.3	7.7	5.9	2.0	7.2	5.6	5.0	7.2	5.6
Algo	30.5	29.8	32.2	29.7	28.9	30.2	30.8	27.8	31.7	30.1
Poco	49.6	46.6	50.1	47.4	56.4	48.8	50.2	59.3	49.8	44.5
Nada	11.0	12.6	8.8	12.9	10.6	11.9	10.2	7.9	8.3	16.5
No sabe	2.6	3.7	1.2	4.1	2.2	2.0	3.1		3.0	3.3

ABRIL 2011

**15.2 NIVEL DE CONOCIMIENTO DE LAS PERSONAS SOBRE LAS LEYES : NIVEL DE CONOCIMIENTO DE LOS PROCEDIMIENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS Y JUDICIALES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	7.8	9.3	5.0	13.6	4.1	10.3	5.9	5.9	8.0	8.6
Algo	15.2	7.0	20.6	11.6	20.6	15.7	14.8	7.6	16.4	17.0
Poco	46.7	53.1	45.6	43.3	44.0	38.8	53.1	59.0	47.7	39.4
Nada	22.7	21.3	22.4	24.7	22.8	30.6	16.3	25.6	20.7	24.3
No sabe	7.6	9.3	6.5	6.8	8.5	4.6	10.0	1.9	7.3	10.7

ABRIL 2011

**15.3 NIVEL DE CONOCIMIENTO DE LAS PERSONAS SOBRE LAS LEYES : NIVEL DE ACCESO A LA JUSTICIA PARA DEFENDER Y HACER VALER SUS DERECHOS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	9.2	9.6	10.2	9.1	6.1	9.5	8.9	9.0	6.1	14.0
Algo	24.4	21.3	25.6	25.4	25.2	28.3	21.3	13.6	29.5	21.9
Poco	44.1	43.5	45.4	38.6	49.9	38.6	48.6	56.4	43.9	38.4
Nada	17.2	19.9	13.6	21.5	14.8	20.1	14.8	17.9	14.1	21.4
No sabe	4.2	3.7	3.8	5.5	4.1	3.6	4.6		6.4	2.8
No contesta	1.0	2.0	1.3				1.8	3.1		1.5

ABRIL 2011

**15.4 NIVEL DE CONOCIMIENTO DE LAS PERSONAS SOBRE LAS LEYES : NIVEL DE CONOCIMIENTO DE LOS PRINCIPIOS ETICOS Y JURIDICOS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	9.1	2.0	15.4	9.3	5.9	12.0	6.8	2.8	8.1	13.8
Algo	18.4	22.2	14.4	26.1	10.6	14.0	21.9	17.1	21.1	14.8
Poco	42.5	44.6	47.7	30.6	43.6	44.5	40.8	59.1	46.0	29.2
Nada	23.2	23.9	16.2	28.6	31.2	24.6	22.1	21.0	18.2	32.0
No sabe	6.4	7.3	6.3	4.1	8.7	4.9	7.7		6.6	9.3
No contesta	0.3			1.4			0.5			0.9

ABRIL 2011

**15.5 NIVEL DE CONOCIMIENTO DE LAS PERSONAS SOBRE LAS LEYES : NIVEL DE TOLERANCIA ANTE EL FENOMENO DE LA CORRUPCION**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	25.3	12.6	31.0	29.5	26.2	27.9	23.2	14.2	28.5	25.7
Algo	13.0	17.2	10.4	14.5	10.4	9.4	15.9	13.4	12.8	13.2
Poco	30.2	31.9	32.2	21.3	35.4	30.4	30.1	43.3	29.1	25.6
Nada	26.4	32.9	21.4	30.6	21.5	27.4	25.6	26.3	24.8	28.8
No sabe	4.7	5.3	3.8	4.1	6.5	3.9	5.3		4.7	6.8
No contesta	0.4		1.2			1.0		2.8		

ABRIL 2011

**16.1 NIVEL DE VIGENCIA DE PRINCIPIOS REPUBLICANOS: DIVISION DE PODERES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	29.1	21.9	29.4	34.2	32.5	34.8	24.4	36.5	26.0	30.1
4 y 5	36.0	32.3	39.0	32.7	39.9	30.3	40.6	48.9	33.6	33.4
6 y 7	17.9	19.6	15.0	18.6	21.3	20.2	16.1	9.6	21.2	17.0
8 y 9	8.0	10.6	7.7	8.4	4.1	8.3	7.8	5.0	9.3	7.7
10	1.8	2.0	2.7	1.6		0.8	2.7		2.7	1.5
Ns/ Nc	7.1	13.6	6.3	4.5	2.2	5.5	8.4		7.2	10.4

ABRIL 2011

**16.2 NIVEL DE VIGENCIA DE PRINCIPIOS REPUBLICANOS: IGUALDAD ANTE LA LEY**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	45.7	36.2	48.4	51.2	46.9	53.7	39.2	60.4	44.6	40.3
4 y 5	28.9	29.5	27.2	27.4	34.1	22.3	34.3	24.7	31.4	27.2
6 y 7	16.1	14.3	18.1	12.7	19.1	13.7	18.0	14.9	15.7	17.2
8 y 9	4.9	14.6	1.3	2.9		4.6	5.1		6.6	4.5
10	1.1		1.2	2.7		1.0	1.1		0.9	1.8
Ns/ Nc	3.4	5.3	3.8	2.9		4.7	2.3		0.8	8.9

ABRIL 2011

**16.3 NIVEL DE VIGENCIA DE PRINCIPIOS REPUBLICANOS: DEBIDO PROCESO**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	36.4	36.2	34.4	36.7	41.0	42.5	31.5	44.7	34.1	35.8
4 y 5	30.8	23.3	31.3	34.7	36.2	24.8	35.6	34.5	32.1	27.0
6 y 7	13.7	16.0	16.6	10.2	8.2	16.5	11.5	11.8	16.0	11.2
8 y 9	2.9	5.9	1.2	2.7	2.2	1.0	4.4	2.8	1.6	4.9
Ns/ Nc	16.2	18.6	16.6	15.7	12.4	15.2	17.0	6.2	16.2	21.0

ABRIL 2011

**16.4 NIVEL DE VIGENCIA DE PRINCIPIOS REPUBLICANOS: RAZONABILIDAD DE LAS LEYES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	29.1	30.6	29.4	30.2	24.7	31.2	27.5	45.7	22.4	31.3
4 y 5	33.1	29.5	32.2	35.4	38.0	30.6	35.2	32.6	34.6	31.2
6 y 7	18.5	21.3	20.6	15.9	12.4	19.8	17.3	17.1	21.0	15.2
8 y 9	7.4	9.3	5.0	5.7	12.6	7.1	7.7	4.7	8.0	7.8
10	1.4		1.2	1.6	3.9	3.2			2.8	
Ns/ Nc	10.5	9.3	11.6	11.3	8.5	8.2	12.3		11.1	14.5

ABRIL 2011



**16.5 NIVEL DE VIGENCIA DE PRINCIPIOS REPUBLICANOS: TRANSPARENCIA E INTEGRIDAD**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	42.3	38.2	38.3	49.9	47.5	46.7	38.7	59.9	39.1	38.6
4 y 5	31.9	39.9	27.4	30.4	31.7	27.5	35.4	29.2	32.7	31.9
6 y 7	14.1	7.3	19.4	12.7	14.8	10.9	16.7	8.1	14.4	16.6
8 y 9	2.8	3.3	3.6	1.4	2.2	4.9	1.2	2.8	4.7	
10	0.6			1.4	2.0	0.7	0.5		0.6	0.9
Ns/ Nc	8.3	11.3	11.3	4.3	2.0	9.4	7.4		8.5	12.0

ABRIL 2011

**16.6 NIVEL DE VIGENCIA DE PRINCIPIOS REPUBLICANOS: ACCESO A LA INFORMACION**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	26.0	23.0	25.7	35.4	18.2	31.2	21.9	49.1	22.0	21.0
4 y 5	21.9	25.6	20.8	14.3	29.7	17.1	25.8	22.1	21.3	22.8
6 y 7	22.2	14.9	28.3	18.6	24.5	20.8	23.2	17.3	25.6	19.3
8 y 9	16.7	19.6	11.5	23.4	15.2	17.2	16.4	6.8	18.0	19.6
10	5.1	4.0	6.2	4.1	6.1	5.4	5.0	4.7	4.8	5.8
Ns/ Nc	8.0	12.9	7.5	4.3	6.3	8.3	7.7		8.3	11.4

ABRIL 2011

**16.7 NIVEL DE VIGENCIA DE PRINCIPIOS REPUBLICANOS: RESPONSABILIDAD DE LOS FUNCIONARIOS PUBLICOS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	57.1	49.8	56.3	65.1	59.7	57.1	57.1	74.0	52.1	56.6
4 y 5	25.1	26.3	27.1	18.6	27.8	24.0	26.0	15.2	30.9	21.1
6 y 7	9.3	10.6	8.9	10.4	6.3	11.7	7.4	7.7	11.6	6.4
8 y 9	1.3	2.0	1.3		2.2		2.4			4.0
10	1.7	2.0	2.6	1.4		1.0	2.3	3.1	0.9	2.4
Ns/ Nc	5.4	9.3	3.8	4.5	4.1	6.2	4.8		4.5	9.4

ABRIL 2011

**16.8 NIVEL DE VIGENCIA DE PRINCIPIOS REPUBLICANOS: VIGENCIA DE LAS LIBERTADES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	27.8	32.6	20.6	32.4	30.6	31.4	25.0	43.2	24.3	25.7
4 y 5	26.9	27.2	28.2	19.5	33.6	23.6	29.5	18.8	28.2	28.8
6 y 7	26.8	21.6	30.9	31.8	18.9	26.1	27.5	28.1	30.4	20.9
8 y 9	8.5	7.3	9.0	7.7	10.6	8.7	8.4	7.1	8.7	9.0
10	1.7	3.7	1.2		2.2	2.0	1.5		1.7	2.5
Ns/ Nc	8.2	7.6	10.1	8.6	4.1	8.2	8.2	2.8	6.8	13.0

ABRIL 2011

**16.9 NIVEL DE VIGENCIA DE PRINCIPIOS REPUBLICANOS: PROTECCION DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	19.6	18.3	17.9	26.3	16.5	20.8	18.7	25.5	17.8	19.6
4 y 5	24.0	27.2	25.5	18.8	22.6	26.7	21.8	30.4	21.1	25.4
6 y 7	36.6	32.9	39.0	35.8	38.0	29.3	42.4	35.1	40.0	32.1
8 y 9	13.6	14.6	12.7	11.8	16.9	14.3	13.0	9.0	14.2	15.1
10	2.0	3.3	2.4	1.4		3.9	0.5		3.4	0.9
Ns/ Nc	4.1	3.7	2.6	5.9	6.1	4.9	3.5		3.5	7.0

ABRIL 2011

**16.10 NIVEL DE VIGENCIA DE PRINCIPIOS REPUBLICANOS: INDEPENDENCIA JUDICIAL**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	30.5	26.9	29.4	36.0	30.8	37.9	24.5	44.6	28.4	26.7
4 y 5	30.5	26.9	32.2	25.2	39.5	27.4	32.9	43.6	30.9	23.4
6 y 7	19.5	16.3	23.0	22.0	12.6	20.7	18.5	9.9	24.0	17.2
8 y 9	5.7	7.6	5.0	1.4	10.6	4.6	6.6		4.9	9.8
10	1.3	2.0	1.2	1.4		1.0	1.5		0.9	2.4
Ns/ Nc	12.6	20.2	9.2	14.1	6.5	8.3	16.1	1.9	10.9	20.4

ABRIL 2011

**16.11 NIVEL DE VIGENCIA DE PRINCIPIOS REPUBLICANOS: PARTICIPACION CIUDADANA**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	26.1	27.2	25.7	32.4	16.1	29.4	23.4	41.8	23.5	22.4
4 y 5	31.3	23.6	33.6	26.1	46.2	28.0	34.0	44.5	29.9	27.2
6 y 7	17.4	14.6	19.5	16.1	18.9	14.8	19.5	5.0	17.9	22.7
8 y 9	12.8	18.0	7.5	14.3	15.0	12.8	12.9	5.9	16.1	11.2
10	1.7	2.0	2.4	1.4		2.0	1.5		1.8	2.4
Ns/ Nc	10.6	14.6	11.2	9.8	3.9	13.0	8.7	2.8	10.8	14.1

ABRIL 2011

**16.12 NIVEL DE VIGENCIA DE PRINCIPIOS REPUBLICANOS: INCLUSION SOCIAL**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	33.0	32.6	34.9	35.1	26.2	35.4	31.1	50.8	28.3	31.5
4 y 5	30.5	23.6	33.3	24.3	44.3	27.8	32.8	32.9	32.5	26.4
6 y 7	22.9	21.3	21.7	30.6	17.1	24.4	21.6	16.3	23.9	24.5
8 y 9	6.8	7.3	6.3	4.3	10.4	7.1	6.5		10.1	4.9
10	2.0	3.7	1.2	1.4	2.0	2.6	1.5		2.3	2.4
Ns/ Nc	4.8	11.6	2.6	4.3		2.7	6.5		2.8	10.2

ABRIL 2011

**16.13 NIVEL DE VIGENCIA DE PRINCIPIOS REPUBLICANOS: FUERZA EFECTIVA DE LAS LEYES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	35.6	28.9	36.1	38.5	40.8	39.8	32.1	44.6	35.4	31.4
4 y 5	33.5	25.6	34.8	38.8	35.8	29.2	36.9	34.5	32.4	34.6
6 y 7	16.3	19.6	19.3	11.6	10.6	16.7	16.0	12.7	19.1	13.9
8 y 9	4.1	7.6	2.4	1.4	6.3	3.6	4.5	2.8	4.6	4.0
10	1.3	2.0	1.2	1.4		1.0	1.5		0.9	2.4
Ns/ Nc	9.3	16.3	6.2	8.4	6.5	9.6	9.1	5.4	7.7	13.6

ABRIL 2011

**16.14 NIVEL DE VIGENCIA DE PRINCIPIOS REPUBLICANOS: LA LUCHA CONTRA LA DISCRIMINACION RACIAL**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	27.9	33.5	24.7	32.0	20.4	24.9	30.3	39.4	22.0	31.2
4 y 5	26.7	27.2	21.8	29.0	34.3	23.3	29.5	32.3	28.8	20.9
6 y 7	25.2	20.7	29.7	23.1	24.9	27.7	23.2	15.7	27.9	25.7
8 y 9	11.2	7.6	12.8	10.2	14.5	10.4	11.8	6.8	12.6	11.2
10	3.5	5.6	4.8	1.4		5.0	2.4		4.4	3.9
Ns/ Nc	5.5	5.3	6.2	4.3	5.9	8.8	2.9	5.9	4.4	7.1

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**17. ¿USTED TIENDE A SER CONFIADO CON LA GENTE QUE NO CONOCE O SUELE TENER CIERTA DESCONFIANZA Y SE MANEJA CON CUIDADO?**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
En general confío sin reparos en la gente desconocida	24.6	25.6	31.7	13.1	22.3	29.7	20.5	18.9	30.7	18.0
En general me manejo con cuidado con la gente desconocida	75.4	74.4	68.3	86.9	77.7	70.3	79.5	81.1	69.3	82.0

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**18.1 CONFIANZA EN PERSONAS DEL FUERO INTIMO PARA CONFIAR PROBLEMAS Y ESPERAR DE ELLOS UNA AYUDA DESINTERESADA: LOS MIEMBROS DE SU FAMILIA**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	1.3		2.6	1.6		1.8	0.9			3.9
4 y 5	1.1	1.7		2.9		1.7	0.5		1.5	0.9
6 y 7	7.4	16.0	6.5	1.6	4.1	9.2	6.0	3.1	7.8	8.9
8 y 9	31.7	29.2	32.9	27.7	38.4	38.9	25.9	23.9	33.9	32.1
10	58.0	53.1	56.7	66.2	57.5	48.4	65.8	69.9	56.8	54.2
Ns/ Nc	0.5		1.3				0.9	3.1		

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**18.2 CONFIANZA EN PERSONAS DEL FUERO INTIMO PARA CONFIAR PROBLEMAS Y ESPERAR DE ELLOS UNA AYUDA DESINTERESADA: SUS AMIGOS EN GENERAL**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	1.2		2.6	1.4		1.0	1.4			3.7
4 y 5	1.4	1.7	2.6			2.0	0.9	2.8	1.0	1.3
6 y 7	15.9	11.0	13.7	25.2	16.1	22.1	11.0		16.2	23.2
8 y 9	43.6	54.5	41.1	39.4	37.5	44.5	42.8	48.5	43.3	41.7
10	36.1	32.9	36.3	32.5	46.4	27.6	43.0	45.7	38.0	28.7
No corresponde	0.9		2.4			2.0			0.9	1.3
Ns/ Nc	0.8		1.3	1.6		0.8	0.9	3.1	0.7	

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**18.3 CONFIANZA EN PERSONAS DEL FUERO INTIMO PARA CONFIAR PROBLEMAS Y ESPERAR DE ELLOS UNA AYUDA DESINTERESADA: SUS VECINOS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	11.2	8.7	16.4	12.0	2.0	16.5	7.0	13.0	7.7	15.8
4 y 5	21.6	36.5	19.5	20.4	3.9	20.6	22.4	21.4	24.6	17.2
6 y 7	32.4	33.2	32.9	27.7	36.9	36.8	28.9	23.3	34.8	33.2
8 y 9	23.9	18.0	20.9	27.2	36.0	18.2	28.5	33.5	21.9	22.3
10	8.0	3.7	5.1	11.3	16.9	5.9	9.6	5.6	7.7	9.5
No corresponde	0.8		1.2		2.2	1.0	0.6		0.9	1.0
Ns/ Nc	2.1		3.9	1.4	2.2	1.0	2.9	3.1	2.5	1.0

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**18.4 CONFIANZA EN PERSONAS DEL FUERO INTIMO PARA CONFIAR PROBLEMAS Y ESPERAR DE ELLOS UNA AYUDA DESINTERESADA: SUS COMPAÑEROS DE TRABAJO**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	9.8	16.6	7.8	10.9	2.0	11.2	8.7	20.5	7.6	8.0
4 y 5	11.4	18.3	10.4	11.8	2.0	11.6	11.2	9.0	14.2	8.3
6 y 7	22.9	29.2	28.0	15.9	10.2	24.9	21.3	19.4	24.2	22.5
8 y 9	17.8	12.6	28.2	13.4	8.0	20.8	15.4	26.4	20.8	9.0
10	7.0	3.7	8.0	10.0	5.9	5.6	8.1	14.5	5.6	5.4
No corresponde	12.1	11.0	5.0	8.4	36.2	8.7	14.9	7.1	8.0	20.8
Ns/ Nc	19.0	8.7	12.7	29.7	35.8	17.2	20.5	3.1	19.5	26.0

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**18.5 CONFIANZA EN PERSONAS DEL FUERO INTIMO PARA CONFIAR PROBLEMAS Y ESPERAR DE ELLOS UNA AYUDA DESINTERESADA: SUS JEFES O SUPERIORES INMEDIATOS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	16.6	26.9	16.7	12.2	5.9	21.4	12.8	23.6	18.3	10.7
4 y 5	14.6	25.9	11.7	15.2	2.0	14.9	14.3	7.4	15.5	16.6
6 y 7	16.7	14.6	22.9	11.8	12.1	19.7	14.2	26.4	17.5	10.8
8 y 9	10.5	11.0	14.2	11.1		8.7	11.9	13.7	12.2	6.3
10	3.0		6.5	2.7		2.0	3.8	8.1	1.9	2.3
No corresponde	16.4	11.0	11.5	15.7	38.2	13.0	19.2	14.6	13.0	22.6
Ns/ Nc	22.3	10.6	16.6	31.3	41.9	20.3	23.8	6.2	21.8	30.8

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**18.6 CONFIANZA EN PERSONAS DEL FUERO INTIMO PARA CONFIAR PROBLEMAS Y ESPERAR DE ELLOS UNA AYUDA DESINTERESADA: LOS SACERDOTES O PASTORES DE SU RELIGION**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	25.4	34.2	25.6	22.6	14.3	31.1	20.8	22.4	27.2	24.1
4 y 5	12.3	18.0	7.5	15.2	10.2	12.6	12.1	9.9	12.4	13.3
6 y 7	14.9	12.9	22.0	8.6	10.4	12.8	16.6	11.7	17.3	12.8
8 y 9	8.5	5.6	5.3	14.5	12.6	6.5	10.2	2.2	8.1	12.2
10	3.0		3.8	4.1	4.3	2.0	3.8	2.8	2.5	3.8
No corresponde	22.0	19.9	23.3	17.2	29.3	19.3	24.2	43.9	19.0	16.1
Ns/ Nc	13.8	9.3	12.5	17.7	18.9	15.7	12.3	7.2	13.5	17.6

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**18.7 CONFIANZA EN PERSONAS DEL FUERO INTIMO PARA CONFIAR PROBLEMAS Y ESPERAR DE ELLOS UNA AYUDA DESINTERESADA: SUS PROFESORES O MAESTROS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1 a 3	6.3	8.7	7.4	6.1		11.2	2.3	8.1	6.6	5.0
4 y 5	9.4	14.6	9.3	9.1	2.0	8.6	10.1	8.1	11.9	6.3
6 y 7	20.2	28.9	20.8	16.5	10.0	22.8	18.1	17.3	22.5	18.1
8 y 9	15.8	12.9	16.7	17.0	16.7	13.3	17.9	10.8	16.3	17.5
10	10.4	12.9	11.5	8.6	6.5	9.5	11.2	8.1	9.1	13.5
No corresponde	22.7	18.0	22.9	20.0	33.6	22.3	23.0	38.6	20.4	18.4
Ns/ Nc	15.1	4.0	11.5	22.7	31.2	12.3	17.4	9.0	13.1	21.2

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**19.1 NIVEL DE ACUERDO CON LA FRASE: LA MAYORIA DE LA GENTE EN EL BARRIO / VECINDARIO ESTA ABIERTA A LOS DEMAS Y DISPUESTA A AYUDAR SI ALGUIEN LO NECESITA**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Muy de acuerdo	12.6	11.0	8.9	8.6	29.7	10.5	14.3	2.6	9.8	21.7
De acuerdo	54.9	51.9	59.2	54.7	49.9	55.3	54.5	61.9	62.4	40.0
En desacuerdo	23.5	27.9	21.7	32.2	8.2	24.0	23.1	23.3	22.5	25.0
Muy en desacuerdo	3.3	3.7	6.5			3.0	3.6		2.9	5.5
Ns/ Nc	5.7	5.6	3.8	4.5	12.1	7.3	4.5	12.2	2.3	7.8

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**19.2 NIVEL DE ACUERDO CON LA FRASE: EN ESTE BARRIO / VECINDARIO, UNO TIENE QUE ESTAR ALERTA. SIEMPRE ALGUIEN TE PODRIA SACAR VENTAJA**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Muy de acuerdo	6.0	9.3	7.4	2.9	2.0	8.4	4.2	2.8	5.6	8.3
De acuerdo	36.5	44.9	33.3	41.0	24.1	43.7	30.7	35.9	36.9	36.2
En desacuerdo	48.5	38.8	52.8	44.5	59.7	37.9	57.0	44.2	48.4	50.6
Muy en desacuerdo	3.9	3.3	3.9	4.3	3.9	5.1	2.9	5.0	6.0	
Ns/ Nc	5.1	3.7	2.6	7.3	10.4	4.9	5.3	12.2	3.0	4.9

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**19.3 NIVEL DE ACUERDO CON LA FRASE: LA GENTE EN EL BARRIO/ VECINDARIO ES INDIVIDUALISTA Y SOLO LE INTERESAN SUS PROPIOS ASUNTOS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Muy de acuerdo	8.1	7.3	12.7	5.9	2.0	10.2	6.5	5.6	7.7	10.1
De acuerdo	40.2	42.5	42.3	39.4	32.8	41.2	39.5	37.1	37.7	45.6
En desacuerdo	38.9	39.6	30.7	38.8	57.1	36.3	40.9	32.2	44.5	33.5
Muy en desacuerdo	3.6	3.7	3.9	4.1	2.2	2.0	4.9	6.8	1.8	4.8
Ns/ Nc	9.2	7.0	10.4	11.8	6.1	10.4	8.2	18.3	8.2	6.1

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**20. ¿QUE PROBABILIDADES EXISTEN DE QUE LA GENTE SE MOVILICE EN CONJUNTO PARA TRATAR DE SOLUCIONAR UN PROBLEMA DE INTERES COMUNITARIO QUE AFECTA A TODOS EN ESTE BARRIO O VECINDARIO?**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Muy probable	21.9	20.9	17.9	27.2	25.4	16.7	26.1	16.3	20.5	26.8
Probable	45.4	42.3	50.1	37.4	50.3	46.8	44.2	39.2	51.0	39.7
Ni probable ni improbable	11.1	10.6	10.1	12.9	11.7	15.3	7.8	5.0	13.4	10.6
Algo improbable	9.7	13.6	8.9	10.4	4.1	8.8	10.4	10.9	10.1	8.4
Muy improbable	7.0	5.6	7.7	10.6	2.2	7.9	6.2	15.5	2.4	9.7
Ns/ Nc	5.0	7.0	5.3	1.4	6.3	4.5	5.4	13.1	2.6	4.8

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**21.1 PARTICIPACION EN ACTIVIDADES: ENTRAR EN CONTACTO PERSONAL CON UNA PERSONA INFLUYENTE**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Si	17.2	7.0	24.1	25.2	5.9	23.0	12.4	37.0	15.4	10.3
No	82.1	91.3	75.9	74.8	92.2	75.3	87.6	60.4	84.0	89.7
Ns/ Nc	0.7	1.7			2.0	1.6		2.6	0.6	

ABRIL 2011

**21.2 PARTICIPACION EN ACTIVIDADES: CONSEGUIR QUE LOS MEDIOS DE COMUNICACION SE INTERESEN EN ALGUN PROBLEMA**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Si	8.0	7.6	10.2	8.8	2.0	8.0	7.9	19.2	4.8	7.4
No	90.9	90.7	88.5	89.8	98.0	90.0	91.5	78.2	94.3	91.7
Ns/ Nc	1.2	1.7	1.2	1.4		2.0	0.5	2.6	0.9	0.9

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**21.3 PARTICIPACION EN ACTIVIDADES: PARTICIPAR ACTIVAMENTE EN UNA CAMPAÑA DE INFORMACION**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Si	8.6	7.3	11.3	8.8	3.9	11.7	6.1	14.9	5.2	10.8
No	89.8	89.4	87.5	91.2	94.1	84.8	93.9	82.5	92.5	89.2
Ns/ Nc	1.6	3.3	1.2		2.0	3.6		2.6	2.3	

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**21.4 PARTICIPACION EN ACTIVIDADES: PARTICIPAR ACTIVAMENTE EN UNA CAMPAÑA ELECTORAL**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Si	6.0	7.3	5.0	7.7	3.9	9.4	3.3	5.0	7.1	4.8
No	93.1	91.0	93.8	92.3	96.1	88.6	96.7	92.4	92.0	95.2
Ns/ Nc	0.9	1.7	1.2			2.0		2.6	0.9	

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**21.5 PARTICIPACION EN ACTIVIDADES: PARTICIPAR ACTIVAMENTE EN UNA MARCHA DE PROTESTA O MANIFESTACION**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Si	28.5	39.3	31.7	22.2	12.1	37.4	21.3	37.7	32.5	17.9
No	70.9	60.7	68.3	76.4	85.9	61.9	78.2	62.3	66.9	81.2
Ns/ Nc	0.6			1.4	2.0	0.7	0.5		0.6	0.9

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**21.6 PARTICIPACION EN ACTIVIDADES: CONTACTAR A SU REPRESENTANTE POLITICO (INTENDENTE, LEGISLADOR,...)**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Si	5.4	3.3	6.2	8.8	2.0	9.0	2.5	14.0	2.3	5.9
No	93.1	93.3	93.8	89.8	96.1	88.4	96.9	83.4	96.2	93.2
Ns/ Nc	1.5	3.3		1.4	2.0	2.6	0.5	2.6	1.4	0.9

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**21.7 PARTICIPACION EN ACTIVIDADES: PARTICIPAR EN UNA REUNION CON FUNCIONARIOS PUBLICOS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Si	7.4	5.0	11.3	6.1	3.9	12.6	3.2	20.8	5.1	4.4
No	91.6	93.3	88.7	92.5	94.1	85.8	96.2	76.6	94.3	94.7
Ns/ Nc	1.0	1.7		1.4	2.0	1.6	0.5	2.6	0.6	0.9

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**21.8 PARTICIPACION EN ACTIVIDADES: ESCRIBIR O PETICIONAR ANTE UN FUNCIONARIO PARA PEDIRLE O NOTIFICARLE ALGO**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Si	9.3	3.3	8.9	17.9	8.0	13.5	6.0	13.7	8.0	9.3
No	89.3	93.0	89.9	82.1	92.0	84.6	93.1	83.7	91.1	89.2
Ns/ Nc	1.4	3.7	1.2			2.0	0.9	2.6	0.9	1.5

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**21.9 PARTICIPACION EN ACTIVIDADES: REALIZAR UNA DONACION DE DINERO O EN ESPECIES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Si	35.8	34.6	38.5	39.2	26.7	37.0	34.9	40.8	38.8	28.9
No	62.6	61.8	61.5	59.4	71.1	62.0	63.1	56.6	61.2	67.7
Ns/ Nc	1.6	3.7		1.4	2.2	1.0	2.1	2.6		3.4

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**21.10 PARTICIPACION EN ACTIVIDADES: OFRECER SU TIEMPO A UNA ORGANIZACION CARITATIVA**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Si	18.0	18.3	21.6	20.2	6.1	20.1	16.3	13.5	21.8	14.4
No	80.0	80.1	76.0	79.8	89.8	76.3	83.1	81.1	77.6	83.3
Ns/ Nc	2.0	1.7	2.4		4.1	3.6	0.6	5.4	0.6	2.4

ABRIL 2011



**21.11 PARTICIPACION EN ACTIVIDADES: SUMARSE A ALGUNA ONG (ORGANIZACION NO GUBERNAMENTAL)**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Si	6.7	5.3	10.0	4.7	4.1	11.0	3.3	5.6	8.4	4.8
No	91.9	89.4	90.0	95.3	95.9	87.1	95.8	91.8	90.8	93.7
Ns/ Nc	1.3	5.3				1.9	0.9	2.6	0.8	1.5

ABRIL 2011

**21.12 PARTICIPACION EN ACTIVIDADES: PARTICIPAR EN AUDIENCIAS PUBLICAS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Si	5.5	9.0	2.6	4.7	7.8	9.0	2.7	6.9	6.5	3.3
No	93.6	89.4	96.2	95.3	92.2	89.1	97.3	90.5	93.5	95.3
Ns/ Nc	0.9	1.7	1.2			2.0		2.6		1.3

ABRIL 2011

**21.13 PARTICIPACION EN ACTIVIDADES: PARTICIPAR EN ALGUN TIPO DE COLECTA**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Si	25.2	27.2	28.3	25.4	14.3	23.5	26.6	33.3	24.8	22.0
No	72.8	71.1	69.3	73.2	83.5	73.5	72.3	64.1	73.8	75.6
Ns/ Nc	2.0	1.7	2.4	1.4	2.2	3.0	1.2	2.6	1.5	2.4

ABRIL 2011

**21.14 PARTICIPACION EN ACTIVIDADES: PARTICIPAR DE UN CORTE DE RUTA**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Si	2.9	6.7	2.4	1.6		6.6			5.8	
No	96.6	91.6	97.6	98.4	100.0	92.4	100.0	97.4	94.2	100.0
Ns/ Nc	0.4	1.7				1.0		2.6		

ABRIL 2011

**21.15 PARTICIPACION EN ACTIVIDADES: PARTICIPAR DE UN "ESCRACHE"**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Si	5.6	12.6	3.8	4.7		8.2	3.6	5.3	7.7	2.8
No	93.1	85.7	95.0	93.7	100.0	89.1	96.4	92.1	90.8	97.2
Ns/ Nc	1.2	1.7	1.2	1.6		2.7		2.6	1.6	

ABRIL 2011

**21.16 PARTICIPACION EN ACTIVIDADES: PARTICIPAR DE ALGUNA CADENA EN LAS REDES SOCIALES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Si	25.7	43.5	28.4	15.9	4.1	25.2	26.1	53.4	26.3	11.4
No	73.4	54.8	70.3	84.1	95.9	72.8	73.9	43.9	72.8	88.6
Ns/ Nc	0.9	1.7	1.2			2.0		2.6	0.9	

ABRIL 2011

**21.17 PARTICIPACION EN ACTIVIDADES: SEGUIR UN TEMA CON IMPLICANCIAS POLITICAS O SOCIALES CON PROFUNDIDAD A TRAVES DE LOS MEDIOS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Si	37.2	25.6	38.3	39.7	49.9	39.8	35.1	62.6	34.3	29.3
No	62.4	72.8	61.7	60.3	50.1	59.2	64.9	34.8	65.7	70.7
Ns/ Nc	0.4	1.7				1.0		2.6		

ABRIL 2011

**21.18 PARTICIPACION EN ACTIVIDADES: INICIAR UNA ACCION JUDICIAL O RECURSO DE AMPARO**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Si	8.6	5.9	14.0	7.5	2.0	9.1	8.3	5.9	8.9	9.6
No	90.6	92.4	86.0	91.2	98.0	90.0	91.2	91.5	91.1	89.5
Ns/ Nc	0.7	1.7		1.4		1.0	0.5	2.6		0.9

ABRIL 2011

**21.19 PARTICIPACION EN ACTIVIDADES: INTEGRAR UNA ORGANIZACION DE DERECHOS HUMANOS O ANTIDISCRIMINATORIOS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Si	3.5	3.7	5.1	3.2		4.5	2.7	5.0	2.5	4.3
No	96.1	94.7	94.9	96.8	100.0	94.5	97.3	92.4	97.5	95.7
Ns/ Nc	0.4	1.7				1.0		2.6		

ABRIL 2011

**22. CUANDO SE PRODUCE ALGÚN PROBLEMA DE TIPO COMUNITARIO, ¿QUÉ FUENTES DE INFORMACIÓN LE RESULTAN EN GENERAL MÁS CONFIABLES? MENCIONE LAS TRES MÁS CONFIABLES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Opinión o testimonio de parientes, amigos y vecinos	56.9%	62.4%	57.8%	47.8%	58.4%	54.1%	59.1%	60.2%	58.1%	53.4%
Mensajes por redes sociales (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, et Boletín comunal	18.9%	30.5%	25.7%	7.7%		16.0%	21.3%	36.3%	18.5%	11.1%
Comercios de la zona	4.4%	3.7%	5.1%	4.3%	3.9%	5.1%	3.8%	4.1%	4.3%	4.6%
Periódico comunal o local	4.7%	7.3%	2.4%	1.6%	10.4%	6.1%	3.6%	7.9%	1.3%	8.4%
Periódico nacional	5.1%	5.3%	7.7%	2.7%	2.2%	4.9%	5.3%	3.1%	6.0%	4.8%
Portales en Internet	17.7%	14.3%	25.9%	14.7%	8.0%	18.8%	16.8%	31.1%	18.3%	10.3%
Radio	34.1%	34.2%	24.1%	43.8%	43.8%	37.2%	31.6%	19.1%	39.1%	33.7%
Televisión (canales de noticias)	42.4%	32.9%	39.8%	44.9%	60.7%	39.9%	44.4%	15.8%	41.1%	57.4%
Grupos o asociaciones movilizadas	66.1%	58.5%	67.1%	72.1%	67.7%	57.0%	73.5%	62.9%	63.4%	71.8%
Sindicatos u organizaciones de trabajadores	4.9%	1.7%	5.1%	5.9%	8.0%	6.6%	3.5%	5.3%	6.7%	1.8%
Asociaciones o partidos políticos	0.7%	1.7%		1.4%		1.0%	0.5%	1.9%	0.8%	
Líderes de la comunidad	2.4%	5.3%		4.5%		3.5%	1.5%	2.2%	3.0%	1.5%
Jueces o fiscales	0.4%	1.7%				1.0%			0.8%	
ONGs	0.4%		1.2%			1.0%		2.8%		
Policía federal	2.2%	3.3%	3.8%			3.9%	0.9%	8.7%	0.8%	1.3%
Abogados	1.7%		3.8%	1.6%		2.8%	0.9%		2.6%	1.3%
Policía de la Ciudad	0.4%		1.2%			1.0%				1.3%
Las Iglesias	0.7%	1.7%	1.4%			1.0%	0.5%		0.8%	0.9%
Internet	3.2%	1.7%	5.1%	2.7%	2.0%	3.6%	2.9%	5.6%	3.4%	1.8%
Asociaciones de usuarios o consumidores	12.1%	16.0%	14.0%	7.3%	8.2%	14.7%	10.1%	12.1%	15.7%	6.7%
Ninguna	1.2%		1.3%	1.6%	2.0%	1.5%	0.9%	1.9%	1.7%	
No sabe/ no contesta	9.3%	12.6%	5.1%	10.0%	12.6%	8.8%	9.7%	15.4%	6.1%	11.1%
	0.3%			1.4%			0.5%			0.9%
	290.4%	294.7%	296.4%	277.3%	287.9%	289.2%	291.3%	296.2%	292.6%	284.2%

ABRIL 2011

**22. FUENTES DE INFORMACION MAS CONFIABLES - 1º MENCION**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Opinión o testimonio de parientes, amigos y vecinos	38.0	47.2	37.2	30.4	35.6	37.8	38.1	57.4	35.3	32.6
Mensajes por redes sociales (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, et Boletín comunal	6.5	11.3	9.0	1.6		5.7	7.2	5.4	7.5	5.6
Comercios de la zona	0.8		1.3	1.4			1.4		0.6	1.5
Periódico comunal o local	0.3				2.0	0.7			0.6	
Portales en Internet	1.5	3.7		2.7		1.0	2.0		2.4	0.9
Periódico nacional	5.2	3.7	9.0	2.9	2.0	5.4	5.0	5.9	7.4	1.5
Radio	8.3	5.3	3.8	16.1	12.6	9.2	7.5	4.1	9.3	8.7
Televisión (canales de noticias)	10.7	5.6	7.5	14.5	21.0	10.2	11.1	7.2	9.2	14.7
Grupos o asociaciones movilizadas	21.5	16.6	23.2	24.5	21.0	18.6	23.8	8.4	21.8	27.2
ONGs	1.1		1.2		3.9	2.4			0.9	1.8
Policía de la Ciudad	0.5		1.3				0.9	3.1		
Las Iglesias	0.3			1.4			0.5			0.9
Internet	0.8		1.2		2.0	1.7		2.8	0.6	
Ninguna	3.5	5.0	5.1	1.6		5.7	1.8	5.9	4.2	1.3
No sabe/ no contesta	0.8	1.7		1.6		1.7				2.3
	0.3			1.4			0.5			0.9

ABRIL 2011

**22. FUENTES DE INFORMACION MAS CONFIABLES - 2º MENCION**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Opinión o testimonio de parientes, amigos y vecinos	10.9	13.3	9.0	8.6	14.5	8.5	12.7		13.0	12.9
Mensajes por redes sociales (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, et Boletín comunal	9.2	13.3	14.2	2.9		7.7	10.5	27.8	8.4	1.5
Comercios de la zona	1.4		1.2	2.9	2.0	2.5	0.5	4.1	0.9	0.9
Periódico comunal o local	2.3	3.3	1.2	1.6	4.1	4.4	0.6	4.8	0.7	3.5
Portales en Internet	1.3		2.6		2.2	1.0	1.5		1.9	1.0
Periódico nacional	7.8	7.0	9.2	8.8	4.1	7.9	7.6	16.0	7.9	3.6
Radio	13.1	18.9	6.2	17.2	14.3	12.8	13.4	7.2	13.4	15.6
Televisión (canales de noticias)	17.8	14.0	19.3	14.7	24.9	20.1	16.0	3.1	18.3	24.1
Grupos o asociaciones movilizadas	22.4	14.3	24.4	26.1	25.8	20.0	24.4	24.7	19.0	26.5
Sindicatos u organizaciones de trabajadores	2.0	1.7	2.7	1.4	2.0	1.6	2.3	3.1	3.0	
Asociaciones o partidos políticos	0.3			1.4			0.5	1.9		
Líderes dela comunidad	0.9	2.0		1.6		0.8	0.9		0.7	1.5
Jueces o fiscales	0.4	1.7				1.0			0.8	
ONGs	0.4		1.2			1.0		2.8		
Policía federal	0.4		1.2			1.0		2.8		
Policía de la Ciudad	0.9		2.6			1.0	0.9		1.9	
Las Iglesias	0.4	1.7				1.0			0.8	
Internet	0.3			1.4			0.5			0.9
No sabe/ no contesta	4.2	7.3	3.9	1.4	4.1	3.6	4.8		6.5	2.9
	3.4	1.7	1.2	10.0	2.0	4.2	2.7	1.9	2.8	5.1

ABRIL 2011

**22. FUENTES DE INFORMACION MAS CONFIABLES - 3º MENCION**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Opinión o testimonio de parientes, amigos y vecinos	8.0	2.0	11.6	8.8	8.2	7.7	8.2	2.8	9.8	7.8
Mensajes por redes sociales (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, et Boletín comunal	3.2	5.9	2.6	3.2		2.6	3.6	3.1	2.6	4.1
Comercios de la zona	2.2	3.7	2.6		2.0	2.6	1.8		2.9	2.2
Periódico comunal o local	2.1	4.0	1.2		4.3	1.0	3.0	3.1		4.9
Portales en Internet	2.3	1.7	5.1			3.0	1.8	3.1	1.7	2.8
Periódico nacional	4.7	3.7	7.7	2.9	2.0	5.4	4.1	9.3	2.9	5.2
Radio	12.7	10.0	14.2	10.4	16.9	15.2	10.7	7.9	16.4	9.4
Televisión (canales de noticias)	13.9	13.3	12.9	15.7	14.8	9.6	17.3	5.6	13.5	18.5
Grupos o asociaciones movilizadas	22.2	27.6	19.5	21.5	20.8	18.4	25.3	29.9	22.5	18.1
Sindicatos u organizaciones de trabajadores	1.8		1.2	4.5	2.2	2.6	1.2	2.2	2.8	
Asociaciones o partidos políticos	0.4	1.7				1.0			0.8	
ONGs	1.5	3.3		2.9		2.7	0.5	2.2	2.3	
Policía federal	1.3	3.3	1.2			2.9		2.8	0.8	1.3
Abogados	0.8		1.2	1.6		1.8			0.7	1.3
Las Iglesias	0.4		1.2			1.0				1.3
Internet	2.2	1.7	3.9	1.4		2.0	2.3	2.8	2.8	0.9
Asociaciones de usuarios o consumidores	4.4	3.7	5.0	4.3	4.1	5.4	3.5	6.2	4.9	2.6
Ninguna	1.2		1.3	1.6	2.0	1.5	0.9	1.9	1.7	
No sabe/ no contesta	8.5	11.0	5.1	8.4	12.6	7.0	9.7	15.4	6.1	8.7
	6.2	3.7	2.4	12.7	10.2	6.6	5.9	1.9	4.6	10.7

ABRIL 2011

**23.1 NIVEL DE ACUERDO CON AFIRMACIONES: LA UNIDAD DE TODOS LOS ARGENTINOS E IDENTIDAD NACIONAL YA NO ES TAN FUERTE COMO EN EL PASADO**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Muy de acuerdo	17.6	16.3	14.0	19.7	24.9	16.6	18.4	17.7	13.9	23.1
De acuerdo	59.7	69.7	61.9	51.0	50.5	54.8	63.6	63.5	61.8	54.7
En desacuerdo	15.6	5.3	16.7	22.0	20.4	17.5	14.0	16.1	17.2	12.9
Muy en desacuerdo	1.9	3.3	1.2	2.9		3.7	0.5	2.6		4.6
No sabe	4.9	5.3	6.2	2.9	4.1	7.4	3.0		6.6	4.8
No contesta	0.3			1.4			0.5		0.6	

ABRIL 2011

**23.2 NIVEL DE ACUERDO CON AFIRMACIONES: LA ARGENTINA ACTUAL ES UNA SOCIEDAD MODERNA Y CADA VEZ MAS HETEROGENEA EN LA QUE LAS DIFERENCIAS DE VALORES Y VISIONES DE LA VIDA ES CADA VEZ MAYOR**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Muy de acuerdo	14.6	13.3	13.9	18.8	12.4	14.9	14.3	21.4	10.6	17.3
De acuerdo	58.1	57.8	58.1	60.1	56.0	54.6	61.0	50.3	63.8	53.3
En desacuerdo	17.6	18.0	15.5	15.2	25.2	19.0	16.4	19.9	17.2	17.0
Muy en desacuerdo	2.6	3.7	3.6	1.6		4.8	0.9	5.3	1.7	2.7
No sabe	7.1	7.3	8.9	4.3	6.5	6.7	7.4	3.1	6.6	9.8

ABRIL 2011

**23.3 NIVEL DE ACUERDO CON AFIRMACIONES: LOS ARGENTINOS, SOMOS UN PUEBLO RESPETUOSO DE LAS LEYES Y LAS INSTITUCIONES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Muy de acuerdo	0.3				2.2		0.6		0.7	
De acuerdo	17.3	23.3	15.2	17.0	12.6	18.4	16.4	9.6	21.5	14.5
En desacuerdo	70.2	58.1	77.2	70.3	72.9	70.2	70.2	69.2	69.8	71.2
Muy en desacuerdo	9.9	16.9	7.5	9.8	4.1	8.3	11.1	21.1	6.0	10.4
No sabe	2.4	1.7		2.9	8.2	3.1	1.8		2.0	4.0

**23.4 NIVEL DE ACUERDO CON AFIRMACIONES: LOS ARGENTINOS COMO PUEBLO SOMOS EN GENERAL RESPETUOSOS DE LA PALABRA EMPEÑADA**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
De acuerdo	26.2	30.9	25.5	24.3	23.0	26.3	26.1	20.3	29.4	24.1
En desacuerdo	52.0	41.5	56.9	52.8	56.4	50.7	53.1	57.6	53.3	47.4
Muy en desacuerdo	11.1	18.6	8.8	8.4	8.2	11.0	11.2	19.0	6.6	14.1
No sabe	10.7	9.0	8.9	14.5	12.4	12.1	9.6	3.1	10.7	14.4

ABRIL 2011

**23.5 NIVEL DE ACUERDO CON AFIRMACIONES: LOS ARGENTINOS SOMOS UN PUEBLO DEMOCRATICO**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Muy de acuerdo	5.0	6.7	3.8	4.3	6.3	7.3	3.2	3.8	4.7	6.1
De acuerdo	60.5	60.1	65.1	51.7	62.5	60.9	60.1	52.0	68.4	52.5
En desacuerdo	24.2	14.3	22.2	36.7	27.3	22.0	26.1	34.9	19.1	26.9
Muy en desacuerdo	7.3	13.3	6.3	4.3	3.9	7.1	7.4	6.2	7.0	8.1
No sabe	2.3	4.0	2.6	1.6		1.8	2.7	3.1		5.4
No contesta	0.7	1.7		1.4		1.0	0.5		0.8	0.9

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**24. ¿CREE UD. QUE LA SOCIEDAD ARGENTINA ES UNA SOCIEDAD VIOLENTA?**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	42.6	40.5	45.8	47.8	31.2	43.9	41.6	47.9	37.2	48.4
Algo	38.3	47.8	34.8	30.6	41.9	35.3	40.6	38.1	42.1	32.6
Poco	12.5	8.4	14.3	11.6	16.1	15.2	10.2	8.2	13.5	12.9
Nada	5.9	1.7	5.1	8.6	10.8	4.5	7.0	5.9	5.8	6.1
No sabe	0.7	1.7		1.4		1.0	0.5		1.4	

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**25. ¿ESTA UD. DE ACUERDO CON QUIENES DICEN QUE LA SOCIEDAD ARGENTINA ES UNA SOCIEDAD CORRUPTA?**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Muy de acuerdo	43.7	37.9	46.1	50.8	37.3	46.0	41.8	52.5	37.5	48.8
De acuerdo	39.8	45.8	41.1	29.7	41.4	41.3	38.6	38.5	46.2	30.8
En desacuerdo	14.3	16.3	10.4	15.2	19.1	9.9	17.8	9.0	13.5	18.1
Muy en desacuerdo	1.9		2.4	2.9	2.2	2.8	1.2		2.8	1.3
No contesta	0.3			1.4			0.5			0.9

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**26. ¿ESTA DE ACUERDO CON QUIENES DICEN QUE LOS ARGENTINOS EN GENERAL SON INDIVIDUALISTAS Y QUE LES CUESTA COOPERAR EN CAUSAS DE INTERES GENERAL?**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Muy de acuerdo	33.7	28.9	35.7	33.1	37.5	34.7	32.9	40.3	26.5	41.4
De acuerdo	37.7	42.2	32.6	41.5	37.3	35.8	39.3	39.3	43.1	28.9
En desacuerdo	21.4	25.3	25.6	14.3	15.0	20.7	21.9	15.7	22.8	21.9
Muy en desacuerdo	5.1	3.7	3.6	7.0	8.0	6.8	3.7	4.7	5.5	4.7
No sabe	1.4		1.2	2.7	2.2	1.0	1.7		2.1	0.9
No contesta	0.7		1.2	1.4		1.0	0.5			2.3

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**27. ¿ESTA DE ACUERDO CON QUIENES DICEN QUE LOS ARGENTINOS SOMOS AUTORITARIOS Y CONFRONTATIVOS POR NATURALEZA?**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Muy de acuerdo	17.1	17.6	19.1	16.3	12.4	21.5	13.6	29.5	12.2	18.5
De acuerdo	38.5	44.5	34.6	38.8	37.3	35.1	41.1	31.5	42.1	36.3
En desacuerdo	32.8	32.6	32.3	30.2	38.0	28.5	36.3	27.9	33.8	33.6
Muy en desacuerdo	5.3		7.5	5.7	8.2	6.2	4.6	5.9	6.4	3.4
No sabe	5.3	5.3	6.3	4.5	4.1	7.2	3.9	3.1	4.8	7.2
No contesta	1.0			4.5		1.6	0.5	2.2	0.7	0.9

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**28. ¿ESTA DE ACUERDO CON QUIENES DICEN QUE LOS ARGENTINOS EN GENERAL, MAS ALLA DE LO QUE OCURRA EN EL TERRENO DE LA POLITICA, EN LA VIDA DE TODOS LOS DIAS, NOS LLEVAMOS EN GENERAL BIEN ENTRE NOSOTROS?**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Muy de acuerdo	8.6	12.6	5.0	7.3	12.4	10.4	7.1	12.3	7.8	8.0
De acuerdo	62.6	63.5	64.7	61.0	58.4	59.1	65.4	59.0	65.1	60.5
En desacuerdo	18.7	16.3	20.3	22.9	12.6	19.1	18.3	17.6	20.6	16.3
Muy en desacuerdo	6.1	5.9	6.2	4.3	8.5	5.5	6.5	8.1	3.1	9.6
No sabe	2.6		2.6	3.2	6.1	3.9	1.5	3.1	2.6	2.4
No contesta	1.5	1.7	1.2	1.4	2.2	2.0	1.2		0.8	3.3

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**29.1 SENSACION DE QUE LAS LEYES Y LAS INSTITUCIONES PROTEGEN Y GARANTIZAN SUS DERECHOS Y LIBERTADES BASICAS: LO PROTEGEN COMO CIUDADANO**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	4.0	5.0	3.9	2.7	4.3	3.9	4.1	5.0	5.0	2.0
Algo	44.0	36.5	51.3	40.8	43.6	44.2	43.9	43.3	48.7	37.3
Poco	34.6	38.5	27.1	39.2	39.7	32.0	36.8	38.4	27.9	43.1
Nada	12.4	12.9	11.6	14.5	10.4	11.4	13.2	13.4	10.6	14.7
No sabe	4.9	7.0	6.1	2.7	2.0	8.6	2.0		7.8	2.9

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**29.2 SENSACION DE QUE LAS LEYES Y LAS INSTITUCIONES PROTEGEN Y GARANTIZAN SUS DERECHOS Y LIBERTADES BASICAS: TIENEN EN CUENTAS SUS NECESIDADES BASICAS DE SALUD, EDUCACION Y TRABAJO**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	7.9	7.3	5.0	13.1	8.2	9.4	6.7	6.8	8.3	7.8
Algo	38.3	33.6	44.6	33.3	38.0	42.0	35.3	28.9	45.4	32.1
Poco	32.6	36.8	32.5	29.2	30.8	30.2	34.6	42.2	31.9	29.0
Nada	19.9	22.2	15.4	24.3	20.8	17.5	21.9	22.0	13.6	28.5
No sabe	0.3				2.2		0.6			1.0
No contesta	0.9		2.6			1.0	0.9		0.9	1.5

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**29.3 SENSACION DE QUE LAS LEYES Y LAS INSTITUCIONES PROTEGEN Y GARANTIZAN SUS DERECHOS Y LIBERTADES BASICAS: LE PERMITEN ACCEDER A UNA DEFENSA Y GARANTIA EFECTIVA DE SUS DERECHOS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	5.4	5.6	6.2	2.9	6.5	5.8	5.1	8.7	4.0	6.0
Algo	39.2	39.3	42.3	36.3	35.8	40.7	38.0	38.7	43.0	33.6
Poco	35.2	32.9	34.9	37.0	36.9	32.0	37.7	31.2	34.6	37.9
Nada	15.6	12.9	14.2	20.6	16.5	16.1	15.3	21.4	14.3	14.9
No sabe	3.7	7.3	1.2	3.2	4.3	4.5	3.0		3.3	6.1
No contesta	0.9	2.0	1.2			1.0	0.9		0.9	1.5

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**29.4 SENSACION DE QUE LAS LEYES Y LAS INSTITUCIONES PROTEGEN Y GARANTIZAN SUS DERECHOS Y LIBERTADES BASICAS: LE PERMITEN PETICIONAR Y RECLAMAR A LAS AUTORIDADES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	2.7	1.7	2.6	2.9	4.3	2.7	2.7	3.1	2.3	3.1
Algo	45.7	40.9	48.2	42.0	52.5	50.5	41.8	56.4	48.8	35.7
Poco	31.0	31.5	31.3	31.5	28.6	25.7	35.2	21.9	31.7	34.3
Nada	15.5	18.3	12.7	20.6	10.2	18.3	13.2	18.7	14.4	15.5
No sabe	4.2	5.6	3.9	2.9	4.3	2.7	5.4		2.7	8.5
No contesta	1.0	2.0	1.3				1.8			3.0

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**29.5 SENSACION DE QUE LAS LEYES Y LAS INSTITUCIONES PROTEGEN Y GARANTIZAN SUS DERECHOS Y LIBERTADES BASICAS: LE OFRECEN IGUALES OPORTUNIDADES DE PROGRESO QUE A LOS DEMAS**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	2.9		3.6	4.1	4.3	3.0	2.9	6.5	2.4	2.0
Algo	27.6	30.3	26.7	24.7	29.5	30.8	25.1	25.6	29.8	25.2
Poco	40.6	41.9	46.5	36.1	31.2	37.7	43.0	35.2	44.0	38.1
Nada	28.4	27.9	21.8	35.1	34.9	28.6	28.2	32.6	23.8	33.2
No contesta	0.5		1.3				0.9			1.5

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**29.6 SENSACION DE QUE LAS LEYES Y LAS INSTITUCIONES PROTEGEN Y GARANTIZAN SUS DERECHOS Y LIBERTADES BASICAS: TIENEN EN CUENTA A GENTE COMO USTED**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	4.7	7.3	5.1	2.7	2.2	3.9	5.3	9.6	1.7	6.8
Algo	34.0	37.6	33.2	30.2	35.8	35.4	33.0	35.9	40.6	23.2
Poco	35.0	32.6	40.0	32.0	31.2	33.8	36.0	24.7	35.9	38.6
Nada	21.2	18.6	16.6	30.8	22.6	22.8	19.9	26.8	16.8	25.0
No sabe	4.0	4.0	3.8	2.9	6.3	3.5	4.5		3.7	6.4
No contesta	1.1		1.3	1.4	2.0	0.7	1.4	3.1	1.2	

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**29.7 SENSACION DE QUE LAS LEYES Y LAS INSTITUCIONES PROTEGEN Y GARANTIZAN SUS DERECHOS Y LIBERTADES BASICAS: RESGUARDAN SUS LIBERTADES PERSONALES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	6.8	3.3	7.5	10.0	6.3	8.2	5.7	10.5	7.1	4.6
Algo	45.3	40.6	50.0	45.3	41.6	50.8	40.9	48.0	53.1	32.2
Poco	27.7	37.5	23.2	21.1	31.9	19.1	34.6	21.0	23.9	36.7
Nada	15.0	16.9	14.0	19.3	8.0	16.4	13.8	17.4	11.0	19.9
No sabe	4.3	1.7	5.3	2.9	8.2	4.1	4.5	3.1	3.1	6.7
No contesta	0.9			1.4	3.9	1.4	0.5		1.8	

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**29.8 SENSACION DE QUE LAS LEYES Y LAS INSTITUCIONES PROTEGEN Y GARANTIZAN SUS DERECHOS Y LIBERTADES BASICAS: RESPETAN SU PROPIEDAD**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	9.2	14.0	6.5	7.3	10.6	10.0	8.6	7.8	10.3	8.3
Algo	45.6	44.6	44.7	50.8	41.9	49.1	42.8	46.1	50.7	37.6
Poco	24.5	18.9	28.3	21.3	28.9	20.8	27.4	22.5	20.3	31.6
Nada	16.3	16.6	16.7	17.9	12.4	17.4	15.4	23.6	14.1	16.0
No sabe	3.4	4.0	3.8	1.4	4.3	2.0	4.5		3.4	4.9
No contesta	1.1	2.0		1.4	2.0	0.7	1.5		1.2	1.5

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**29.9 SENSACION DE QUE LAS LEYES Y LAS INSTITUCIONES PROTEGEN Y GARANTIZAN SUS DERECHOS Y LIBERTADES BASICAS: LO PROTEGEN DE LA VIOLENCIA Y LA INSEGURIDAD**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	2.1	1.7	3.6	1.4		4.0	0.5		4.1	
Algo	20.5	23.6	24.4	17.5	10.4	21.0	20.0	21.5	22.2	17.3
Poco	42.8	46.6	42.3	39.0	43.4	46.0	40.3	37.9	47.4	38.2
Nada	33.2	26.2	29.7	40.8	42.1	28.4	37.1	40.5	25.7	41.1
No sabe	1.4	2.0		1.4	4.1	0.7	2.1		0.6	3.4

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**29.10 SENSACION DE QUE LAS LEYES Y LAS INSTITUCIONES PROTEGEN Y GARANTIZAN SUS DERECHOS Y LIBERTADES BASICAS: GARANTIZAN SU SALARIO Y CONDICIONES DE TRABAJO**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	9.9	7.3	11.2	10.2	10.4	12.7	7.6	6.5	10.9	9.9
Algo	44.4	49.6	38.4	42.6	52.7	49.0	40.8	34.9	46.9	45.2
Poco	31.6	28.2	36.3	30.2	28.4	27.5	35.0	35.0	33.0	28.0
Nada	13.0	14.9	12.9	14.3	8.5	9.9	15.6	23.6	7.7	16.1
No sabe	1.1		1.2	2.7		1.0	1.1		1.5	0.9

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**29.11 SENSACION DE QUE LAS LEYES Y LAS INSTITUCIONES PROTEGEN Y GARANTIZAN SUS DERECHOS Y LIBERTADES BASICAS: LE PERMITEN ACCEDER A LA ATENCION Y PROTECCION DE LOS JUECES**

	Total	18 a 29 años	30 a 49 años	50 a 64 años	65 y más	Varón	Mujer	NIVEL SOCIO-ECONOMICO		
								Alto	Medio	Bajo
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mucho	0.8		1.2		2.2	1.0	0.6		0.9	1.0
Algo	27.4	23.0	29.4	25.9	31.9	27.4	27.3	31.5	27.7	24.9
Poco	37.0	43.5	38.5	29.5	33.2	39.1	35.3	27.5	42.6	32.9
Nada	20.1	16.9	16.8	30.6	18.2	19.1	21.0	29.8	15.2	22.8
No sabe	12.7	12.9	12.7	11.3	14.5	12.5	12.9	11.2	12.1	14.4
No contesta	2.0	3.7	1.3	2.7		1.0	2.9		1.4	3.9

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